Chapter1:Perception

Youhaveafriendthatliessometimesaboutmundanestuff,butwhentheylieyoucannottellthe
differencebetweenthemlyingandthemtellingthetruth.Obviously,itwouldbedifficulttotrust
suchaperson.Inthesameway,weknowthatourperceptionsandsensationscanlie.For
example:

Dreams

Dreamsoftentellusthatweareindangeroussituations,andiftheycandothat,then
howdoyouknowyourmundanesituationrightnowisntalsoadream?Anyevidenceor
testyoucanappealtoyoumightjustbepartofthedream.

NatureofSensations

Sincesensationsarejustneuronalfirings,thenitiseasytoseehowinprincipletheycan
befaked.

DemonorBraininavat

Or,perDescartes,perhapsademonistrickingyouandfeedingyousensations,and
nothingisrealatallexceptyouandthedemon.OryouarepluggedintotheMatrix.

EpistemologicalProblems

Sincewecanttrustoursensescompletely,thenwecantrelysolelyonempiricism.Wedohave
knowledge,soitmustbeatleastpartiallyfromrationalism,orapriorireasoning.

IndirectRealism(CausalRealism,RepresentativeRealism)

Descarteswasnotasolipsistandagreedthattheexternalworldexists,butthatwecanhaveno
directknowledgeofit.LikewhenwatchingTV,justfromwatchingalivebroadcastwecant
knowwhethertherereallyisarealbroadcasthappeningornot,unlesswehaveother
informationthanfromjustourdirectwatchingoftheTV.

Skepticism

Butindirectrealismmeansonlythatwe

couldberightthattheexternalworldisthereitdoesnt
meanweareright.Soperhapsindirectrealismisnotenoughweneedabetterway.
Unfortunately,nomatterwhatwedo,wecouldstillbedreamingandsoindirectrealismmightbe
thebestitgets.Still,isthereawaytoavoidskepticism?

God


DescartesappealtotheexistenceofGod,anallgoodbeing.Anallgoodbeingwould
notallowDescartestobetrickedbyademonabouteverything.Obviously,thisis
contentious,andsosomethingbetterisneeded.

OccamsRazor

Perhapsthesimplestexplanationisthemostlikely.Ifitsjustyou,andademon,then
wouldntthatbethesimplestexplanation?Simplerthanpostulatinganentirecomplex
world?Butthedemonwouldhavetobeevenmorecomplex,foritwouldhavetohave
knowledgeofa(phony)externalworld,andbecapableoftrickingusandknowwhatitis
doing.

AppearanceandReality,MindandMatter

IftheOccamsRazorargumentiscorrect,thenwecanatleasthaveasomewhatgood
argumentfortheexternalworld.Sothattakescareoftheepistemologicalconcerns.Whatabout
themetaphysicalconcerns?Duetothethoughtexperimentsabove,wecanseethatthemind
hasexperience(qualia),abilityreason,andintentionality(thinkingaboutthingsotherthanitself).
Clearly,thisisdifferentfromthematerialphysicalthingsthattheexternalworldismadeupof,
sowhatisthenatureofthemindandhowcanitarisefromphysicalmatter?

Chapter2:Dualism

Mindisdifferentfrommatter:

Qualia

Themindhasprivateexperiences.Youcanwatchsomeonewinceinpain,andevenseethe
brainactivityonanMRI,butyoucanneverexperiencetheiractualexperience.Thisisqualia
theprivacyofpersonalexperience.Materialthingsarepublicandcanbeobserved.Themindis
privateandcanonlybeobservedfromafirstpersonperspective.

Indivisibility

Themindcannotbedividedintoparts,likematerialthingscan.MultiplePersonalityDisorderisa
caseofanothermindinthesamebody,notthemindsplittingupintotwo.MPDmightnoteven
reallyexist,asmanycaseshavebeenexaggerationsorhoaxes.Splitbraincasesmaybea
caseofmindsplitting,butevidenceshowsthatitmightnotbesomuchacaseofonemind
splittingintotwoasmuchasjustanabsenceofmindtypeofphenomenon,thatanybody
experiencesfromtimetotime.

Conceivability

Iftwothingsareidentical,thenitislogicallyimpossibletohavetheonewithouttheotheritisnt
evencoherenttoimaginetheonewithouttheother.YoucantimaginewaterwithoutH20they
areidentical.Butitseemsthatwecancoherentlyimaginemindwithoutbrain:imagineyourself
disembodied,forexample.Itisatleastlogicallycoherent,evenifnotphysicallyso.This
indicatesthattheyarenotidentical.

