MIGUEL MAPALO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

MAXIMO MAPALO,
ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-21489 and L-21628 May 19, 1966
FACTS: The spouses Miguel Mapalo and Candida Quiba, simple
illiterate farmers, were registered owners of a 1,635-square-meter
residential land in Manaoag, Pangasinan. Said spouses-owners, out
of love and affection for Maximo Mapalo a brother of Miguel who
was about to get married decided to donate the eastern half of
the land to him. As a result, however, they were deceived into
signing, on October 15, 1936, a deed of absolute sale over
the entire land in his favor. Their signatures thereto were procured
by fraud, that is, they were made to believe by Maximo Mapalo and
by the attorney who acted as notary public who "translated" the
document, that the same was a deed of donation in Maximo's favor
covering one-half (the eastern half) of their land. Although the
document of sale stated a consideration of Five Hundred (P500.00)
Pesos, the aforesaid spouses did not receive anything of value for
the land.
Following the execution of the afore-stated document, the spouses
Miguel Mapalo and Candida Quiba immediately built a fence of
permanent structure in the middle of their land segregating the
eastern portion from its western portion. Said fence still exists. The
spouses have always been in continued possession over the western
half of the land up to the present.
Not known to them, meanwhile, Maximo Mapalo, on March 15, 1938,
registered the deed of sale in his favor and obtained in his name
Transfer Certificate of Title over the entire land. Thirteen years later,
he sold for P2,500.00 said entire land in favor of the Narcisos.
The Narcisos took possession only of the eastern portion of the land
in 1951, after the sale in their favor was made. On February 7, 1952
they filed suit to be declared owners of the entire land, for
possession of its western portion; for damages; and for rentals. It
was brought against the Mapalo spouses as well as against Floro
Guieb and Rosalia Mapalo Guieb who had a house on the western
part of the land with the consent of the spouses Mapalo and Quiba.
The Mapalo spouses filed their answer with a counterclaim on March
17, 1965, seeking cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of
the Narcisos as to the western half of the land, on the grounds that
their (Mapalo spouses) signatures to the deed of sale of 1936 was
procured by fraud and that the Narcisos were buyers in bad faith.
They asked for reconveyance to them of the western portion of the
land and issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in their names as
to said portion.
In addition, the Mapalo spouses filed on December 16, 1957 their
own complaint against the aforestated Narcisos and Maximo
Mapalo. They asked that the deeds of sale of 1936 and of 1951 over
the land in question be declared null and void as to the western half
of said land.
Now, as to the western portion, however, the fact not disputed
herein is that no donation by the Mapalo spouses obtained as to
said portion. Accordingly, we start with the fact that liberality as a
cause or consideration does not exist as regards the western portion
of the land in relation to the deed of 1936; that there was no
donation with respect to the same.
ISSUE: Whether a deed which states a consideration that in fact did
not exist, is a contract without consideration, and therefore void ab
initio, or a contract with a false consideration, and therefore, at least
under the Old Civil Code, voidable.
RULING: A contract without a consideration is null and void.

Accordingly, since the deed of sale of 1936 is governed by the Old

Civil Code, it should be asked whether its case is one wherein
there is no consideration, or one with a statement of a false
consideration. If the former, it is void and inexistent; if the latter,
only voidable, under the Old Civil Code. As observed earlier, the
deed of sale of 1936 stated that it had for its consideration Five
Hundred (P500.00) Pesos. In fact, however, said consideration was
totally absent.
According to Manresa, what is meant by a contract that states a
false consideration is one that has in fact a real consideration but
the same is not the one stated in the document. Thus he says:
In the first place, we want to remember the difference between
simulation and the contract with fraudulent purpose. [The latter] is
real although unlawful; but the [former] is false in reality, although
it is presented as true. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, Tomo VIII, Vol. II, p.
354.)
From the foregoing it can be seen that where, as in this case, there
was in fact no consideration, the statement of one in the deed will
not suffice to bring it under the rule of Article 1276 of the Old Civil
Code as stating a false consideration.
In our view, therefore, the ruling of this Court in Ocejo, Perez & Co.
vs. Flores, 40 Phil. 921, is squarely applicable herein. In that case
we ruled that a contract of purchase and sale is null and void and
produces no effect whatsoever where the same is without cause or
consideration in that the purchase price which appears thereon as
paid has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.
Needless to add, the inexistence of a contract is permanent and
incurable and cannot be the subject of prescription. In the words of
Castan: to non-existence it is perpetual and irremediable not be
subject to confirmation or prescription (Op. cit., p. 644.) In Eugenio
v. Perdido, 97 Phil. 41, 42-43, involving a sale dated 1932, this
Court, speaking through Justice Cesar Bengzon, now Chief Justice,
stated:
Under the existing classification, such contract would be "inexisting"
and "the action or defense for declaration" of such inexistence
"does not prescribe". (Art. 1410, New Civil Code). While it is true
that this is a new provision of the New Civil Code, it is nevertheless
a principle recognized since Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67 that "mere
lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and
void".
SERAFIN MODINA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
ERNESTO HONTARCIEGO, PAUL FIGUEROA, TEODORO
HIPALLA AND RAMON CHIANG, MERLINDA CHIANG,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 109355. October 29, 1999]
FACTS: The parcels of land in question are those under the name of
Ramon Chiang covered by TCT Nos. T-86912, T-86913, and T86914. He theorized that subject properties were sold to him by his
wife, Merlinda Plana Chiang as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 17, 1975,[1] and were subsequently sold by
CHIANG to Serafin Modina (MODINA), as shown by the Deeds of
Sale, dated August 3, 1979 and August 24, 1979, respectively.
MODINA brought a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Damages against the private respondents, Ernesto Hontarciego,
Paul Figueroa and Teodoro Hipalla.
Upon learning the institution of the said case, MERLINDA presented
a Complaint-in-intervention, seeking the declaration of nullity of the
Deed of Sale between her husband and MODINA on the ground that
the titles of the parcels of land in dispute were never legally
transferred to her husband. Fraudulent acts were allegedly

