Germany, Turkey and Zionist

Germany, Turkey, and the Zionist Movement, 1914-1918
Author(s): Saadia E. Weltmann

Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Apr., 1961), pp. 246-269
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Germany, Turkey, and the Zionist

Movement, 1914-1918
Saadia E. Weltmann
1. Introduction
In 1897, the first Zionist Congress met in Basle and founded

the World Zionist Organization, defining its programme as follows: "Zionism strives to create for the Jewish People a home
in Palestine secured by public law."I
With the establishment of the Organization the efforts to promote the settlement of Jews in Palestine were supplemented by
official negotiations to secure the support of the Turkish government and the international community. Negotiations between
Theodore Herzl, the founder of the Zionist Organization, and
the Turkish government ensued to secure a "charter" from the
Sultan of Turkey permitting the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine; however, no results were attained. In
an effort to re-enforce his position by German backing, Herzl won
the sympathy of Emperor William II in 1898, but Germany rendered no support because of the opposition of Foreign Minister
Billow. Negotiations were conducted with the British as well, and
during 1902-1903 several schemes of Jewish settlement in British
controlled territories, especially Uganda, were considered. Because
of the vehement opposition to the Uganda project at the Sixth
Zionist Congress in 1903, the Zionist Organization declined the
British proposal, insisting that Zionist aspirations centered solely
on Palestine.2
Zionist political activity subsided with Herzl's death in 1904.

Although Zionists succeeded in arousing some awareness of their
cause throughout Europe, Zionism was regarded as a utopian
and insignificant movement until World War I.
1 The Basle Programme reads as follows: "Zionism strives to create for the
Jewish People a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end: 1) The promotion
on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers. 2) The organization and binding together of the whole of
Jewry by the means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the law of each country. 3) The strengthening and fostering of
Jewish national sentiment and consciousness. 4) Preparatory steps toward obtaining government consent where necessary to the attainment of the aim of
Zionism."
2 For a brief summary of this period see: A BShm, Die Zionistische
Bewegung, I (Berlin, 1935), 185-198.
246
ZIONIST MOVEMENT, 1914-1918 247

By the end of the World War the Zionist Organization emerged
as a factor in international relations, and though it remained a

relatively unimportant factor, the international community had
to reckon with it. The development of Zionism from an insignificant movement to its new position may be attributed to the planning of the post-war political settlement and the discussions be-
tween Zionist representatives and the great powers during the

war years. The most important result of these talks was the Balfour Declaration by which the British government announced its
support of the establishment of a Jewish National Home in
Palestine. Much has been written about this Declaration and about
the considerations which motivated the British government to

adopt it. One of the many explanations offered regarding the
origins of the Declaration is that the Declaration was adopted
in order to win the support of world Jewish opinion, which might
otherwise have favored the Central Powers; and moreover, the

Declaration was intended to forestall a similar pronouncement
by the Central Powers.3 Oddly enough, this theory received very
little study. It is the intention of this paper to analyze the impact of the War on the Zionist movement and particularly on
the relations between the Zionist movement and Turkey and
Germany. Such an analysis provides a basis for challenging the
validity of that theory concerning the origins of the Balfour Declaration.
2. Zionism and the Powers Before the War
The Zionists' efforts to secure a charter for the establishment
of a National Home in Palestine brought them into contact with

the various powers throughout the period preceding the World
War. The most continuous Zionist endeavors were centered upon
the Ottoman Empire. Between 1896 and 1903 Theodor Herzl
tried to obtain a charter from the Turkish government in return

for the assumption of the Ottoman debt by the Zionist movement.
The Turkish government, however, was strongly dedicated to

the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Empire and
could not accept any proposal that might weaken its control
over Palestine or lead to the secession of Palestine from the Em-
pire. Indeed, to prevent the concentration in Palestine of a large

I See: H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris,
VI (London, 1924), 172-173. Also Lloyd George's statement in Parliament,
June 19, 1936, Commons Debates, Fifth Series, 313, cols. 1341-42.
248 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
Jewish community which could amount to the creation of a new
and additional nationality problem, the government imposed

stringent restrictions upon the immigration of Jews into Palestine
and the purchase of land there by foreign nationals.

After the "Young Turks" assumed control in 1908, there followed a brief period of Zionist hopes based mainly upon the assumed liberalism of the new rulers and the hope that some of
the influential Jewish and Donmeh4 members of the Committee
of Union and Progress might use their influence in favor of the
Zionist objectives. But the new regime rapidly developed strong
nationalist attitudes, and the Jews and Donmehs, who at the
outset displayed an interest in Zionism, failed to exert themselves
in its favor lest it harm their position in the movement. Thus,
the "Young Turks" adopted an anti-Zionist position similar to
that of the old regime. They feared that the creation of a National
Home in Palestine would result in the creation of a new nationality
problem. Moreover, they were suspicious of the foreign influences
involved in the introduction of immigrant Jews, a great number
of whom were Russian citizens. Such an influx could lead to
renewed pressures for concessions by the protecting powers and

particularly by Russia. Another important influence on the "Young
Turks" was the strong Arab opposition to Jewish settlement in
Palestine and the growth of the Arab national movement.5 The
anti-Zionist sentiment was expressed by the press as well as in
Parliament. In March, 1911, the government was severely criticized in Parliament for its alleged sympathy with Zionism, and in
the following month, a strong attack against Zionism for being
merely a cloak for German designs in Turkey was published in
Roumelie, an influential organ of the Committee of Union and
Progress.6 Thus, the combined effect of domestic political con-
siderations as well as considerations of the national interest re-
sulted in the government's adoption of a strong anti-Zionist posi-
tion.
The attitudes of other governments toward the Zionist movement were less definite. There was very little contact between the
4Donmeh are members of a Moslem sect of Jewish origin established in the
17th century, when the followers of Shabbetai Zwi, who proclaimed himself
Messiah, followed his example and were converted to Islam.
5 I. Grunbaum, Hatenua Hazionit, III (Jerusalem, 1949), 127-141, 179181. R. Lichtheim, She'ar Yashuv (Tel Aviv, 1954), 198-200, 238-240.
6 The Times, London, March 3, 1911; April 14, 1911.
Zionist movement and the European powers after Herzl's initial
efforts failed. The Great Powers, however, took notice of Zionism

whenever it seemed to affect their interests in the Ottoman Empire.
Before the War, German policy involved peaceful economic

and cultural penetration of the Ottoman Empire as well as a
growth of military ties. But because of its religious significance
Palestine readily attracted German penetration involving German missionary societies, scientific and archeological expeditions,
and even German colonies with German settlers. Furthermore,

a Jewish-German organization, the Hilfsverein der Deutschen
Juden, established an extensive school system, which was regarded
favorably by the German government.
It appears that after Herzl's activity the Zionist movement did
not come to the attention of the German government until 1913,
and then only because an internal Jewish controversy drew
the German government's attention to Zionism. The controversy
evolved about the language of instruction in a new Technical

