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The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914
Author(s): Kemal H. Karpat

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May, 1985), pp. 175209
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 17 (1985), 175-209. Printed in the United States of America
Kemal H. Karpat
THE OTTOMAN EMIGRATION TO AMERICA,

1860-1914
INTRODUCTION
Population movements have always played a major role in the life of Islam and
particularly the Middle East. During the nineteenth century, however, the transfer
of vast numbers of people from one region to another profoundly altered the
social, ethnic, and religious structure of the Ottoman state-that is, the Middle
East and the Balkans. The footloose tribes of eastern Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, and
the Arabian peninsula were spurred into motion on an unprecedented scale by
economic and social events, and the Ottoman government was forced to undertake settlement measures that had widespread effects. The Ottoman-Russian
wars, which began in 1806 and occurred at intervals throughout the century,
displaced large groups of people, predominantly Muslims from the Crimea, the
Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean islands. Uprooted from their
ancestral homelands, they eventually settled in Anatolia, Syria (inclusive of the
territories of modern-day Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel as well as modern Syria),
and northern Iraq. These migrations continued until the time of the First World
War.' In addition, after 1830 waves of immigrants came from Algeria-especially
after Abdel Kader ended his resistance to the French-and from Tunisia as well.
These people too settled in Syria at Damascus.2

The immigration into the Ottoman domain (mainly of various Muslim groups
but also of some non-Muslims, notably Jews) was the predominant feature of
the population movements of the nineteenth century. Paralleling it, however, was
a movement out of the Ottoman state towards the Americas. (At the same time
there was a much smaller emigration of Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians to
Russian territory; many of the Bulgarians subsequently returned to Ottoman
lands, however, and at no time did this northward migration reach a proportion
anywhere near that of the westward movement.) The source of the emigration to
the New World was Syria and, to a lesser extent, southeastern Anatolia.
The purpose of this article is to study the "Syrian" emigration-not, as has
been done until now, as an isolated phenomenon, but as a part of the total
Ottoman emigration to the Americas and in relation to the Ottoman policies
governing the movement of people out of its territories.3 While the size and
special peculiarities of the Syrian emigration do place it in a category of its own,
it may not properly be treated apart from the totality of the social and economic
? 1985 Cambridge University Press 0020- 7438/85/000175-35 $2.50
176 Kemal H. Karpat
forces and the government policies that affected Ottoman demography as a

whole.
Existing literature on the Syrian emigration is limited in quantity and scope,

and, like most of the writings dealing with the history of the Arabic-speaking
lands during the Ottoman era, it makes no use of Turkish sources. Turkish
archives, especially the Prime Minister's and Foreign Ministry archives, contain
a sizable number of communications from governors and other officials (in
Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli, Beirut, Acca, and Jerusalem) giving information
about a variety of problems involving persons who had already emigrated, who
planned to leave, or who had returned home. The Ottoman embassies, legations,
and consulates in France, Spain, Italy, England, the United States, Canada, the
Caribbeans, and South America also provided information on the migrants'

transportation, their legal and social situations in the settlement countries, their
cultural and political activities, their relations with the Ottoman government,
and related issues.
In this study I shall attempt to piece together and analyze in a general historical framework the information provided by these Ottoman documents, my
hope being that it will stimulate greater interest in the Ottoman social history
that led up to the Syrian migration. It should be noted that, although I use the
traditional term for convenience's sake, "Syrian emigration" is a misnomer in
two respects: the term was once used by outsiders, the emigrants identifying
themselves mostly in accordance with religious affiliation or by smaller region,
town, village, or tribe; furthermore, the Ottoman migrants were not all from the
territory of Syria, as the available data indicate. As will be pointed out, the
emigration was not a "Christian" migration either; impelled by many of the same
causes that led Ottoman Christians to seek their fortunes in the New World, a
substantial number of Ottoman Muslims left their homes and traveled west
across the Atlantic.
THE CAUSES OF EMIGRATION
For thousands of years the peoples inhabiting the coastal areas of Syria and
Anatolia have been prone to migrate westward, using the seaways to reach the
faraway lands where they traded and settled. These ancient peoples, deprived of
easily accessible and secure hinterlands, were accustomed to rely on the sea for
their survival and were thus highly mobile. Seafaring and far-flung trading estab-
lished patterns and traditions of migration that were followed whenever conditions warranted. During the last half of the nineteenth century, changes in the
economic and ethnocultural structure of Ottoman society, coupled with the
industrialization of North America and the rise of large agricultural enterprises
in South America-that is, the emergence of "push" factors in the Ottoman
realm enhanced by "pull" factors in the Americas-revived the dormant tradition of outward migration, and the peoples of Syria and sections of Anatolia
once more turned their faces toward the west.
The structural changes in the Ottoman state at this time were profound. The
traditional economy was shifting to a primitive form of dependent capitalism
Ottoman Emigration to America 177

that came to rely almost entirely on agriculture. This transition had been preceded by a relatively long period (1792-1853) during which epidemics and wars,
economic stagnation, and demographic decay had been the salient features of the
Ottomans' world. The decrease in population, especially of Anatolia and Rumili,
was so severe that the government sought to attract immigrants from Europe by
offering incentives such as tax exemptions. In 1857 advertisements inviting immi-
grants were placed in the journals of various European capitals and excited much
inquiry from prospective settlers.4 However, after 1862 millions of Muslim refu-
gees from Crimea, the Balkans, and the Caucasus began pouring into Ottoman
territories, and the liberal European immigration policy was reversed.5 The influx
of huge numbers of refugees transformed the remnant of the Ottoman Empire

into a predominantly Muslim state. Thus, on the eve of the Syrian emigration, a
drastic transformation of both the religious-cultural structure and the economic
conditions in the Ottoman state was taking place and profoundly affecting many
of its peoples.
The settlement of the Muslim refugees, often on uncultivated state-owned

land, was itself in a way a social revolution, for most of the newcomers were
given title to their lands, whereas many of the established cultivators continued
to work the state-controlled (miri) land as tenants only (although their rights as
cultivators were enlarged in 1867 and thereafter). Moreover, European demand
for agricultural products brought about a mini-revolution in the Ottoman agricultural economy by stimulating the cultivation of cash crops and turning certain
farm sectors toward a market economy. As a result, large tracts of land in

Anatolia and Syria were brought under cultivation, and the production of agricultural commodities increased substantially.
The agricultural revolution did not bring prosperity to all sectors of the
Ottoman society, however. The coastal areas with relatively rich agricultural
hinterlands and/or suitable ports (such as Izmir, Mersin, Beirut, Haifa, etc.)
developed rapidly; the interior, due to lack of transportation and other causes,
did not immediately feel the benefit of the socioeconomic renaissance occurring
along the privileged coasts. In fact, it seems that the quantity and prices of
agricultural commodities produced in the interior-which consisted of traditional crops raised by the old methods of dry farming-remained unchanged, or
even decreased. In some areas of Anatolia and Syria the immigrant Bosnians,
Circassians, Cretans, and Turks were prospering, while the natives, tied to the
old land system and unable to accept innovative methods (and for various other
causes), remained economically stagnant and socially and culturally conservative. On the other hand, there were also immigrants who, unable to adapt to
their new homes, did not prosper in the changing economic climate.
The increased commercial activity of the port cities produced new employment
opportunities that attracted many ambitious persons from the poorer regions of
the country. At the same time, the cities became the gathering places of the
unemployed and unemployable.6 These included some groups of immigrants,
who came to the urban areas in such numbers that they caused severe problems
in some cases (such as the Circassians in Beirut and the Cretans in Izmir), and
some landless peasants. In addition, the rapid occupational transformation of
178 Kemal H. Karpat

the cities left many traditional craftsmen and professionals unemployed because
their skills had become obsolete in the new society. Several lists of professions
published by the Ottoman government between 1880 and 1900 show an interesting duality: on the one hand are listed the old crafts and professions, whose
practitioners are shown to be dwindling in number; and on the other hand, many
new professions-in transportation, banking, insurance, and the like-are included in the lists, and the numbers of people in these fields were expanding
rapidly.7 Thus, besides the general change in the Ottoman economic, social, and
cultural milieu that was the principal stimulant of emigration from Syria and
eastern Anatolia, there were specific causes that affected particular groups of
people, such as the traditional craftsmen and professionals who could no longer
find work in their native cities.
Some other particular causes of economic dislocation for certain groups were
the destruction of the major part of the vineyards by phylloxera; the opening of
the Suez Canal, which caused the trade routes to shift southward; and the col-
lapse of the silk industry due to a disease that killed the local worms over the
period from 1875 to 1885 and made it necessary to buy silkworm eggs from
France and ship the cocoons there. Also, the special administrative status granted
to Mount Lebanon in 1861 had the effect of cutting its people off from the
prosperous Biga valley and Tripoli and throwing them back on to their own
relatively limited resources; thus the mountaineers, who were mostly Christians,
sought economic security through migration.
Meanwhile, the old religious communities disintegrated and new churches

proliferated, adding religious turmoil to the dislocation caused by socioeconomic
change.8 Some have claimed that the Christians of Syria emigrated and sought to
enrich themselves mainly because of the threat of the Muslim population.9 The
idea is unacceptable in this form, although the fear that the large numbers of
Muslim immigrants could shift the demographic balance in Syria was a real one
(which is discussed further in a later section of this article). The desire to escape
from a condition of poverty or to remedy one's deteriorating economic situation
by moving to a place that offered the possibility of bettering oneself was a powerful one. The early Syrian migrants to the Americas were mainly from the lower
socioeconomic classes'?; some had had to sell almost all of their belongings
simply to pay for their passage.
The existing literature on the Syrian emigration lays exaggerated stress on

