Metrobank v.

Pascual
FACTS:
Florencia Nevalga and Nicholson Pascual were
married in 1985. During the union, they acquired
a lot with a three door apartment standing
thereon. Their marriage were annulled in 1994
and they went on their separate ways without
liquidating their properties.
In 1997, Florencia mortgaged the aforesaid
property as a security for the loan she obtained
with spouses Oliveros. Petitioner foreclosed the
mortgage, had the property auctioned and
acquired it as the successful bidder. Nicholson
filed an action to annul the mortgage alleging
that the subject property is still a conjugal
property and it was executed without his
consent
RTC ruled that mortgage is invalid. The said lot is
a conjugal property, the same having been
acquired during the existence of the marriage of
Nicholson and Florencia. (Art 116 NCC)
Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive
conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal,
the RTC concluded that the disputed property
may not be validly encumbered by Florencia
without Nicholsons consent.CA affirmed the
decision

applies even when the manner in which the

property was acquired does not appear. (Note:
The
petitioner
failed
to
overcome
the
presumption in this case)
B.) While the declared nullity of marriage severe
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties
acquired before such declaration continues to
subsist as conjugal properties until and after the
liquidation and partition of the partnership. In
this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship
between the former spouses. Thus, applying the
provision to the present case, the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. Accordingly,
the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the
remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null
and void, Nicholson not having consented to the
mortgage of his undivided half.
(In the trial, it was found that the alleged waiver
presented by Florencia bore Nicholson's forged
signature.)
Dino v. Dino
G.R. No. 178044; January 19, 2011

ISSUES:

FACTS:

A. WON the subject property is a conjugal by

applying Article 116 of the Family Code.

Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood

friends and sweethearts who started living
together in 1984, separated in 1994, and lived
together again in 1996. On January 14, 1998,
they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar
of Las Pinas City. On May 30, 2001, petitioner
filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of the respondents psychological
incapacity. Petitioner alleged that respondent
failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, abandoned her responsibility to
the family and that she was unfaithful. Petitioner
later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce and was granted by the Superior Court
of California and that she married a certain
Manuel Alcantara. Doctor Tayag submitted a
report establishing that the respondent was
suffering from Narcissitic Personality Disorder.

B. WON the declaration of nullity of marriage

between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and
Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the
regime of community of property of the spouses.
RULING:
A.) The property relations of the former spouses
are governed by the Civil Code Art 106 (Being
contrated prior to effectivity of the Family Code)
which provides that all property of the marriage
is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it
be proven that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. This article does not
require proof that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership. The presumption

ISSUE:
Did the trial court err when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages does not apply to Article
147 of the Family Code. It is clear from Article 50
of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Articles 40 and 45 and not
under Article 36 which is the ground for the
nullification of the petitioner and respondents
marriage. Thus, the decision of the trial court is
affirmed but with modifications.
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR.,Petitioner,v.
SPOUSES
PAULINO
and
EVANGELINE
ABUDA,Respondents.
FACTS:
In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where
they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married to
Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the
parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr.
(Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban
even if she had a subsisting marriage with
Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also
married before but the same was dissolved by
virtue of the death of his previous wife. Esteban
had a daughter named Evangeline.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion
of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining
portion was purchased by Evangeline on her
fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban
and Evangeline also had small business
establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo
(Delpan Property). When Esteban was diagnosed
with colon cancer, he decided to sell the
properties to Evangeline.
Esteban passed away on September 1997, while
Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners

mother discovered the sale sometime in 2000,

they filed a petition for annulment of the sale,
claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or
interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand,
argued that because of Socorros prior marriage
to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban
was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her
heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties
purchased
by
Esteban
and
respondents.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that
Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal
properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed
the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to
any right or interest over the subject properties
HELD: No. CA decision sustained
Civil Law -in unions between a man and a
woman who are incapacitated to marry each
other, the ownership over the properties
acquired during the subsistence of that
relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family
Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and

Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2)
there is evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title
covering the Vitas property shows that the
parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and
Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or
several months after the parties were married;
and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is
owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil
status, and does not show that Socorro coowned the property.The evidence on record also
shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the
Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro,
even if the certificate of title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Registration under
the Torrens title system merely confirms, and
does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual
contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since
Evangeline
shouldered
some
of
the
amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the
acquisition of the Delpan property.
Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third
person who does not intend to be reimbursed by
the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which
requires the debtor s consent. But the payment
is in any case valid as to the creditor who has
accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of
her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and
registered under the name of Esteban.

G.R. No. 202370 : September 23, 2013

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR.,Petitioner,v. EDEN

VILLENA AGUILA,Respondent.
FACTS:
In 1985, Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. and
respondent Eden Villena Aguila were married. In
1986, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since
then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or
their daughter.
In 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity
of
Marriage
citing
psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition states that they "have no conjugal
properties whatsoever.".
In May 2007, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and
Aguila. The RTC Decision further provides for the
"dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, if any."
In September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation
and Motionstating that she discovered properties
covering TCTs under the name of "Juan S. Salas,
married to Rubina C. Salas, found to be the
common-law wife of Salas. Thereafter, Salas filed
a
Manifestation
with
Entry
of
Appearancerequesting for an Entry of Judgment
of the RTC Decision since no motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed and no
conjugal property was involved.
Salas
filed
an
Opposition
to
the
Manifestationalleging that there is no conjugal
property to be partitioned based on Aguilas
petition. According to Salas, Aguilas statement
was a judicial admission and was not made
through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that
Aguila waived her right to the Discovered
Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties
he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, namely,
parcels of land in Batangas, cash amounting
toP200,000.00 and motor vehicles. Thus, Salas
contended that the conjugal properties were
deemed partitioned.
The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila confirming the
partition of the properties.
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules, even
upon entry of judgment granting the annulment

of marriage, the court can proceed with the

liquidation, partition and distribution of the
conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been
judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The
RTC found that the Discovered Properties are
among the conjugal properties to be partitioned
and distributed between Salas and Aguila.
However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove
the existence of the Waived Properties.
Rubina
filed
a
Complaint-in-Intervention,
claiming that : (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow
and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered
Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3)
Salas did not contribute money to purchase the
Discovered Properties as he had no permanent
job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in
the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to
purchase the Discovered Properties but because
he
was
not
well-versed
with
legal
documentation, he registered the properties in
the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C.
Salas."
The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were
at fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they
were not married as they claimed.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Salas. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial courts decision ordering the
partition of the parcels of land.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial courts decision in not allowing
Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this case.
HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is
sustained.
CIVIL LAW property regime
Since the original manifestation was an action
for partition, this Court cannot order a division of
the property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of a co-

ownership.Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R.

165427, 21 March 2011

No.

Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition

stating that they had no conjugal property, they
actually acquired the Waived Properties during
their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the
CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the
existence and acquisition of the Waived
Properties during their marriage.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, has the presumption of regularity.
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the
Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas
during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA
agreed that the Discovered Properties registered
in Salas name were acquired during his marriage
with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered
Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29
September 2003, or during the validity of Salas
and Aguilas marriage.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title
or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties,
she has no right to intervene in this case. The
Rules of Court provide that only "a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action."
Rules of Court, Rule 19, Sec. 1.
In Di v. Di, G.R. No. 178044, 19 January 2011we
held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, as in this case.
Under this property regime, property acquired
during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couples joint
efforts and governed by the rules on coownership.Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
City, 328 Phil. 1289 (1996)

In the present case, Salas did not rebut this

presumption. In a similar case where the ground
for nullity of marriage was also psychological
incapacity, we held that the properties acquired
during the union of the parties, as found by both
the RTC and the CA, would be governed by coownership.Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,
494 Phil. 264 (2005).