Case Digest Compilation Torts and Damages 1

Case Digests - Torts and Damages
[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]

Case Title
Citation
Page
BATCH 01
1.
Barredo vs. Garcia
73 PHIL 607
2.
Robles vs. Yap Wing
41 SCRA 267
3.
FGU Insurance vs. CA
287 SCRA 718
4.
So Ping Bun vs. CA
314 SCRA 751
5.
Jarco Marketing vs. CA
321 SCRA 375
6.
Calalas vs. CA
332 SCRA 356
7.
Cervantes vs. CA
304 SCRA 25
10
8.
People vs. Delos Santos
355 SCRA 415
11
9.
Sanitary Steam Laundry vs. CA
300 SCRA 20
12
10. Phoenix vs. IAC
148 SCRA 353
13
11. Batangas Laguna vs. IAC
167 SCRA 379
14
12. Air France vs. Carrascoso
18 SCRA 155
15
13. Go vs. CA
272 SCRA 752
16
14. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital
341 SCRA 760
17
15. Ramos vs. CA
321 SCRA 584
18
250 SCRA 195
19
BATCH 02
1.
Mansion Biscuit Corporation vs. CA
2.
People vs. Elizalde (NOT FOUND

)
3.
Vda de Bataclan vs. Medina
102 PHIL 181
21
4.
Ma-ao Sugar Central vs. CA
189 SCRA 93
23
5.
MMTC vs. CA
AUG 1 2002
25
6.
Taylor vs. Manila Electric
16 PHIL 8
27
7.
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
148 SCRA 353
29
8.
Ong vs. Metro Water District
104 PHIL 397
30
9.
Hidalgo vs. Balandan
91 PHIL 488
31
10. Picart vs. Smith
27 PHIL 809
32
11. De Roy vs. CA
157 SCRA 757
33
12. Bustamante vs. CA
193 SCRA 603
34
13. Windvalley Shipping vs. CA
342 SCRA 214
36
14. Africa vs. Caltex
123 PHIL 272
38
15. Espiritu vs. Phil Power
SEPT 20 1949
40
211 SCRA 519
41
85 PHIL 67
44
59 OFF GAZETTE 124
BATCH 03
1.
McKee vs. IAC
2.
Alfiada vs. Hasole
3.
PLDT vs. CA
178 SCRA 94
45
4.
Ilocos Norte vs. CA
179 SCRA 5
47
5.
Salen vs. Balce
107 PHIL 752
48
6.
University of the East vs. Jader
325 SCRA 804
49
7.
Castillex vs. Vasquez
321 SCRA 401
51
Contributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
Monique Pagarigan; Rainier Palogan; Cielo Santos; Kremlin Santos; Janine Villabeto. | UST Faculty of Civil Law
8.
Rosete vs. Auditor General
81 PHIL 453
53
9.
Palisoc vs. Brillantes
41 SCRA 538
54
10. Amadora vs. CA
160 SCRA 315
56
11. Mercado vs. CA
108 PHIL 414
58
12. Sarkies Tour vs. IAC
124 SCRA 588
59
13. Vestil vs. IAC
179 SCRA 48
60
14. Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai
26 SCRA 410
62
15. Mallari vs. CA
324 SCRA 147
63
16. City of Manila vs. Teotico
22 SCRA 267
65
BATCH 04
1.
Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co
82 PHIL 360
67
2.
Ballatan vs CA
304 SCRA 34
69
3.
RCBC vs. CA
305 SCRA 449
70
4.
Vda de Severo vs. Go
157 SCRA 446
72
5.
Banez vs Valdevilla
331 SCRA 584
73
6.
People vs. Ballesteros
285 SCRA 438
75
7.
Robleza vs. CA
174 SCRA 354
76
8.
Mabutol vs. Pascua
124 SCRA 867
78
9.
Algarra vs. Sandejas
27 PHIL 284
80
10. Farolan vs. Salmac
195 SCRA 168
82
11. Japan Airlines vs. CA
294 SCRA 19
83
12. People vs. Malapo
294 SCRA 579
84
13. People vs. Ereno
326 SCRA 157
85
14. People vs. Laceste
293 SCRA 397
86
15. People vs. Panado
348 SCRA 679
88
7 SCRA 72
90
338 SCRA 582
91
16. Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo

17. People vs. dela Cruz
BATCH 05
1.
Capco vs. Macasaet
189 SCRA 561
92
2.
Rafael Reyes Trucking vs. People
329 SCRA 600
94
3.
RCPI vs. Lantin
134 SCRA 395
98
4.
BA Finance Corp. vs. CA
161 SCRA 608
99
5.
Boysaw vs. Sarreal
148 SCRA 535
101
6.
Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Esteva
67 PHIL 16
103
7.
RCPI vs. CA
103 SCRA 359
104
8.
Hicks vs. Manila Hotel
28 PHIL 325
105
9.
Lemoine vs. Alkan
33 PHIL 162
107
10. Southern College vs. CA
292 SCRA 422
109
11. People vs. Lopez
312 SCRA 684
111
12. ABS CBN vs. CA
302 SCRA 572
113
13. People vs. Medroso
62 SCRA 245
115
14. People vs. Rodriguez
139 SCRA 23
116
15. People vs. Aspiras
330 SCRA 479
117
BATCH 06
1.
PAN Malayan Insurance vs. CA
184 SCRA 54
118
2.
Royal Traders Bank vs. NLRC
269 SCRA 733
120
3.
Quirante vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court
169 SCRA 769
123
4.
Araneta vs. Bank of America
40 SCRA 144
125
5.
Lorenzo Shipping vs. CA
161 SCRA 319
128
6.
Quiroz vs. Tan Guinlay
5 PHIL 675
129
7.
Soberano vs. Manila Railroad

Company
18 SCRA 732
131
8.
Philippine Accident Insurance vs.

Flores
97 SCRA 811
133
9.
Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport
148 SCRA 440
134
1 SCRA 215
136
11. People of the Philippines vs.

Principe
381 SCRA 642
138
12. Albert vs. University Publishing
103 PHIL 351
140
13. NPC vs. National Merchandising

Corporation
117 SCRA 789
142
14. Ledesma vs. CA
160 SCRA 449
143
15. LTB Co. vs. Diasanta
11 SCRA 474
145
10. Ventanilla vs. Centeno
BATCH 07
1.
Sea Commercial Company vs. CA
319 SCRA 210
146
2.
Hermosisima vs. CA
109 PHIL 629
148
3.
St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. CA
133 SCRA 179
149
4.
Yakult Philippines vs. CA
190 SCRA 357
150
5.
Aberca vs. Ver
160 SCRA 590
151
6.
Manila Electric Company vs. CA
114 SCRA 173
153
7.
Juan F. Nakpil and Sons vs. CA
144 SCRA 596
154
8.
Ty vs. CA
346 SCRA 86
156
9.
De Guzman vs. CA
168 SCRA 612
157
10. Abelardo Lim vs. CA
373 SCRA 394
159
11. Dawa vs. De Asa
292 SCRA 703
161
12. Floralde vs. CA
337 SCRA 371
162
Contributors:
Christel Allena
Angel Alonso
Margarita Baa
Jeff De Gulan
Jeseth De Vera
Angelo Dizon
Lawrence Holanday
Leslie Jose
K.C. Ochoa
Monique Pagarigan
Rainier Palogan
Cielo Santos
Kremlin Santos
Janine Villabeto
BATCH 01
1.
Fausto Barredo vs. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario (1942)
FACTS: About half past 1 in the morning of May 3, 1936, between Malabon and Navotas street in the province of Rizal, there was a
head-on collision between a taxi of Petitioner (sole prop of Malate Taxicab) driven by Fontanilla and a carratela which was overturned.
Faustino Garcia, a 16 year old passenger thereof suffered injuries and died 2 days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in
the CFI of Rizal, he was convicted and was given an indeterminate sentence of 1 year and 1 day to 2 yrs. of prision correctional. In the
criminal case, the court granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence. The parents of Faustino brought an action in the CFI of Manila against Barredo being the employer of Fontanilla.
The CFI of Manila awarded P2,000 in damages and legal interest from the date of the complaint. The CA modified this, reduced to
P1,000, basis: civil code: no proof that Barredo exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. It was shown
that he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and Speeding
violations that appear in the records of the Bureau of Public Works, which were available to the public and to himself.
Defense of Barredo: His liability is only subsidiary under the RPC and no civil action had been filed against Fontanilla.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents may bring a separate civil action against Barredo thereby making him primarily and directly
responsible under Art. 1903 Civil Code as employer of Fontanilla - Yes
HELD:
Barredo has 2 civil liabilities:
1)
2)
Subsidiary because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latters criminal negligence RPC, Art. 103
Primary as the Employer, under Art. 1093 (?), civil code, for his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome.
Art 1903(?) civil code, not only establishes liability in case of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease- upon
proof that diligence of a good father of a family had been employed to avoid damage. Responsibility of the employer selection,
supervision or both. This exception from civil liability does not apply to subsidiary liability under the RPC.
The respondents were free to choose which courts to take and they preferred the second remedy which is more expeditious
and effective method of relief because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without
property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
The primary and direct responsibility of the employer and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employers should be carefully chosen to avoid injury to the public.
Additional notes:
DELICTS CRIMES (RPC)
1.
2.
3.
Affect public interest

Penal Code corrects or punishes the criminal act
Not as broad as quasi-delicts: punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them
QUASI-DELICTS (Culpa Aquilana)

1.
2.
3.
Only of private concern

By means of indemnification, merely repairs
the damage.
Include all acts in which any kind of fault
or negligence intervenes
Civil liability arising from a crime
*Civil liability for quasi-delict (culpa aquilana)
-governed by the RPC
-under the Civil Code
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2.
CIRIACO ROBLES vs.YAP WING.
FACTS:
Ciriaco Robles, who received apparently serious head injuries when a piece of lumber fell on his head while working on July 6,
1961 on a construction job of his employer, Yap Wing, filed the damages suit below in the regular court of first instance, alleging that
"defendant (employer) negligently failed to provide safety measures within the construction premises" and praying actual damages,
moral damages, exemplary and nominal damages as attorneys fees.
In his answer defendant alleged by way of affirmative defense that plaintiffs claim is one for disability resulting from an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and thus pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmens
Compensation Commission.
The lower court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for damages with costs, holding that it had no jurisdiction over the case, since
all such claims for compensation fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmens Compensation Commission.
On appeal, appellant contends that his claim is not for compensation under the Workmen's Corporation Law but one for
damages under Article 1711 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
Whether the action of the injured employee restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such that they cannot seek higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the latter or
of his other employees.
Whether the appellant can claim moral damages.
HELD:
1.
YES. Section 5 of the Act provides that "the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury
entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and, remedies accruing to an employee, his personal representation
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury ..." Hence, where the
employee's cause of action against his employer derives mainly from an injury received in an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment, such employee may not elect other forms of damages in place of and/or in addition to compensation. He
may not have recourse in the ordinary courts, for his remedies are confined to lodging the proper claim with the Workmen's
2.
The alleged negligence was not a quasi-delict inasmuch as there was a pre-existing contractual relation of employer and employee
between the parties (Art. 2176, Civil Code); and in breaches of contract moral damages may be recovered only where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the complaint here.
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3.
FGU Insurance Corporation vs. CA
FACTS:
A Mitsubishi Colt Lancer owned by FILCAR driven by a Danish tourist Peter Dahl-Jensen collided with another Mitsubishi Colt Lancer
owned by Lydia Soriano driven by Benjamin Jacildone. The accident took place at EDSA. The car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right
hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time, Dahl-Jensen did not possess a Philippine drivers license. FGU Insurance
Corporation, in view of its contact with Soriano, paid Soriano. By way of subrogation, FGU sued Dahl-Jensen and FILCAR and Fortune
Insurance Corporation. Dahl-Jensen was dropped in the complaint because summons was not served to him. TC dismissed the case for
failure to substantiate the claim of subrogation. CA affirmed the TCs ruling based on another ground, i.e. only the fault or negligence
of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proceed but not that of FILCAR.
ISSUE:
WON on the action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company, and consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of
the car lease in driving the rented vehicle.
HELD:
No.
To sustain a claim based on Article 2176 CC, the following requisites must concur: a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal
liability. FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under
consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for
the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
Par. 5 of Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2184 of the same Code provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was
not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable
because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of
action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
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4.
SO PING BUN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISING GROUP and MANUEL C. TIONG,
respondents.
FACTS:
and
Sons, Inc. (DCCSI). The premises subjects of the agreements were located in Soler St. Binondo, Manila.
he areas to store its textiles. The each contract had a one-year term and they provided that should the lessee
continue to occupy the premises after the term, the leases shall be a month-to-month basis.
new. However, Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises.
.
se for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing.
losed in
the letters were new lease contracts for signing wherein DCCSI warned the petitioner that failure to accomplish the contracts shall be
deemed as lack of interest and deemed terminated. Private respondent did not answer but the contracts were not rescinded.
the warehouse. Petitioner refused to do so. Petitioner requested formal
contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor of Trendsetter which were executed.
Trial Court, the private respondents prayed for the nullification of the lease contracts. Annulled the contracts and damages were
granted. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied. On appeal, CA upheld the decision of trial court reducing the award of attorneys
fees.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in affirming the trial court decision finding Petitioner guilty of tortuous interference of contract.
RULING:
yment of
asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use of enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is
substantial, (c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or
unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules.
istence of a valid contract (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence
of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.
d as a result petitioner deprived respondent of its property right. The
three elements of tort interference are present.
Corporation. Nothing in the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
iable.
The conduct complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages. Lack of malice precludes damages.
DENIED.
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5. Jarco Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999.
PARTIES:
Jarco Marketing Corporation
-owner of Syvels Department Store
Spouses Conrado & Criselda Aguilar

-parents of Zhieneth Aguilar
Leonardo Kong (Manager)

Jose Tiope (Operations Manager)
Elisa Panelo (Supervisor)
FACTS:
In the afternoon of May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Criselda
was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud
thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the stores gift
wrapping counter/ structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.
Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor.
Zhieneth was quickly rushed to Makati Medical Center where she was operated on.
The next day, Zhieneth lost her speech and thereafter communicated with Criselda by writing on a magic slate.
She died 14 days after the accident on the hospital. She was 6 years old.
After the burial, respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and
funeral expenses which they incurred.
Petitioners refused to pay. Respondents filed a claim for damages.
Petitioners contention:
Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware
and appliances.
Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter triggering its eventual collapse on her.
The counter never fell nor collapsed for the past 15 years since its construction.
It observed diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees.
TC: DISMISSED the complaint.
The proximate cause of the fall of the counter was the act of clinging to it.
Criseldas negligence contributed to Zhieneths accident.
The counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor, it could not be considered attractive nuisance.
Respondents appealed.
Zhieneth should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below 9 years old is incapable of contributory
negligence.
Proximate cause: Negligence is failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed.
CA: decided in favor of respondents and REVERSED RTCs decision. MR denied. Hence, this case.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence;
(2) In case of finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to
Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
RULING:
The tragedy that befell Zhieneth was no accident and that Zhieneths death could only be attributed to negligence.
Conclusive presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that they are capable of contributory negligence.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have
occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable and study.
Criselda too should be absolved from contributory negligence. Criselda momentarily released the childs hand from her clutch when
she signed her credit card slip. It was reasonable and usual for Criselda to let go of her child. At the moment Zhieneth was pinned
down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother and the gift wrapping counter was just 4 meters away from
Criselda.
Zhieneth was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress. She even admitted to the doctor who
treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything, the counter just fell on her.
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6.
Calalas vs Court of Appeals

GR 122039, 31 May 2000
FACTS:
-Defendant is Vicente Calalas who is the owner and operator of the passenger jeepney.
st 23, 1989, Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas.
n stool
at the back of the door of the rear end of the vehicle.
ed
the left rear portion of the jeepney.
on the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict and
that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
RULING:
cident and
to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of the passengers.
no merit. Principle of Res Judicata does not apply because the complainant is not a party to the said civil case, there are
different issues, and different sources of obligation.
for quasi delict for damages in the jeepney. In quasi-delict,
the negligence or fault should be clearly established .
e prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination.
the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause does
not apply in breach of contract. It is applicable only in quasi-delict as the obligation is created by law. But where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created.
ting
capacity; 3. Sung was seated in an extension seat.
the
performance of the contract of carriage.
ral damages is deleted.
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7. Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals

Nicholas Y. Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals and the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 125138 | March 2, 1999 | Purisima, J.
Facts:
On March 27, 1989, PAL issued a round trip plane ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila to Cervantes
(petitioner) with an expiry date of one year from issuance or until March 27, 1990. The issuance is a result of a Compromise
Agreement entered into between the parties concerning 2 civil suits before the RTC in Surigao City.
On March 23, 1990, Cervantes used the ticket and upon arrival in Los Angeles., booked his return ticket with the PAL office,
which was confirmed for the April 2, 1990 flight. On April 2, 1990, Petitioner was not allowed to board the plane and the PAL personnel
marked his ticket: Ticket not accepted due expiration of validity. Petitioner had a back-up ticket, which he used to board a flight back
to Manila.
Cervantes filed a Complaint for Damages, for Breach of Contract of Carriage before RTC Surigao del Norte. During trial, it was
established that Petitioner had called the PAL office prior to the flight and was informed that he needed to send a letter to the latters
legal department to extend the tickets period of validity. Petitioner contends that the PAL agents, by confirming the flight changed the
Compromise Agreement between the parties.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper.
Held:
Yes, the denial was proper. The ticket, which stated that it was valid only for one year from issue, constitutes the contract
between the parties. It is axiomatic that when the terms are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
contracts are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning.
Under Art. 1898 of the Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal unless the
latter ratifies the same. Also, when the third person (Petitioner) is aware of the limits of such authority, the principal cannot be held
liable for the acts of the agent.
The PAL agents did not change the Compromise Agreement, because they acted beyond the scope of their authority and were
not privy to such agreement. Petitioner knew they had no authority to extend the tickets validity as he was already told that he needed
to send a letter to PALs legal department for the requested extension.
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the
one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he would not be able
to use the ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up ticket. What the employees of PAL did was merely simple negligence and no
injury resulted as Cervantes was able to use his back-up ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him.
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10
8.
People of the Philippines vs. Glenn De los Santos (2001)
FACTS
Early in the morning around 2:00-3:00am along Maitum Highway in Cagayan de oro, the Special Counter Insurgency unit of
the PNP, conducted an endurance run, the last phase of the training. They occupied the right lane, 3 columns, 2 rear security guards
at each column to jog backwards.
Earlier that evening, around 10:30pm, Glenn was asked by a friend and a fellow band member to provide them with
transportation since they were to participate in the San Miguel sponsored sabado nights of the Lanzones festival. (20 band members
and 9 utitlites and hand instruments). Before travelling on the highway he drank 3 bottles of beer. Glenn was the one driving the Isuzu
elf.
The rear guards waived at the defendant when they saw the truck fast approaching but the latter kept going and ran over
several members of the PNP. They fell like dominos, one after the other, some were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle.
The RTC convicted Glenn of the complex crime of murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder with the use of a
motor vehicle as qualifying circumstance. He was sentenced to death, thus this automatic review.
ISSUE: whether Glenn should be convicted of murder or reckless imprudence reckless imprudence
HELD:
Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should be more scrupulous in weighing the evidence.
All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence and not criminal intent should be indulged.
From the circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a
malicious intent.
-Pag asas observed weather report: sky was overcast absolutely no break in the thick clouds.
-The joggers were wearing black no reflectorized vests or gloves.
-joggers were facing the same direction as Glenn who was driving at the correct lane.
- Instinct, to stop or swerve when something on the road is seen. It would be inconceivable for Glenn, a then young college
graduate with a pregnant wife and 3 very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group
with his truck. We are convinced that the incident was an accident and not an intentional felony.
What Glenn did wrong:
-he failed to apply the brakes or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping
thuds. Glenn showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
Art. 365. Reckless Imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Taking into
consideration:
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)
His employment or occupation;

His degree of intelligence;
His physical condition;
Other circumstances regarding persons, time and place
What then is the proper crime?

-Considering that the incident was not a product of malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn
should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
Additional notes:
-No showing of political angle if ever the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a rebellion movement, Glenn cannot be convicted
because the proper charge would be rebellion, not murder.
-BACK TO TOP-
11
9.
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-45, was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the employees of Project Management
Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the PMCI. They had just visited the construction
site of a company project at Lian, Batangas. The other passengers were family members and friends whom they invited to an excursion
to the beach after the visit to the construction site.
It appears that on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner's panel truck. The panel truck
was on its way to petitioner's plant in Dasmarias, Cavite after delivering some linen to the Makati Medical Center. The driver claimed
that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his
vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on
the north-bound lane. The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers died.
In a subsequent suit filed by the respondent, damages were awarded to them by the court. However, petitioner claims that
the driver of the Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic rules and regulations at the time of the mishap (i.e. overloading, driving with
only one headlight). Hence, its liability should be mitigated, if not totally extinguished.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
Whether the driver of the Cimarron is guilty of contributory negligence.

Whether the respondents should be awarded moral damages.
HELD:
1.
No. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the
vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of
the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any
other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
2.
Yes. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be
given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. Here, the actual damages claimed by private respondents were duly
supported by receipts and appear to have been really incurred.
Moral damages are awarded to allow the victims to obtain means, diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moral suffering
they had undergone due to the defendant's culpable action. In this case, private respondents doubtless suffered some ordeal
because some of them lost their loved ones, while others lost their future. Within the meaning of Article 2217 of the Civil
Code, they suffered sleepless night, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. An award of moral damages in
their favor is thus justified.
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12
10. PHOENIX Construction Inc vs. IAC

FACTS:
A Volkswagen car driven by Leonardo Dionisio collided with a Ford dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. and whose driver
was Armando Carbonel. The accident took place at General Lacuna St. around one oclock in the morning. Dionisio also claimed that he
had taken a shot or two of liquor that his car headlights suddenly failed and when he switched it on, he thereupon saw the truck
parked askew, sticking out onto the road lane and partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. Dionisio also claimed that he tried to
avoid the collision by swerving to the left but it was too late and he smashed into the truck. He suffered some physical injuries
nervous breakdown and lost two gold bridge dentures. Thereafter, Dionisio filed an action for damages in the CFI Pampanga. Dionisio
argued that the legal and proximate cause of the accident was the negligent manner in which Carbonel parked the truck. Phoenix, on
the other hand, argued that it was Dionisios own recklessness in driving while under the influence of liquor and driving without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass, was the legal and proximate cause of the accident.
TC ruled in favor of Dionisio. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision but modified the award of damages.
ISSUE:
WON the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather the
reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump truck.
HELD:
No.
The factual circumstances show that Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and
driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between
petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a
slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause.
The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to
which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original
risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in
a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory,"
that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the
plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a
court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the
injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of
the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission
of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on
quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept
the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus,
20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by
petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's
fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. -BACK TO
TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
13
11. BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO PON, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA. DE PAMFILO, THE HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON SALES
and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES, respondents.
FACTS:
Ruben Dasco at the highway in Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon.
by
sales (wife
of Aniceto) and Baylon Sales, all passengers of BLTB Bus.

hway and tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car while Superlines Bus was
coming from the opposite direction. Armando Pon made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his
proper lane. However, it was unsuccessful.
instituted separated cases in the CFI Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together with their drivers praying for
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses plus cost. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed in the CFI
Quezon.
nd shifted
the fault against each other.
CFI exonerated Superlines and its driver from liability and attributed the sole responsibility to BLTB and its driver and ordered them
jointly and severally to pay damages. On appeal, IAC affirmed the CFI with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IAC erred in adjudging that actions of respondents are based on culpa contractual.
HELD:
tion has the
duty to see that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. It is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
circumstances. He recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed by the Traffic Rules and
Regulations.
f the
passengers were caused through the negligence of its employee. The common carriers liability for the death or injury to its passengers
is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. Utmost diligence of very cautious person is
required which the BLTB and its driver failed to prove.
accidents
which cannot be foreseen or inevitable. The court ruled that their contention had no merit.
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14
12. Air France vs. Carrascoso

L-21438. September 28, 1966.
FACTS:
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was
issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager
of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat
and was transferred to the planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment
he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class,
he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the planes journal
the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused
to intervene.
-
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso.

The TC eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso.
This was AFFIRMED by CA.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso
was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the said
note was never presented in court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
(2) Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
RULING:
(1) Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class
passage; Second, That said contract was breached whenAir France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an
assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act
based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is
one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
(2) Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the
ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence
was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of
the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
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15
13. Go vs Court of Appeals

GR 114791, 29 May 1997
FACTS:
d thrice they failed because the tape

was apparently not yet processed.
elivered.
ourts decision
ISSUE:
W/N Spouses Go are liable for breach of contract
RULING:
w that
the erasure was done in good faith.
Petitioners further claims that the video coverage was done by Lim and he also owns the camera and they merely get commission.
Hence, the contract is really between Lim and Spouses Ong.
of video coverage and not the video equipment.
ntract, the
erasure was done in consonance with consistent business practice.
his is also without merit because it is contrary to human nature for any newly wed couple to neglect claim of video coverage. Also,
the petitioners were informed that the newly wed couple will leave the country for their honeymoon.
tified as reimbursement of downpayment.
the
contract may also constitute a quasi-delict.
the attendant wanton of negligence and to serve as warning to all entities engaged in the
same business.
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into the contract.
16
14. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital

Leah Alesna Reyes, et. al. vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Marvie Blanes, and Dr. Marlyn Rico
G.R. No. 130547 | Oct. 3, 2000
| Mendoza, J.
Facts:
On January 8, 1987, Jorge Reyes, husband of Leah Alesna Reyes, had been suffering from a recurring fever with chill when he
was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife. Dr. Rico subjected Jorge to a series of tests and after a Widal Test, was able to
conclude that he was suffering from typhoid fever. The clinic has been getting about 15 to 20 typhoid cases a month. After being
indorsed to Dr. Blanes, Jorge underwent a compatibility test with the antibiotic chloromycetin. Since there was no adverse reaction, the
doctor ordered 500 milligrams to be administered to Jorge at around 9:00pm and again before midnight.
At 1:00am, Jorge began exhibiting respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions and Dr. Blanes was able to
temporarily stabilize his condition. His conditioned worsened a few minutes later and after not responding to emergency treatment, he
slipped into cyanosis and died at around 2:00am due to Ventricular Arythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.
On June 3. 1987, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the hospital, its directress and the doctors before the RTC
of Cebu City. They contended that failure to exercise due care and diligence, rushing the performance of tests, hastily diagnosing the
patient with typhoid fever, and failing to conduct sufficient compatibility tests lead to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin,
which caused Jorges death. The RTC dismissed the complaint, which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Res Ipsa Loquitur is applicable.
Whether or not the respondents are liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.
Held:
Res Ipsa Loquitur is not applicable. It finds no application in a suit against a physician which involves the merits of a diagnosis
or of a scientific treatment.
No, the respondents are not liable. In medical malpractice, negligence consists in the failure of a physician to apply to his
practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions and
in like surrounding circumstances. The patient must prove that the physician failed to do something which a reasonable prudent
physician would have done or did something a reasonably prudent physician would not have done, and such failure caused injury to
the patient. Thus, there are four elements in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.
While a physician-patient relationship existed between the doctors and Jorge Reyes, there was no breach in their duty as the
doctors did not depart from reasonable standard recommended by the experts. The Widal Test, coupled with the patients existing
symptoms and the clinics status of getting several typhoid cases a month were sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill
the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever. Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the administration of the drug
chloromycetin, which is the drug of choice for typhoid fever. Also, the dosage given to Jorge was still within medically acceptable limits,
as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
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17
15. Ramos vs CA
FACTS
1. Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old, underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she
was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka.
2. He was charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee.
3. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda was
with Herminda Cruz (her sister -in-law) and her husband, in the operating room.
4. Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M. Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw
the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
5. She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.
6. When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm.
7. She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes.
8. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage"
9. Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
ISSUE: Whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a
patient scheduled for cholecystectomy?
HELD
Res ipsa (The thing or transaction speaks for itself) the fact of the occurrence
of the injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
The Requisites are:
o the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence
o
it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants
o the possibility of contributing conduct which would make plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof
of injury to patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its common knowledge can determine
the proper standard of care. The doctrine is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as
such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols
Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient.
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was,
therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols.
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in
fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are
not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition,
the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employeremployee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and
temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for
anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable.
The damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to
the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.
Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years
now
Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case
is clearly a real one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be appropriate.
By way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and
nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000 are likewise proper. -BACK TO TOP-
18
BATCH 02
1. Mansion Biscuit Corp vs CA
FACTS:
Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, ordered numerous cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits
from Mansion Biscuit Corporation. Before the delivery of the goods, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion, 4
postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutri-wafer biscuits. 4 other postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00
each, were issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui (treasurer) as co-signor in Dec. of the same year. Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit
Corporation delivered the goods.
When the first 4 checks dated Dec. 24, 1981, Jan. 2, 1982, Jan. 9, 1982 and Jan. 16, 1982 were deposited, they were all dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds. Ang Cho Hong informed Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested him to replace the checks with cash
or good checks. Ty Teck Suan failed to heed said request.
Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion Biscuit on Feb. 11, 1982, Feb. 22, 1982 and
Mar. 8, 1982. Said deliveries plus cash advanced by Ty Teck Suan in Dec. 1981 amounted to P162,500.00. The same amount was
applied by Mansion Biscuit as payment for the first postdated check issued by Ty Teck Suan in the amount of P104,980.00. (This
resulted in the exclusion of the first check from the information which was later filed against Ty Teck Suan.)
On Mar. 1, 1982, Ang Cho Hong sent Ty Teck Suan a formal demand letter requesting that the latter make good the value of the
dishonored checks within five (5) days from receipt thereof. Thereafter, the second batch of checks issued by Ty Teck Suan and Siy
Gui dated Mar.20, 1982, April 10, 1982, May 1, 1982 and May 22, 1982 all became due and payable but on deposit, they were all
dishonored again. On Aug. 3, 1982, Mansion Biscuit, through its counsel, sent a final demand letter informing Ty Teck Suan that it
would be constrained to file an action against him should he continuously refuse to pay.
Ty Teck Suan having failed to meet his obligation, an information for violation of BP. 22 was filed against him before the RTC Branch
172 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. An identical information was filed covering the 2nd batch of dishonored checks against Ty Teck Suan,
Siy Gui and Edward Ty Brothers Corp.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the issuance of the above-mentioned checks by the accused subject of these two criminal cases,
and their subsequent dishonor cannot be considered in Violation of BP 22 because one important element of the offense is missing;
that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value and because these were issued to guarantee the
fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by complainant when accused Ty Teck Suan would place orders
In the same order of dismissal, Judge Capulong found that accused Siy Gui's liability had not been established by the prosecution as it
appeared that he had no personal transactions with the complainant although he was a co-signatory in the second batch of four
checks.
The CA dismissed the petitioners appeal of the civil aspect of the criminal cases filed.
Petitioner contends that "when Ty Teck Suan committed the illegal act of insuring and delivering worthless checks as advance
payment, thus successfully inducing Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion, to deliver several hundred cartons of nutri-van biscuits, two
(2) civil liabilities arose, namely: (1) the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the RPC, and (2) the civil liability arising
from tort or quasi-delict." Petitioner further alleges that when Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui were acquitted in the criminal cases, "only the
civil liability arising from crime was extinguished" pursuant to Article 100 of the RPC, but their civil liability based on quasidelict remained.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can enforce the civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits in question against private
respondents notwithstanding the fact that the latter contracted the agreement in behalf of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation. - No
HELD:
The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by petitioner to the Edward Ty Brothers Corp. cannot be enforced
against the private respondents because the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit Corp.,
rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corp., of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corp.
The plaintiff-appellant is enforcing a contractual, not a tortious, liability. Moreover the fraud allegedly committed by accused-appellee
was merely incidental to the contractual obligation, not an independent act which could serve as a source of obligation. The cases cited
by plaintiff-appellant, to illustrate that the existence of a contract does not preclude an action on quasi-delict where the act that breaks
19
the contract constitutes a quasi-delict, have no application because the acts complained of therein were performed to break an existing
contract, whereas the alleged fraud herein was committed at the time of the creation of the contractual relationship and as an incident
thereof.
Necessarily, any claim for tortious liability must be ventilated in a separate action against the proper party.
In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the
order acquitting them that the issuance of the checks in question did not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Consequently, no civil
liability arising from the alleged delict may be awarded. -BACK TO TOP-
20
3.
Vda de Bataclan vs Medina
FACTS:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City
There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor.
At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
Three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.
There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to rescue the four
passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently
fueled with petroleum.
These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it.
It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one
of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Juan
Bataclan.
His family filed a suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P87,150.
CFI of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried
by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.
On appeal, CA endorsed the appeal to SC because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.
HELD: NO
There is no question that the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the
opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have
suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries
suffered by him.
We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence,
cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.' xxx
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was
the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle
to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
21
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its
conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or
taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the
carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
The damages awarded by the trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) to (P6,000), and from P600 to P800 for
the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively. -BACK TO TOP-
22
4.
Ma-ao Sugar Central vs CA
FACTS:
On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the cabose or carbonera of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of
the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train
fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot.
The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages
awarded 25% thereof for the decedents contributory negligence and total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent would be
receiving from the SSS for the next five years.
The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not
negligent and therefore not liable at all.
In its own decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the
deceased and disallowed deductions protested by the private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in ruling that the petitioner is guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due
diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial court.
RULING:
Petition denied; Appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
To say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central to recompense the
private respondent for the death of Julio Famoso, their main source of support, who was killed in line of duty while in
its employ. It is not only a matter of law but also of compassion on which we are called upon to rule today. We shall
state at the outset that on both counts the petition must fail.
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails
which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates.
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of preventing derailments, was the
responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose T Reyes, its own witness,
who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were
frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should therefore
have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because
of its negligence.
At any rate, the absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or reason is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the
petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care.
Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held that
"to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his
injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body." There is no showing that the
caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite
warnings or signs of impending danger.
Payment of SSS benefits to the employee would not wipe out or extinguish the employers liability for the
injury or illness contracted by his employee. As observed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Valencia v. Manila Yacht
Club, which is still controlling:
. . . By their nature and purpose, the sickness or disability benefits to which a member of the System may be entitled
under the Social Security law (Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 1792 and 2658) are not the same
23
as the compensation that may be claimed against the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act or the Civil
Code, so that payment to the member employee of social security benefits would not wipe out or extinguish the
employer's liability for the injury or illness contracted by his employee in the course of or during the employment. It
must be realized that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act (or the Civil Code, in a proper case), the employer is
required to compensate the employee for the sickness or injury arising in the course of the employment because the
industry is supposed to be responsible therefore; whereas, under the Social Security Act, payment is being made
because the hazard specifically covered by the membership, and for which the employee had put up his own money,
had taken place. -BACK TO TOP-
24
5.
MMTC vs CA
FACTS:
o In the afternoon of 24 December 1986, Maria Zenaida Baylon (Baylon), her daughter Maria Zenita and the victim, Florentina
Sabalburo were on their way to Baclaran to buy food stuffs for Noche Buena.
o They stood on the island at the intersection of St. Andrews Street and Domestic Road in Pasay City waiting for the traffic light to
change so they could cross the other side of St. Andrews St. to take a ride for Baclaran.
o The traffic light turned red and the vehicles stopped.
o Just as they started to cross the street, Baylon saw an MMTC bus (Bus No. 033) coming from their right which was moving at a
high speed.
o The left portion of the bus hit Florentina on the right side of her head. The impact was of such force that her left ear was slashed
off. She fell on the cement and became unconscious.
o Florentina was brought to San Juan De Dios Hospital by the MMTC bus driver, Ajoc and the bus conductress.
o 03 January 1987, Florentina died.
o
Respondents filed a complaint for damages against MMTC and Ajoc with the RTC Makati alleging that Ajoc drove
the bus in a wanton and reckless manner, in gross violation of the traffic rules and regulations and without due regard for the
safety of others.
o
PETITIONERS denied the allegations of the respondents and insisted that the accident was solely due to
Folorentinas own negligence. Ajoc was driving the bus in a slow accelerating speed on the outer right lane of the road. Florentina
was covered from Ajocs peripheral vision by a big truck. Without regard to her own safety and in total defiance of the traffic signs
suddenly darted across the road. JUDGMENT WAS MADE IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS.
o On appeal, CA affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
1. WON Art. 2179 is applicable in the instant case.
2. WON Ajoc is negligent and MMTC is liable.
RULING:
1. NO. The applicable law in this case is Art. 2176 CC.
o
o
o
o
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there arises a presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of the employee or supervision over him.
To escape solidary liability for quasi-delict, an employer must rebut the presumption. MMTC failed to do so.
MMTC claimed that Ajocs act of bringing Florentina to the hospital shows adequate supervision of MMTC. However, his act
was neither voluntary nor spontaneous because he was prevailed upon by Florentinas companions to render assistance.
Also, the evidence showed by MMTC that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees consisted
merely of pertinent guidelines for the screening as well as periodic seminars on road safety. MMTC failed to show that Ajoc
had actually undergone screening and had attended seminars.
MMTC being a government-owned public utility was organized for public welfare.
2.
o
YES.
Ajocs claim that he failed to see the victim and her companions proved his recklessness and lack of caution in driving his
vehicle.
o
MMTC failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part; hence it is PRIMARILY AND DIRECTLY LIABLE
for damages caused by its employee pursuant to Art. 2180 CC.
o
The owners of public utility fall within the scope of Art. 2180. Hence, MMTCs liability to respondents, for the
negligent and reckless acts of its driver, Ajoc, under Art. 2180 CC is both manifest and clear.
o
Petition DISMISSED. CA AFFIRMED.
____________________
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
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The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official
to whom the task done properly pertains; in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. -BACK TO TOP-
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6. Taylor vs Manila Electric

