SECTION 3. SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS (ARTS.

857- 870)

FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION CASES

46. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31703

February 13, 1930

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Manila,defendants-appellants.
L. D. Lockwood and Jose M. Casal for appellants.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Leoncio B. Monzon for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in
Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is
said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano
Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband
of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment,
levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria
Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so
attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the
dissolution of the injunction.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary
heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the decision of the trial court, assign
the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by the will of Doa Ana Maria Alcantara.
2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the amount of P21,428.58 deposited
with La Urbana is the property of the children of the plaintiff as "herederos fidei-comisarios."
3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and condemning defendant to pay the
costs.
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the institution of heirs made in the will of
the late Ana Maria Alcantara already admitted to probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in
dispute.

The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the ninth, tenth, and
eleventh, quoted below:
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen
Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house
with me, I institute her as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the
payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after probate of this will, and after
the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and approved, she will
receive from my executrix and properties composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy
them with God's blessing and my own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass
unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase
the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall
never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me while her children are
still in their minority, I order that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana,
and in her default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the
direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my nephew
Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the duties of administering my estate, because I
recognize that his character is not adapted to management and administration.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, while the
appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a
simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would
in the instant case give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance,
or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause XI provides for the administration of the
estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still
under age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before
the testator, and the fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the substitution is ordered where
the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution.
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and since it cannot be a simple
substitution in the light of the considerations above stated, let us now see whether the instants case is a
fideicommissary substitution.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, and provides that
upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee
on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this
clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal heiress does
not prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the
testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above quoted) clauses which cannot
be disregarded if we are to give a correct interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily
exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such word means that the
plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate, is not
incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple
substitution, where the heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of the

inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir
instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass
it on the second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and 143, 5th
ed.), says:
Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution, as held in the Resolution of
June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, requires three things:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a
part of the estate.
3. A second heir.
To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another, namely that the
fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit
from the latter and not from the fiduciary. (Emphasis ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as referred to in articles 783 of the
Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the
fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly
equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the English "trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to
dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication
of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say whether the death of the
heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that
in making the provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary
substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision,
"in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is
legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility that the substitution
might later be legally declared null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which
prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond the second
degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that
the wholeestate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to
preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary
heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to
our quotation from Manresa inserted above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is
therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the
case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the
inheritance.
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according
to the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under
consideration, to wit:

1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted
an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole
or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole
estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the
heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she
dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also
provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second
heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit, that the fideicommissarius or
second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant
case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary
substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the
plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the
testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the
association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be
subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary
heirs.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano Garchitorena. So
ordered.

47. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitionerappellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees,
oppositors- appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion
Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July
27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an
inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garantizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad,

residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma.
Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto,
con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz
Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha
propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del
apellido Ramirez,
B.Y en usufructo a saber:
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle Ramirez,
domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion
vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son
Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda de
Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, de
Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D.
Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las usufiructuarias
nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en cualquier memento vender
a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los titulares
fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction
of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda
propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs
Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are
also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree,
as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta)
Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this
property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They
admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil
Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary
estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over

which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art.
904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears
that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a
usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to onehalf of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the
will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will
run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and
tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter
into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are
several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and
fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four
classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary.
The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the
three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that
the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and
Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en
su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question the
sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third
usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as
We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct
over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or stated
differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case
for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art.
859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.

As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is
void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this
point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not
be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word
"degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by
providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be
one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the
first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary
(Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by
Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the
establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to
be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because
it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion
that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would
be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise
of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.
Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

48. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992

CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE
GUINTO,petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod
City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of
the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992
ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the ESTATE OF
EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE
PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE GUINTO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1 dated September 20, 1976, January 7, 1977 and
January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch, IV respectively,
cancelling the notice of lis pendensfiled by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. with the Register of Deeds
of Negros Occidental, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976
filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., and holding in abeyance the resolution of defendants' motion
to dismiss.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento"
among its provisions, the following:

which contains

DECIMA Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una

tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas partes proindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan,
que he adquirido mediante permuta de mi hermano Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se adjudique,
como por el presente se adjudica, a mi sobrina Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin
embargo, que en el caso de que mi citada sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o sin
descendientes legitimos, mi referida participacion en la Hda. Minuluan se adjudicara a
mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que me sobrevivan.
UNDECIMA Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de todas mis propiendades,
incluyendo mis participaciones, derechos e intereses (no dispuestos mas arriba) an las
Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, 1274, 1278, 1279 y 1280 del
Catastro de Talisay, Negros Occidental), y "Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y
1287-C del Catastrado de Talisay, Negros Occidental), situadas en el Municipio de
Talisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental, I.F., el resto de mis acciones en la Central
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of the
Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones), registradas a mi nombre y no heredadas de mi
difunta madre Da. Enrica A. Vda. de Lizares, mis acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., Negros Navigation Co. y otras Compaas Mineras, y todos los demas
bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que me pertenezcan en la fecha de mi
muerte, se adjudiquen, como por el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eusaquia
Lizares, hija de mi difunto hermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados que mi citada
sobrina me ha prestado y signe prestandome hasta ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi
referida sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo de pagar todas las
obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las propriedades adjudicadas a la misma.
Asimismo ordeno a mi citada sobrina que ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada
ao en sufragio de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas de mi difunto
Padre y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre de cada ao,
respectivamente, y mande celebrar todos los aos la fiesta de San Jose en Talisay como
lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares,
falleciere sin dejar descendientes legitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion
consistente en una sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su correspondiente
cuota de azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano antes
mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied)
On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said "testamento" in the
possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. 3 On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a
petition for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452. 4
The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been made, in due course, the
probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointing Eustaquia as the executrix of
the estate of Maria Lizares. 5
On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted by the probate court in an
order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and
usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and

usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to each and
every one of them, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to effect
the corresponding transfer of the real properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks,
and dividends in different corporations, companies and partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to
the heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares. 7
Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some
properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. 8 The Court
granted the motion and correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It adjudicated to
Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota
allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other
person in her last will and testament. 9
On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios
L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed
an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550,
514, 553, 1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-65007, and T-65008. 10
A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without any descendant. 11 In due
time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate
estate.
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria
Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko,
Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once again
the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute
administrator be appointed; that the order dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by
declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of which
form an aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after such
amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of title, the order of
probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said properties, and correspondingly issue
new certificates of title in their names. 12
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely: Socorro L. Vda. de Escario,
Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo, and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid
motion. They alleged that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings
of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions
sought to be enforced are null and void. 13
On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate proceedings and
holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is
binding against the whole world. It observed that inspite of the fact that the movants knew that the
court had jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did they appeal the
order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the court concluded, even if the said order was erroneous, and since
the error was not jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The
period for filing a motion for reconsideration having expired, the court opined that the movants could
have sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but unfortunately for the
movants, the period for filing such remedy had also elapsed. 14

Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. It was denied on
June 17, 1974. 15 Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said movants filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of real property against the joining administrators of the estate of
Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the then
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV. 16 On the same date, they availed of their
rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules of Court
by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. 17
As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo
Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators for brevity), filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case; the cause of action was
barred by prior judgment, and the complaint stated no cause of action. 18 This motion was opposed by
the plaintiffs.
On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional circumstances which justified the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs. 19 The
latter opposed said motion. The defendants having filed a reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder
reiterating their arguments in their opposition to the motion for cancellation of notice of lis
pendens. 20
On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for cancellation of
notice of lis pendens. 21 The court simultaneously held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to
dismiss the complaint.
The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639. 22 Thereafter, they
filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. 23 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.
vigorously opposed said motion. 24
On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of
the order dated September 20, 1976. 25 The joint administrators having filed an opposition
thereto, 26 on January 7, 1977 the lower court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. 27 It
held that while a notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers that a particular property
was under litigation, its annotation upon the certificates of title to the properties involved was not
necessary because such properties, being in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without the
approval of the court. Moreover, the court added, a notice of lis pendens would prejudice any effort of
the estate to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable cultivation and production of
sugar to which the properties were planted.
Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in this Court a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. Docketed as G.R No. L-45425, the petition
contends that the grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia legis and the
lending institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the legal grounds provided for
under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that since on September 21,
1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss, it was also proper to suspend
the resolution of the affirmative defenses interposed by the defendants until after trial on the merits
of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March 24, 1977. 28

On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and/ormandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965.
Petitioners contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves
the interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the adjudication of her
properties. They assert that the matter had been settled in Special Proceedings No. become final and
unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become final and
unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the cause of
action in the latter case was barred by the principle of res judicata. They aver that the claim of Celsa,
Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia
and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10
and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a
fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said provisions of the will are not valid
because under Article 863 of the Civil code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of
heirs.
On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the lower court from
further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 11639. 29 After both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-45965
had been given due course and submitted for decision, on January 20, 1986, the two cases were
consolidated.
The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. 30 The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory. 31 The authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 32
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and
such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza,

33

and Torres v. Encarnacion,

34

the Court said:

. . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most
logical authority to effectuate this provision, within the estate proceeding, said
proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the court
can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties to
undergo the incovenience and litigate an entirely different action.
Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle
the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of the properties, are worth mentioning. In the
cases of Arroyo v. Gerona, 35 and Benedicto v. Javellana, 36 this Court said:
. . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof,
and everydemand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or
intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same
special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in
the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch
as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of
the property to the interested parties. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to
determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . . .. 37 A project of partition is
merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity estate which the court may accept or reject. It is
the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. 38
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares,
the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a project of partition in which the
parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the
estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said
project of partition which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio,
Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia
Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on November 28, 1972, whereby they
agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These
facts taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by
the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise
of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap
the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. 39 Thus, where
a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was
affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the
court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. 40 The question of private
respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the partition and became a closed
matter.
The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, Civil Case No. 11639, that
Eustaquia had been in possession of the questioned lots since March 2, 1971 up to the time of her
death indicates that the distribution pursuant to the decree of partition has already been carried out.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the reopening of
the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of
such proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty (30) days

having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them.
Therefore, they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the properties left by will of
Maria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of the very same properties
subject of such partition.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for
once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside
for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. 41
It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by
law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted was
to put an end to controversies." 42 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period,
instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court or
judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. 43
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 44
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order approving the
distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will has become final and
unappealable; the probate court that rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties; the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that was directed against the
whole world including Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said that there is a similarity of
parties in Special Proceedings No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial administrators of
Eustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.; there is identity of subject matter involved in
both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is identity of causes of action because
in the first action there was a declaration of the probate court in its order dated April 6, 1974 that
although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will,
the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not been satisfied. 45
Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639, the contention of
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate
estate of Maria Lizares 46 is not meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators that
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose
upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.,
neither may said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.
It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir
should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The

substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil
Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. 47 In this case, the instituted
heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for,
upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under
the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation
of the law of intestacy.
With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved, there is no
merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., that the lower court acted contrary to law
and/or gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court having
jurisdiction over it at any given time. 48 Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded." 49 In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal
reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the supervision of the court
and the said properties are undercustodia legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect
the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case where it turned out that their claim to
the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby DENIED but the petition
for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus in L-45965 is GRANTED. The temporary restraining
order of April 26, 1977 which was issued by the Court in L-45965 is made PERMANENT. Costs against
the petitioners in L-45425.
SO ORDERED.