employed by him to obtain a Torrens Title in his favor. However, she

confirmed the validity of the lease contracts with the other private
respondents.
MERLINDA also admitted that the said parcels of land were those
ordered sold by Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo
in Special Proceeding No. 2469 in Intestate Estate of Nelson Plana
where she was appointed as the administratix, being the widow of
the deceased, her first husband. An Authority to Sell was issued by
the said Probate Court for the sale of the same properties.[2]
ISSUE: Whether the sale of subject lots should be nullified.
RULING: YES.
Under Article 1409[11] of the New Civil Code, enumerating void
contracts, a contract without consideration is one such void
contract. One of the characteristics of a void or inexistent contract is
that it produces no effect. So also, inexistent contracts can be
invoked by any person whenever juridical effects founded thereon
are asserted against him. A transferor can recover the object of
such contract by accion reivindicatoria and any possessor may
refuse to deliver it to the transferee, who cannot enforce the
transfer.[12]
Thus, MODINAs insistence that MERLINDA cannot attack subject
contract of sale as she was a guilty party thereto is equally
unavailing.
But the pivot of inquiry here is whether MERLINDA is barred by the
principle of in pari delicto from questioning subject Deed of Sale.
It bears emphasizing that as the contracts under controversy are
inexistent contracts within legal contemplation, Articles 1411 and
1412 of the New Civil Code are inapplicable. In pari delicto doctrine
applies only to contracts with illegal consideration or subject matter,
whether the attendant facts constitute an offense or misdemeanor
or whether the consideration involved is merely rendered illegal.[13]
Records show that in the complaint-in-intervention of MERLINDA,
she did not aver the same as a ground to nullify subject Deed of
Sale. In fact, she denied the existence of the Deed of Sale in favor of
her husband. In the said Complaint, her allegations referred to the
want of consideration of such Deed of Sale. She did not put up the
defense under Article 1490, to nullify her sale to her husband
CHIANG because such a defense would be inconsistent with her
claim that the same sale was inexistent.
Since one of the characteristics of a void or inexistent contract is
that it does not produce any effect, MERLINDA can recover the
property from MODINA who never acquired title thereover.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
ASUNCION MENESES VDA. DE CATINDIG, petitionerappellant,
vs.
The Heirs of CATALINA ROQUE, namely, ESCOLASTICO
CERVANTES, LEONCIA CERVANTES and EMERENCIANA
CERVANTES, represented by her guardian ad litem, DAMASO
SANTOS; CARLOS KATIPUNAN; Heirs of JORGE KATIPUNAN;
Heirs of ROBERTO ROQUE, namely, MAGDALENA, GORGONIA
and ELISA, all surnamed ROQUE; INES ROQUE; Heirs of
BARBARA ROQUE VILLANUEVA, namely, MERCEDES
VILLANUEVA FAJARDO, VENANCIA VILLANUEVA, LIGAYA
VILLANUEVA, PEDRO VILLANUEVA, PABLO VILLANUEVA,
LEONILA VILLANUEVA, MARCIAL VILLANUEVA; Heirs of
APOLONIO ROQUE, namely, DOLORES, AURELIA,
CONSTANCIO, GUILLERMO, JOSEFINA, all surnamed ROQUE,

