Torts Finals Reviewer - MRT

With love,
B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN
Part I TORTS
I. QUASI-DELICT
TORT
- From the Latin tortus, which means twisted or crooked
- Warren Seavey: harm is the tort signature. In general, the
action is based upon the theory that one person has caused
harm to another; the causing of harm is predominantly the
basis of tort actions
- Tort under common law and Philippine tort law are different
because the latter is based on the Civil Code
- The Code Commission chose the term quasi-delict and
rejected the term tort because the former best described
the civil action for damages envisioned under the proposed
code
o Tort was rejected because the common law concept
covered far more than what the Commission envisioned
o Original plan was to exclude intentional and malicious acts
from the coverage of the concept because there are to be
governed by the RPC
o Despite rejecting the term, they did not completely reject
the concept of tort Art. 19-21 are even broader than the
common law tort, there are independent civil actions for
violations of civil liberties and for violations of right to
privacy as well as for defamation, fraud and physical injuries
civil actions which correspond to certain common law torts
Art. 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
Scope of Philippine Tort Law (according to Antonio

Carpio)
1. Intentional Torts can be broken down into two:
a. Those adopted from American jurisprudence
b. Those taken from the codes of civil law jurisdictions
2. Negligent Torts can be divided into two:
a. Those covered by Art. 2176
b. Those which are not
3. Strict Liability Tort such as the Workmens Compensation
Act, Arti. 1171, 2183, and 2187 of the Civil Code
Note: A quali-delict is a kind of tort, it is a subset of tort
Definition of Tort Under Philippine Law
- Naguiat v. NLRC: tort consists in the violation of a right given
or the omission of a duty imposed by law or simply a breach
of a legal duty (obiter dicta)
o Essentially, tort consists in the violation of a right given
or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated,
tort is a breach of a legal duty.
o Note: Prof. Casis said this is obiter dicta
- Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune: [a] tort is a wrong]
o Note: This definition is too broad
Art. 2177 Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
Art. 2178 The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also
applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)
Art. 1172 Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173 The fault of negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2,
shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Art. 1171 Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
(1102a)
Art. 2201 (2) In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation. (1107a)
Art. 1174 Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature
of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall
be responsible for those events which, could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
A. General Principles
1. Elements
- Elements of quasi-delict are based on Art. 2176, and elements
of a tort are based on Art. 20 of the Civil Code
Elements of Quasi-Delict (Art. 2176)
1. Act or omission;
2. Damage to another;
3. Fault or negligence; and
4. No pre-existing contractual relation
Elements of Quasi-Delict (acc. to jurisprudence)
1. Damage to the plaintiff;
2. Negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant, or by some
other person for whose act the defendant must respond; and
3. Connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff
Note: To be more precise, instead of damage, the element
should be injury because there can be damage without injury
(damnum absque injuria = loss without injury) from which no
damages can be awarded
Elements of Quasi-Delict (Sinsgon v. BPI as cited in Sangco)
1. There must be an unlawful act or omission amounting to fault
or negligence, imputable to the defendant;
2. The plaintiff suffered damage or injury;
3. Such damage or injury to the plaintiff was the natural and
probably, or direct and immediate consequence of
defendants wrongful act or omission; and
4. There is no pre-existing contractual relations between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
Elements of Tort
- The Court has adopted the 4 elements of tort under common
law and applied it to cases which could fall under Art. 20 of the
Civil Code
Elements of Tort (Prosser and Keeton)
1. A duty or obligation recognized by law, requiring a person to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks;
2. A failure on the persons part to conform to the standard: a
breach of a duty;
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct
and resulting injury; (legal cause; proximate cause)
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another
Note: These are the elements of common law tort, but the
Court has adopted these elements in a few cases
Elements of Actionable Conduct (Garcia v. Salvador)

1. Duty;
2. Breach;
3. Injury; and
4. Proximate causation
Note: Court appears to be saying these are the elements of an
intentional tort under Art. 20 of the Civil Code
- The Court held that violation of a statutory duty is
negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to
do something, his omission or non-performance will render
him liable to whoever may be injured thereby.
- The Court cited Art. 20 and explained that, The foregoing
provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to
a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in
violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the
Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers
damage because another has violated some legal provision.
Elements of Medical Negligence (Lucas v. Tuao)
- Same as the 4 elements cited for actionable conduct, as cited
in Garcia v. Salvador, and anchored on Art. 2176
Elements for an Action Anchored on Tort (Ocean Builders
v. Spouses Cubacub)
1. Duty;
2. Breach;
3. Injury and proximate causation
Note: The basis here is Art. 20 of the Civil Code, similar to Garcia
v. Salvador
- Negligence does not appear to be relevant in the context of
the elements identified by the Court nor in the violation of the
legal provision
- Negligence would only be relevant if the action was based on
quasi-delict
TORT
Covers
voluntary
and
intentional acts
May arise in contractual
relations
Covers only private or civil
wrongs
(From A2016 Reviewer)
QUASI-DELICT
All acts attended by fault or
negligence
Must have no pre-existing
contractual obligation
May cover acts that are
felonies
Yamada v. Manila Railroad Co. (1915)

Concept: Elements of a Quasi-delict
Garcia v. Salvador (2007)

Brief Facts: Yamada and friends hired a taxi from Bachrach. On

their way home, the taxi was hit by a train owned by Manila
Railroad Co. Yamada sued both Bachrach and Manila Railroad
Co.
Brief Facts: Salvador underwent a medical exam which showed

that she was suffering from Hepa B. She was thus terminated
from work. Another test revealed the opposite. She filed a
complaint for damages against the med tech, Garcia. SC found
that Garcia was guilty of gross negligence.
SC held that the taxi driver was negligent. A prudent driver

should have slowed down approaching a railroad crossing
regardless if he could see a train or not regardless of the
presence of tall bushes. Bachrach is also liable as an employer.
Although they did establish that they have done their diligence
in properly selecting their driver and in providing said driver with
a good car, they have failed to provide proper supervision and
control over their employee. Failure is due to the lack of proper
rules and regulations as seen in their allowing their drivers to
habitually drive over railroad crossings without slowing down.
Doctrine: When an injury is cause by the negligence of a
servant, there arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master either in the selection of
the servant or in supervision over him
Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently can be rebutted by showing that the master
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in
selection and supervision.
A practice which is dangerous to human life cannot ripen into a
custom which will protect anyone who follows it.
Phil. National Railways v. Brunty (2006)
Brief Facts: PNR did not set up lights or a flag bar to warn
vehicles. Its train hit a car and PNR was held liable. SC held that
railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a
reasonable degree of care to avoid injury. Its failure to put a
cross bar/ signal light is negligence and disregard of the safety
of the public even if no law or ordinance requires it because
public safety demands that said device are installed.
Doctrine: In determining whether or not there is negligence,
jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in
doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. In
order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by
act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose
acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and damage.
Doctrine: For healthcare providers, the test of the existence of

negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do
something which a reasonable prudent health care provider
would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done;
and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then
he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an actionable
conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.
L.G. Foods v. Philadelfa (2006)
Brief Facts: Vallereja was hit and killed by a Ford Fiera van
owned by L.G. Foods and driven by Yeneza. An information for
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide was filed against
Yeneza. Before the trial could be concluded, Yeneza committed
suicide. Thus, the criminal case was dismissed. Vallejeras
parents find a complaint for damages against L.G. Foods as
employers of the deceased driver alleging that they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
SC held that Since there was no conviction in the criminal case
against the driver due to his death, the spouses' recourse was to
sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on
quasi-delict.
Doctrine: An act or omission which violates the rights of
another gives rise to an obligation which may come from law,
contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily, act
or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender i.e. (1) civil
liability ex delicto; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as
those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as
felony (e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the
intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured
party Is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action.
2. Concept and scope of quasi-delict