RESERVA TRONCAL ART.891

49. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13386

October 27, 1920

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, absolving the
defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab
intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land abovementioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco
Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the
other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took
possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose
Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said
Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels
of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions
of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural
daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an
illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural
daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while
unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as
her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva
nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until
the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her
publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 1617; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente vs.
Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so
decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria
Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes,
29 Phil., 167.)

The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an illegitimate relative
within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That
article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously
from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son
Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the
natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the
same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve
said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo
Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo,
was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and
"relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to
legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared
brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or tribunal.
However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and
solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt
with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the provision of article 811 of
the Civil Code apply only tolegitimate relative. One of such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of
them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in
deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811,
he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or
grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article
811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of
legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the
natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to
the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only
upon the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not recognize
the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established by
acknowledgement between the father or mother who acknowledges and the acknowledged
children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that in said Code, the
legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is
the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents,
of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course made of those who are
legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to natural relationship, it does
not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does not say child, but natural
child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural
ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846,
935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)

Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that
they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of
the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811,
and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the
natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly included in the eighth section
and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3,
and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to
legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of
article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is
just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945,
which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating
of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed
neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the
properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or
is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of
reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be
preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article
968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage;
only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede
the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate
ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised just as
the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the
realm of the statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which
should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate
ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate points in
the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of
the parentswho are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles
915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each
spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission
of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article
intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who
inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this
being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be
the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we
have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the
precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents
the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural
parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited
established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass
by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same conclusion as
Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article
811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so
inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by
operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as
to costs. So ordered.

50. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffsappellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendantsappellants.

NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was
submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and
Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a

common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of
the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral
part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of
land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and
64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four
(4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate
children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land
now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her
father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue,
leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer
Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and
interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate
child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her
surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only
legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2)
of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half
of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal
imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because
they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land,
which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8)

of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino
Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal
issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the
seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives
of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half proindiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino
Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three
eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the
rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes
corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon
legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve
harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other
for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this
Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the
seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds
that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to threefourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay
D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their
claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court
renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167,
T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D.
Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by her on
the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining the legal interests
which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in
question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all
relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction

to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be
determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino,

where the reservatario was survived by eleven

nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all
eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles
of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the
nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva

troncal, where the onlyreservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging
to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews
of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved
properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole
blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the
subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is
correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of
the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of
the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to
the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further
occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the
same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective
share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of
intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has
resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to
the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros,
Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives
of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called

reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never
be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one
alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios
who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs.
Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share
double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion
is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its
application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the
law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino
mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere
necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas
generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes no
resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la
reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of
the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively,
of Faustino Dizon (thepraepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this
effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall
inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who
are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall
inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of
the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being
called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus,
Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the
former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a
final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters,
nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of
deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and
sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis
the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable
property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:

... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not
inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands

, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of

a reservatarioare not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over property
subject to reserva troncalIdentifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption
that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from
the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis
causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are
all agreed that there beingreservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be
deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.
As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of thereservista, and does not
even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the
plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate
succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission
of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an
ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint
is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. SO ORDERED.

51. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE,
INC., petitioners,
vs.

THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS,
ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-956 1 and
Civil Case No. SC-957. 2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of
this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw)
Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose,
Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels
of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother,
Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties abovementioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an
Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he tenido
varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la Ciudad de
Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo y por
lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles situados
en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul Balantakbo
per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described in Civil
Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to
the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio
Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The properties
are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining
1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described in the
complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn
transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain
any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in
full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving
children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the
above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints which
they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject matter
of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the same legal question
of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey
to the plaintiffs
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in
paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this
decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land described

in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of
this decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein ordered
to be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and
Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of the one
share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account for and pay
to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the properties herein ordered to be
returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of income being for the period
from January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay plaintiffs
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in
toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no
cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the following
errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for value
and in good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable interest of
the reservee in the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the plaintiffs
by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court
affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they
agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that there was no
encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.

The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista,
Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate
of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose,
Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that
said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of
the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the
affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving
properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the
said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were
free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby
showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this
is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration
Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province
or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from
the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited in People
v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R.
Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto
v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which
an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object
of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated
by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all
persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law.
The rule must be absolute, any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of a
document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient registration.
However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil.
420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA
380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.

That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil.
420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary registration, such
as the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the
like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient
notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to
the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of voluntary
registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes
the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the
moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is
entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's
duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees,
because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform. The register of
deeds is duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which
contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise
inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The
failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate
of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable
character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the
deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the
property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3)
portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10,
1945 and said portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was
adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this
property is entirely free from any encumbrance of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . .
(p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no such
admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of the reservable
character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered
with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time
acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners
knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his
father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these
properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of
the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister,
is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need to register
the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent
third persons. This was suggested as early as the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737,
August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution therein was whether the
reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the
benefit of the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the
ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives
within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction legitimate, natural
and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter dictum this
Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant
reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant
reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891,
New Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of
succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question not
being pertinent to this case, need not now be determined. But if this condition is not
fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular
order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the
efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested
ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with whether the reservation has been
noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the notation is
nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p.
292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court
ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value.
Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the
reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See
also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente
Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record in the Registry of
Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not
belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said
land in good faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when
Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente
Galang) not inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this
conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not
arise that he had any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from the fact
alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also from the fact
that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina Dizon, which
circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not
decide, however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to

acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for the reason that
there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in regard
thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse)
had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property,
in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the
latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate
also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real
property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition
of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second
paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis
supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration
of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced
thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private
respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the
death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor
Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the
right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property
during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the
latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree
(SeeVelayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is
extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part
of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not
exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil
Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty
years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was
brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of
the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private
respondents were compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a
property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.

