Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(ARGUED)
In Chiarella, the Court reversed the conviction of a printshop employee who traded securities of takeover targets he
deduced from print materials because he did not share a
fiduciary or similar relationship with the targets
shareholders. 445 U.S. at 224-225, 235. Similarly, in Dirks,
an investment analyst was not liable for tipping his clients
about a companys fraud because [t]here was no expectation
by [the analysts inside] sources that he would keep their
information in confidence. 463 U.S. at 665.
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1.
At Chevron step one, we decide that 10(b) is
ambiguous and expressly delegates broad rulemaking
authority to the SEC. Section 10(b) acts as a catch-all
provision and authorizes the SEC to prescribe [regulations]
as necessary or appropriate to prevent the use of
manipulative or deceptive device[s] in connection with
trading securities. 15 U.S.C. 78j(b). McGees contention
that 10(b) unambiguously requires deception misses the
point. Appellants Br. at 25. The statute is ambiguous because
Congress declined to define the amorphous term deceptive
device. Moreover, Congress did not speak to the precise
question at issue because 10(b) does not mention insider
trading at all, much less misappropriation or relationships
required for liability. This congressional omission constitutes
a delegation of authority to the SEC to fill the statutory gap
in reasonable fashion. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980. The SEC
filled this gap with Rule 10b5-2.
Having identified the gap in 10(b), we turn to
McGees argument that Supreme Court precedent forecloses
us from applying Chevrons framework to Rule 10b5-2(b)(2).
We do not accept this argument. The Court has recognized
that allowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an agency
from interpreting an ambiguous statute . . . would allow a
courts interpretation to override an agencys. Id. at 982.
Chevrons premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill
statutory gaps. Id. Hence, it bears reemphasis that [o]nly a
judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agencys interpretation, and therefore contains
no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency
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1.
A perjury conviction under 1621 cannot be obtained
solely on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, but
must be based on the testimony of two independent
witnesses or by one witness and corroborating evidence.
United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297, 306 (3d Cir. 1954).
Evidence corroborating the testimony of a single witness
must be independent of the witnesss testimony, trustworthy
enough to convince the jury that what the witness said was
true, and be inconsistent with the innocence of the
defendant. Id. at 307. To be inconsistent with innocence,
corroborating evidence must merely support the inference
that the defendant was lying. United States v. Nessanbaum,
205 F.2d 93, 95 n.4 (3d Cir. 1953).
At trial, the Government offered McGees highvolume trading in PHLY stock to corroborate Maguires
testimony that he told McGee about PHLYs sale before it
was publicly announced. McGee contends that his trading
records are not sufficient corroborative evidence. McGee
points to United States v. Chestman, in which the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a perjury conviction
because the evidence of trading was not inconsistent with the
defendants position that he researched the company,
assumed it was a takeover target, and invested accordingly.
903 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1990), revd on other grounds en
banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). McGee argues that, like
the defendant in Chestman, his trading records are insufficient
corroborative evidence because there are other explanations
for his excessive trading.
McGee contends that his trades are congruous with his
investment strategy of averaging down. Averaging down
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