Institute in Haifa, a cooperative project of the Hilfsverein and
the Zionist Organization. After the Board of Directors of the new

Institute decided in favor of German in spite of Zionist demands
to establish Hebrew as the language of instruction, riots against
Hilfsverein schools broke out in Jerusalem and required the intervention of the German Consul and the Turkish police. Moreover, the Jewish Teachers Federation in Palestine organized a
boycott against Hilfsverein schools in Palestine, and a new Hebrew school system was established with the support of the Zionist
Organization.7 These events made an unfavorable impression on

the area's German diplomatic representatives, and some of them
interpreted the controversy as instigated by Russian influences
and directed against German culture.
The fear that as a result of this controversy Germany might
assume an anti-Zionist position induced the Zionist representatives
in Constantinople to seek contact with the German Embassy there.
Several conversations took place from November, 1913, to June,
1914, between members of the Embassy staff and Zionist representatives, in which the Zionists endeavored to explain that Zionism was not opposed to German culture; and that the establishment of a Jewish center in Palestine would lead to an increase in
cultural and economic ties between Palestine and Germany. These
7Grunbaum, op. cit., III, 240-249.
contacts were later expanded into more general discussions on

the origins and meaning of Zionism and resulted in a greater
degree of understanding of the Zionist point of view by the German
diplomatic mission in Turkey.8
Britain, chiefly concerned with maintaining the security of

her communications with the Empire, strove to exclude the estab-
lishment of any other power on the flank of the Suez Canal in

Palestine, or on the shores of the Persian Gulf in Iraq. Consequently the British viewed with great uneasiness the rapid growth
of German influence in Turkey. Although projects to increase

British influence in Palestine and Syria through the protection
of religious minorities had been discussed in the past, no such
project in conjunction with Zionism was contemplated in the
prewar decade. Only once, during 1902-1903, did the British
government negotiate with Zionist leaders regarding a scheme
for the settlement of Jews in Sinai, and after this failed to ma-
terialize the government unsuccesfully offered the Zionists the

territory of Uganda for a similar scheme. Thereafter, until the
War, only unofficial and intermittent contacts between British
statesmen and individual Zionist leaders took place, and it was
through such contacts that Balfour first learned from Weizmann
about Zionism in 1906.9
The Zionist movement again came to Britain's attention after

the "Young Turks" assumed power. The prominence of individual
Jews in the movement, the opposition of some of them to the

expansion of British economic activities in Mesopotamia, and
finally the publication of anti-British articles in the Jeune Turc,
a daily newspaper, published jointly by Zionist and "Young Turk"
elements, combined to arouse British suspicion regarding the Zionist movement. It was suspected that the Zionists were engaged in
promoting German interests and German influence in the Otto-
man Empire. This view seems to have been held by Sir Gerard
Lowther, the British Ambassador to Constantinople,1o and it was
reflected also in a series of articles and letters published in the

Times in 1911.11 These suspicions had subsided by 1913, after
8 Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 269-273.

9 B. E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, I (New York, 1937), 324-325.
10 G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the
War, 1898-1914, X (London, 1938), 2, 6.
11 The Times, London, February 14, March 3, April 14, April 21.
the Turkish government assumed a strong anti-Zionist stand.12

The French government, which sought to make French influence predominant in Palestine, seems to have entertained similar
suspicions. During 1910-11 the French considered Zionism to be

an "agent" of the German policy of penetration. But, as a result
of the Turkish government's opposition to Zionism, and the language controversy in which the Zionists demanded the substitution
of Hebrew for German in Palestine schools, French views chang-
ed and ceased to regard Zionism as inimical to French interests.

Throughout this period, unofficial and intermittent contacts were
maintained between Zionist leaders and French statesmen.13
Other governments, such as the Austrian and the Russian,

were even less interested in Zionist aspirations in Palestine, though
the Russian government displayed marked hostility toward the

Zionist movement at home.14
3. The Zionist Movement and the War
The outbreak of the War confronted the Zionist Organization

with a difficult problem, for it was an international movement,
encompassing Zionists in belligerent and neutral countries. Furthermore, it was committed to attain the establishment of a National
Home by "public law," that is, by international agreement.15 Thus,
the Zionist leaders recognized that the Organization must remain neutral in the War. But the application of neutrality to
specific decisions was bound to arouse difficulties, since Palestine,
the principal Zionist interest, was a part of the Ottoman Empire
and geographically within the sphere of one of the belligerent

camps. Moreover, the seat of the Inner Executive of the Zionist
Organization was in Berlin.16 Furthermore, while there seems to
have been general agreement on the neutrality of the Zionist Organization, the individual Zionist leaders entertained diverse and
12 Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 268. A. M. Hyamson, The British Consulate in
Jerusalem, II (London, 1941), 580-581.
13 Le Mois Colonial, 1910, p. 279, quoted in E. Lewin, The German Road
to the East (New York, 1917), pp. 113-114. L'Asie Francaise, December 1913,
p. 9. For an interesting conversation on Zionism between the Zionist leader
Max Nordau and French Foreign Minister Pichon, see A. and M. Nordau, Max
Nordau (New York, 1943), pp. 204-208.
14 Grunbaum, op. cit., III, pp. 145-147.
15 See footnote 1.
e6 The principal governing bodies of the Zionist Organization were the
Zionist Congress, the Full Executive and the Inner Executive. The Zionist
Congress was held biennially, and the delegates were elected by Zionists in dif-
conflicting views regarding the War, and their sympathies were

reflected in many of their activities.
In August, as soon as War broke out, the Inner Executive of

the Zionist Organization met in Berlin. It decided to suspend all
political activity and to discontinue the publication of Die Welt,
the central organ of the Zionist Organization, because of the
difficulty in forwarding the paper to its subscribers in enemy countries, and because the paper, "in view of its international character
cannot take a position on current affairs." It was also decided to

restrict the political activity of the Organization to questions re-
lating to the maintenance and preservation of the Jewish community in Palestine.'7
The question of the location of the Inner Executive and the
central Zionist offices also arose. Zionist leaders in Entente coun-
tries demanded that the Executive transfer to a neutral country.
The German Zionists opposed this move. To discuss questions