SECTION 4. CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS AND TESTAMENTARY

DISPOSITIONS WITH A TERM
CONDITIONAL INSTITUTION (ARTS. 872-877; 833-884)
53. THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA
MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, [3] dated December 23, 1993, in
CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in
Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of
511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights
which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and
spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx

FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time
that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have
the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until
the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the
obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to
whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot,
the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly
ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month
of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic,
until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not
have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and
shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to
give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command
in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will
obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with
others than my near descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed
as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the
above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The
Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters
Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the
near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs
of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in
case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/returnLot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the
name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the
Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer,
accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of
the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendantheirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the
obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will
be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our
names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each
sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of
the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the
annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be
complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as
herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each
sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment,
payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a
partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of
plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction
from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of
the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar
must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that
plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive
100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's
obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver
such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance
with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil
and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza
in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title
over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However,
plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate,
secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's
legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy
of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion
of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil,
and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with
Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised
which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882
does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's
"near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not

complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid
substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the
substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and
therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed
as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals
deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals
found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition
made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally
demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of
Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent[10]and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs
of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of
further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of
death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by
virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year.
Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over
the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds
to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now
being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not
applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation
to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,

[12]

or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. [13] The Codicil sued upon
contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is
in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." [16] Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore,
void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. [17] In the case under scrutiny,
the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left
by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless
it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted
heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the
return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they
should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article
cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a
manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modoor a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. [18] A "mode" imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. [19] On the
other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not

obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that
the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property
shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that
such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only
a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the
right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. [23] Such construction
as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. [24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100)
piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize
the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said
obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case
of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-ininterest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said
obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement
between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the
petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.[25] Since the Will expresses the manner in
which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must
be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.

MODAL INSTITUTION (ARTS. 882-883)

54. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11386

March 31, 1917

EMILIO NATIVIDAD, administrator of the estate of the deceased Tiburcio Salvador y

Reyes, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BASILIA GABINO, respondent-appellee.
Herrero and Marasigan and I. Santiago for appellant.
Perfecto Gabriel for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal, filed by the administrator of the estate of the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, from
the order of August 21, 1915, by which the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, interpreting the
true wishes of the testator, expressed the opinion that the ownership and dominion of the property
mentioned in clause 6 of the will should be awarded to Basilia Gabino, subject to the reservation made in
behalf of Lorenzo Salvador and Emilio Natividad. Therefore the trial court ordered an amendment made to
the fourth basis for the proposed partition of the decedent's estate, presented by the testamentary
executor, and, as soon as such be made, a day set for the hearing and approval of the proposed amended
partition.
The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who died in
1868, leaving a daughter named Higinia who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died in 1913,
survived by two children Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. Tiburcio Salvador

disposed of all his property in the manner recorded in the will executed in legal form on November 9, 1914,
instituting as sole heirs his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. In
the sixth clause of this will the testator left to Basilia Gabino the legacy mentioned therein. Literally, this
clause is as follows:
I bequeath to Doa Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of
a house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares of the said district of San Nicolas and designated by No.
520, and in addition eleven meters by two meters of the lot designated by No. 419, situated on
Calle Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that part of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of
said property No. 520. If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver
this house, together with the lot on which it stands, to my grandson Emilio Natividad, upon
payment by the latter to the former of the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency.
The executor of the estate of the decedent is the decedent's own heir, Emilio Natividad, who in due season
and by counsel presented to the court for its approval a proposed partition of the property pertaining to
the estate, setting forth in the fourth basis the following relative to the legacy made to Basilia Gabino:
Summarizing the statements made in respect to this matter, we are of the opinion that the sixth
clause expresses in itself a right of usufruct, in favor of Doa Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520
Calle Lavezares, and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of the sum of P4,000 whenever
Basilia should die; but that the ownership of the property upon which this right and legacy are
established belongs to the heir Emilio Natividad who, by the express will of the testator, had been
made liable for these encumbrances.
By a writing of August 5, 1915, counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino opposed the approval of the
proposed partition with regard to the adjudication to the legatee of the usufruct only of the property at No.
520 Calle Lavezares, claiming that said legatee ought to be recognized as entitled to the dominion and
ownership of the same. For this and the other reasons set forth, her counsel requested that the
testamentary executor be ordered to amend the fourth basis of the proposed partition in order that
ownership and dominion, instead of usufruct only, of said property be adjudicated to the objector-legatee,
Basilia Gabino.
After proper legal steps had been taken and the written briefs of the parties and the schedule of the
proposed partition filed by the testamentary executor had been examined, the trial judge issued the order
aforementioned. Appeal was taken by counsel for the executor to this court, and a transcript of the record
of the proceedings below was forwarded to the clerk of this court.
The only question raised by this appeal and submitted to us for decision is: What construction must be
given to the above-quoted sixth clause of the will executed by Tiburcio Salvador?
A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the
testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with
respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon
the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs
and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code,
arts. 790 and 791.)
In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to
Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the property therein specified as to its location and other
circumstances, on condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the
payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the
latter.