Historical Background
- The Code Commission chose to use the term quasi-delict
rather than tort.
- The term corresponds to the concept of what is known in
Spanish law as culpa aquiliana, culpa-extra-contractual, or
cuasi-delitos.
Definition, Nature, and Governing Provisions
- Per NCC Art. 2176, a quasi-delict refers to the fault or
negligence that accompanies an act or omission which causes
damage to another, there being no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties.
- It is one of the 5 sources of obligations, as enumerated in NCC
Art. 1157
- The governing provisions of the legal concept of quasi-delicts
range from NCC Articles 2176 to 2194, and pertinent special
laws.
Scope:
On Intentional Acts
- For a cause of action based on quasi-delict to arise, it is
required that the act or omission be committed with
negligence; hence, there must have been no intent on the part
of the defendant to harm the plaintiff.
- The Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad enunciates that the
liability from quasi-delicts is always based upon a voluntary
act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
o The Court here recognizes that not all voluntary acts are
with willful intent to harm.
- However, some decisions of the Court have raised the
question of whether the scope of quasi-delicts includes
intentional acts.
o In Elcano v. Hill, the Court enunciated that the concept
covers acts which are criminal in character whether
voluntary or negligent, which imports a meaning that
quasi-delicts include intentional acts.
o However, the Elcano decision was not cited in this regard
and differs from the intent of the Code Commissioners, as
well as the text of Art. 2176: that while quasi-delicts may
include voluntary acts, acts done with intent to harm are not
covered.
o Another case, Andamo v. IAC, supports the thesis from the
Elcano decision. The Court stated there that quasi-delicts
covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts
criminal in character whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. It did not, however, cite any basis for making
such a ruling.
- It is the case of Baksh v. CA, that provides a stark contrast to
the Elcano and Andamo cases; it limited the scope of quasi
delicts to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the
notion of willfulness or intent.
o It provided a spectrum: on the one hand, there is the narrow

concept of quasi-delicts which only includes negligent
acts/omissions, as opposed to the much more broad
concept of torts, which not only covers negligence but also
intentional criminal acts.
o The Court provided that when the intent of the Code
Commission is to be considered, they envisioned that
intentional criminal acts should be covered by the RPC while
the negligent acts fall under Article 2176.
o It also provided that in between the opposite spectrums of
intentional acts (torts) and negligent acts (quasi-delicts), it
would be Article 21 that would cover such acts (intentional
acts which aim to injure but not criminal in nature) that fall in
between these two classifications.
- In conclusion, it is more appropriate to consider that the
scope of quasi-delicts cover only those negligents acts without
willful intent to injure, even though they may be voluntary.
On Damage to Property
- In Cinco v. Canonoy, the Court ruled that quasi-delicts not
only cover injuries to persons but also damage to property.
o The Court in that case, cited the Barredo ruling. However,
the page in the Barredo ruling cited contained no statement
to support this thesis by the Court.
o Furthermore, the Barredo case was decided prior to the
enactment of Art. 2176 and hence, could not have been
used to determine its scope.
o Notwithstanding these two issues, the Court made the
ruling that there was no distinction on the use of the word
damage in Art. 2176; the word may refer to both damage
to persons and damage to property.
Barredo v. Garcia (1942)
Concept: Concept and Scope of Quasi-delict
Brief Facts: A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela
resulted in the death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers
of the carretela. A criminal action was filed against the taxi driver
and he was convicted and sentenced accordingly. The court in
the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter, the parents of the
deceased brought suit for damages against the employer of the
taxi driver, under article 1903, Old Civil Code.
SC held that the civil action lies, the employer being primarily
and directly responsible in damages under articles 1902 and
1903, Old Civil Code.
Doctrine: A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a
delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the working and spirit
of article 1903, Old Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Elcano v. Hill (1977)

Mendoza v. Arrieta (1979)

Brief Facts: Defendant was a married minor who killed

petitioners son. He was tried and acquitted, for lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake. Petitioners then filed an action to
recover damages
from defendants father, which was dismissed for three reasons:
(1) Having been extinguished, as per the Rules of Court;
(2) Being barred by res judicata; and
(3) Not having a cause of action, because the defendant had
been emancipated by marriage.
Brief Facts: A truck hit a jeep, which lurched forward and hit a
Mercedes. In the criminal case, the truck driver was found guilty
of negligence, and the jeepney owner/driver was absolved of
liability. The owner of the Mercedes, plaintiff herein, sought to
recover from the driver/owner of the jeepney and the owner of
the truck.
SC held that Acquittal only extinguishes civil liability if such

liability is founded on Art. 100, RPC. If it is based on quasi-delict,
then acquittal in the criminal case will not extinguish it. The act
constituting a crime may also constitute a quasi-delict, so
acquittal of the accused in the criminal case does not affect
liability in the civil action.
Doctrine: The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which
are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent.
Acquittal from criminal negligence, whether or not for
reasonable doubt, does not extinguish civil liability based on
quasi-delict. Neither shall it bar a subsequent action to recover
based on quasi-delict.
Because the accused is a minor, his parents civil liability subsists
in spite of emancipation by marriage.
Garcia v. Florido (1973)
Brief Facts: A public utility car owned by one respondent and
driven by another respondent was traversing a highway, when it
collided with a passenger bus, injuring the passengers of the car.
The passengers thus instituted this civil action for damages, and
wished to intervene in the criminal case.
SC held that by instituting this separate civil action to recover
damages, petitioners have foreclosed their right to intervene in
the criminal case.
Doctrine: The same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100, RPC or
create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual under
articles 2176-2194, CC. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence,
having always had its foundation and individuality.
SC held that The action against the truck owner is based on

quasi-delict, and therefore is not barred by the decision in the
criminal case. Meanwhile, the action against the jeepney
owner/driver was based on civil liability ex delictu. Therefore, the
decision in the criminal case had already extinguished such
liability.
Doctrine: The owner of a car which was bumped by a jeep after
the latter was bumped from behind by a truck may still file a civil
action for damages against the truck driver and its owner even
after the truck driver was adjudged guilty in the criminal case
filed by the car owner against the jeepney driver. There is no
identity of cause of action between the civil case in question and
the criminal case against the truck driver for damage to the jeep.
Articles 2176 and 2177, CC creates a civil liability distinct from
the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the
RPC. No reservation need be made in the criminal case.
(i) Distinguished from Crime
- Art. 1157 already recognizes delicts and quasi-delicts as
separate sources of obligation.
- Both are independent of each other; whatever happens in a
criminal action does not affect the quasi-delictual action. It is
possible that while both originate from the same factual
circumstances, they arrive at a different conclusion.
- The Court in Barredo v. Garcia summarized the distinctions
between the two:
o Delicts affect the public interest while quasi-delicts are only
of private concern
o The Penal Code corrects the delictual act. On the other
hand, in quasi-delicts, the objective of the Civil Code
provisions is to make reparations for the damage done.
o Delicts can be considered as less broad than quasi-delicts
because it needs a penal law that clearly covers the delictual
act for it to be punished, while any manner of acts or
omissions that are negligent in nature may fall under quasidelicts.
- However, these statements from the Court in Barredo should

not be taken at face value.
o There is also an aspect of public concern regarding quasidelicts: it is within the States interest to make sure that the
obligations arising from quasi-delicts are well observed
and enforced. An example would be Art. 2180, where
parents and guardians are made liable for the acts of minor
children in their custody.
o As for the aspect that quasi-delictual actions have
reparation as their main concern, this is not always true.
Some damages that are awarded are not always
compensatory and may be punitive in nature. Both nominal
damages and exemplary damages fit into this punitive
nature.
- Despite the distinction, there is a recognized overlap between
delicts and quasi-delicts.
o The Court in Barredo encountered a dilemma (note that the
Old Civil Code was still in effect at the time of the case):
While OCC Art. 1902 is broad enough to cover the
negligent act of the defendant, OCC Art. 1903 limits the
coverage of quasi-delicts to acts not punishable by laws.
Since RPC Art. 365 punishes even simple negligence, it
seemed that Art. 1902 would not be applicable.
o The Court here ruled that to follow such an interpretation
would effectively cripple the application of quasi-delicts in
our jurisdiction and so, it held that these negligent acts,
though criminal in nature, are also covered by quasi-delicts.
Furthermore, it said that such overlap does not destroy the
distinction between the two legal concepts.
o Now, this dilemma no longer exists with the introduction of
the New Civil Code. NCC Article 2177 now supports the
view that the Court enunciated in Barredo: that an act which
was the basis of a criminal action can be the basis of a civil
action for damages.
Delicts v. Quasi-delicts
DELICTS
Affect public interest
The law punishes or corrects
the criminal act
QUASI-DELICTS
Are only of private concern
The law merely repairs the
damages
through
indemnification
Any kind of fault or negligence
Covers only acts punished by

law
(Barredo v. Garcia, From A2016 Reviewer)
Art. 100, RPC Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony.