FACTS:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his
nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and electric light system in the city of
Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River, known as Isla del Provisor. The
power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the vehicle.
David Taylor, 15 years of age, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the
Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of MERLC.
Finding on inquiry that Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys spent some time in wandering about the companys
premises. They found 20 or 30 brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size
and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be
discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power.
Afterwards, the boys picked up all they can find and carried them home.
The boys met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of Manuel. The boys
made several experiments with the caps. They opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding it was filled with yellowish
substance, they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion
followed, causing more or less injuries to all three.
Jessie received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck, in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
Hence this action for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. is liable for damages.
RULING:
Not Liable.
The entry of the plaintiff upon the defendants property without defendants express invitation would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of the opinion that under all circumstances of this case, the negligence
of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, attributable to the negligence of the defendant. And on the other
hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus injured.
No fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the
plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendants unenclosed premises without express
permission or invitation; but it is a wholly different question, whether such a youth can be said to have been free from fault
when he wilfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he
undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made
by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation.
His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and
the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that
he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might
be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to
the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from
the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well
knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he wilfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care
and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for
injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in
the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of
things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts
and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own
acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed
27
capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by
our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain
responsibilities, though it cannot be said that these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at
bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the
varying circumstances of each case.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which
he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have
been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would
not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. -BACK TO TOP-
28
7.
Phoenix Construction vs IAC
FACTS:
A Volkswagen car driven by Leonardo Dionisio collided with a Ford dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. and whose
driver was Armando Carbonel. The accident took place at General Lacuna St. around one oclock in the morning. Dionisio also claimed
that he had taken a shot or two of liquor that his car headlights suddenly failed and when he switched it on, he thereupon saw the
truck parked askew, sticking out onto the road lane and partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. Dionisio also claimed that he tried
to avoid the collision by swerving to the left but it was too late and he smashed into the truck. He suffered some physical injuries
nervous breakdown and lost two gold bridge dentures. Thereafter, Dionisio filed an action for damages in the CFI Pampanga. Dionisio
argued that the legal and proximate cause of the accident was the negligent manner in which Carbonel parked the truck. Phoenix, on
the other hand, argued that it was Dionisios own recklessness in driving while under the influence of liquor and driving without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass, was the legal and proximate cause of the accident.
TC ruled in favor of Dionisio. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision but modified the award of damages.
ISSUE:
WON the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather the
reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump truck.
HELD:
No.
The factual circumstances show that Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving
faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly
different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the
defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and
hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will
not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street
where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the
car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate
and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has
to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has
itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury.
The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasidelicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as
attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
29
8.
Ong vs Metro Water District
Facts:
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) owns and operates 3 recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters in Diliman, Q.C., to
which people are invited and charged a nominal fee. Depths of the pools water are indicated by different marks on the wall.
The staff in charge of the care and supervision of the pools included a male nurse, a sanitary inspector in charge of a clinic, and 6
lifeguards who had taken life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross. The pools are also provided with a ring buoy, toy roof,
towing lines, saving kit and resuscitator. There is also a display of Rules and Regulations, one of which prohibits swimming alone or
without an attendant.
At about 1:00pm on July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio went to the defendants swimming pool.
They were swimming in one of the small pools where the water was shallow when at about 4:35 pm, Dominador told his brothers
that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of Coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went
to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool. They did not see the latter leave.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 pm, Manuel Abao, lifeguard on duty, was going around the pools observing the bathers when he was told
that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time and he immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and
retrieved the lifeless body of Dominador.
Abao immediately applied manual artificial respiration on Dominador. Soon after, the male nurse came to render assistance,
followed by the sanitary inspector, who upon arriving injected the boy with camphorated oil. The sanitary inspector also fetched Dr.
Ayuyao from U.P. while Abao continued manual artificial respiration. When that failed, they applied the resuscitator until the two
oxygen tanks were exhausted. When the doctor arrived, he found the boy already dead and ordered that the latter be taken to the
clinic.
Written statements by Ruben Ong and one Andres Hagad, Jr. were taken during that evenings investigation.
An action for damages, funeral expenses and attorneys fees were filed against MWD by the Spouses Ong, Dominadors parents.
Plaintiffs Contention: MWD is liable for the death of Dominador due to its culpable negligence in failing to take necessary
precautions to protect the lives of its patrons by not placing at the pools efficient and competent employees who may render help at a
moments notice and the negligence attributable to the lifeguard who was, at the time of the drowning, not available or attending to
something else.
MWDs Defense: Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs son was drowned in one of its pools, but avers that his death was caused
by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident. It also contends that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and
supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances.
Trial Court: Action is untenable, dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not Metropolitan Water District is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.
Ruling:
No, Metropolitan Water District is not liable.
The person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault or negligence of the person
from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees. In this case, the plaintiffs failed to prove the negligence of
defendant. While the testimonies of Ruben and Hagad, Jr claim that the lifeguard was reading a magazine at the time of the
incident and allowed 3-4 minute to elapse before responding to it, such claims were belied by Ruben and Hagads written
statements executed 3 hours after the incident, where they informed the police that the lifeguard immediately jumped in the
water to retrieve the body.
The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable for the drowning or death of a patron, if said operator had exercised
due diligence in the selection of and supervision over its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law
under the circumstances in that it has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent
accident which may cause their death. The facilities, staff employed, trained and certified lifeguards are all sufficient evidence
to show that appellee has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent
accidents which may cause their death. The record also shows that the lifeguard, nurse, and sanitary inspector did everything
humanly possible under the circumstances to save Dominador. For such reason, it would be unfair to hold it liable for his
death.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance was held as inapplicable to the case as it was not known how Dominador ended up in the
Main Pool or how he drowned. -BACK TO TOP-
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9.
Hidalgo vs Balandan
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of an ice-plant factory (San Pablo, Laguna) in whose premises were installed two water tanks, 9ft. deep, for
cooling purposes of its engine. The tanks were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers, its edges were barely 1ft. high from
the ground. The factorys gate where motor vehicles hauling ice and buyers passed was continually open, and with no guard assigned
therein, any one could easily enter its premises. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiffs son, Mario Balandan, 8 yrs. old, together
with other boys of his age, entered the factory premises through the gate to take a bath in one of said tanks. While thus bathing, Mario
sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already dead due to asphyxia secondary to drowning."
The CFI of Laguna and the CA took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to
adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons entering its premises. Said courts ordered petitioner to pay damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the water tanks maintained by the petitioner constitute an attractive nuisance.
HELD:
Under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, one who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
The principal reason is that the condition or appliance in question, although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to
such children.
However, based on American jurisprudence from which this concept originates, the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial or natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere
water and its location.
As explained by the Indiana Appellate Court, nature has created streams, lakes and pools, which attract children, and by lurking
therein, there is always the danger of drowning. Children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the
danger. If an artificial pool is created within a private property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger,
the owner is not liable because of having created an attractive nuisance.
As petitioners tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question of whether it had taken reasonable precautions becomes
immaterial. On the counter argument that the respondents were guilty of contributory negligence for leaving their son under the care
of no responsible individual, thus precluding recovery, it also needs no further discussion. Petitioner is absolved from liability. -BACK TO
TOP-
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10. Picart vs Smith
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Amado Picart, seeks to from Frank Smith, the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile
driven by the defendant.
Plaintiff was riding on his pony over a bridge. The defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the
defendant neared the bridge, he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
The plaintiff pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left because
he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine.
In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, he continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but
in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge with its head toward the railing.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
When the accident occurred, the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was
probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries, the horse died.
Issue: whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives
rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done.
Held:
1. The court said that the defendant is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side.
But as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in
a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
A prudent man, placed in the position, would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk,
and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of
the road. But, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
Separate opinion:
"last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence is applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence
of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. If a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate
himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. When a traveler has reached a point where he cannot
extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and
not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
32
11. De Roy vs CA
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the fifteen-day period to file
an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration but was eventually denied by the
appellate court.
Issues:
1.
W/N the denial of the apellate court was proper?
2.
W/N petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code?
Held:
Yes. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day period for appealing
or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
In the instant casepetitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of
the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Yes. The Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case. -BACK TO TOP-
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12. Bustamante vs CA
FACTS:
April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del
Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite
front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping
off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat
several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained.
The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by
Magtibay and Serrado
Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of
the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling.
He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the
truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was
ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the
shoulder of the highway
RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
It was negligent on the part of driver Montesiano to have driven his truck fast, considering that it was an old vehicle,
being a 1947 model as admitted by its owner, defendant Del Pilar; that its front wheels were wiggling; that the road was
descending; and that there was a passenger bus approaching it. Likewise, driver Susulin was also guilty of negligence in not
taking the necessary precaution to avoid the collision, in the light of his admission that, at a distance of 30 meters, he
already saw the front wheels of the truck wiggling and that the vehicle was usurping his lane coming towards his direction.
Had he exercised ordinary prudence, he could have stopped his bus or swerved it to the side of the road even down to its
shoulder. And yet, Susulin shifted to third gear so as to, as claimed by him, give more power and speed to his bus in
overtaking or passing a hand tractor which was being pushed along the shoulder of the road.
CA: Reversed the ruling of the RTC in so far as the owner and the driver of the truck is concerned.
The bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake
the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision. The record also discloses that the bus driver was not a
competent and responsible driver. His driver's license was confiscated for a traffic violation on April 17, 1983 and he was
using a ticket for said traffic violation on the day of the accident in question (pp. 16-18, TSN, July 23, 1984). He also
admitted that he was not a regular driver of the bus that figured in the mishap and was not given any practical
examination.
ISSUE: WON the last clear chance is applicable

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In
other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril,
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.
As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
However, the said doctrine is not applicable in this case for the following reasons:
34
1.
2.
In the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, it was held that the principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the
owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to
enforce its contractual obligations."
Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that
another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury. -BACK TO TOP-
35
13. Windvalley Shipping vs CA

Facts: Philippine President Lines, Inc. (private respondent, President Lines for brevity) owned a vessel called Philippine Roxas. On the
other hand, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. (plaintiff, Wildvalley for brevity) Owned a vessel called Maladrinon.
February 1988, the Philippine Roxas arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when
the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in to navigate
the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.
Captain Colon, captain of Philippine Roxas, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer
on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel but it proceeded on its way, with the pilot
assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel.
The vessel again experienced some vibrations. It was then that the watch officer called the Captain Colon to the bridge to check the
position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the
vessel on the chart. He ordered Mr. Monis, Chief Officer of President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks. The Philippine Roxas
ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wildvalleyfiled a suit
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against President Lines for damages in the form of unearned profits.
The trial court ruled in favor of Wildvalley. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision and ruled in favor of President Lines.
Hence this petition
Issue(s): (1) Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the President Lines that would warrant the award of damages; (2)
Whether or not res ipsa loquitur applies to the case at bar.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 36821 is AFFIRMED.
(1) There being no contractual obligation, President Lines is obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in
accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus: Art. 1173. xxx If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his
own property. This we have found President Lines to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the "main engine, machineries,
and other auxiliaries" were checked and found to be in good running condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on
watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered the inspection of the
vessel's double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules
and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, provides that The master remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there
is a pilot on board. He remains in control of the ship as he can still perform the duties conferred upon him by law despite the presence
of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is not required of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is being navigated by
a pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides for compulsory pilotage in entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf.
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of
every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river.
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of
the Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel because the latter had assured him that they were
navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel. Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was very
familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that he does not even refer to river charts when
navigating the Orinoco River. Admitting his limited knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and
experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the
portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set
course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique , 182 U.S. 406, it was
held that: xxx if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty,
then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner will be liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot; for
in such a case the pilot cannot be deemed properly the servant of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them xxx
36
(2) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly
indicate negligence on the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met: (a) the
accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for defendant's negligence; (b) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and (c) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on
a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render
the respondent liable, are absent. -BACK TO TOP-
37
14. Africa vs Caltex
FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage,
right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire burned several neighboring houses,
personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and
Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of
both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
ISSUES:
HELD:
1.
1. W/N the principle of res ipsa loquitur is applicable

2. W/N Caltex and Boquiren are solidarily liable
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should
apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees. The SC cited a CA decision, stated that -It is true that decisions of the
Court of Appeals do not lay down doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we do not consider this a reason for not applying
the particular doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of
which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from
some act of man. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire
started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care.
The report, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation
of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and
objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which
would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than
the statement of Leandro Flores before the police investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and
without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before
loading the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were people who went to drink
coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the
tank was almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard
someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the
part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it
was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which
would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect
to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses. There is an admission on the part of
Boquiren in his amended answer to the second amended complaint that "the fire was caused through the acts of a stranger who,
without authority, or permission of answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted
match in the premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to be true certainly any
unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken against Boquiren it does not extenuate his negligence.
2.
This issue depends on whether Boquiren was an independent contractor. But even if the license agreement were to govern,
Boquiren can hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely
nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance
of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or
transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be from January 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel
and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the business with due diligence,
in the judgment of Caltex. Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren. These
provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was virtually
an employee of the former. Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his position to the company and the latter
38
could remove him or terminate his services at will; that the service station belonged to the company and bore its tradename and
the operator sold only the products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to the company and were
just loaned to the operator and the company took charge of their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the company
supervised the operator and conducted periodic inspection of the company's gasoline and service station; that the price of the
products sold by the operator was fixed by the company and not by the operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator
indicated that he was a mere agent. Hence, respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily. -BACK TO TOP-
39
15. Espiritu vs Phil Power Taken from Torts and Damages book (Aquino, 2005)
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows: In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and other
companions were loading grass between the municipalities of Bay and Calauan, in the province of Laguna, with clear weather and
without any wind blowing, an electric transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development
Co., Inc. alongside the road, suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the
truck. As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by the wire and was knocked unconscious to the ground. The
electric charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and serious multiple burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone exposed
in some parts and causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over
one year after the mishap.
[The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence but the
appellate court overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:]
The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiffs evidence to place appellant on its defense. While it is the rule, as
contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principle that Where the
thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not occur if those having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of the explanation that the injury arose from defendants want of care.
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co.
vs. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 68). This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), and is
peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every right to be on the highway, and the electric
wire was under the sole control of defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair
weather and injure people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain and stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance
and supervision; just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure passersby unless someone was negligent.
(Byrne vs. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 22; 159 Eng. Reprint 299, the leading case that established that rule). Consequently, in the absence of
contributory negligence (which is admittedly not present) the fact that the wire snapped sufices to raise a reasonable presumption of
negligence in the installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock, if there are any facts inconsistent
with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove. -BACK TO TOP-
40
BATCH 03
1. Mc Kee vs IAC
2, consolidated cases:
G.R. No. L-68102 Petitioners: Parents of the minors George Koh Mckee, Christopher Koh Mckee and the deceased Kim Koh Mckee.)
G.R. No. L-68103 petitioners are the wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh
Both cases against Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo owners of Loadstar
FACTS:
Between 9-10am, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-oncollision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang,
and a Ford Escort car by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical
injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc,
on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida
Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling
southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its
way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the
bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and
entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to
his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite
lane, on the said bridge.
As a result of the vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical
injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, 2 civil cases for damages based on quasidelict were filed before the CFI of Pampanga against the owners of the truck.
An information charging the truck driver, Ruben Galang with the crime of Reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and
physical injuries and damage to property was filed with the trial court.
Respondents alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, . . .
which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules and regulations applicable under
the circumstances then prevailing
In the criminal case filed, Ruben Galang was found guilty. The civil cases were dismissed and the respondents were awarded moral
damages, exemplary damages and attys fees. On appeal, the respondent court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court
and held ordered the respondents to pay damages.
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that
these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
and supervising the said employee.
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of
which the respondent Court reconsidered and set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment.
ISSUES/HELD:
A. Procedural- WON the rules of court allows consolidation of an independent action for the recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the civil code with a criminal action yes
41
-In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. CA, this Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a
consolidation of an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil
Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.
-As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether
acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action.
B. WON the CA correctly held that Jose Kohs presumed negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision - no
Findings of facts of the trial courts and the CA may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the
trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment.
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and the respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not supported by the evidence, are based on an
misapprehension of facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken.
The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said
lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the
appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.
This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane
because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, 2 boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the
car.
C. WON Jose Koh is negligent - No
Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril
death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.
Negligence - the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
No negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate
peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could
very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence."
Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the
given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
D. WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies - YES
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law
of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof
42
E. WON the respondents as employers of the negligent truck driver are directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages under art. 2180 of the civil code yes
it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable
for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The answers of the
private respondents in Civil Cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it. -BACK TO TOP-
43
2.
FACTS:
Alfialda vs Hisole
Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation.
While tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of the carabaos.
He later died as a consequence of his injuries and the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure.
The plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
The complaint is for damages arising from the injury caused by an animal.
Defendant Hisole moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action. Lower court sustained the motion for
dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker
RULING:
The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable
only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he
had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code.
This view was countered by plaintiff claiming that the Article in the Civil Code does not distinguish between damage caused to
the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. This opinion, however, appears to have
been rendered in a case where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the
present where the person injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important. For the statute names the possessor or
user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has
the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such.
Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and
for which he must take the consequences. In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12,
p. 578), the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said
tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of the
Civil Code.
This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act as
the risk involve was one of occupational hazards. -BACK TO TOP-
44
3. PLDT vs CA
FACTS:
In the evening of July 30, 1968 the respondents jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.
As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar
on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
Respondent spouses filed an action for damages against PLDT. The latter denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all,
is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit system.
Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte. In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it had complied with the terms of
its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both
ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of
excavations.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. Both PLDT and private respondents appealed; the latter
appealing only as to the amount of damages. Third-party defendant Barte did not appeal.
Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent
spouses. It held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for
damages.
On the second MR, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: WON PLDT should be held liable for damages.
HELD: NO.
Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into the substantive merits of the case, we find no error in the findings of the
respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT based on the following:
1.
2.
3.
The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside
lane. That may explain plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into
it.
Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. If the jeep had been braked at 25
kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have been thrown against the windshield and they would not have suffered their
injuries.
With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him
see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his
failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was
relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and
warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site.
The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations
which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the
site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury.
It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable
care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his
own protection.
45
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger; hence
he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court of Appeals in its original decision that there was insufficient evidence
to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We have for consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban
and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. A person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must
be affirmatively established by competent evidence. 33 Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the
first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail. -BACK TO TOP-
46
4.
Ilocos Norte vs CA
FACTS: Complainants, heirs of deceased Isabel Lao Juan, initiated a Complaint to recover damages from defendant The Ilocos Norte
Electric Company. Previously, Isabel Lao Juan was on her way to her store to check for damage to her merchandise when she was
electrocuted while wading through waist-deep water caused by recent typhoon Gening. There was a dangling electric wire moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. As a defense, the company claimed that the unfortunate incident was a result of fortuitous event and
that the decedent assumed the risk when she waded through the water.
ISSUE: WON CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are
fortuitous events.
HELD: Ilocos Norte Electric was liable. The cause of the death of the decedent was the failure of the Company to repair the damage
brought by the typhoon. When a storm occurs that is liable to prostate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and
repair broken lines. No assumption of risk attributable to Isabel since she was responding to an emergency to protect her property.
PETITIONER NOT EXONERATED AS VICTIM'S DEATH IS CAUSED BY ITS NEGLIGENCE. The respondent CA acted correctly in
disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that
typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
PETITIONER NOT EXONERATED AS VICTIM'S DEATH IS CAUSED BY ITS NEGLIGENCE . The respondent CA acted correctly in
disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that
typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly
caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
A PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY ASSENTS TO A KNOWN DANGER MUST ABIDE BY THE CONSEQUENCES; EXCEPTIONS. As for the
defense on assumption of risk, the same was not tenable. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria means that when someone voluntarily
assents to a known danger then he must abide by the consequences. These are the exceptions: (1) when there is an emergency; (2)
protection of ones life and property; and (3) protection of life and property of another. Here, the decedent was moved to act to protect
her property.
PRESENT WHERE PETITIONER'S DUTY TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE WAS NOT OBSERVED. "When a storm occurs
that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v.
3, p. 474). The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29,
1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO
lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence
under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner.
ACTUAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF INCREASED PURSUANT TO RECENT JURISPRUDENCE. In considering the liability of
petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in private respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the
victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in accordance with the formula set
in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary
damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the victim's death, We affirm
the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's fees. Pursuant to recent jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196;
People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We increase the said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages to
P48,229.45.
AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES UNWARRANTED WHERE ACTION WAS FILED IN GOOD FAITH THERE BEING NO
PENALTY ON RIGHT TO LITIGATE; CONCEPT OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, EXPLAINED. The exclusion of moral damages and
attorney's fees awarded by the lower court was properly made by the respondent CA, the charge of malice and bad faith on the part of
respondents in instituting this case being a mere product of wishful thinking and speculation. Award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to litigate (Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50).
If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110). -BACK
TO TOP-
47
5.
Salen vs Balce
FACTS:
Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera (plaintiffs) are the parents of Carlos Salen.
Carlos Salen, single, died from wounds caused by Gumersino Balce, son of Jose Balce (defendant).
Gumersino was accused and convicted of homicide. He was sentenced to imprisonment and pay a fine.
At that time, he was single and minor. He was living with Jose.
Upon petition of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued for the payment of indemnity but it was unsatisfied because
Gumersino was insolvent and no property.
The plaintiffs demanded payment from defendant. However, he refused to pay.
RTC: There is no law which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is a
minor.
Based on Art. 101 and 102 of the Revised Penal Code and by the principle of exclusio unus exclusio ulterius, Jose Balce cannot be
held subsidiarily liable for the civil liability.
Art. 2180 CC is not applicable to the case.
Obligations arising from criminal offences are never obligations arising from quasi-delicts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Balce can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity which his son was sentenced to pay in a criminal case.
RULING:
YES.
SC agreed that as a rule, the civil liability arising from crime shall be governed by the revised penal code. But disagreed with the
contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody should be governed by RPC.
In Art. 101, the son who commits the act is by law exempt from criminal liability. The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority.
Art. 2180 of NCC governs this case.
To hold this provision does not apply would only result to absurdity.
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them
in proportion to their means while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way
by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
Defendant failed to prove.
___________________
Article 101.
XXX
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a
person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve
upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part.
Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company. -BACK TO TOP-
48
6.
University of the East vs Jader
FACTS:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year, he failed to take
the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade.
He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student and he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade
given him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the
examination, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5).
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students
should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation with the following
annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O.
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled and in the invitation for
that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there
appeared however the following annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports.
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
escorted by his mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he
was thereafter handed by the Dean rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the
occasion.
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the
forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out.
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job from and enrolled at the
pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take
the bar examination.
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from
the latter's negligence.
He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
ISSUE:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case? YES.
RULING:
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between said institution
and the student. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to
each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or
whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the
educational institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a
degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony,
the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and
performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
49
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the
forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientiously.
It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its
rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Being the party that hired them, it
is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of
reports involving the students' standing.
Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused
the damage or injury.
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and
the supervision of faculty and student services. He must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or
position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to
observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the
professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have
practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to
inquire from the former. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades
at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for
taking the bar.
Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading
the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
information to respondent.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that
respondent should not have been awarded moral damages.
As a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically
those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites,
enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take
the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before
preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation
on the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet. -BACK TO TOP-
50
7.
Castillex vs Vasquez
FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around
Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective
helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time.
Benjamin Abad was a manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with
plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around
the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic
St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the
former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of
Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez
may incur.
Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for
damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose
Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for
the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.
RTC: ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily.
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a
managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the
employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is
therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to
be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to
employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to
employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former
in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed
neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within
the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck
operators and banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the
torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of
his assigned tasks.
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working hours is
generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the
employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business
purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle
51
has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that
he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during
the return trip.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with
his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal
working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection to petitioners
business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was
a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. BACK TO TOP-
52
8.
Rosete vs Auditor General
Facts:
On 22 November 1945, there was a fire at the Emergency Control Administration (ECA) motor pool at 22 Azcarraga,
Manila. The building which was burned was used by the ECA as bodega in which oil and gasoline, among others were stored.
The fire started when one Jose Fraino ignited his cigarette lighter, which he had just filled with gasoline, near a 5-gallon
drum into which gasoline was then being drained. The spark from the lighter also ignited the gasoline, burning the bodega as
well as the inhabitant houses, among which were the properties of Inocencio Rosete (Rosete).
The fire reduced to ashes the professional and cultural books, jewelries, clothing, furniture, silverwares, and other household
equipment of Rosete and his family, the total value of the losses amounted to P35, 376. Rosete filed an action for damages
with the Insular Auditor.
Claimants contention: The government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control Administration or the
officers thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a highly combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on
bodega in Manila in violation of City Ordinances. Therefore, the government is liable for the damages sustained by the
claimant under Article 1903 (Now Art. 2180) of the Civil Code.
Decision of the Insular Auditor: Claim denied, for even granting that the officials and employees of the former ECA were
negligent, the government cannot be prejudiced by the illegal or tortious acts of its servants.
Issue: Whether or not the government is responsible for damages.
Ruling: No, there being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers, was done by a special agent,
because the officers of ECA did not act as special agents of the Government within the meaning of that word in Art. 1903 of the Civil
Code as defined in Merrit vs. Government of the Philippines in storing gasoline in the warehouse of the ECA, the Government is not
responsible for the damages caused through such negligence.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also
for those persons for whom another is responsible.
***
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by
the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
According to the Merrit case, a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official, so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office which are regulated
by law and regulations.
1.
Dissenting Opinion by J. Perfecto: The ECA is a special agent within the purview of paragraph 5 of Art.1903 of the Civil
Code. All persons and entities acting by commission of the Government, such as government enterprises and other organs of
government created for activities ordinarily of ungovernmental nature, are special agents. They are special in contradistinction
with the officers and employees of governments who are ordinary agents. -BACK TO TOP-
53
9.
Palisoc vs Brillantes
FACTS:
Plaintiff son, Dominador Palisoc (16yo), was a student of automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute (M. I. T.,
Quezon Blvd., Manila). On March 10, 1966, during classs recess at around 2 to 3 in the afternoon, Dominador, together with his
classmates, Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz (lone witness), were in the laboratory. While the latter two were working on a machine
and Dominador was merely observing, Daffon made a remark to the effect that Dominador was acting like a foreman, to which he
slightly slapped the former on the face. In retaliation, Daffon gave Dominador a strong flat blow on the face, followed by other fist
blows on the stomach. Both exchanged blows until Dominador stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward,
which made him pale and fainted. First aid was administered but he was not revived. He was rush to a hospital but he never regained
consciousness, and later on died from shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intragastric hemorrhage and slight hemorrhage on the brain.
CFI Manila found Daffon liable for quasi delict under Art. 2176, Civil Code, but absolved from liability Antonio Brillantes
(member of MIT Board of Directors), Teodosio Valenton (MIT president) and Santiago Quibulue (class instructor/teacher-in-charge) on
the ground that Art. 2180 is inapplicable for the reason (based on Mercado v. CA) that the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody" contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents, since there is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants-officials of the school.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable
as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon.
HELD:
The Court holds that under Art. 2180, Valenton and Quibulue, as head and teacher respectively, are liable jointly and severally
for damages.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. This is expressly provided for in Art. 349, 350 and 352. In the law of
torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries
that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
As tersely summarized by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde v. Capuno, the basis of the presumption of
negligence under Art. 2180 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of
their authority, and where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent,
should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. The
school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.
The lower court erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Art.
2180 only if the defendant student "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." The clause "so
long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school. The dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde), on which the lower court based its judgment, must now be deemed to have been
set aside by the present decision.
The death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had defendants-school officials but
complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect them
from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. The law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Art. 2180, by proving that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. Based on factual findings of the lower court, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
Defendants Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue are sentenced jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs (a) P12,000 (increased from
P6,000) for the death of Dominador Palisoc. (The Court, in People v. Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the
Philippine peso, expressed its considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict should now be P12,000); (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances. No award of
54
exemplary damages since under Art 2231, it may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross negligence. No gross
negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of
interest and increased attorney's fees. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The
school itself cannot be held liable, not being properly impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by
improperly impleading Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated since 1962, and
therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. -BACK TO TOP-
55
10. Amadora vs CA
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Petitioners filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped.
The respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at
the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in
any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
Their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation. Private respondents contended
that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
Sergio Damaso, the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without
making a report to the principal or taking any further action. As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter
fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban
and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that
there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Issue: whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when
the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
Held:
1. Three cases have been decided by the Court in connection with the provision: Exconde v. Capuno; Mercado v. Court of
2.
3.
4.
Appeals; and Palisoc v. Brillantes.

Provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge
of such student, following the first part of the provision. (General Rule).
In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by
their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The injury contemplated may be caused by any student
regardless of the school where he is registered.
If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school
only that is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical
school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
1. The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a
closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of
their craft
Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term?
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
2.
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish
his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. Even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved
in its discipline. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not
necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
56
3. Assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon
4.
5.
or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school
on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter
was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing
discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence,
through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of the
unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to
him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his
part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not
been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged
with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody BACK TO TOP-
57
11. Mercado vs CA
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr and Augusto Mercado Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon,
Quezon City. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". A "pitogo"may be
described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a
piece of razor.
The "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. was unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when
Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain
into the holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started
then. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's
anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.
Counsel for petitioner argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during
recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of
the latter.
CA decision: The damages specified in the plaintiffs-appellant's complaint come under the class of moral damages by reason of the
wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado. Though such kind of damages cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe that the
sum of P2,000.00 would fully compensate the child. As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering the
moral damages they allegedly suffered due to their son's being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible as contemplated under of Article 2180 of the Civil Code?
2. Whether or not the moral damages awarded was proper?
Held:
1.
NO.
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances
the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would
the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of
Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by
their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.
2.
NO.
While moral damages included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil
Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral
damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which
moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old
and it does not appear that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing
physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a
quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which motivated
the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his
pitogo from Renato." This is, according to the decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing
who, in turn, also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was
Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179,
Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not
justified. -BACK TO TOP-
58
12. Sarkies Tour vs IAC

Facts:
A few weeks before June 12, 1971, petitioner Sarkies Tours Phils., Inc. advertised in the newspapers its tour to Corregidor on
Independence Day, for a fee including: a) boat fare - Manila-Corregidor-Manila b) shrine fee and c) tour of Corregidor Island by bus. A
day before the scheduled tour, private respondent ,purchased six round-trip tickets from SARKIES. They were issued an official receipt
under the SARKIES letterhead.With the DIZONS the next day, June 12, 1971, were their four children Cecilia, Bernardita, Merceditas
and Emerito. From the SARKIES main office at Filipinas Hotel, Roxas Boulevard, they were transported on a SARKIES bus, together
with other excursionists, to Muelle del Banco Nacional, alongside the Pasig River, where they boarded the M/V Edisco. The M/V Edisco,
owned and operated by MENDOZA, is an oversized motorized banca with outriggers, a steel hull, a canvas awning and rattan chairs on
the deck. It was not registered to ferry passengers, nor was it licensed to operate as a watercraft. On that trip, it had 146 passengers
on board and was overloaded and lacked adequate lifesaving equipment. On the return trip to Manila, the weather was practically the
same as when they left but with intermittent rains (Folio, p. 77). Around 2:00 P.M., disaster struck after about thirty minutes of
cruising. The boat leaned towards starboard and the chairs slid into the water in that direction. The boat capsized. Private respondents
lost cash and personal belongings. Merceditas, their six-year old daughter was missing and could not be located. After six days, private
respondents were summoned to Funeraria Quiogue were they identified a lifeless body as that of their daughter, Merceditas. There
were other fatalities. For damages based on the drowning of MERCEDITAS, the DIZONS filed a complaint against SARKIES and
MENDOZA before the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
Issue: whether or not defendants are liable, whether the amount of damages by the IAC was justified
Held:
The Appellate Tribunal reversed and held both SARKIES and MENDOZA jointly and severally liable for the damages for the reason that
the relationship between SARKIES and the excursionists was "a single operation which in effect guaranteed them safe passage all
throughout". We concur with the view. The issue, we had resolved to consider, as earlier mentioned, is in respect of the award of
moral and exemplary damages. In its Answer to the Complaint of the DIZONS, SARKIES included a cross-claim against MENDOZA as
the owner/operator of the EDISCO. Considering that actual negligence for the drowning of MERCEDITAS was the responsibility of
MENDOZA, it is but fair that SARKIES should have a right of action against MENDOZA for reimbursement. Although Article 2181 of the
Civil Code is not technically invocable, its principle should be applied in favor of SARKIES.The judgment of the then Court of Appeals is
modified by eliminating exemplary damages therefrom; reducing the adjudged moral damages and ordering Mendoza to pay and/or
reimburse petitioner any and all expenses and damages to be paid by petitioner to the private respondents. -BACK TO TOP-
59
13. Vestil vs IAC

Facts:
David and Teresita Uy had a child named Theness Tan Uy who died at the age of three. On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog
named Andoy while she was playing with a child of the Purita and Agustin Vestil in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of
Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple
lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days
but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of
death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
An action for damages filed by the Uys, they claimed that their child died because she was bitten by a dog of the Vestils, but the latter
denied this, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one
had witnessed it bite Theness. The trial court ruled in favour of the Vestils. However, the appellate court ruled in favour of the Uys and
reversed the court a quos ruling. It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible
under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites
and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Hence, this petition.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the Vestils are the owner of the dog;
(2) whether or not Vestils liable for the death of Theness Uy;
(3) whether or not there is casual connection between rabies and bronco-pneumonia, the latter being the cause of death of Theness
Uy.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
(1) Purita Vestil's testified that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him ("one way or the other") and
maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate ). She also
mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be
close kin.
However, there is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were more of boarders than relatives who paid the Vestils for
providing them with meals and accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the
cooking and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically
declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog. Another witness, Marcial Lao,
testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. And although Purita
denied paying the water bills for the house, the Uys submitted documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the
Cebu Water District, which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she
and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most
logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, a nd used it virtually as a
second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The
dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question
occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she
knew them only casually.
(2) The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article
2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And
it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her.
The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation,
the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she
might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack
of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
60
(3) The Vestils also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing
that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had
nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended
scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that Dr. Tautjo
testified, first, that Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia
broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. He further elaborated that broncho-pneumonia
can result from physical, chemical and bacterial means. ... It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any other disease which
can lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia. -BACK TO TOP-
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14. Caedo vs Yu Khe Thai

FACTS:
Caedo and his family were traveling Highway 54 {now edsa} from his home in QC to the airport. Bernardo, Yu et al. were
traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personal river of Yu. Both vehicles were running at moderate speeds when a
carritela was traveling the same direction as Bernardos. The latter overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos were traveling and
caused multiple injuries and damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was held liable.
ISSUE:
WON the owner of the vehicle who was riding with the driver at the time of the accident be held solidarily liable.
HELD:
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held
liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily
liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could
have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory
is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before
that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of
violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the
part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see
that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and
open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason
to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters
behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did
see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact
that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity
for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or
not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not
held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars
and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know
the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road.
What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped. -BACK TO TOP-
62
15. Mallari vs CA
FACTS:
On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 AM, the passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari, Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner
Alfredo Mallari, Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corporation (BULLETIN), being driven by Felix
Angeles, along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Petitioner Mallari, Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane.
Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of respondent BULLETIN coming from the opposite direction. The sketch of the accident
showed that the collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of collision
were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN. The two (2) right wheels of
the delivery van were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the shoulder
of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and
fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his
injuries.
On 16 December 1987 Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Olongapo City
against Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands
Insurance Company. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel Reyes was caused by the fault and
negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van. The complaint also prayed that the defendants
be ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff compensatory damages, payment for hospital and medical expenses, burial expenses
plus such amounts as may be fixed by the trial court for exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The RTC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles (driver of Bulletin), considering the fact
that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by him hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney. The court
ordered Bulletin and Felix Angeles to pay jointly and severally. The trial court also ordered N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company to
indemnify Reyes which when paid should be deducted from the liabilities of respondent BULLETIN and its driver Angeles to the plaintiff.
It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Mallari, Sr. and Mallari, Jr.
On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the trial court and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and his employer, BULLETIN.
Instead, it ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Mallari, Jr. The CA then ordered petitioners Mallari Jr.
and Mallari Sr. to compensate Claudia G. Reyes. It absolved from any liability respondent BULLETIN, Felix Angeles and N.V.
Netherlands Insurance Company.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of Mallari, Jr.;
2. Whether he negligence and recklessness of Mallari, Jr. is binding against Mallari Sr., as owner of the passenger jeepney
RULING:
1. Mallari, Jr.s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has
the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or
rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on
the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the
opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the
left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision
resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the
passenger jeepney, Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not
allowed by traffic rules.
Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present
satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
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2. Mallari, Sr. is liable as a common carrier

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was
the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage,
the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the
payment of damages sought by the passenger.
1.
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover,
under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759
of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of
the formers employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees. -BACK TO TOP-
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16. City of Manila vs Teotico

FACTS:
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within
a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail
a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his
eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons
came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his
injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered
contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals:
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at UE. He
held responsible positions in various business firms and he was also associated with several civic organizations. As a result of
the incident, he was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for 20 days. He lost income during his incapacity to
work and was subject to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the period of his treatment,
plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. x x x
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence to prove that the Storm Drain Section of the Office of the City
Engineer of Manila received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta
Streets, Manila on 24 January 1958 but the same was covered on the same day but the iron cover was reported missing on 30
January but was replaced again the next day. The Office of the City Engineer asserts that they never received any report to
the effect that catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 to 29. It stated that it has always been a policy of
the said office that whenever a report is received, the matter is immediately attended to.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned. The City of Manila is sentenced to pay damages. Hence, the present appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code;
2. Whether the City of Manila is liable to Teotico for damages
RULING:
1. Article 2189 applies.
Section 4 of RA No. 409 provides: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended
exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The CA however applied the Civil Code. The SC concurs. The reason for such application is that while Section 4 of RA 409 refers to
liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, Article 2189 particularly governs liability due to
"defective streets. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189
is decisive thereon.
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2. The City of Manila is liable for damages.

Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street
which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the
streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the
performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law ." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. Moreover, the assertion that said Avenue is a national highway was made,
for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that
the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision"
by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. -BACK TO TOP-
66
BATCH 04
1. Castro vs Acro
FACTS:
-It appears that on July 14, 1939, about 4 a.m., after taking a cup of coffee at the Central Hotel, Juan Castro boarded taxicab No. 962,
a car for hire owned by appellant corporation and driven by Sancho Ruedas, to go home.
-The cab proceeded northward on Rizal Ave. and before reaching Calle Lope de Vega, the passenger told the driver to turn to the right
or east of Calle Zurbaran, the next cross street. Ruedas drove the cab so fast that when he had to turn it to the right or east of Calle
Zurbaran, it collided with another taxicab No. 936 owned by the same corporation coming from the north.
-Both cars were heavily damaged, and the first hit the fire hydrant that was on the sidewalk, east of Rizal Avenue and southeast of
Calle Zurbaran. Without losing time Castro boarded another car and directed the driver to take him to the Philippine General Hospital,
and upon reaching Calle Carriedo in front of Tom's Dixie, he ordered the driver to stop and requested patrolman Jose Lomboy to
accompany him to the hospital.
-Upon arriving there, Dr. Eriberto Aguilar asked him to undress, looked over his body, applied ointment to aching parts, and told him to
return home.
-The following day, as he was still suffering from acute pains on the left side of the chest, difficult breathing, fever, and coughs, he
called Dr. Herrera who prescribed some palliative medicines, and on the 17th, Dr. Herrera advised him to go to a hospital because it
was a case for a surgeon.
-On July 18, he entered St. Luke's Hospital and was treated there by Dr. Fores who advised him to have an X-ray taken. Dr. Paulino J.
Garcia took an X-ray and this revealed that five left ribs were fractured. After 3 days stay in the hospital he was advised to go home
because the hospital charges were rather heavy, and was told by Dr. Fores that he would continue treating him at the house. Twice a
week for 2 consecutive weeks and once in the 3rd week after his discharge from the hospital, or 3 or 4 times, he was visited in his
house and treated by Dr. Fores, and after 1 month he was told to report to the surgeon once every 2 weeks, and reported twice.
-The honorarium of Dr. Herrera is P100; of Dr. Fores, P150; and the hospital bill was P40. Castro testifies that prior to the accident he
was a sort of a utility man of Eleuterio Navoa, and for that work he was paid a salary of P250 a month, but he could no longer work
after the accident, he lost his job.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the determination of which cab, both owned and operated by the appellant, caused the accident would
affect the appellants obligation arising from the imprudent or reckless act of its servant no.
-The determination of the accident's cause is only necessary to ascertain and fix the source of appellant's liability. If the cause
of the accident was the imprudent act of the first car's driver, then appellant's obligation would be contractual. If it was the
recklessness on the second car's driver, then its liability would arise from tort or culpa aquiliana.
-A review of the evidence discloses that the driver of the first car ran his car at an immoderate speed, so much so that instead
of passing the lamp post in the middle of the avenue and cross street to turn to the right or east of Calle Zurbaran, as
required by law and ordinance, he did not pass it, an act which indicates clearly that because of the speed he was going he
could not pass it but turned his car to the right passing on the south of the post, and after turning it in that way, the two cars
collided at a point on the east of Rizal Avenue and on the south of Calle Zurbaran.
2. WON the amounts awarded for damages were proper

- P1,000 for all fees and expenses would still be reasonable. This is to cover expenses for the x-ray picture, Dr. Herrera, Dr. Flores
and the amounts spent for medicines prescribed.
-The award of P5,000 for injuries suffered is speculative. There is no sufficient evidence to support it. If it is true that he only
stayed 3 days in the hospital and was treated in his house by Dr. Fores 3 or 4 times, then he was not disabled for the rest of his
life, as claimed by him, to perform his previous work which required no physical exertion, for it was most likely that the fracture of
67
the ribs had been cured by ossification, this kind of fracture being curable from 4 to 8 weeks, as shown by the fact that appellee
was stout and healthy when seen at the trial of this case.
According to appellee, his work before the accident was that of a utility man of Eleuterio Navoa; according to appellant's witnesses
his work was that of a dealer in the game of cards conducted by his principal. Whether it be the first or the second, certainly his
work required no physical exertion and the ossification of the fractural ribs rendered him fit to perform again the work.
On the whole, P3,000 would be an adequate compensation for pains and disability to work during the time he had been actually
disabled to perform the work previously done by him. -BACK TO TOP-
68
2.
Ballatan vs CA
FACTS:
The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon,
Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, 414 square meters in area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez
and Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25 and 26, with an area of 415 and 313 square meters respectively, are registered in the name of
respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No.
26 is Lot No. 27, 417 square meters in area, and is registered in the name of respondent Li Ching Yao.
Petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and
side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property.
Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his encroachment on her property. Respondent Go, however, claimed that his
house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of his father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer
Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Upon the third relocation survey requested by the parties, Engr. Quedding found that Lot No. 24 lost approximately 25 square
meters on its eastern boundary, that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area;
that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were gained by Lot No. 27 on its western boundary. In short, Lots
Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and
dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay.
Respondents Go did not appear. Thus, on April 1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan instituted a civil case for recovery of possession before the
RTC. The Go's filed their "Answer with Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA
and Engineer Quedding.
RTC: decided in favor of petitioners. It ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of Lot No. 24, demolish their improvements and
pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. It dismissed the third-party complaint. Respondents
Go appealed
CA: modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the
complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. Instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject
land, the appellate court ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable
amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered Jose Quedding to
pay respondents Go attorney's fees of P5,000.00 for his erroneous survey. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the award of damages is proper.

2. WON the respondents are builder in good faith.
HELD:
1. YES. Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the
amount prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to damages arising
after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the
judgment award.[20]
2. YES. The appellate court found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it
was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house in the belief
that it was entirely within the parameters of his father's land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached on
petitioners' lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on
her property.Petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land,
or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house useless, then
petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or
unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however,
cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon.
If the value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not
agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to fix the same. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
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3.
RCBC vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Felipe Lustre purchased a Toyota Corolla from Toyota Shaw, Inc. for which he made a down payment
of P164,620.00, the balance of the purchase price to be paid in 24 equal monthly installments. Private respondent thus issued 24
postdated checks for the amount of P14,976.00 each. The first was dated April 10, 1991; subsequent checks were dated every
10th day of each succeeding month.
To secure the balance, private respondent executed a promissory note and a contract of chattel mortgage over the vehicle in
favor of Toyota Shaw, Inc. The contract of chattel mortgage, in paragraph 11 thereof, provided for an acceleration clause stating that
should the mortgagor default in the payment of any installment, the whole amount remaining unpaid shall become due. In addition,
the mortgagor shall be liable for 25% of the principal due as liquidated damages.
Toyota Shaw, Inc. assigned all its rights and interests in the chattel mortgage to petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC).
All the checks dated April 10, 1991 to January 10, 1993 were thereafter encashed and debited by RCBC from private respondent's
account, except for RCBC Check No. 279805 representing the payment for August 10, 1991, which was unsigned.
On the theory that respondent defaulted in his payments, the check representing the payment for August 10, 1991 being
unsigned, petitioner demanded from private respondent the payment of the balance of the debt, including liquidated damages. The
latter refused, prompting petitioner to file an action for replevin and damages before the RTC. Private respondent, in his Answer,
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
RTC dismissed the case and ordered RCBC to accept the payment equivalent to the three checks amounting to a total of
P44,938.00, without interest, to cancel the mortgage on the car upon payment of the amount of P44,938.00 without interest and to
pay the cost of suit. On the counterclaim, the RTC rendered as follows: Plaintiff RCBC to pay Atty. Lustre the amount of P200,000.00
as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as Attorney's fees.
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court.
HELD:
NO.
We do not subscribe to petitioner's theory.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code states that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of delay are liable for
damages. The delay in the performance of the obligation, however, must be either malicious or negligent. Thus, assuming that private
respondent was guilty of delay in the payment of the value of the unsigned check, private respondent cannot be held liable for
damages. There is no imputation, much less evidence, that private respondent acted with malice or negligence in failing to sign the
check. Indeed, we agree with the CAs finding that such omission was mere "inadvertence" on the part of private respondent. Toyota
salesperson Jorge Geronimo testified that he even verified whether private respondent had signed all the checks and in fact returned
three or four unsigned checks to him for signing.
Even when the checks, were delivered to petitioner, it did not object to the unsigned check. In view of the lack of malice or
negligence on the part of private respondent, petitioner's blind and mechanical invocation of paragraph 11 of the contract of chattel
mortgage was unwarranted.
Petitioners conduct, in the light of the circumstances of this case, can only be described as mercenary. Petitioner had already
debited the value of the unsigned check from private respondent's account only to re-credit it much later to him. Thereafter, petitioner
encashed checks subsequently dated, then abruptly refused to encash the last two. More than a year after the date of the unsigned
check, petitioner, claiming delay and invoking paragraph 11, demanded from private respondent payment of the value of said check
and. that of the last two checks, including liquidated damages. As pointed out by the trial court, this whole controversy could have
been avoided if only petitioner bothered to call up private respondent and ask him to sign the check. Good faith not only in compliance
with its contractual obligations, but also in observance of the standard in human relations, for every person "to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." behooved the bank to do so.
Failing thus, petitioner is liable for damages caused to private respondent. These include moral damages for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation suffered by the latter. The trial court found
that private respondent was [a] client who has shared transactions for over twenty years with a bank xxx. The shabby treatment given
the defendant is unpardonable since he was put to shame and embarrassment after the case was filed in Court. He is a lawyer in his
70
own right, married to another member of the bar. He sired children who are all professionals in their chosen field. He is known to the
community of golfers with whom he gravitates. Surely, the filing of the case made defendant feel so bad and bothered.
To deter others from emulating petitioners callous example, we affirm the award of exemplary damages. As exemplary damages
are warranted, so are attorney's fees.
We, however, find excessive the amount of damages awarded by the trial court in favor of private respondent with respect to his
counterclaims and, accordingly, reduce the same as follows:
(a)
Moral damages - fromP200,000.00 to P100,000.00,
(b)
(b)Exemplarydamages from P100,000.00 to P75,000.00,
(c)
(c) Attorney's fees - from P 50,000,00 to P 30,000.00. -BACK TO TOP-
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4.
Vda de Severo vs Go
FACTS:
Ricardo Severo was an employee of respondents (Luningning Feliciano-Go and Joaquin Go).
First, he worked as a baker and finally as a driver-mechanic.
Unidentified armed men forcibly took away and/or carnapped the car owned by respondents and driven by Severo, who in his
efforts to resist the carnappers, was shot and killed.
The parties responsible for his death have not been identified nor apprehended.
The heirs of Severo filed with CFI Samar an action against the respondents for Death Compensation and Damages in
the total amount of P74,500.00.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that CFI Samar (respondent court) has no jurisdiction
over the nature of the action. DENIED by CFI.
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents was DENIED by CFI.
During the Pre-trial, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss reiterating their allegation that CFI has no jurisdiction
over the claim.
Petitioners filed a reply contending that their claim is not for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act but for
damages under Article 1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, hence, cognizable by the regular courts.
CFI Samar acting on the latest motion to dismiss declared itself without jurisdiction following the ruling on Robles vs Yap
Wing. That the cause of action falls within the WCA and the proper forum was the Workmens Compensation Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners claim is for Compensation under the WCA.
RULING:
NO
The ruling in the case of Robles vs Yap Wing, that the action of the injured employee or that of his heirs in case of his
death is restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the WCA relied upon by the CFI, no longer controls.
In the case of Ysmael Maritime Corp. vs Hon. Celso Avelino, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the
rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case.
The employee or his heirs have the choice of cause of action and corresponding relief, i.e. either as an ordinary action for
damages before the regular courts or special claim for limited compensation under the WCA before the Workmens
However, the right of choice is qualified in that the employee should be held to the particular remedy in which he has staked
for his fortunes and must pursue even his alternative claim for compensation exclusively in the same regular courts once he
has opted to seek his remedy there rather than on the Workmens Compensation Commission.
This is what the petitioners did in filing their complaint for Death Compensation and Damages.
Petitioners opted to seek their remedy before the regular court. Their demand for compensation is predicated on the
employers liability for the death of their employee (Ricardo Severo) imposed by Article 1711 CC.
Petitioners claim for compensation based on the CC pertain to the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
GRANTED.
_________________
Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their
laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a
fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. . . . . -BACK TO TOP-
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5. Banez vs Valdevilla
FACTS:
BEBIANO M. BAEZ was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in Iligan City. In 1993, ORO MARKETING,
INC. "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") in Iligan City.
Labor Arbiter- found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
and of backwages and attorney's fees.
The decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time.
Elevated by petition for certiorari before this Court, the case was dismissed on technical grounds; however, the Court also pointed out
that even if all the procedural requirements for the filing of the petition were met, it would still be dismissed for failure to show grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
ORO MARKETING, INC., filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Misamis Oriental, which prayed for the payment of the
following: P709,217.97 plus 12% interest as loss of profit and/or unearned income of three years; P119,700.00 plus 12% interest as
estimated cost of supplies, facilities, properties, space, etc. for three years; and P5,000.00 as initial expenses of litigation; and
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.
BEBIANO M. BAEZ filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint.
Petitioners contention: The action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final
judgment in the labor case. He accused private respondent of splitting causes of action, stating that the latter could very well have
included the instant claim for damages in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter. He also pointed out that the civil action of private
respondent is an act of forum-shopping and was merely resorted to after a failure to obtain a favorable decision with the NLRC.
Ruling upon the motion to dismiss, HON. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA issued the herein questioned Order, taking jurisdiction over an
action for damages filed by an employer against its dismissed employee.
Respondents contention: A perusal of the complaint which is for damages does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the
Philippines. It seeks to recover damages as redress for defendant's breach of his contractual obligation to plaintiff who was damaged
and prejudiced. The Court believes such cause of action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to
the regular courts. While seemingly the cause of action arose from employer- employee relations, the employer's claim for damages is
grounded on the nefarious activities of defendant causing damage and prejudice to plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 7 of the complaint.
The Court believes that there was a breach of a contractual obligation, which is intrinsically a civil dispute. The averments in the
complaint removed the controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and brought it within the purview of civil
law.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Which court had jurisdiction over claims for damages as between employers and employees. - Labor Arbiter
RULING: There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondent's claim against petitioner for actual damages
arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioner's
"doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee. Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are:
first, those amounting to lost profits and earnings due to petitioner's abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, having
been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and second, those equivalent to the value of private
respondent's property and supplies which petitioner used in conducting his "business ".
Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant action for damages would be to open anew the
factual issue of whether petitioner's installment sale scheme resulted in business losses and the dissipation of private respondent's
property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in the illegal dismissal case, where private respondent brought up as a
defense the same allegations now embodied in his complaint, and presented evidence in support thereof. The Labor Arbiter, however,
found to the contrary - that no business losses may be attributed to petitioner as in fact, it was by reason of petitioner's installment
plan that the sales of the Iligan branch of private respondent (where petitioner was employed) reached its highest record level to the
extent that petitioner was awarded the 1989 Field Sales Achievement Award in recognition of his exceptional sales performance, and
that the installment scheme was in fact with the knowledge of the management of the Iligan branch of private respondent. In other
words, the issue of actual damages has been settled in the labor case, which is now final and executory.
Clearly, respondent court's taking jurisdiction over the instant case would bring about precisely the harm that the lawmakers sought to
avoid in amending the Labor Code to restore jurisdiction over claims for damages of this nature to the NLRC.
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This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and
the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the
damages, claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt
from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.
Neither can we uphold the reasoning of respondent court that because the resolution of the issues presented by the complaint does
not entail application of the Labor Code or other labor laws, the dispute is intrinsically civil. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as
amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employeremployee relations ---in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also
damages governed by the Civil Code.
Thus, it is obvious that private respondent's remedy is not in the filing of this separate action for damages, but in properly perfecting
an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision. Having lost the right to appeal on grounds of untimeliness, the decision in the labor case
stands as a final judgment on the merits, and the instant action for damages cannot take the place of such lost appeal.
APPLICABLE PROVISION:
Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, which was already in effect at the time of the filing of this case, reads:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. --- (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code
the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee
relations; -BACK TO TOP-
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6. People vs Ballesteros
FACTS:
In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal
Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel
Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall at Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not
tarry for long at the dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger
looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity, they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived
provocation of Galo and his companions.
The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. Vidal
Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the topdown jeep and landed just beside it. He scurried to the side of the road
and hid in the ricefield. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and died. Carmelo Agliam,
Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the right foot, back of the right thigh, and legs and thighs, respectively. The
stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney. He
did not survive. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injured.
All were charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and
Ballesteros produced positive results. The accused interposed different defenses:
Galo- claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions at the basketball court; the nitrates were
a result of his being a smoker for 10 years
Ballesteros- defense of alibi
Bulusan- defense of alibi
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is correct to find the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the award for damages?
RULING:
Yes. Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam recognized them as the
assailants. This claim is unmeritorious. In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by
the moon. The shooting took place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilocos Norte, where the air is free from darkening
elements and turbidity. It being a summer evening, there could not have been any fog to becloud the atmosphere and hamper the
vision of the victims, which would have prevented them from clearly seeing their assailants.
That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. Lack or absence of motive for committing the
crime does not preclude conviction thereof where there were reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the
perpetrator of the felony.
The hackneyed defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellants must likewise fail. As consistently enunciated by this Court,
the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove, not only that he was at some other place
at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. On the night of May 28, 1991, Galo and Bulusan attended the
dance at the barangay hall. After the dance, they went their separate ways but remained within the barangay. Galo lingered in the
premises. Bulusan slept over at the house of Michael Viloria, which was within walking distance from the dance hall.
The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims. Damages may be defined as the
pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences
which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the
complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown
that these were the proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission. In granting actual or compensatory damages, the
party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated by his
testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated
by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. However, the order
granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of
this Court, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as
compensatory damages. As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of the
victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as
to this matter. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
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7. Robleza vs CA
Facts:
On June 24, 1979, in General Santos City, Julita Robleza, with the consent of her husband, Jesus Robleza, (petitioners), sold
to spouses Elpedio Tan (Tan) and Marianne Tan two lots respectively covered by two TCTs. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
consideration allegedly acknowledged as paid was P10,000. Tan is the baptismal godson of petitioners. The parents of Tan and
petitioners have known each other for over 40 years and are close to each other. The TCTs over the two lots were given to Tan,
who, thereafter, transferred the same in his name.
Tan used the new TCTs to execute a Deed of Mortgage, securing the payment of a promissory note he previously executed in
favor of Inter Island Fishing Gear & Equipment Inc. (private respondent).
According to petitioners, they did not receive a single centavo from Tan; that the purchase price of 10,000 appearing on the deed
of sale was not the true purchase price. The actual consideration was P50,000.00 for each lot. Since, however, petitioners owed
Tans mother P6,000, it was agreed that this amount would be deducted from the total purchase price. They presented 2 checks
issued by Tan which represented the actual stipulated price (1st: P50,000 and 2nd: P44,000). Both checks were dishonored
("account closed"). Petitioners demanded the return of the Titles, but Tan admitted that he had the Titles transferred in his name,
which were mortgaged and turned over to private respondent.
When a lawyer of respondent corporation went to General Santos City for the purpose of fencing the land, he was prevented from
doing so and was, instead, informed by petitioners about the nonpayment by the Tan spouses of the purchase price and given
xerox copies of the bouncing checks of Tan.
Petitioner Jesus Robleza thereafter went to Bacolod City, and informed the manager of respondent corporation of what had
transpired and of the fraud Tan had perpetrated. The private respondents general manager, refused to return the certificates but
signified willingness to accept other collaterals provided a partial payment of P50,000 would first be made by Tan.
Failure of the Tans to pay their obligation forced the private respondent to foreclose on the properties.
On May 16, 1983 petitioners filed an action against private respondent and Spouses Tan for the "Declaration of Nullity of
Documents of Sale, Cancellation of Torrens Titles, Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Damages
with the RTC Branch XXII, General Santos City. Petitioners claim: that they have always been in possession of the subject
property, that neither the Tan spouses nor private respondent ever took possession thereof and that respondent corporation acted
in bad faith.
RTC Decision: in favor of petitioners. Petitioners were held as the absolute and registered owner of the lots, entitled to
possession thereof. The foreclosure sale was declared void and defective. Damages awarded: Moral damages - 100,000;
Compensatory damages - P50,000; Exemplary damages -10,000.
CA: Reversed and dismissed action.
Issues:
1. WON the Deed of Absolute Sale can be declared null and void. No (proper action: resolution/rescission)
2. WON the respondent corporation acted in bad faith. - Yes
3. WON the petitioners are entitled to moral damages. Yes (but amount awarded by RTC was modified by SC)
Ruling:
1. When the parties intended to be bound by the contract except that it did not reflect the actual purchase price, the contract cannot
be declared null and void. Nonpayment of the contract price results in a breach of contract for nonperformance and warrants an
action for rescission or specific performance under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Where the parties intended to be bound by the
contract except that it did not reflect the actual purchase price of the property, there is only a relative simulation of the contract
which remains valid and enforceable, but the parties shall be bound by their real agreement. The present contract cannot be
declared null and void or inexistent from the beginning since it does not fall under the category of an absolutely simulated or
fictitious contract the basic characteristic of which is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal
effects or to alter in any way the juridical situation of the parties.
2.
When respondent corporations lawyer went to see the property, bad faith had set in since, in that posture, it was incumbent upon
respondent corporation to initiate the proper legal remedies for the protection of its supposed alleged rights. Its failure to do so is
strongly indicative of bad faith for, if it really believed that it had every right to the possession of the land as a mortgagee, it would
not have treated the matter so lightly and with indifference. Its unexplained silence may be deemed a recognition and an
admission on its part that petitioners are the true owners of the subject lots. The categorical refusal of petitioners to surrender
possession of the land and their unequivocal declaration that they are the true owners thereof, made in the presence and within
the observation of private respondents agents who did or said nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against respondent corporation and, in this case, should be considered as
evidence adverse to it.
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3.
Petitioners are entitled to damages. It is said, however, that the law on damages is merely intended to repair the damage done by
putting the plaintiff in the same position, as far as pecuniary compensation can do, that he would be had the damage not been
inflicted and the wrong not committed. Moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff; they are designed to compensate
for the actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Considering, further, that petitioners were never
dispossessed of the subject lots, although their right of disposition and alienation there over was impaired, an award of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, in addition to the compensatory and exemplary damages awarded by the trial
court, is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
Lastly, since the resolution of the subject deed requires mutual restitution by the parties of what they have received, private
respondent is ordered to surrender the transfer certificates of title issued in its name covering the subject lots and petitioners are
ordered to return the amount P6,000.00 to Tan.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered REINSTATING and AFFIRMING the
decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 2717, subject to the modifications above stated. -BACK TO TOP-
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8. Mabutol vs Pascua
FACTS: In 1972, Defendant Mayor Arturo Pascual promulgated his EO No. 16 upon which notices were sent to all persons concerned,
among them the plaintiffs Sps. Mabutol (owners of a 3-door commercial building), to demolish their buildings on the ground that they
occupied creek beds, pursuant to PD 296 and LOI No. 19. Mabutol wrote the City Mayor to allow him to excavate the property on the
other side of the creek and have it deposited on the bank adjacent to his building, but the same was objected to by the defendant City
Engineer. Failing with administrative remedies to prevent demolition, he filed with the CFI of Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the City, which was subsequently dismissed.
CA also denied the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Mayor. When officially informed about the resolution of
the CA and upon the City Fiscals legal opinion on his next course of action, defendant Mayor wrote a demand letter to Mabutol to
remove his building within 30 days from receipt thereof. Mabutol, instead of objecting to the demand or availing of any judicial
remedies with the courts or other administrative or executive authorities to enjoin the Mayor from carrying out his order to demolish,
wrote in reply that he be given a period of 15 days extension within which to undertake personally the demolition. The extension
sought for was granted, but plaintiffs offer to undertake the demolition was not complied with.
In 1975, the Ad Hoc Committee implementing PD 296 and LOI No. 19 for the City of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sent another notice of
demolition to plaintiff Sps. Mabutol. For lack of material time to secure an injunction from the courts, plaintiffs, through their counsel,
presented their evidence before the committee and argued that their building could not be legally demolished for lack of clearance
from the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Resettlement Agency (PAHRA), and that a clearance could not be validly issued because
the body of water abutting the building is a man-made creek, not a creek within the meaning of 296, and LOI No. 19. The committee
over-ruled plaintiffs objection and reiterated its order of demolition. And so plaintiffs building was demolished.
Plaintiffs complain that they were deprived of the right to avail of judicial remedies, and that the demolition was done in bad faith,
with abuse of authority and without giving them the opportunity to remove personal belongings. Sps. Mabutol sued Mayor Arturo
Pascual and other members of the Ad Hoc Committee allegedly for having passed an illegal resolution for the demolition of their
building, asking for a monetary award totalling P1,210,000.
Defendants contend that in issuing the order of demolition, the Ad Hoc Committee took into consideration the revocation of the
building permit granted the plaintiff on the ground that a portion of the building then under construction occupied 96 sq. m. of the
creek bed, and that it exceeded the area granted in the permit. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied in view of the
allegations of bad faith and abuse of authority on their part in the commission of the acts complained of. However, their Motion for
Reconsideration was granted.
ISSUE: Whether defendants ordered the demolition in their official capacities, having acted in bad faith and abuse of authority, so as
to warrant award of damages in favor plaintiffs.
HELD: The rule is well-settled that public officials are not liable for damages for performing a duty required by law and absent bad
faith. In this particular case, plaintiffs themselves stated in their complaint that the defendants are all public officials and that they
ordered the demolition of the apartment building in the discharge of their official function. There can be no dispute that the defendants
are members of the Ad Hoc Committee, duly appointed to implement the policy embodied in the provisions of PD 296 and LOI No. 19.
The authority and power of the Ad Hoc Committee to implement the law, to order the demolition, was indeed acknowledged and
recognized by the plaintiffs when they appeared, by themselves and counsel, before the committee. Therefore, the order of demolition
was issued by the defendants in their official capacities, and that indeed the defendants acted and performed their official duties in
consonance with law, with caution, fairness and due process.
On whether they acted in bad faith and abuse of authority, the answer is in the negative. Among the facts forming the basis of
defendants good faith are documentary evidence, most of which are public documents, and not denied by plaintiffs in their opposition:
(1) the decision of the CFI of Nueva Ecija dismissing the case for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction; (2) the resolution of
the CA denying the petition for writ of preliminary injunction; (3) the Legal Opinion No. 98 of the City Fiscal; (4) the certification of the
City Engineer that plaintiffs building occupied a 96 square meters area of the creek bed; (5) the letters of Mabutol requesting for an
extension of time to demolish the building by himself, and; (6) the fact that plaintiffs are affluent*.
*On the plaintiffs contention that a clearance from PAHRA should first be secured before an order of demolition be issued, the CFI
ruled that the PAHRA, by its name and function, is to assist and rehabilitate those who could be classified as eligible to the concern and
help of the government. As embodied in the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, there should be no mercy for the rich and
professional squatters, and they should be removed bodily and left to their own devices. Measured in terms of the value of their
properties (valued at P113,000 and a monthly rental value of P1,085), the plaintiffs are relatively rich, and certainly not poor or
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indigent to be classified as eligible.