The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the
event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition
according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law
or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code.
The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property
to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of
P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these
legacies being the voluntary reservation to Basilia Gabino of the ownership of the said house, and the
second, the conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador.
Making use of his right, the testator provided in his will that the dominion, that is, the ownership and
possession of his house situated on Calle Lavezares, No. 520 together with a part of the lot at No. 419,
should be delivered as a legacy, provided that if the legatee should die, this property instead of passing to
the successor, would revert to the testator's grandson and heir, provided that he in turn would pay to
Lorenzo Salvador the sum of P4,000. It cannot be understood that the legacy conveyed only the usufruct of
the property because the plain and literal meaning of the words employed by the testator in the said
clause sixth clearly shows beyond all doubt the express wished of the testator who, establishing a
voluntary reservation of the ulterior and final disposition of the bequeathed property, ordered that the
legatee's right of dominion should end at her death, and that on this occurrence his wish was that the
ownership of the property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided the latter in turn delivered said P4,000
to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the son of the legatee Gabino.
If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood that the
testator meant to bequeath to Basilia Gabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by
unmistakable language employed in the said sixth clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion
of the said property language which expresses without the slightest doubt his wishes which should be
complied with literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last wills and
testaments the testator's will is the law.
It is true that the legatee could not make any disposal of the bequeathed real property to be effective after
her death, nor could the property be acquired from her by her heir through testate or intestate succession;
but if we take into account that the institution of donations and legacies depends on the full free will of the
testator, and that if the testator intended no more than that Basilia Gabino should enjoy the ownership of
the property during her lifetime, this testamentary provisions is not contrary to law or to public morals,
inasmuch as the testator thereby intended that the property should revert to its lawful heir, the latter
being obliged to make a monetary compensation to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the successor of
the legatee Gabino.
For the foregoing reasons, considering that the order appealed from is in accordance with law and that the
several features of the sole assignment of error made thereto are without merit, the said order of August
21, 1915, must be affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

CONDITON NOT TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE (ART. 874)

55. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11386

March 31, 1917

EMILIO NATIVIDAD, administrator of the estate of the deceased Tiburcio Salvador y

Reyes, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BASILIA GABINO, respondent-appellee.
Herrero and Marasigan and I. Santiago for appellant.
Perfecto Gabriel for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal, filed by the administrator of the estate of the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, from
the order of August 21, 1915, by which the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, interpreting the
true wishes of the testator, expressed the opinion that the ownership and dominion of the property
mentioned in clause 6 of the will should be awarded to Basilia Gabino, subject to the reservation made in
behalf of Lorenzo Salvador and Emilio Natividad. Therefore the trial court ordered an amendment made to
the fourth basis for the proposed partition of the decedent's estate, presented by the testamentary
executor, and, as soon as such be made, a day set for the hearing and approval of the proposed amended
partition.
The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who died in
1868, leaving a daughter named Higinia who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died in 1913,
survived by two children Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. Tiburcio Salvador
disposed of all his property in the manner recorded in the will executed in legal form on November 9, 1914,
instituting as sole heirs his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. In
the sixth clause of this will the testator left to Basilia Gabino the legacy mentioned therein. Literally, this
clause is as follows:
I bequeath to Doa Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of
a house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares of the said district of San Nicolas and designated by No.
520, and in addition eleven meters by two meters of the lot designated by No. 419, situated on
Calle Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that part of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of
said property No. 520. If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver
this house, together with the lot on which it stands, to my grandson Emilio Natividad, upon
payment by the latter to the former of the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency.
The executor of the estate of the decedent is the decedent's own heir, Emilio Natividad, who in due season
and by counsel presented to the court for its approval a proposed partition of the property pertaining to
the estate, setting forth in the fourth basis the following relative to the legacy made to Basilia Gabino:
Summarizing the statements made in respect to this matter, we are of the opinion that the sixth
clause expresses in itself a right of usufruct, in favor of Doa Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520
Calle Lavezares, and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of the sum of P4,000 whenever
Basilia should die; but that the ownership of the property upon which this right and legacy are
established belongs to the heir Emilio Natividad who, by the express will of the testator, had been
made liable for these encumbrances.
By a writing of August 5, 1915, counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino opposed the approval of the
proposed partition with regard to the adjudication to the legatee of the usufruct only of the property at No.
520 Calle Lavezares, claiming that said legatee ought to be recognized as entitled to the dominion and
ownership of the same. For this and the other reasons set forth, her counsel requested that the
testamentary executor be ordered to amend the fourth basis of the proposed partition in order that

ownership and dominion, instead of usufruct only, of said property be adjudicated to the objector-legatee,
Basilia Gabino.
After proper legal steps had been taken and the written briefs of the parties and the schedule of the
proposed partition filed by the testamentary executor had been examined, the trial judge issued the order
aforementioned. Appeal was taken by counsel for the executor to this court, and a transcript of the record
of the proceedings below was forwarded to the clerk of this court.
The only question raised by this appeal and submitted to us for decision is: What construction must be
given to the above-quoted sixth clause of the will executed by Tiburcio Salvador?
A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the
testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with
respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon
the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs
and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code,
arts. 790 and 791.)
In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to
Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the property therein specified as to its location and other
circumstances, on condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the
payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the
latter.
The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the
event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition
according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law
or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code.
The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property
to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of
P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these
legacies being the voluntary reservation to Basilia Gabino of the ownership of the said house, and the
second, the conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador.
Making use of his right, the testator provided in his will that the dominion, that is, the ownership and
possession of his house situated on Calle Lavezares, No. 520 together with a part of the lot at No. 419,
should be delivered as a legacy, provided that if the legatee should die, this property instead of passing to
the successor, would revert to the testator's grandson and heir, provided that he in turn would pay to
Lorenzo Salvador the sum of P4,000. It cannot be understood that the legacy conveyed only the usufruct of
the property because the plain and literal meaning of the words employed by the testator in the said
clause sixth clearly shows beyond all doubt the express wished of the testator who, establishing a
voluntary reservation of the ulterior and final disposition of the bequeathed property, ordered that the
legatee's right of dominion should end at her death, and that on this occurrence his wish was that the
ownership of the property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided the latter in turn delivered said P4,000
to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the son of the legatee Gabino.
If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood that the
testator meant to bequeath to Basilia Gabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by
unmistakable language employed in the said sixth clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion
of the said property language which expresses without the slightest doubt his wishes which should be
complied with literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last wills and
testaments the testator's will is the law.