such factors as the Druze revolts, the unchecked brigandage, the corruption of
Ottoman officials (who practiced extortion against merchant and peasant alike),
and the feelings of insecurity caused by these factors." In fact, the major Druze
uprisings-supposedly aimed at Christians and responsible for their emigrationtook place in 1896 and 1909 after the migration was already well under way.
Moreover, the standard European version of these events, which puts the blame
for the disturbances entirely on the Druzes and portrays the Christians as
defenseless victims of aggression, is not supported by the facts.'2 Stories about
the oppressions allegedly perpetrated by the Ottoman regimes (at least up until
the Young Turks era) are negated not only by a variety of reliable studies but
also by the actions of the emigrants themselves: most of them were determined to
return to Syria after accumulating some money, and a third of them did eventually return. The endless tales of oppression, injustice, and maltreatment at the
hands of the Ottoman government and their Muslim fellow citizens were aimed
primarily at arousing sympathy and support among Christians in Europe and the
Americas. These tales were published in the press of the United States and
elsewhere, often backed up by reports from missionaries or local priests-who
were prone to interpret any act of authority on the part of the Ottoman govern-
ment as "oppression" and any demand for the payment of legitimate taxes as
"extortion."13
The appeal to Christian sympathies in the U.S. took a more vehement antiOttoman, anti-Muslim turn after the beginning of the twentieth century, when
immigrant intellectuals began to publish journals and write books espousing various brands of nationalism and to consider themselves the political spokesmen
for those back home.'4 One of the techniques for arousing Christian sympathy
was to claim to have been driven out of Jerusalem by fanatic Muslims-even if
one's original home had been elsewhere in Syria or Anatolia and far from
Jerusalem.
It must be stressed therefore that the chief "push" factor in the Syrian emigration was the deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions in the Ottoman state
after 1860-a deterioration that affected all population groups, Muslims as well
as Christians. Some particular stimuli of Muslim emigration were the introduction of compulsory military service for Muslims and the occasional discrimination in the enforcement of army duties, as well as unrest in some sections of
Syria.'5 Thus, although the number of emigrating Christians was greater, the
Syrian migration was not an exclusively Christian phenomenon.
There were "pull" factors associated with the Americas that were very strong
and probably were more important in the emigration movement than the "push"
factors described above. The availability of employment in North and South
America and the relatively high wages paid were powerful attractants. Manpower
was needed in the factories of North America and in the fields of Argentina and
Brazil; and in the rapidly growing cities of these lands there was opportunity for
craftsmen and artisans.
The need for manpower seemed acute, if one is to judge from the requests for
immigrants addressed to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. For example, Paulo
Duval, a landowner of Sao Paulo, Brazil, asked permission to bring large
numbers of immigrants to work on his lands. He wrote that he was particularly

impressed with "the activities, sobriety, and facility of adaptation of oriental
workers, among whom the Armenians, it seems to me, appear to embody the
qualities necessary for agricultural labor."'6
Successful emigrants who returned home from the Americas with the money
to buy land, put up large houses, and become a rural upper class represented a
strong argument in favor of bold initiative and enterprise on the part of their
fellow Ottomans. Their tales of the wealth of the Americas stimulated the desire
for enrichment even in those who were not badly off, and later emigrants were
often people of some means who were drawn to the New World by the prospect
of increasing their wealth.
180 Kemal H. Karpat
As the immigrant colonies overseas became well established and prosperous,

they became themselves a "pull" factor, attracting those persons, perhaps less
venturesome or in less desperate straits at home, for whom the presence in the
alien West of already settled groups of their fellows was the circumstance that
tilted the balance in favor of emigration. (Of course, the relatives of the established colonists also came to the Americas.) In addition, a quite different group
began arriving around the turn of the century: the professionals and the writers
and journalists whose motive for emigration was cultural and political. The
Rev. Henry H. Jessup reported, for example, that in 1906, 58 graduates of the
Syrian Protestant College in Beirut were in the United States.'7 Furthermore,
data from the U.S. Immigration Commission shows that in 1911 the Syrian
immigrants had a significantly higher level of skills than other entering workers:
22.7% were in skilled occupations and 20.3% were engaged in trade, as compared
to figures of 20.2% and 19.1%, respectively, for all other immigrants. Just over
half the Syrian migrants were unskilled farm and factory workers (50.8%), while
nearly 60% of all other immigrants (59.2%) were in these jobs.'8
The overwhelming majority of the Ottoman immigrants to the Americas,

Africa, and Australia settled in the cities. Many practiced crafts or worked as
peddlers, and many eventually came to own small businesses. In fact, a number
of them came from home with a stock of carpets or other craftworks to be sold
on the streets of New York and other cities, thus introducing many oriental
products to the public of their new countries.
Later immigrants came also from different areas of Syria and Anatolia.
According to a French consular report of 1907, which provided an overall view
of immigration from Ottoman lands, the construction of railroads to the interior
allowed residents from the regions of Damascus, Aleppo, and of the entire
Mesopotamia to reach the coastal ports with ease for embarkation on ships for
the Americas. The report mentions emigration from Palestine, which was on a
much smaller scale than that from some other areas, totaling only about 4,000 in
10 years; however, about half of the Palestinians took their families with them.'9
In fact, after 1900 a large proportion of Syrian immigrants entering the United
States were women and children who came to join husbands and fathers, thus
balancing out the 67.9% male immigration of the earlier years (a total of 38,635
males to only 18,274 females).20 It may be remarked that the above ratio, although
heavily weighted toward males, was, in fact, much higher than the male-female
ratio among other Ottoman groups emigrating to the U.S. The Druzes brought
only a dozen women among 1,000 immigrants, while out of a total of about
8,000 Muslim immigrants there were only about two dozen women.21 These figures are, I believe, significant in explaining why Muslim migrants failed to establish strong communities in their adopted countries.
THE SCOPE OF EMIGRATION: NUMBERS, ORIGINS, RELIGIONS
The steady trickle of emigration from Ottoman lands, especially from Syria to
the Americas, started in the 1860s (some sources indicate that there were Ottoman
immigrants to the U.S. even as early as the 1820s); the number of departures in
the early years was fairly insignificant, however. The rate of outflow began to

increase in 1878/79, the additional movement being at first mainly toward South
America and the Caribbean. After 1891, Spain having decided to prohibit
Ottoman immigration to Cuba (and the Philippines), the stream turned toward
North America and increased in volume, reaching a peak level in 1896/97 after
the Ottoman government lifted its ban on emigration. The rate of emigration
increased again after the turn of the century, despite renewed restrictions at the
source, and it reached a final peak during the period from 1908 to 1914, stimulated first by the relative freedom initially established by the Union and Progress
government in 1908 and then by the dislocation caused by the Balkan war in
1912. The latter event triggered emigration from all the Ottoman provinces, but
particularly the Balkans and Anatolia, to the Americas and to Russia as well.
It is not possible to determine accurately the total number of Syrian immigrants to the United States, since precise and well-kept statistics are lacking.
Although the U.S. government began collecting immigration data as early as
1798 and stepped up this procedure in 1819 in accordance with an act requiring
ship passenger lists (manifestos) to be delivered to the local customs officers,
these statistics became generally systematized and relatively reliable only after
1880. Statistics on immigration from Asian Turkey were kept beginning in 1869
only-well after the flow had begun-and are obviously unreliable, because an
extremely low number of immigrants is recorded. For the period between 1867
and 1881 it is recorded that only 74 Asian Ottomans entered the country; and for
the period 1881-1885 none were recorded as entering the U.S. According to the
official statistics, immigrants from "Turkey in Asia" began to arrive in large
numbers in 1895 (no information is provided for the years 1885-1894), yet by
1910 the total of such immigrants is already given as 59,729, and they formed
nearly one-third of all the U.S. population born in Asia.22 Thus, even after the
improvement of immigration data gathering in 1880 the record of Asian Ottoman
immigration is noticeably incomplete. Many entered illegally or came via Canada

or using non-Ottoman documents and were never registered or were registered
incorrectly. The Ottomans kept few official figures on emigration (it being formally forbidden), but some estimates are provided by the various consular reports
and so on previously mentioned. Some of the available statistical material is

included in Appendices I-IX following this article.
Another difficulty standing in the way of making a precise determination of
the number of Syrians who entered the United States is the failure of most of the
reports to distinguish among Ottoman emigrants from different areas. Ottoman

reports tend to lump all emigrants together, whether from Asia or Europe.23
Although distinguishing "Turkey in Europe" from "Turkey in Asia," U.S. data
began to mention the particular place of origin of immigrants only in 1895; not
until 1920 were separate figures given for immigrants from Palestine (3,202),
Syria (51,900), and "Turkey in Asia," that is, Anatolia (11,014), under the general
category "Turkey in Asia." (Armenia was listed under the "Turkey in Asia"
category in 1920 also, but no figure for immigration was given; initially the
Armenians were included in a category with "Other Asians," separate figures
being recorded for them only in later years when the classification criteria
changed.)
182 Kemal H. Karpat

Despite this lack of hard data, it has often been stated in positive terms that
the emigrants from the Ottoman state to the Americas were Syrians, mainly
Lebanese, and Christians, either Maronites or Orthodox, who were escaping
oppression at home. The available Ottoman documents indicate that, in fact, the
number of Muslim immigrants was substantial. For example, an Ottoman consulate reported in 1904 that a ship arriving at Malta had aboard 201 "Syrians"
who had embarked at Tripoli to go to the Americas and that half of these
were Muslims who had left without permission; and the Ottoman consulate in
Marseilles subsequently reported that there was considerable "clandestine emigration of Muslims of 18-35 years of age" from Mamuretulaziz (Elazig), Aydin,
and Trabzon in Anatolia, as well as from Syria, and that these young Muslims
were escaping conscription and poverty.24
Reference to Muslim emigrants is made in all types of communications concerning this traffic. For example, a group of Ottomans denied entry to the
United States because of lack of the proper documents and/or any established
means of subsistence was reported to consist of approximately 200 Syrians, 200
Armenians, and 60 "Turks," that is, Muslims.25 An Argentine statistical report
(see Appendix VI) shows that of 11,765 Syrian immigrants admitted to that
country in 1909, some 5,111 (or roughly 45%) were Muslims, the rest being
Catholics (6,428) and Jews (226).
Although it may be suggested that Muslim immigration took place only
after 1900, the Ottoman legation in Washington reported as early as 1892
that among Syrian immigrants there were "considerable numbers" of Muslims.
The report stated that the total was some 200 and that they were to be found in
Massachusetts, Michigan, and St. Louis, Mo. (it did not mention New York or
other large eastern cities where many more Muslims had settled); it noted particularly that 10 Muslims from Kharput had recently come to Worcester, Mass.,
and that one of these was an imam (religious leader) who had come to work with
his sons already in the country. Significantly, the report mentions the fact that in
many cases Muslims preferred to pass as Christians-particularly as Armenians,

whose living habits were similar to those of other Anatolians and who often
spoke Turkish as a first language-in the hope of gaining easier acceptance in
the U.S. and of avoiding trouble with the Ottoman government.26
Thus, in addition to the general lack of systematic data collection programs

for emigration/immigration statistics in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, the deliberate reticence of the Muslims themselves handicaps us in our

attempt to ascertain the number of Muslim immigrants to the United States.
Their departure from the Ottoman state was necessarily clandestine, since they
were forbidden to emigrate even before general restrictions were imposed. There
is some evidence that a few missionary groups abetted the effort of some Muslims
to slip away from the Ottoman state and enter the U.S. (the intent being to
accomplish the bona fide conversion of these Muslims to Christianity). In any
event, many elected to pass as "Syrians" and as Christians so as not to arouse the
interest of Ottoman officials or otherwise jeopardize their entry into their new
countries. Furthermore, those in the United States often continued to assume
Christian coloration so as to be less conspicuous culturally in a society that, as

