Eusebio vs.

Eusebio
In the matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. Eugenio
Eusebio, petitioner and appellee, vs. Amanda Eusebio, Virginia Eusebio, Juan
Eusebio, et al., oppositors and appellants.
December 28, 1956 | Concepcion
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged
that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenios
siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are
illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon
the ground that venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenios petition and overruled his siblings objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A
Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him,
resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to
the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his sons
residence. It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a
place merely for one owns health even if coupled with knowledge that one will
never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over
seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct
evidence of such intent Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City
indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented
to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed
of sale of his house at 889 A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as
his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres when he was married
in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his
residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of
choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no
change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI
of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must
be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the
same.

In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.
Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not
changed by presence in a place for ones own health.

G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in
Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator
died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon
City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed
a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but
this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted
on
the
probate
proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were
denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to
CFI
Quezon.
ISSUEs:

Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of

discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the
precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it
would affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.
San Luis vs. San Luis
Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him,
then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried
again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st
marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage
was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't
apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van
Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage,
thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse.
However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded
in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
1.
VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
1.
MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before
Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
1.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church
in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang
residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of
administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
1.
Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and
not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)
1.
No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry
Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it
would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence
of the ff:
Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove

proper venue
Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo

to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue

RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or

physical habitation so petition was properly filed

Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under

Philippine law
1 WON Venue properly laid? YES
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,

"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
1 WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES
As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo
(1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained
by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which
were in Ma'am's book)
-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van
Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to
marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was
not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC
Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of
administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both
stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons
living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.
Camaya v. Patulandong
423 SCRA 480
FACTS:
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she
devised Lot no. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During herlifetime, the
testatrix herself filed the petition for the probate of her will before the CFI. Later, on
June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying her will by devising the said
Lot 288-A in favor of her four children Bernardo (the executor), Simplicia, Huillerma
and Juan (all surnamed Patulandong), and her grandson Mangulabnan to the extent
of 1/5 each.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title of
Lot 288-A, but Patulandong refused to heed the request because of the codicial which
modified the will of the testatrix. Thus, Mangulabnan filed an action for partition
against Patulandong in the RTC. The court in this partition ordered the partitioning of
the property. However, the court holds that the partition is without prejudice to the
probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court. So, by virtue of the
decision in partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the
testatrix over Lot 288-A, and another TCT was issued in his name. Mangulabnan later
sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot no. 288-A by a Deed of Sale, and thus, a TCT
was issued under the name of the Camayas.

However, come now the decision of the probate court admitting the codicil, and
disposing that the Deed of Sale in favor of the Camayas, and the corresponding TCT
issued in their name are null and void, and that the Register of Dees was ordered to
issue instead corresponding certificates of titles to the aforesaid four children of the
testatrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan to the extent of 1/5 each pursuant to the
codicil.
The Camayas and Mangulabnan filed an MR. But the probate court denied this. The CA
affirmed the decision of the probate court. Thus, the case was brought to the SC via a
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void
and ordered the cancellation of the TCT of Camayas and the deed of sale.
2.Whether the final judgment in partition case bars the allowance of the codicil.
HELD:
1.As

to

the

first

issue,

the

probate

court

exceeded

its

jurisdiction

when

it declaredthe deed of sale as null and void, and also as to the cancellation of the TCTs
under the name of the Camayas. It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should not be included in the inventory. If there is no dispute,
well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action for final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Having been apprised of the
fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their
possession and ownership of the property. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it declared the deed of sale and the titles of the Camayas as null and void, it
having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
2.As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in
effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed by law;

and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal
presumption that the transfer was lawful. Petitioners argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was
not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was
without prejudice [to] the probate of the codicil. The rights of the prevailing
parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners
titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas
claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption
that the transfer was lawful.
The petition is granted in part. The decision of the probate court allowing the codicil is
affirmed. But, the declaration of the aforesaid Deed of Sale, and the order to reissue
corresponding certificates of titles to the four children of the testratrix, and her
grandson Mangulabnan are set aside, without prejudice to the respondents
ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.

Pacioles v. Chuatoco-ching

Facts:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value
million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting
million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her
petitioner, and their two minor children. milio Pacioles husband of deceased
filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate.

of P10.5
to P6.54
husband,
Miguelita

Miguelitas mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is

incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and the bulk of
Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no
direct and material interest in the estate. Respondent countered that she has direct
and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to
Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners. She then nominated
her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
The intestate court then issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint
regular administrators of the estate and then declared petitioner and his two minor
children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner then submitted to the

intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an

inventory.
Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that an Order be issued
directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate
among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees. Respondent opposed on
the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is premature and
precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties
specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.
Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and coowner. She prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but
denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is
indeed premature. It also ordered that a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in
her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or
the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor
and the petitioner in their partnership venture.
Petitioner questrioned this order but the MR was denied. The Petition for Certiorari
with the CA. This is a Petition for Certiorari to the CA.
Issue: Did the lower court acted with GADALEJ in ordering that a hearing be set to
determine the ownership of the properties in an intestate procedding?
Held: YES May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions
of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
Ratio::
The general rule is that the intestae court cannot hear and pass upon questions of
ownership. However the intestae court may hear and pass upon questions of
ownership provisionally and when merely incidentalif the purpose is to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory of he estate of the
deceased. But this case does not fall under the above mentioned deviation from the
general rule, thus the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering that a
hearing be set for determining the ownership of the properties in question.
The facts of this case show that the inventorty is not disputed. In fact, in repondents
Manifestation and Opposition, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared
by petitioner. Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the
exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But
instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the
low valuation placed on the real estate properties. Also, Emmanuel, respondents son
and representative, did not submit his own inventory
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a
ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She

wanted to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of
ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her
adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate
given that she had Torrens title over such properties. (Miguela cannot even determine
in particular the properties she is claiming.
Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. 167405, February 16, 2006_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012
(Special Proceedings Adoption)
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was
the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and
personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes,
a grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Lising and the latters husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the
certification of her adoption from the local civil registrars office that the adoption
decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification
issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have
been cast on Petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain
badges of fraud.
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon
the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree
render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.
Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities.
Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than
those which she had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public
records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the
court which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty

by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the
certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details
of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications
suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of irregularities
will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.