SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117857. February 2, 2001.]

LUIS S. WONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Atty. Agapito P. Pagayanan and Taada Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of
calendars. He had a history of unremitted collections, which he duly acknowledged
in a conrmation receipt he co-signed with his wife for LPI. Hence, petitioner's
costumers were required to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their
purchase orders. Wong issued 6 postdated checks all dated December 30, 1985 and
drawn payable to the order of LPI. The checks were initially intended to guarantee
the calendar orders of customers who failed to issue postdated checks. However,
following company policy, LPI refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead,
the parties agreed to apply the checks to the payment of petitioner's unremitted
collections for 1984. Before maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not
to deposit the checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. He failed to
honor his words and upon deposit of LPI, the checks were returned for the reason of
"account closed." After being notied, petitioner still failed to make arrangement for
payments. He was charged with three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 under three
separate informations, all cases were raed to the same trial court. Upon
arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court issued its decision
nding the accused guilty on all charges and was sentenced to serve an
imprisonment of four months on each of the charge. He was also ordered to pay the
amount due plus interest and trial costs. Petitioner appealed his case to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. Hence, this appeal.
CTacSE

According to the Supreme Court the issue on whether the check was issued as
guarantee or as payment for the petitioner's unremitted collections was a factual
issue, which had been settled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Although
Manuel Limtong, owner of the LPI, was the sole witness for the prosecution, his
testimony was found sucient to prove all the elements of the oense charged.
Despite petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, the Court found no error in the
Court of Appeal's armance of his conviction for violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law. However, pursuant to policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000,
the penalty imposed on petitioner should be modied to a ne not less than but not
more than double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.
SYLLABUS

1.
CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22; WHEN COMMITTED. There are
two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check
to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the check is not
suciently funded; and (2) by having sucient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sucient funds therein or credit with
said bank to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank
within a period of ninety (90) days.
2.
ID.; ID.; MERE ACT OF ISSUING A WORTHLESS CHECK IS MALUM
PROHIBITUM; RATIONALE. In cases elevated from the Court of Appeals, our
review is conned to alleged errors of law. Its ndings of fact are generally
conclusive. Absent any showing that the ndings by the respondent court are
entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand. The lack of
accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly held, this
Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, we held that "
[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions
for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade
and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is
malum prohibitum ." Nothing herein persuades us to hold otherwise.
3.
ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS THEREOF, CONSTRUED. The elements of B.P. Blg. 22
under the rst situation, pertinent to the present case, are: "(1) The making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sucient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insuciency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." An
essential element of the oense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer
of the check of the insuciency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the
check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind dicult to establish,
the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insucient funds in or
credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check." To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides
that such presumption shall not arise if within ve (5) banking days from receipt of
the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of
the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Rather, the clear
import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insuciency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90
days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the
maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice
thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of
the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to
arise. It is not an element of the oense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from

his duty to maintain sucient funds in the account within a reasonable time
thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By
current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or
180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of
the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of
knowledge of insuciency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that
he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit
the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notied of
such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within ve (5) banking
days thereof. There is, on record, sucient evidence that petitioner had knowledge
of the insuciency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of
issuance of the checks.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J :
p

For review on certiorari is the decision dated October 28, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CR 11856 1 which armed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 17, convicting petitioner on three (3) counts of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) violations and sentencing him to
imprisonment of four (4) months for each count, and to pay private respondent the
amounts of P5,500.00, P6,410.00 and P3,375.00, respectively, corresponding to the
value of the checks involved, with the legal rate of interest from the time of ling of
the criminal charges, as well as to pay the costs.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of
calendars. LPI would print sample calendars, then give them to agents to present to
customers. The agents would get the purchase orders of customers and forward
them to LPI. After printing the calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to the
customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around to collect the payments.
Petitioner, however, had a history of unremitted collections, which he duly
acknowledged in a conrmation receipt he co-signed with his wife. 2 Hence,
petitioner's customers were required to issue postdated checks before LPI would
accept their purchase orders.
In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling P18,025.00,
all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI, as follows:
(1)

Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Check No. 660143464-C for

P6,410.00 (Exh. "B");

(2)

ABC Check No. 660143460-C for P 540.00 (Exh. "C");

(3)

ABC Check No. PA660143451-C for P5,500.00 (Exh. "D");

(4)

ABC Check No. PA660143465-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "E");

(5)

ABC Check No. PA660143463-C for P3,375.00 (Exh. "F");

(6)

ABC Check No. PA660143452-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "G").

These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers
who failed to issue post-dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI
refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the
checks to the payment of petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984 amounting to
P18,077.07. 3 LPI waived the P52.07 difference.
Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the
checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged
on his promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the checks with Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for the reason
"account closed." The dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the RCBC return slip.