arising from the international situation the Full Executive was
called to meet in Copenhagen where it sat December 3-6, 1914.
There the British, Russian, and American Zionists renewed their
demand to transfer the Executive. Professor Otto Warburg, a
German Zionist and President of the Organization, argued that
such an act was undesirable, because it would "displease" the
German government. Finally, a compromise was reached whereby a temporary office would be opened in Copenhagen to maintain contact among the Zionists. The Inner Executive was to remain in Berlin until it considered a transfer advisable. To supervise
Zionist activities in Palestine and in non-European countries was a
task assigned to a temporary committee in New York. The meeting
also expressed opposition to the participation of leading Zionists in
activities which might jeopardize the position of Jews in any of
the belligerent statess18
ferent countries. Its main function was to elect the Executive and supervise its
activities. The Full Executive (also called Greater Actions Committee) com-
posed of 25 members, was supposed to meet several times a year and to direct
the activity of the Inner Executive. The Inner Executive (also called Smaller
Actions Committee), of six members, was charged with the management of the
Zionist Organization. During the War, the members of the Inner Executive
were: Otto Warburg, Arthur Hantke, Victor Jacobson (Germany), Nahum

Sokolow, E. W. Tschlenow (Russia) and Shmarya Lewin (U.S.). For a full
description of the constitution of the Zionist Organization in 1914, see N.
Sokolow, History of Zionism, II (London, 1919), 358-374.
' N. M. Gelber, Hatsharat Balfour Vetoldoteha (Jerusalem 1939), pp.
28-29.
18 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
In general, there prevailed a feeling among Zionists that the

World War and the peace conference might present a unique
opportunity for the fulfillment of the Zionist aspirations in Pales-
tine. But the diverse views of the Zionist leaders regarding the
outcome of the War precluded any action by Zionist organs towards that end. At the beginning of the War, the majority of the
European Zionist leaders expected a German victory. Some of

them actually favored the Central Powers, largely as a result of
their dislike of Russian antisemitic policies. A few, such as Nahum
Sokolow, a Zionist representative in negotiating the Balfour Declaration, changed their minds in the course of the War. There were
also some, especially in England and France, who believed in the

victory of the Entente powers and were willing to stake on it the
realization of the Zionist objectives. Among these was Professor
Chaim Weizmann, who went as far as to refuse all contacts with

the Berlin Executive and with the Copenhagen office.19
It was very difficult for the Executive to enforce discipline,
even in peace time, because the World Zionist Organization was
merely a federation of Zionist associations operating in the differ-
ent countries. During the War, it appears that the Executive

gradually lost control over the activities of individual Zionists or
groups in the various countries. Contact between the Executive

and the Zionist movements in the opposing camps was maintained
however, and neutrality remained the official Zionist policy

throughout the War. Whenever prominent Zionists engaged in
activities inconsistent with the neutrality of the movement, the
Executive tried hard, often successfully, to restrain them. One

of the projects which failed partly because of the Executive's
opposition was a move to found a volunteer corps of Jews from
the German-occupied territories of eastern Europe to come to the
aid of the Turkish army in the Middle East.20 The Executive,
however, was not able to prevent the formation of special Jewish

units, who fought with the Entente against Turkey. The creation
of these units was the result of the activities of a group headed
by Vladimir Jabotinski, a Russian Zionist, which believed that

organized Zionist participation in the war effort was necessary to
lay the basis for political demands at the peace conference.21

19 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York, 1949), pp. 148; 164-170.
20 Grunbaum, op. cit., IV, pp. 78-79.
21 Gelber, op. cit., pp. 95-98; Grunbaum, op. cit., IV, pp. 37-38, 49-55;
Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 404-407; Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 169-170.
Thus, in spite of the formal consensus about the need of

following a neutral course, it was impossible for the Organization
to enforce its decisions on all parts of the movement. Departures
from the policy of neutrality were not numerous, and most were
relatively insignificant. But the negotiations in England between
Zionist leaders and the British government that resulted in the

Balfour Declaration, proved to be of utmost importance for
Zionism's and Palestine's future. The Executive in Berlin ad-
hered to the policy of neutrality, and between 1914-17 limited

its activities to questions related to the preservation of the Jewish
community in Palestine.
4. Turkey and Zionism, 1914-1917
On the outbreak of war Zionist activity in Turkey was con-
cerned almost solely with problems of the Jewish community in
Palestine. Most of these problems arose because many of the

Jewish institutions in Palestine had earlier enjoyed British and
French protection and were regarded as enemy property by the
Turks. Moreover, a large proportion of the Palestine Jews from
Russia had remained Russian citizens and thus were considered
enemy nationals. The strong anti-Zionist views and the personality
of Djemal Pasha, who as commander of the 4th army was also
the governor of Syria and Palestine, accentuated the difficulties.
Djemal's excesses and harsh measures continued throughout

the War. They were particularly directed against the leaders of
the Jewish community, many of whom were arrested and illtreated. Most of those arrested were released, but some were interned, and others deported.22 Some government decrees, such as
the sequestration of the property and the closing of the branches
of the Anglo-Palestine Company (the principal financial institu-
tion of the Zionist Organization) were temporarily modified by
the intervention of the German and American Embassies in Con-
stantinople. Another repressive government edict was averted when
the Chief Rabbi succeeded in persuading the authorities to permit the continuation of the operation of the Alliance Israelite
schools in spite of sponsorship by a French-Jewish association.23
The fact that a large number of Jews were formally considered
enemy nationals created a much more difficult problem. In No22 Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 334-354. Also, Grunbaum, op. cit., IV, pp. 32-36.
23 Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 303-307; 330-333.
vember, upon a request by the Chief Rabbi, the Ministry of Interior eased the naturalization requirements and facilitated its
procedure. The Zionist Organization urged enemy nationals among
Palestine Jews to acquire Ottoman citizenship. Though mass na-
turalization was taking place, the procedure was still cumbersome
and moreover, many Jews hesitated or failed to apply for naturalization. While this process was continuing, the military authorities in Palestine issued on December 17 an order for the
immediate deportation of all Jews holding Russian citizenship.