Thisargumentrequiresrigiddesignators,orwordsthatrefertothesamethingnomatterwhat.
NeilArmstrongisidenticalwiththefirstpersontowalkonthemoon,butthereisapossible
worldwheresomeoneelsewalkedonthemoonfirst.Hence,thetwoareidenticalinourworld,
butfirstpersontowalkonthemoonisnotarigiddesignatoritcouldhavebeenanybody.H20
andwater,ontheotherhand,areinfactrigiddesignators.Soaremymindandmybrain.
Yet,itslogicallypossibletohavemymindwithoutmybrain.

Anotherpossibleproblemwiththisargumentisthatperhapswecantreallyimagineourminds
disembodiedatall,likewethinkwecan.Whenlightbouncesoffanobject,thephotonsgointo
youreyesandcausethesensationofsightbutifyouaredisembodied,whathappens?The
photonsbounceofftheobjectandgotonowhere.Soperhapsyoucantreallyimagineyourself
disembodiedlikeyouthoughtyoucould.Ontheotherhand,takeawaythesightandyoustill
haveathinkingperson,andhencetheargumentmaystillwork.

InteractionProblem

Themainargumentagainstdualismis:howcansomethingnonphysicalinteractwithsomething
physical?Nomechanismhasbeenforthcoming.Also,theinteractionproblemimpliesthat
energywouldhavetocomefromsomewhereelse(becausethemindisnonphysical,but
interactswiththephysical),andthisisagainstthelawsofthermodynamics.Thisdoesnot
necessarilyrefutedualism(iftheargumentswork,thensomuchtheworseforphysics),butitis
ahugeproblem.Thereareafewanswerstothisproblem.

Occasionalism

Godseesthatthephonerings,andsimultaneouslycausesyoutohavethesensationof
thephoneringing.

Parallelism

Godseteverythinginmotionatthebeginningoftime,likesyncedclocks.Youreceive
thesensationofthephoneringingatthesametimethatthephoneringsbecausethe
twohavebeentimedtohappensimultaneouslyfromthebeginning.

Epiphenominalism

Themindisabyproductofphysicalprocesses,likesmokeisthebyproductoffire.There
isonlyaonewaycausalconnection.Yourphysicalbodydoeswhatitdoes,andyour
mindisjustalongfortheride.Theproblemisyoucouldneveraffirmyourmentalstate,
suchasyourbeliefthatepiphenominalismistrue,becauseyourmindhasnocausal
poweroveryourlips.

Chapter3:Materialism

Trees,Chairs,Rocks,andTrees

Sciencetellsusthatordinarysolidobjectsareinfactnothingbutemptyspaceitisonlythe
repellingforceofelectronsthatmakethingsfeelsolid.I.e.,physicalobjectsarereducibleto
atomsofmostlyemptyspace,orarenothingbutthat.Similarly,materialistssuggestthatthe
mindwillsimilarlybereducibletonothingbutphysicalparticles.

ReductionandSupervenience

Dualismmakessuggestionsthatthiswillbedifficult,ifnotimpossible.Onewayofgoingforthe
materialistiscalledsupervenience.Apaintingsupervenesonthepaintparticles,andthusis
notreducibletojustthepaintparticlesthearrangementofthepaintparticlesgiverisetoa
higherordereffect.

Therearethreereasonstothinkthatmaterialismmightbetrue:

1.Causeandeffecttheclosednatureoftheuniverse
2.Thesuccessofmaterialisminscience
3.Thereisacloselinkbetweenbrainandmind

However,aspecifictheoryofhowitworksisstillbeingdebated.Themaintheoriesof
materialismfollow:

Behaviorism

Thefirstmaterialisttheory.Theviewthatallbraineventsarejustbehavior.Yourfeeling
offearisjustthebehaviorofscreaming,runningaway,etc,andnothingmorethanthat.
Iftrue,thiswouldmaketheoryofmindeasytoobserveandstudy.Asnotedabove,
materialthingscanbeobservedandhasledtothesuccessofscience.

Therearetwoproblemswiththistheorythathasledittobealmostcompletelydropped.

1.Manythoughtsareaninterconnectedwebofthoughts.Yourfeelingoffearofbears
alsoinvolvesbeliefsthatthebearwilleatyou,thatbeingeatenwillhurt,thatyoudont
wanttobeeaten,etc.Allofthesebeliefsarebehindthefeelingoffearofbears,and

arenotdescribableintermsofjustbehavior.
2.Moreimportantly,behaviorismleavesoutthesubjectiveexperience.Toknowyourein
painyoudontlookinthemirrorandseeyourselfwincing,youjustfeelthepainitself,
directly.Behaviorismdoesnotaccountforfirstpersonexperience.