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Art. 101, RPC Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions
1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of
this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and
by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor
under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the
persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion,
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
the
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined,

even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with
the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification
shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12,
the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily
liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part
of their property exempt from execution.
Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in
the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall
be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall
be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information
also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional
filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation
of
the
civil
and
criminal
actions.
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever state it
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension
shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party,
be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the

criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right
of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness presented by
the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period
of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the
delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be
continued against the estate or legal representative of the
accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the
case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Sec. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for
the same act or omission subject of the civil action.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition

for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency
of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court
for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Effect of Circumstances Under RPC on Civil Liability

Exempting
Justifying Circumstances
Circumstances
Generally do not Generally extinguish civil liability
extinguish
civil Exception: Art. 11, par. 4 (avoidance of
liability
greater evil/injury)
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a

prejudicial questions are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed
Barredo v. Garcia, supra

Concept: Quasi-delict Distinguished from Crime
Civil Liabilities Compared

Ex delictu (Art. 100, Quasi-delicts
RPC)
(Art. 2176, CC)
Obligation
Delict
Quasi-delict
Need
for Deemed instituted with Separate
legal
reservation
criminal case; must be institution; no need
reserved
to
proceed to be reserved
separately
Quantum of Preponderance of evidence (only criminal action
evidence
needs proof beyond reasonable doubt)
Suspension
During
pendency
of Proceeds
prosecution of criminal independent
of
case
criminal case
Effect
of No effect, unless acquittal No effect
acquittal
is because the act does
not exist/accused is not
the author of the act
Effect
of Before arraignment: May May be recovered
death
of still be recovered from from the estate of
accused
estate of accused
the
accused,
regardless of the
After arraignment:
stage the case is in
Extinguished
(Sec. 4, Rule 111, Rev. Rules on CrimPro, From A2016 Reviewer)
Two Liabilities of the Employer of a Tortfeasor
Subsidiary
Primary Liability
Liability
Legal basis
Art. 103, RPC
Art. 2180(5), CC
Quantum of May be proven through preponderance of
evidence
evidence
Nature of Subsidiary assets of Primary no need to
employers
the accused must first exhaust assets of the
liability
be exhausted
tortfeasor
Defenses
Employer not liable if Diligence of a good
available to employee
is father of a family in the
employer
acquitted (except if selection and supervision
on reasonable doubt) of his employee
Basis
of Negligence
of Employer-employee
liability
employee
relationship; employers
own negligence
(Barredo v. Garcia, From A2016 Reviewer)
Brief Facts: A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela

resulted in the death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers
of the carretela. A criminal action was filed against the taxi driver
and he was convicted and sentenced accordingly. The court in
the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter, the parents of the
deceased brought suit for damages against the employer of the
taxi driver, under article 1903, Old Civil Code.
SC held that the civil action lies, the employer being primarily
and directly responsible in damages under articles 1902 and
1903, Old Civil Code.
Doctrine: (Distinguished from Crime): The same negligent act
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under Art. 100, RPC, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extracontractual under articles 1902-1910, Old Civil Code.
Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce. Some of
the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the
culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are
only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances,
violation of the game laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt.
Manliclic v. Calaunan (2007)

Concept: Quasi-delict Distinguished from Crime
Brief Facts: A Philippine Rabbit bus and a jeepney collided on
the NLEX, and the jeepney veered to the right shoulder of the
road and fell into a ditch with water. A criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical
injuries was filed against petitioner, the bus owner, and was tried
before the instant civil case. The CA held that he had not been
negligent. Meanwhile, the civil case was decided in favor of
respondent, who owned the jeepney.
SC held that the civil action for damages need not be reserved
since the civil action is based on culpa aquiliana, whose
existence is separate from that of civil liability under the RPC.
Doctrine: A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a
delict or crimea distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual; It is now settled that acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasidelict.
(ii) Distinguished from Contract
- There a number of distinctions that can be made from
obligations arising from quasi-delicts and from contractual
breach.
Quasi-Delict
Contractual Breach
Source
of The wrongful or It is the contract itself
Obligation
negligent act or that creates the tie and
or Juridical omission itself
not the breach
Tie
Burden
of The plaintiff must The existence of the
Proof
prove
the contract and the fact of
negligence of the non-compliance
will
defendant
before justify, prima facie, the
relief can be granted right to the relief sought
Applicability
It is required that the The doctrine is not
of Proximate negligent act or applicable
and
the
Cause
omission be the action
can
be
Doctrine
proximate cause of prosecuted merely by
the
damage proving the existence of
suffered.
the contract and with the
fact that it was breached
Defense of The defense of due The defense of due
Employer for diligence on the part diligence is not available
the
of the employer in to the employer.
Negligence
the selection and
of
the supervision of his
Employee
employees can be
raised
Vinculum
Juris
Presence of
Negligence
What Must
Be Proven
Defense
Culpa Aquiliana
Negligence
becomes
source of obligation
between persons not
formerly connected by a
legal tie
It is the vinculum juris
Culpa Contractual
A breach in the
performance of an
obligation
already
existing
Merely incidental
A lack of the diligence Existence of contract

required
and breach thereof
Diligence in selection Rebuttal
of
the
and
supervision
of breach*
employee
Liability
Direct
liability
as Direct and immediate,
employer
as contracting party
(Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., From A2016 Reviewer)
* Rationale: It would be unfair for anyone liable for breach of
contract to be absolved merely by proving diligence. They may
no longer be compelled to honor their contractual obligations if
such a defense is available.
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. (1918)
Concept: Quasi-delict Distinguished from Contract
Brief Facts: Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad
Company, entitling him to ride the trains for free. On one
occasion, as he tried to alight from the car, his feet came in
contract with a sack of watermelons, causing him to slip and fall
violently on the platform. As a result, his body rolled from the
platform, and his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. He
filed a case to recover damages from Manila Railroad. RTC said
that while Manila Railroad was negligent in placing the sack of
melons on the platform, Cangco was negligent in failing to use
caution in alighting.
Doctrine: Liability of Manila Railroad is direct. It cannot
exculpate itself from liability by proof that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, as the cause of action is a breach of
contract of carriage. In the same vein, liability cannot be escaped
by proof that the fault was imputable to the employees.
10
Manila Railroad Co. v. Cia. Transatlantica (1918)

boarded the train, the contract was already perfected hence, the
obligation of LRT already existed.
Brief Facts: Manila Railroad had a contract with Compania

Trasatlantica for the transport of two locomotive broilers. The
latter contracted the services of Atlantic Gulf as its equipment
was not strong enough to handle the broilers. Atlantic Gulf
damaged the broilers when it was unloading the same from
Compania Trasatlanticas hold. This was allegedly because of the
negligence of the employee of Atlantic Gulf in operating the
crane used for unloading the said broilers.
Common carriers are liable for death of or injury to passengers:

through the negligence or willful acts of its employees; or on
account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carriers employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission
Doctrine: The existence of a contract between Manila Railroad

and Compania Trasatlantica precludes the former from
recovering damages directly from Atlantic Gulf for the injury
caused by the negligence of its employee. There is no privity of
contract between the two. Compania Trasatlantica is
nevertheless liable to Manila Railroad notwithstanding the fact
that it was the employee of Atlantic Gulf, an independent
contractor, who caused the damage. The formers liability arises
from breach of contract. Atlantic Gulf can only be liable to
Compania Trasatlantica and cannot escape liability by proof that
it exercised diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, as its liability arises from a
breach of contract.
Syquia v. CA (1993)
Brief Facts: Manila Memorial Park supplied a concrete vault
encasing the coffin of Syquias father. It was discovered that the
concrete vault had a hole through which water and dirt seeped
in causing damage to the coffin as well as the to the body of the
deceased.
Doctrine: Existence of a contract does not preclude liability
arising from quasi-delict. Nonetheless, there was no finding of
negligence on the part of the employees of Manila Memorial
that would warrant an award of damages. Neither can it be held
liable for breach of contract. Sealed does not mean
waterproof.
LRT v. Navidad (2003)
Brief Facts: Navidad, drunk, had a fist fight with a security
guard stationed in LRT Terminal. Navidad fell on the tracks and
was struck by the moving train and was instantly killed.
Doctrine: LRT is liable for the death of Navidad. Its liability
arises from a breach of contract of carriage. A common carrier
has the obligation of ensuring the safe transport of its patrons.
Said obligation begins from the moment of perfection of the
contract until the passenger arrives at his destination. Contract is
perfected from the moment Navidad purchased the token
representing the payment of fare. Although Navidad has not yet
By simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to