This was followed by action and, on the same day, 800 Jews
were deported to Egypt. Upon the request of the Zionist representative in Constantinople, the German Embassy addressed the
Turkish authorities and the deportations were stopped.24
With the opening of the British offensive in 1917, orders were
issued on March 28 by the Turkish military authorities for the

evacuation of all Jews from the cities of Jaffa and Tel Aviv and
the adjoining areas. This forceful evacuation of thousands of

families created much hardship and suffering, and greatly aroused
public opinion in many countries, including Germany. The Allied
press made use of these measures in its propaganda, and it was

charged that the Turks were preparing a repetition of the Armenian massacres.25 The intervention of the German Embassy
succeeded in easing the situation and resulted in permitting the
Jewish population of the agricultural colonies to stay in their
homes. But, many thousands were still forced to spend several
months in temporary shelters in northern Palestine.26
The effect of the anti-Jewish measures taken by the Turkish
authorities in Palestine during the War was greatly mitigated by
incessant efforts of the Zionist representatives in Constantinople,
Victor Jacobson and Richard Lichtheim, who obtained invaluable
assistance in these matters from the German and American Embassies. Most of the effective interventions on behalf of the Palestine
Jews took place on the highest level through contacts between the
ambassadors and Talaat Pasha, who was Minister of the In-
24 Ibid., pp. 302; 314-321.

25 Djemal Pasha himself was reported to have stated in December 1916
that because of Zionism, Palestine might become a second Armenia. See Gelber,
op. cit., p. 180.
26 Grunbaum, op. cit., IV, pp. 165-178. Also The Times, London, May 25,
1917; June 1, 1917.
terior.27 It appears that between 1914-1917 there was very little

direct contact between Zionist representatives and leading Turkish statesmen and no political negotiations took place until after
the Balfour Declaration. The Zionist representatives in Turkey

during this period were almost entirely limited to dealing with
current problems of the Jewish community in Palestine.
The reasons behind this political stalemate were twofold. First,
the Zionists were committed to neutrality and, therefore, were

cautious in their diplomatic activity. Secondly, the Turkish government, which had adopted an anti-Zionist policy, did not consider the Zionist question as urgent and requiring review until
November, 1917. Jacobson who saw Talaat in April, 1915 and
urged that the government review its policy toward Zionism, was
told that the government was occupied with other matters, and
could take up the question of Zionism only at an unspecified later
date.28
On the whole, Turkey's anti-Zionist policy was not violent,

and the government continuously tried to restrain Djemal's severe
measures. The Turkish government believed that an all out anti-
Zionist campaign would damage its relations with the United

States as well as its general reputation which had greatly de-
clined as a result of the Armenian massacres. From time to time,

however, the government's suspicion of Zionism was intensified
by events. Thus, the formation of Jewish units to fight on the
Allied side against Turkey threatened to increase the government's
hostility. A speech by Henry Morgenthau, Sr., after his return
from a mission as American Ambassador to Turkey, stating that
he had discussed with Turkish statesmen the establishment of a
Jewish republic in Palestine after the War and secured their approval for the project, greatly angered the Turks.29 It appears
that there was no basis for Morgenthau's statement, and further-
more, it was damaging from the point of view of Turkish domestic politics. The intense nationalism in the country and strife
within the ruling circles rendered any talk about alienation of

Turkish territory politically dangerous.
Turkey's anti-Zionist position remained unchanged as did the

27 Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 301-354. See also J. Bernstorff, Memoirs of Count
Bernstorff (New York, 1936), pp. 204-206.
28 Gelber, op. cit., p. 166.
29 A report on Morgenthau's speech was published in The Times, London,
May 22, 1916. For the Turkish reaction see Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 401-403.

factors behind it. The fear that Zionism would result in a new
nationality problem was the main motive behind the Turkish

attitude. The Turkish government was determined not to aggra-
vate further its relations with the Arabs because of the Zionist
issue. Moreover, it seems that at least on the local level, Djemal

Pasha hoped that his anti-Zionist measures might help him in
his relations with the Arabs and counterbalance to some extent
the effect of his severe repression of Arab nationalism.
5. Germany and Zionism, 1914-1917

Germany's interest in Zionism remained very limited during
the first three years of the War, and no definite policy with respect
to Zionism was adopted. The Zionist Organization maintained

contact with the German government through the Foreign Ministry in Berlin and through the German Embassy in Constantinople,
but these contacts were limited in scope. But apart from issues
involving the protection of the Jewish community in Palestine,
only very general discussions, intended to acquaint the German
officials with the Jewish problem and the Zionist movement, took
place between 1914-1917.
After having met Embassy officials on several occasions during the early part of 1914. Lichtheim had his first conversation
with the German Ambassador Baron von Wangenheim on June
29. In this informal meeting the Ambassador said that Germany
could not commit herself politically to support Zionism, but added
that unofficially he would be glad to be of assistance. The Embassy, however, would be able to support the Zionist cause only
if specific instructions to this effect were received from Berlin.3'0
With the outbreak of War, it became clear to the Zionist
representatives that the support of foreign powers might become

necessary for the protection of the Jewish community in Palestine.
The American Embassy had traditionally used its influence in

favor of the Palestine Jews, and much assistance was received
also from Ambassador Morgenthau. With the rapid growth of
German influence in Turkey, it became essential to obtain German
support. Thus, when Lichtheim was in Berlin in November, he

visited the Foreign Ministry and submitted a memorandum to
the head of the Balkan and Near East division, Von Rosenberg.
The memorandum outlined Zionism and its objectives and ar30 Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 274-277.
gued that the establishment of a National Home in Palestine

would result in the economic strengthening of the Ottoman Em-
pire. Von Rosenberg did not express any views on the subject,
but promised to inform the Constantinople Embassy of Lichtheim's
return to Turkey and his desire to renew and maintain contact

with the Embassy.31
Lichtheim on returning to Constantinople had several conversations with the Counsellor of the Embassy, Richard von Kuhl-
mann, and the First Dragoman, Dr. Weber. In these talks Lichtheim emphasized that Zionism was not a movement of German
Jews, but an international movement, and that it did not serve
the interests of any one country. He said, moreover, that Zionism
would not affect German interests in any immediate and direct

manner, but that from an enlightened long range view it deserved
the attention of the German government. These vague remarks

were probably intended to explain that the Zionist Organization
could not involve itself in the existing international conflict, and
to hint that the realization of Zionist aspirations in Palestine

coincided with German interests, for it would result in the economic strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, and could firmly establish German influence in Palestine.32 Lichtheim, also, had
several conversations with Ambassador von Wangenheim who expressed the view, shared by Weber, that Zionism must ultimately
lead to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and that
this would contradict Turkish interests. Lichtheim's response to
this was, that the creation of a Jewish state "cannot be regarded
a political objective," but rather "a description of an ideal situation." He added that the Zionist aim for the foreseeable future
was to establish a national center in Palestine within the Otto-
man Empire, and that the Zionist movement and Germany had
an equal interest in the strengthening and progress of the Ottoman Empire.33
Talks of this nature continued intermittently for many months
and did not result in any statement defining the German attitude
toward Zionism. In fact, until 1917 the Zionists did not attempt
to obtain any public commitment from the German government.
They hoped to win the friendship of the German government,