It is true that the legatee could not make any disposal of the bequeathed real property to be effective after
her death, nor could the property be acquired from her by her heir through testate or intestate succession;
but if we take into account that the institution of donations and legacies depends on the full free will of the
testator, and that if the testator intended no more than that Basilia Gabino should enjoy the ownership of
the property during her lifetime, this testamentary provisions is not contrary to law or to public morals,
inasmuch as the testator thereby intended that the property should revert to its lawful heir, the latter
being obliged to make a monetary compensation to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the successor of
the legatee Gabino.
For the foregoing reasons, considering that the order appealed from is in accordance with law and that the
several features of the sole assignment of error made thereto are without merit, the said order of August
21, 1915, must be affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

SECTION5. LEGITIME (ARTS. 886-914)

CLASSIFICATION OF COMPULSORY HEIRS
56. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17742

December 17, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON VICENTE NOBLE. JUAN NOBLE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARIA S. NOBLE, oppositor-appellant.
Jesus N. Maravilla and Nicolas Belmonte, for petitioner-appellee.
Farrera, Belmi and Associates for oppositor-appellant.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal by Maria S. Noble from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (in Sp. Proc. No.
343), dismissing her opposition to the probate of the purported last will of the late Don Vicente Noble, who
died on April 25, 1959.
The proceedings for the probate of the last will of the deceased was instituted by Juan Noble who was
named executor therein and who had expressed willingness to assume the trust. This was opposed by
Maria S. Noble, who claimed to be an illegitimate (spurious) child of the deceased, born on July 22, 1923
out of an illicit relation between the latter and Lucia Sinag. It was alleged that the will sought to be
probated, dated August 25, 1957, was not the last will and testament of the late Don Vicente Noble; that
from all indications as shown by a perusal of the alleged last will of the deceased, the same was not
executed in accordance with the law, and that the said will was executed through undue influence, mistake
and improper pressure on the part of one or some of the beneficiaries, and that petitioner Juan Noble, as
then incumbent Assistant General Manager of the NAMARCO, a government corporation could not properly
execute the trust of his office in the estate of the deceased, which consists of real and personal properties
located in several provinces. Furthermore, oppositor contended that petitioner has an adverse interest
against those immediately interested in the estate, like her. Thus, she prayed that the purported last Will

and Testament presented to the court be disallowed; that she be declared the only surviving illegitimate
daughter of the deceased; and in case the will sought to be probated be allowed, the institution of heirs
made therein be declared null and void; the devises and legacies be declared ineffective for being
inofficious; and oppositor be declared entitled to one-half of the entire hereditary estate of the deceased;
that instead of petitioner, letters of administration be issued in favor of Mrs. Corazon Apacible de Caiza of
Taal, Batangas. Simultaneously, she filed a motion asking for permission to present evidence of her alleged
filiation with the deceased. This motion was opposed by petitioner Juan Noble, on the ground that the
claim was in effect an action for compulsory recognition, and since it was brought after the death of the
putative father and when claimant was already of majority age, the right to bring the same has already
prescribed pursuant to Article 285 of the new Civil Code. 1 This motion was not immediately resolved.
Instead, the court proceeded with the reception of the evidence for the petitioner, during which
proceeding, the oppositor was allowed to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses.
Finding, on the basis of the evidence presented by the petitioner, that the document, Exhibit "D", and its
copies, Exhibits "D-1" to "D-12", constitute the last will and testament of the deceased Vicente Noble, and
it was executed with all the formal requirements of the law, the aforesaid will was admitted to probate, and
Juan Noble was appointed administrator of the estate upon a bond of P30,000.00. It was also ruled that the
petition of Maria S. Noble to present proof for the purpose of establishing her filiation, filed after the death
of the presumed father, had been barred by prescription. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the petition
of Maria S. Noble was granted. Oppositor appealed.
The main issue presented in this case requiring resolution by this Court is: what is necessary to be
established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights
under Article 887 of the new Civil Code, the fact of his bare filiation, or a filiation acknowledged by the
putative parent?
While the Civil Code merely provides that "in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved" (Art. 887), there are cogent reasons, both legal and moral, which require that such filiation must
be acknowledged by the presumed parent. For, if the mere fact of the paternity of the supposed father is
all that need be proved, that construction of the law would pave the way to unscrupulous individuals
taking advantage of the death of the presumed parent who would no longer be in a position to deny the
allegations, to present even fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting his
character.
But more important than this, the law could not have demanded anything less than proof of an
acknowledged filiation. Precisely, under Article 289 of the new Civil Code, the investigation of the paternity
or maternity of children mentioned in the two preceding articles (referring to illegitimate not natural
children) is specifically permitted only in the circumstances enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of the
same code. It must be noted that these two articles refer to compulsory recognition or acknowledgment.
Hence, since the proof of filiation required in Article 887, necessarily involves the investigation mentioned
in Article 289, and this investigation in turn refers to recognition by the putative parent, it follows that the
filiation to be proven must be one that is recognized.
In the present case, what is intended to be proved by appellant is simply the supposed naked paternity of
the deceased. This is evident from the pertinent allegations of her opposition to the probate of the will,
which state:
2. That the oppositor is in continuous possession of status of a child of the late Don Vicente Noble
by the direct acts of the latter and/or his family; and, that the oppositor has in her favor evidence
and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father.
It may be pointed out that the first sentence does not state that the supposed father had recognized or
acknowledged the oppositor as his child. It is merely claimed that she was in continuous possession of the