On June 20, 1986, complainant through counsel notied the petitioner of the
dishonor. Petitioner failed to make arrangements for payment within ve (5)
banking days.
On November 6, 1987, petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 4 under three separate Informations for the three checks amounting to
P5,500.00, P3,375.00, and P6,410.00. 5
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055 reads as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1985 and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of
issue of the check she/he does not have sucient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then
and there issue, make or draw Allied Banking Corporation Check No.
660143451 dated 12-30-85 in the amount of P5,500.00 payable to Manuel T.
Limtong which check was issued in payment of an obligation of said
accused, but when the said check was presented with said bank, the same
was dishonored for reason 'ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite notice and
demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused failed and
refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of said Manuel T. Limtong in the amount of P5,500.00
Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.

Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for ABC Check No.
660143463 in the amount of P3,375.00, and in Criminal Case No. 12058 for ABC
Check No. 660143464 for P6,410.00. Both cases were raed to the same trial
court.
Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Manuel T. Limtong, general manager of LPI, testied on behalf of the company.
Limtong averred that he refused to accept the personal checks of petitioner since it
was against company policy to accept personal checks from agents. Hence, he and
petitioner simply agreed to use the checks to pay petitioner's unremitted collections
to LPI. According to Limtong, a few days before maturity of the checks, Wong
requested him to defer the deposit of said checks for lack of funds. Wong promised
to replace them within thirty days, but failed to do so. Hence, upon advice of
counsel, he deposited the checks which were subsequently returned on the ground
of "account closed."
The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6) checks to guarantee
the 1985 calendar bookings of his customers. According to petitioner, he issued the
checks not as payment for any obligation, but to guarantee the orders of his
customers. In fact, the face value of the six (6) postdated checks tallied with the
total amount of the calendar orders of the six (6) customers of the accused, namely,
Golden Friendship Supermarket, Inc. (P6,410.00), New Society Rice and Corn Mill
(P5,500.00), Cuesta Enterprises (P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00), New Asia
Restaurant (P3,375.00), and New China Restaurant (P1,100.00). Although these
customers had already paid their respective orders, petitioner claimed LPI did not
return the said checks to him.
On August 30, 1990, the trial court issued its decision, disposing as follows:

CTHaSD

"Wherefore, premises considered, this Court nds the accused Luis S.

Wong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the oense of Violations of
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in THREE (3) Counts and is hereby
sentenced to serve an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS for each count;
to pay Private Complainant Manuel T. Limtong the sums of Five Thousand
Five Hundred (P5,500.00) Pesos, Six Thousand Four Hundred Ten
(P6,410.00) Pesos and Three Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Five
(P3,375.00) Pesos corresponding to the amounts indicated in Allied Banking
Checks Nos. 660143451, 66[0]143464 and 660143463 all issued on
December 30, 1985 together with the legal rate of interest from the time of
the filing of the criminal charges in Court and pay the costs." 8

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On October 28, 1994, it
affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. 9
Hence, the present petition. 10 Petitioner raises the following questions of law

11

May a complainant successfully prosecute a case under BP 22 if there is

no more consideration or price or value ever the binding tie that it is in

contracts in general and in negotiable instruments in particular behind the
checks? if even before he deposits the checks, he has ceased to be a
holder for value because the purchase orders (PO's) guaranteed by the
checks were already paid?
Given the fact that the checks lost their reason for being, as above stated, is
it not then the duty of complainant knowing he is no longer a holder for
value to return the checks and not to deposit them ever? Upon what legal
basis then may such a holder deposit them and get paid twice?
Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost their reason
for being, still bound under BP 22 to maintain his account long after 90 days
from maturity of the checks?
May the prosecution apply the prima facie presumption of "knowledge of
lack of funds" against the drawer if the checks were belatedly deposited by
the complainant 157 days after maturity, or will it be then necessary for the
prosecution to show actual proof of "lack of funds" during the 90-day term?

Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the 1985 purchase
orders (PO's) of his customers. He contends that private respondent is not a "holder
for value" considering that the checks were deposited by private respondent after
the customers already paid their orders. Instead of depositing the checks, private
respondent should have returned the checks to him. Petitioner further assails the
credibility of complainant considering that his answers to cross-examination
questions included: "I cannot recall, anymore" and "We have no more record."
In his Comment, 12 the Solicitor General concedes that the checks might have been
initially intended by petitioner to guarantee payments due from customers, but
upon the refusal of LPI to accept said personal checks per company policy, the
parties had agreed that the checks would be used to pay o petitioner's unremitted
collections. Petitioner's contention that he did not demand the return of the checks
because he trusted LPI's good faith is contrary to human nature and sound business
practice, according to the Solicitor General.
The issue as to whether the checks were issued merely as guarantee or for payment
of petitioner's unremitted collections is a factual issue involving as it does the
credibility of witnesses. Said factual issue has been settled by the trial court and
Court of Appeals. Although initially intended to be used as guarantee for the
purchase orders of customers, they found the checks were eventually used to settle
the remaining obligations of petitioner with LPI. Although Manuel Limtong was the
sole witness for the prosecution, his testimony was found sucient to prove all the
elements of the oense charged. 13 We nd no cogent reason to depart from
ndings of both the trial and appellate courts. In cases elevated from the Court of
Appeals, our review is conned to alleged errors of law. Its ndings of fact are
generally conclusive. Absent any showing that the ndings by the respondent court
are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand. 14 The
lack of accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly

held, this Court is not a trier of facts. 15 Moreover, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 16
we held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum ." Nothing herein persuades us to hold otherwise.
The only issue for our resolution now is whether or not the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the oense penalized under
B.P. Blg. 22.
There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and
issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that
the check is not suciently funded; and (2) by having sucient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sucient funds
therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check when
presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days. 17
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the rst situation, pertinent to the present case,
are: 18
"(1)
The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2)
The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sucient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3)
The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insuciency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."

Petitioner contends that the rst element does not exist because the checks were
not issued to apply for account or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation
from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming that the checks were issued
as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already
paid. This awed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled
that the checks were in payment for unremitted collections, and not as guarantee.
Likewise, the argument has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. 19

As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the
second element prima facie exists when the rst and third elements of the oense
are present. 20 Thus, the maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the
check for insufficiency of funds. 21

Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or
157 days after the December 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of
knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not apply to him.
He further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank account active
and funded beyond the ninety-day period.
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Evidence of knowledge of insucient funds . The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insucient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insuciency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within ve (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.

An essential element of the oense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or

drawer of the check of the insuciency of his funds in or credit with the bank to
cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind dicult to
establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge
where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insucient funds
in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check." To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute
provides that such presumption shall not arise if within ve (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for
payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. 22
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law require a
maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear
import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insuciency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90
days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the
maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice
thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of
the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to
arise. It is not an element of the oense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from
his duty to maintain sucient funds in the account within a reasonable time
thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By
current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, 23
or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date
of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of
knowledge of insuciency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that
he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit

the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly notied of
such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within ve (5) banking
days thereof. There is, on record, sucient evidence that petitioner had knowledge
of the insuciency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of
issuance of the checks. And despite petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, we nd
no error in the respondent court's armance of his conviction by the trial court for
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000,
which took eect on November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should
now be modied to a ne of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the checks that were dishonored.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found liable for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 but the penalty imposed on him is hereby
MODIFIED so that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner is ORDERED
to pay a FINE of (1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check
involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00, equivalent to double the
amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12058, and (3) P11,000.00,
equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU12055, with subsidiary imprisonment 24 in case of insolvency to pay the aforesaid
nes. Finally, as civil indemnity, petitioner is also ordered to pay to LPI the face
value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with legal interest thereon from the time
of filing the criminal charges in court, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, concurred in by Justices Ricardo

P. Galvez and Eugenio S. Labitoria.

2.

Records, p. 119.

3.

Id. at 130.

4.

Otherwise known as "An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a
Check without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,"

5.

As to the three (3) remaining checks, petitioner was also charged with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 3 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 25078-R, 25079-R, and 28440-R. The MTC convicted petitioner but on appeal,
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, acquitted him for lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

6.

Records, p. 89.

7.

Rollo, pp. 185-199.

8.

Id. at 198-199.

9.

Id. at 88-108.

10.

Id. at 11-86.

11.

Id. at 17.

12.

Id. at 290-321.

13.

Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744, 749 (1998).

14.

Bunag Jr. vs . Court of Appeals , 211 SCRA 440, 447-448 (1992); Morales vs .
Court of Appeals, et. al., 197 SCRA 391, 401(1991).

15.

Aleria v. Melez, 298 SCRA 611, 618 (1998).

16.

270 SCRA 423, 431 (1997).

17.

Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22.

18.

Lim v. People, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 7.

19.

Dichaves v. Apalit, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1274, June 8, 2000, p. 6.

20.

Sycip Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 125059, March 17, 2000, p. 8.

21.

Vaca v. Court of Appeals , 298 SCRA 657, 661 (1998).

22.

Lozano v. Martinez , 146 SCRA 323, 330-331 (1986).

23.

Pacheco v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 126670, December 2, 1999, p. 9.

24.

Lim v. People, G.R No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 11.