And even on the assumption that defendants committed error in ordering the demolition without first securing the clearance from the
PAHRA, a legal requirement as plaintiffs would want it to appear, yet, under the circumstances they could not be held liable for
damages. An erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an ordinance by a City Mayor does not amount to bad faith
that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages against an official. A city official who performed a duty required by law,
there being no showing that he acted in bad faith, is not liable for damages. -BACK TO TOP-
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9.
Facts:
Algarra vs Sandejas
1.
Lucio Algarra filed a civil action for personal injuries received from a car collision due to the negligence of Sixto Sandejas
causing him to be hospitalized for 10 days, four of five days of which he could not leave his bed.
2. After being discharged, he still continued to receive medical treatment and that he had done no work since he was not yet
entirely recovered. He also spent to pay the doctor P8 and medicine P2, the expense totalling to P110
3. Algarra sells the products of a distillery and earns 10% commission which averages to P50/month. He had around 20 regular
customers which took him 4 years to build who order in small quantities and require regular and frequent deliveries. Since his
accident, his wife tried to keep up with the business but only 4 regular customers remained.
4. Lower court: refused to allow him anything for his injury on the ground that the doctrine of Marcelo vs. Velasco is opposed to
such allowance and Viada which does not pertain to personal injuries
ISSUE: W/N there is actual or compensatory damage despite absence of malicious intent (since negligence)? How is the damage
measured?
HELD:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Plaintiff is awarded the following damages; P10 for medical expenses; P100 for the 2 months of his enforced absence from his
business; and P250 for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits = P360
Article 1902 of the Civil Code, states that "A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another where there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of the loss which may have been suffered, but
also that of the profit which the creditor may have failed to realize, reserving the provisions contained in the following articles.
1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may have been
foreseen, at the time of constituting the obligation, and which may be a necessary consequence of its nonfulfillment.
In case of fraud, the debtor shall be liable for all those which clearly may originate from the nonfulfillment of the obligation not in present case
GR: in order that an act omission may be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be the natural and probable
consequence of the act or omission and such as might have been foreseen by an ordinarily responsible and prudent man, in
the light of the attendant circumstances, as likely to result therefrom . .
in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by
competent evidence:
(1)
Damages to the plaintiff.
(2)
Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3)
The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damages.
5.
6.
7.
8.
"actual damages"
-purpose of the law in awarding actual damages is to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate
for the injury inflicted, and not to impose a penalty not dependent on nor graded by the intent with which the
wrongful act is done.
-shall be construed to include all damages that the plaintiff may he has suffered in respect to his property,
business, trade, profession, or occupation, and no other damages whatever."
-proceed from a sense of natural justice
-indemnity comprises, not only the value of loss suffered, but also that of the prospective profit that was not
realized, and the obligation of the debtor in good faith is limited to such losses and damages as were foreseen or
might have been foreseen at the time the obligation was incurred and which are a necessary consequence of his
failure of fulfillment
The abstract rules for determining negligence and the measure of damages are, however, rules of natural justice rather than
man-made law, and are applicable under any enlightened system of jurisprudence.
As to the damages resulting from the actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business there is no question. They are,
of course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which in this case, is P50 per month.
Evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged to have been
suffered." But, while certainty is an essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty.
When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady average profit on the investment, it may be
assumed that had the interruption to the business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued
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9.
10.
11.
12.
producing this average income "so long as is usual with things of that nature.
When in addition to the previous average income of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the business
are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed, there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits
has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant.
In the present case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the accident, but we also have its
value to him after the accident
The value of such a business depends mainly on the ordinary profits derived from it. Such value cannot be ascertained without
showing what the usual profits are; nor are the ordinary profits incident to such a business contingent or speculative, in the
sense that excludes profits from consideration as an element of damages. What they would have been, in the ordinary course
of the business, for a period during which it was interrupted, may be shown with reasonable certainty. What effect
extraordinary circumstances would have had upon the business might be contingent and conjectural, and any profits
anticipated from such cause would be obnoxious to the objection that they are merely speculative; but a history of the
business, for a reasonable time prior to a period of interruption, would enable the jury to determine how much would be done
under ordinary circumstances, and in the usual course, during the given period; and the usual rate of profit being shown, of
course the aggregate becomes only a matter of calculation.
Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling goods on commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild
his business to its former proportions; so that at some time in the future his commissions will equal those he was receiving
when the accident occurred. Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild this business to its former proportions in
much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to
do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive from the business in the course of its reconstruction will gradually increase. The
injury to plaintiff's business begins where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is where defendant's liability
begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at P250. -BACK TO TOP-
81
10. Farolan vs Salmac

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting
Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division. They were sued in their official capacities as officers in the government,
nevertheless, they were both held personally liable for the awarded damages "(s)ince the detention of the goods by the defendants
(petitioners herein) was irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular performance of official duty.
Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was the
assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of what is technically known as polypropylene
film. Polypropylene is a substance resembling polyethelyne which is one of a group of partially crystalline lightweight thermoplastics
used chiefly in making fibers, films, and molded and extruded products. Without defect, polypropylene film is sold at a much higher
price as prime quality film. Once rejected as defective, polypropylene film is sold at a relatively cheap price without guarantee or
returnThis latter kind of polypropylene is known as OPP film waste/scrap and this is what respondent SOLMAC claimed the Clojus
shipment to be.
The subject importation consisted of seventeen (17) containers. Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent
SOLMAC for its authority from any government agency to import the goods described in the bill of lading. Respondent SOLMAC
presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment by the
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers of the importation were oriented in such a way that
the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. It was oriented polypropylene and importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited,
under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B.Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI
and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation.
Respondent Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC as above mentioned. It prayed for the unconditional
release of the subject importation. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
RTC Decision: Judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to release the subject importation immediately without drilling of
holes, subject only to the normal requirements of the customs processing for such release to be done with utmost dispatch as time is
of the essence; and the preliminary injunction hereto issued is hereby made permanent until actual physical release of the merchandise
and without pronouncement as to costs.
Solmac, the plaintiff below and the private respondent herein, appealed to the Court of Appeals only insofar as to the denial of the
award of damages is concerned. On the other hand, the petitioners did not appeal from this decision. They had already ordered the
release of the importation "without drilling of holes," as in fact it was so released, in compliance with the advice to effect such
immediate release. Still the private respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be held, in their personal and private
capacities, liable for damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of the public officers.
CA Decision: Appealed judgment is modified by ordering the defendants Ramon Farolan and Guillermo Parayno solidarity, in their
personal capacity, to pay the plaintiff temperate damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Costs
against the defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply, can they
be held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent.
Held: NO. We rule for the petitioners.
The respondent court committed a reversible error in overruling the trial court's finding. We hold that this finding of the trial court is
correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies.
We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and convincing proof showing the alleged bad faith of
the petitioners. On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was the
report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject
importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene, whose importation to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited,
under
LOI
658-B. It was on the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the subject importation for being contrary to
law. Second, the petitioners testified that, on many occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the
subject importation might be released. Third, petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that time (of the trial) there
was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP). The conflicting
recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek final clarification from the former with regard to its policy
on these importations. This resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of such
importations. The confusion over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith.
But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject importation, nonetheless, it is the
duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of
personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous
interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, "even
under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith and that an official duty has
been regularly performed applies in favor of the petitioners: Omnia praesumuntur rite etsolemniter esse acta All things are presumed
to be correctly and solemnly done. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
82
11. Japan Airlines vs CA

FACTS:
On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco, California bound for
Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles,
California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight
stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next
day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic.
Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers on flight No. 741 due
to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16, 1991, much to the
dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled due to NAIAs indefinite closure. At this
point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in
Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private respondents were forced to pay for their
accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended
on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991, commenced an action for damages against
JAL. they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. JAL denied this
allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force
majeure.
RTC: JAL is liable for damages
CA: affirmed with modification on the amount of damages
ISSUE:
Whether or not JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until
they have reached their final destination, even if the delay were caused by force majeure.
RULING:
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled that a contract to transport passengers
is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with
public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care and diligence renders it liable for
any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for
all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of force
majeure, as an exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general
rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It must be noted that private
respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was no longer required to defray
private respondents living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the
necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its
obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from transit
passengers to new passengers as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements
themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure
themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only
at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m.
the next day. The award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss
suffered by him. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in
every case where any property right has been invaded. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
83
12. People vs Malapo

Facts:
Sometime on the month of September, 1991 at Salvacion, Iriga City, the accused-appellant Nixon Malapo entered the house
of Nenita No, aunt of Complainant AMALIA TRINIDAD who was then and there alone, and by means of force and intimidation,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of said Amalia Trinidad against her will and consent and as a result she has become pregnant
and delivered a baby at the Iriga City Puericulture Center.
Three witnesses testified against him: First, Nenita No testified that Amalia Trinidad had been under her care and custody since
Amalia is a retardate. Amalia is seemingly an example of a pseudoretardate. She might have been deprived of intellectual stimulations
which explains her lag in cognitive development. Mrs. No told the court that, sometime during the first week of September 1991,
Amalia was left alone in their house. When Mrs. No came home, she found accused-appellant Malapo in the yard of her
house. Accused-appellant was in haste. She stopped him and asked why he was in a hurry, to which accused-appellant replied he had
gathered firewood. Mrs. No found Amalia inside their house crying. But Amalia would not say anything. On May 18, 1992, Amalia
finally told Mrs. Nos cousin, Bernardita Marquinez, that she had been raped by accused-appellant.
Second, complainant Amalia Trinidad. She recounted that while she was then cooking, she saw Malapo and tried to run away, but
Malapo caught her hand and brought her to the dining room. After he had succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, accusedappellant left after warning her that he would kill her if she reported the incident to Mrs. No or to anyone else.
The last witness for the prosecution was Bernardita Marquinez, a resident of Iriga City and guidance counselor of the University of
Saint Anthony, who was presented to corroborate the testimonies of Mrs. No and the victim.
Accused-appellant Nixon Malapo testified on his behalf, basically claiming alibi as his defense.
The trial court finds accused-appellant guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify
the private offended party, AMALIA TRINIDAD, of the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: W/N accused-appellant may be ordered to pay indemnity in addition to moral damages
Held:
Yes. In conclusion, we hold that the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of rape. However, it failed to order
accused-appellant to pay indemnity. After reciting that, in all criminal cases, unless the offended party reserves the right to institute a
separate civil action, she has a right to recover civil indemnity, the trial court awarded the complainant in this case moral damages
only. As we have explained in a number of cases, the indemnity provided in criminal law as civil liability is the equivalent of actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. It is, therefore, separate and distinct from any award of moral damages.
Since in this case the rape is not qualified, the indemnity should be P50,000.00. This is in addition to the amount of P50,000.00
awarded by the trial court as moral damages. It should be added that the latter amount is automatically granted in rape cases without
need of any proof. It is assumed that the offended party has suffered moral injuries entitling her to the award of such damages.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the
bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes
and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly
present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade. -BACK TO TOP-
84
13. People vs Ereno

FACTS:
On June 21, 1995, at 9:30 pm,Rosanna Honrubia was at N. Domingo Street in Tangos, Navotas, Metro Manila, supervising and
helping in the work being done on the busted electric line from which residents were drawing electricity. Wilfredo Quibado and
Arminggol Teofe were actually working thereon with Rosanna the one holding the flashlight being used in the work. While Rosanna was
holding the flashlight, accused Carlito Ereo took from her the flashlight and brought the same with him to the interior of the place.
Rosanna followed Ereo and upon return she already had the flashlight. A heated argument followed which made Rosanna to move
away to a place known thereat as "Bato." Ereo also followed Rosanna and the argument continued. Ereo all of a sudden stood up
and drew a bladed weapon and with it stabbed Rosanna at the back. This made Rosanna to run towards a tricycle which happened to
be in said place but Ereo followed her again and gave chase to Rosanna but Ereo catched up and then held Rosanna frontally by the
hair and thereafter stabbed her at the chest twice. Rosanna slumped to the ground clutching her chest. At this point, Teofe approached
Rosanna while Dematera called for Rosannas parents. Rosanna died by reason of the stab wounds she sustained at the back and at
the chest.
ISSUE: W/N damages could be granted
HELD:
On the civil aspect of the case, the court a quo overlooked certain evidentiary facts in its award of damages. For instance, in
seeking recovery for actual damages, it is necessary that the claimant produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable such
as receipts to justify an award therefor. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be proved and proved with
reasonable degree of certainty.Only substantiated and proven expenses or those which appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized by the courts. The list of expenses incurred for the wake,
funeral and burial of the victim amounting to P24,700.00 submitted by the victims mother Lita Honrubia is self-serving and not
substantiated. We cannot therefore affirm the trial courts award of P24,000.00 for actual expenses.
In line with current jurisprudence, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity (ex delicto) which requires no proof
other than the fact of death of the victim and assailants responsibility therefor.
We also sustain the award of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for the pain and sorrow suffered by the victims family in
connection with Rosannas untimely death. We find the award to be adequate, reasonable and with sufficient basis taking into
consideration the pain and mental anguish suffered by the victims family.Manikan
The court a quo correctly denied for lack of factual basis the claim of the victims mother for an award for loss of income or
earning capacity of the deceased estimated by her at P600.00 per day, (Sunday excluded) or P15,600.00 a month or P187,200.00 a
year.This hand-written estimate of the deceaseds daily income as a self-employed fish vendor during the past eight (8) years prior to
her death on June 21, 1995, submitted by the victims mother in the course of her testimony in court is not supported by competent
evidence like income tax returns or receipts. It bears stress that compensation for lost income is in the nature of damagesand as such
requires due proof of the damages suffered;there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income.In the instant case, the
victims mother, Lita Honrubia, gave only a self-serving hence unreliable statement of her deceased daughters income. Moreover, the
award for lost income refers to the net income of the deceased, that is, her total income less her average expenses.No proof of the
victims average expenses was presented. Hence, there can be no reliable estimate of the deceaseds lost income. -BACK TO TOP-
85
14. People vs Laceste

FACTS:
On 9 August 1995, an information was filed with the RTC of Dagupan City charging EUFROCENIO, Cipriano Laceste, Rizalino Laceste,
Eddie Bauson, Arthur Bauson, Bonifacio Soriano, and one John Doe with the crime of murder.
The information provided that on or about 9:30 PM of April 9, 1995, at the Municipality of San Fabian, Pangasinan, the accused armed
with a fan-knife with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, hold and stab RUFO
NARVAS, SR. inflicting upon him a stab wound which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
After presenting evidence (as narrated by Orlando Dispo and Bernardo Raboy), the prosecution manifested that as to the civil liability,
it would prove that the expenses incurred by the heirs [of Rufo Narvas, Sr.] is P41,000 and moral damages; but if the defense would
admit that, it would dispense with the presentation of the witnesses. Upon inquiry by the court, the defense admitted; thus:
Court:
In case of favorable judgment, you will admit that the deceased of the heirs here [sic] have [sic] been put to expense
and also suffered loss in the amount of P60,000.00, total loss?
Atty. Gabat:
Yes, Your Honor.
The RTC found EUFROCENIO LACESTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. In case of
accused CIPRIANO LACESTE, he was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Both
accused are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P100,000.00 as actual, moral,
compensatory, and other consequential damages.
EUFROCENIO filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were improbable, immaterial,
contrary to human experience, and full of inconsistencies in material and major details. As to the finding of treachery, EUFROCENIO
argues that the existence of only one stab wound corroborated by the fact that the victim and the assailant were facing each other
negates the existence of treachery.
The OSG affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
RULING:
EUFROCENIOs conviction for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
stands. The SC, however, modified his sentence.
The SC agrees with the trial court and the OSG that treachery attended the killing of Rufo Narvas, Sr. After alighting from the
tricycle, EUFROCENIOs companions suddenly approached and held the unsuspecting and unarmed Rufo; and without much
ado, EUFROCENIO stabbed Rufo. There is at all no doubt that they deliberately and consciously employed means and method
in the execution of the crime that tended directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to themselves arising from
the defense which Rufo might make. All the elements of treachery as defined in paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code are, therefore, present.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since no mitigating or generic aggravating circumstances had been proved, the lesser penalty -- reclusion perpetua -shall be applied pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court then erred in
imposing upon EUFROCENIO the death penalty.
The SC also modified the award of damages.

In the RTCs decision, the lower court awarded the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000 as actual, moral,
compensatory and other consequential damages. In the first place, actual damages are not different from compensatory
damages.
Under Chapter 2, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code, actual and compensatory damages are synonymous; hence the title of
the Chapter as well as Article 2199 thereof refer to them as actual or compensatory damages. They are, as well, different
from moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. In every case then, courts must specify the award for each
item of damages and make a finding thereon in the body of the decision.
In this case, apart from the indemnity for death under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which current jurisprudence law has
fixed at P50,000, the heirs of the victim are entitled to an award of actual damages in the amount of P60,000, which the
86
defense had admitted during the trial. However, since they waived moral damages by agreeing to a limited and
specific amount to be paid by accused-appellant, the award therefor was unwarranted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, x x x the award of P100,000 for actual, moral, compensatory, and other consequential damages is
substituted with the awards of P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of Rufo Narvas, Sr., and P60,000 as actual damages, which
accused-appellant shall pay to the heirs of the victim. -BACK TO TOP-
87
15. People vs Panado

Victim: Danilo del Rosario
Accused: Uldarico, Ronnie and Ronel (all surnamed Panado), Jessie Oquendo, John Paul Eleserio and John Doe
Facts:
At about 4pm on 28 June 1997, the Panados in conspiracy with Oquendo, Eleserio and John Doe armed with assorted
weapons, treacherously and with abuse of superior strength, attacked and killed Danilo del Rosario. The prosecution presented three
(3) witnesses. Hilda, Loui Gee, and Elmer.
Hilda del Rosario testified that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of 28 June 1997 she was in her house in Sitio Batuan,
Mandong, Batan, Aklan, together with her husband Danilo del Rosario, who was drinking liquor in their kitchen with his friend Elmer
Sison. Her 10-year old son Louie Gee was outside playing in the yard. While going about her household chores four (4) armed persons
arrived and forthwith surrounded their house. The intruders were Uldarico Panado, Placido Panado, Jessie Oquendo and Lorenzo de
Pedro, although on cross-examination Hilda mentioned only the names of Uldarico, Placido and Jessie as she failed to recognize the
fourth.i[1] With a bolo in hand, Uldarico walked towards the front door while Ronie Panado challenged her husband Danilo saying,
"Danny go out, we will fight."
Uldarico approached Danny in a threatening manner. Instinctively, Danny stood up from his perch and stepped back towards
a coconut plantation outside his house. But as he stepped out of his house he was encircled by Ronie, Ronel and John Paul Eleserio.
According to Hilda, she heard Uldarico prodding his companions to kill Danny who continued to step backwards blindly until he tripped
over a barbed wire that sent him stumbling to the ground. Uldarico then attacked his fallen quarry with a bolo while Ronel stabbed him
with a knife. Ronie joined the fray by smashing Danilos left ear with a stone and Placido and Jessie made sure that their victim could
not escape. When asked if she knew of any reason for the killing of her husband, she surmised that it could be a long-standing grudge
between Danilo and the Panados which started when the latter accused her husband of conspiring with a certain Atty. Hernando Cortes
to assassinate them.
This statement was corroborated by the two other witnesses. The accused also presented witnesses asserting the defense of
alibi.
The Trial court rendered the assailed Decision finding Uldarico, Ronie and Ronel guilty of murder and sentencing each
to reclusion perpetua. Placido Panado however was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence while the case against accused Jessie
Oquendo, John Paul Eleserio and John Doe was archived for failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
Explaining its Decision the lower court opined that prosecution witnesses Hilda del Rosario, her 10-year old son Louie Gee,
and Elmer Sison clearly and positively showed the circumstances regarding the death of Danilo del Rosario and the persons who
inflicted the injuries that caused his death. The alibi of the accused was rejected in view of the positive identification of the accused by
4 prosecution witnesses.
ISSUE: WON the amount of damages awarded is proper
HELD:
SC found the accused guilty.
As regards damages, there is need to modify the award by the trial court. In fixing the amount of P50,000.00 for actual or
compensatory damages, it appears to have been based on the claim of the widow that the heirs incurred burial and funeral expenses.
But Art. 2199 of the Civil Code explicitly requires that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled only to such
pecuniary loss as he has duly proved.
In the instant case, aside from the assertion of the widow that he spent P9,000.00 for the coffin of the deceased, no
documentary evidence was presented to prove that burial or funeral expenses were actually incurred. However, from her own
testimony she claimed that the receipt for the purchase of the coffin was delivered to the Social Security System (SSS) to support her
claim for reimbursement. In fact, according to her, she was expecting to be reimbursed P12,000.00 for her funeral expenses. The
amount should more than make up for the P9,000.00 she allegedly spent for the coffin of her husband. With regard to her other
funeral expenses, the widow failed to prove them with competent evidence.
88
Nonetheless, the heirs are entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Danilo del Rosario. The
absence of documentary evidence to support such claim does not preclude its recovery. The testimony of the victims wife, Hilda del
Rosario, as to the earning capacity of her husband during his lifetime sufficiently cures this deficiency.
Danilo del Rosario was 37 years old at the time of his death. His average income as fishpond caretaker was P3,000.00 a
month. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table, the loss of earning capacity must be computed as follows: 2/3
multiplied by (80 minus age of the deceased). Since Danilo was 37 years of age at the time of his death, then his life expectancy was
28.66 years.
Net Earning Capacity(x)
(x)
Life Expectancy
2(80-37)
Gross Annual Income
- Reasonable & Necessary Living Expenses
(P36,000
- P18,000)
P18,000
3
(x)
28.66
(x)
P 514,800.00
21
On the award of moral damages, this Court is convinced that the prosecution has amply demonstrated that the heirs suffered mental
anguish to justify this award. Current jurisprudence has set moral damages at P50,000.00. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to rethink
our policy on moral damages.
Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved
mental suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family
For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering.
Verily, Hilda and her son Louie Gee would forever carry the emotional wounds of the vicious killing of a husband and a father. With or
without proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be considered proved. -BACK TO TOP-
89
16. Heirs of Justiva vs Gustilo

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding to the spouses Jesus Gustilo and
Purificacion Gustilo, attorney's fees plus moral and actual damages.
It appears that in December, 1952, petitioners filed against said spouses a complaint for the annulment of two deeds of sale
executed in their favor by Isidra Justiva, of whom plaintiffs claimed to be the legal heirs. They alleged that Isidra Justiva had signed
said deeds because of insidious words and machinations of the Gustilo spouses. Later, the complaint was amended in September,
1954, to assert as basis therefor that the same defendants "had fraudulently transferred in their names said two parcels of land
belonging to Isidra Justiva without her knowledge and consent, taking advantage of her credulity, ignorance and illiteracy, and abusing
the absolute confidence and trust she reposed on them." Again in June, 1955, petitioners amended their complaint to add another
ground of action, namely, that the signatures of Isidra Justiva were forgeries.
Denying the charges, the defendant spouses prayed in their counterclaim for moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00,
attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint. Sentenced petitioners to pay respondents P2,000.00 for moral damages, P1,000.00 for actual damages
and P2,000.00 for attorney's fees.
CA: affirmed the court's decision in toto.
ISSUE: 1. WON the imposition of attorneys fees is proper.
2. WON the imposition of actual damages is proper.
HELD:
1.
Briefly stated, their arguments rests on the alleged absence of any finding in the decisions of the lower court and of the Court
of Appeals, that their complaint was malicious or that they had acted in gross and evident bad faith in filing the same.
Generally, the attorney's fees are not a proper element of damages, for it is not sound policy to set a premium on the right to
litigate.1 Thus, no right to such fees can accrue merely because of an adverse decision.2 This is precisely the rationale for
taxing costs, in certain cases, against the losing party. The payment therefor, from the viewpoint of sanction, is deemed
sufficient. Nonetheless, various exceptions are provided for by law.3 Some of these are: "In case of a clearly unfounded civil
action or preceeding" or where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees be recovered.4
Petitioners' actuations in this case were expressly found to be insincere and baseless, by both the Court of First Instance and
the Court of Appeals. There was, therefore, no error in the award of attorney's fees.5
For the same reason, this Court must sustain the imposition of moral damages.6 Patent indeed is the insincerity of the
petitioners' various amended complaints.
And the allegation of forgery of the documents is all but a defamation, which in the light of Art. 2219(7) of the Civil Code,
could by analogy be ground for payment of moral damages, considering the wounded feelings and besmirched reputation of
the defendants.
2.
While the prayer by the respondents in their "Answer" mentions only exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,
therein also is a plea for "such further relief ... as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable." This prayer may include
"actual damages", if and when they are proved. It is to be observed that in the course of the trial, defendants introduced
evidence of actual damages; yet petitioners failed to object to such presentation. Consequently, the unalleged but proved
matter of actual damages may be considered by the court. The trial judge mentioned such damages. And the Court of
Appeals, without going into specifics, approved the award, and declared explicitly that the evidence sustained it. In this Court
appellees quoted without contradiction portions of the oral evidence in support of the judge's findings. So, the matter being
factual, we must, in the circumstances, affirm the appellate court's assessment of actual damages. -BACK TO TOP-
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17. People vs dela Cruz