31 Ibid., pp. 296-298.
32 Ibid., pp. 309-310; Gelber, op. cit., pp. 169, 174-175.
because that would be essential for the progress of Zionism if

Germany became the dominant power in the Near East.
Though not seeking a public commitment, the Zionist representatives did press the German government to issue specific in-
structions to its consuls in Palestine to use their influence for the
protection of the Jewish population there. It was hoped that such

instructions would provide a positive guide for action and would
implicitly indicate to the Turkish authorities Germany's support
for Zionism. Negotiations on this matter continuing throughout
1915 were somewhat hindered by the illness and subsequent death
of Ambassador Von Wangenheim and by the unsympathetic attitude on the part of some officials. Finally, in January 1916,
the desired instructions were issued after being approved by Chan-
cellor Bethmann-Hollweg. The text of this directive was very

vague and did not refer to Zionism or to Palestine but merely
to the immigration and settlement of Jews in Turkey. Furthermore, the consuls were told that their support should be given in
an unofficial manner and should take into account the sentiments
of the local Turkish authorities.34 The vagueness of these instructions can be attributed to the Foreign Ministry's desire to avoid
any commitment whatsoever as well as to the necessity not to
disturb the Turks on the sensitive issue of foreign interference.
The instructions were interpreted and acted upon in a spirit
sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Throughout the war years
German support was most helpful in mitigating the severity of
the anti-Jewish measures taken by Turkish authorities in Palestine.
In addition to its efforts to protect the Jewish population in Pales-
tine, the German government provided other assistance such as

allowing the Zionist Organization to use the German diplomatic
courier service.35
German public opinion did not concern itself much with
Zionism before the Balfour Declaration. When on a few occasions
the German press mentioned Zionism, the attitude was generally

friendly. Public attention was particularly directed to the force-
ful evacuation of the Jewish inhabitants of Jaffa and Tel Aviv

in the spring of 1917. In May, 1917, the Frankfurter Zeitung
expressed the hope that the Jewish population of Palestine would
be preserved. The paper implicitly criticised Djemal's policy by

emphasizing the loyalty of the Zionists and stating that the German
34 Ibid., pp. 374-387; Gelber, op. cit., pp. 170-171.
Empire "must have" interest in Zionism in view of "future and

very promising trade relations." The issue of the deportations was
also raised in the Reichstag by a Jewish Socialist member of the
House.36 But public opinion was not greatly interested in the
issue.
German diplomatic support and efforts to protect the Jewish

community in Palestine can be attributed to three principal factors.
First, it seems reasonable to assume that German diplomatic

representatives were influenced by general moral considerations,
and viewed the protection of Jews from Turkish persecution as

a matter of course. A second reason seems to have been German
desire to open a possibility of utilizing the Zionist Organization

after the war for purposes of German foreign policy. Some of von
Kuhlmann's remarks to Lichtheim about the desirability of con-
centrating all Zionist activity through German-Jewish channels

can be interpreted in this sense.37 But, the most important motive
was the desire to avoid the damaging repercussions on public
opinion that the anti-Jewish measures taken by the Turkish government were bound to produce. Moreover, the Germans probably
hoped to win the sympathy of public opinion, particularly in

the United States, by actively protecting the Jewish community
in Palestine. The importance of this consideration is borne out

by the fact that the German Embassy in Washington was constantly informed about events in Palestine, and that, in turn, the
Embassy in Constantinople was informed about the reactions of

American public opinion to these events. Moreover, von Wangenheim several times urged Lichtheim to publicize more extensively, through Zionist channels in the United States, the facts about
German efforts to protect the Jewish population of Palestine.38
German support was limited by general considerations connected with German-Turkish relations. The Turkish government
was sensitive to any foreign intervention in its affairs, and Germany's support of Zionism undoubtedly increased Turkish suspicion of Zionism as an instrument to increase and spread German
influence. Finally, German prestige in Turkey depended much
upon the military situation, and consequently, the effectiveness
of the German support tended to fluctuate with changes in the
military situation.
36 The Times, London, May 17, 1917; May 25, 1917.
87 Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 305, 313.

88 Ibid., pp. 331, 335, 358.
6. The Balfour Declaration

From early in the War many Zionist leaders believed that
the peace settlement would afford a unique opportunity for the
realization of Zionist aspirations. But the uncertainty of the War
and the diverse sympathies among Zionists in different countries
prevented the Zionist Organization from presenting formal proposals regarding the future of Palestine to any of the Powers.39
This caution was not shared by the Zionist leadership in Eng-
land, which was firmly convinced not only of the victory of the
Entente but of the identity of interests between the British Em-
pire and the Zionist movement. The outbreak of War increased
Britain's interest in Palestine. The Turkish attack on the Suez
Canal served to demonstrate the importance of Palestine for the

security of the Canal. British statesmen, as well as public opinion,
adopted the view that the forthcoming peace conference should

change the status of Palestine so as to prevent its being used as a
base for an attack on the Canal.
These ideas were expressed as early as 1914 in the press and

in government circles. The New Statesman opened the press discussion in November, 1914, by suggesting that after the War
the British sponsor the colonization of Palestine by Jews, as a
contribution to the solution of the Jewish problem. Articles in
other papers followed and introduced into the discussion the
element of Britain's strategic interest.40 The issue was discussed
in government circles, and in November Herbert Samuel, a member of the government at that time, raised the question of Zionism
with Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, and David Lloyd
George, Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the spring of 1915,
Samuel circulated among the Cabinet two memoranda on the
problem which were received with much scepticism by Grey and
Asquith.41 Zionist leaders, for example, Weizmann also discussed
the problem, informally at first, with Lloyd George and Balfour.
Weizmann met Lloyd George for the first time in December,
1914, and renewed his acquaintance with Balfour during the
same month.42
These informal talks had, by late 1916, developed into formal

9 Gelber, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 33.
40 Ibid., pp. 46-47. Among the papers which participated in the discussion
were The Fortnightly Review, The Globe, The Manchester Guardian, and The
Times.
41 Lord Samuel, Grooves of Change (New York, 1946), pp. 171-175.