Asaresult,behaviorismisalmostcompletelyabandonedtoday.Itwasreplacedby:

IdentityTheory

Thistheorysaysthatamindeventisidenticaltoabrainevent.Painjustisacertain
patternoffiringneurons.Itisimportanttobeclear:itdoesntsaythatacertainfiringof
neuronscausespain,butthatpainisidenticaltothefiringofcertainneuronsinthesame
waythatwaterisidenticaltoH20.I.e.,youcanthavetheonewithouttheother.Two
problems:

1.Certainbeliefsareactuallyawebofbeliefswithlogicalinferencebetweenthem.Your
beliefthatitiswetoutsidemightbeinferredfromasetofotherbeliefs:thatitrained
recently,thatraincauseswetness,andsoon.Soeachbeliefisactuallyawebofbeliefs
withlogicalrelationsbetweenthem.Butifmindstatesareliterallyjustneuronsfiring,
thentherecanclearlybenologicalrelationshipbetweenfiringneurons.Whatdoesit
meantosaythatthereisalogicalrelationbetweenelectronsfiringoverhere,and
electronsfiringoverthere?
2.Multiplerealizability:itislogicallyconceivablethattherearealienswithcompletely
differentbrainneuronsotherthanus,butyetstillfeelpain.Orthatartificialintelligenceat
somepointinthefuturemaygainconsciousness.Ifso,thenclearlymindstatescannot
beidenticaltocertainbrainstates.

Asaresult,identitytheoryfelloutoffavor,andwasreplacedby:

Functionalism

Itdoesntmatterwhataknifeismadeoutof,aslongasithasthepropertiesofbeing
hardandbeingabletobesharpened.Otherwise,itcanbemadeoutofmetal,wood,etc.
Sothisideaisthatmentalstatesserveacertainfunction,andunlikeidentitytheory,they
donothavetobeanorganicbrainperse.Sothementaleventpainservesthefunction
ofindicatingtothebeingthatsomepartofthebodyisinjured.Butthiscouldbeahuman
brain,acomputerbrain,analienbrain,etc.Thistheoryalsoprovidesananswertothe
dualistconceivabilityargument(outlinedabove):thatwecancoherentlyimaginethe
mindseparatefromthebrainisbecausethemindfulfillscertainfunctionsbutdoesnot
havetobemadeoutofabrain(justliketheknifedoesnthavetobemadeoutofmetal).

BurdenofProof

Soitseemsthatmaterialismhasalotgoingforit,anditisonlyamatteroftimebeforescience
canfinallyunderstandthemindinpurelymaterialisticterms.However,purposefulintentinthe
universeisoftensweptundertherugofthemindbymaterialists,andthuswhenitcomesto
theminditselfandallitspurposefulness,itmaybeinexplicableinmaterialistterms.

Materialismofthemindhasnotwonout,andthedebateisstilllive.Materialisminphilosophyof
mindisfashionable,butitsargumentshavenotbeendecisivelyproven.

Chapter4:Qualia

Variousargumentshavebeenputforthtotrytoshowthatmaterialismcannotaccountfor
qualia,orfirstpersonsensation.

InvertedSpectrum

IfwhatIcallredlooksbluetoyou,thenthisistheinvertedspectrum.Thiswouldbeaproblem
formaterialismiftherewerenowaytotellobjectivelywhowasseeingwhatcolorcorrectly.
However,peoplecandiscernmoreshadesofcertaincolorsthanothers,andsothiswouldbe
onewayofobjectivelydeterminingwhohasaninvertedspectrum.Thus,thisargumentisnot
successfulinrefutingmaterialism.

ChineseNation

Ifmaterialism/functionalismistrue,thenintheoryonecouldcreateaconsciousmindbyhaving
everyoneinChinaactasaneuron,usingwalkietalkiesorwhatever.Theargumentsuggests
thatitwouldbeabsurdtosuggestthatthenationofChinawouldthenbecomeactually
conscious,asonegiantmind.

However,imaginescientistscuttingyourheadopen,andstretchingoutyourneurons.Theythen
swapyourneuronsoneatatimewithaChinesepersonlikeintheargument.TheChinese
peoplearefulfillingthesamefunctionasyourneurons,andeventuallyyourmindwouldbe
nothingmorethanpeoplecommunicatingwithwalkietalkies.Butyouwouldstillbeconscious.
SotheChineseNationargumentisnotsuccessfulagainstmaterialism.

