LEGAL ETHICS JURISPRUDENCE

A.M. No. P-12-3090

January 7, 2013
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3662-P)
MARIANO T. ONG, Complainant,
vs.
EVA G. BASIYA-SARATAN, CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 32,Respondent.
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel 16 enjoins court
personnel to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all times.
Clerks of Court like respondent are primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient
service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken
on their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping the records and the
seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving
certified copies of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a
high degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions to help
ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay. 17
As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and
diligence in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of
court,18 failing which, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. In this
case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs of execution to
implement the judgment in Civil Case No. 18978 despite orders from the RTC.
Moreover, she failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of every
employee in the judiciary to obey the orders and processes of the Court without
delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied
admission of the charges.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J

January 15, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF AMA LAND, INC. AGAINST HON.

DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON and HON. RICARDO
R. ROSARIO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
In Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Lavia,21 we ruled that resort to and exhaustion
of judicial remedies and a final ruling on the matter, are prerequisites for the
taking of appropriate measures against the judges concerned, whether of
criminal, civil or administrative nature. If the assailed act is subsequently
found and declared to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed
against him at all.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J

January 15, 2013

RE: COMPLAINT OF LEONARDO A. VELASCO AGAINST ASSOCIATE

JUSTICES FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR., ALEX L. QUIROZ, AND
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
"Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of
law or a standard of behavior. 22 To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions of a public officer.23 In grave misconduct, as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be established.

Adm. Case No. 6148

January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L.
MACARUBBO.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude,
learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the

development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills),

as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.9 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any
other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person
of good moral character.

Adm. Case No. 5530

January 28, 2013

SPOUSES ARCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA, EDAY RAGADIO and

FRANCING GALGALAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO CEFRA, Respondent.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence."10
It further states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." 11 In
addition, a lawyer has the corresponding duty to "keep the client informed of
the status of his case."12
In Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,13 the Court held:
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee
or free. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to
practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from
the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.
In sum, the above actuations showing Atty. Cefras lack of diligence and
inattention to his duties as a lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. We have
repeatedly held that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it.
Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They
must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Adm. Case No. 6475

January 30, 2013

FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
It may be initiated by the Court motuproprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases deleted]
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a
witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.48 Flowing from
its sui generis character, it is not mandatory to have a formal hearing in
which the complainant must adduce evidence.
From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to
the disciplinary proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination
or to provide corroborative evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is
important is whether, upon due investigation, the IBP Board of Governors
finds sufficient evidence of the respondents misconduct to warrant the
exercise of its disciplinary powers.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest
require that this be so. Part of the lawyers duty to his client is to avoid
representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to decline professional
employment, no matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its
acceptance involves a violation of the proscription against conflict of interest,
or any of the rules of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a
retainer from a defendant after he has given professional advice to the
plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment from another in
a matter adversely affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to

decline employment in any of these and similar circumstances in view of the

rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.78
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if
the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other, or that there would be no occasion to use
the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the
other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."79 The sole exception is
provided in Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
if there is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326

January 30, 2013
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3692-RTJ)
GEOFFREY BECKETT, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Cebu City, Respondent.
Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling
lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established
jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the competence and
fairness of the court which he personifies. Not to know the law as basic,
almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting in disregard of
established rule of law as if he were not aware of the same constitutes gross
ignorance whence no one is excused, especially an RTC judge

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ

February 12, 2013

EDUARDO PANES, JR., JOSEPHINE J. COSEP, ROGER M. ROSAL,

LOURDES G. SOLATORIO, AMY P. AGUIRRE, JUANCHO B.
HOLGADO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent.
X---------------------------X