they discovered, preached religious equality in public but was intolerant of it in
private. Many took on Christian names, and it is certain that a large number
actually converted to Christianity (or their children did). Some Turkish Muslim
children also were converted through being adopted by Bulgarian, Serbian, or
Bosnian families, after their parents had been murdered by nationalist terrorist
bands or slaughtered by Bulgarians and Serbians in Macedonia during the
Balkan war, and these Muslim children entered the United States under European
Christian headings when their adoptive families immigrated. (I have recently
met personally representatives of these two groups of converted Muslims: a
Mr. Johnson, originally Ahmad Sharif, who had raised his family as Christian,
and a priest whose father was a Turk brought as an infant to the United States
by a Bulgarian family.)
Apparently there were inducements to conversion other than the simple desire
to blend in with the rest of society; these were quite attractive-so much so that
in a number of cases Christian immigrants claimed that they were Muslims and
expected to be induced to "convert" at some gain for themselves.27
Some of the early Muslim communities survive in debilitated form in various

cities of North and South America, but most seem to have disappeared as their
membership dwindled through conversion, death, and especially, return to the
home country.28 The lack of Muslim leadership to provide support and guidance
and the scarcity of Muslim women among the immigrants-which resulted in the
lack of opportunity to form families, the main vehicles of culture transmissionprobably account in large part for the decline of these communities; they never
became strong enough to enable their members to resist conversion pressures or
to make the New World culturally attractive enough to be considered a permanent home by those who did not care to convert.
Despite their desire not to be identified as Muslims, many of them were

revealed as such when difficulties with transportation or admission into the
country of destination led them to seek official aid. For example, the consul in
Marseilles learned that there were 18 Muslims among a total of 108 emigrants,
all ostensibly Syrian Christians, who came forward to complain that they had
been defrauded by travel agents in Beirut who had charged them 310 francs for
tickets from Marseilles to New York when the going price from Naples to New
York was only 160 francs.29 The consular dispatches indicate that many Muslims-
from places such as Mumuretulaziz, Malatia, Kharput, Akchedag-traveled long

distances, sometimes even by foot, to reach ports for overseas embarkation.
There were, in fact, well-defined migration routes from the interior to the coast:
Konya to Mersin, Aleppo-Urfa to Beirut, Sivas and Ankara to Izmir, and

Erzincan to Trabzon.30 Tripoli was also a major embarkation port, especially for
Syrian Muslims. The consular reports indicate that "Syrian" emigrants came
from Mount Lebanon, Tripoli, and Jerusalem; but by 1895 the migration from
Lebanon seems to have overtaken in volume that from the other areas.
Although the Christians formed the large majority in the Ottoman emigration, the available evidence indicates that the proportion of Muslims was fairly
substantial-probably 15% to 20% of the total. As to the size of that total, a
reasonable estimate may be made on the basis of such sources as are available.
184 Kemal H. Karpat
Himadeh estimated that about 120,000 persons left Syria between 1860 and
1914;3' Issawi places the total emigration from Syria and Mount Lebanon at
330,000 for the period 1860-1914, while Ruppin, basing his figures on German
consular estimates, gives the number of Syrian emigrants living in North and
South America in 1912 as 500,000, of whom half were Lebanese;32 E. Weakly
reports that in 1909 a total of 13,848 embarked from Tripoli and Beirut alone;33
Issawi and Ruppin both estimate the annual outflow to have been 15,000 to
20,000 people.34 On the basis of these estimates one may conclude that the total
emigration from Beirut and Tripoli only was approximately 280,000 in the period
1900-1914. Taking into consideration also the emigration from other ports such
as Izmir, Mersin, and Trabzon, it may be estimated that the total Ottoman
migration from Asia during that time came to nearly half a million.
The original estimates of emigration totals, both in general and for Syria
alone, are quite certainly low. Some Ottoman consular reports dating from as
early as 1893 suggest that the number of "Arabic-speaking Ottomans" living in
the two Americas was as high as 200,000. These reports indicate that even by
1880, and especially after 1885, the rate of emigration and the number of
Ottomans living abroad was such that the government was forced to open new
consulates or expand existing ones in Spain (Barcelona), France, the Caribbean
(Havana, Cuba), and South America (Argentina). The impetus for providing
substantial consular service abroad came not merely from the Ottoman government's desire to provide protection to its citizens but also from its wish to prevent them from seeking diplomatic protection and acquiring passports from
European governments. Maronites in particular often managed to obtain French
passports and become thereby de facto French citizens, enabling them to act
without regard for Ottoman law when they returned home.35
Data scattered through various Ottoman consular reports provide a good
basis for estimating the emigration trend. One report states that vessels bound
for America that had docked in Barcelona carried 980 Lebanese emigrants in
April of 1889, 860 in May, and 665 in June-a total of 2,505 in just three months
at one transshipment point.36 In 1899 the Ottoman consul in Marseilles reported
that during the previous year a total of 29,763 emigrants had passed through that
port, 7,010 of whom were Syrians, 526 Armenians. Three years later the consul
stated that 15,000 Syrians left the country annually to seek their fortunes in the
New World and that of these 5,000 returned home early.37 Another dispatch
from the Ottoman consul at Genoa reports that in September of 1910, a total of
28,705 kuru4 in passport fees was collected (the fee was 11.50 or 12 to 15 francs
per passport). The consul suggested that, because 60% of the Syrian emigrants
passed through Genoa (an exaggerated percentage claim), the revenue from passports could be increased from its present level of 800 to 900 Ottoman liras per
month to 4,000 to 5,000 liras per month.38 Other consular communications gave
the totals of Syrian (Lebanese) immigrants to Argentina alone in the years 1910,
1911, and 1912 as 13,099, 13,605, and 19,797, respectively-figures much higher
than any previously known.39 Complete lists are not yet available; however, a
dispatch from Buenos Aires in September of 1913 stated that more than a million Ottomans had thus far emigrated to the Americas; this migration had started
during the Hamidian regime and continued in the Young Turks era, but the
government had not occupied itself with the problem.40
The mounting wave of emigration was greatly alarming the Ottoman consuls
abroad, despite their government's official indifference to the problem. The
consul at Buenos Aires reported that approximately 46,000 Ottomans had come
to Argentina during the 2-year period 1911-1913. He wrote, "If the preceding
reports are studied, one will see that the number of emigrants is increasing every
year and that serious measures need to be taken in order to stop this wave which
is emptying the country, especially now when the country has supreme need for
its sons."41
Thus, the available evidence indicates that the total of Ottoman emigrants to
the Americas in the period from 1860 to 1914 probably came to 1,200,000. Of
these, approximately 600,000 were from Syria and Mount Lebanon and were
Arabic speakers; about 150,000 were Muslims of all areas; the rest came from
Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, and western Anatolia. (The French Ambassador to
Turkey estimated in 1907 that Macedonians had been emigrating at a rate of
about 15,000 per year since 1902, and that approximately the same rate applied
in Albania.)42
The number of Ottoman emigrants who did not make the New World their
permanent residence was substantial. The rate of return home was unusually
high, and among the Muslims of all regions and the Syrians, the returnees seem
to have constituted one-third of the original total of migrants. Ruppin states that
the port authorities in Beirut listed departures of 41,752 persons and arrivals of
27,868 in the 3-year period 1912-1915.43 Although presumably not all of the
travelers were migrants (the war probably caused an unusually high amount of
traffic), the fact remains that the number of returnees was surely quite high.
Himadeh's figures show that in the period 1926-1933 the ratio of returns to
departures ran from 30% to 60% annually.44 (In this case the larger percentage
no doubt resulted from the economic dislocation in the U.S.) Antun Fares, the
publisher of al-Mercad in Marseilles who supplied the Ottoman government
with information on the political activities of the Syrian immigrants, also placed
the ratio of returning emigrants at one-third of the departures.45 According to

the Ottoman consul in New York, the overwhelming majority of Syrians entering there expressed a resolute intention to return home sooner or later; consequently many refused to become naturalized in the United States-except for
the Armenians, who "became naturalized as soon as their business went well."46
Thus it seems fairly certain that one-third of the Ottomans who emigrated
(roughly 400,000, or, proportionally, 200,000 Syrians) returned to their homeland. This would leave some 400,000 or more Syrian immigrants still in North
and South America-a figure that corresponds with the totals reported in the
47
various sources.4
Even those who could not or did not wish to return to their original homes
maintained ties with the Old World, since most had relatives that had remained
behind. There was an endless traffic between Syria and the Americas: a bride
from the native village would come to marry some immigrant in a New England
town and would be followed by countless brothers, sisters, cousins, and in-laws.
186 Kemal H. Karpat
In fact, after the first wave of migrants had become established, family ties
became one of the dominant motives for travel across the Atlantic. According to
a report of the U.S. Immigration Commission, out of 9,188 Syrians entering the
country in 1908-1909, 95% stated that they were coming to join relatives or
friends.48
OTTOMAN MIGRATION POLICY AND EMIGRANT TRANSPORTATION
A substantial part of the Ottoman diplomatic correspondence concerning emigration from Syria, Anatolia, and Egypt revolves around the two intertwined
problems of travel documents and transportation, the latter problem being a
consequence of Ottoman policy with regard to the former.
Returnees had no problems of re-entry into the Ottoman state and were, in
fact, often given financial help. The government's basic policy was to allow
unlimited freedom of return to all Ottoman subjects, present or former, with no
discrimination on the basis of race or religion. The best example of this liberal
policy was the government's repatriation, at its own expense, of about 16,000
Bulgarian Orthodox Christians who, having migrated to settle in Crimea and
Kuban in villages formerly occupied by Muslims, became unhappy with their
lives in Russia and petitioned the sultan to be allowed to return to their original
villages in the Lom area.49 The policy of government-financed repatriation
was applied also to Greek and Armenian subjects who wanted to return from
Russia, and to Syrian and other Ottoman subjects who sought to return from
the Americas, Australia, and Africa. This liberal policy had to be modified
eventually-even drastically reversed in the period 1900-1903; but for most of
the time it stood in strong contrast to the unusually conservative position of the
Ottoman government with regard to emigration.
For many years emigration was simply forbidden, not merely because of the
government's desire not to lose population and tax income but also because it
was feared that poor immigrants would damage Ottoman prestige abroad. The
prevailing view in Ottoman official circles in 1888 was that many emigrants
belonged to the "proletarian classes" and intended to become beggars in the
Americas. This view was strongly expressed by Turkhan Bey, the consul in
Barcelona, who was an especially prestige-conscious, elitist-minded individual.50
The Ottoman government's attitude reflected also the negative attitude toward
immigrants expressed in some of the U.S. press. The Mail and Express, for
example, described the Maronites who had embarked from Cyprus in the following terms:
[They are] a fierce, war-like body of people but densely ignorant and imbruted by long
ages of battles against the Moslems. They are nominal Christians ... [and] the movement
for transporting them to the United States has the sanction and support of the Roman
Catholic Church. By nature, by training, by hereditary instinct, these predatory, halfsavage mountaineers are totally unqualified for American citizenship ... [and] their
arrival among us would add still greater weight to the evil burden of foreign-born
ignorance with which we are already afflicted.... A large number of Armenians have
made preparations for emigrating to the United States. ... All of them are utterly unfitted
to become American citizens.5
On the other hand, many American businessmen who employed Syrians expressed
admiration for their skill and their willingness to work.
Because emigration was officially prohibited and took place illegally, it was by
necessity "clandestine"-but only in a rather loose sense, for Ottoman officials
often took bribes from emigrants and made only scant efforts to stem the traffic.
At one point the government became so alarmed about the size of the emigration
from Mount Lebanon-which occurred despite the sultan's order (irade-i seniye)
prohibiting it-that the Minister of the Interior issued a stern order that the
cause of this illegal situation be identified. The main blame was put on the local
officials, and stringent measures to stop illegal emigration were recommended.52
The recommended measures were never undertaken, however, because the ban
on emigration was lifted shortly thereafter.
The method adopted to prevent emigration was the denial of passports to