ZombieArgument

Wecancoherentlyconceiveofaworldidenticaltoours,withpeoplelivingandworkingandso
forth,exceptthattheyhavenoconsciousexperience.Theirmindsmakethemeatwhenthey
arehungryandsoforth,sotheyfulfillthesamefunctions,buttheyarenotconscious.This
showsthatconsciousnessisoverandabovethephysicalfacts.

KnowledgeArgument(MarysRoom)

Marylivesinablackandwhiteroomherwholelife,butlearnseverythingthereistoknowabout
colorandhowpeopleperceiveit.Sheknowseveryphysicalfactaboutcolorperception.But
thensheisreleasedfromtheroomandexperiencesredforthefirsttimesheseesthatred
lookslikethis.I.e.,shelearnsanewfactthatwasnotcoveredbythephysicalfacts.Hence,
materialismisfalse.NagelmakesasimilarargumentinhisessayWhatIsItLikeToBeABat?

ResponsestoMarysRoom:

1.Perhapswejustassumethatfutureneurosciencewillnotbeabletotellyouwhatred
lookslike.Oneproblemwiththisisthatitishardtoseehowitispossiblefuture
neurosciencewillstillbeobjectivethirdpersonfacts,becausethatswhatscienceis,
whereaswhatredlookslikeisasubjectivefirstpersonfact.Anotherproblemisthat
futureneurosciencemayindeedhavetopostulateconsciousnessasanadditionalentity,
thusvindicatingMarysRoom.

2.PerhapsMarydoesntlearnnewfactsuponleavingtheroom,butjustanewwayof
thosesamefactsi.e.knowledgebydescriptioniswhatMarylearnsintheroom,and
thenknowledgebyacquaintanceiswhatshelearnsonleavingtheroom.Butsurelythe
factthatredlookslikethisisanewfactshelearneduponleavingtheblackandwhite
room.Also,Russellheldthatwhatweknowbyacquaintanceisnottheexternalworld,
butmerelyourqualiathatisproducedbytheexternalworld.

3.PerhapsMarylearnsaknowledgeofhowtodosomething,ratherthanjustknowledge
thatsomething.But,likeabove,surelytheknowledgethatredlookslikethisandnot
thisisnewknowledge,notjustknowledgeinadifferentway.Also,Maryhasnew
abilitiesnowbecausehelearnedwhatredlookslike.

4.MaybeMarylearnsanewconcept.H20andwaterrefertothesamething,butthey
aredifferentconceptsandusedindifferentsituations.SoyoucouldlearnaboutH20and
thenlaterlearnaboutwater.PerhapsMarylearnsanewconceptofafactshealready
knew.However,liketheabove,Maryjustseemsintuitivelytohavelearnedanewfact,of
thekindshedidntknowbefore.Butperhapsintuitioniswrong,andshedidjustlearna
newconceptofafactshealreadyknew.However,thisisntclearlycorrect.Is5+7=12
thesamefactasthat38isthesquarerootof1444?Doesntseemtobe.Thesearetwo
differentfacts,eventhoughtheyhavethesameanswer.

Subjectivity

AnotherpossibleanswertoMarysRoomisthatperhapsMarycandeducewhatcolorslooklike
bytheirrelativepositiontowhatothercolors,suchastheblackandwhite,looklike.Ifshe
knowsthatblueisrelativeinsuchandsuchawaybetweenacertainshadeofgrayandsoforth,
maybeshecanfigureoutfromjustthephysicalfactswhatbluelookslike.

Theproblemwiththisresponseisthatithighlightsthemainproblemwithmaterialism,whichis
thatredlookslikeanythingatall.Whyistherethissubjectiveexperienceatall?

Scienceisinthebusinessofcarvingoffthesubjectiveanddescribingeverythinginobjective
mindindependentfacts.Youmayfeelwhathotandcoldwaterfeelslike,andperhapsanalien
wouldfeelthesetheoppositeasyoudo,butsciencewouldjustdescribethesameobjective
factsaboutwhattemperatureactuallyis,andignorewhatitfeelslike.Thus,itseemsthat
sciencecannevergetahandleonthemindeveninprinciple.