FACTS:
-2 criminal cases were filed charging Nelson Dela Cruz of raping his 2 minor daughters, Jardeliza and Redelia, ages 15 and 14
respectively.
-The evidence on record adequately proves carnal knowledge by force or intimidation. During the rape, it was established that the
appellant poked a knife at Jardeliza, repeatedly boxed her side and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. Redelia was similarly
threatened. Although the appellant was unarmed when he last molested Redelia, the coitus was nonetheless by force as the appellant
held Redelia tightly and punched her, making her weak and totally incapable of offering resistance
-At the outset, we note that the prosecutor overlooked the revelations of the 2 complainants in their sworn statements that they had
been raped by the accused on numerous occasions yet the two 2 Information(s) against the accused charged him with only 1 count of
rape in each case.
-Delia Dela Cruz, the 33-year old mother of the complainants, completed only Grade 6. On the witness stand, she confirmed that the
accused had been abusing their daughters since 1993. Some of the rapes were committed in her presence. She was hurt by the
accused whenever she tried to prevent him from molesting their daughters. She had tried to use a bladed weapon on the accused to
defend the honor of her daughters but her efforts were fruitless. When she asked the accused why he was ravishing his own flesh and
blood, the accused would reply that he was re-channeling his love for her to his daughters
-In his defense, the accused claimed that Delia and her daughters filed the rape charges as they harbored ill feelings against him. Prior
to his arrest on April 14, 1996, he and Delia had strained relations as he failed to attend to her when she suffered a miscarriage
because he was then working in the field. On the other hand, Jardeliza was angry with him for not allowing her to marry her boyfriend
Ramil Mendoza.
- It is not difficult to understand why Delia failed to report the rape of her daughters to the police authorities until after 3 years. Delia
completed only primary education. They were originally from the Visayas. They had no relatives in Laguna where they were residing.
She had 7 children with the appellant who repeatedly threatened to kill them all if they reveal to anyone his misdeeds. She gathered
the courage to break her silence only when her sister-in-law in Manila assured her of help. Her testimony against the appellant which
exposed her daughters to public ridicule cannot be a sham.
-Nelson Dela Cruz was sentenced to death for raping his 2 minor daughters, ages 14 and 15. He was ordered to pay Jardeliza and
Redelia, P50,000 each as moral damages.
ISSUE: WON the award of moral damages of P50,000 each is proper without need for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof yes
HELD: We come now to the civil liability of the appellant. We affirm the trial court's award of moral damages to each of the victims in
the amount of P50,000.00. In rape cases, moral damages may be awarded to the victim in such amount as the court deems just,
without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. The conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil cases has been
dispensed with in rape cases where the civil aspect is included in the prosecution as the mental, physical and psychological trauma
suffered by the victim is too obvious to require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim.
However, we note that moral damages are all that the trial court awarded to the victims. It failed to award civil indemnity ex
delicto which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape and independent of the award for moral damages. Pursuant to current
jurisprudence, a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 should be imposed for rapes qualified by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty is authorized under Republic Act No. 7659.
__________
Additional Notes
The burden to prove the minority age of the victim is on the prosecution. As minority age is a qualifying circumstance, it must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Using this unbending yardstick, the death penalty was not imposed by this Court in cases where
there was no evidence at all of the minority age of the victim or where the evidence was weak, unreliable and insufficient.
In the case at bar, however, the prosecution proved the minority age of the victims beyond reasonable doubt. Delia, the
victims' mother, categorically testified in the hearing of October 9, 1996 that her daughters were both fourteen (14) years of age at
the time of the rape incidents complained of. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
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BATCH 05
1.
Capco vs Macasaet
FACTS:
Fructuoso Capco (petitioner) was a stockholder of record, director and executive vice-president of Monte Oro Mineral
Resources, Inc. He owned 56, 588, 358 shares of the capital stock of Monte Oro or total par value of P565, 833. 58 as
evidenced by two Stock Certificates (Nos. 002 and 026).
On 18 February 1976, petitioner indorsed and delivered the two Stock Certificates to Manuel Macasaet (respondent), Board
chairman and President of Monte Oro.
He personally received the said certificates and indicated in the Acknowledgment Receipt that he only received in trust and for
safe keeping the said Stock Certificates and to be delivered and/or surrendered to the petitioner or his heirs or duly authorized
representative on demand.
On 26 April 1976, petitioner demanded the return of his Stock Certificates from Macasaet. However, the latter failed to
produce the same because he had given them to Jacobo Feliciano (respondent), another officer of Monte Oro, allegedly in
connection with a contemplated joint venture with the group of one Leonilo Esguerra.
Macasaet replaced the petitioners Stock Certificate No. 026 with his own (No. 025) which was acknowledged by the former.
While Stock Certificate No. 002 was returned to the petitioner. It was received and signed by him with a notation stating ALL
CLEARED at the left hand margin.
PETITIONER filed a complaint for damages alleging that at the time he demanded his Stock Certificates, he had a ready
buyer and because of the failure of Macasaet to return the said certificates, he lost profit therefrom. Also, moral and
exemplary damages could be awarded because of Macasaets failure and refusal to pay the lost he incurred and due to his
intentional, deliberate and malicious acts.
MACASAET alleged that he entrusted the Stock Certificates Nos. 002 and 026 of petitioner to Feliciano to be shown to a
certain group for the purpose of joint venture. He made several demands for the return but Feliciano refused and failed to do
so. That he replaced petitioners Stock Certificate No. 26 with his own which covered 149, 925 shares more than those of
petitioners. That he also returned Stock Certificate No. 002 after he recovered the same from Feliciano. And that the words
ALL CLEARED written by petitioner himself undoubtedly meant to discharge Macasaet from any responsibility or liability
regarding the petitioners stock certificates.
LOWER COURT: In favor of petitioner. Dismissed Macasaets cross-claim against Feliciano. Dismissed Macasaets counterclaim against petitioner.
CA: Reversed and set aside for lack of merit and supporting proofs. Petitioners MR Denied.
ISSUES:
A.
B.
Whether or not CA committed gross error in clearing Macasaet of liability for all damages suffered and incurred by
petitioner.
Whether or not CA committed grave error by concluding lack of evidence to support claim for damages.
RULING:
A.
NO.
The petitioner argued that CA faulted when it interpreted literally the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by Macasaet which
allegedly serves as a clear proof that Stock Certificate Nos. 002 and 026 were held by the latter in trust and for safekeeping
only.
It is true that when the petitioner delivered Stock Certificates to Macasaet, the latter acknowledged receiving them "in trust
and for safekeeping only." This acknowledgment, however, cannot outweigh the legal effects of the stock
certificates having been "already indorsed". There is no dispute that Macasaet received the petitioner's certificates in
that condition as evidenced by the same Acknowledgment Receipt.
Certificates of stocks are considered as "quasi-negotiable" instruments. When the owner or shareholder of these
certificates signs the printed form of sale or assignment at the back of every stock certificate without filling in the blanks
provided for the name of the transferee as well as for the name of the attorney-in-fact, the said owner or shareholder, in
effect, confers on another all the indicia of ownership of the said stock certificates.
Petitioner signed the printed form at the back of both Stock Certificates without filling in the blanks at the time the said stock
certificates were delivered to Macasaet. Hence, the petitioner's acts of indorsement and delivery conferred on
Macasaet the right to hold them as though they were his own. On account of this apparent transfer of ownership, it
was not irregular on the part of Macasaet to deliver the stock certificates in question to Feliciano for consideration in
connection with a contemplated tie-up between two business groups.
It is worth noting that in view of the petitioner's concurrent positions as director, Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of Monte Oro at the time of the incident under consideration, he could not have been unaware of the consequences
of the delivery coupled with the indorsement of his two stock certificates to Macasaet, notwithstanding the tenor of the
Acknowledgment Receipt.
92
It is hard to believe that the petitioner's delivery of the subject stock certificates to Macasaet was strictly for safe-keeping
purposes only because if that were his real and only intention, there is neither logic nor reason for the indorsement of the said
certificates.
B. NO.
CA did not err in holding that the petitioner failed to support his claim that he suffered the claimed damages as a result of
Macasaet's failure to return his Stock Certificates upon demand.
The alleged "unrealized profits" representing actual and compensatory damages must be supported by
substantial and convincing proof. The records are bereft of such kind of proof. Mere allegation that there was a "ready
and willing buyer' of all the petitioners shares covered by Stock Certificate Nos. 002 and 026 for P0.014 per share at the time
the demand for the return of the said certificates was made cannot suffice to allow the petitioners claim for unrealized profits
to prosper. Such claim is clearly speculative in nature.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation, and the same must be proved; otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages
will be given. Actual and compensatory damages require evidentiary proof. They cannot be presumed.
The good faith of Macasaet is shown by the fact that after trying to recover the missing certificates, he immediately
substituted Stock Certificate No. 026 with his own Stock Certificate No. 025 which covered more shares than the petitioner's
replaced certificate. The petitioner's other Stock Certificate No. 002 was subsequently returned and received by the petitioner
with the notation "All Cleared" on the acknowledgment receipt duly signed and personally written by him.
That said notation meant to discharge respondent Macasaet' together with Feliciano from any liability with
respect to the stock certificates in question as there can be no other plausible interpretation therefor. He would not
have written "all cleared" if he was unhappy at that time about the substitution of the higher value certificate for his other
certificate.
In the absence of malice and bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the grant of moral and exemplary
damages has no basis if not predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code
CA properly set aside the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages given by the trial court in favor of the petitioner.
DISMISSED. -BACK TO TOP-
93
2.
Rafael Reyes Trucking vs People
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION- owner of the truck driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol
ROSARIO P. DY- wife of Francisco Dy, Jr, one of the two persons who died in the accident
FACTS:
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
from the latters San Fernando, Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white
truck trailer driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol.
Aside from the Corporations memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles before each trip, the SMCs
Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989. In addition to a
professional drivers license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants before they are hired.
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga
loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck
helper (pahinante).
At around 4:00 oclock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran,
Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the trucks right lane going south and about
six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane
parallel to this damaged portion is smooth.
As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from
the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the
incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck
swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left
shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped.
The Nissan was severely damaged, and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly from
external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures.
For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00. At the time of his death he was 45 years old. He was the
President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic Wood Products and Development Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing
establishment, from which he was receiving an income of P10,000.00 a month.
In the Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy appear to be stockholders of 10,000
shares each with par value of P100.00 per share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60,000 shares valued at
P6,000,000.00.
Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns, the DWPC had a taxable net income of P78,499.30. Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University
graduate in Business Administration, past president of the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the Philippine Jaycees in
1971 and 1976, respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees International in 1979. He was also the recipient of numerous awards
as a civic leader. His children were all studying in prestigious schools and spent about P180,000.00 for their education in 1988 alone.
An information was filed charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor
children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused
arising from the offense charged.
Thereafter, offended parties actually filed with the RTC a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer
of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict.
The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident).
The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against
petitioner. They withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute
94
the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict against
petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver.
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same.
TC:
1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same; and to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the
amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral
expenses;
"2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the amount of P84,000.00;
and
"3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
Petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint decision.
On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused.
TC rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion, ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation
subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but
deducting therefrom the damages of P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant in the next preceding paragraph; and x x x"
Petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental decision.
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country.
The CA dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.
The CA rendered an amended decision affirming that of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended decision.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES:
1.....May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended
parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the
employer of the truck driver? NO.
2.....May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer
of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
to property? NO.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: The answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged
guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action
based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil
liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as
complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions
95
predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck driver became
clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict.
Consequently, the CA and the TC erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable
for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the
employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against
the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action. However, the
withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil
action against petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure is clear that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil
actions arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil actions
deemed waived upon such reservation or filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111,
Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides:
"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others."
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act
or omission of the offender. The restrictive phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil
actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for its basis the same act or omission of the offender.
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable
thereon. Thus, the TC grievously erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision.
Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and could not be granted affirmative relief.
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding" or exempted "a particular case from the operation of the
rules."
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing the civil action.
Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did
appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as
may be warranted by the evidence.
SECOND ISSUE: The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer.
As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before
the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property.
The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as
employer of the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became
final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action
was invalid because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil liability arising
from the crime has been waived in said criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the amended
information, the issue is de minimis.
96
At any rate, the TC erred in awarding damages in the criminal case because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate
civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there
would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused.
As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. The injured party must choose which of the
available causes of action for damages he will bring.
Additional Notes:
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between:
(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for
the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability."
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the
accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law,
this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict
to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment
against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability
of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.
The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a
felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done
in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. BACK TO TOP-
97
3. RCPI vs Lantin
Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc. (RCPI) vs. Hon. Jaime Lantin, Sheriff of CFI QC, and Rufus Rodriguez
Globe McKay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE) vs. CA, Hon. Jaime Lantin, Sheriff of CFI QC, and Rufus Rodriguez
Facts:
On 08 Sept. 1978, Rufus Rodriguez, as President of the World Association of Law Students (WALS), sent 2 cablegrams overseas
through RCPI. These were relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their foreign destinations.
1st cablegram was addressed to Mohamed Elsir Tahar in Khartoum, Sudan Socialist Union advising him of Rodriguezs pending
arrival in Khartoum on 18 Sept. 1978.
2nd cablegram was addressed to Diane Merger (WALS secretary) in Athens, Georgia, USA advising her of the scheduled WALS
conference in Khartoum.
1st cablegram was not delivered; 2nd was delivered but Merger was no longer staying there and this fact was not relayed back to
GLOBE and was therefore not reported to Rodriguez.
On 18 Sept. 1978, Rodriguez arrived in Khartoum at 9:30 in the evening with no one around to meet him. Due to the lateness of
the hour, he was forced to sleep at the airport. He also had difficulty speaking the local language in looking for a cab to a hotel
and in finding the place of Tahar. There was no PH consulate in the said place.
While officers of WALS arrived the next day, Merger did not. All preparations for the international conference had to be cancelled.
Complaint with CFI of Rizal: Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages against RCPI and
GLOBE.
CFI of Rizal: Ruled in favor of Rodriguez, awarding: 100,000 (moral); 50,000 (exemplary); and actual damages consisting
of 10,000 (preparation for the trip); 20,000 (plane fare); 5,000 (Stay in transit in Pakistan); 4,000 (hotel in Khartoum); 4,000
(meals in Khartoum); 70 (telegraphic toll); 70 (cost of cablegram to Merger); 20,000 (attorneys fees and litigation expenses).
Total P 213,148.00.
On 26 May 1980, Rodriguez filed a Motion for Execution Before Expiration of Time to Appeal, relying on Rule 39, Sec 2
Rules of Court (Execution pending appeal for good reasons). He contends that the appeal is clearly dilatory and that the lapse of
time would make the ultimate judgment illusory and ineffective. Petitioners opposed the motion but it was granted by the CFI.
CA: on Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, the CA
dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the award for damages (actual, moral, and exemplary) may be ordered executed pending appeal. yes for actual; no
for moral and exemplary
Ruling:
Award for compensatory damages for breach of contract may be ordered executed pending appeal but not the award for moral and
exemplary damages.
Considering the nature of the wrongful acts found by the trial court and the amount of damages adjudicated as recoverable, both of
which are stated in detail in the decisions and various orders of the trial court and the appellate court, we are constrained to sustain
the respondent courts in so far as the award for actual and compensatory damages are concerned but to postpone the execution of the
awards for moral and exemplary damages until such time as the merits of the case now on regular appeal before the CA are finally
determined.
The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual
damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are
fixed and certain liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact amount remain uncertain and indefinite
pending resolution by the CA.
The existence of factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners act will have to be determined in
the light of assignments of error on appeal
It is possible that the petitioners, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or in some
cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced. -BACK TO TOP-
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4.
BA Finance Corp vs CA
FACTS: Private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the BA Finance Corp. evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his
own behalf and as representative of A & L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged SPA executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo,
who manages and is the registered owner of said entity, purportedly authorizing him to procure the loan and sign the PN. Augusto
failed to pay the obligation when it became due and demandable.
Petitioner filed its amended complaint against Sps. Yulo on the basis of the PN, also praying for the issuance of a writ of attachment,
alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt for inducing petitioner to enter into a contract with them by
executing a Deed of Assignment in favor of the petitioner, assigning all their rights, titles and interests over a construction contract
when in truth, the Yulos did not have any intention of remitting the proceeds of the said contract to petitioner and in fact,
misappropriated the same for their own use and benefit.
The trial court issued the writ of attachment, enabling petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Lily Yulo filed her answer
with counterclaim, alleging that although they are husband and wife, Augusto had abandoned his family before the filing of the
complaint, that they were already separated when the PN was executed, that her signature in the SPA was forged, and that she never
received anything from the proceeds of the loan.
The trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint against Lily Yulo and A & L Industries, and upon finding of bad faith in securing the
attachment, ordered petitioner to pay her 660K as actual damages; 500K as unrealized profits; 300K as exemplary damages; 30K
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. Upon petitioners appeal, CA affirmed the trial court's decision except for the exemplary damages,
which it reduced to 150K and attorney's fees reduced to 20K.
ISSUE: Whether the attachment of the properties of A & L Industries was wrongful so as to entitle the petitioner to actual damages
only or whether the said attachment was made in bad faith and with malice to warrant the award of other kinds of damages in favor of
the defendant.
HELD: As regards the issue of forgery, the trial court did not err in admitting as standards the documents given by Lily Yulo as
samples of her signature, as basis of which a handwriting expert, whose credibility the petitioner failed to impeach, categorically
concluded that the signatures of Lily in the SPA were all forgeries (12 glaring and material differences) which petitioner also failed to
rebut.
As to petitioner's contention that even if the attached properties were Lilys exclusive property, the same can be made answerable
because they form part of the conjugal partnership of the Sps. Yulo, these are without merit. While the single proprietorship was
established during their marriage and therefore presumed conjugal, and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the
spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must
have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In the present case, the obligation which petitioner is seeking to enforce
against the conjugal property managed by Lily was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he
incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. It follows that the writ of attachment
cannot issue against the said properties, and to make A & L Industries liable for the said loan would be unjust.
As regards the main issue, Sec. 4 of Rule 59 does not prescribed the remedies available to the attachment defendant in case of a
wrongful attachment, but merely provides an action for recovery upon the bond, based on the undertaking therein made and not upon
the liability arising from a tortuous act, like the malicious suing out of an attachment. Where malice is not essential, the attachment
defendant is entitled to recover only the actual damages sustained by him by reason of the attachment. Where the attachment is
maliciously sued out, the damages recoverable may include a compensation for every injury to his credit, business or feed.
An attachment may be said to be wrongful when, for instance, the plaintiff has no cause of action, or that there is no true ground
therefore, or that the plaintiff has a sufficient security other than the property attached, which is tantamount to saying that the plaintiff
is not entitled to attachment because the requirements of entitling him to the writ are wanting. In the instant case, although the
petitioner failed to prove the ground relied upon for the issuance of the writ of attachment, this failure cannot be equated with bad
faith or malicious intent. The steps which were taken by the petitioner to ensure the security of its claim were premised on the firm
belief that the properties involved could be made answerable for the unpaid obligation due it. The petitioner is liable only for actual
damages and not for exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Lily Yulo manifested that she no longer desires the return of the attached properties since said attachment caused her to close down
the business and has grave doubts as to the running condition of the attached machineries and equipment. The Court, therefore, deem
it just and equitable to allow her to recover actual damages based on the value of the attached properties as proven in the trial court,
99
in the amount of 660K. The award of 500K representing unrealized profits was not sustained since this amount was not proved or
justified before the trial court. Its basis is too speculative and conjectural to show actual damages for a future period. Lily Yulo failed to
present reports on the average actual profits earned by her business and other evidence of profitability, which are necessary to prove
her claim for the said amount.
_______
CAs finding of bad faith: These incidents and actions taken by BA Finance are sufficient to prove and establish the element of bad
faith and malice on its part, which may warrant the award of damages in favor of defendant. First, the petitioner did not present the
Deed of Assignment or the construction agreement or any evidence to support its claim of fraud and to justify the issuance of a
preliminary attachment. Second, that notwithstanding the instant case, petitioner filed a foreclosure proceeding to enforce the chattel
mortgage it executed with Augusto against the properties of A & L Industries, exclusively owned by Lily and therefore, such is without
any factual or legal basis. The chattel mortgage and the PN are based on one and the same obligation, but petitioner tried to enforce
its claim under a single obligation into two different modes. Third, despite being aware of Lilys Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
petitioner still filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment. To add insult to injury, it even filed a Motion for Examination of
the Attachment Debtor, although aware that Lily had already denied participation in the execution of the PN and SPA. Fourth,
petitioners officer, Abraham Co, did not even bother to demand production of at least the duplicate original of the SPA and merely
contended himself with a mere xerox copy thereof and neither did he require a more specific authority from A & L Industries to
contract the loan, since from its very content and recitals, no authority has been delegated or granted to August to contract a loan. BACK TO TOP-
100
5.
Boyshaw vs Sarreal
On May 1, 1961, Boysaw and his then Manager, Ketchum, signed with Interphil Promotions, Inc. represented by Sarreal, Sr., a
contract to engage Elorde in a boxing contest for the junior lightweight championship of the world. It was stipulated that the bout
would be held at the Rizal Memorial Stadium in Manila on Sept. 30, 1961 or not later than thirty [30] days thereafter should a
postponement be mutually agreed upon, and that Boysaw would not, prior to the date of the boxing contest, engage in any other such
contest without the written consent of Interphil Promotions, Inc. On June 19, 1961, Boysaw fought and defeated Avila in a ten-round
bout held in Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.. Presumably in preparation for his engagement with Interphil, Boysaw arrived in the Philippines
on July 31, 1961.
On Sept. 1, 1961, Araneta assigned to Yulo, Jr. the managerial rights over Boysaw that he earlier acquired from Ketchum and
Ruskay. The next day, Sept. 2, 1961, Boysaw wrote Sarreal, Sr. informing him of his arrival and presence in the Philippines. On Sept. 5,
1961, Yulo, Jr. wrote to Sarreal informing him of his acquisition of the rights over Boysaw and indicating his and Boysaw's readiness to
comply with the boxing contract of May 1, 1961. On the same date, on behalf of Interphil Sarreal wrote a letter to the Games and
Amusement Board expressing concern over reports that there had been a switch of managers in the case of Boysaw, of which he had
not been formally notified, and requesting that Boysaw be called to an inquiry to clarify the situation. Yulo, Jr. refused to accept the
change in the fight date, maintaining his refusal even after Sarreal on Sept. 26, 1961, offered to advance the fight date to Oct. 28,
1961 which was within the 30-day period of allowable postponements provided in the principal boxing contract of May 1, 1961.
While an Elorde-Boysaw fight was eventually staged, the fight contemplated in the May 1, 1961 boxing contract never
materialized. As a result of the foregoing occurrences, on October 12, 1961, Boysaw and Yulo, Jr. sued Interphil, Sarreal, Sr. and
Manuel Nieto, Jr. in the CFI of Rizal for damages allegedly occasioned by the refusal of Interphil and Sarreal, aided and abetted by
Nieto, Jr., then GAB Chairman, to honor their commitments under the boxing contract of May 1,1961. Plaintiff Boysaw left the country
without informing the court and, as alleged, his counsel. He was still abroad when, on May 13, 1963, he was scheduled to take the
witness stand. Thus, the lower court reset the trial for June 20, 1963. Since Boysaw was still abroad on the later date, another
postponement was granted by the lower court for July 23, 1963 upon assurance of Boysaw's counsel that should Boysaw fail to appear
on said date, plaintiff's case would be deemed submitted on the evidence thus far presented. After the lower court rendered its
judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial. The motion was denied, hence, this appeal taken
directly to this Court by reason of the amount involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the fight contract of May 1, 1961; and if there was, who was guilty of such
violation. Whether or not the lower court, on the basis of the evidence adduced, erred in awarding the appellees damages of the
character and amount stated in the decision.
HELD: On the issue pertaining to the violation of the May 1, 1961 fight contract, the evidence established that the contract
was violated by appellant Boysaw himself when, without the approval or consent of Interphil, he fought Avila on June 19, 1961 in Las
Vegas. Yulo admitted this fact during the trial. While the contract imposed no penalty for such violation, this does not grant any of the
parties the unbridled liberty to breach it with impunity. Our law on contracts recognizes the principle that actionable injury inheres in
every contractual breach. There is no doubt that the contract in question gave rise to reciprocal obligations.Reciprocal obligations are
those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one
is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously, so that the performance of one is conditioned
upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. The power to rescind is given to the injured party. Where the plaintiff is the party who
did not perform the undertaking which he was bound by the terms of the agreement to perform 4 he is not entitled to insist upon the
performance of the contract by the defendant, or recover damages by reason of his own breach
On the issue pertaining to the award of excessive damages, it must be noted that because the appellants wilfully refused to participate
in the final hearing and refused to present documentary evidence after they no longer had witnesses to present, they, by their own
acts prevented themselves from objecting to or presenting proof contrary to those adduced for the appellees. On the actual damages,
the appellants contend that a conclusion based upon the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness cannot be sufficient. We hold that
in civil cases, there is no rule requiring more than one witness or declaring that the testimony of a single witness will not suffice to
establish facts, especially where such testimony has not been contradicted. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the award for unrealized
profits.
On the award of actual damages to Interphil and Sarreal, the records bear sufficient evidence presented on actual damages which
were neither objected to nor rebutted by appellants, again because they adamantly refused to participate in the court proceedings. The
award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00 in favor of defendant-appellee Manuel Nieto, Jr. and another P5,000.00 in favor of
defendants-appellees Interphil Promotions, Inc. and Sarreal, Sr., jointly, cannot also be regarded as excessive considering the extent
101
and nature of defense counsels' services which involved legal work for sixteen months. However, in the matter of moral damages, we
are inclined to uphold the appellant's contention that the award is not sanctioned by law and well- settled authorities. Art. 2219 of the
Civil Code provides: Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases:1) A criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries; 2) Quasi-delict causing physical injuries; 3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; 4) Adultery or
concubinage; 5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; 6) Illegal search; 7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; 8) Malicious
prosecution; 9) Acts mentioned in Art. 309. 10) Acts and actions referred to in Arts., 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The award of moral damages in the instant case is not based on any of the cases enumerated in Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. The action
herein brought by plaintiffs-appellants is based on a perceived breach committed by the defendants-appellees of the contract of May 1,
1961, and cannot, as such, be arbitrarily considered as a case of malicious prosecution. -BACK TO TOP-
102
6.
Bachrach Motor vs Esteva
Between Sept. 1, 1927 and Jan. 1, 1930, Esteva bought from Teal Motor Co., Inc., fourteen autotrucks, eleven trailers and
one Buick automobile for the sum of P105,730. On Apr. 8, 1930, a liquidation was made which showed that Esteva was owing P54,500,
the balance of the purchase price of said motor vehicles. Esteva then executed in favor of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., twenty-two
promissory notes, the first of which for the amount of P1,000, matured on May 10, 1930 and the last for the amount of P7,500 became
due on Feb. 10, 1932. To secure said promissory notes, Esteva, on the same date, mortgaged all the motor vehicles in favor of Teal
Motor Co., Inc. Once in possession of the promissory notes, Teal Motor Co., Inc., endorsed the same to the Bachrach Motors,
reserving, however, the mortgage. Thereafter Esteva paid the eight promissory notes when they fell due, namely, those corresponding
to May up to Dec., 1930, amounting to P8,000, but he failed to pay each of the promissory notes for P6,000 corresponding to January,
February and March, 1931. Esteva having defaulted in the payment of the last three promissory notes, Teal Motor Co., Inc., foreclosed
the mortgage of the motor vehicles on March 31, 1931. After said motor vehicles had been attached, the sheriff sold the same at the
public auction to Teal Motor Co., Inc., for P20,000. After the mortgage executed in favor of Teal Motor co., Inc., was thus foreclosed,
the plaintiff, in turn, brought an action against Esteva and Teal Motor Co., Inc., to recover from both the amount of the promissory
notes executed by Esteva. The amount of the unpaid promissory notes was P46,500, plus the interest thereon of 12 per cent per
annum, and 25 per cent of the amount owing by way of attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether Esteva is entitled to damages on account of erroneous foreclosure
HELD: In the appealed decision the trial court found that only Teal Motor Co., Inc., was liable for damages suffered by Jose
Esteva, absolving therein the plaintiff. This part of the decision is the subject of the third assignment of error. We believe that the
contention of the appellant Esteva is well-founded. In the decision of this court it is said:
. . . The rights of Esteva, who has been injured by an illegal foreclosure of the mortgage, consist in securing damages from the entities
who caused him these damages. In this connection it may be said that the evidence is sufficient to establish the interlocking
relationship between the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. The action of Esteva would, therefore, lie against both
corporations. This conclusion is the more evident when we realize that to hold otherwise might simply result in permitting Esteva to
prove damages against the Teal Motor Co., Inc., a corporation with possibly no visible assets. The corresponding obligations of the
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and Esteva will necessarily have to be determined at a new trial, at which the
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., After analyzing the evidence, the trial court concluded that Esteva realized a profit of P20,453.08 from the
time he acquired the motor vehicles until they were attached, or an average monthly profit of P524.43. But in fixing the number of
years to which Esteva would be entitled by way of profits, the trial court granted him only for one year, upon the ground that damages
for a longer period would be speculative. In his other assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court should have
awarded him more damages under this claim. We rule that the conclusion reached by the trial court should be sustained because,
taking into account the nature of the business in which the appellant Esteva was engaged, it would really be problematical and
speculative to hold that he could have realized more profit for this supposes a longer operation of the business. And even if the
average life of the motor vehicles had been calculated at five years, it would not be incorrect to affirm that the same could be reduced
to one year, or two, depending upon how the appellant would fare in the operation of the business. The appellant claims in his
assignment of error that the indemnification for profit which he was unable to realize should have been fixed by the trial court at more
than P6,293.16. This amount represents the profit for one year based upon the average monthly profit allowed the appellant by the
trial court. In view of our ruling on the eighth assignment of error, we believe that this assignment of error should likewise be
overruled. The appellant Esteva also claims indemnification for the good-will of his business. The value of the goodwill of his business
has been calculated at P63,085.49. The trial court did not award him anything under this claim. In his tenth assignment of error the
appellant contends that the lower court erred in not awarding him said indemnification. A proper resolution of this assignment of error
requires that we clarify the meaning of "good-will" in order to determine if the business of the appellant really had a good-will and,
consequently, if he is entitled to be indemnified therefor can establish the debt due from Esteva and the latter can set off against the
debt whatever damages he can prove at the trial. This conclusion arrived at by the court clearly means that for the damages
occasioned to Esteva, the plaintiff and Teal Motor Co., Inc., should be held jointly and severally liable, and that Esteva may set off the
amount of said damages against the judgment which the plaintiff may obtain against him for the amount of the unpaid promissory
notes. The trial court, therefore, erred in not ordering both the plaintiff and Teal Motor Co., Inc., to pay said damages, and in limiting
the liability to the co-defendant Teal Motor Co., Inc. -BACK TO TOP-
103
7.
RCPI vs CA
RCPI the freight company claimed that due to "utter, patent, and wanton carelessness, gross negligence and unpardonable
fault" of the personnel of RCPI, the latter transmitted erroneously a telegram which should have read " No truck available "
but instead read " Truck available ". As a consequence, the freight company suffered damages, and prayed for an award of
P100,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages in the discretion of the
Court, and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees
The trial Court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, awarded damages as follows:
P10,000.00 as compensatory, plus P500.00 as actual, and P5,000.00 as corrective damages plus P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses with the costs of this suit.
3. RCPI elevated the case on the following grounds:

First: The respondent court erred in finding that the suit was predicated on quasi-delicti.
Second: The respondent court erred in virtually ruling that the petitioner's acts were the proximate cause of the
alleged damage.
Third: The respondent court erred in awarding compensatory in addition to actual damages.
Fourth: The respondent court erred in condemning the petitioner to pay corrective damages and attorney's fees plus
costs and litigation expenses.
Fifth: The respondent court erred in not finding that private respondent had committed negligence which was the
proximate cause of the alleged damage or at least, amounted to contributory negligence warranting reduction of the
award.
Held:
Respondent Court correctly concluded that the error in the transmission of the telegram was due to the gross negligence of
RCPI employees and not to atmospheric disturbances as it claimed, and that there was no contributory negligence on the part
of the freight company.
In respect of compensatory and actual damages, it is not-entirely erroneous to grant both items of damages. True,
compensatory and actual damages are dealt with in the Civil Code under the same Chapter 2 thereof and that the two terms
are used therein as equivalent to one another. However, as provided for in Article 2200, indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, or actual damages ("damnum emergens"), but also that of the profits
which the obligee failed to obtain, or compensatory damages ("lucrum cessans"). In other words, t here are two components
to actual or compensatory damages.
The value of the actual loss suffered by Yabut has been proven to be P132.12 (not P500.00 ,as held by respondent Court).
This is compensable. Compensatory damages were also awarded for injury to Yabut's "business reputation or business
standing", "loss of goodwill and loss of customers or shippers who shifted their patronage to competitors". The grant thereof
is proper under the provisions of .Article 2205 of the Civil Code, which provides that damages may be recovered "for injury to
the plaintiff's Business standing or commercial credit." And even if not recoverable compensatory damages, they may still be
awarded in the concept of temperale or moderate damages.
Exemplary damages were likewise properly imposed. In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if
the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, opressive or malevolent manner. There was gross negligence on the aprt
of the RCPI personnel in transmitting the wrong telegram, for which RCPI must be held liable. Gross carelessness or
negligence constitutes wanton misconduct.
But while the assessment of damages, except liquidated ones, is generally left to the discretion of the Court according to the
circumstances of each case, we find that the damages and attorney's fees awarded are excessive and should be reduced. BACK TO TOP-
104
8.
Facts:
Hicks vs Manila Hotel
on the 9th of November 1912, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract by which the defendant ceded to the plaintiff
the exclusive right to serve its patrons with five-passenger automobiles for a period of one year from the date thereof, with certain
rights with respect to a renewal of the contract for a second year. Plaintiff successfully discharged them during the first year.
When about half of the first year had expired,the defendant company, disregarding, the terms of its agreement with him, invited
proposals from various garages for its five-passenger automobile privilege for the ensuing year, the time covered by the second
year of plaintiff's contract. Under these proposals various garages competed for the privilege, including that of George E. Brown,
and, after certain negotiations with the latter, his offer was accepted by the defendant company and a written contract made with
him for the exclusive right to the privilege during the year. This contract with Brown was executed some months prior to the
termination of the first year of plaintiff's contract.
Upon the termination of the first year of the contract the defendant company having, already entered into a contract with Brown
relative to the matter included in plaintiff's contract for the period representing the second year thereof, refused, to permit him to
continue for the second year, deprived him of the privilege which the contract conferred, and evicted him from the hotel.
This action was brought to recover damages for breach of contract.
The contract between the parties hereto contains a clause "This agreement to remain in effect for a period of one year from date,
with preference over others of renewing for a further period of one year."
Issue: whether that portion of the agreement gave the plaintiff an enforceable right to renew the contract for a second year.
whether the plaintiff, even though he had that right, waive that right and thereby exempt the defendant from the liability, if any,
which it incurred by its eviction of plaintiff and the refusal to permit him to enjoy the privilege for the second year.
Held:
1. the clause "with preference over others of renewing for a further period of one year" was intended to confer a right either on the
plaintiff or upon the defendant.The grammatical structure of the stipulation shows both that the thing to be renewed was agreement in
force the first year and that the party who possessed the right to renew was the plaintiff.
As to the second question:
the plaintiff sought to make arrangements with the hotel of a nature different from those contained in the contract under
consideration and also that he had negotiations with Brown looking to an agreement with him whereby he might assist him in
handling the five-passenger automobile business under the privilege which it appeared the hotel would concede to him. No
contract, however, was made with either and the plaintiff at no time found himself under any obligation to the defendant or
Brown by reason of the acts which appellee makes the basis of its argument.
the defendant had, prior to the negotiations and offers of plaintiff, repudiated its contract with him so far as it related to the
renewal for the second year and was preparing itself to make a contract with any person with whom it might secure the most
advantageous terms. When a person who is under an obligation to another to perform certain acts upon the demand of that
person, repudiates that obligation prior to the time when the demand for its fulfillment is necessary, the person to whom that
obligation runs is not required to sit down, fold his hands and calmly await the disaster which the violation of the obligation
entails. He waives nothing, when he seeks other employment or the same or similar employment with others. The waiver will
not be presumed; and, if the intention to waive or release is denied, such waiver or release must be proven by the party
alleging it by a preponderance of the evidence.
the plaintiff was under no obligation to defendant with respect to a renewal of the contract. The obligation was wholly on the
side of the defendant. In doing whatever he did to obtain other employment, he was not violating any obligation which he
owed to the defendant and, therefore, gave it no legal reason for complaint.
Issue: plaintiff's damages.
The plaintiff claims his damage to be P10,800, basing that claim upon the profits which he would have received if he had continued the
business for the second year.
The appellee makes no objection to this amount, the question of the amount of damages not having been referred to in its brief. It is
the practice of this court, in case of reversal of a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits, to examine the evidence and enter
or order entered the judgment which the inferior court should have rendered; and, where the action is for a sum of money or
damages, to find from the evidence the amount due or the damages suffered and to render or order the trial court to render judgment
for the amount.
if appellee had any objection to urge as to the amount of damages which should be awarded to the plaintiff in case judgment should
be found for him in this court, it would have presented it in its brief.
The only damages claimed relate to profits. Article 1106 and 1107 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of the loss which may have suffered, but also that of the
105
profits which the creditor many have failed to realize, reserving the provisions contained in the following articles.
The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the
time of constituting the obligation, and which may be necessary consequence of its non-fulfillment.
In case of fraud, the debtor shall be liable for all those which clearly may originate from the no-fulfillment of the obligation.
Plaintiff testified that he made P11,000 profit the first year and that he would unquestionably have made a net profit of P1,200 a
month if he had been left to enjoy the second year of the contract. There is no evidence contradicting this, and while the estimation of
speculation, it is inherent in the nature of the subject matter and not in its manner of treatment.
There is more or less inaccuracy in every action for damages for breach of contract, but in order to justify a recovery in any case, a
there are two necessary elements to be considered: One that a damage has been done; the other that such damage is the result of the
breach. The amount of the one should be computed with reasonable accuracy. The fact of the other must be determined with
reasonable certainty. A less degree of accuracy is required in the former than of certainty in the latter, but neither is required to be
absolute or beyond conjectural possibilities. Where it reasonably appears that a party has been damaged, and that such damage is the
direct result of the breach, then a recovery is justified.
The next step is to ascertain how much will reasonably compensate the injured party. This should be computed by the plainest, easiest,
and most accurate measure which will do justice in the premises, and if from the conditions in the contract, and the nature of the
breach, it reasonably appears that the extent or amount of damages may be more readily, easily, correctly, and justly ascertained by
applying the loss of profits as a measure, if it is evident that profits were lost and the amount thereof can be calculated with
reasonable accuracy, then such profits are the true measure to be applied. In such cases, however, it should appear evident that profits
were lost.
It is undisputed that the business was a very profitable one the first year and that the second year would have been more profitable
than the first. While the estimate of the amount of profits for the second year is an estimate of necessity, it is one which is based upon
facts testified to by the plaintiff, which were within his knowledge and which appear to the court to sustain his contention. While the
evidence is not as conclusive as in cases where the damages are certain and capable of accurate statement, we are satisfied with its
sufficiency, particularly in view of the fact that all that courts may require of litigants is the production of the best evidence of which the
case is susceptible.
As to whether or not the plaintiff in an action of this character may recover only that portion of the profits which had accrued up to the
time of bringing the action, or whether he may sue for all the damages resulting from the breach in a single action, even though that
action is begun long before the period during which the profits will accrue has expired, the plaintiff need bring but one action and that
he may recover the damages sustained for the whole period even though it be by anticipation.
Whatever profits plaintiff had gained up to the time of the action or might reasonably be expected to gain during the period sued for.
No evidence, however, has been introduced on that subject. The opportunity to earn wages or profits in reduction of the damages
claimed will not be presumed but must be affirmatively shown by the defendant. -BACK TO TOP-
106
9.
Lemoine vs Alkan
Facts: On the 10th day of July, 1913, the plaintiff and defendant signed a written contract whereby the defendant hired the plaintiff, an
expert automobile mechanic, to perform services as such expert mechanic in his automobile repair shop in the city of Manila for the
period of three years from the date of the contract at a salary of P350 a month. Plaintiff entered defendants service on the day on
which the contract was executed and continued therein until he was discharged by the defendant the latter part of August of the same
year, plaintiff actually leaving defendants service on the 5th day of September. On the 8th of the same month this action was begun to
recover, as damages for breach of contract, the wages to which he was entitled under the contract.
The
defendant
presents
three
defenses
to
the
action.
The first is that plaintiff was incompetent and insubordinate and that he unduly and without permission absented himself from the
repair
shop
during
the
hours
when,
under
the
contract,
he
should
have
been
at
work.
The second is founded on the claim that plaintiff, if he had used due diligence, would have been able to obtain a like position in the city
of Manila.
The defendant claims as his third defense that on the 6th of December, 1913, in a letter addressed to plaintiff, he offered to take him
back into his employ under term and conditions substantially the same as those specified in the original contract of service and at the
same rate of wages; and that plaintiff, without reason or justification, refused to accept the offer.
The court found for the defendant on his second defense but allowed plaintiff wages for three months, which the court considered a
reasonable time which ought to be conceded to him in which to obtain other employment. Both parties appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitle to damages for having been illegaly discharged by his employer?
Held:
While we agree with the findings of fact as to these alleged defenses, we do not agree with the conclusion of law which the trial court
draws
therefrom.
The defendant asserts the principle of law that, where a servant has been illegally discharged and has failed to obtain other
employment, he must accept the offer of the employer who discharged him to receive him back into his employ under terms and
conditions substantially those of his previous employment and at the same rate of wages on pain of having his damages on a suit for
breach of contract reduced to the extent of the wages which he would have received if he had accepted the offer. We understand that
the facts on which this defense rests are admitted by both parties. There remains only the discussion as to whether such facts
constitute a defense or whether they may be used in mitigation of damages to which plaintiff may prove himself entitled.
The action in this case is founded on that provision of the Civil Code which provides that "field-hands, mechanics, artisans, and other
hired laborers, for a certain time and for a certain work, shall not leave nor be dismissed, without just cause, before the fulfillment of
the contract" (art. 1586); and also that disposition of the same code which provides that "those who, in fulfilling their obligations, are
guilty of fraud, neglect or delay, or who violate the provisions thereof, are liable for the damages caused thereby." (Art. 1101.)
Under both the Spanish and American law, then, the action based on a wrongful discharge is one to recover damages for breach of
contract.
That which defendant alleges to be his second and third defenses, even if all the facts necessary to establish the defenses as alleged
were proved, could not really be called defenses, but even considering them as matters in mitigation of damages, the defendant has
not proved facts sufficient to avail himself of the benefit thereof under his so-called second defense. There is nothing in the record
showing the wages of a particular position or the usual wages paid in such employment. We understand it to be the rule that before
107
defendant can take advantage of the failure of plaintiff to obtain like employment, it must apear: (1) That it is like employment, (2)
that it is in the same locality; (3) that it is under substantially the same conditions; and (4) the wages which he could have earned. We
are of the opinion that defendant has successfully established the first three conditions; but, on the other hand, he has utterly failed to
established
the
fourth.
Defendant is more successful with his third defense. We are of opinion that plaintiff should have accepted the offer of defendant and
that, in refusing to do so, he conferred on the defendant the right to present his offer in mitigation of any damages which plaintiff
might have sustained by reason of the wrongful discharge.
It has been held that, when a contract of employment has once been broken by the employer by a wrongful discharge of the employee
and that status has been recognized by both parties, the employee is not obliged to do anything more under the original contract; that,
it having been broken voluntarily by the employer, his employees is no longer under any obligation to comply with the terms thereof.
But, notwithstanding this, we believe that, under such circumstances, the employee should accept an offer even under the old contract,
as long as it does not involve a renunciation of any right already accrued, although it is doubtful if it can be said in the case at bar that
the offer was in reality one to return to employment under the old contract but was, rather, the creation of a new contract, the terms
and conditions of which were substantially those of the old.
The mere acceptance of the offer of defendant would not constitute a waiver of his right to recover damages for the time intervening
from the date of the wrongful discharge to the time when he returned to work under the new offer, which would consist in the loss of
wages for that period, and any other damages which might have been sustained and which plaintiff could prove.
Plaintiff proved no other damages than the loss of wages. The damages in an action for wrongful discharge are prima facie the amount
of wages for the full term. These are the damages and the only damages which plaintiff proved. Plaintiff can recover in this action only
for the three months period. The court below allowed plaintiff his wages for the months of September, October and November, but on
a different theory from that on which we have based his right; but, whatever the theory, the amount is correct and the judgment of
the
trial
court
is
to
that
extent
proper.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. -BACK TO TOP-
108
10. Southern College vs CA
Facts:
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along
the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted
by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the
roofing of private respondents house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by
a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.
It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity,
the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a structural hazard.
In their Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private
respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others
houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral
damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorneys fees; plus costs.
In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in
the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said
school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-top condition; and furthermore, typhoon
Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond human control such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought
thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
RTC Decision: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment (sic) in favor of the plaintiff (sic) and against the
defendants, (sic) ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the former as follows:
a) P117,116.00, as actual damages, plus litigation expenses;
b) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P100,000.00 as attorneys fees;
d) Costs of the instant suit.
CA Decision: Affirmed with modification the trial courts disposition by reducing the award of moral damages from P1,000,000.00
to P200,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages?
Held: No.
This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person
who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a persons negligence
concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable
despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care.In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence
engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person seeking
exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. From these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner was
negligent.
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team
which made an ocular inspection of petitioners school building after the typhoon. What is visual to the eye though, is not always
reflective of the real cause behind. In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioners school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans,
specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the
approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed.
109
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents, city building official Jesus Reyna, that the
original plans and design of petitioners school building were approved prior to its construction. Furthermore, when part of its roof
needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon Saling, the same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs without any
deviation from the original design and subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. These only
prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect. Having given his unqualified imprimatur, the city building off icial is
presumed to have properly performed his duties in connection therewith.
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold
that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question
and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents house.
With this disposition on the pivotal issue, private respondents claim for actual and moral damages as well as attorneys fees must
fail.Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous event. More so because no bad faith or willful act to cause damage was
alleged and proven to warrant moral damages.
Petition is GRANTED and the challenged Decision is REVERSED. -BACK TO TOP-
110
11. People vs Lopez
Facts: At around 6:00 in the evening of November 15, 1991, Mario Seldera, 11, his father Rogelio Seldera, and his cousin Rodolfo
Padapat worked in the riceland of a certain Lagula in Barangay Nancalabasaan, Umingan, Pangasinan. It was harvest time and the
three were hired to bundle the palay stalks which had been cut. As it was a moonlit night, the three worked in the field until around
9:00 when they started for home taking a trail alongside the Banila river. The trail is about two feet wide only, and so the three
walked along the trail single file with Rogelio, being the oldest, leading the way, followed by his son Mario and by Rodolfo who was
last. As they reached a sloping portion in the trail, accused-appellant Federico Lopez appeared armed with a shotgun. Accusedappellant had a companion, a dark man. He was unarmed. Without uttering a word, accused-appellant fired at the three, who slumped
forward, face down. Accused-appellants companion went near the bodies of the victims and rolled them over with his foot. Satisfied
that the victims were dead, accused-appellant and his companion left.
However, Mario, the youngest in the group, was not killed, although he had been wounded in the back. As soon as accused-appellant
and his companion had left, Mario stood up and, crying, he walked to the house of his uncle, Alfredo Padapat, the father of Rodolfo,
and reported the matter. He decided not to go home as accused-appellant and his companion went in the direction of their
house. Marios mother was fetched from their house and told what had happened to Rogelio and Rodolfo. The three then reported
the incident to the barangay captain who lost no time in accompanying them to the police in Umingan, Pangasinan.
Mario was investigated by CPL Jose Almerol. Afterwards, he was taken to the Umingan Medicare Hospital where he was treated by Dr.
Suller-Santos. The boy suffered three gunshot wounds on the back and right side. Dr. Santos issued a medical certification and
referred Mario to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital for x-ray examination.
The Information was filed against Federico Lopez, Amboy Lopez and one whose identity has not yet been established charging them of
two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder.
Mario positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant. He testified that accused-appellant wore a white, long-sleeved shirt, blue
jeans and white slippers, while his companion had a black t-shirt, black jeans and brown slippers on. He was able to recognize
accused-appellant and notice the type and color of the latters clothes and those of the latters companions because the moon was
brightly shining. He knew accused-appellant very well, because the latter used to frequent their house in Nancalabasaan to play cards
with his father. In addition, Mario used to buy cigarettes from accused-appellants store. As to the gun used, he stated that it was
similar to those used by security guards. When asked whether his father and accused-appellant had a quarrel on November 15, 1991,
Mario said he did not know.
Accused-appellants defense was alibi. He claimed that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of November 15, 1991, he was in the house of
his uncle, Asterio Sonaco, in Caurdanetaan, another barangay of Umingan in Pangasinan, about three kilometers from
Nancalabasaan. He had a round of drinks with four friendsover a dish of dog meat. At 11:00 that night, the party broke up and
accused-appellant went home. He claimed that it was dark that night and that during the party, they used a lamp for illumination.
The defense presented Daniel Fortunato and Mario Sonaco to corroborate accused-appellants testimony on the events which
transpired in the evening of November 15, 1991. Daniel Fortunato testified that he is a barangay councilman of Caurdanetaan,
Umingan, Pangasinan. He claimed that from 4:00 in the afternoon to 11:00 in the evening of November 15, 1991, he was with
accused-appellant in a party where there were about thirteen[ other people, drinking gin and eating cooked dog meat. Fortunato said
he and Mario Sonaco helped accused-appellant home as the latter was too drunk. Accused-appellant was allegedly received by his
wife.[19]
On cross-examination Fortunato admitted that he was not always watching accused-appellant during the party and that it was possible
that the latter may have slipped out. With regard to the distance of Caurdanetaan to the Banila river, where the incident happened,
Fortunato estimated it to be about 1 1/2 kilometers, which can be covered in 20 minutes by walking and in about 11 minutes by
running. Fortunato testified that accused-appellant had the same height and body build as Rodrigo Thunder Lopez although the
latter was darker.
Mario Sonaco, for his part, claimed that there were less than ten people present in the house of his brother, Asterio Sonaco, in the
evening of November 15, 1991. However, he corroborated Fortunatos testimony that he and Fortunato took accused-appellant home
at 11:00 oclock that night because the latter was drunk.
On cross-examination, Sonaco admitted that accused-appellant is his nephew. He estimated that accused-appellants house was less
than two kilometers from the Banila river. He reiterated that by taking the barangay road, the distance could be covered in 30 minutes
on foot but if one runs or uses the shorter route through the ricefields, the travel time would be less.
The Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan found the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder
and ordering him to pay a total of P204,300.00 in damages.
Issue: Whether or not the RTCs award for damages is proper.
Ruling: Wherefore, decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
111
Certain modification should also be made with respect to the award of damages. The lower court awarded P50,000.00 for
compensatory damages and P30,000.00 for moral damages to each set of heirs of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat in addition to
the P14,000.00 actual damages to be divided among them. The P50,000.00 should be treated as civil indemnity, which under
prevailing jurisprudence, is fixed at P50,000.00, to be awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the
victim. Further, in accordance with our rulings in other cases,[ the amount of moral damages should be increased to P50,000.00.
With regard to the amount of actual damages, Leonida Seldera and Alfredo Padapat testified that they could not present any receipt for
their funeral expenses because the funeral agency refused to issue one in view of an unpaid balance. They have likewise allegedly lost
the receipts for their joint expenses for the wake. Under the Civil Code (Art. 2199), a party is entitled to compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. However, under Art. 2224, temperate damages may be recovered if it is shown
that such party suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. As
the heirs of the two victims clearly incurred funeral expenses, an award of P5,000.00 for each set of heirs by way of temperate
damages should be awarded, to be divided equally by the heirs of Seldera and Padapat.
For the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera, the court a quo awarded P10,000.00 moral damages, P20,000.00 exemplary damages and
P300.00 actual damages for medical expenses. The first item should be disallowed for lack of evidence to support it. The second item
should likewise be deleted as under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are awarded when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. There was no aggravating circumstance in this case other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. As to the actual damages of P300.00, as the prosecution failed to present any documentary proof for such, its award is
improper. However, the amount of P200.00 as temperate damages may be made in its place.
Actual damages representing unearned income of Rogelio Seldera and Alfredo Padapat should also be awarded. Leonida Seldera
testified that her husband was 43 years old when he was killed and that he earned P13,000.00 a year as a farmer. On the other hand,
Alfredo Padapat testified that his son, Rodolfo, was then 25 years old when he died and that he was earning P5,000.00 a year also as a
farmhand. The formula for the computation of unearned income is:
net
earning (x)
capacity
life
expectancy
x
income
gross
living
annual less
expenses
(50% of gross annual income)
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula

2
/3 x [80 - age of deceased]
Accordingly, Rogelio Selderas unearned income is:

X
= 2 [80 - 43]
P13,000 - P6,500
3
= 24.67 x P6,500
= P160,355
Rodolfo Padapats unearned income is:
X
= 2[80 - 25]
P5,000 - P2,500
3
= 36.67 x P2,500
= P91,675
-BACK TO TOP-
112
12. ABS CBN vs CA

Facts: In 1992, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, through its vice president Charo Santos-Concio, requested Viva Production, Inc. to
allow ABS-CBN to air at least 14 films produced by Viva. Pursuant to this request, a meeting was held between Vivas representative
(Vicente Del Rosario) and ABS-CBNs Eugenio Lopez (General Manager) and Santos-Concio was held on April 2, 1992. During the
meeting Del Rosario proposed a film package which will allow ABS-CBN to air 104 Viva films for P60 million. Later, Santos-Concio, in a
letter to Del Rosario, proposed a counterproposal of 53 films (including the 14 films initially requested) for P35 million. Del Rosario
presented the counter offer to Vivas Board of Directors but the Board rejected the counter offer. Several negotiations were
subsequently made but on April 29, 1992, Viva made an agreement with Republic Broadcasting Corporation (referred to as RBS or
GMA 7) which gave exclusive rights to RBS to air 104 Viva films including the 14 films initially requested by ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN now filed a complaint for specific performance against Viva as it alleged that there is already a perfected contract between
Viva and ABS-CBN in the April 2, 1992 meeting. Lopez testified that Del Rosario agreed to the counterproposal and he (Lopez) even put
the agreement in a napkin which was signed and given to Del Rosario. ABS-CBN also filed an injunction against RBS to enjoin the latter
from airing the films. The injunction was granted. RBS now filed a countersuit with a prayer for moral damages as it claimed that its
reputation was debased when they failed to air the shows that they promised to their viewers. RBS relied on the ruling in People vs
Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB which states that a corporation may recover moral damages if it has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in social humiliation. The trial court ruled in favor of Viva and RBS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
(http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2011/12/torts-and-damages-case-digest-abs-cbn-v_2316.html)
Issue: Whether or not the award for damages are proper
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No, 44125 is
hereby REVERSED except as to unappealed award of attorney's fees in favor of VIVA Productions, Inc.
The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. It arose from the fact of filing of
the complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged knowledge of lack of cause of action. Thus paragraph 12 of RBS's Answer with Counterclaim
and Cross-claim under the heading COUNTERCLAIM specifically alleges: 12. ABS-CBN filed the complaint knowing fully well that it has
no cause of action RBS. As a result thereof, RBS suffered actual damages in the amount of P6,621,195.32.
Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be comprehended under the above law on actual damages. RBS could only
probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
It may further be observed that in cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the damages which the defendant may suffer
by reason of the writ are recoverable from the injunctive bond. In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter
of fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the matter, Clearly then, it
was not necessary for RBS to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the
counterbond.
Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka Man" for lack of sufficient legal basis. The RTC issued
a temporary restraining order and later, a writ of preliminary injunction on the basis of its determination that there existed sufficient
ground for the issuance thereof. Notably, the RTC did not dissolve the injunction on the ground of lack of legal and factual basis, but
because of the plea of RBS that it be allowed to put up a counterbond.
As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered as actual or
compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's
fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith
could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only
in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental
anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber
Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is
an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
113
It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the
claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after
it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result
of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria. -BACK TO TOP-
114
13. People v. Medroso

FACTS:
On 16 May1971, in barrio of San Roque, Bombon, Camarines Sur, Philippines, Medroso,without any license to drive motor,operated a
BHP dump truck and while passing along the said barrio in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, bumped and hit one Iigo
Andes thereby causing his death.
ISSUE: Is the imposition of moral and exemplary damages in addition to actual damages proper?
RULING:
We do not find any reversible error in the judgment awarding to the heirs of the deceased P4,000.00 as moral damages and another
P4,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to P12,000.00 byway of actual damages.
Moral damages compensate for mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock suffered by the victim or his family as the proximate
result of the wrongful act, 5 and they are expressly recoverable where a criminal offense result in physical injuries as in the instant
case before Us which in fact culminated in the death of the victim.
In People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468, this Court fixed the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for a
death caused by a crime (Art. 2206 of the Civil Code) and it was there stated that, in proper cases, the courts may adjudge additional
sums by way of moral damages and exemplary damages.
The determination of the amount which would adequately compensate the victim or his family in a criminal case of this nature is left to
the discretion of the trial judge whose assessment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest showing that the same is
arbitrary or excessive, for it has been said that "(T)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and
the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case." (25 C.J.S., 1241, cited in Alcantara vs. Surro, et al., 93 Phil. 472, 477)
With respect to the exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, the same are justified by the fact that the herein appellant without
having been issued by competent authority a license to drive a motor vehicle, wilfully operated a BHP dump truck and drove it in a
negligent and careless manner as a result of which he hit a pedestrian who died from the injuries sustained by him. Exemplary
damages are corrective in nature and are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (Art. 2229, Civil Code), and the
situation before Us calls for the imposition of this kind of damages to deter others from taking into their hands a motor vehicle without
being qualified to operate it on the highways thereby-BACK TO TOP-
115
14. People vs Rodriguez

FACTS:
Leticia Osal, the aunt of the victim Reynaldo, testified that the Rodriguez and the victim were once her tricycle drivers. Upon discovery
by the victim that she was carrying on an illicit relationship with the accused, she sold all her tricycles after which both the accused and
the victim left her place. The accused looked for another tricycle to drive while the victim was employed as one of the three security
guards at the Rancho Estate Subdivision. Leticia was at the house of the accused chatting with the latter's wife. She requested the
accused to take her home. The accused informed her of his intention to talk to the victim, who was then guarding Gate of the
subdivision. The accused suddenly held Reynaldo by the arms and dragged him to a darker portion of the area, about twenty meters
away from her. At that point in time she could not see them any more because of the darkness. Subsequently, she heard a gunshot
coming from the direction where the two had proceeded. Frightened, she immediately went home. It was the following day when she
learned
of
the
death
of
her
nephew.
Note
on
damages-
from
30
it
was
raised
to
50,000
in
accordance
with
jurisprudence
Ruling
While the records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing, the circumstantial evidence attendant and relied upon by
the Trial Court is sufficient for conviction. There is more than one circumstance. The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven. The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Rule 133, Section 4, Rules
of
Court
[1964]).
The judgment of the Court a quo, however, has to be modified in so far as it holds that the circumstances of evident premeditation and
nocturnity are present. No direct and positive evidence has been shown as to the time when accused conceived to kill his victim. It is
even doubtful whether there was a predetermined intent to kill. When he decided to see the victim his purpose was merely to talk to
him.
He
was
unarmed
as
he
sallied
forth.
Neither is there any convincing showing that the accused had purposely sought nighttime in order to facilitate the commission of the
crime
or
to
prevent
its
discovery
or
to
evade
his
capture.
Under the circumstances, and as recommended by the Solicitor General, the accused can be convicted only of Homicide, punishable by
reclusion
temporal,
in
its
medium
period,
absent
any
modifying
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of the Court a quo, the accused, Alberto A. Rodriguez, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 consonant with
recent case law; to pay the sum of P7,000.00 as expenses incident to the burial of the victim; and to pay the costs. -BACK TO TOP-
116
15. People vs Aspiras

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Dominador Aspiras, a police officer assigned at Pilar Village Detachment in Las Pinas, Manila, was accused of the
crime of Murder for the killing of Renato Lumague, during a political rally in Urdaneta Pangasinan in April 6, 1992.
Renato Lumague was a crusher general supervisor of the Northern Cement Corporation and a supporter of the NPC-KBL political party
at the time of his death.
The pertinent facts state that while the victim was delivering a speech on stage, a man appeared in front of him and shot him three
times. The victim died instantly.
The prosecution presented two eyewitness who positively identified the accused as the assailant. The medico-legal, the Personnel
Manager of the Northern Cement Corporation and the victims daughter were also presented before the court to testify.
For his defense, accused presented his own testimony and the testimony of his colleagues. He interposed an alibi, stating that he was
at Las Pinas at the time of the incident.
The RTC found Aspiras GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. For the death of the victim, he was ordered to pay the heirs of
Lumague the following:
P50,000 for indemnity;

P50,000 for moral and exemplary damages
P82,250.00 for actual damages
P1,421,200 for expected or future income.
Costs
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in awarding the victims heirs indemnity for civil damages.
RULING: The award for damages which should be paid by appellant to the heirs of the victim is MODIFIED as follows:
1.
P50,000 for indemnity;
2.
P50,000 for moral and exemplary damages
3.
P1,558 for actual damages
4.
P1,379,197.80 for expected or future income
Costs against appellant.
Actual damages
Only actual expenses duly supported by receipts may be granted. Among the actual expense allegedly incurred by the family of the
victim, only those for funeral expenses (P17,000), materials for gravestone (P1,308) and the funeral mass (P250) were supported by
receipts.
Further, it was shown that the funeral expenses were shouldered by Northern Cement Corporation.
The award for actual damages must be limited only to those they incurred for gravestone and mass services, amounting to P1,558.00.
Expected or future income
The correct formula for computing the loss of earning capacity is as follows: 2/3 x (80 age of the victim at the time of death) x
(reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been received as support by heirs).
The age of the victim at the time of his death was 48. He was receiving a monthly salary of P7,610 and yearly benefits in the amount
of P38,000. Hence, his annual gross income is P129,320. Net income is 50% of the gross annual income, in the absence of proof
showing the deceased livings expenses. Hence:
Net earning capacity
= 2(80-48)/3 x (P129,320 64,660)

= 2(32)/3 x 64,660
= 21.33 x 64,660
= P1,379,197.80
The award of P1,421200 should therefore be reduced to P1,379,197.80 only. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
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BATCH 06
1.
Pan Malayan Insurance vs CA
Private respondents: Erlinda Fabie and her Unknown Driver

FACTS:
On December 10, 1985, PANMALAY filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Makati against private respondents Erlinda Fabie and
her driver.
Petitioner averred the following: that it insured a Mitsubishi Colt Lancer car with plate No. DDZ-431 and registered in the name of
Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation [CANLUBANG]; that on May 26, 1985, due to the "carelessness, recklessness, and
imprudence" of the unknown driver of a pick-up with plate no. PCR-220, the insured car was hit and suffered damages in the amount of
P42,052.00; that PANMALAY defrayed the cost of repair of the insured car and, therefore, was subrogated to the rights of CANLUBANG
against the driver of the pick-up and his employer, Erlinda Fabie; and that, despite repeated demands, defendants, failed and refused to
pay the claim of PANMALAY.
Private respondents, thereafter, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and a supplemental motion thereto. In compliance therewith,
PANMALAY clarified, among others, that the damage caused to the insured car was settled under the "own damage", coverage of the
insurance policy, and that the driver of the insured car was, at the time of the accident, an authorized driver duly licensed to drive the
vehicle. PANMALAY also submitted a copy of the insurance policy and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt executed by
CANLUBANG in favor of PANMALAY.
On February 12, 1986, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that PANMALAY had no cause of action against them.
They argued that payment under the "own damage" clause of the insurance policy precluded subrogation under Article 2207 of the
Civil Code, since indemnification thereunder was made on the assumption that there was no wrongdoer or no third party at fault.
RTC dismissed PANMALAY's complaint for no cause of action. The CA upheld the RTCs decision.
The RTC held that payment by PANMALAY of CANLUBANG's claim under the "own damage" clause of the insurance policy was an
admission by the insurer that the damage was caused by the assured and/or its representatives.
On the other hand, the CA in applying the ejusdem generis rule held that Section III-1 of the policy, which was the basis for settlement
of CANLUBANG's claim, did not cover damage arising from collision or overturning due to the negligence of third parties as one of the
insurable risks.
Both tribunals concluded that PANMALAY could not now invoke Article 2207 and claim reimbursement from private respondents as
alleged wrongdoers or parties responsible for the damage.
ISSUE: WON the insurer may institute an action to recover the amount it had paid its assured in settlement of an insurance claim
against private respondents as the parties allegedly responsible for the damage caused to the insured vehicle. yes
HELD:
Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed or damaged
through the fault or negligence of a party other than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured, will be subrogated to
the rights of the assured to recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay. Payment by the
insurer to the assured operates as an equitable assignment to the former of all remedies which the latter may have
against the third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor
does it grow out of, any privity of contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues simply upon payment of the insurance claim
by the insurer
There are a few recognized exceptions to this rule. For instance, if the assured by his own act releases the wrongdoer or third party
liable for the loss or damage, from liability, the insurer's right of subrogation is defeated. Similarly, where the insurer pays the assured
the value of the lost goods without notifying the carrier who has in good faith settled the assured's claim for loss, the settlement is
binding on both the assured and the insurer, and the latter cannot bring an action against the carrier on his right of subrogation. And
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where the insurer pays the assured for a loss which is not a risk covered by the policy, thereby effecting "voluntary payment", the
former has no right of subrogation against the third party liable for the loss. None of the exceptions are availing in the present case.
It must be emphasized that the lower court's ruling that the "own damage" coverage under the policy implies damage to the insured car
caused by the assured itself, instead of third parties, proceeds from an incorrect comprehension of the phrase "own damage" as used by
the insurer. a phrase which, incidentally, is not found in the insurance policy to define the basis for its settlement of CANLUBANG's
claim under the policy, it simply meant that it had assumed to reimburse the costs for repairing the damage to the insured vehicle.
It is in this sense that the so-called "own damage" coverage under Section III of the insurance policy is differentiated from Sections I
and IV-1 which refer to "Third Party Liability" coverage (liabilities arising from the death of, or bodily injuries suffered by, third parties)
and from Section IV-2 which refer to "Property Damage" coverage (liabilities arising from damage caused by the insured vehicle to the
properties of third parties).
In conclusion, it must be reiterated that in this present case, the insurer PANMALAY as subrogee merely prays that it be allowed to
institute an action to recover from third parties who allegedly caused damage to the insured vehicle, the amount which it had paid its
assured under the insurance policy. Having thus shown from the above discussion that PANMALAY has a cause of action against third
parties whose negligence may have caused damage to CANLUBANG's car, the Court holds that there is no legal obstacle to the filing by
PANMALAY of a complaint for damages against private respondents as the third parties allegedly responsible for the damage.
Respondent Court of Appeals therefore committed reversible error in sustaining the lower court's order which dismissed PANMALAY's
complaint against private respondents for no cause of action.
Hence, it is now for the trial court to determine if in fact the damage caused to the insured vehicle was due to the "carelessness,
recklessness and imprudence" of the driver of private respondent Erlinda Fabie. -BACK TO TOP-
119
2.
Royal Traders Bank vs NLRC
Petitioner union retained the services of Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz for P3,000.00 in consideration of his law firm's
undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to
private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). The complaint was filed and the NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential,
mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential. TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the Supreme Court. The
Court, in its decision modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while
affirming the award of holiday pay differential. The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and paid its concerned
employees their respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll.
After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme Court, he notified the petitioner union, the TRB
management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay differential. Private
respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorney's fees, praying that ten percent (10%) of
the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his
attorney's fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him. Labor arbiter granted the motion which was
affirmed by NLRC on appeal.
Petitioner now posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorney's fees, as said act constituted a
modification of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorney's fees. It then cited decisions of the
Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be altered or modified even by the court which
rendered the same.
ISSUE: 1. WON respondent can file his claim for professional fee after the finality of the judgment.
2. WON respondent can exercise his attorneys lien over the award of holiday pay differential in addition to his retainers fee.
3. WON respondent had already waived his right to charge additional fees because of their failure to come to an agreement as
to its payment.
4. WON the attorneys fees should be pegged at 10% based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
HELD:
1.
YES. A lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well
within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of
filing it ahead of the award's complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action
only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render
ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
2.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary
concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing
party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those
authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorney's fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. It is elementary that an
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance
and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests
of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services.
The provisions of the retainer contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the
instant controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover
the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in
120
Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm's commitment to render
the services enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.
There are two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a
special retainer.
a. A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for
any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action.
The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. The reason for the remuneration
is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties.
In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
b. A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client
may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and
independent contract for attorney's fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.
3.
NO. The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of
professional fees for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration in
favor of the latter.
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil
Code is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As
embodied in our law, 32 certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to
the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another A quasi-contract between the
parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent's lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of petitioner's cause
without awaiting the latter's consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private respondent's
efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union. It cannot even hide
behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier,
private respondent's actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.
A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute
justice. Some of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody
wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do
unto us under the same circumstances.
Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondent's legal services and assistance
regarding its claims against the bank, only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor,
there is at least the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give). 36 This rule of law, likewise founded on
the principle against unjust enrichment, would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent which proved
beneficial to petitioner's members. In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services.
4.
However, the value of private respondent's legal services should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the
Labor Code alone. Article 111 fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney's fees the victorious party may recover in any
judicial or administrative proceedings and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten
percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it.
The measure of compensation for private respondent's services as against his client should properly be addressed by the
rule of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction. Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as
the basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his
client. Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on
quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services.
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be
charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task
was expecting to be paid compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.
121
Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a
lawyer's services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
should be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum
meruit. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) the character of
the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a
conflict between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of
quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney's fees. The criteria
found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper
amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the
resolution of private respondent's fees.
In the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for
the legal services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. -BACK TO TOP-
122
3.
Quirante vs IAC
Dr. Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine American
General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his
part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN
for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against GUERRERO for indemnification.
RTC: ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages
in the amount of P129,430.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P40,000.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00; ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from December 15,
1978 to July 16, 1979; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00. MR filed
by PHILAMGEN was denied. Appeal by PHILAMGEN denied because it was allegedly filed out of time. The trial court thereafter issued a
writ of execution.
A petition was filed for the quashal of the writ of execution, which was dismissed, so the case was elevated to this Court. In the
meantime, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as survivors.
Petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in
writing by the widow and the two daughters of the deceased. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees
would be computed as follows:
A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty.
Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally
between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation in an order, despite an opposition thereto. It also denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order of confirmation in its second order. Petition for certiorari was filed before the IAC.
IAC- set aside the order of confirmation of attorneys fees. Reasons: there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or
may not ultimately result in the granting to the CASASOLA family of the total amount of damages given by the respondent Judge, and
assuming that the grant of damages to the family is eventually ratified, the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not and should
not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Quirante can claim attorney's fees. -NO
RULING: (Affirmed the decision of IAC)
What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided
for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his
counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are
based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper
remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is
premature.
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the
propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance.
It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that the recovery of the
amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies. It is subject to the condition that the fee shall be P30,000.00 in case of recovery
of the P120,000.00 surety bond, plus an additional amount in case the award is in excess of said P120,000.00 bond, on the sharing
basis hereinbefore stated.
123
With regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the heirs of the deceased. We are of the
considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch
as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's
fees by both petitioners herein.
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds that the alleged
confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant
of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of factual
and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court. -BACK TO TOP-
124
4.
Araneta vs Bank of America
FACTS:
Leopoldo Araneta, the petitioner herein, was a local merchant engaged in the import and export business. On June 30, 1961
he issued a check for $500 payable to cash and drawn against the San Francisco main office of the Bank of America, where he had
been maintaining a dollar current account since 1948. At that time he had a credit balance of $523.81 in his account, confirmed by the
bank's assistant cashier in a letter to Araneta dated September 7, 1961. However, when the check was received by the bank on
September 8, 1961, a day after the date of the letter, it was dishonored and stamped with the notation "Account Closed."
Araneta inquired as to why his check was dishonoured. Bank of America claimed that it was an error on their part. It even
sent a letter of apology to the payee of the check admitting that they had a mistake in declaring that the account of Araneta was
closed. The bank informed Araneta that this will never happen again.
But on May 25 and 31, 1961, the two checks issued by Araneta drawn against Bank of America were both again stamped with
the notation Account Closed and both returned by the clearing bank.
In view of the foregoing incidents, Araneta, through counsel, sent a letter to the Bank of America demanding damages in the
sum of $20,000. While admitting responsibility for the inconvenience caused to Araneta, the bank claimed that the amount demanded
was excessive, and offered to pay the sum of P2,000.00. The offer was rejected.
On December 11, 1962 Araneta filed the complaint in this case against the Bank of America for the recovery of the following:
1. Actual or compensatory damages P30,000.00
2. Moral damages 20,000.00
3. Temperate damages 50,000.00
4. Exemplary damages 10,000.00
5. Attorney's fees 10,000.00
TOTAL P120,000.00
The judgment of the trial court awarded all the item prayed for, but on appeal by the defendant the Court of Appeals
eliminated the award of compensatory and temperate damages and reduced the moral damages to P8,000.00, the exemplary damages
to P1,000.00 and the attorney's fees to P1,000.00.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not temperate damages can be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss
Whether or not moral damages may be recovered as an item separate and distinct from the damages recoverable for injury to
business standing and commercial credit
RULING:
Petitioner: An action by a depositor against a bank for damages resulting from the wrongful dishonor of the depositor's checks,
temperate damages for injury to business standing or commercial credit may be recovered even in the absence of definite proof of
direct pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, a finding as it was found by the Court of Appeals that the wrongful acts of the respondent
had adversely affected his credit being sufficient for the purpose.
Also invoked by the petitioner is the case of Atlanta National Bank vs. Davis, 96 Ga 334, 23 SE 190; 1 and the following citations in
American Jurisprudence:
In some states what are called "temperate damages" are allowed in certain classes of cases, without proof of actual or special
damages, where the wrong done must in fact have caused actual damage to the plaintiff, though from the nature of the case, he
cannot furnish independent, distinct proof thereof. Temperate damages are more than nominal damages, and, rather, are such as
would be a reasonable compensation for the injury sustained. ... . (15 Am. Jur. 400)
... . It has been generally, although not universally, held, in an action based upon the wrongful act of a bank dishonoring checks of a
merchant or trader having sufficient funds on deposit with the bank, that substantial damages will be presumed to follow such act as a
necessary and natural consequence, and accordingly, that special damages need not be shown. One of the reasons given for this rule
is that the dishonor of a merchant's or trader's check is tantamount or analogous, to a slander
of his trade or business, imputing to him insolvency or bad faith. ... . (10 Am. Jur. 2d. 545)
Respondent: Since the petitioner invokes Article 2205 of the Civil Code, which speaks of actual or compensatory damages for injury to
business standing or commercial credit, he may not claim them as temperate damages and thereby dispense with proof of pecuniary
loss under Article 2216. The respondent cites Article 2224, which provides that "temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, proved with certainty," and contends that the petitioner failed to show any such loss in
this case. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
125
The question, therefore, is whether or not on the basis of the findings of the Court of Appeals, there is reason to conclude that the
petitioner did sustain some pecuniary loss although no sufficient proof of the amount thereof has been adduced. In rejecting the claim
for temperate damages the said Court referred specifically to the petitioner's failure to prove "the existence of a supposed contract for
him to buy jewels at a profit," in connection with which he issued the two checks which were dishonored by the respondent. This may
be true as far as it goes, that is, with particular reference to the alleged loss in that particular transaction. But it does not detract from
the finding of the same Court that actual damages had been suffered, thus:
... Obviously, the check passed the hands of other banks since it was cleared in the United States. The
adverse reflection against the credit of Araneta with said banks was not cured nor explained by the letter of
apology to Mr. Gregory.
xxx xxx xxx
... This incident obviously affected the credit of Araneta with Miss Saldana.
xxx xxx xxx
However, in so far as the credit of Araneta with the First National City Bank, with Miss Rufina Saldana and
with any other persons who may have come to know about the refusal of the defendant to honor said
checks, the harm was done ...
The financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset, it being a significant part of the foundation of his business. Any
adverse reflection thereon constitutes some material loss to him. As stated in the case Atlanta National Bank vs. Davis, supra, citing 2
Morse Banks, Sec. 458, "it can hardly be possible that a customer's check can be wrongfully refused payment without some
impeachment of his credit, which must in fact be an actual injury, though he cannot, from the nature of the case, furnish independent,
distinct proof thereof."
The Code Commission, in explaining the concept of temperate damages under Article 2224, makes the following comment:
In some States of the American Union, temperate damages are allowed. There are cases where from the
nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that
there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business
firm is often hard to show with certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The
judge should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff
should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act.
The petitioner, as found by the Court of Appeals, is a merchant of long standing and good reputation in the Philippines. Some of his
record is cited in the decision appealed from. We are of the opinion that his claim for temperate damages is legally justified.
Considering all the circumstances, including the rather small size of the petitioner's account with the respondent, the amounts of the
checks which were wrongfully dishonored, and the fact that the respondent tried to rectify the error soon after it was discovered,
although the rectification came after the damage had been caused, we believe that an award of P5,000 by way of temperate damages
is sufficient.
Under the third error assigned by the petitioner in his brief, which is the second of the two reasons relieve upon in his petition for
review, he contends that moral damages should have been granted for the injury to his business standing or commercial credit,
separately from his wounded feelings and mental anguish. It is true that under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. "besmirched reputation"
is a ground upon which moral damages may be claimed, but the Court of Appeals did take this element into consideration in adjudging
the sum of P8,000 in his favor. We quote from the decision:
... the damages to his reputation as an established and well known international trader entitled himself to
recover moral damages.
xxx xxx xxx
... It was likewise established that when plaintiff learned that his checks were not honored by the drawee
Bank, his wounded feelings and the mental anguish suffered by him caused his blood pressure to rise
beyond normal limits, thereby necessitating medical attendance for an extended period.
126
The trial court awarded attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000. This was reduced by the Court of Appeals to only P1,000.
Considering the nature and extent of the services rendered by the petitioner's counsel both in the trial and appellate courts, the
amount should be increased to P4,000. This may be done motu propio by this Court under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, which
provides that attorney's fees may be recovered in the instances therein enumerated and "in any other case where the Court deems, it
first and equitable that attorney's fees ... should be recovered," provided the amount thereof be reasonable in all cases. -BACK TO TOP-
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5.
Lorenzo Shipping vs CA
FACTS:
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in domestic shipping, carrying passengers
and cargoes from port to port. When loading and unloading cargo at Sta. Ana pier and Sasa wharf in the Port of Davao City,
petitioner is compelled by the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) to avail itself exclusively of the arrastre and stevedoring services
of Filipinas Port Services, Inc. (respondent) subject to the payment of fees provided by the PPA rules.
Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services and is the exclusive cargo handling
operator-contractor for all inter-island vessels calling at the port of Davao City including those owned and operated by
petitioner.
In October 1981, respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner, alleging that as of 31 May 1981,
petitioners outstanding account for stevedoring, handling and other services rendered to it by respondent amounted to P375,
263.05.
Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed and refused to pay.