A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ

JOEWE PALAD, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent.
X---------------------------X
A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2652-RTJ
ROQUE C. FACURA, DANIEL I. LANDINGIN, ALFREDO B. ESPINO,
VENUS M. POZON, FRED F. FABELLON,Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City,, Respondent.
X---------------------------X
A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ
EDEN V. CASTRO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent.
X---------------------------X
A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ
ROSALINDA G. FAROFALDANE, BARBIE GAIL LUANNE MANANES,
ALVIN TROJILLO, REXES CAILAN, ARIEL RENDON, EDUARDO PANES,
JR., ROGER ROSAL, ELENITA JOQUINO, MELODY JOY COSEP, AMY P.
AGUIRRE, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent.
X---------------------------X
A.M. OCA-IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ
ENGR. ROQUE C. FACURA, JOSEPHINE J. COSEP, EDUARDO A. PANES,
JR., REV J. VARGAS, NONITO R. PALMA, MA. LOURDES G. SOLATORTO,
AMY P. AGUIRRE, JUANCHO B. HOLGADO, JOSE AMORMIO T. REYES,
REXES S. CAILAN, JERRY M. GAY ANILO, ARIEL V. U.ENDON, BARBY
GAIL LUANNE S. MANANES, RIC DAGOHONG, ASER G. SADAVA,
ROGER M. ROSAL, Complainants,
vs.

JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal

City, Respondent.
A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.23 He should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 24 He shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence
To be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts
complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence,
but must have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption.26 Gross ignorance of the law is considered as a serious offense
under Rule 140, Section 8, and is punishable as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of
the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than 20,000.00 but not exceeding 40,000.00.

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818

February 13, 2013
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-2265-MT J-P]
ATTY. MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MICHAEL M. AMDENGAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, Angono, Rizal, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ.:
It was sufficiently established that respondent judge committed undue delay
in rendering a Decision in the subject ejectment Complaint. An action for
ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10 of
which provides:

Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment.- Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
the same, the court shall render judgment.
However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it
may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be
clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the
said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall
be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory
affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the
rendition of the judgment.
This provision is mandatory.

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771

February 13, 2013
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-2160-MTJ)
VICTORIANO G. MANLAPAZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. SABILLO, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Lamitan,
Basilan, Respondent.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the
unpaid debts of its officials and employees, 15 but has nevertheless provided
for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds its officials and
employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This Section
provides that willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary
action against judges and justices and should find full application in the
present case.1wphi1
Just debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a
court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and justness of which are admitted
by the debtor.

A.M. No. P-11-2967

February 13, 2013
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2991-P)
ERLINDA C. MENDOZA, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. ESGUERRA, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch
89, Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,Respondent.

No less than the Constitution itself mandates that all public officers and
employees should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency, for
public office is a public trust.9 The Court has repeatedly reminded those who
work in the Judiciary to be examples of responsibility, competence and
efficiency; they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost
diligence, since they are officers of the Court and agents of the
law.10 "Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would
violate the norm[s] of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced."

A.C. No. 7350

February 18, 2013

PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY, Respondent.
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the
necessity of the affiants personal appearance before the notary public: 14
x xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as
notary public to authenticate documents without requiring the physical
presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this practice far
outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing
away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant does
not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or
that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should
not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of
this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document
is the partys free act and deed.

x xx [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one

invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by
law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity
of a notarized document would be undermined.

A.M. No. P-12-3032

February 20, 2013
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3652-P]
RAY ANTONIO C. SASING, Complainant,
vs.
CELESTIAL VENUS G. GELBOLINGO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,Respondents.
Gross neglect of duty refers to negligence that is characterized by glaring
want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a
conscious indifference to consequences with respect to other persons who
may be affected.22 "It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In cases involving
public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable."23 Gross inefficiency is intimately akin to gross neglect as both
involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in
damage to the employer or to the latters business.
The Court, however, agrees that Sheriff Gelbolingos failure to properly
respond to the communication of Sasing is tantamount to discourtesy. A
simple note as to where their personal effects were temporarily stored could
have assured him that their belongings were not confiscated but merely
stored for safekeeping until the same could be properly turned over to them.
The Court is fully aware that a sheriffs schedule can be hectic, but she could
have easily relayed the information to the other court staff to address
Sasings concerns. This simple gesture could have avoided this controversy.

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438 MTJ)

February 27, 2013

ANONYMOUS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Ozamiz City, MisamisOccidental,Respondent.
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints
may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for
anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings
which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable
public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If
the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his defense.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently
provides:
CANON
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
x xx
CANON
PROPRIETY

x xx

x xx
4

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance

of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding that it is not
commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with
a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well
as to that of the Judiciary.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly
failed to abide by the above-cited Canons of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.

