Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LatinoJustice PRLDEF,
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund,
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Garden State Bar,
Association, Hispanic Bar Association of New Jersey,
Association of Black Women Lawyers of New Jersey
Bruce D. Brown, Esquire
Gregg P. Leslie, Esquire
Jamie T. Schuman, Esquire
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
1101 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1100
Arlington, VA 22209
Jennifer A. Borg, Esquire
North Jersey Media Group Inc.
1 Garret Mountain Plaza
Woodland Park, NJ 07424
Counsel for Amicus Appellants
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
North Jersey Media Group Inc.
Michael W. Price, Esquire
Faiza Patel, Esquire
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law
161 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10013
Counsel for Amicus Appellant
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
A.
Plaintiffs Allegations
The Program
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District Court
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STANDING
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Injury-in-Fact
See, e.g., Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.
2015) ([E]qual treatment under law is a judicially cognizable
interest . . . even if it brings no tangible benefit to the party
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Fair Traceability
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Redressability
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CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A.
Equal-Protection Claim
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There are a variety of theories to consider in an equalprotection claim of this type. First, Plaintiffs could point to a
policy that is facially discriminatory, meaning that the policy
by its own terms singles out Muslims for different
treatment. 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise
on Constitutional Law 18.4 (10th ed. 2012); see, e.g.,
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213, 22729. Second, they could
identify a policy that either shows no classification on its
face or else indicates a classification which seems to be
legitimate, yet one that NYPD officers apply to Muslims
with a greater degree[] of severity than other religious
groups. Rotunda & Novak, supra, 18.4; see, e.g., Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 37374 (1886). Or, third, Plaintiffs
could identify a facially neutral policy that the City
purposefully designed to impose different burdens on
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738 F.3d 562, 586 (3d Cir. 2013) (The TSA Officials
suspicion was an obvious alternative explanation for their
conduct, which negates any inference of retaliation.). That
we might be able to conjure up some non-discriminatory
motive to explain the Citys alleged conduct is not a valid
basis for dismissal. It is only when [a] defendants plausible
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Sch. Athletic Assn, 459 F.3d 676, 694 (6th Cir. 2006)
(distinguishing between an intent to treat two groups
differently and an intent to harm); Garza v. County of Los
Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ([T]here can be
intentional discrimination without an invidious motive.).
Thus, even if NYPD officers were subjectively motivated by
a legitimate law-enforcement purpose (no matter how
sincere), theyve intentionally discriminated if they wouldnt
have surveilled Plaintiffs had they not been Muslim.
2.
Is
the
Alleged
Discrimination
Nonetheless Legally Justified?
Level of Scrutiny
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784 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1986) (It seems clear that an
individual religion meets the requirements for treatment as a
suspect class.), amended, 792 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1986).11
Today we join these courts and hold that intentional
discrimination based on religious affiliation must survive
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First-Amendment Claims
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CONCLUSION
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