still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that
the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In
the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the
accident occurred, the presumption would be that it has been at
fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must
be proved.
Consolidated Bank v. CA (2003)
Brief Facts: L.C. Diaz instructed its cashier to deposit money
with Solidbank. The cashier instructed the companys messenger
to perform the task. The messenger brought the deposit slips
and passbook to the bank. As it was taking too long, he left the
passbook in the possession of Solidbanks clerk. An unknown
and unauthorized person claimed the passbook and the clerk,
without ascertaining this persons authority, surrendered the said
passbook to him. Money was withdrawn and withdrawal slips
contained forged signatures of officers of L.C. Diaz
Doctrine: Liability of Solidbank arises from breach of contract.
When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers
during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers
an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the
passbook. They must return the passbook only to the depositor
or his authorized representative. In culpa contractual, once the
plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that
the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the
defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In
contrast with culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the defendant was negligent.
L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual
obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that
Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not
returning the passbook to the messenger. The burden was on
Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its
employees. This, Solidbank failed to discharge.
11
Batal v. San Pedro (2006)

Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. CA (1993)

Brief Facts: Northern portion of the fence constructed around

the Spouses Tominagas property encroaches upon a right of
way. The fences were constructed under the supervision of Frank
Batal, who represented himself as a surveyor. It was later
discovered that it was not Frank, but his wife who was a licensed
geodetic engineer.
Brief Facts: Geronimo sues Coca-Cola Bottlers for having sold

adulterated products to her.
Doctrine: Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two

different senses:
Culpa aquiliana: the wrongful or negligent act or omission
which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation
between two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation (Art. 2176, CC)
Culpa contractual: the fault or negligence incident in the
performance of an obligation which already existed, and
which increases the liability from such already existing
obligation. (Art. 1170-1174, CC)
Doctrine: Existence of contract does not preclude liability

arising from quasi-delict. Allegations in the complaint make
reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of
"adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption." Cause of action is quasi-delict and not breach of
implied warranty against hidden defects; therefore Geronimos
action has not yet prescribed.
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the
warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the
thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Art. 1567, CC.
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Art.
2176, CC.
B. Basic Elements
The Batals are liable for culpa contractual. They failed to exercise
the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings.
Air France v. Carrascoso (1966)
Brief Facts: Carrascoso was forced by Air France manager to
vacate his seat because there was a white man who had a better
right to a first class seat.
Doctrine: Existence of a contract does not preclude liability
arising from quasi-delict. Liability arising from quasi-delict may
still arise when the act which constituted the breach is also a tort.
Singson v. BPI (1968)
Brief Facts: BPI erroneously froze the account of Singson. BPI
later rectified its mistake and apologized to Singson.
Doctrine: The existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order
and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and
considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done
to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the
bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had
committed, an award of nominal damages would suffice to
vindicate plaintiff's rights.
3 Basic Elements:
1. Act or omission in breach of legal duty
2. Concept of fault or negligence
3. Causal relation between act/omission and injury
1. Act or omission in breach of legal duty
In most, if not all, cases wherein the Court expounds on the
elements of quasi-delicts, the first requisite is always the
existence of a duty or obligation, recognized by
law, requiring a person to conform to a certain standard of
conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks.
In most cases, such duty need not be proven since it
is either already apparent or is expressly provided
by law, such as the duty of a driver of an automobile to
observe traffic rules, or that of common carriers to safely
transport its passengers.
Since such duty is recognized by law, Article 19, 20, and
21, NCC can be used as legal basis for indemnity for
damages for such breach.
Breach of duties arising from contractual obligations or
culpa contractual, is different from the breach referred to in
quasi-delicts or culpa aquilana, the former being governed
by Article 1170, NCC, and the latter under Article
2176, NCC.
Jurisprudence does not offer a clear answer on the question
of WON there can be a quasi-delict when there is a
pre-existing contract between the parties.
Jurisprudence
In the Courts obiter dictum in the case of Naguiat v. NLRC,
it said that: Essentially, tort consists in the violation of a
right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply
stated, tort is a breach of legal duty. However, being a
mere obiter, it can be argued that the Naguiat definition is
not binding.
It was in Garcia v. Salvador where the Court held that
violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where
the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something,
his omission or non-performance will render him liable to
whoever may be injured thereby.
As was also held in Cangco v. Manila Railroad, The legal
rights of each member of society constitute the measure of
the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other
members of society. The breach of these general
duties whether due to willful intent or to mere
inattention gives rise to an obligation to indemnify
the injured party.
In Air France v. Carrascoso, while the Court held that the
act that breaks the contract may also be a tort, this could
not be used as a legal basis for saying that an act
can be both culpa contractual and culpa aquilana
at the same time.
Firstly, although both are
homologous, and while all quasi-delicts are torts,
not all torts are quasi delicts. Secondly, the term
tort cannot be interpreted as culpa aquilana because the
Court in this case cited Article 21 as the basis of
responsibility for the committed tort and not
Article 2176, which is the basis for culpa aquilana.
2. Concept of fault or negligence
Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2
shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Art. 1171 Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
(1102a)
Art. 2201 (2) In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation. (1107a)
12
(i) General)
In Common Law
Negligence is a matter of risk that is to say, of
recognizable danger of injury
Conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of
causing damage
Conduct which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm
Negligence is conduct and not a state of mind (Prosser &
Keeton)
In Philippine Law
Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk or harm to
another. It is that failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. (U.S. v. Barrias,
adopting the definition given by Judge Cooley; Jarco
Marketing Corporation v. CA)
Article 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are
also applicable to a quasi-delict.
Test for Determining Whether a Person is Negligent
1. Reasonable care and caution expected of an
ordinary prudent person
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person
or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to the pursued? If so, the
law imposes the duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precaution against its mischievous results,
and the failure two do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm followed by the ignoring of
the admonition born of this provision, is the constitutive fact
of negligence. (Picart v. Smith)
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have used in the same situation. If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. (Mandarin Villa, Inc. v. CA; Jarco
Marketing Corp. v. CA)
2. No hard and fast rule for measuring degree of care
There is no hard and fast rule whereby the degree of care
and vigilance required is measured
It is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person
finds himself situated
All the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a
person to use that care and diligence expected of prudent
and reasonable men under similar circumstances (Cusi v.
PNR)
Existence of negligence is not determined by reference to
the person judgment of the actor; it is the law that considers
what would be reckless or negligent
Factors To Be Considered
1. Nature of the obligation
2. Circumstances of the person
3. Circumstances of time
4. Circumstances of the place
Kinds of Diligence Required
Diligence is the attention and care required of a person
in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence
(Sambijon v. Suing)
Under Art. 1173, the following kinds are required:
1. That agreed upon by the parties, orally or in writing;
2. In the absence of stipulation, that required by law in the
particular case (extraordinary diligence for common
carriers)
3. If both the contract and law are silent, then the
diligence expected of a good father of a family (par. 2)
or ordinary diligence
What needs to be proved:
1. Negligence - In action for quasi-delict, plaintiff must prove
negligence of defendant
Exception:
a. In cases where negligence is presumed or imputed by
law - this is only rebuttable/presumption juris tantum
b. Principle of res ipsa loquitur - grounded on the difficulty
in proving through competent evidence, public policy
considerations
2. Damage/injury
3. Causal connection between negligence and
damage (to be actionable)
Defendants negligence must be the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the plaintiff to enable plaintiff
to recover.
If plaintiffs own conduct is the cause of the injury there
can be no recovery.
If plaintiff's negligence is only contributory, he is
considered partly responsible only, may still recover
from defendant but must be reduced by the courts in
proportion to his own negligence
Doctrine of proximate cause:
Any cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have occurred and
from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably
anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury
complained of or some similar injury would result therefrom as a
natural and probable consequence. (Pilipinas Bank v. CA)
13
Rakes v. AG&P (1907)