A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC

February 27, 2013

RE: MISSING EXHIBITS AND COURT PROPERTIES IN REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 4, PANABO CITY,DAVAO DEL NORTE
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the
complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once
jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondents cessation from
office. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Hamoy,15 the Court held
that:
Respondents cessation from office x xx does not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service
nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The Courts
jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost
by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the
pendency of the case.16
In the present case, Judge Gragedas compulsory retirement divested the
OCA of its right to institute a new administrative case against him after his
compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire administrative
jurisdiction over Judge Grageda by filing a new administrative case against
him after he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy, if necessary, is to
file the appropriate civil or criminal case against Judge Grageda for the
alleged transgression.

A.C. No. 9615

March 5, 2013

GLORIA P. JINON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ, Respondent.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a

high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair

dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms embodied in the Code. 12 "Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional
or in their private capacity."13
Undeniably, "when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family
makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the
court and society."14
Moreover, money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for
the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should
be immediately returned.15 "A lawyers failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment."

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342

March 6, 2013
(Formerly: A.M. No. 11-8-152-RTC Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol)
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR COURT
vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Tagbilaran City
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318
(Formerly: OCA IPI No. 11-3755-RTJ)
PAULINO BUTAL, SR. Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO G. FUENTES III Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,
Tagbilaran City, Respondent.
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve
cases within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to

this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial
duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to
promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory
matters or incidents pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a
judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial
conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an
administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, 11 the Court held that a judge
cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without
an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case
within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine 12 on the
defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on
the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other
factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age
of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.

A.C. No. 9120

March 11, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1783)
AUGUSTO P. BALDADO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA, Respondent.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE
Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.18 He owes entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A
lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.

Adm. Case No. 9612

March 13, 2013

JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant,

vs.
MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent.
An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving
wrong information to his client regarding the matter subject of their
professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the
Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he is called upon to
serve his client with competence and diligence.
Atty. Millos acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to
enable him to attend to the transfer of title and to complete the adoption
case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that
moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and efficient
professional service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his
duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional
service he had assumed required him to do. He concealed his inefficiency
and neglect by giving false information to his clients about having already
paid the capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax,

rendering the clients liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of
penalties.

A.C. No. 9604

March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. CristalTenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to
see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to
be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on
his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the
practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of
Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the
pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is
good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by
affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ

April 1, 2013

JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk
City, Kalinga, Respondent.
Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of
the other spouse."19 It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation
resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.20
Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as
marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly referred to as
"in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.21
Affinity may also be defined as "the relation which one spouse because of
marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in
consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the
kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical
maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the
same relation by affinity to his wifes blood relatives as she has by
consanguinity and vice versa."22
Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and
the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wifes
brother, but not to the wife of his wifes brother. There is no affinity between
the husbands brother and the wifes sister; this is called affinitasaffinitatis.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217

April 8, 2013

SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN
PILI, CAMARINES SUR,Respondent.
A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the
private practice of law. His acceptance of an appointment to the Bench
inhibits him from engaging in the private practice of law, regardless of the

beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family. He is

guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge otherwise.
Section 3527 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting
judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or
giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, 28 Canon 4 (Propriety),29 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 30 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law
or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound
reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and
functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the
high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting
judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to
their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private
interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of
their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency
and desire to promote the public interest.31
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept
that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby
suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of
his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but
extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same,
the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special
proceedings.

A.C. No. 9514

April 10, 2013

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond
dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaintaffidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.
Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies
him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act,
since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil
degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it

behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing
the document.
In Cortez, we noted the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice that a person shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the
notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through a competent evidence of identity.