TRIAL COURT: Rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner.
Plaintiffs (Filport) rates for stevedoring and arrastre services which were imposed at the time when PPA has not yet come up
with rates specifically applicable for ten-footers and below were not merely imposed by plaintiff on its own free will but were
based on PPAs administrative order No. 08-79 which prescribed the rates in container handling for domestic operations in all
ports.
If the rates were later on increased again, they were based on specific PPA AOs, leaving however, rates specifically applicable
to ten-footer containers and below unresolved, until on 15 October 1981 when PPA issued AO No. 11A-81 which finally
prescribed the rates applicable to ten-footer containers and below but at the same time however, provided for a nonretroactivity clause.
Even assuming that plaintiff erred in its imposition of the rates for defendants 10-footer containers which the latter failed to
prove. Defendant has no other alternative but pay or settles its outstanding account.
Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the computation made by the plaintiff.
COURT OF APPEALS: Affirmed in toto.
PPA AO No. 06-78 indicates applies only to container operations at the North Harbor, Port Manila. While, PPA AO No. 08-79
prescribes the arrastre and stevedoring rates for container handling in the domestic operations in all ports. It does not make
any distinction on the size of the container nor does it make any reference to any previous administrative order for its
understanding.
PPA AO No. 08-79 is clear by itself and hence ought to be enforced even by judicial authorities.
Since the stevedoring rate of plaintiff-appellee is sanctioned by PPA AO No. 08-79, the trial court was correct when it refused
to apply the general principles of fairness, justice and equity in fixing the stevedoring rate due and owing to the plaintiffappellee.
PETITIONER
PPA AO No. 08-79 does not apply to the 10-footer containers.
The term per ISO container embodied in said PPA AO No. 08-79 should be understood in the light of an earlier PPA AO No.
06-78, Section 1, Article 1. The 10-footer containers or less than 20-footer containers are not included under Class A and,
hence, no stevedoring rate can be prescribed on them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent company is entitled to the award of attorneys fees of 25% of the principal claim plus litigation
expenses of P5,000.00.
RULING:
No reversible error in the finding of fact and conclusions of law of the trial and appellate courts.
As regards attorneys fees, SC reduced the award for being grossly excessive. An award of 10% of the amount of P375,
263.05 is reasonable.
DENIED. -BACK TO TOP-
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6.
Quiroz vs Tan_Guinlay
FACTS:
FRANCISCO GONZALEZ QUIROS brought this action to recover the sum of 10,217.75 pesos, the value of goods sold by him to
CARLOS PALANCA TAN-GUINLAY and the sum of 64,984.89 pesos, as damages caused to him by the failure of the defendant to pay
for the goods at the time agreed upon.
The defendant in his answer denied all the allegations of the complaint, and further, alleged the pendency of another action for the
same cause; a counterclaim to the amount of 40,000 pesos, for damages suffered by the defendant by reason of an attachment
wrongfully secured by the plaintiff in 1893; and a further counterclaim for damages caused by reason of a prosecution
for estafa instituted against him maliciously by the plaintiff.
The goods referred to in the complaint were sold to the defendant in two parcels.
1st lot: 2,235.95 pesos- The defendant delivered to the plaintiff a bill of exchange for 2,700 pesos, purporting to be drawn by Juan VyTeco to the order of Chua-Sengco on Lucio Icaza. When this bill of exchange was delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant, and
apparently accepted by Lucio Icaza. By the terms of the acceptance the bill of exchange was payable on the 26th of December, 1893.
The plaintiff took the bill of exchange and paid the defendant in cash the difference between 2,700 pesos and the value of the goods
sold, 2,235.95 pesos. At the maturity of the acceptance Icaza refused to pay the bill of exchange, on the ground that his signature
thereto was a forgery, and nothing was ever realized thereon. The plaintiff neglected to have the bill of exchange protested for this
nonpayment.
RTC: ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the value of the goods sold and delivered to the defendant, with interest thereon.
He sustained the first counterclaim of the defendant, and assessed the damages suffered by the defendant by reason of the
attachment referred to in the answer, at 6,347.75 pesos. The other defenses and counterclaims of the defendant the court held not to
have been proven, and final judgment was entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant for 10,000 pesos and costs.
Both appealed the judgment.
Defendants contention: The court committed an error in ordering judgment for the full value of the goods sold, inasmuch as the
plaintiff, by reason of his failure to protest the bill of exchange, must suffer the loss occasioned by its non-payment.
Hence, this review.
ISSUE:
1. WON the defendants counterclaim for damages may prosperNO.
On damages suffered by the defendant by reason of an attachment wrongfully secured by the plaintiffThe plaintiff cannot be held responsible for the value of the goods. His responsibility would be limited to the damages suffered by the
goods while they were held under his own attachment from the 5th day of December, 1893, until the 28th day of January, 1894, and
for the time elapsing after the 28th of January he would incur certain responsibility in connection with Germann & Co., but under the
evidence in the case there is no ground for holding that he is responsible for the value of the goods.
There was no evidence to show how much the goods had been damaged, if at all, while they were in the possession of the plaintiff,
nor was there any evidence to show how much they had been damaged after the 28th of January, and while they were subject to both
attachments. The only evidence in regard to damages which the defendant offered was evidence relating to the value of the goods
when they were seized under the plaintiff's attachment. As we have said, that is not the measure of damages in this case, and the
defendant having failed to prove any other kind of damages, the decision of the court below allowing him the sum of 6,347 pesos as
damages, cannot be sustained.
On damages caused by reason of a prosecution for estafa instituted against him maliciously by the plaintiffNo prosecution for a false accusation or complaint in a criminal case can be commenced unless the judge, in dismissing the first
complaint, orders a complaint to be filed against the complaining witness for false accusation. The judgment dismissing the complaint
against this defendant contained no such provision. We hold that this article applies not only to a criminal proceeding against the
complaining witness, but also to civil proceedings, and that no action to recover damages in a civil suit can be maintained by the
person arrested against the person presenting the complaint, unless in the order acquitting the person arrested the judge certifies that
the complaint was malicious, as required by said article 326. The defendant in this case, therefore, is not entitled to recover any
damages by reason of the criminal prosecution against him.
2.
WON the plaintiffs claim for damages may prosper. NO.
Damages may be recovered when the obligation is to do something other than the payment of money, but when the obligation which
the defendant has failed to perform consists only in the payment of money the rule of damages is that laid down by article 1108 of the
Civil Code, which is as follows:
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Should the obligation consist in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor should be in default, the indemnity for losses and
damages, should there not be a stipulation to the contrary, shall consist in the payment of the interest agreed upon, and should there
be no agreement, in that of the legal interest.
Until another rate is fixed by the Government interest at the rate of six per cent annum shall be considered as legal.
And the only damages which the plaintiff can recover in this case for the nonpayment of the debt are those declared in this article, viz,
interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. This being a mercantile contract the interest should commence to run from the time the
debt became due. (Art. 341 of the Code of Commerce.)
The result of an examination of the whole case is that from the sum of 10,217.75 pesos, the value of the goods sold and
delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, there should be deducted the sum of 2,235.95 pesos, on account of the bill of
exchange hereinbefore referred to. The defendant is not entitled to recover any damages on account of the attachment of the
goods procured by the plaintiff, for which he was allowed by the court below 6,347.75 pesos. The plaintiff therefore, is
entitled to judgment against the defendant for the sum of 7,981.80 pesos, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum
from the 1st day of January, 1894, until the amount is paid, and the costs of this suit. -BACK TO TOP-
130
7.
Soberano vs Manila Railroad
Facts:
In the moring of March 8, 1955 in Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Juana Soberano boarded the Baguio-bound Bus No. 155 of the Benguet Auto
Line (BAL), a subsidiary of Manila Railroad Company (MRR), driven by Santiago Caccam. She brought with her 3,024 chicken eggs to
be sold in Baguio and some personal belongings.
Along Naguilian Road, 3 km from Baguio, the bus hit a stone embankment causing it to fall into a 65-foot deep precipice, resulting in
the death of 2 passengers and serious physical injuries to Juana with the loss of all her belongings.
She sustained comminuted fracture in the left mandible near the articulation, cracked fracture in the right temporal bone, crushed
fractures, both scapular, and fracture in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ribs. She was confined in the Baguio General Hospital until April 14,
1955 and was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where she stayed until June 6, 1955. Her injuries left her permanently
disfigured and partially disabled as she walks with a stiff neck and her arms have partly lost their full freedom.
Caccam was criminally charged in the CFI of Baguio. Juana Soberano did not intervene, filing a formal reservation to file a separate
civil action for damages and indemnity against MRR and BAL.
Because of the loss of the eggs and her personal effects, Juana demanded from the defendant the value of P370.66, of which MRR
paid P300. MRR also paid the daily expenses, allowances, subsistence, hospitalization, medical fees and medicines of Juana Soberano
as well as the services fees of her caretaker.
MRR offered to settle the case extrajudicially, offering P5,000, but the spouses rejected the offer, filing a civil action against the
defendant companies and Caccam with damages with total sum of P76,757.76.
CFI Baguio: Ordered defendant to pay the plaintiffs and her husband the sum of P5,070.60, and to pay the costs. The complaint
with respect to Caccam was dismissed .
The spouses appealed, mainly contending whether the award for damages was adequate.
Issue:
Whether or not the following damages should be awarded: (1) expenses and attorneys fees in connection with Juana Soberano
attending as a witness in the criminal case - no; (2) moral damages to Jose Soberano- no; (3) moral damages to Juana Soberano -no;
(4) attorneys fees no; and (5) compensatory damages with unearned profts- yes.
Ruling:
(1) The expenses and attorneys fees for attending as a witness in the criminal case were properly taxable in the criminal case.
Since appellants did not intervene therein, this claim must be considered as having been impliedly adjudicated in the criminal case and
cannot be ventilated in the present action.
(2) In case of physical injuries, moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin, unless
there is express statutory provision to the contrary.
(3) In case of breach of contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable only where the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, and the terms fraud and bad faith have reference to wanton reckless, oppressive, malevolent conduct,
or in the very least, to negligence so gross as to amount to malice.
The plaintiffs averred that the defendants intentionally omitted the name of Juana as the offended parties in the information, having
been included only upon intervention of the spouses; that the companies prevailed upon Caccam to plead guilty to a lesser offense to
prevent introduction of evidence of gross negligence amounting to malice against defendants; that the BAL physician disowned having
been the attending physician of Juana and together with the MRR physician suppressed the introduction of the X-ray plates taken of
Juana as proof of the extent of her injuries; and that the defendants exerted undue influence upon another doctor not to testify as to
the dental injuries. These incidents, even if true, cannot be considered as acts committed fraudulently or in bad faith. The
allegation that the incident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the driver does not per se justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the defendant companies. The absence of fraud, malice, or bad faith on the part of the
carrier justifies denial of claim for moral and exemplary damages.
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(4) Attorneys fees are not recoverable if claimants refuse settlement of the case.Defendants did not compel appellants to
litigate or incur expenses in connection with the litigation. Defendants were not in bad faith because the appellants have asked for too
much and the former was justified in resisting this action.
(5) The claim for additional unpaid allowances of Juana while she was undergoing medical and dental treatment in Manila and QC has
merit. The allowance was recommended for approval by respective BAL and MRR physicians and approved by an MRR administrative
officer, where the companies agreed to pay the Soberanos the sum of P10/ day for her stay in a private house while undergoing
treatment beginning June 7, 1955 not to exceed 60 days depending on the advice of the physician or other bone specialist. The
deposition of the EENT specialist show that he treated her for more than 60 days. The balance of P600 should be paid to Soberano.
With respect to loss of earning capacity, P5,000 is inadequate. The extent of Juanas injuries were attested by 3 reputable physicians
from Baguio General Hospital, National Orthopedic Hospital and an EENT specialist, respectively. Her injuries left her abnormal and
naturally she could not be expected to live a normal life. The resultant physical handicaps would entail loss of positive economic
values. Compensatory damages were increased to P15,000.
The sum of P45.35 representing unrealized profits from the loss of the chicken eggs was also awarded. -BACK TO TOP-
132
8.
Philippine Accident Insurance vs Flores
FACTS: Private respondent, Concordia Navalta, was a plaintiff in a civil case before CFI La Union against herein petitioner, Phil.
American Accident Insurance Co., Inc. (PAAICI) The trial judge, respondent Hon. Jose Flores, rendered a judgment ordering PAAICI to
pay Navalta P75,000.00 with legal interest from October 1968, plus attorneys fees and cost of suit. Petitioner paid after the CA denied
its appeal.
Navalta thereafter advised petitioner that the payment was not in full satisfaction of the judgment because the latter had to pay a
compound interest. Upon refusal of the petitioner to pay the sum additionally claimed, Navalta secured a writ of execution for the
same, which the petitioner sought to quash. In resolving the question, the respondent judge issued an order in favor of Navalta on the
ground that the compound interest has been computed from the time the claim was judicially demanded (July 1970).
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is obligated to pay compound interest under the judgment.
HELD: The questioned Order cannot be sustained. The judgment, which was sought to be executed, ordered the payment of a simple
"legal interest" only. It said nothing about the payment of compound interest. Accordingly, when the respondent judge ordered the
payment of compound interest, he went beyond the confines of his own judgment which had been affirmed by the CA and which had
become final. Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision.
Likewise, a court cannot, except for clerical errors or omissions, amend a judgment that has become final.
Navalta invokes Sec. 5 of the Usury Law which reads in part as follows: " In computing the interest on any obligation, promissory note
or other instrument or contract, compound interest shall not be reckoned, except by agreement, or, in default thereof, whenever the
debt is judicially claimed in which last case it shall draw six per centum per annum interest ..." as well as Art. 2212 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent
upon this point." Both legal provisions are inapplicable for they contemplate the presence of stipulated or conventional interest, which
had accrued when demand was judicially made.
In this case, no interest had been stipulated by the parties. In other words, there was no accrued conventional interest which could
further earn interest upon judicial demand. -BACK TO TOP-
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9. Prudenciado vs Alliance
Facts:
At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra. Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with
the intention of crossing Taft Ave. in order to turn left, to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound where she would hold classes.
She claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph; that before crossing Taft Ave. she stopped her car and looked to the
right and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same, but
when she was almost at the center, near the island thereof, Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance,
suddenly bumped and struck Dra. Prudenciado's car, thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body, suffering more
particularly brain concussion which subjected her to several physical examinations and to an encephalograph test while her car was
damaged to the extent of P2,451.27. The damage to the taxicab amounted to P190.00. After due hearing, the CFI of Rizal, Quezon
City, found Jose Leyson guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as taxicab driver which is the proximate cause of the
accident in question. On the other hand, defendant Alliance failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the
required diligence of a good father of the family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees including defendant Leyson.
Consequently, both defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff Dra. Prudenciado
as well as for the damage to her car, in addition to the other consequential damages prayed for, by ordering the said defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of
plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, with
costs against the defendants.
The CA concedes that a concussion of the brain was suffered by Dra. Prudenciado but as to how serious was the concussion
or how it had later become, and the disastrous extent of the injuries which she alleges to have sustained as a result of the accident,
are seriously doubted by said Appellate Court thus reducing the amount of moral damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the
award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees but granting actual damages of P2,451.27.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in reducing the amount of damages
Held:
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission. In the same manner, it is
undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages and that the CA can only modify or
change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court . But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
far too excessive compared to the, actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduced to more
reasonable amounts.
Thus, in the case of San Andres v. CA the SC ruled that while the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the sound
discretion of a court, the same when found excessive should be reduced to more reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts
and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
In a much later case, the SC, reiterating the above ruling, reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages which were far too
excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and where the records show that the injury suffered was
not serious or gross and, therefore, out of proportion to the amount of damages generously awarded by the trial court.
In any case the Court held that "moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant.
They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action." The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Coming back to the case at bar, a careful review of the records makes it readily apparent that the injuries sustained
by Dra. Prudenciado are not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the damages awarded by the trial court. In
fact, a closer scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination produce a logical
conclusion that such disastrous effects of the accident sought to be established, actually took place, not to mention the fact that such
were not supported by the medical findings presented. Unquestionably, therefore, the damages imposed' by the lower court should be
reduced to more reasonable levels.
On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and
unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness, which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such reduction. While the damages
sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that
an accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which
134
although mild can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and
can lead to some, serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other sickness . Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more
real and intense than an ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are
proportionate to her suffering.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides: In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with grave negligence.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good
.The findings of the trial court in the case at bar which became the basis of the award of exemplary damages are to the effect that it is
more apparent from the facts, conditions and circumstances obtaining in the record of the case that respondent driver was running at
high speed after turning to the right along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering that the traffic was clear. Failing to
notice petitioner's car, he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the right to avoid the collision
The CA conforms with aforesaid findings of the trial court but is not prepared to accept that there was gross negligence on the part of
the driver to justify the imposition of exemplary damages.
However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on a slippery road in complete disregard of the hazards to life and limb of other
people cannot be said to be acting in anything less than gross negligence. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by
taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures. The Supreme Court modified its judgment insofar as the award of damages is
concerned; and respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioner; (1) the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages
representing the cost of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (4) the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. -BACK TO TOP-
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10. Ventanilla vs Centeno
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
In a Civil Case, plaintiff retained the service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to represent him and prosecute the case. It was an
action for the recovery of P4,000.00 together with damages. Decision unfavorable to the plaintiff was received by Atty.
Gregorio Centeno, and a notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno.
Atty. Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter, enclosing copies of the decision and that notice of appeal, and stating that he
was not conformable to the decision and had not hesitated to file the notice of appeal.
Atty. Centeno informed him that he intended to appeal and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff, however, did not leave with Atty.
Centeno at that time the amount for the appeal bond. Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the plaintiff enclosing therein forms for
an appeal bond. The plaintiff Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal bond, and because use of his reluctance to
pay the premium on the appeal bond, decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60.00.
He went to the office of Atty. Centeno, but was informed by the clerk, Leonardo Sanchez, that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna
campaigning for his candidacy as member of the Provincial Board.
Plaintiff then issued the check Exhibit 1, for P60.00 as appeal bond and delivered the same to Leonardo Sanchez with
instruction to give the same to Atty. Centeno upon his arrival. The Court does not believe plaintiff's testimony that Sanchez
had contacted Atty. Centeno by telephone and that he issued the cheek upon instruction of Atty. Centeno. Leonardo Sanchez
had informed the plaintiff that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna, and if he were in Manila, Sanchez could not have known the
whereabouts of Atty, Centeno. It was therefore improbable that he could contact Atty. Centeno that afternoon.
Atty. Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal. Atty. Centeno returned to Manila.
According to Atty. Centeno it was not accepted because the period of appeal had already expired, and that it was only at that
time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired. The court does not likewise believe the testimony of Atty.
Centeno. Neither the Clerk of Court, or any of the employees had the right to refuse an appeal bond that is being filed, for it is
not in his power to determine whether or not the appeal bond has been filed within the time prescribed by law. In fact the
record on appeal was accepted and filed on September 5, 1955, but no appeal bond has been filed by Atty. Centeno. The fact
that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond.
The record on appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had been filed by the plaintiff.
Issue: I1: whether the trial court erred in not ordering the appellee to pay him actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate,
and exemplary or corrective damages
I2: in ordering the appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in not ordering the
appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee.
Held: Article 2199 of the new Civil Code provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.
The appellant's bare allegation that by reason of the appellee's indifference, negligence and failure to perfect within the reglementary
period his appeal from an adverse judgment, by not paying the appeal bond of P60, he lost his chance to recover from the defendants
therein the sum of P4,000 and moral and actual damages, which he could have recovered if the appeal had duly been perfected,
indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is highly speculative. Hence he is not entitled to such damages.
The appellant claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary
period due to the appellee's negligence; serious anxiety upon learning that his adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched
reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to collect the
sum of P4,000 and damages from the defendants in civil No. 18833; and wounded feelings for the appellee's failure to remain faithful
to his client and worthy of his trust and confidence.
Moral damages are recoverable only when physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shocks, social humiliation, and similar injury are the proximate result of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries,
quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary
detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation, malicious prosecution, disrespect for the dead or
wrongful interference with funerals, violation of specific provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, and willful injury to property.
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Where a mishap occurs resulting in the death of a passenger being transported by a common carrier, the spouse, descendants and
ascendants of the deceased passenger are entitled to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the passenger's death.
. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries," as an instance when moral damages may be allowed,
thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded excepting, of course, the special torts.
Since the appellant's cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated, the
trial court did not err in declining to award moral damages to him.
Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the appellant, considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory
damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate
damages, and so the trial court did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the appellant
As regards exemplary or corrective damages also claimed by the appellant, since it cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the
court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner,6 the trial court has judiciously, wisely and correctly exercised its discretion in not awarding them to the appellant.
Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court to the appellant, article 2221 of the new
Civil Code provides:
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case. A lawyer, in not
depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted by the court, which brought
about the refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to the appellant as
nominal damages may seem exiguous. Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but
for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil had been duly perfected, it was not
an assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the
appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive. The amount awarded to the appellant for nominal damages should not be
disturbed.
As regards attorney's fees, since the appellant's claim does not fall under any of those enumerated in article 2208, new Civil Code, the
appellee may not be compelled to satisfy it. -BACK TO TOP-
137
11. People vs Principe

PER CURIAM:
Facts: Accused-appellant, an elementary graduate and then 19 years old, had a drinking spree with eight friends at the birthday party
of Freddie Saragpon, held in the latters house on Perigola Street, Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City on August 9, 1998, starting 9:00 a.m.
At about 4:00 p.m., accused-appellant went to buy some pulutan at the Best-Line Eatery located along the national highway. As it was
raining, he brought an umbrella with him.
On the way, he passed by the victim, 6-year old Arlene Ipurong, who asked if she could share his umbrella.Arlene was his
niece, her paternal grandmother being the sister of accused-appellant's mother. Accused-appellant carried Arlene on his back and went
to Best-Line Eatery to buy the puIutan. They were seen by witness Alfredo Apan as they passed by the church between 3:00 to 4:00
p.m.
At the restaurant, accused-appellant was served by witness Lerma Morales. Lerma noticed the child with him, whom accusedappellant introduced as his niece. After getting the pulutan,accused-appellant took the hand of Arlene, and the two went in the
direction of an abandoned house, approximately 10 meters from the restaurant.
Accused-appellant took Arlene to the abandoned house, which was owned by a certain Jet Magno.There, accused-appellant
ordered Arlene to undress. Although Arlene complied, she told him that she was going to tell somebody about it. This angered accusedappellant, who picked up a big rock and hit the child with it three times on the forehead. When Arlene fell unconscious, accusedappellant pulled down his shorts to his knees and raped her. Accused-appellant then brought her to the toilet and dumped her into the
bowl.
RTC Decision: Court holds the accused GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Rape with Homicide, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased offended party in the sum of
P50,000.00, and the additional sum of P21,307.00 representing funeral expenses.
Issue:
1.
W/N the court manifestly erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged.
2.
W/N the heirs of the victim is entitled to damages.
Held:
1.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court failed to ascertain whether accused-appellant was fully apprised of the legal
consequences of his plea, considering that he finished only up to the sixth grade of the elementary school. Accused-appellant is
correct.
When an accused enters a plea of guilt to a capital offense, the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment.
Thus, the inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. In this case,
the trial court failed to comply fully with the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant's plea
was voluntary and done with full comprehension of the consequences thereof.
Thus, in determining whether accused-appellant was aware of the full consequences of his plea of guilt, the trial court simply
asked him whether he knew that he may be sentenced to death, implying that it was possible that the death penalty might not be
imposed on him. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. More often than not, an accused
pleads guilty because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
Although accused-appellant said he was admitting guilt because [he] did it, there is doubt whether that was his only reason
for pleading guilty because he also said he wanted leniency from the court. This makes it doubtful whether his plea was voluntary.
While accused-appellant's improvident plea should be disregarded, nevertheless his conviction cannot be set aside as there is,
in addition to his plea, other sufficient and credible evidence on which the judgment of the trial court rests. This evidence consists of
accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession, his testimony in open court, and the testimony of the other witnesses.
Accused-appellant acknowledged his extrajudicial confession in court.The court asked him if he executed the extrajudicial
confession voluntarily and in the presence of counsel, and he answered in the affirmative. Accused-appellant testified with some
relatives present in the courtroom, including his grandmother. In addition, he was assisted by his counsel de oficio.
Finally, the testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution confirm accused-appellant's testimony that he committed the crime.
This conclusion becomes all the more certain and inevitable when the circumstantial evidence is considered together with accusedappellant's extrajudicial confession and his own testimony in open court. -BACK TO TOPContributors: | Christel Allena; Angel Alonso; Margarita Baa; Jeff De Gulan; Jeseth De Vera; Angelo Dizon; Lawrence Holanday; Leslie Jose; K.C. Ochoa;
138
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death. Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides for the imposition of the
death penalty when, by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed.
2.
The trial court erred, however, in fixing the civil indemnity at P50,000.00. In People vs. Robles, Jr. and in subsequent cases,
this Court ruled that where homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the civil indemnity shall be not less than
P100,000.00.
The trial court likewise erred in granting the heirs of the deceased victim an additional amount of P21,307.00 representing
funeral expenses. Under Art. 2199 of the Civil Code, a party is entitled to compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
proven. The recovery thereof must be premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, by the
injured party showing the actual expenses incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim. The list of expenses
incurred for the wake, funeral, and burial of the victim amounting to P21,307.00 submitted by Arlene's father is self-serving and not
proved. Thus, the trial court's award of funeral expenses cannot be affirmed.
However, the reason Arlene's father was unable to present the receipt for the funeral parlor was because the latter's
representative refused to issue a receipt until he had fully paid the entire amount, which he had not done at the time of the trial. Under
Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered if it is shown that such party suffered some pecuniary loss but the
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. As there is no doubt the heirs of the victim incurred funeral
expenses, although the amount thereof has not been proven, it is appropriate to awardP15,000.00 by way of temperate damages to
the heirs of the victim.
In addition, the heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in accordance with Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code for the physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock caused by the manner by which Arlene was raped
and killed.
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim, Arlene Ipurong, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as temperate damages, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. -BACK TO TOP-
139
12. Albert vs University Publishing
FACTS: In 1948 the Mariano Albert and University Publishing Co. Inc. entered into a contract whereby, for and in consideration of the
exclusive right to publish or cause to be published a manuscript containing commentaries on" The Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended until July 15, 1948," written by the plaintiff, for a period of five years from the date of execution of the
contract, provided that the total number of copies to be printed within said period shall not be more than 4,000 copies; of the
liquidated balance due the plaintiff as his share in the sale of the reprinted copies of the book as stipulated in a contract executed on
21 May 1946 by and between him and the defendant corporation; and of the liquidated share of the plaintiff in the sale of 1,500
reprinted copies of the book, the defendant corporation undertook to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30,000 in eight quarterly
installments of P3,750 each, beginning 15 July 1948. It is also agreed that should the defendant fail to pay to the plaintiff any one of
the eight installments referred to when due, the rest of the installments shall be deemed due and payable, whether there is judicial or
extrajudicial demand made by the plaintiff. In this event, the plaintiff shall take charge of the publication of this book, and in case it
has already been published, will take over the sale and distribution of the printed book, without any right on the part of the PARTY
defendant to participate in its proceeds
That the plaintiff obligates himself to deliver to the defendant the manuscript in its final form not later than December 31, 1948;
provided, however, that the defendant shall have no right to make any change in the manuscript as prepared by the plaintiff who, if
the circumstances do permit, must stamp his approval in the printers final proof.
In the event of the impossibility for the plaintiff to deliver the manuscript complete by December 31, 1948, the defendant shall no
longer be under obligation to pay the installments remaining payable by virtue of the provisions of the contract, unless the plaintiff
undertakes to complete the same by inserting the latest decisions of the Supreme Court as digested and/or commented upon by the
plaintiff.
The defendant corporation paid P1,000 to the plaintiff on 31 July 1948; P1,000 on 10 September 1948; P2,000 on 10 November 1948
P2,000 on 29 November 1948; and P1,000 on 24 December 1948, or a total of P7,000. The defendant corporation made no other or
further payment to the plaintiff on account of the contract.
The evidence for the plaintiff shows that on 16 December 1948 he wrote a letter advising the defendant corporation that "The
manuscript of my Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, subject matter of our Contract executed on the 19th of July this year, is
now at your disposal."
The plaintiff claims that the defendant corporation breached the contract when it failed to pay the full amount of the installment for the
first quarter on or before 15 October 1948, the last day within which to pay it. The defendant corporation contends that the plaintiff
failed to deliver to it the manuscript in its final form not later than 31 December 1948 as stipulated in paragraph 7 of the contract.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering the defendant corporation to pay to the Administrator of the estate of the late Mariano
A. Albert, who died during the pendency of the case, the sum of P23,000, interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint,
and costs.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the counterclaim of the defendant for the reason that the total amount sought to be recovered by the
defendant corporation exceeds P50,000. Hence this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not Albert is entitled to liquidated damages.
RULING: With this modification as to the amount of liquidated damages, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
The stipulation in paragraph 4 of the contract may be considered as liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach of the contract.
The defendant corporation has not paid the share of the plaintiff in the proceeds of the sale of the first 1,000 copies of the book
printed and sold by the defendant corporation as agreed upon in the contract entered into by and between the parties on 21 May
1946. In the original and amended answers of the defendant corporation it is alleged that said copies remained unsold, but on the
witness stand Jose M. Aruego, President of the defendant corporation, admitted that 800 copies thereof had been sold. There is also a
share due the plaintiff in the sale of 1,500 reprinted copies of the book. But how much that share amounts to, the evidence does not
throw any light, in like manner that there is no evidence to show how much is due the plaintiff as his share in the sale of 800 copies of
the book.
140
Although the defendant corporation breached the contract, as found by the trial court, and there is no reason which may find support
in the evidence for disturbing such finding, yet we believe that in the absence of evidence to show the amount that should accrue to
the plaintiff as his share in the proceeds of the sale of 1,000 copies of the book and of 1,500 copies of the reprinted book that were in
press when the contract of 19 July 1948 was entered into, and the amount of profits that the plaintiff would derive from the sale of the
books to be printed, as agreed upon in the contract of 19 July 1948, the amount of liquidated damages is rather excessive, because
even if the books were sold at P40, P35 or P30, as hinted by Aruego in his testimony, the cost of paper, printing, binding, advertising,
sales promotion and other incidental disbursements should be deducted from the gross proceeds. For that reason and in accordance
with the provisions of article 2227 of the new Civil Code, the reasonable amount of liquidated damages that must be awarded to the
plaintiff as a result of the breach by the defendant corporation of the contract is equitably reduced to P15,000. -BACK TO TOP-
141
13. NPC vs National Merchandising
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) and National Merchandising Corporation (NAMERCO), the Philippine representative of New
York-based International Commodities Corporation, executed a contract of sale of sulfur with a stipulation for liquidated damages in
case of breach. Domestic Insurance Company executed a performance bond in favor of NPC to guarantee the seller's obligation. In
entering into the contract, Namerco, however, did not disclose to NPC that Namerco's principal stated that the sale was subject to
availability of a steamer, and contrary to its principal's instruction, Namerco agreed that non-availability of a steamer was not a
justification for non-payment of liquidated damages. The New York supplier was not able to deliver the sulfur due to its inability to
secure shipping space. Consequently, the Government Corporate Counsel rescinded the contract of sale due to the supplier's nonperformance of its obligations, and demanded payment of liquidated damages from both Namerco and the surety. Thereafter, NPC
sued for recovery of the stipulated liquidated damages.
ISSUE: whether the defendants are liable for interest and nominal damages
HELD:
With respect to the imposition of the legal rate of interest on the damages from the filing of the complaint in 1957, or a
quarter of a century ago, defendants contention is meritorious. It would be manifestly inequitable to collect interest on the damages
especially considering that the disposition of this case has been considerably delayed due to no fault of the defendants.
The contention that only nominal damages should be adjudged is contrary to the intention of the parties (NPC, Namerco and
its surety) because it is clearly provided that liquidated damages are recoverable for delay in the delivery of the sulfur and, with more
reason, for non-delivery.
No proof of pecuniary loss is required for the recovery of liquidated damages. The stipulation for liquidated damages is
intended to obviate controversy on the amount of damages. There can be no question that the NPC suffered damages because its
production of fertilizer was disrupted or diminished by reason of the non-delivery of the sulfur.
The parties foresaw that it might be difficult to ascertain the exact amount of damages for non-delivery of the sulfur. So, they
fixed the liquidated damages to be paid as indemnity to the NPC.
Nominal damages: On the other hand, nominal damages are damages in name only or are in fact the same as no damages. It
would not be correct to hold in this case that the NPC suffered damages in name only or that the breach of contract was merely
technical in character. -BACK TO TOP-
142
14. Ledesma vs CA
FACTS:
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late
Violeta Delmo as treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school.
The petitioner, as President of the School, claims that said act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, he
sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a
candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. The Director, in his decision, sustained the penalty
against the adviser of the Club and the dropping of the officers and members from said club. However, the Director is convinced the
Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, when she extended the loans. In Resolution No. 2 of the Club, the
Club Treasure, as approved by the club Adviser, is authorized to discharge funds.
With this finding of negligence on the part of the club adviser, the Director found that it was too severe and unwarranted that portion
of the questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation from this school or any
organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and she alone has maintained
her scholarship. The decision in question would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with
honors.
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the case. On the same day,
petitioner received a telegram stating the following: "AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE". The Director asked for
the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the
same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The
petitioner, in turn, sent a letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a
copy thereof.
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive
Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students,
the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he
believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor,
"Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in filing an action for damages against the petitioner. During the
pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as
her sole and only heirs.
The RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses Delmo. It found that the petitioners acted in bad faith.
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for
nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent CA erred in affirming the trial courts finding that the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27
of the New Civil Code
RULING:
No. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty
and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
143
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission."
The Solicitor-General tried to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of
the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to
enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent
it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner
should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the
petitioner likewise failed to do.
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the
name implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good.
However, the Court did not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual
capacity, separately from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the
decision is modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf. -BACK TO TOP-
144
15. LTB Co vs Diasanta