DEMETRIA RAMIREZ; ENCARNACION CAMINGAL, as

guardian ad litem of RENATO and ERNESTO, both surnamed
ROQUE; Heirs of IRENE BOLORAN, namely, HERMOGENA,
CIRIACO, VICENTE and DOMINADOR, all surnamed
TOLENTINO; Heirs of LEONILA DE GUZMAN, namely,
PETRONILA, MARCELINA and PEAFRANCIA, (all surnamed
SANTIAGO, CIPRIANA) and PASTORA, both surnamed
SANTIAGO, both minors, represented by PETRONILA
SANTIAGO, as guardian ad litem; GERMAN RAMIREZ; Heirs of
CONCORDIA ROQUE, namely, BELEN and GUILLERMO, both
surnamed PAGSANJAN, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-25777 November 26, 1976
FACTS: The said fishpond, known as Lot No. 4626 of the Malolos
Cadastre, has an area of more than thirteen hectares. As shown in
Original Certificate of Title No. 7937, it is registered in the names of
the several persons who were co-owners of the lot.
The co-owners of the fishpond leased it to Mrs. Catindig for a term
of ten years counted from October 1, 1941 for a total rental of six
thousand pesos (Exh. C-1; Amendment to Decision, per Resolution
of February 22, 1966).
After the termination of the lease on September 30, 1951, Mrs.
Catindig remained in possession of the fishpond because she was
negotiating with the co-owners for the purchase thereof. She
wanted to buy it for P52,000.
On October 18, 1960 German Ramirez, one of the co-owners,
executed a deed wherein he sold his 2/16 share to Mrs. Catindig for
P6,500 (Exh. E). The sale was annotated on the title on October 19,
1960. Two weeks later, Pedro Villanueva, one of the co-owners,
learned of the sale executed by German Ramirez. That sale
retroacted to April 13, 1950.
On November 18, 1960 the respondents filed this action against
Mrs. Catindig to compel her to allow them to redeem the portion
sold by German Ramirez. In April, 1962 the respondents amended
their complaint by including, inter alia, a prayer for the recovery of
the possession of the fishpond.
ISSUE: Whether the sale of the fishpond to her is void for
nonpayment of the price.
RULING: The alleged sales were absolutely simulated, fictitious or
inexistent contracts (Arts. 1346 and 1409[2], Civil Code). "The
action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe" (Art. 1410, Ibid; Eugenio vs. Perdido, 97 Phil.
41). Mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to a void contract
(Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67).
The Appellate Court's finding that the price was not paid or that the
statement in the supposed contracts of sale (Exh. 6 to 26) as to the
payment of the price was simulated fortifies the view that the
alleged sales were void. "If the price is simulated, the sale is void ..."
(Art. 1471, Civil Code).
A contract of sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever where
the price, which appears thereon as paid, has in fact never been
paid by the purchaser to the vendor (Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. Flores
and Bas, 40 Phil. 921; Mapalo vs. Mapalo, L-21489, May 19, 1966,
64 O. G. 331, 17 SCRA 114, 122). Such a sale is non-existent
(Borromeo vs. Borromeo, 98 Phil. 432) or cannot be considered
consummated (Cruzado vs. Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil. 17;
Garanciang vs. Garanciang, L-22351, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 229).
The foregoing discussion disposes of whatever legal issues were
raised by appellant Catindig which are interwoven with her factual
contentions, including the issue as to whether she is entitled to

demand the execution of a notarized deed of sale for the 14/16 pro
indiviso portion of the fishpond. She is not entitled because, as
already held, the alleged sales in her favor are void.

Anent the first main issue as to whether the Kasulatan over the 512square meter lot is voidable for vitiated consent, the answer is in
the affirmative.

SPS. RAMON LEQUIN and VIRGINIA LEQUIN, Sps. Lequin, vs.

SPS. RAYMUNDO VIZCONDE and SALOME LEQUIN VIZCONDE,
The Vizcondes.
G.R. No. 177710 October 12, 2009

A contract, as defined in the Civil Code, is a meeting of minds, with

respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
[12]
For a contract to be valid, it must have three essential elements:
(1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which
is established.