Concept: General Concept of Fault or Negligence
Brief Facts: Rakes, one of the employees of AG&P, while he
was transporting iron rails for the employer, got into an accident,
which resulted in the breaking of his leg and its further
amputation. The cause of the accident was due to the failure of
AG&P to maintain the tracks on which the accident occurred.
Rakes filed an action for damages against its employer. CFI
found AG&P liable for a breach of duty to properly secure the
load of iron or to maintain the tramway in a proper condition.
Doctrine: It was the duty of the defendant to build and to
maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect
its workingmen from unnecessary danger, on the basis of a
contract of employment. It was the duty of AG&P to build and
maintain its track in reasonably sound condition to protect its
employees from unnecessary danger. AG&P is considered
negligent because of its failure to comply with its
aforementioned duty.
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., supra
Brief Facts: Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad
Company, entitling him to ride the trains for free. On one
occasion, as he tried to alight from the car, his feet came in
contract with a sack of watermelons, causing him to slip and fall
violently on the platform. As a result, his body rolled from the
platform, and his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. He
filed a case to recover damages from Manila Railroad. RTC said
that while Manila Railroad was negligent in placing the sack of
melons on the platform, Cangco was negligent in failing to use
caution in alighting.
Doctrine: The foundation of the liability of Manila Railroad is
the contract of carriage, and it is obligated to Cangco for the
breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise due
care in its performance. The contract of carriage, aside from
involving the obligation to transport the passenger, also involves
the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of
entering and leaving its trains.
14
Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co. (1929)

Concept: Fault or negligence in general
Wright v. Manila Electric Co. (1914)

Brief Facts: Del Prado attempted to board the street car

operated by Manila Electric Co., and raised his hand as an
indication of his desire to board. The driver eased up without
stopping, and Del Prado seized the hand post, while placing his
left foot on the platform. Before he had secured his position, the
driver applied the power and the car lurched forward, causing
Del Prado to slip off, and his right foot was crushed by the
moving car. Del Prado filed an action for damages against MEC.
CFI ruled in favor of Del Prado.
Brief Facts: Wright (intoxicated), on his way home via a calesa,

was crossing the tracks of an electric street railway maintained by
Manila Electric Co. The horse stumbled upon the tracks, causing
the cart to strike the rail, and Wright to be thrown off and
injured. The tops of the rails were projected from the ground,
which was a negligent act admitted by MEC. Wright filed an
action for damages. RTC found both parties negligent, but
MECs was greater.
Doctrine: MECs liability arises from a breach of a contractual

duty because the relation between a carrier and its passenger is
contractual in nature. Failure on the part of the carrier to use due
care in carrying its passengers, which extends to those boarding
and alighting, is considered a breach of that duty, making the
carrier liable. There is no duty on the part of the carrier to come
to a full stop, but it has the duty not to do any act, which would
increase Del Prados peril as he was attempting to board the car.
The street cars premature acceleration is a breach of duty.
Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co. (1930)
Brief Facts: Astudillo, along with his friends, were by the gate
of Intramuros in the City of Manila. An electric light pole, with a
triple braid weather-proof wire, owned and operated by Manila
Electric Co., was near a public area just by the abovementioned
gate. Astudillo reached out and grabbed the wire of the light
pole and was instantly killed. His mother filed an action for
damages against Manila Electric Co., and the CFI ruled in favor
of the mother.
Doctrine: An electric company, which is not an insurer of safety,
is a provider of electricity, which requires a measure of care
commensurate with or proportionate to the danger it involves.
There is a duty on their part involving a high degree of diligence
and care, which extends to places where persons have a right to
be. There should have been proper insulation of the wires, which
MEC failed to do. It should have foreseen and guarded against
such a danger (people touching the wire and dying), especially in
a place frequented by many people.
Doctrine: Mere intoxication is not negligence per se, nor does

it establish by itself a lack of ordinary care. Intoxication or
sobriety is immaterial if no lack of ordinary care or prudence can
be imputed to him. No higher degree of care is required of a
drunken man compared to a sober man they are held to the
same standards, and therefore, Wright is not negligent.
Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1988)
Concept: Concept of Fault or Negligence
Brief Facts: Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire
of a cargo truck, parked along the right side of the National
Highway. Another truck (driven by Serrano) bumped Layugan,
who ultimately had his left leg amputated. Layugan filed an
action for damages against the owner of the truck that hit him,
the latter arguing that it was Layugan who was negligent in the
positioning of the truck and the failure to install an early warning
device. RTC attributed negligence to the driver of the truck,
which hit Layugan, and his employer is considered also liable.
IAC reversed, finding Layugan negligent.
Doctrine: Negligence is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers an injury. Evidence
shows that 3-4meters away from the parked truck, a lighted
kerosene lamp was placed, which Serrano admitted. This, in
addition to the fact that the brakes wouldnt work, makes
Serrano negligent. His employer, Isidro, is also liable under Art.
2180.
15
PNR v. Brunty, supra

Sicam v. Jorge (2007)

Concept: Concept of Fault or Negligence
public safety demands that said device are installed.
Brief Facts: Jorge pawned jewelry to Sicam to secure a loan

she had. However, 2 armed men entered the pawnshop and
took the contents of a pawnshop vault, including Sicams jewelry.
Sicam informed Jorge of the loss, and eventually, Sicam failed to
return the jewelry despite Jorges demands. Jorge filed a
complaint with the RTC seeking indemnification for the loss of
the pawned jewelry. RTC found no liability because robbery is a
fortuitous event; CA reversed, finding Sicam liable.
Doctrine: Negligence is the omission to do something which a

reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It
is the want of care required by the circumstances, and its
application depends upon the situation of the parties and the
degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. PNRs negligence was the cause of the collision. It failed
to provide the necessary safety device, making it liable for
damages under Art. 2176. Because of PNRs duty to the public,
even if there is no law or ordinance requiring the safety
precautions, failure to provide the necessary safety device is
evidence of negligence and disregard of the publics safety.
Garcia v. Salvador, supra
Doctrine: Robbery is an inadequate defense of fortuitous

event. Sicam admitted that he thought of opening a vault with a
nearby bank for safekeeping the valuables, but was discouraged
by the Central Bank. Robbery was not only foreseeable, but
actually foreseen and anticipated, which contradicts the defense
of a fortuitous event. In addition, robbery does not foreclose the
possibility of negligence on Sicams part. His operation of the
pawnshop shows that they failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation they were guilty of negligence in the operation
of their business. There were no security measures adopted no
sufficient precaution and vigilance, no security guard present,
and the vault was open at the time of the robbery (as was the
practice).
(ii) Specific cases

Doctrine: Negligence is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The test for
determining the negligence of healthcare providers is whether
he failed to do (or did he do) something, which a reasonable
prudent health care provider would have done (would not have
done)? If yes, he is guilty. Owners and operators of clinical
laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes promulgated
to protect and promote the health of the people by preventing
the operation of substandard, improperly managed and
inadequately supported laboratories. Violation of a statutory
duty is negligence; where the law imposes a duty to do
something, the omission or non-performance will render him
liable. Garcia failed to comply with RA 4688 (The Clinical
Laboratory Law) and DOH AO No. 49-B Series of 1998 (Revised
Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration, Operation
and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines). He
is negligent in not following the appropriate lab measures and
procedures dictated by his training and experience, and this act
or omission makes him negligent.
Jarco Marketing v. Court of Appeals (1999)

Concept: Fault or negligence; specific cases
Brief Facts: While Criselda and her daughter were at Syvels
Dept. Store, owned by Jarco, the gift-wrapping counter
collapsed and pinned down the 6-year old girl, Zhieneth. The girl
was operated on, but lost her ability to talk, and eventually died
as a result of the injuries sustained. Spouses Aguilar demanded
for compensation from Jarco, who refused, so the spouses filed
a complaint for damages. TC dismissed the complaint because
the proximate cause of the fall was Zhieneths act of clinging to
it. CA reversed it, finding Jarco negligent.
Doctrine: Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing or
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It
is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such person
suffers injury. Jarcos negligence or omission to secure or make
stable the counters base was the proximate cause of the death.
Employees testified that the counter should have been secured,
but the supervisors did not remedy the situation nor insure the
safety of the employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinarily prudent man would have done.
Ylarde v. Aquino (1988)