status of a child, an allegation which is a ground for compelling recognition under Article 283 of the new
Civil Code and, therefore, presupposes no previous recognition. The last sentence alleges that oppositor
has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father. Again, there is no
assertion that she has evidence that the deceased had recognized or acknowledged her as such a child.
In a unanimous decision, in the case of Paulino v. Paulino (G.R. No. L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961), this Court
held:
It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted that the
appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural, child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an
admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It is necessary
to allege that her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such
acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of
such acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which can not be brought
after the death of the putative father. (Emphasis supplied.)
This is authority to the declaration that acknowledgment is the basis of the right of a spurious child to
enjoy the successional rights mentioned in Articles 287 and 887 of the new Civil Code. There being no
allegation of her recognition or acknowledgment by the alleged father in the petition to establish her
filiation, the same, therefore, states no cause of action and the dismissal thereof by the lower court was
proper.
Incidentally, the last sentence of the above-quoted portion of the decision in the Paulino case constitutes a
reversal of the ruling contained in the majority opinion in the case of Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui (G.R. No.
L-10010, Oct. 31, 1957) relied upon by the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

PROPERTY SUBJECT TO COLLATION

57. THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998]
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch
120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz.,
Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas

and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon
Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his
parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m.
located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206
for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng
Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.[1] In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering
the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita.[2] On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela
property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five
Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).[3] In June of the same year, Estrellita bought
from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes,
Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car
while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and her two
daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the
Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died
ahead of her daughters.[4] Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita
and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his
daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into anExtra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares,[5] with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas
parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her
two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank
deposits, a car and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and
other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00).[6] The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits
of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of
Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The
Paraaque property and the car were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all
their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs[7] in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an intestate
estate proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of
Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. Additionally, she
sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent
brother. Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition [9] dated March 24, 1993, praying to be
appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another
opposition[10] alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael
which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon
pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution
made by deceased Rafael to his children,[11] Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas
and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the
properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. [12] Ramon stated that herein
petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate
daughter of Estrellita.[13]
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of
Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafaels

estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs. [14] Neither was the
Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate. [15] Subsequently, the RTC
in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his
wards property without the courts knowledge and permission. [16]
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10) days x x x
within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the
case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the
counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated
January 19, 1994, stressing tha the was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and
he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order
dated February 2, 1994.[17] Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated February 14,
1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque
property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated.[18] Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order
which pertinently reads as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and considering
the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. [19]
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed. [20] On
August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. It
provides:
xxxxxxxxx
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially
incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela
from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said
spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the
United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines
only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property
from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture
such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing.However, no competent
evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas
was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was
gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said
transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[21] (Underscoring added)

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its
decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals [22] denied the petition stressing that the
RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the
probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court).
[23]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima facie merit,
the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent Court of
Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and
declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code
speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the
division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they
received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator.
[24]
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves
property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. [25] The
purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a
donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his
share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of
any expression to the contrary.[26]Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but
rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, [27] the rationale being that the donation
is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.[28]
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well
as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the
Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do
they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in
the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of
Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. [29] As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the
intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no
personality or interest in the said proceeding, [30] which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation.[31]
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a
property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. [32] Such determination is
provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. [33] In the
case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction
when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael
and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was
gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues
should be ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or
excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or
ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to
raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit. [34]
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find
nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant
collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions of article
1035[35] of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations
received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or
hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation
sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court,
nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We note that what
was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque
property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does

not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no
statutory basis.[36] The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was
gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property
was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael,
the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner
of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation
against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and
not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the
Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the
decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of
the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any
claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir[38] in the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property
may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was
Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.
[39]
Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed
as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any
determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

58.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO,
represented
by
her
duly
appointed guardians, AGNES P.
ARELLANO
and
NONA
P.
ARELLANO,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 189776

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,
MENDOZA,** and
SERENO, JJ.

FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL

PASCUAL,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
December 15, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters [1] Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes)
and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. [2]
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration,
docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged,inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated
property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an
advance legitime of petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate by
Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.[3]
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in
any event, posited that it may be considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court,
acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate,[4] the probate court found the
Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on
to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: [5]
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus it
disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:
1.
2.
3.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati as
part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the
3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N.
Pascual;

4.

The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:

a.

1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT
No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;

b.

1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located
at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;

c.

Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera

Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;

d.

Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following

Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796,
A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026,
C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308,
S69309;

e.

Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following

Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680,
A020786, S18539, S14649;

f.

share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;

g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona
Arellano;
i.

Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No.
181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;

j.

Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of the
Court on November 17, 1995.

5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a.
b.

To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889;

To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties
covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally
between them up to the extent that each of their share have been equalized
with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value
of which shall be determined by an independent appraiser to be designated
by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real
properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then Franciscos and
Miguels shares may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of
stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF
THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.

II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE
1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL N.
PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS
LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.[6] (underscoring supplied)

By Decision[7] of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal partly
meritorious. It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to
collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality
of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of
Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the
decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable
though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her
share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible
error when it included the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N.
Pascual.[8] (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein
petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which
have not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator.
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N.
Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are
concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in
accordance with the disquisitions herein.[9](underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration [10] having been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution[11] of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as
errors of the appellate court its ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER AMELIA
PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER
ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER
ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND AREENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY AMONG
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. [12] (underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation;
and whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the
parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the
addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary
estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title
by the testator during his lifetime.[13]
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations
may be reduced.[14]
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine
the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.[15]
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory
heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not

entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the
law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.[16]
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and
exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the
absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary
compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with
the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the
surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.[17]

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, [18] is deemed as donation made to a
stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate.[19] There being no compulsory heir,
however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblingscollateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the
property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr.
is SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati
Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of
determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it
equally among the parties.
SO ORDERED

SECTION 6. DISINHERITANCE (ARTS. 915- 923)

GROUNDS FOR DISINHERITANCE (ARTS. 915-921)
59. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 7890

September 29, 1914

FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio

Pecson, et al., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.
S. E. Imperial for appellants.
Tomas Lorayes for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will
and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on
the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable
Percy M. Moir, judge, found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the
provisions of law, and denied the opposition on the 17th day of September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo
and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:
1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased
Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore
the first mentioned is and the second was a grandchild of the latter.
2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her
grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she
failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due
to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from
which she now suffers in periodical attacks.