would-be emigres, but this policy simply stimulated the growth of an exceptionally lucrative business for middlemen, transport companies, and others who were
able to devise ways to help defeat the ban. Beirut and (to a lesser degree) Izmir
and Alexandria harbored a multitude of agents who prospered by recruiting
emigrants and arranging their passage. The standard fee for transport out of
Ottoman jurisdiction was initially 60 francs, but this had risen to 190 francs by
1914. The agents in Beirut, who worked for shipping companies in Marseilles,
Naples, and Genoa, would recruit the emigrants and embark them as ordinary
travelers to some transshipment point. When the emigration prohibition became
more strictly enforced, ships suspected of being emigrant transportation vessels
were not allowed to dock at Beirut.53 (Eventually these ships began lying to
outside Ottoman territorial waters and taking on passengers from a variety of
small coastal craft, thus increasing the profits for the shipping companies and the
intermediaries.)
Out of Ottoman territory travelers were able to use their certificates of travel
(murur tezkeresi)-a sort of identity card introduced during the last years of the
reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839)-in lieu of passports. The tezkere was intended
to be used for internal travel only, but it continued to be widely used as a sort of
passport well after the modern nationality law was adopted (1861) and regular
Ottoman passports began to be issued. Foreign governments would honor the
tezkere so long as it was not stamped "reserved for the interior" (dahiliyeye
mahsustur). An applicant for the tezkere would therefore make sure that the
issuing official did not stamp it with the reservation clause. Once landed in some
Mediterranean port, such as Marseilles, Genoa, Naples, Barcelona, or Corfu, emigrants were given trans-Atlantic tickets and embarked for their chosen destinations. Passengers for North America frequently transshipped through Marseilles,
although Italian ports also were used and Maronites from Mount Lebanon
sometimes embarked from Cyprus and even from Liverpool in England; for
those bound to South America, Spanish ports, notably Barcelona, were the
standard transshipping points.
At the transshipping points Lebanese and Egyptian emigrants were actually
able to obtain regular Ottoman passports to replace their murur tezkeresi because
of their special legal status within the Ottoman Empire. Egypt and Mount
188 Kemal H. Karpat

Lebanon were autonomous administrative districts but were still formally under
Ottoman suzerainty-a state of affairs the government was anxious to maintain.
Consequently, once a resident of one of these areas made it to a non-Ottoman
port he would be issued a passport to use for the rest of his journey.54 (It was the
issuance of these passports for a fee that produced the income the Ottoman
consul in Genoa wanted to see increased.)
Individuals of all nationalities were involved in the business of arranging
transport for emigrants.55 They often overcharged or left the travelers stranded.
The Ottoman government tried to persuade the European governments not to

allow vessels sailing under their national flags to carry emigrants for the Americas,
but with the temporary exception of Spain, the Europeans failed to honor this
request.
The ban on emigration from Mount Lebanon was extended and was to be
applied to Syria also, as an order issued in 1895 by the governor of Syria
shows.56 However, in 1896/97 the prohibition was effectively removed by the
new conditions imposed on it. The reasons for this abrupt change in policy were
numerous and complex, and I do not attempt here to discuss them comprehensively or in detail. An important one was almost certainly the great influx of
Muslims from the Balkans and the Caucasus who, beginning in 1896, sought
refuge in Ottoman lands in ever-growing numbers. After a lengthy debate between
the government bureaucrats-who saw numerous problems with this enormous

immigration and were opposed to granting permission for the refugees to enter
Ottoman territory-and the religious establishment-which insisted that unlimited sanctuary must be given all Muslims-the sultan chose the path of religious
duty and ordered that the refugees be accommodated.57 The Ottoman government no longer had to worry about underpopulation, since the places of those
who departed under the liberalized emigration policy could quickly be filled by
the newcomers.
Another reason for the change in policy was that the government had become
aware of the value of the remittances sent home by emigrants in the Americas.
A. A. Naccache, the inspector of public works and agriculture in Mount Lebanon,
estimated that the total annual income of the district amounted to 220 million
francs, 90 million of which were remitted from the New World.58 The Ottoman
consuls in South America reported that in the one year of 1913 Syrian emigrants
had sent home to relatives through a single Argentine bank a sum of 11,800,000
pesos; five or six other banks transferred similar amounts, and the estimated
total of funds sent from Argentina alone in that year was 24 million pesos, or
240 million Ottoman kuruy.59 Emigrants from other areas-for example, Muslims
from Hama and Homs-also sent money home.
These remittances had the noticeable effect of changing the appearance of
many villages and towns. In Zahleh, for example, handsome new houses of stone
were built; apparently, however, this wealth did not affect the basic economy of
the region. In a special report to the sultan, Lewis Sabuncu, an interpreter at the
court, described how some emigrants made fortunes by popularizing Middle
Eastern specialties in the United States. Two had become very rich (one of them
was a woman) by obtaining patents for the manufacture of yoghurt and unleavened bread, respectively. Wealthy returning immigrants not only improved
their own positions in their native areas but "added strength to the reconstruction of the country and provided the Treasury with considerable benefits because
of the increased revenue obtained by taxing the buildings."60 Sabuncu advised

the sultan to send an Arabic-speaking diplomat as ambassador to the U.S. to
win the confidence of the emigrants and induce them to return home, bringing
their wealth with them, rather than become American citizens. Belatedly, then,
the Ottoman government began taking an interest in the economic achievements
of its subjects residing abroad.61
The lucrative business of the agents who secured transportation for emigrants
was adversely affected by the liberalization, since passports could now be freely
obtained and travel arrangements made openly. Bona fide maritime companies
were established in Beirut, and these issued regular tickets to New York and
other destinations. There was open competition for passengers among the shipping companies, which tried to attract fares by advertising the safety and comfort
of their vessels.62 Eventually some enterprising agents entered the game once
more by encouraging and abetting emigrants who preferred to leave without
getting passports, either because they did not want to pay the fees or because
they wished to avoid the requirement of obtaining documents to show that they
owed no money to the government or to fellow citizens.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EMIGRANTS: THE U.S.-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSY
The Ottoman emigration to the United States raised issues around which there
developed a diplomatic controversy that affected relations between the two
nations for half a century. The controversy was inherent in the difference in their
philosophies of citizenship and individual rights: the Ottoman state adhered to

the principle of jus sanguinis, which denies the citizen the right to expatriate
himself without government permission, while the U.S. accepted the doctrine of
jus soli, with the right of expatriation.63 This basic difference was subsequently
emphasized, and the disagreement intensified and acquired special political overtones as time went on.
The Ottoman nationality law of 19 January 1869 (Article 5) stipulated that

former Ottoman subjects who had acquired foreign nationality after emigrating
with the permission of the Ottoman government would be considered as foreign
aliens upon their return home. Those who had left without benefit of official
permission were to be treated as Ottoman subjects upon return, their foreign
naturalizations being considered null and void. In practice Ottomans who had
emigrated without permission prior to 1869 had few difficulties with this law,
although in a number of cases the government insisted on its right to ratify the
acquisition of another citizenship. The issue of the validity of an individual's
foreign naturalization arose when he came before an Ottoman tribunal as a
defendant or as a plaintiff in cases concerning inheritance or property claims or
when he sought validation of official documents from a government office. The
majority of persons whose foreign nationality was denied by the Ottoman govern-
ment were subjects who, it was insisted, to avoid payment of debts or escape
criminal prosecution had left without official permission.
190 Kemal H. Karpat
The United States did not insist that all immigrants who departed from the
country necessarily remained citizens entitled to U.S. protection abroad. John
Bassett Moore, the leading authority on the subject, states the U.S. position as
follows: "Our naturalization treaties with perhaps a single exception have incorporated the principle that a naturalized citizen permanently returning to the
country of his origin is to be considered as having renounced his naturalization."64 The American government contended that the Ottoman state's assertion
of the right to decide unilaterally the citizenship of naturalized Americans raised
a "conflict between the laws of sovereign equals" and that in practice the Ottoman
government, by its "obsolete doctrine of perpetual allegiance" discriminated

between classes of foreigners and compelled the United States to discriminate
between its native-born and its naturalized citizens. However, the United States
acknowledged that the Ottoman position was "recognized by the rest of the
civilized world in their dealings with Turkey."65 Most of the European governments, England and France included, accepted the provisions of the Ottoman
Nationality Law and refrained from demanding special privileges or protections
for those of their naturalized citizens who, being former Ottoman subjects,
returned to Turkey.66 The United States, however, had adopted a different policy,
extending protection to all persons who had lived for 5 years in America and
acquired American citizenship.
The open conflict with the U.S. began in the 1870s over the status of former
Ottoman subjects mostly from Syria and eastern Anatolia, but on 11 September
1874 officials of the two governments reached an agreement providing that
former Ottoman subjects who had acquired U.S. citizenship would be deemed to
have expatriated themselves and become once more Ottoman citizens if they
returned and remained for 2 years in their homeland. This agreement was
modeled on the U.S.-German naturalization treaty and was not an unusual one.
However, the U.S. Senate raised objections and refused to ratify the document.
Beginning in the 1880s the need for such a treaty became even more acute for
the Ottomans, as Armenian nationalists, many of whom were former Ottoman
subjects, were regularly using their status as U.S. citizens to defeat efforts to
arrest and prosecute them for armed insurrection and sedition against the state.
That some returning Armenians were taking advantage of the protection accorded
them by the United States government and engaging in subversive activities was
acknowledged by the American consul (Charles Dicknon) in Istanbul. He also
told the district governor (mutasarrif) of Beyoglu (Pera) that Armenians were
urging other Christians to emigrate, acquire U.S. citizenship, and then return to
engage in political activities. The consul advised that the Ottoman government
press for acceptance of the 2-year limit on immunity, as the Senate now seemed
predisposed to ratify the 1874 treaty.67
On 8 January 1889 the Ottoman government agreed to modify the naturalization treaty to meet the objections originally raised; but the Senate then raised
new objections, and the nationality issue remained unsolved and was a source of
conflict until well into the twentieth century. Roger R. Trask, in his study of the
conflict, goes directly to the heart of the matter:
The existence of the capitulations before 1914 complicated this situation because many
Ottoman subjects, including thousands of Armenians, came to the United States, acquired