PropertyDualism

Theideathatthereisonlythematerialworld,butthattherearetwokindsofproperties:physical
andnonphysical.Propertydualismallowspropositionalattitudes(yourattitudetowards
propositions,suchasbelief,desire,etc),butnotqualia,tobematerial.Thus,yourbeliefthatitis
rainingcancauseyourlegstoruninsideandsoforth,butqualiaitselfwouldbeepiphenomenal
(onewaycausal)andthusstillnotcauseanything.However,thisleadstotheabsurd
consequencethatwecanteventhinkaboutourqualia,sincequaliaareepiphenomenaland
henceaonewaycausalrelation.Thus,youexperiencingthequaliaofpaincannotcauseyouto
believethatyouhavepain.

DavidChalmers(oneofthemainpurveyorsofpropertydualism)attemptstodealwiththis
problembysayingthatqualiahavenocausalchainatallbecausetheyareexperienced
directly.OneproblemwithChalmersviewisthat,sincepropositionalattitudesarepurely
physical,andyoucanthusreasonphysically,thenevenzombiescouldhavebeliefsanddesires
andsuch.Ifso,thentheycanbelievetheyhavequalia.Andthus,noonecouldtelliftheywere
azombieornot.

Chapter5:Consciousness

Thereceivedwisdominphilosophyofmindisthatqualia(subjectivefirstpersonexperience)is
whatisessentialtoconsciousnessandismoredifficulttoaccountforinmaterialistterms,and
intentionality(aboutness,orrepresentation)iseasier.Fesersviewisthatthisisbackwards.Itis
intentionalitythatisessentialtoconsciousnessandisalsomoredifficulttoaccountforin
materialterms.Oneofthemainmaterialistapproachesistowrapqualiaintointentionality,and
thenreduceintentionalitytomaterialexplanations.Thisiscalledtheintentionalistapproach.

Eliminativism

Qualiamightbedifficulttowrapintointentionality.Thepainofatoothacheisnotaboutanything
itjusthurts.Asaresult,somematerialistssuchasDanielDennethaveaimedtoeliminatequalia
entirely.Dennetdoesnotdenythatwehaveconsciousexperience,onlythatqualiaarenot
intrinsic(abletobeanalyzedintermsofrelationstooneanother)orsubjective.Whileheis
probablyrightaboutintrinsicality,hemightnotbeaboutsubjectivity.Onhisview,common

sensementalviewslikequaliaareasortoftheory,andlikeastrologyandgeocentrism,should
bedumpedasafolktheory.Heprovidesanexampleofyouwakingfromasurgerytofindthat
youqualiaareinverted.Thegrasslooksblueandtheskylooksgreen.Youassumethatthe
surgeonshaveinvertedyourqualia,butitcouldalsobethattheyrewiredyourmemory:your
qualiaarestillthesame,butyoujustrememberthemincorrectly.Inthatcase,youhavetorely
on3rdpersoninformationandsoyourqualiaarenot1stpersonsubjective.Ifsubjectivityis
essentialtoqualia,andDennetsaysthatqualiaarenotsubjective,thenDennetiseliminating
qualiaaltogether.

Butthisisanonsequitur.Justbecauseyourmemorymighthavebeentamperedwithdoesnot
meanthatyourexperiencerightnowisnotsubjective.Whetheryourqualiaormemoryhave
beentamperedwithornot,youarestillsubjectivelyexperiencingthingsrightnow.Infact,if
BertrandRusselsindirectrealismiscorrect,itisonlyvia1stpersonsubjectivitythatweare
evenawareofa3rdpersonobjectiverealm,includingneurosurgeons,inthefirstplace.
Dennetsargumentrequires1stpersonsubjectivitytoevengetofftheground.

ContraDennet,subjectiveexperienceisnotatheorythatneedstobechucked,butrather
bottomleveldatathatneedstobeexplainedbyanygoodtheoryofmind.Dennetthinksthat
subjectiveexperienceisincompatiblewiththe3rdpersonobjectivityofscientificpursuit,butthis
justbegsthequestionagainstsubjectiveexperience.EventheextremelyscientisticCarnap
acceptedsubjectiveexperienceandthatitcouldbeexaminedintersubjectively,intermsof
relations.

Representationalismandhigherordertheories

Ifqualiacannotbeeliminated,thenperhapstheycanbereducedtointentionality
(representation).Qualiaarerepresentationsofthings,andperhapspainqualia(liketheabove
toothache)actuallydorepresentthingsbeyondthemselves,suchasthedamagedbodypart.
However,thiswouldnotaccountforunconsciousrepresentationalcontent,suchasyourbelief
that2+2=4evenwhenyouarenotconsciouslythinkingaboutit.Sometheorizethenthatthere
isahigherordermentalstatethatrepresentsthelowerstates,anditisthislowerstatethatis
conscious.Thisisaplausibletheory,butasamaterialistfunctionalisttheoryitisstillvulnerable
tothezombieargument.Thezombiecouldhaverepresentationalstatesandhigherorder
states,andstilllacksubjectiveexperience.Sowhileagoodtheory,itdoesnotdomuchfor
materialismoverdualism.