Concept: Specific Cases on the Concept of Fault or
Negligence
Brief Facts: Aquino asked his students to help clear concrete
blocks that remained in their school after WWII. They were made
to dig an excavation to push the cement stones in. At some
point, Aquino left the children to look for rope, and later, the 3
kids playfully jumped into the pit. A 4th kid jumped on top of the
concrete block, which slid down the opening. 2 of the kids were
able to scramble out, but Ylarde got caught and was pinned by
said block. 3 days later, he died. His parents filed an action for
damages against Aquino and Soriano (principal). CFI dismissed
the case, finding Aquino exercised utmost diligence. CA
affirmed.
Doctrine: Aquino is liable under Art. 2180. As the teacher-incharge, he was negligent in his supervision of them, and in his
failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on
their persons. He acted with fault and gross negligence in
directing the students to take on this task and leaving them
alone in such a dangerous site. Everything that occurred was the
natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of Aquino
because children are, by nature, playful and adventurous.
Filinvest Credit v. Court of Appeals (1989)
Concept: Basic Elements of Torts; Specific Cases (Waiver)
Brief Facts: Jose and Iluminada were in the business of the
sale of gravel from crushed rocks for construction purposes.
They looked for a rock crusher, and they were referred to Rizal
Consolidated Corporation. The machine sold by RCC was
labeled to have a certain capacity, and was inspected by Oscar
(Joses brother) he was satisfied and signified their intent to
purchase the machine, obtaining assistance from Filinvest
Credict Corporation, executing a mortgage in favor of FCC for
their loan. 3 months after, buyers said the machine was not up to
their standards (could crush only 5 tons instead of 20-40).
Eventually, buyers stopped payment then FCC foreclosed the
mortgage. Buyers filed an action for rescission for the lease and
annulment of the mortgage. RTC rescinded the lease and
annulled the mortgage. CA affirmed.
Doctrine: The buyers are more knowledgeable about the
machine because it is in the nature of their line of business, and
because of the fact that they were able to inspect the machine in
question they are now disallowed from complaining about its
deficiencies. Actually, it is their failure or neglect to exercise the
caution and prudence of an expert, or, at least, of a prudent
man, in the selection, testing, and inspection of the rock crusher
that gave rise to their difficulty and to this conflict. The rule is
that between 2 parties, he who by his own negligence caused
the loss shall bear the same.
16
Professional Services v. Agana (2007, 2008, 2010)

Concept: Basic Elements of Torts; Specific Cases
Brief Facts: Natividad underwent a surgery headed by Dr.
Ampil in Medical City Hospital to remove the cancer that spread
to her ovaries. After the surgery, Natividad began to feel a
constant pain in the lower region of her body. It was later on
discovered that the pain was caused by two gauze bandages
that were left behind in her body. These bandages were
subsequently removed. The Agana family filed for damages
against the lead surgeon and the hospital.
Doctrine: While the general rule is that there exists no ER-EE
relationship between hospitals and visiting physicians, under
Ramos v. CA, hospitals may be held vicariously liable as
employers as an exception the general rule, under the
respondeat superior and/or doctrine of apparent authority
(estoppel by agency).
Applied in medical negligence cases, there are two element in
agency by estoppel: a) voluntary acts by the principal in such a
manner as to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual alleged to be negligent was its agent (ex. hospital lists
doctors name under its directory) and b) reliance by the plaintiff
on such voluntary acts.
There is pro hac vice liability through corporate negligence on
the part of hospitals, whenever they admit that they have a
corporate responsibility to attend to its patients after the
operation, especially if there was something irregular with the
procedure done within its premises.
Medical Negligence
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give
primordial consideration to the well-being of their patients.
If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable
for his acts.
Physicians are not guarantors of care and, they never set out
to intentionally cause injury to their patients.
However, intent is IMMATERIAL in negligence cases
because where negligence exists and is proven, it
automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the
damage caused.
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify
a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury. (See requisites of
res ipsa loquitur)
What patient must prove in medical negligence (medical

malpractice)
1. Health care provider either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provide would have done;
or
2. Health care provider did something that a reasonably
prudent provider would not have done.
(Professional Services v. Agana, From A2016 Reviewer)
Carillo v. People (1994)
Concept: Medical Negligence
Brief Facts: Catherine underwent an appendectomy under Dr.
Madrid, the lead surgeon. For such operation, she received an
anesthetic called Nubain by the anesthesiologist, Dr. Carillo.
However, she was not weighed before the administration of such
drug, a procedure that is important for determining the dosage.
Hence, an improper dosage was administered, which led to
post-operative complication that led to her death. Her family
filed suit, as a result of the incident.
Doctrine:
The standard of care that the law imposes on doctors are for
them to serve the interest of [the] patient "with the greatest of
solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill and to
"attend to his patients faithfully and conscientiously." Should the
plaintiff prove that these standards were not met, there shall be
a finding of negligence on the part of the defendant doctor.
Batiquin v. Court of Appeals (1996)
Concept: Basic Elements of Torts; Specific Cases; Medical
Negligence
Brief Facts: Mrs. Villegas underwent a caesarian section for the
delivery of her first child, performed by Dr. Batiquin at the
Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital. After the successful
operation, she began to suffer constant abdominal pain and
became ill. Through second opinion with a different physician, it
was discovered that there was a piece of rubber material left
inside her abdominal cavity which caused an infection, which in
turn, caused the symptoms she had been enduring. The material
was removed but was, however, lost.
Doctrine: The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, a rule on evidence,
may be applied in cases of medical negligence upon the
showing of the following requisites: a) that the injury was caused
by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and
management of defendant, and b) that the occurrence of such
injury was in a manner that would not have happened if
reasonable care was used. Whenever these elements obtain, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to disprove the
rebuttable presumption that he/she was negligent.
17
Cantre v. Go (2007)
Concept: Medical Negligence
Brief Facts: During the delivery of her fourth child, Dr. Cantre
ordered that a droplight (a device that emits light and heat) be
used to warm her body and her baby while they were trying to
stop Noras internal bleeding. After the delivery, Noras husband
discovered that there was a wound on Noras arm. When he
asked the nurses, he was informed that it was a burn wound.
During the subsequent investigation, Dr. Cantre claimed that the
wound was caused by the blood pressure cuff. Meanwhile, the
medico-legal officer, in its report, claimed that the wound was a
burn and that the droplight was what probably caused it. The
spouses then filed for damages for the injury.
Doctrine: In applying the res ipsa loquitur to medical
negligence cases, the following requisites have to concur: a) the
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence; b) it is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and c) the possibility of contributing conduct which
would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Once these
requisites concur, a rebuttable presumption of negligence arises
against the defendant.
(iii) Res ipsa loquitor
Latin: the thing, or transaction speaks for itself
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence
of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the
part of the person who controls the instrument causing the
injury
Requisites:
a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someones negligence;
b. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant or defendants; and
c. The possibility of contributing conduct, which would make
the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
18
Africa v. Caltex (1966)

Concept: Res ipsa loquitur
Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra

Brief Facts: While gasoline was being transferred from a tank

truck into the underground storage of a Caltex gas station, a fire
broke out. It spread into the neighborhood and burned down
several houses. The owners of these houses now file damages
against Caltex, claiming negligence against them as the cause of
the fire.
Brief Facts: Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire

of a cargo truck, parked along the right side of the National
Highway. Another truck (driven by Serrano) bumped Layugan,
who ultimately had his left leg amputated. Layugan filed an
action for damages against the owner of the truck that hit him,
the latter arguing that it was Layugan who was negligent in the
positioning of the truck and the failure to install an early warning
device. RTC attributed negligence to the driver of the truck,
which hit Layugan, and his employer is considered also liable.
IAC reversed, finding Layugan negligent.
Doctrine: When the thing that caused the injury is under the
control of the defendant, and that the accident, which produces
the injury, occurs in such a manner that would not happen if
there were proper care, it constitutes reasonable evidence,
absent the defendants explanation, that the accident arose from
the negligence of the defendant. Also, in this jurisdiction, fire is
not considered as a fortuitous event as it almost always arises
from some act of man.
Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Co. (1967)
Brief Facts: Luzon was towing its barge with two of its boats
down the Pasig River. The river was swollen at the time due to
the heavy rains. Due to this, the barge smashed into the
Nagtahan bailey bridge. The Republic sued Luzon for damages.
Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur applies when the instrument that
causes injury is under exclusive control of the defendant and the
accident occurs in such a way that would not have happened if
proper care was used.
MRT: Res ipsa loquitur should not have been used because there
was direct evidence.
F.F. Cruz v. Court of Appeals (1988)
Concept: Res ipsa loquitor
Brief Facts: FFC operates a furniture manufacturing shop in
Caloocan, adjacent to some houses. Some of the residents
nearby requested FFC that a firewall be constructed between
the shop and the houses. The requests went unheeded, despite
several repeated requests. Fire did break out in the furniture
shop and it spread to the plaintiffs house which was also razed
to the ground with the shop. Hence the civil suit for damages.
Doctrine: The case reiterates the doctrine of Africa v. Caltex:
where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown
to be under the management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care.
Doctrine: Where the plaintiff presents direct evidence as to the