A.C. No. 5119

April 17, 2013

ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO

BERENGUER, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY.
PEDRO VEGA, Respondents.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then
he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of
private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government
service. This is clear from Canon 6 44 of said Code. Lawyers in government are
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they
should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations,
as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

A.C. No. 7944

June 03, 2013

REX POLINAR DAGOHOY, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN, RESPONDENT.
In DalisayCapili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, 16 we held that the failure to file a
brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. In this case, Atty. San Juans negligence in handling his clients
appeal was duly established by the records and by his own admission. We

cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client in

failing to provide him a copy of the case records.
The preparation and the filing of the appellants brief are matters of
procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of Atty.
San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures
necessary and incidental to the perfection of his clients appeal.
"It is a fundamental rule of ethics that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion." 20 It was
Atty. San Juans bounden duty to see his cases through until proper
completion; he could not abandon or neglect them in midstream,21 in the way
he did with the complainants case.

A.C. No. 4191

June 10, 2013

ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not
preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for
administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the
culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can
proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on
both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to
prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was
committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the
misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the
notary to send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First
Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month next following or the
failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper
clerk of court

A.C. No. 9537

June 10, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489)
DR. TERESITA LEE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is
guilty of representing conflicting interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in
behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that
same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether
the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez25 that the termination of the relation of
attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for
the rule is that the clients confidence once reposed cannot be divested by
the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer
should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which
he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the
client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.

A.C. No. 7749

July 8, 2013

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR., RESPONDENT.
Case law further illumines that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the

handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.28
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to
disciplinary action.29 While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of
exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyers mere
failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation

A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC

July 9, 2013

RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL TO DECIDE

CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING
MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, SAN
FERNANDO, LA UNION.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of
cases.12 Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn
duty to administer justice without undue delay.13 Thus, judges have been
constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy disposition
of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding
cases, which is three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum for lower courts. 14To further impress upon judges such
mandate, the Court has issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99
dated January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy disposition of cases
and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribed in the Constitution.

A.C. No. 6490

July 9, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the
lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the

bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as

such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only
for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting
the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where
any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine
would accomplish the end desired.33
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."

A.C. No. 6942

July 17, 2013

SONIC STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC., COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. NONNATUS P. CHUA, RESPONDENT.
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration
of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and
upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in
all their dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any
falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.
Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

OCA I.P.I. NO. 11-3589-RTJ

July 29, 2013

KONRAD A. RUBIN and CONRADO C. RUBIN, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE EVELYN CORPUS-CABOCHAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 98, Quezon City,

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may
be disqualified from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the
inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill
of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if
the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.16
Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of
the parties-litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At
the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether wellgrounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself
from the case.17 The better course for the judge under the circumstances is
to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood; his
reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important,
the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. 18 Hence, Judge
Cabochan should not be condemned for her recusal in Civil Case No. Q-0964898.

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
SERENO, CJ.:
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period
spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither

willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the
legal consequences of his acts 23 as it negates malice or evil motive, 24 a
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone
is presumed to know the law and its consequences. 25 Ignorantiafactiexcusat;
ignorantialegisneminemexcusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first
operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would
have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming
to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct
of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses
Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting
in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the
lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring

members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance

with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have
warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of
this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount
of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834

October 2, 2013
(Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 12-2541)
JESUS D. CARBAJOSA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz,Respondent.
Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant
to the ideal administration of justice. Hence the rule that once a judgment
attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the
immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by final judgment, is
a major component of the ideal administration of justice. 23 Our penal laws
and rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the judgment of
conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial. 24
Respondent Judge Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above
rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory judgment of
conviction against Bieles.
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know
how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance
of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In
other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement
the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise
implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios
actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.

A.C. No. 9532

October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause
and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their
affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair
and honest means to attain lawful objectives.

A.C. No. 9401

October 22, 2013

JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TYRONE PEDREA, Respondent.
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a female
client is guilty of reprehensible conduct that is unbecoming of a member of
the Bar and may be condignly punished with suspension from the practice of
law.
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain
membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly dutybound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to
safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a
lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, is
sufficient to warrant the lawyers suspension or disbarment. 17 Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his oath
as a lawyer.