FACTS: As established during the trial, Sps. Lequin bought the entire
subject property consisting of 10,115 square meters from Carlito de
Leon. The title of the subject property was duly transferred to Sps.
Lequins names. The Vizcondes, on the other hand, bought the dried
up canal consisting of 1,012 square meters from de Leon. This dried
up canal is adjacent to the subject property of Sps. Lequin and is the
lot or area between the subject property and the public road
(Sto. Rosario to Magsaysay).
Before this factual clarification was had, the Vizcondes, however,
made a claim against Sps. Lequin in 1997, when subject lot was resurveyed by Sps. Lequin, that the Vizcondes also bought a 1,012
square-meter lot from de Leon. Undeniably, the 1,012 square
meters was a portion of the 10,115 square meters which de Leon
sold to Sps. Lequin.
Obviously, Sps. Lequin respected the Vizcondes claim if not, to
maintain peace and harmonious relations and segregated the
claimed portion. The situation was further complicated by the fact
that both parties built their respective houses on the 1,012 squaremeter portion claimed by the Vizcondes, it being situated near the
public road.
To resolve the impasse on the Vizcondes claim over 1,012 square
meters of Sps. Lequin property and the latters house built thereon,
and to iron out their supposed respective rights, Sps. Lequin
consulted a notary public, who advised and proposed the solution of
a contract of sale which both parties consented to and is now the
object of the instant action. Thus, the contract of sale was executed
on February 12, 2000 with Sps. Lequin, being the title holders of the
subject property who were ostensibly selling to the Vizcondes 512
square meters of the subject property while at the same time
paying PhP 50,000 to the Vizcondes for the other 500 square-meter
portion.
In July 2000, Sps. Lequin tried to develop the dried up canal located
between their 500-square meter lot and the public road. The
Vizcondes objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal.
This prompted Sps. Lequin to look into the ownership of the dried up
canal and the 1,012 square-meter lot claimed by the
Vizcondes. Carlito de Leon told Sps. Lequin that what he had sold to
the Vizcondes was the dried up canal and that the 1,012-square
meter lot claimed by the Vizcondes really belongs to Sps. Lequin.
Thus, Sps. Lequin filed a Complaint [4] for Declaration of Nullity of
Contract, Sum of Money and Damages against the Vizcondes for the
declaration of the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan as null and void ab
initio, the return of PhP 50,000 they paid to the Vizcondes, and
various damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Kasulatan covering the 512 square-meter
lot is a valid contract of sale; and who is the legal owner of the other
500 square-meter lot.
RULING: We find for Sps. Lequin.

Article (Art.) 1330 of the Civil Code provides that when consent is
given through fraud, the contract is voidable.
There was vitiated consent on the part of Sps. Lequin. There was
fraud in the execution of the contract used on Sps. Lequin which
affected their consent. Sps. Lequin reliance and belief on the
wrongful claim by the Vizcondes operated as a concealment of a
material fact in their agreeing to and in readily executing the
contract of sale, as advised and proposed by a notary
public. Believing that Carlito de Leon indeed sold a 1,012-square
meter portion of the subject property to the Vizcondes, Sps. Lequin
signed the contract of sale based on the Vizcondes
representations. Had Sps. Lequin known, as they eventually would
sometime in late 2000 or early 2001 when they made the necessary
inquiry from Carlito de Leon, they would not have entered or signed
the contract of sale, much less pay PhP 50,000 for a portion of the
subject lot which they fully own. Thus, Sps. Lequin consent was
vitiated by fraud or fraudulent machinations of Raymundo. In the
eyes of the law, Sps. Lequin are the rightful and legal owners of the
subject 512 square-meter lot anchored on their purchase thereof
from de Leon. This right must be upheld and protected.
On the issue of lack of consideration, the contract of sale
or Kasulatan states that the Vizcondes paid Sps. Lequin PhP 15,000
for the 512-square meter portion.
On its face, the contract of sale appears to be supported by a
valuable consideration. We, however, agree with the trial courts
finding that this is a simulated sale and unsupported by any
consideration, for the Vizcondes never paid the PhP 15,000
purported purchase price.
Moreover, the evidence of Sps. Lequin was uncontroverted as the
Vizcondes failed to adduce any proof that they indeed paid PhP
15,000 to Sps. Lequin. Indeed, having asserted their purchase of the
512-square meter portion of Sps. Lequin based on the Kasulatan, it
behooves upon the Vizcondes to prove such affirmative defense of
purchase. Unless the party asserting the affirmative defense of an
issue sustains the burden of proof, his or her cause will not
succeed. If he or she fails to establish the facts of which the matter
asserted is predicated, the complainant is entitled to a verdict or
decision in his or her favor.[16]
In the instant case, the record is bereft of any proof of payment by
the Vizcondes and, thus, their affirmative defense of the purported
purchase of the 512-square meter portion fails.
Consideration and consent are essential elements in a contract of
sale. Where a partys consent to a contract of sale is vitiated or
where there is lack of consideration due to a simulated price, the
contract is null and void ab initio.
The PhP 50,000 paid by Sps. Lequin to the Vizcondes as
consideration for the transfer of the 500-square meter lot to Sps.
Lequin must be restored to the latter. Otherwise, an unjust
enrichment situation ensues. The facts clearly show that the 500square meter lot is legally owned by Sps. Lequin as shown by the

testimony of de Leon; therefore, they have no legal obligation to pay

PhP 50,000 therefor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.