42 Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 150-153; Dugdale, op. cit., II, p. 163.
and detailed negotiations between Zionist leaders and British

Ministers and officials, regarding British support for Zionism in
general and the possibility of a declaration expressing Britain's

support. They resulted in the Cabinet's approval of a declaration
supporting the "establishment in Palestine of a National Home
for the Jewish People."43
In addition to strategic considerations linked to the security
of the Suez Canal and the desire to establish a basis for a claim
for Palestine at the peace conference,44 the British also hoped that
the Declaration might influence Jewish public opinion throughout the world in favor of the Entente. The importance of this
factor may be open to considerable doubt, because it seems that
Jewish opinion in allied and neutral countries favored Britain's
cause anyhow, and even many of those Jews, whose anti-Russian
sentiment influenced them, early in the War, to side with the
Central Powers, changed their views after the March revolution
in Russia.45
7. The Repercussions of the Balfour Declaration, 1917-1918

The Declaration had great effect on Jewish public opinion and
in many countries aroused great enthusiasm for Britain and her
allies. Some embarrassment was caused to the official Zionist policy
of neutrality. In fact, the Organization did not view approvingly
the negotiations with the British government.46 The Zionist Execu-
tive realized that the peace conference might be of utmost importance, and with this in view presented in August, 1917, a
memorandum to the ambassadors of the major powers at the
Hague. The memorandum was essentially a repetition of the prin-
ciples of the Basle Programme, but even this produced controversy since some members of the Executive held that it might imply disloyalty to the Turkish government.47
When the Declaration was finally adopted, it received the full
endorsement of the Zionist movement in all countries including
Germany, where the Zionist Federation formally welcomed the

48 For a detailed account of the background and the negotiations leading to
the Declaration, see Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 176-208; Gelber, op. cit., pp. 3665, 71-94, 109-124.
44 For a discussion of the Anglo-French rivalry on Palestine and the role of
the Balfour Declaration in this connection, see H. F. Frischwasser-Ra'anan,
The Frontiers of a Nation (London, 1955), pp. 58-82.
46 Weizmann, op. cit., p. 165.
47 Gelber, op. cit., pp. 144-146.
Declaration and proclaimed its great satisfaction. Most of the

Jewish press in Germany also welcomed the Declaration, adding
that the status of Palestine could only be altered by the peace
conference and expressing the hope that the Central Powers and
especially Turkey would join in endorsing the principles embodied in the Declaration. The general German press and a few
of the Jewish papers were inclined to minimize the significance
of the Declaration, and considered it "a bluff" perpetrated for
British imperialist purposes.48
But the German and Turkish governments viewed the Zionist-
British negotiations with some uneasiness. This uneasiness was

reflected in German reaction to the news of Sokolow's visit to
Rome and his meetings with the Pope and the Italian Prime
Minister, in the course of the negotiations preceding the Balfour
Declaration. The German Foreign Ministry warned the Zionist

Executive in June, 1917, that these talks might "cause great
damage." Lichtheim's answer, on behalf of the Executive, was
that the activities of the Zionist movement in the other countries
could not be stopped and that the only way of utilizing the move-
ment to Turkey's advantage would be through German and
Turkish endorsement of Zionism.49
During the spring and summer of 1917, the Zionist Executive
urged the German government on several occasions to adopt a

pro-Zionist stand and to influence the Turkish government to as-
sume a similar attitude. The Zionists explained that, in view of
the British, French, and American governments' support for the

establishment of a Jewish center in Palestine, it would be politi-
cally advantageous to the Central powers to consider Zionism as

an international problem and to adopt a pro-Zionist position.50
Although these efforts did not then produce the desired German-Turkish declaration, there is evidence that the German
Foreign Ministry realized the necessity of inducing Turkey to

adopt a pro-Zionist attitude, a step which would have enabled
Germany herself to come out openly in support of Zionism. Such
a step by the two powers would have forestalled the agreement

between the Zionists and Britain and would have had a profound
effect on Jewish public opinion. During the summer of 1917,
Germany attempted to influence Turkey in this respect. During
48 Ibid., pp. 186-189.
49 Ibid., p. 184.
50 Ibid.
August, the German Embassy in Constantinople conveyed to

Dr. Ruppin, the Zionist representative, its views regarding the
possibility of inducing Turkey to issue a declaration in support of
Zionism.51 The new German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, dis-
cussed the question of the establishment of a Jewish home in

Palestine with Talaat Pasha, who had become Grand Vizier. According to Bernstorff, Talaat was ready to promise all he wanted,
provided Palestine remained Turkish after the War; but he repeatedly warned of Arab opposition.52 In spite of Talaat's accommodating attitude, no positive results were achieved at that
time.
During the summer of 1917 domestic political considerations

and intensified nationalist feeling in Turkey rendered a pro-Zionist
declaration inadvisable. In the competition within the Turkish

leadership, Talaat had to rely on Djemal against Enver. Djemal,
however, was probably the most determined anti-Zionist within
the Turkish leadership, and all efforts to persuade him had failed.
The German Foreign Ministry took an active part in the attempts
to change Djemal's mind, and it was upon its initiative that a
Zionist delegation met Djemal during a visit to Berlin in August.

This meeting, also, failed.53
The active efforts on the part of Germany to induce Turkey
to adopt a pro-Zionist position signify a departure from its previ-
ous aloofness in this respect. Until 1917, Germany's support of
Zionism was confined to issues arising out of excesses committed

by the Turkish authorities in Palestine. The change in the German
attitude stemmed mainly from the desire to forestall the announce-
ment of Britain's support for the Zionist cause, because of its

effect on Jewish public opinion. It is possible that German officials
also hoped that a pro-Zionist declaration by the Central Powers

would help to intensify suspicions between Britain and France re-
garding Palestine. But German efforts to persuade Turkey to

adopt a pro-Zionist position remained rather limited. Undoubtedly,
Germany did not want to exert itself in this respect. Turkish nationalist sentiment against the extent of German influence in the
country was on the rise, and under these conditions, it was feared
that German pressure in behalf of Zionism would be damaging
to Turco-German relations.
51 Ibid., pp. 184-185.
52 Bernstorff, op. cit., p. 205.
53 Gelber, op. cit., pp. 320-321.