precise cause of the accident and all facts and circumstances
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear, the presumption of
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may NOT be
availed of.
(iv) Assumption of risk
Complete defense by the defendant in a quasi-delict action.
Voluntarily assumes a risk of harm from the negligent
conduct.
Volenti non fit injuria (Latin: "to a willing person, injury is not
done")
Requisites:
a. Intentional exposure to a known danger
b. One who voluntarily assumed the risk of an injury from a
known danger cannot recover in an action for negligence or
an injury is incurred
c. Plaintiffs acceptance of risk (by law/contract/nature of
obligation) has erased defendants duty so that his
negligence is not a legal wrong
d. Applies to all known danger
Afialda v. Hisole (1949)
Concept: Basic Elements of Torts; Assumption of Risk
Brief Facts: Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the carabaos of
the Hisoles. While he was tending to them, he was gored by one
of these carabaos and passed away due to the injury he
sustained. His wife filed for damages against the Hisoles for her
husbands death.
Doctrine: The possessor or user of an animal is liable for any
damages it may cause and therefore has responsibility to
prevent such damages from being caused by the animal. This
responsibility extends not only to others but also to himself; this
is a risk that the possessor or user assumes. Hence, the case
becomes damnum absque injuria; the plaintiff must bear his own
losses.
Nikko Hotel v. Reyes (2005)

Concept: Assumption of Risk
Brief Facts: Reyes joined his friend in attending a party to
which he was not invited. He was eventually asked to leave
because the event was private. He filed a civil case for damages,
claiming he was rudely asked to do so and was shamed in front
of the guests, while the defendant, Ms. Lim, defends that she
was not rude and had discreetly asked Reyes to leave.
Doctrine: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria refers to a case
of self-inflicted injury or consent to injury, which operates to
preclude the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he was not
negligent in doing so.
(v) Degrees
Degrees of negligence (Prosser & Keeton)
a. Slight negligence = failure to use great care
b. Ordinary negligence = failure to use ordinary care
c. Gross negligence = failure to use even slight care
Gross negligence (Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo)
It implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight
care or diligence, or the entire absence of care.
It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.
It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may
be affected
Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo (2007)
Concept: Fault or negligence; degrees
Brief Facts: Dr. Ilao- Oreta, a OB-Gyne from St. Lukes, missed
the laparoscopic procedure (an insertion of a laparoscope
through the abdominal wall to get a direct view of the internal
reproductive organ to determine the real cause of infertility) she
was supposed to conduct on Eva Ronquillo. She miscalculated
her time of arrival from her honeymoon in Hawaii. Spouses
Ronquillo filed a compaint for breach of professional contract
and damages.
Doctrine: Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence
of care. In this case, Dr. Ilao-Oreta was not grossly negligent as
evidenced by her earnest efforts to rectify her mistake
(apologized to spouses). However, she is still negligent for
scheduling the procedure without considering the time
difference between Philippines and Hawaii.
19
(vi) Contributory negligence

Art. 2179 When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2214 In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
Contributory Negligence
The plaintiff was also negligent together with the defendant;
to constitute a defense, proximate cause of injury/damage
must be the negligence of defendant
Conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. (Valenzuela v. CA)
Effect: It shall reduce the damages that he may recover
Other related doctrines:
Comparative negligence
o Modification of Contributory Negligence.
o Comparison is made in terms of the degree of the
negligence of the plaintiff and that of the defendant
and the amount of damages recoverable.
o This is considered more equitable system of
apportioning liability for damages.
Concurrent negligence
o If both parties are equally negligent, the courts will
leave them as they are; there can be no recovery
Bernal v. House (1990)
Concept: Contributory negligence
Brief Facts: Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion
Bernal passed along a public street after a religious procession.
The daughter was allowed to get a short distance in advance of
her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile appeared
from the opposite direction, frightened the child so she ran and
fell at the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this
gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. The child
died of shock due to the burns she sustained.
Doctrine: The negligence of parents is only a remote cause
and cannot be a basis of an action if there intervened between
the remote cause and the injury a distinct efficient cause of the
injury.
20
Rakes v. AG&P (1907), supra

Concept: Contributory Negligence
Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon (2005)

Brief Facts: Rakes, one of the employees of AG&P, while he

was transporting iron rails for the employer, got into an accident,
which resulted in the breaking of his leg and its further
amputation. The cause of the accident was due to the failure of
AG&P to maintain the tracks on which the accident occurred.
Rakes filed an action for damages against its employer. CFI
found AG&P liable for a breach of duty to properly secure the
load of iron or to maintain the tramway in a proper condition.
Brief Facts: Vehicular accident between a motorcycle and a

Tamaraw jeepney. Motorcycle belonged to Joel Castillon and
was driven by his brother Ray. Tamaraw was owned by Nelen
Gambert. Both vehicles were traveling on the same direction but
the jeep made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the
instantaneous death of Ray so his heirs filed an action for
damages.
Doctrine: Rakes was guilty of contributory negligence for

walking beside the car, but not for continuing to work despite
noticing a depression in the track. The disobedience of Rakes
contributed to the injury. His contributory negligence has the
effect of offsetting the damages due him by reducing said
damages. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own
injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. CA (1990)
Brief Facts: Julio Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the
caboose of Ma-aos cargo train. Train fell on its side and caught
Julios legs and pinned him down. Julio died so wife filed claims
for death against Ma-ao.
Doctrine: Contributory negligence is the act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person
injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Julio cannot be held guilty of
contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his
assigned station. It might have been a violation of company rules
but could not have directly contributed to his injury.
Del Rosario v. Manila Electric Co. (1932)
Concept: Basic Elements of Tort; Contributory Negligence
Brief Facts: Fallen wire of Manila Electric. Kid touched wire.
Shouted, Ay Madre! Died.
Doctrine: The Court deems it doubtful to impute (contributory)
negligence on the part of the kid as he was immature due to his
years and would be naturally curious to do something out of the
ordinary.
Doctrine: Ray was guilty of contributory negligence so heirs

shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. The
underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled
to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of
his own negligence. The determination of the mitigation of
liability varies depending on the circumstance of each case.
(vii) Last clear chance
Even though a persons own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril and an injury results, the injured is entitled
to recover if the defendant thru the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff.
This defense is available only in an action by the driver or
owner of one vehicle against the driver or owner of the
other vehicle involved.
Requisites:
a. Plaintiff was in a position of danger by his own negligence
b. Defendant knew of such position of the plaintiff
c. Defendant had the least clear chance to avoid the accident
by exercise of ordinary care but failed to exercise such last
clear chance and
d. Accident occurred as proximate cause of such failure
Who may invoke: Plaintiff
NOTE: The doctrine is inapplicable to
a. Joint tortfeasors
b. Defendants concurrently negligent
c. As against 3rd persons
21
Picart v. Smith (1918)

Concept: Fault or negligence; last clear chance
Bustamante v. CA (1991)
Concept: Last Clear Chance
Brief Facts: Picart was riding his horse over Carlatan Bridge.
Picart was at the wrong side of the road, and a car was directly
approaching him from the opposite direction. It was driven by
Smith. Picart, upon his observation that the car was fastapproaching, pulled his pony up against the railing on the right
side of the bridge instead of going left because he did not have
enough time to get to the other side. Smith quickly turned his
car to the right to escape hitting the horse, but in doing so, leg
of the horse was struck and it fell. Horse eventually died and
Picart received contusions. Picart filed a complaint for damages.
Brief Facts: Collision between a gravel and sand truck & a