A.C. No. 6732

October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBIWEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR,
SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of
law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of
disbarment.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court
decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to
mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby
became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they
should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of
the public in their professional fidelity and integrity. 26 The Court will not
hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who
wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys
Oath

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962

October 17, 2013

ATTY. JESSIE TULDAGUE and ATTY. ALFREDO BALAJO

JR., Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MOISES PARDO and JAIME CALPATURA Legal Researcher and
Officer-In-Charge Regional Trial Court Branch 32
CabarroguisQuirino, Respondents.
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that " Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer." Section 2, Canon 2 of the Code states that "The behavior and
conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the

judiciary." Section 1, Canon 4 of the Code states that "Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."
In Tan v. Rosete,39 we ruled that the respondent judges acts of meeting with
litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours and sending a
member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct. In
J. King & Sons Company v. Hontanosas, 40 we likewise held respondent judge
liable for misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his home and received
benefits given by the litigant.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. It
is punishable by: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and
disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.

A.C. No. 8954

November 13, 2013

HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal

Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion
to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled
to voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right
carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his
client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and
common sense

A.C. No. 10164

March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public

service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200

April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Batangas City, Respondent.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social
networks, judges must bear in mind that what they communicate
regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial
duties creates and contributes to the peoples opinion not just of the judge
but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true
when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family
and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in
the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this
picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

A.C. No. 9317

June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3615)
ADELIA V. QUIACHON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS, Respondent.

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by

complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven x xx. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges
Even if respondent was "honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of
complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the
latter's knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling
to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his
appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.

A.C. No. 9881

June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD 10-2607)
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ:
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he
still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act
was attended with bad faith or malice. The rule on mistakes committed by
lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake
or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney
is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an
attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law.

A.C. No. 5377

June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When
this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer
must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from
holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394

September 1, 2014
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3847-RT J)
GEORGE T. CHUA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Respondent.
A trial judge is not accountable for performing his judicial functions and office
because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility
Indeed, the judge's office and duty to render and administer justice, being
functions of sovereignty, should not be simply taken for granted. No
administrative charge for manifest partiality, gross misconduct, and gross
ignorance of the law should be brought against him for the orders issued in
the due course of judicial proceedings.
A.C. No. 7184

September 17, 2014

FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE, Respondent.
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondents act of
notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted
by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.
While perhaps not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the
violation involved, what the Court said in Nunga v. Viray is very much
apropos: Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do
so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing
a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate false hood, which the lawyers
oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition
of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837

September 24, 2014
[formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ]
CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, represented by ATTY. ROMUALDO
JUBAY, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
1, Mandaue City, Cebu,Respondent.
Being and serving as an attorney-in-fact is within the purview of "other
fiduciary" as used in Rule 5.06. As a noun, "fiduciary" means "a person
holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a
trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the
scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires." A fiduciary primarily
acts for another's benefit, pursuant to his undertaking as such fiduciary, in
matters connected with said undertaking

A.C. No.7054

November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is
whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct
and character.23 Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. 24 The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that
he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his
or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed
in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360

November 19, 2014
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3010-RTJ)
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON,
LEYTE, BRANCH 17, Respondent.
Sec. 3. USE OF [Halls of Justice] HOJ.
Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public
Attorneys, Probation and Parole Officers and, in the proper cases, the
Registries of Deeds, including their support personnel.
Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall
not be used for residential, i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or commercial
purposes.
Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage,
shall not be allowed in the HOJ.

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399

November 19, 2014
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]
GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and
ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENT AL MINDORO, Respondent.
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.40 There is gross ignorance of the law when the
error committed by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious."41It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or
fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.42 Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence
cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.43

The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the
legal profession to know the very law that they are supposed to apply in a
given controversy.44 They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the
basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence. 45 When a
judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court
the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be
the mainspring of injustice.
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants
are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The
other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become
meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must
do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.

A.C. No. 10576

January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the
rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. 19 A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
A.C. No. 7325

January 21, 2015

DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who,
through an incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was
apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof,
to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without
cause. The defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this

responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right
to submit evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracols liability
under the present circumstances, we would like to highlight the important
role of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular nature of
an attorneys function it is essential that they should act with fairness,
honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients.

A.C. No. 8776

MARCH 23, 2015

SOSA VS ATTY. MENDOZA

This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or in his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential
qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law.16 Any
wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness
for the profession justifies disciplinary action.