The final shift in the Turkish and German positions occurred
only after the Balfour Declaration was published, on November 2.
On December 12, the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha granted an in-
terview to Dr. Julius Becker, a Zionist who was the correspondent

of the Vossische Zeitung. Talaat said that Turkey's attitude toward
the Jews was always sympathetic and that the government viewed
with favor Jewish resettlement and colonization in Palestine. With
respect to the Balfour Declaration, the Grand Vizier expressed the
view that it was a hoax (une blague), and that it would not be
of any use to the Zionist movement. To a question regarding
self rule, Talaat answered that no special rights could be granted

to the Jews, and that they would enjoy self-government within the
existing constitutional and administrative system. Public opinion
in Germany welcomed Talaat's declaration as a new and significant departure. Becker himself, however, warned in a special
report to the Zionist Executive that the Turkish leadership was
as opposed to Zionism as ever, and that continuous international
pressure would be necessary in order to secure unhindered Zionist
activity in Palestine.54
Turkey's allies, Austria and Germany publicly declared their

sympathy for Zionism. The Austro-Hungarian declaration was
made on November 21 by Foreign Minister Czernin to Dr. Hantke,
a member of the Zionist Executive.55 The German declaration,
which merely endorsed Talaat's statement, was issued on January

5, by the Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry von dem BuscheHaddenhausen.56
Public opinion, including the Zionist press, such as the

54 Gelber, op. cit., pp. 203-205. For the full text of Talaat's statement, see
Pro Paliistina, No. 1 (Berlin, 1918), pp. 26-29.
55 Gelber, op. cit., p. 200; Pro Palastina, 1, p. 26.
56 Gelber, op. cit., p. 206; Pro Palastina, 1, pp. 29-30. The German Under-
secretary's statement reads:
"We value and appreciate the aspirations of the Jewish minority directed
toward the development of its own culture and peculiarities in countries where
Jewish life is developed, we view these aspirations with understanding and we
are prepared to favor and support them.
"As to the aspirations of Jewry, and particularly the Zionists in Palestine, we
welcome the statements made recently by the Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha, and
especially the intention of the Imperial Ottoman Government, in accordance
with its longstanding friendship toward the Jews, to assist the flourishing Jewish
settlements in Palestine by permitting free immigration and resettlement within
the limits of the country's absorption capacity, by local self-rule in accordance

with the laws of the state, and by unhindered development of Jewish cultural
life."
Jiidische Rundschau, welcomed the German declaration, and

interpreted it as expressing the government's support for Zionist
aspirations in Palestine. However, there was also some criticism
that the German declaration was a belated and insufficient meas-
ure. Among the critics was the noted publicist Maximilian Harden
who urged the government in an article in Zukunft to adopt a more
pronounced pro-Zionist policy.57 The growing interest in Zionism
was reflected also in the formation of the Deutsches Komitee zur
Forderung der Jiidischen Paliistinasiedlung. The Committee was

a private body, composed of intellectuals and politicians, but
probably received some encouragement from government circles.
The Committee advocated German support for Zionism, and

argued that the establishment of a National Home in Palestine
would be in the German national interest. The yiddish speaking
immigrants would have close ties with German culture, while the
economic development of the country would help to strengthen
Germany's ally - the Ottoman Empire.58
Even after the declarations of the powers in support of Zion-
ism, the German government persisted in its cautious handling

of the Zionist issue. Undoubtedly, the Foreign Ministry felt that
in view of the difficulties in Turco-German relations, it would

be inadvisable to pressure the Turks on the Zionist issue and thus
provide additional ammunition to the anti-German elements. The
German reluctance to press the Turks for a more positive stand

in support of Zionism was reflected in Count Bernstorff's state-
ment (January 19, 1918) to Ruppin, the Zionist representative.

The Ambassador told Ruppin on this occasion that the time was
not appropriate for representations to the Turkish government,
and that only when the military situation in Palestine improved,
would it be advisable to urge Turkey to open negotiations with

the Zionist Organization.59
The Turkish government apparently estimated the situation
differently. In the same month it approached the Zionist Organization. Contact with the Zionists was established through the
Grand Rabbi and the Turkish-Jewish statesman, Carasso, who

was sent to Berlin for that purpose. On January 23, Talaat received a delegation of Jewish leaders in Berlin and told them about
his government's desire to enter into negotiations regarding the
58 Pro Paltistina, Nos. 1-5, Berlin, 1918.
59 Gelber, op. cit., pp. 208-209.

establishment of a corporation for the promotion of Jewish resettlement and colonization in Palestine.60 A committee representing different segments of German Jewry, including Zionists and
non-Zionists, was formed, and after protracted planning and dis-
cussions a detailed proposal submitted to the Turkish govern-
ment. The proposal included not only the articles of incorporation

of the projected company, but details about administrative changes
required in Palestine in order to facilitate immigration and resettlement.61 In July, a Jewish delegation arrived in Constantinople
for negotiations on these proposals, and was received by the Grand
Vizier on the 14th. The negotiations broke down because of disagreements regarding Jewish demands for self-government. In
July and August a final attempt was made to compose the differences by referring them to a special committee representing both
sides. This committee was supposed to meet later in the year, but
the Turkish collapse intervened and brought an end to the TurcoJewish negotiations.62
This Turkish readiness to negotiate regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine can be attributed
mainly to the deteriorating military situation and the loss of Pales-
tine. As long as Turkey was in possession of Palestine, the antiZionist policy prevailed. After the British breakthrough at Beer-
sheba on October 31, 1917, was followed by steady advance so
that by the end of the year most of Palestine was in British hands,
the Turkish statesmen probably concluded that nothing would

be lost by agreeing to the National Home. Indeed, in view of the
Balfour Declaration, the Turkish position might be stronger at
the peace conference if the Turkish government pledged itself to
support the National Home. Moreover, Arab opposition to the

National Home, which counted heavily with the Turkish government earlier, lost much of its influence after the outbreak of the
Arab revolt. While the Turks had felt that a pro-Zionist policy
would aggravate their relations with the Arabs, after the Arab
revolt they probably concluded that a pro-Zionist policy on their
part would not affect Turco-Arab relations in any serious manner.
On the other hand, despite its readiness to proclaim its support

of Zionism, and to negotiate about a corporation for the resettlement and colonization of Jews in Palestine, Turkey was
60 Ibid., pp. 207-209.
61 Ibid., pp. 210-226.
62 Ibid., pp. 228-233.
not prepared to give in to Zionist demands for self-government.

If the Zionist movement was to be of any interest to the Turks,
then it was only as a means of strengthening Turkey's claim for
Palestine at the peace conference.