FACTS:
On 28 July 1958, Rufina Diasanta (respondent) boarded at Atimonan, Quezon, Bus No. 29 of Laguna-Tayabas Transportation
Co. (petitioner) bound for Manila.
The bus driver, Henry Betito drove and operated it so recklessly.
Upon nearing the town of Pagbilao, the bus went off the asphalted part of the road on to the shoulder thereof. Because of the
holes and the ruts on that portion ad of the excessive speed of the bus, the same jumped up and down so violently.
Respondent was jerked from her seat to the floor with such force that she suffered a fracture in her vertebrae.
She was taken to a clinic in San Pablo City and later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal
where she was placed in a cast, immobilizing her for several months.
She demanded for corresponding indemnity but to no avail.
CFI: She filed an action for damages and CFI ruled in favor of her sentencing the petitioner to pay: Reimbursement for actual
expenses, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees.
CA: Affirmed. Deleted the award of Moral damages and reduced Exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to damages.
RULING:
YES.
SC maintains the awards of actual and consequential damages.
As regards exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Petitioners driver was found guilty of recklessness. Moreso, under Article 2208, attorneys fees other than judicial costs may
be awarded when exemplary damages are awarded.
It is to be noted that in the cases of Bautista vs Lovina and Alegre vs Batangas Transportation Co. are not applicable in the
present case. In Bautista case, there was no finding of recklessness, and in the Alegre case, the bus driver had not acted
recklessly, and the injured party therein contributed to the occurrence of the accident which factors are not present in this
case.
Also, the courts have discretion to grant or not to grant exemplary damages and that the circumstances obtaining in this case
do not warrant interference with the exercise of such discretion by the lower courts.
AFFIRMED. -BACK TO TOP-
145
BATCH 07
1.
Sea Commercial vs CA
Facts:
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery, products and equipment.
On September 20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer
in the City and Province of Iloilo. Tirso Jamandre executed a suretyship agreement binding himself jointly and severally with JII to pay
for all obligations of JII to SEACOM.
The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a
non-exclusive basis. In the course of the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries,
and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and attorney's fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing unrealized profits when SEACOM
sold to the Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) 21 units of Mitsubishi power tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a
dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in 1977 24 units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers to be financed by said
corporation, which fact JII allegedly made known to petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith,
went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and 21 units of said tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit P85,415.61.11
Petitioner SEACOM invokes the non-exclusivity clause in the dealership agreement and claims that the transaction with FSDC was
concluded pursuant to a public bidding and not on the basis of alleged information it received from private respondent Tirso Jamandre.
Moreover, petitioner SEACOM claims that it did not underprice its products during the public bidding wherein both SEACOM and JII
participated. Petitioner also disputes the award of moral damages to JII which is a corporation, in the absence of any evidence that the
said corporation had a good reputation which was debased.
The RTC found that JII was an agent of SEACOM and the act of SEACOM in dealing directly with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its
agent, and that there was fraud in the transaction between FSDC and SEACOM to the prejudice of JII. The following awards were
made:
1) To pay defendant the sum of P66,156.15 (minus 18,843.85) with legal interest thereon, from the date of the filing of the
counterclaim until fully paid;
2) To pay defendant P2,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
3) To pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
On the other hand, the CA ruled that there was no agency relationship between the parties but SEACOM is nevertheless liable in
damages for having acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer in the sale of the farm machineries to FSDC. Both courts
invoke as basis for the award Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Issue: won SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries to
FSDC. yes
Held:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or
bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all
information or belief of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as
understood by men of affairs.
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the "cardinal law on human conduct" expressed in said
article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his
duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of
rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By appointing as a dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized the role
and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as a middleman to sell
SEACOM's products, in its area of operations, i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of other places, to send its men to Manila
146
for training on repair, servicing and installation of the items to be handled by it, and to comply with other personnel and vehicle
requirements intended for the benefit of the dealership. After being informed of the demonstrations JII had conducted to promote the
sales of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JII's expense conducted for 5 months, and the approval of its facilities (service
and parts) by FSDC, SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a lower price, placing itself in direct competition with
its own dealer. The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.
Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted. This provision, together with the succeeding article on human relation, was intended to
embody certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human being and for the stability of the
social order." What is sought to be written into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.
We accordingly resolve to affirm the award for unrealized profits. The CA noted that the trial court failed to specify to which the two
appellees the award for moral and exemplary damages in granted. However, in view of the fact that moral damages are not as a
general rule granted to a corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who testified on his feeling very aggrieved and on his
mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how SEACOM "dealt with us behind (our) backs", the award should go to defendant
Jamandre, President of JII. -BACK TO TOP-
147
2.
Hermosisima vs CA
FACTS:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High
School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as
engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after
coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the
child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the
birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court
of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in
connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral
damages to P7,000.00 on the ground that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her
love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and,
therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE: 1. WON moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.
2. WON Article 2219 par. 3 is applicable in this case to award moral damages.
HELD:
1. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of
promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of
the American States.
2. The general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of
Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as
such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." -BACK TO TOP-
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3.
St. Louis Realty vs CA
FACTS:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation
misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue
of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the
photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the following write-up:
Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been captured by
BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for
the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans
took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house ... for
P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class subdivision
planned for wholesome family living.
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the
faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the a letter
of protest.
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the
advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published.
Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages. In its answer, St. Louis Realty claimed that
there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times. It published in the
issue of the Manila Times a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to
Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.
Aramil filed his complaint for damages. Subsequently, St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times a
Rectification.
Notice of
Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as
a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was
reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy.
RTC: awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
CA: affirmed that judgment. Reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who,
naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps.
St. Louis Realty filed an appeal contending that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity
with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence"
and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".
ISSUE: Whether or not St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil. YES
RULING: The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows
moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the
firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like
the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed.
He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. -BACK TO TOP-
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4.
Yakult Phils vs CA
FACTS:
On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado. Salvado was charged
with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries.
On October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult
Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317.
In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989 ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff
the sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals challenging
the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case.
Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without
malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is
expressly made.
ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil
action?
RULING: The petition is denied.
Under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the
offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly
informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.
The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi delict as defined under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176
of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was
instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed
thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation
that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or
omission.
Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil action brought before it. -BACK TO TOP-
150
5.
Aberca vs Ver
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver
to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila, Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided
several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs
were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned
by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each
or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's
fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by
the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function.
RTC: granted the motion to dismiss- sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants' contention
(1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to
them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
(2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and
(3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the
complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of
Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the
duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180
of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution NO
We find respondents invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents
actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of
President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive
strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untrammelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual
citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high
or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges
are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a
damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by
the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim
of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the
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petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net
result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the
mere expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional
rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
It is wrong to at the plaintiffs action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to acts of alleged physical violence which constituted delict
or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional
rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs constitutional rights and liberties
mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches
made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without
proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal
nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal
circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of safehouses where they were kept incommunicado and subjected
to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory
statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
2.
May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated? - YES
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent
superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or
employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is
not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible
has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he
does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing
damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and
jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on
the face of the complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others,
should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. -BACK TO TOP-
152
6.
Meralco vs CA
Facts:
On Feb. 12, 1948, Pedro Velasco purchased 3 lots from Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) located at the corner of
South D and South 6 Sts, Q.C.
The Deed of Sale provided that :
o The properties sold shall be used exclusively for residential purposes and no business shall be allowed within the premises.
o The vendor shall have the right to enter the premises to install electric lines/ utilities for the community.
o Violation of the terms shall entitle vendor to rescind the sale, seek cancellation of title, repossess the property, and dispose of
the same as if there had been no previous sale.
o Terms and conditions are binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the parties.
The terms and conditions were annotated, but not word for word, on the title issued to Velasco.
On Jan 31, 1952, Velasco sold 2 of the 3 lots to MERALCO, which established a substation therein the following year. A letter by
Velasco to MERALCO dated Sept. 26, 1953 asked for technical assurance that the electric substation is not dangerous to neighbors
nor would it be a nuisance.
On Nov 29, 1954, Velasco wrote a letter to MERALCO, calling the attention of the latter on the effects of the substation that the
Velasco and his family tried to tolerate for a while. This included the severe noise and electrification of the ground and the artesian
well, which made life of the family unbearable and made the residential district dangerous.
On Feb. 1, 1955 Velasco filed a Nuisance Case against MERALCO before the CFI of Rizal, praying for the removal and abatement of
the substation with damages. CFI Rizal dismissed the complaint, but the SC (on appeal) ordered MERALCO to either transfer the
substation or take appropriate measures to reduce the noise between its property and the Velascos to an average of 40 to 50
decibels within 90 days from finality of the decision.
On Nov. 23, 1957, during the pendency of the previous case, Velasco filed a second action, a Cancellation Case, for rescission of
the sale of the property between Meralco and Velasco and to collect rentals while the former is still in possession of the same. CFI
dismissed it for splitting of cause of action. The CA reversed the decision, considering that abatement of a nuisance was distinct and
separate from rescission of contract of sale.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Velasco has a cause of action against Meralco. No.
2. Whether or not MERALCOs substation is a commercial/ non-residential establishment.- No.
3. Whether or not the filing of the Cancellation Case is barred by estoppel. Yes.
Ruling: Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, complaint DISMISSED.
1. It is the original vendor, not the vendee, who later sold the property to another, who has right of cause of action against
assignee of vendee for alleged violation of condition that only constructions exclusively for residential purposes shall be built on
the property. The requirement in the PHHC-Velasco contract was binding on VELASCO and MERALCO as his assignee. That contract
implies that it is PHHC itself which has the right of action against the assignee of VELASCO. Cancellation of the title to the PROPERTY
would be by virtue of the condition imposed in the PHHC-VELASCO contract, and not by virtue of the contract between VELASCO and
MERALCO. If title to the property is cancelled, and PHHC repossesses, no damage will be suffered by VELASCO who had already sold
and had received the value thereof. The damage will be borne solely by MERALCO.
2. From the PHHC or community point of view, Construction of an electric substation by a local electric public service
company within the subdivision is within the term residential purposes Residences are expected to be furnished with
electrical connection. Without such, because of the lack of a substation, the residences within the entire subdivision area could be
valueless for residential purposes. Also, while the property is in a residential district, authorities of Q.C. granted a permit for the
construction of the substation, thereby conceding that a substation is not necessarily nonresidential.
3. Where a party failed to object to the construction of an electric substation within the property but merely asked for
assurance that the substation would not be dangerous or be a nuisance, he was guilty of contractual estoppel. What
was ultimately objected to by VELASCO was the noise of the substation, but there was no original and timely objection to the
establishment itself of the substation as being not for residential purposes. If there had been no noise whatsoever from the substation,
no controversy would have arisen.
Acts done by the parties to a contract in the course of its performance are admissible in evidence upon the question of its meaning as
being their own contemporaneous interpretation of its terms. VELASCO should be held as estopped from seeking cancellation of his
sale of the property to MERALCO because the substation, while it was being built, was considered by Velasco as not violative of the
requirement for residential purposes.
There was no split of a single cause of action. The principle applicable would be estoppel by judgment or collateral estoppel by
judgment. An issue resolved in one cause of action cannot be relitigated in a subsequent case filed on a different
cause of action to obviate multiplicity of suits. -BACK TO TOP-
153
7.
J Nakpil vs CA
Facts:
Philippine Bar Association decided to construct an office building on its 840 sq. meters lot located at the corner of Aduana and
Arzobispo Streets, Intramuros, Manila. For the plans, specifications and design, PBA contracted the services of third-party defendantsappellants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil. For the construction of the building, PBA contracted the services of United
Construction Company, Inc. on an administration basis. The building was completed in June 1966.On Aug. 2, 1968, an unusually strong
earthquake hit Manila and its environs and the building in question sustained major damage. The front columns of the building buckled
causing the building to tilt forward dangerously. As a temporary remedial measure, the building was shored up by UCCI at the expense
of P13,661.28.On Nov. 29, 1968, PBA commenced this action for recovery of damages against UCCI and its President and General
Manager Juan J. Carlos, claiming that the collapse of the building was caused by defects in the construction. UNITED, in turn, filed a
third-party complaint against the NAKPILS, alleging in essence that the collapse of the building was due to the defects in the architects
plans, specifications and design. Roman Ozaeta, the then President of PBA, was included as a third-party defendant for damages for having
included Juan J.Carlos, President of UNITED as party defendant .At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to refer the technical issues in the
case to a commissioner Hizon, a lawyer and structural engineer, was appointed by the Court as commissioner.
Meanwhile, PBA moved twice for the demolition of the building on the ground that it might topple down in case of a strong
earthquake. The motions were opposed by the defendants and the matter was referred to the Commissioner. Finally, on April 30,1979,
the building was authorized to be demolished at the expense of PBA, but not before another earthquake of high intensity on April 7,
1970followed by other strong earthquakes on April 9 and12, 1970, caused further damage to the property. The actual demolition was
undertaken by the buyer of the damaged buiding .After the protracted hearings, the Commissioner eventually submitted his report on
Sept. 25,1970 with the findings that while the damage sustained by the PBA building was caused directly by the Aug. 2, 1968
earthquake, they were also caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared by the NAKPILS; UNITEDs deviations from
said plans and specifications and its failure to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of the building; and failure of PBA
to exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of the building .All the parties registered their objections to aforesaid findings which
in turn were answered by the Commissioner. The court agreed with the findings of the Commissioner except as to the holding that the
owner is charged with full time supervision of the construction. The court saw no legal or contractual basis for such conclusion. Thus,
on Sept. 21, 1971, the lower court rendered a decision, Ordering defendant United Construction Co., Inc. and third-party defendants
(except Ozaeta),the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate from Nov. 29,1968, the date of the filing of thecomplaint until
full payment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the above said decision of the lower court to include an award of P200,000.00
in favor of plaintiff-appellant Philippine Bar Association, with interest at the legal rate from Nov. 29, 1968 until full payment to be paid
jointly and severally by defendant United Construction Co.,Inc. and third-party defendants(except Ozaeta).
Issue: Wheteher or not United and Nakpil should held liable
Held:
There should be no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED are liable for the damage resulting from the partial and eventual
collapse of the PBA building as a result of the earthquakes.
There is no question that an earthquake and other forces of nature such as cyclones, drought, floods, lightning, and perils of
the sea are acts of God. It does not necessarily follow, however, that specific losses and suffering resulting from the occurrence of
these natural force are also acts of God. We are not convinced on the basis of the evidence on record that from the thousands of
structures in Manila, God singled out the blameless PBA building in Intramuros and around six or seven other buildings in various parts
of the city for collapse or severe damage and that God alone was responsible for the damages and losses thus suffered.
The record is replete with evidence of defects and deficiencies in the designs and plans, defective construction, poor workmanship,
deviation from plans and specifications and other imperfections. These deficiencies are attributable to negligent men and not to a
perfect God.
The act-of-God arguments of the defendantsappellants and third party defendants-appellants presented in their briefs are
premised on legal generalizations or speculations and on theological fatalism both of which ignore the plain facts. The lengthy
discussion of United on ordinary earthquakes and unusually strong earthquakes and on ordinary fortuitous events and extraordinary
fortuitous events leads to its argument that the August 2, 1968 earthquake was of such an overwhelming and destructive character
that by its own force and independent of the particular negligence alleged, the injury would have been produced. If we follow this line
of speculative reasoning, we will be forced to conclude that under such a situation scores of buildings in the vicinity and in other parts
of Manila would have toppled down. Following the same line of reasoning, Nakpil and Sons alleges that the designs were adequate in
accordance with pre-August 2, 1968 knowledge and appear inadequate only in the light of engineering information acquired after the
earthquake. If this were so, hundreds of ancient buildings which survived the earthquake better than the two-year old PBA building
must have been designed and constructed by architects and contractors whose knowledge and foresight were unexplainably auspicious
and prophetic. Fortunately, the facts on record allow a more down to earth explanation of the collapse. The failure of the PBA building,
as a unique and distinct construction with no reference or comparison to other buildings, to weather the severe earthquake forces was
154
traced to design deficiencies and defective construction, factors which are neither mysterious nor esoteric. The theological allusion of
appellant United that God acts in mysterious ways His wonders to perform impresses us to be inappropriate. The evidence reveals
defects and deficiencies in design and construction. There is no mystery about these acts of negligence. The collapse of the PBA
building was no wonder performed by God. It was a result of the imperfections in the work of the architects and the people in the
construction company. More relevant to our mind is the lesson from the parable of the wise man in the Sermon on the Mount "which
built his house upon a rock; and the rain descended and the floods came and the winds blew and beat upon that house; and it fen not;
for it was founded upon a rock" and of the "foolish upon the sand. And the rain descended and man which built his house the floods
came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell and great was the fall of it. (St. Matthew 7: 24-27)." The requirement
that a building should withstand rains, floods, winds, earthquakes, and natural forces is precisely the reason why we have professional
experts like architects, and engineers. Designs and constructions vary under varying circumstances and conditions but the requirement
to design and build well does not change.
The findings of the lower Court on the cause of the collapse are more rational and accurate. Instead of laying the blame solely
on the motions and forces generated by the earthquake, it also examined the ability of the PBA building, as designed and constructed,
to withstand and successfully weather those forces.
The evidence sufficiently supports a conclusion that the negligence and fault of both United and Nakpil and Sons, not a
mysterious act of an inscrutable God, were responsible for the damages. The Report of the Commissioner, Plaintiff's Objections to the
Report, Third Party Defendants' Objections to the Report, Defendants' Objections to the Report, Commissioner's Answer to the various
Objections, Plaintiffs' Reply to the Commissioner's Answer, Defendants' Reply to the Commissioner's Answer, Counter-Reply to
Defendants' Reply, and Third-Party Defendants' Reply to the Commissioner's Report not to mention the exhibits and the testimonies
show that the main arguments raised on appeal were already raised during the trial and fully considered by the lower Court. A
reiteration of these same arguments on appeal fails to convince us that we should reverse or disturb the lower Court's factual findings
and its conclusions drawn from the facts Again, the Court concurs in the findings of the Commissioner on these issues and fails to find
any sufficient cause to disregard or modify the same. As found by the Commissioner, the "deviations made by the defendants from the
plans and specifications caused indirectly the damage sustained and that those deviations not only added but also aggravated the
damage caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared by third-party defendants.
The afore-mentioned facts clearly indicate the wanton negligence of both the defendant and the third-party defendants in
effecting the plans, designs, specifications, and construction of the PBA building and We hold such negligence as equivalent to bad
faith in the performance of their respective tasks.
reads:
Relative thereto, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Tucker v. Milan (49 O.G. 4379, 4380) which may be in point in this case
One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof,
although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss. As already
discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity were hardly affected
by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage
would not have occurred. -BACK TO TOP-
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8.
Ty vs Court of Appeals
1. private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and
void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the
parties.
2. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in
ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay.
3. Respondent filed a Civil Case with the RTC of Pasig, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void for lack of
marriage license and that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
4. Petitioner pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their
Marriage License No. issued at Rosario, Cavite. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence.
5. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City which declared null and void his
civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August
27, 1977. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment
declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed.
ISUUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?
Held:
1. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Indeed we find there was a
marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage.
That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the
church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the
first.
Issue: Damages
9.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although the appellate court admitted that they
found private respondent acted duplicitously and craftily in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the
latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.
10. No damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would
have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.
11. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.
Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation. There are other remedies. -BACK TO TOP-
156
9.
De Guzman vs CA
Facts: Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Upon
gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) sixwheeler trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles
with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged
freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates.
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company
(Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a
warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 December 1970. Accordingly, on 1
December 1970, respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by
respondent himself, while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada, respondent's driver
and employee.
Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck
which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with
them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo.
RTC Decision: Found private respondent to be a common carrier and holding him liable for the value of the undelivered goods (P
22,150.00) as well as for P 4,000.00 as damages and P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
CA Decison: Reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of
freight "as a casual occupation a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not as a common carrier.
Issues:
Held:
W/N private respondent is a common carrier.

W/N respondent is liable for the value of the undelivered cargo.
Yes. Ernesto Cendana may be properly characterized as a common carrier.
The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.
It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "backhauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather
than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private respondent'sprincipal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others.
There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below
commercial freight rates is not relevant here.
No, respondent is not liable.
Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
It is important to point out that the above list is a closed list. Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to
constitute a species of force majeure fall within the scope of Article 1735, which provides as follows:
In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed
or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.
In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo. The
157
record shows in Criminal Case No. 198 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon Presno, Armando Mesina, Oscar
Oria and one John Doe." There, the accused were charged with willfully and unlawfully taking and carrying away with them the second
truck, driven by Manuel Estrada and loaded with the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk destined for delivery at petitioner's store in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The decision of the trial court shows that the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or
force. Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo but also
kidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them for several days and later releasing them in another province (in Zambales).
In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of
the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made
absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be
foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
We do not believe that in the instant case, the standard of extraordinary diligence required private respondent to retain a
security guard to ride with the truck and to engage brigands in a firelight at the risk of his own life and the lives of the driver and his
helper.
Under Article 1745 (6), a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such
responsibility even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat,
violence or force."
The petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. -BACK TO TOP-
158
10. Aberlardo Lim vs CA

FACTS: Sometime in 1982 private respondent Donato Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Gomercino Vallarta, holder
of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of public utility vehicles plying the Monumento-Bulacan route. While Gonzales
continued offering the jeepney for public transport services he did not have the registration of the vehicle transferred in his name nor
did he secure for himself a certificate of public convenience for its operation. Thus Vallarta remained on record as its registered owner
and operator.
On 1990, while the jeepney was running northbound along the North Diversion Road somewhere in Meycauayan, Bulacan, it collided
with a ten-wheeler-truck owned by petitioner Abelardo Lim and driven by his co-petitioner Esmadito Gunnaban. Gunnaban owned
responsibility for the accident, explaining that while he was traveling towards Manila the truck suddenly lost its brakes. To avoid
colliding with another vehicle, he swerved to the left until he reached the center island. However, as the center island eventually came
to an end, he veered farther to the left until he smashed into a Ferroza automobile, and later, into private respondent's passenger
jeepney driven by one Virgilio Gonzales. The impact caused severe damage to both the Ferroza and the passenger jeepney and left one
(1) passenger dead and many others wounded.
Lim shouldered the costs for hospitalization of the wounded, compensated the heirs of the deceased passenger, and had the Ferroza
restored to good condition. He also negotiated with private respondent and offered to have the passenger jeepney repaired at his
shop. Private respondent however did not accept the offer so Lim offered him P20,000.00, the assessment of the damage as estimated
by his chief mechanic. Again, petitioner Lim's proposition was rejected; instead, private respondent demanded a brand-new jeep or the
amount of P236,000.00. Lim increased his bid to P40,000.00 but private respondent was unyielding. Under the circumstances,
negotiations had to be abandoned; hence, the filing of the complaint for damages by private respondent against petitioners.
Meanwhile, the damaged passenger jeepney was left by the roadside to corrode and decay.
The trial court upheld private respondent's claim and awarded him P236,000.00 with legal interest from 22 July 1990 as compensatory
damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the new owner is entitled for damages despite the fact that he is not the registered owner under the certificate
of public convenience?
RULING: WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision awarding private respondent Donato Gonzales P236,000.00 with legal interest from 22
July 1990 as compensatory damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees is MODIFIED. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be computed from the time the judgment of the lower court is made until the finality of this Decision. If the adjudged
principal and interest remain unpaid thereafter, the interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time
judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.
The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons
who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings.
It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the
person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy
therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved.
In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system does not exist. First,
neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages. Second, the case arose from the negligence of
another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of
the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said
that private respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for leading the public to believe that the
jeepney belonged to the registered owner. Third, the riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal
arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the
damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right.
In awarding damages for tortuous injury, it becomes the sole design of the courts to provide for adequate compensation by putting the
plaintiff in the same financial position he was in prior to the tort. In the present case, petitioners insist that as the passenger jeepney
was purchased in 1982 for only P30,000.00 to award damages considerably greater than this amount would be improper and
unjustified. Petitioners are at best reminded that indemnification for damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but
also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. In other words, indemnification for damages is not limited to damnum
emergens or actual loss but extends to lucrum cessans or the amount of profit lost.
Had private respondent's jeepney not met an accident it could reasonably be expected that it would have continued earning from the
business in which it was engaged. Private respondent avers that he derives an average income of P300.00 per day from his passenger
jeepney and this earning was included in the award of damages made by the trial court and upheld by the appeals court. The award
therefore of P236,000.00 as compensatory damages is not beyond reason nor speculative as it is based on a reasonable estimate of
the total damage suffered by private respondent, i.e. damage wrought upon his jeepney and the income lost from his transportation
business. Petitioners for their part did not offer any substantive evidence to refute the estimate made by the courts a quo.
However, we are constrained to depart from the conclusion of the lower courts that upon the award of compensatory damages legal
interest should be imposed beginning 22 July 1990, i.e.the date of the accident. Upon the provisions of Art. 2213 of the Civil Code,
159
interest "cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty." It is axiomatic that if the suit were for damages, unliquidated and not known until definitely ascertained, assessed and
determined by the courts after proof, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum should be from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to be reasonably ascertained).
In this case, the matter was not a liquidated obligation as the assessment of the damage on the vehicle was heavily debated upon by
the parties with private respondent's demand for P236,000.00 being refuted by petitioners who argue that they could have the vehicle
repaired easily for P20,000.00. In fine, the amount due private respondent was not a liquidated account that was already demandable
and payable. -BACK TO TOP-
160
11. DAWA vs DE ASA

Facts:
Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan
City, was charged with "sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness" in a letter-complaint dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride
Dawa, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto and Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, who assisted the aforementioned
complainants, also filed, on September 5, 1997, an affidavit-complaint against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual harassment under
Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and [for] violation [of] the high standard of moral[s]
demanded by judicialethics .
Judge claimed that all these charges were obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated. He accused the Clerk of Court,
Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, as the "prime mover of this cabal" and that aside from her there were "other people behind the
conspiracy" and said that the complaints were set up, hatched and designed, to destabilize and destroy the good image of the
undersigned created in the minds of party litigants, government, local as well as private concerns, in Caloocan City. Although, known to
be strict [in] fining lawyers, litigants, court personnel and even himself, for unsatisfactory and unexpected justifications for violations of
court rules and procedures, he had gained respect and admiration for his reasonable, well-balanced, compassionate and well-meant
application of the rule of law.
Issue : Whether Judge de Asa is guilty of allegations

Held:
YES.
In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his
subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of
the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at
large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because
they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for theemployee[s]." Let it be remembered that
respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. Let
it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of
which he is an officer. In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official responsibility over the
complainants, who were his subordinates in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Court concludes with moral certainty that
he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for
persons like him.
Add'l note on damages: a claim for damages under anti-sexual harassment act r.a. 7877 is based on crime. The offended party is not
precluded from filing separate action for damages and other affirmative relief under the civil code. -BACK TO TOP-
161
12. Floralde vs CA
Note: The ones in bold text in the Ruling part have been cited in the book of Dean Pineda. I added the annotation in the end
as to the liability of the employer as discussed in the said book
FACTS:
Petitioners, employees of the ATI, charged respondent Paulino Resma with grave misconduct in office (sexual harassment) in
3 separate complaints filed directly with the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
After a formal investigation and hearing of the case, the CSC was convinced that the complainants had proven the guilt of the
respondent with substantial evidence. It then issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and meted out
the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the Commission erred because the decision was not supported
by evidence. The motion was denied.
The CA reversed and set aside the resolutions of the CSC.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission on the ground that
the same were not supported by substantial evidence
RULING:
The sexual harassment charges against Resma were filed by three (3) rank and file employees of the
Agricultural Training Institute, where respondent Paulino Resma is OIC. Being rank and file employees, they
were all reporting to their superior, Paulino Resma. Their time records were signed by the latter. Sexual
harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire; it is
about power being exercised by a superior officer over his women subordinates. The power emanates from the
fact that the superior can remove the subordinate from his workplace if the latter would refuse his amorous
advances.
This is the situation at bar. Respondent Resma alleged that the Civil Service Commission erred in its resolutions since the
petitioners were unable to prove his guilt by the quantum of substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings.
The Court does not agree. The evidence adduced before the Commission consists of the positive testimonies of petitioners. On
the other hand, respondent claimed that it was impossible for him to be at the office on the days that the sexual harassment
occurred. In other words, respondent presented an alibi.
Respondent's defense is that the complaints were instigated by a certain Atty. Ola, who was his rival for
promotion. The defense alleged that the three complaining petitioners were all convinced by Atty. Ola to file
charges against respondent Resma so that he would be out of contention for promotion.
The Court is not convinced that all three women would prevaricate at the mere urging of Atty. Ola. Filing a
charge for sexual harassment is not a trivial matter. It entails having to go public with an incident that one is
trying to forget. It means opening oneself to public ridicule and scrutiny. The Court, therefore, cannot believe
the version of the defense that the charges were all fabricated.
As to the issue of whether the resolution of the Civil Service Commission is supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds
that, in fact, preponderant evidence supported its findings.
** Liability of Employer in Sexual Harassment Committed By An Employee Against Another Employee

-
When there is sexual harassment as defined by RA No. 7877, the employer is made liable solidarily with the offender, if
the former after having been informed of the act by the offended party did not make any immediate action against the
offender.
A claim for damages under the above law is based on a crime.
(Torts and Damages, Pineda)

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Case Digests - Torts and Damages

[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]

Case Digests - Torts and Damages

Barredo vs. Garcia

Robles vs. Yap Wing

FGU Insurance vs. CA

287 SCRA 718

So Ping Bun vs. CA

314 SCRA 751

Jarco Marketing vs. CA

321 SCRA 375

332 SCRA 356

People vs. Delos Santos

355 SCRA 415

Sanitary Steam Laundry vs. CA

10. Phoenix vs. IAC

148 SCRA 353

11. Batangas Laguna vs. IAC

167 SCRA 379

12. Air France vs. Carrascoso

272 SCRA 752

14. Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital

341 SCRA 760

15. Ramos vs. CA

321 SCRA 584

250 SCRA 195

Mansion Biscuit Corporation vs. CA

People vs. Elizalde (NOT FOUND

Vda de Bataclan vs. Medina

102 PHIL 181

Ma-ao Sugar Central vs. CA

Taylor vs. Manila Electric

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC

148 SCRA 353

Ong vs. Metro Water District

104 PHIL 397

Hidalgo vs. Balandan

10. Picart vs. Smith

11. De Roy vs. CA

157 SCRA 757

12. Bustamante vs. CA

193 SCRA 603

13. Windvalley Shipping vs. CA

342 SCRA 214

14. Africa vs. Caltex

123 PHIL 272

15. Espiritu vs. Phil Power

211 SCRA 519

59 OFF GAZETTE 124

McKee vs. IAC

Alfiada vs. Hasole

Ilocos Norte vs. CA

Salen vs. Balce

107 PHIL 752

University of the East vs. Jader

325 SCRA 804

Castillex vs. Vasquez

321 SCRA 401

Case Digests - Torts and Damages

[ATTY. PAOLO DIMAYUGA]

Rosete vs. Auditor General

Palisoc vs. Brillantes

10. Amadora vs. CA

160 SCRA 315