citizenship, and then returned to their homeland where, as naturalized Americans, they
were not subject to Ottoman law. Between 1900 and 1924 about seventy thousand such
persons returned to Turkey from the United States.68
The imperial decree of 9 October 1896 by which emigration was liberalized

under certain conditions was designed in part as a device to enable the Ottoman
government to get some control over the Armenian nationalists. As early as 1892
the government had accorded the right to emigrate and change citizenship without imperial permission to those who agreed not to return. The new law codified
this condition for expatriation and made the legal return of such emigrants
almost impossible. The pertinent provisions of this decree are as follows:
All who desire to leave the country must sign a document and also have a solvable
guaranty, confirmed by the patriarchate, that they will not return to Turkey. This declara-
tion must be accompanied by the likeness of the emigrant, and it will only be after
fulfilling such formalities that emigration will be authorized. The passports delivered to
these emigrants will state that such persons will not be allowed to set foot again on
Ottoman territory. The explanation in question, as well as a declaration that the emigrants have lost Ottoman nationality, will be duly inscribed in the register of the commission ad hoc, in the archives of the competent department, as well as at the chancellery of
the Armenian patriarchate. A delay of a month and a half, and in cases of plausible
hindrance two months' delay, commencing from today, will be granted to those who have
gone abroad without authorization from the Imperial Government to return to their
homes. In the event of their design to stay where they are, they must make a declaration
to this effect in the Turkish embassies or legations abroad. Emigrants of this category
will, nevertheless, lose their nationality as Ottoman subjects, unless they return to Turkey
within the above named period.
Ottoman Armenian subjects who have emigrated under false names and, yet, by diverse
means, have returned to Turkey with foreign passports will not be recognized as foreign
subjects, nor will they be allowed to live in any part of the Empire.69
In 1902/03 the provisions of the decree were made even more stringent in
response to a rapidly increasing pace of emigration from Albania and Macedonia
in the Balkans. Emigration from this area had been relatively limited, but after
1900 it had intensified greatly, and in the period from 1902 to 1907 as many as
75,000 left from Macedonia alone. The French ambassador in Istanbul reported
that by 1907 this emigration was affecting even the Ottoman provinces in the
interior. He stated that 1,000 Greeks and 100 Armenians from Bursa had left for
America and Russia (he put the total of Armenians who had migrated to Russia
at 20,000).7o Most of the migrants were young men: craftsmen and artisans such
as carpenters, shoemakers, blacksmiths, tailors, tanners, pastry makers, etc., who
found easy employment in the cities of North and South America; and peasants,
who were readily employed in mining industries. Their departure not only caused
a drop in the rate of production of many commodities, leading to a rise in prices,
but also upset the structure of the various religious communities. The leaders of
these communities urged the Ottoman government to ban emigration from
Albania and Macedonia because their political influence was being lessened by
the depletion of their constituencies.
During most of the years of this migration, relations between the emigrants
and the Ottoman government were rather good. The government seems to have
192 Kemal H. Karpat

enjoyed the loyalty of Syrian immigrants in the U.S. and Latin America until the
turn of the century and was content with the knowledge that most of these
Syrians planned to return home and bring their accumulated earnings with them.
(As early as 1880 it was calculated that each Syrian in New York saved about
$50 a month.) The government did not appear alarmed when informed that a
small group of intellectuals calling itself "The Young Syria" had adopted an
anti-Ottoman position and that four out of nine journals published in the United
States by Syrian immigration intellectuals were taking a line hostile to the
Ottoman government. This opposition was an insignificant minority.7' However,
when Lebanese Christian intellectuals began arriving in America, chiefly after
1895, and the Union and Progress government that took power in 1908 proved a
disappointment, there was a marked shift toward a form of ethnic-religious
nationalism (occasionally called "Arab nationalism") that was directed specifically against the Ottoman government.
Meanwhile, in Syria, as in other parts of the Ottoman state, the influx of

Muslim refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus combined with the exodus
of large numbers of Christians produced a drastic change in the ethnic, religious,
and economic structure of the society. Prosper de Barante, secretary of the French
Embassy in Istanbul, reported in 1907 that the population balance and ratio of
land ownership and involvement in agricultural enterprise had changed in favor
of the Muslims. He gave some examples of this change in Bursa, and then discussed the situation of Syria:
The same phenomenon is seen in Syria and particularly in Beirut where the Muslim
element, in minority until the present time, has acquired a growing importance, and
thanks to a methodical and rational plan tends to replace the Christians from the dominant position they occupied since 1860. The Muslims of Aleppo, Damascus, and the
people of Bekaa and Hauran, who have become rich by trading in cereals, are buying the
properties of the Christians. The latter empoverished by [their tendency] to great luxury
or afraid of local disorders are moving some towards Egypt; other towards America.72
Thus it seems reasonable to say that the "nationalism" of the Christian Arab
emigrants was in part a reaction to their loss of majority and power in certain
areas of Lebanon and Syria-a development for which they held the Ottoman
government responsible because of its policy of settlement of refugees that was
favorable to the Muslim segment of the population.
CONCLUSION
A factual, in-depth study of Ottoman emigration and immigration provides

far better insight into the transformation of the Middle Eastern society in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries than do standard sweeping ethnoreligious
generalizations-which actually tend to obscure the true happenings. The information currently available, as discussed in this brief study, provides numerous
tantalizing leads, which could be pursued further. I shall not elaborate on those
leads here but shall simply state a few of the conclusions that can be reached on
the basis of this discussion.

It is quite obvious that the Syrian emigration cannot be studied apart from the
topic of the general policy of the Ottoman government on emigration and immi-
gration. This policy was first devised in accordance with traditional Ottoman
concepts regarding the movement of people from one territory to another, but
eventually it came to be shaped by concrete economic and political as well as
ideological factors. This led the government to move from a mild form of prohi-
bition on emigration to a conditional liberalization in 1896/97 and, finally, to a

stringent prohibition (never fully enforced) in 1902/03 after emigrants returning
with foreign passports used their new status to claim special privileges and
immunities as citizens of foreign powers.
There was close and friendly contact between Syrian emigrants abroad and the
Ottoman government-despite antagonistic attitudes on the part of certain

groups of politically motivated intellectuals-until the final breakup of the
Empire. At least until the advent of the Union and Progress Party government
most of the emigrants had the intention of returning home someday and were
anxious to maintain roots in their native regions. In fact, a large proportion of
them never acquired citizenship in the New World.
The Syrian emigration was part of an overall Ottoman emigration. It is virtually certain that the volume of the outflow, of both the general emigration and
of the Syrian segment of it, was much greater than has been estimated previously.
The "Syrian" emigrants initially came from the entire western and northeastern
sections of Syria and southeast Anatolia, including Palestine, but eventually
Mount Lebanon became the main source of emigrants. The Muslims of Syria
and eastern Anatolia participated in this migration in far greater numbers than
those given in some published sources.
In its effort to formulate policies toward emigration and toward its former
citizens who returned with foreign passports to live in their native land, the
Ottoman government was hamstrung by the capitulations. Although formally
independent and sovereign, the Ottoman state was not permitted to enforce its
laws on foreigners-even when these were its own former subjects who were
engaging openly in anti-Ottoman activities.
Immigration and emigration appear to have been the forces chiefly responsible
(factors such as industrialization being lacking) for the alteration of the economic and socioethnic structure of the Ottoman state and, thus, for the accelerated downfall of the traditional imperial edifice and the rapid emergence of
territorial national states in the Middle East.
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MADISON
APPENDICES
A Note on the Statistical Appendices
The statistics presented in Appendices I-IX as a very general supplement to

the text of this article are extracted from some of the published basic sources and
194 Kemal H. Karpat

from unpublished documents dealing with the populations of the United States,
Argentina, Brazil, and the Ottoman state. Some of the tables were compiled by
me from material found in various places, while others are taken from the source
with only minor editorial emendations.
Ottoman figures are taken from consular reports and may have originated in
information supplied by the various foreign governments. The emigration figures
given by these reports appear generally higher than the corresponding immigration figures of the recipient countries. The major reason for this discrepancy lies
in the lack of uniform criteria for classification of immigrants and, especially, in
the fact that much immigration went completely unrecorded.
The methods used by U.S. authorities to classify immigrants varied from one
office to another, and the criteria were continuously changing. Figures given by
the Bureau of Statistics, for example, were usually 7% to 8% higher than those
issued from 1892 on by the Office of Immigration and its successor; while the
Bureau of Statistics compiled its figures based on immigrant arrivals, the Office
of Immigration counted only official admissions and did not count cabin-class
passengers as immigrants until 1904. The system was later (1906) refined to
exclude from the count passengers in transit and resident aliens returning from
abroad. The annual reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration have
more detailed immigration information than the other U.S. sources utilized. For
further information on U.S. immigration records, see E. P. Hutchinson, "Notes
on Immigration Statistics on the United States," American Statistical Association Journal (December 1958) 1, 963 ff.
Statistics on Ottoman immigration to Latin America are equally unsystematic
and incomplete. Only Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela gave figures on these
entrants, although Ottoman subjects were found in almost every Latin American
country, including Cuba and Mexico. However, in a number of cases data from
Brazil and Argentina are surprisingly detailed as to the religious background and
occupations of immigrants, although it must be pointed out that the general
classification terms for Ottoman immigrants were nondescriptive: in Argentina
they were all called "Syrians," while in Brazil they were referred to as "Turks"
and "Arabs."
A cursory comparison shows that initially Ottoman immigrants constituted

one-third of all Asian immigrants to the U.S.: in Brazil they were the fifthlargest group of immigrants in the period 1908-1912 (the first through fourth
groups being the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Italians, and the Russians, while
Germans, Austrians, and French were sixth through eighth); in Argentina the
Ottomans were the sixth-largest group of immigrants.