The policy of the Zionist Executive in Berlin continued to be
based on the principle of neutrality even after the Balfour Declaration. In January, 1918, the final outcome of the War had not
yet been decided. Moreover, since it was assumed that a conventional peace conference in the tradition of the European Concert would take place, it was thought that the Zionist cause would
be greatly enhanced if the support of the Central Powers could

be obtained. The exact nature of Zionist peace conference demands had not yet been decided, but some preparatory work had
been done.63 As a result of these considerations, the Zionist

Executive responded in January, 1918, to the Turkish overtures
for negotiations. The fact that these negotiations were bound to
fail could not have been foreseen by either side.
8. Conclusion
Any ultimate verdict on the relations between the Zionist Or-
ganization and Germany and Turkey must await the publication

of the German and Turkish documents of this period. The available evidence prompts the conclusion that no negotiations on a
German or Turkish declaration supporting Zionism were held prior
to November 1917. Thus, the theory that the Balfour Declaration
was issued in order to forestall a German or Turkish declaration

is unfounded.
Most probably, the Zionist Organization would have gladly

entered into negotiations with Turkey and Germany despite its
official policy of neutrality. It was thought that German and Turkish support of Zionism might be of great value at the peace conference. But there was no willingness on the part of Germany or
Turkey to enter into any commitment, public or private, toward
the Zionist Organization. Turkey's policy was one of explicit opposition to Zionism. The Turks suspected that Zionism would
introduce foreign influences into the Empire. Moreover, in view
of Arab opposition to Zionism, the Turkish government did not
wish to further aggravate Turco-Arab relations, by supporting

Zionism. Finally, the most important factor behind Turkey's antiZionist policy was the fear that the establishment of the National
83 Ibid., pp. 144-146.

Home would create an additional nationality problem, and would
lead to the ultimate secession of Palestine from the Ottoman Em-
pire. The Turkish government was willing, however, to act with

restraint, and it accepted the German view that extreme antiJewish measures in Palestine would be politically damaging to
the cause of the Central Powers. Germany, too, was unwilling
to commit itself in favor of Zionism. The Germans apparently felt
that support of Zionism would strain their relations with Turkey,
because it would arouse Turkish suspicion and offend nationalist
sentiment.
Only after the Balfour Declaration was issued did negotiations
between Turkey and the Zionist Organization take place. These

negotiations were motivated by Turkish desire to counteract the
effect of the Balfour Declaration on public opinion, and by the

desire to strengthen, through an agreement with the Zionists,
Turkey's claim at the peace conference for the restoration of
Palestine to Ottoman rule. But, even in these negotiations in
1918, no concession was granted to the Zionist demand for the
political autonomy of the National Home. The German government, also, had reason to counteract the effect of the Balfour
Declaration, and intensified to some extent its unofficial efforts
to persuade Turkey to change its policy. But the German govern-
ment did not consider the Zionist issue important enough to

justify pressuring Turkey. At the same time, the German government was willing to maintain informal contacts with the Zionist
Organization so that the Zionist movement might eventually be

used for purposes of German foreign policy.
Such unofficial discussions could serve to prepare the basis

for cooperation between the Zionist movement and Germany, in
case conditions for such cooperation arose sometime in the future, possibly after the War. However, there was no connection
between these irregular and highly informal discussions, held on
the secondary level, and the British-Zionist negotiations which
started as early as 1916.
It seems that the motives which induced the British government to issue the Balfour Declaration should be sought elsewhere.
British dissatisfaction with the Sykes-Picot agreement and the timing of the Declaration to coincide with the renewal of the British
offensive in Palestine seem to indicate that Anglo-French rivalry
may have played an important role in the British decision.

Germany, Turkey and Zionist

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Germany, Turkey, and the Zionist Movement, 1914-1918

Author(s): Saadia E. Weltmann

Cambridge University Press, University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of

Germany, Turkey, and the Zionist

In 1897, the first Zionist Congress met in Basle and founded

Zionist political activity subsided with Herzl's death in 1904.

2 For a brief summary of this period see: A BShm, Die Zionistische

Bewegung, I (Berlin, 1935), 185-198.

ZIONIST MOVEMENT, 1914-1918 247

as a factor in international relations, and though it remained a

tween Zionist representatives and the great powers during the

support of the establishment of a Jewish National Home in

the considerations which motivated the British government to

otherwise have favored the Central Powers; and moreover, the

2. Zionism and the Powers Before the War

The Zionists' efforts to secure a charter for the establishment

of a National Home in Palestine brought them into contact with

the Ottoman Empire. Between 1896 and 1903 Theodor Herzl

tried to obtain a charter from the Turkish government in return

The Turkish government, however, was strongly dedicated to

pire. Indeed, to prevent the concentration in Palestine of a large

248 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

Jewish community which could amount to the creation of a new

and additional nationality problem, the government imposed

and the purchase of land there by foreign nationals.

renewed pressures for concessions by the protecting powers and

siderations as well as considerations of the national interest re-

sulted in the government's adoption of a strong anti-Zionist posi-

ZIONIST MOVEMENT, 1914-1918 249

Zionist movement and the European powers after Herzl's initial

efforts failed. The Great Powers, however, took notice of Zionism

Before the War, German policy involved peaceful economic

and even German colonies with German settlers. Furthermore,

and then only because an internal Jewish controversy drew

the German government's attention to Zionism. The controversy

evolved about the language of instruction in a new Technical

the Zionist Organization. After the Board of Directors of the new

Organization.7 These events made an unfavorable impression on

250 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

contacts were later expanded into more general discussions on

Britain, chiefly concerned with maintaining the security of

lishment of any other power on the flank of the Suez Canal in

of German influence in Turkey. Although projects to increase

terialize the government unsuccesfully offered the Zionists the

The Zionist movement again came to Britain's attention after

Jews in the movement, the opposition of some of them to the

Lowther, the British Ambassador to Constantinople,1o and it was

reflected also in a series of articles and letters published in the

8 Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 269-273.

ZIONIST MOVEMENT, 1914-1918 251

the Turkish government assumed a strong anti-Zionist stand.12

suspicions. During 1910-11 the French considered Zionism to be

ed and ceased to regard Zionism as inimical to French interests.

Other governments, such as the Austrian and the Russian,

the Russian government displayed marked hostility toward the

3. The Zionist Movement and the War

The outbreak of the War confronted the Zionist Organization

and geographically within the sphere of one of the belligerent

e6 The principal governing bodies of the Zionist Organization were the

252 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

conflicting views regarding the War, and their sympathies were

In August, as soon as War broke out, the Inner Executive of

cannot take a position on current affairs." It was also decided to