Russellianidentitytheoryandneutralmonism

BertrandRussellwasadefenderofindirectrealism,theideathatwecanneverseetheexternal
worldasitreallyiswejustseeourinnerrepresentationsofit(thesamewaythatifyouwere
wearingredglasses,youwouldnotseethingsastheyactuallyare).Therednessofanapple
maynotactuallybethereitmayjustbethewayweseeitthroughourinnerrepresentation.

Russellarguedthatwhilesciencetellsusthattheworldisreallycomposedofatoms,quarks,
andsoforth,itdoesnttelluswhatthesethingsreallyare.Itjustdescribesthemincausalroles:
theroleofaquarkistoattachtootherquarksandcreatelargerparticles,etc.Butitdoesnt
describetheirintrinsicnature.Whattheyreallyare.Thebrainisagraysquishythingwith
complexneuraleventshappening,butwhatistheintrinsicnatureoftheseneuralevents?

Russellsuggeststhatintrospectiontellsusthetruenatureofneuraleventsthat,essentially,the
graysquishybrainarisesfromthemind.Preciselytheoppositeofmaterialisttheories.
Materialisttheoriestakeforgrantedthatweknowtheintrinsicnatureofmatter,andthatmind
mustbedefinedintermsofmaterialcausesandeffects.Russellsaysthatthisisbackwards
thatitistheinnermentalrealmthatweknowbestandthatphysicalneuraleventsarereallyjust
thoughtsonthebaselevel.

Thistheorycountsasarejectionofmaterialismbecauseitgivesprimacytothefirstperson
subjectivepointofview.Butitisntdualismeither,becauseitsaysthatmindandbrainare
identical.Infact,ifintrospectivestates(e.g.qualia)arethebasicconstituentofthebrain,and
thebrainismadeupoutofthesamematerialthateverythingelseis,thenitfollowsthat
everythingelseismadeupofqualiaaswell.Ifso,thenRussellianismmightbeseenasakind
ofidealism:everythingisultimatelymind,ratherthanmatter.Butproponentssaythatifqualia
makeupthebasicconstituentofreality,theygounsensedandtheyarenotreallymind.
Therefore,Russellstheoryisatypeofneutralmonism:realityconsistsofneithermindnor
matter,butsomeothersubstancethatisneutralbetweenthem.

Thetheoryisimmunetosomeoftheproblemswithmaterialism.Forexample,zombiesare
inconceivableonRussellianism,becausetoimaginethemmadeupofqualiaistoimaginethem
withintrospectiveexperience.

TroubleswithRussellianism

Oneproblemisthatitmaynotbepossibletoabstractqualiaawayfromaconscioussubject.
Howcanqualiajustexist,unsensed?

SomeRussellians,likeDavidChalmers,acceptthatqualiarequireaconsciousmindand
theorizethatmindisafundamentalelementalongsideothers,everywhereintheuniverse.
Particlesconsistofprotoconsciousness,thatwhenarrangedintocomplexbrainslikeours
giverisetorealconsciousness.Theinitialresponsefromcriticsisthatthisisjustcrazy.Buta
betterresponseistoobjectthatprotoconsciousparticlescouldnotgiverisetoasingle,unified
consciousnesslikeours.

AnotherproblemwithRussellianismisthatzombiesarereallyconceivableafterall.Thisis
becausethefundamentalparticlesaredescribedbytheirroles,andnotwhattheyare.Soqualia
orprotoqualiadonothavetoplaythatroleanyothernonqualiaparticlecouldplaythecausal
rolesjustaswell.Ifso,andqualiaareonetypeofthingandparticlesanother,then

Russellianismisreallyatypeofpropertydualism.Chalmersagrees,andlabelshisversionas
propertydualism.Thisalsoendsupentailingepiphenomenalism,andthusthemindcanhave
noinfluenceonthephysical.

AmoreconsistentRussellianism

Despitetheproblems,thistheorystillhasalotgoingforit.Notbecauseofitstheorythatqualia
playthecausalroles,butbecauseofitsaccountthatindirectrealismhasdramaticimplications
forthemind/bodyproblem.