APPENDIX 1
Immigrantsfrom Asian Turkey to U.S., 1869-1915
Year Number 5-year total Year Number 5-year total

1869
1871
1893
2
2
1870
4
1872
1894
1895
2,767
1896
4,139
1873
1897
4,732
1874
1898
4,275
1899
4,436
1900
3,962
14
5,255
1875
1876
1877
1901
5,782
1878
1902
1879
31
1880
1881
6,223
7,118
5,235
6,157
30,515
6,354
8,053
9,753
7,506
15,212
46,878
10,229
12,788
23,955
21,716
3,543
72,231
1903
53
1904
1905
1882
1906
1883
1907
1908
1884
1885
1909
1910
1886
15
1887
208
1911
1888
273
1912
1889
593
1890
1,126
1891
2,488
1892
1913
2,215
1914
1915
Grand total
21,544
178,712
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Division of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), Part 1, pp. 105-7. The same figures appear
with minimal changes in The Statistical History of the United States From Colonial Times to the
Present (Stamford, Conn.).
196 Kemal H. Karpat

APPENDIX II
Annual report of Commissioner General of Immigration,

U.S. Department of Labor
Turkey Turkey
in
Year
Europea
1895
242
in
Asia
Armenian
2,766
Turkish
1896
169
4,139
1897
152
4,732
1898
176
4,275
1899
80
4,436
1900
285
3,962
1901
387
5,782
1,855
136
1902
187
6,223
1,151
165
1903
1,529
7,118
1,759
449
1904
4,344
1,745
1,482
1905
4,542
5,235
6,157
1,878
2,145
1906
9,510
6,354
1,895
2,033
1907
20,767
8,053
2,644
1,902
1908
11,290
9,753
3,299
2,327
1909
9,015
7,506
3,108
820
1910
18,405
15,212
5,508
1,283
3,092
5,222
9,353
1,336
1911
14,438
10,229
1912
14,481
12,788
1913
14,128
23,955
1915
1,008
3,543
1916
313
1,670
964
216
1917
152
393
1,221
454
1918
15
43
221
24
1919
10
19
282
18
1920
1,933
5,033
2,762
140
1921
6,391
11,735
10,212
353
1922
1,660
1,998
2,249
40
1923
3,743
2,183
2,396
237
1924
1,481
2,820
2,940
355
140,833
178,112
65,756
18,848
918
2,015
1914
Total
Note: These statistics run by fiscal year, June 30 to June 30.
aIt is probably the case that a considerable number of immigrants listed in U.S. statistics as
originating in "Turkey in Europe" in fact had their roots in Asia.
APPENDIX III Ottoman Immigration to U.S., 1891-1892
Place of origin
Without With occupation Without

Professionalsa profession (employed) occupation Totals
or ethnicity 1891 1892 1891 1891 1892b 1891 1892 1891 1892
European Turkey 7 30 32 117 95 109 102 265 227
Arabia
221
110
130
81
352
191
Asian Turkey 6 114 159 1,324 1,105 339 1,953 2,488 3,172
Armenians 2 6 75 619 2,406 118 316 812 2,728
Egypt
22
17
40
17
Total 15 152 267 2,302 3,724 713 2,459 3,957 6,335
Source: AFM, fol. 587 (Idare), figures supplied by U.S. Immigration Service; also BA, Yildiz,
Perakende, 20 L.310, No. 1317 of 17 May 1893, Communication by the Ottoman Legation in
Washington, D.C.
aThe documents refer to two categories: sanatkar and meslek sahibi, "artisan" and "professional."
The two categories have been lumped together here, since no criterion for classification is indicated.
bThe Ottoman communication notes the sharp increase that occurred in 1892.
APPENDIX IV Age characteristics of the Ottoman migrants

arriving in U.S. in 1889
Under 15 15-40 Above 40 Total Grand total
Place of origin
or ethnicity M F M F M F M F M and F
European Turkey 21 18 162 28 19 4 202 50 252
Arabia
18
Armenia
157
13
20
68
14
7
189
2
86
27
216
10
96
Asian Turkey 36 14 419 65 44 15 499 94 593

Egypt - 2 26 4 1 - 27 6 33
Total 88 39 832 124 83 24 1,003 187 1,190
Source: AFM, fol. 587 (Idare). These figures probably were based on information supplied by the
U.S. government.
198 Kemal H. Karpat

APPENDIX V Immigration of the
Syrians to Argentina
Year
Number
1871-1876
164a
1877-1890 (not available)

1891-1895
885
1896-1900 8,394
1901-1905 15,591
1906-1909 35,489
Total
60,653
Sources: Juan A. Alsina, La inmigraci6n Europea
(Buenos Aires, 1898), and idem, La inmigracion en

el primer siglo de la independencia (Buenos Aires,
1910), pp. 22, 76, 96. See also the official figures in
Tercer Censo National, Vol. II (Buenos Aires, 1914),
p. 397.
Note: The probable number of Syrians in Argentina
in 1909 was 51,936. By 1914 the total was 64,369, of
whom 52,369 were men and 12,175 were women.
aDescribed as "Greeks" and "Turks" (figure obtained

by combining the annual totals).

APPENDIX VI
General characteristics of Syrian immigrants

to Argentina in 1909
Entering
Departing
1. Age groups and sex

Men
9,065
Boys
998
Women
1,363
Girls
339
Families
(3,638 individuals)
Single men
Single women
Old residents
Total immigrants
1,154
7,665
462
128
11,765
Total individuals
departing
11,893
2. Religion
Catholics
6,428
Muslims
5,111
Jews
226
Total
11,765
3. Main professions
Farmers
1,477
Traders
3,634
Dependents
Wage earners
2,114
1,906
Servants
298
Semsters
184
Without profession
(children)
133
Without profession
(women)
639
Source: Juan A. Alsina, La inmigracion en el primer siglo de la independencia (Buenos Aires, 1910),
pp. 96-97.
Note: Ferenczi and Willcox, on the other hand, give the following totals for Ottoman immigration to
Argentina (condensed figures): 1871-1880, 672; 1881-1890, 3,537; 1891-1900, 11,583; 1901-1910,
66,558; 1911-1920, 59,272. See Imre Ferenczi and W. F. Willcox, International Migrations, Vol. I
(New York, 1929), p. 546.
200 Kemal H. Karpat
APPENDIX VII Immigration of Ottomans to Brazil

A. According to official statistics" B. According to Ferenczi-Willcox
Immigrants
(from Turkey in Asia) Departures
Year Immigrant entries Departures Year Number' Year Number

1908
3,170
1871-1875
31
1908
3,170
1909
4,017
1876-1880
21
1909
4,027
1910 5,257" 2,318 1881-1885 103 1910 5,257

1911
6,319
2,424
1886-1895
1911
6,319
1912 7,302 2,260 1896-1900 1,900 1912 7,302
1901-1905 4,577" 1913 10,886
Total 26,065 7,002 1906-1910 15,127 1914 3,456

1911-1915 28,477
Sources: Part A: Directoria Geral de Estatistica. Annuario, Estatistico do Brasil, Anno I (19081912), Vol. 1, and Territoria e Popula(a'o (Rio de Janeiro, 1916), pp. 429-51; Part B: Imre Ferenczi
and W. F. Willcox, International Migrations, Vol. 1 (New York, 1929), pp. 264, 551.
aBrazilian statistics classify the Ottoman immigrants as Turko-Arabs ("Turco-Arabes") under the
general category of Asians.
bThe totals of "entries" for 1910, 1911, and 1912 are given, respectively, as 6,879, 7,008, and 8,002;
these figures presumably include visitors as well as official "immigrants."
'The figures in this column are condensed.
dNone of the total for this period were listed as being from Syria.

APPENDIX VIII Numerical table of Ottoman emigration
collected from various Ottoman documents
A. Annual figures
Year Number Place of origin Place of destination

1885
561
1886
178
1887
254
Havana,
Cubaa
1888 369 Ottoman Empire

1889h
334
1890' 22,000 Mostly North America

1893 410'1 Melbourne, Australia
1898 7,890e Syria & East Anatolia Both Americas
1902-1904f 281 Ottoman subjects South Africa (Transvaal)

1910
13,099
1911 13,605 Ottoman Empire Argentina

1912
19,792
B. General estimates of the total number of emigrantsg
Year Number Place of origin Place of destination

To 1883 1,000,000 North and South America
1881-1901 320,000 Syria U.S., Brazil, & others

1880-1901 1,000,000+ Entire Ottoman realm U.S., Brazil, & others
Sources: AFM, fol. 587 (Idare), 29 February 1911, 7 March 1890, 4 May 1891; fol. 346 (Idare),
13 February 1901; fol. 473 (Idare), 31 January 1898.
aHavana, given as the destination for immigrants of 1885 through 1889, was primarily a transshipping point rather than an ultimate destination.
bThe statistics are for 5 months of the year only.
"Of these, 240 were from Mt. Lebanon and Syria, mostly Maronites. The port of embarkation for
those going to North America was Barcelona, Spain. Separate figures for June of 1890 give a total of
2,167 who emigrated in that single month; the figure includes 598 Armenians and 1,126 people from
European Turkey.
dThese were listed as mainly Syrians; most were Christians, but some were Muslims from Baghdad
and Egypt.
eThis figure includes 6,287 Syrians and 1,603 Armenians. The departure point for the Syrians was
France.
fThese statistics are for all of 1902 and 1903 and the first 4 months only of 1904. The emigrants were
Syrians who were going to join 600 of their fellows already in Transvaal and Orange; of the 600 in
South Africa, 500 were from Mt. Lebanon, and 12 of these were Muslims working in the gold mines.
gThe first of these estimates called the emigrants to 1883 "Arabic-speaking" Ottomans; the second
estimate is that of Antun Fares.
APPENDIX IX Indirect statistics: immigration from Turke
into extra-European countries

A. 1820-1890
To
United
From
States
From
To
Fro
Turkey Turkey From Tur

To
To
in
in
all
To
Year Argentina Brazil Europe Asia Turkey Year Argentina

1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
-17
11
10
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
672
1861
--5
1861
- - 5 - - 1876
1862 - - 11 - - 1877 -
1863
1864
16
1878
- 11 - - 1879 -
1865
14
1866
18
1867
1868
1869
1870
26
18
1881
20
6
24
1880
1882
1883
1884
1885
43
3,537
1886
1888
1889
1890
1887
B. 1891-1924
To United States
To
CubaCuba
From From
TurkiC
To
To
Turkey Turkey From (not
To
in in a
Year Argentina Brazil Turks Turkeya Europe Asia Turkey fied) Arabians
1891
To
From
265 2,488 2,753 - 1,331 3,172 4,503 - -
1892
1893 -
625 1,829 2,454 - -
1894
298 1,219 1,517
1895
245
2,326
2,571
11,583
1896
1897
1898
648
169
978
176
1899 - 1,823
1900
1901
1902
1903
4,308
4,275
4,451
80 4,436 4,516 -
874
- 285 3,962 4,247 37 98
781
387 5,782 6,169 17 70