By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the will is
unfounded, the undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause and to make the
testator's died without succession, but is represented now by his father, Basiliso
Mediavillo), participants in the estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the court
grant such other relief as it may deem just and equitable.
After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court, on the 22d day
of September, 1911, rendered the following decision:
This case has come up to-day for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of the decease
Florencio Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.
From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his wife Nicolasa
Manjares, likewise deceased, which children are those named Emerenciano, Teresa,
Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino, Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also
appears that Rufino Pecson absented himself from these Islands twenty-five years ago,
going to Australia, and that nothing has been heard of him for the past twenty years. The
said Rufino Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was unmarried when he
emigrated. As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is presumed that he died
and it is held that the part of this estate to which he was entitled must be divided among
the other heirs.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso Mediavillo, by whom
she had two children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo. Teresa also died, leaving these two
children and her husband, Basiliso Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and
childless, before the death of the testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living
daughter of Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso Mediavillo, is also living. The
evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva
Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that
she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator
states in the third paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that
this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane,
was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.
The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law and sets it aside as
being of no force or value whatever. The court further holds that Rosario Mediavillo, the
daughter of Teresa Pecson, is the heiress of the one-half of the share of this estate
pertaining to the said Teresa, and that her father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also
Teresa's son, is the heris of the other one-half of the said share pertaining to Teresa that
is, of the one-seventh of this estate that pertains to the latter. Moreover, the court decrees
that, besides the two heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano, Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila,
Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children of Teresa, are also heirs of the
estate of Florencio Pecson.
From the decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignments of
error:
FIRST ERROR

The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which disinherits Rosario Mediavillo
is contrary to law, and in setting it aside as being of no force or value whatever.
SECOND ERROR
The lower court erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin
Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the one-half of the one seventh of this estate
pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo.
With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the record it appears that
during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he
had eight children, named Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino
and Teresa Pecson; that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will
in question. The will made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any
provision in the will for the said Teresa. All of the other children were named as heirs in said will.
It appears that Teresa had been married with one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before
the making of the will in question she died, leaving her husband and two children, Joaquin
Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also appears from the record that Joaquin
Mediavillo died without heirs, leaving as the only heirs of the said Teresa Pecson, her husband,
Basilio Mediavillo and the said Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin Mediavillo died before his
grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before the will in question was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate
daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, the
said Rosario Mediavillo, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one
occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is
my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and which is copied above,
alleges that she was disinherited without case. Upon a consideration of that question, the lower
court found that she had been disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the
will. That order of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant in her first
assignment of error.
By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio Pecson disinherited
the said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one
occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will
that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof the question of the responsibility of the said Rosario Mediavillo at
the time she offered the offense to her grandfather, Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the
lower court reached the following conclusion:
The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva
Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that
she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator
states in the third paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that

this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane,
was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.
The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts, when a parent
disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there
was or was not ground for such disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that
disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance
with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or
causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by
will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance
can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes
for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes
mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire
whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The
right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the
disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850
provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established
by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if
the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be
permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the
disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in
part provides that:
Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as
it prejudices the person disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the justice of a
disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they find that the disinheritance
was without cause, that part of the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It
remains, however, to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present
cause was sufficient to show that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made
for just cause. It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of
age, she had received some attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from
him and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the
relations between her and the said young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged,
the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her
disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said event she lost the
use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods,
up to the present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact
that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that
she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather
in the year 1894 or 1895.
After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the same supports the
conclusions of the lower court and that the same supports the conclusions of the lower court that
he did not commit the error complained of in the first assignment of error.

With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that Teresa Pecson, the
mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and
her husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower
court gave one-half of the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the
share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone to Joaquin
Mediavillo, to his father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the lower court we think error
was committed. The appellant relies upon the provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his
contention that the lower court committed an error. Article 925 provides that:
The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never
in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood.
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935 and 936 of the
Civil Code. Article 935 provides that:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants
shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
Article 936 provides that:
The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If one of them only
survive, he or she shall succeed to the son's entire estate.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first
assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently
believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and
that therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants.
Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could
not ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso
Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of
the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that
art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio
Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had
he been surviving, is hereby revoked. And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby ordered
that the cause be remanded to the lower court, with direction that judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and that such further proceedings be had as the interested parties may
deem necessary, for the purpose of disposing of that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson
would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving.

60. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72

November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999
and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying
for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power
to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is
the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo
because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In
view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is
found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and
replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the

probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng
lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging
lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya
na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa
ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan
ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya
makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong
saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396
were consolidated.4

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet
the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the
will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or
legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the
extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same,
and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it
contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition
does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,
clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and
Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However,
insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155
SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate
of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically
void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14,
1999.
Petitioners contend that:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS,
DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF
THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL
HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE
CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF
THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS
LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF
THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY
AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place
to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of
the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states,Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory
heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike,
with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing
of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners,
and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed
and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private
respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos
intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child
or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In
other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo
in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. 10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It
is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot
be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and
the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect. 14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the
direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression
to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere
mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to
institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation
between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. 17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to
reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination
of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.