- 187 6,223 6,410 43 46
1,529 7,118 8,647 29 58
772
481
23
88
1904 - 1,097 86
1905 - 1,446 228
66,558
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
4,139
- 152 4,732 4,884
1,193
1,480
3,170
4,027
5,257
264
248
190
277
210
4,344 5,235 9,579 30 48

- 4,542 6,157 10,699 357 19
9,510 6,354 15,864 232 31
20,767 8,053 28,820 489 50

11,290 9,753 21,043 236 4
9,015 7,506 16,521 517 14

18,405 15,212 33,617 459 3
Asia Europe
1911 - 6,319 223 - 90 14,438 10,229 24,667 632 2

1912 - 7,302 320 128 203 14,481 12,788 27,269 770 10
1913 - 10,886 336 439 244 14,128 23,955 38,083 187 16
1914 - 3,456 205 34 - 8,199 21,716 29,915 33 1915 - 514 71 - - 1,008 3,543 4,551 - 59,272
APPENDIX IX (cont.)
-
To United States
To Cuba
From From From Turkish
Turkey Turkey Turkey From (not
To
To
in
in
all
s
Year Argentina Brazil Turks Asia Europe Europe Asia Turkey fied) Arabians Ar
1916
1917
1918
1919
603
68
259
-
93
504
33
313
13
79
77
1,670
152
-
10
1,9
393
15
19
43
29
1920 - 4,854 572 - 566 1,933 5,033 6,96
1921 162 1,865 159 - 57 6,391 11,733 18

1922 199 2,278 137 3 109 1,660 1,998
1923 1,611 4,829 803 23 42 3,743 2,183 5,

1924 1,309 4,078 1,148 - 30 1,481 2,820 4,
Source: Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Willcox, International Migrations, Vol. I (New York, 1
"From 1911 on, figures refer to Asia and Europe, respectively.

APPENDIX X: BEIRUT TRAVEL AGENCY ADVERTISEMENT 1896
The Facilities and Comfort for the Passengers

Traveling to Marseilles, America and Brazil, etc.
The agency of Mikhail and Taufail Far'un in Beirut, which is in charge of representing
in Syria the famous French Steamboats Company of Marseille (Frasinet), has made every
effort (beyond description) to ensure the comfort (that cannot be found elsewhere) for the
passengers traveling to Marseille, then to America. Thus, all passengers prefer our steamboats over all other steamboats. The reasons are the following:
First, every 10 days we prepare a steamboat that takes the passengers directly to
Marseille without passing by or stopping at any iskila [iskele-port], thus arriving at its
destination in a matter of 6 days, by saving half the time the sea trip usually takes and by
avoiding the hardship the passengers usually encounter by passing the asakil [plural of
iskila] and etc.
Second, the company has emphatically asked the agents and the captains of the ships to
make every effort to comfort the passengers and treat them well in order and thus avoid
the harsh treatment that other companies usually inflict on their passengers.
Third, in every steamboat, there is a shelter prepared especially for passengers in the
back of the ship to resort to in the case of danger.
Fourth, the company has employed a doctor to take care of the passengers in case
someone gets sick.
Fifth, [the services] of the agents (mentioned above) are much cheaper than most of the
other companies; thus passengers end up saving more [by traveling in our ships].
Sixth, every effort has been made by the company to facilitate the passenger's arrival
into Beirut for boarding [our ship].
Seventh, this company has employed fast and large steamboats for the convenience of
the passengers. Also the passengers in the back of [the ship] are allowed to go everywhere
inside the ship except the Captain's cabin. Other companies keep these passengers in a
very bad spot and restrict their movements.
From Marseilles to America
and Elsewhere
Tickets to America, Brazil, and other destinations to which the passengers wish to go
once they get to Marseille can be purchased from the same agency. This is 25% cheaper
than [the price offered by other agencies in Marseille]. Once a passenger gets a ticket from
Beirut to the mentioned designations, he will be serviced upon his arrival to Marseille by
the well-known Nawar Indo-American Company, thus saving himself the trouble of dealing with guides and dealers because the mentioned company has Arabic-speaking employees capable of taking care of the passenger, who will thus save expenses incurred by
other travelers [who use the services of other agencies]. All a passenger has to do is to
show the Company's card to the [travel bureau in Marseille] and the agent [there] will
make all the necessary arrangements. In order to provide additional facilities to the passenger who wants to purchase [from our company] a ticket from Beirut to America or
elsewhere in accordance with the above-explained method, he [the passenger] has to pay
the agents in Beirut only 20 francs, the remaining amount to be paid to the company in
Marseille. He who wants further information must contact the general agents for the
[company] mentioned above. They are Khawajat Mikhail and Rufail Far'un at the
Gemayel Suq in Beirut.
July 1 [18]96
Source: BA, Yildiz, Perakende, 9, B.1314, No. 961, 14 December 1896.
Note: I am thankful to Mr. Ali Kholaif for his help in translating the advertisement into English.
206 Kemal H. Karpat
NOTES
'See Kemal H. Karpat, "The Status of Muslims under European Rule: The Eviction of the
Circassians and Their Settlement in Syria," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, No. 1 (1980).
2Pierre Bardin, Algeriens et tunisiens dans L'Empire ottoman de 1848 a 1914 (Paris, 1979). Bardin's
work is based on French diplomatic reports.
3Some of the main writings on the Syrian emigration are the following: "Migration from and
to Syria, 1860-1914," Chapter 6 in Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East,
1800-1914 (Chicago, 1966) (A. Ruppin's article is reprinted and discussed in this chapter); Elie
Safa, L'Emigration Libanaise (Beirut, 1960); Said Himadeh, The Economic Organization of Syria
and Lebanon (Beirut, 1936); George Tu'meh, Al-mughtaribun al-arab fi Amerika al-shimaliyya
(Damascus, n.d.); Najib E. Saliba, "Emigration from Syria," in Sameer Y. Abraham and Nabeel
Abraham, eds., Arabs in the New World(Detroit, 1983), pp. 31-40; and Philip K. Hitti, The Syrians
in America (New York, 1924). Information can be found also in works dealing with Middle Easterners
established in the United States: see Barbara Aswad, ed., Arabic-Speaking Communities in American
Cities (New York, 1974); Beverly Turner Mehdi, The Arabs in America, 1492-1977 (New York,
1978); Abdo A. Elkholy, The Arab Moslems in the United States (New Haven, 1966); and Earle H.
Waugh et al., eds., The Muslim Community in North America (Edmonton, Alta., 1983).
4For details, see Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Social and Demographic
Characteristics, University of Wisconsin Press, in press.
51n fact, when a group of Germans persisted, for religious reasons, in taking in newcomers and
enlarging their colonies at Acre and Haifa, they met with such hostility from the local population
that the Porte found it necessary to assure Berlin and Vienna that the safety of these settlers would be
guaranteed. See the Archives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry (hereafter AFM), fol. 36 (Siyasi
[Political]), I February 1863.
61 have discussed the occurrence of simultaneous economic development and migration in The
Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization in Turkey (New York and London, 1976).
7Some of these lists will appear in Karpat, Ottoman Population.
8Sameer Y. Abraham and Nabeel Abraham, The Arab World and Arab-Americans (Detroit,
1981), p. 17; see also the enlarged version of this work, Arabs in the New World (cited in note 3),
which has extensive bibliography.
9See Donald M. Reid, "The Syrian Christians, the Rags-to-Riches Story and Free Enterprise,"
International Journal of Middle East Studies 1 (1970): 358-66; a similar rags-to-riches story is provided by Leila Fawaz, "Refugees of a Civil War: The Case of Dimitri Debbas, 1860," paper read at a
meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, November 1980.
'?Abdo A. Elkholy stresses the fact that early "Arab immigrants," as he calls them, came from
peasant stock in Syria and Lebanon and that the majority belonged to the lower socioeconomic
classes; see "The Arab-Americans: Nationalism and Traditional Preservations," in E. C. Agopian and
Ann Paden, eds., The Arab Americans (Wilmette, 111., 1969), p. 5.
"The reports of attacks by nomads on settled people were often blown out of proportion and
described by European diplomats seeking to embarrass the Ottoman government as being attacks
directed specifically against Christians or as "uprisings" against the government. When the nomadic
tribe of Beni-Sahr, accompanied by bands from the tribes of Lehib and Beni-Kilab, tried to steal
cattle from villages around Acre, the Europeans described this as a full-fledged insurgency, although
a single Ottoman battalion re-established order within a matter of days. See AFM, fol. 36 (Sivasi),
report of the governor of Saida, 29 October 1863. Such occurrences were often cited by immigrants
as the reason for their decision to leave the country, but these same immigrants stated also their
desire to return as rich persons to their villages.
'21n 1860 Lord Dufferin, reporting to Sir H. Bulwer about the events in Mount Lebanon, wrote:
"When I first came to this country I was under the impression of those natural sentiments of indigna-
tion [against] the atrocities perpetrated by the Druzes on the Christians .... To my surprise however
I soon began to discover... that there were two sides to the story .... I am now in a position to
state, without fear of contradiction, that however criminal may have been the excesses to which the
Druses were subsequently betrayed, the original provocation came from the Christians" [Great

Britain, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, vol. 68 (1861), p. 439,
dispatch of 24 February 1861 from Beirut].
'3See, for example, the New York Times, 9 December 1896 and 4 September 1899: A returning
missionary, Edward Riggs, referring to the Muslim-Christian tensions in Mount Lebanon, did not
hesitate to describe the Muslims as "non-speakable" Turks, causing a protest by the Ottoman legation in Washington. (I am indebted to Dr. G. M. Bannerman for some of the information on Syrian
emigrants that he presented at a seminar on migration held at the University of Wisconsin, Madison,
1972.)
'4For some of these emotional and distorted appeals to Christian sympathies, see Abraham M.
Rihbany, A Far Journey: An Autobiographyi (Boston, 1914); George Haddad, Mt. Lebanon to
Vermont (Rutland, Vt., 1916); Hitti, Syrians in America; and Salom Rizk, Syrian Yankee (New
York, 1943).
51n the pashalik of St. Jean d'Acre (usually known simply as Acre) there were 16 Druze villages with an aggregate population of about 15,000 that were subject to military conscription; the
villages were Gerha, Djulus, Abu-Snan, El-Meghar, Errami, Bidjin, Shefama, Djedd, Esfia, Eddaliye,
Elebkeaa, Harfar Kefr, Essmeaa, Sedjiar, Yamah, and Kessa. On the other hand, the Druzes of
Houran and Liban were not subject to conscription. Obviously such unequal treatment was a cause
for resentment. See AFM, fol. 36 (Siyasi), dispatch of 13 December 1873.
'6AFM, fol. 346 (Idari [Administration]), letter of 5 March 1908.
'7Fifty-Three Years in Syria (London, 1910), Vol. 2, p. 589. Jessup reported also that 87 of the
college's graduates were in Egypt.
'8Report of the Immigration Commission, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1911), p. 100.
'9See L'emigration ottomane aux Etats-Unis," a lengthy memorandum dated 14 October 1907,
from the French ambassador in Istanbul to the Foreign Minister, Archives des Affaires Etrangeres,
Correspondence Politique, N.S., Turquie, Politique Int6rieure, Macadonie XXXIII, vol. 54 (1907).
20Report of the Immigration Commission, p. 97.
21Hitti, Syrians in America, p. 58.
22See E. P. Hutchinson, "Notes on Emigration Statistics of the United States," American Statistical
Association Journal 53, 284 (December 1958): 963 ff.
23At one point Prince Said Halim asked Emin Arslan Bey, Ottoman consul in Buenos Aires, for a
list of towns and villages from which immigrants to Argentina had come; see AFM, fol. 346 (Idare),
13 March 1913. (The Ottoman archives contain no such list, however.)
24AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), 27 April 1904 and 12 December 1907.

2"Ibid., 16 February 1914.
26AFM, fol. 473 (Idare), letter of 20 November 1892, signed by Mavroghenii, an Ottoman Greek.
27AFM, fol. 36 (Idare), 29 January 1889.
28Hitti and, especially, Elkholy provide some information on Muslim immigrants, as do the two
works by the Abrahams; see notes 3, 8, and 10.
29AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), 12 December 1907.

30Ibid., 4 April 1907 and 27 July 1909.
31 Economic Organization, p. 16.
32 Economic History of the Middle East, p. 271.
33""Reports on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Syria," Great Britain, Parliamentary
Papers, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, vol. 87 (1911), pp. 7-11. Saliba also provides
some figures that are useful; see "Emigration from Syria," pp. 34-35.
34Issawi, Economic History of the Middle East, p. 271.
35See the correspondence between Yusuf Efendi, consul in Barcelona, and Turkhan Bey, Ottoman
representative in Madrid, in AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), June 1889 to 14 November 1892.
36Ibid., report of 23 October 1893.
37AFM, fol. 177 (Idare), 14 February 1899 and 5 February 1902.
38AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), 23 October 1893.

391bid., 10 January 1913.
40Ibid., 17 September 1913.
4 Ibid., dispatch of 10 January 1913.

42"L'6migration ottomane aux Etats-Unis."
208 Kemal H. Karpat

43Cited in Issawi, Economic History of the Middle East, p. 271.
44Economic Organization, p. 20.
45See AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), dispatches of 13 February 1901 and 21 February 1914. Fares stated
that between 1881/82 and 1901 a total of 320,000 had left their homes and that in 1901 there were
220,000 Syrians living in foreign lands: in the U.S.A., 100,000; in Brazil, 60,000; and in other
countries, 60,000. He also stated that about 100,000 Syrians had returned home. The high percentage
given for returnees is consistent with other figures, including those of the Ottoman consul in
Marseilles (cited in note 37), suggesting that the return rate was about one-third. Fares' figure for
total emigration is obviously too low. See also Donald Reid, Odyssey of Farah Antun (Chicago,
1975).
46AFM, vol. 587 (Idare), 3 June 1889.

47According to the New York Times of 15 September 1895 about 10,000 Syrians were residing in
New York, 150,000 throughout the rest of the U.S.A.
4Vol. 12, p. 59.
49AFM, fol. 177 (Idare), communications of 1861 and, especially, 1862.
50AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), 14 April 1888 and 29 January 1889.
51Issue of 11 July 1890. In some cases even U.S. immigration officials called the Syrians "dirty,"
"liars," and "innately dishonest"; they were resentful also that some of the new arrivals claimed that
"all other Lebanon Arabs are our brothers and cousins." See the New York Times, 17 January 1888,
7 June 1894, and 21 July 1894.
52The correspondence on this problem between Interior Minister Sefik and the Porte is to be found
in the Basbakanlik Arsivi (hereafter BA), Yildiz collection, Perakende section, 9/B/1314 no. 961 of
14 December 1896 (2 Kanunevel 1312).
53AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), 21 April 1895.

541t was the position of the Ottoman government that once outside their own autonomous territories the Lebanese and Egyptians became subject to Ottoman law and thus were required to obtain
Ottoman passports if they wished to travel abroad. The government found it necessary to articulate
this position when a group of 25 Lebanese refused to accept the Ottoman passport on the grounds
that Lebanon was autonomous; ibid., Foreign Ministry communication of 18 April 1911.
55The Ottoman consulate in Marseilles gave a list of individuals active as migration intermediaries;
these included Alexander Saab, Selim Saab, Tanous Bechelani, Isaac (a Jew of Morocco), Joseph
Chababe (a nephew of Isaac), Ibrahim Chababe, Selim Beyruti, Boutrous al-Hazin, Bemandos and
his nephew, George Richa, Joseph Tehara, Nassim al-Trablussi, Suleyman Sahaf, Vincent Jamuzzi,
etc.
56See correspondence of 1895 in AFM fol. 346 (Idare).

57See Karpat, "Status of Muslims under European Rule."
581ssawi, Economic History of the Middle East, p. 271.

59AFM, fol. 346 (Idare), 21 February 1914.
60BA, Yildiz, Perakende, 1326 no. 844.
6'The government was always keenly interested in the general welfare of its former subjects in the
Americas. Those who were not economic successes and found themselves stranded for lack of funds
were paid reparation expenses, although this policy was modified when it was discovered that some
well-to-do returnees were abusing the government's good will by getting their passage home paid. As
early as 1895, therefore, it was ordered that repatriation expenses of Syrians and Lebanese not be
paid. The order was often ignored, however.
62The Ottoman government, remaining apprehensive about the large numbers of emigrants, investigated the travel agencies and found that they sought to entice passengers by offering them especially comfortable conditions. A travel agency advertisement that gives an excellent picture of the
facilities offered in this competition is preserved in the Ottoman archives and is reproduced as
Appendix X.
63Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939
(Minneapolis, 1971), p. 189. See also Leland J. Gordon, "The Turkish-American Controversy over
Nationality," A merican Journal of International Law 25 (October 1931 ).
64The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore, vol. 5 (New Haven, 1944), p. 54.
65John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C., 1906), p. 686.

66BA, Yildiz, Perakende, 20 Za. 316 no. 1506, memorandum of the Foreign Ministry of 1 April
1899 (H. 20 Zilkade 1316, R. 20 Mart 1316); a variety of similar documents are included in the same
folio.
671bid., no. 633, letter of the Beyoglu Mutasarrif of 14 August 1899 (H. 6 Rebiulevel 1316.,
R. 2 August 1315).
68United States Response, p. 189. Oscar S. Straus, a former U.S. ambassador to the sultan's court,
states that the 1874 treaty was sabotaged "by our leading missionaries under the instigatiort of
prominent Armenians who had been naturalized in America and returned to Turkey.... It was a
very discouraging situation, for many annoying cases constantly came up, some of a rather serious
nature" (Under Four Administrations [Boston and New York, 1922], p. 92).
69Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. 3, p. 706.
70"L'emigration ottomane aux Etats-Unis."
71Many journals were published by the immigrant groups. Those in Brazil were publishing nine
newspapers (another report said four) in 1901, while two were published in Argentina. See AFM, fol.
346 (Idare), letter of A. Fares of 13 February 1901.
72Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Correspondence Politique, N.S., Turquie, Politique G6enrale,
IV, vol. 5 (1905, 1907, fol. 130 sq., "Note sur les Mohadjirs," Annexe, Dispatch of 26 November
1907.

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The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914

Author(s): Kemal H. Karpat

THE OTTOMAN EMIGRATION TO AMERICA,

These people too settled in Syria at Damascus.2

176 Kemal H. Karpat

forces and the government policies that affected Ottoman demography as a

Existing literature on the Syrian emigration is limited in quantity and scope,

Caribbeans, and South America also provided information on the migrants'

THE CAUSES OF EMIGRATION

Ottoman Emigration to America 177

of huge numbers of refugees transformed the remnant of the Ottoman Empire

The settlement of the Muslim refugees, often on uncultivated state-owned

farm sectors toward a market economy. As a result, large tracts of land in

178 Kemal H. Karpat

Meanwhile, the old religious communities disintegrated and new churches

The existing literature on the Syrian emigration lays exaggerated stress on

Ottoman Emigration to America 179

Duval, a landowner of Sao Paulo, Brazil, asked permission to bring large

numbers of immigrants to work on his lands. He wrote that he was particularly

180 Kemal H. Karpat

As the immigrant colonies overseas became well established and prosperous,

The overwhelming majority of the Ottoman immigrants to the Americas,

Ottoman Emigration to America 181

immigration is noticeably incomplete. Many entered illegally or came via Canada

and so on previously mentioned. Some of the available statistical material is

reports to distinguish among Ottoman emigrants from different areas. Ottoman

182 Kemal H. Karpat

many cases Muslims preferred to pass as Christians-particularly as Armenians,

Thus, in addition to the general lack of systematic data collection programs

turies, the deliberate reticence of the Muslims themselves handicaps us in our

Christian coloration so as to be less conspicuous culturally in a society that, as

Ottoman Emigration to America 183

Some of the early Muslim communities survive in debilitated form in various

Despite their desire not to be identified as Muslims, many of them were

from places such as Mumuretulaziz, Malatia, Kharput, Akchedag-traveled long

Konya to Mersin, Aleppo-Urfa to Beirut, Sivas and Ankara to Izmir, and

184 Kemal H. Karpat

Ottoman Emigration to America 185

the ratio of returning emigrants at one-third of the departures.45 According to

186 Kemal H. Karpat

OTTOMAN MIGRATION POLICY AND EMIGRANT TRANSPORTATION

Ottoman Emigration to America 187

The method adopted to prevent emigration was the denial of passports to

188 Kemal H. Karpat

The Ottoman government tried to persuade the European governments not to

the government bureaucrats-who saw numerous problems with this enormous

Ottoman Emigration to America 189

of the increased revenue obtained by taxing the buildings."60 Sabuncu advised

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EMIGRANTS: THE U.S.-OTTOMAN CONTROVERSY

philosophies of citizenship and individual rights: the Ottoman state adhered to

The Ottoman nationality law of 19 January 1869 (Article 5) stipulated that

190 Kemal H. Karpat

government, by its "obsolete doctrine of perpetual allegiance" discriminated

Ottoman Emigration to America 191

The imperial decree of 9 October 1896 by which emigration was liberalized

192 Kemal H. Karpat

Meanwhile, in Syria, as in other parts of the Ottoman state, the influx of

A factual, in-depth study of Ottoman emigration and immigration provides

Ottoman Emigration to America 193

bition on emigration to a conditional liberalization in 1896/97 and, finally, to a

Ottoman government-despite antagonistic attitudes on the part of certain

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MADISON

A Note on the Statistical Appendices