Mazda passenger bus. Cargo truck and the passenger bus were
approaching each other, coming from opposite directions of the
highway. From 30 meters away, the bus driver saw the front
wheels of the truck wiggling and that the truck was heading
towards his lane but he believed the truck driver was merely
joking. While bus was overtaking the hand tractor in front of it,
and truck was approaching the bus, they sideswiped each other.
Several passengers died, and their heirs filed complaints.
Doctrine: Damages was awarded to Picart. In cases where both

parties are guilty of negligence, it is to be determined which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. Under these
circumstances, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party. Regardless of Picarts antecedent negligence of
riding his horse at the wrong side of the road, Smith had the last
clear chance to avoid danger, making him directly liable for the
damage. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to
Smith and it was his duty to either bring his car to an immediate
stop, or to take the other side of the road to avoid the collision.
Phoenix Construction v. IAC (1987)
Brief Facts: While on his way home, Leonardo Dionisios car
headlights suddenly failed. He then was able to switch his
headlights back on and thereupon saw a Ford dump truck 2
meters away from his car. He tried to avoid the collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. He suffered some physical injuries
and filed an action for damages. Owner (Phoenix) and the driver
(Carbonel) of the truck say Dionisio had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident.
Doctrine: SC did not apply the last clear chance doctrine,
saying that the Courts real duty is to determine whose
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Carbonels
negligence is the proximate cause of the accident because the
collision would not have occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning devices.
Doctrine: Both drivers were negligent. SC did not apply the

doctrine of last clear chance. The principle of last clear chance
applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
McKee v. IAC (1992)
Concept: Basic Elements of Tort; Last Clear Chance
Brief Facts: Collision between a cargo truck and Ford Escort.
Ford Escort entered the trucks lane because 2 boys suddenly
darted from the side of the road and into the Ford Escorts lane.
Collision resulted to death and physical injuries to the
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Doctrine: As employers, owners of the cargo truck are liable.
Given the distance of the truck from the oncoming Ford Escort,
truck driver would have still been able to slow down to let the
Ford Escort driver drive back to the proper lane. Ford Escorts
entry into the lane of the truck was necessary to avoid a greater
peril: causing the death or injury of the two boys- the action of
the Ford Escort driver was not negligent. Moreover, under the
emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence. SC also applied doctrine of last clear
chance, because truck driver had the last fair chance to avoid the
accident but failed to exert the care to avoid the same. The
doctrine provides that a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law to be solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA (1997)

Brief Facts: RMC maintained 2 separate accounts with PBC.
Cash was entrusted to secretary to deposit. Was not credited to
the accounts but was deposited to the account of secretarys
husband. Secretary had 2 deposit slips. The original showed the
name of her husband as depositor and his current account
number while on the duplicate copy was written the account
number of her husband but the name of the account holder was
left blank. This was made easier by the fact that it had never
been the practice of Lipana to check the monthly statements of
account sent by PBC.
Doctrine: Bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to
avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Degree of
diligence required from banks is more than that of a good father
of a family, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship
with their depositors. As such, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.
Engada v. CA (2003)
Brief Facts: Edwin Iran was driving a Toyota Tamaraw jeepney.
Passengers allegedly saw a speeding Isuzu pick-up from the
opposite direction. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly
gradient and when it was just a few meters away from the
jeepney. The pick-up encroached on the lane of the Tamaraw
and headed towards a head-on collision. Both swerved in the
same direction and hit each other.
Doctrine: Jeepney driver cannot be faulted when in his
attempt to avoid the pick-up. Pickup drivers acts put Iran in an
emergency situation, which forced him to act quickly. An
individual, who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence. Therefore last
clear chance not applicable.
22
(viii) Presumed negligence; Negligence Per Se (and Exceptions)

Art. 2184 In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have,
by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of
article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185 Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188 There is prima facie presumption of negligence on
the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof
is indispensable in his occupation or business.
-
If the very injury has happened which was intended to be

prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of
the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the
injury (65 C.J.S. 1156)
Non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a
suitable precaution = Failure to observe that care which an
ordinarily prudent man would observe
When the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure
others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the
forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who
may be injured thereby
When the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform
to such standard is negligence per se, in the absence of a
legal excuse.
Presumption of Contractual Negligence

Where the source of the obligation is derived from a
contract, the mere breach or non-fulfillment of the
prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part
of the obligor.
Lapanday v. Angala (2007)

Del Rosario v. Manila Electric Co. (1932), supra

Concept: Basic Elements of Tort; Contributory Negligence
Brief Facts: Two cars. One car hit while making a u-turn. Car
from behind alleged that the car making a u-turn did not flash
signal lights.
Brief Facts: Fallen wire of Manila Electric. Kid touched wire.

Shouted, Ay Madre! Died.
Doctrine: Last clear chance applies. The one driving the rear
vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him. He had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.
Doctrine: The Court deems it doubtful to impute (contributory)

negligence on the part of the kid as he was immature due to his
years and would be naturally curious to do something out of the
ordinary.
Teague v. Fernandez (1973)

Concept: Presumed negligence; Negligence per se (and
Exceptions)
Brief Facts: Vocational school for hair and beauty culture.
Building was within the coverage of an ordinance. The
requirement of the ordinance having 2 separate stairways for
schools. They only had one. Fire broke out in a store 10m away
from school, across the street. Students shouted fire and caused
panic. Teachers tried to control panic, failed. A stampede
happened and 4 died and several injured.
Doctrine: The general principle is that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of
the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.
To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate
cause of the injury does not the portray the situation in its true
perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it
was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by
requiring that there be 2 stairways instead of 1
Aonuevo v. CA (2004)
Concept: Presumed negligence and Negligence per se
Brief Facts: Lancer was speeding as car turned left. Hit a
bicycle. Bicycle guy injured. Duh.
Doctrine: Negligence per se need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages. Defendant has the burden of
showing a causal connection between the injury received and
the violation of the statute. Negligence to abide by ordinance is
without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a
contributing cause of the injury.
(ix) Fortuitous event
Art. 1174 Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature
of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall
be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
23
Requisites:
a. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or
of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will;
b. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes
caso fortuito or if it can be foreseen it must be impossible to
avoid
c. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner
d. The obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
GENERAL RULE: Fortuitous Event is a complete defense
and a person is not liable if the cause of the damage is a
fortuitous event.
EXCEPTION: It is merely a partial defense and the courts
may mitigate the damages if the loss would have resulted in any
event [Art. 2215(4) NCC]
Art. 2215 In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the
court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances
other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the
following instances: xxx
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
NOTE: A person may still be liable for a fortuitous event if such
person made an ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
Sicam v. Jorge (2007), supra
Concept: Fortuitous event
Brief Facts: Jorge pawned jewelry to Sicam to secure a loan
she had. However, 2 armed men entered the pawnshop and
took the contents of a pawnshop vault, including Sicams jewelry.
Sicam informed Jorge of the loss, and eventually, Sicam failed to
return the jewelry despite Jorges demands. Jorge filed a
complaint with the RTC seeking indemnification for the loss of
the pawned jewelry. RTC found no liability because robbery is a
fortuitous event; CA reversed, finding Sicam liable.
Doctrine: Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, but
it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. When the
effect is found to be partly the result of a persons participation
whether by some overt act, negligence, or omission- the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable
to acts of God.
The possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen and anticipated. This contradicts petitioners defense
of fortuitous events.
Ilocos Norte Electric Co. v. CA (1989)

Concept: Fortuitous Event
Brief Facts: Typhoon Gening hit the province of Ilocos Norte,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding. Girl went into
waist deep flood and sank into water. Electric wire slipped into
the place where girl went into. She died. Autopsy showed burns.
Doctrine: Electric companys employees did not work around
the clock during the occurrence of typhoon. Petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the public
considering that electricity is a subtle and deadly agency. The
negligence of petitioner having been shown, the event is now
taken out the ambit of fortuitous events. When an act of God
concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission.
College Assurance v. Belfrant (2007)
Concept: Fortuitous Event
Brief Facts: Petitioner CAP and CAPP leased several units on
the 2nd and 3rd floors of the building of Belfrant. Fire destroyed
portions of the building including units occupied by defendants.
Origin of fire is the store room occupied by CAP. Coffee
percolator. CAP disclaimed any liability as fire was fortuitous
event.
Doctrine: Fire was not considered a fortuitous event because it
was caused by CAPs negligence in using their coffee percolator.
Nakpil & Sons v. CA (1986)
Concept: Fortuitous event
Brief Facts: Phil Bar Assoc had a building constructed. Plans
made by Nakpil and carried out by a contractor. Earthquake hit,
building destroyed. Contractor did not fully implement plan.
Contractor was saying that the plans were faulty.
Doctrine: Act must be one occasioned exclusively by the
violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded
from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be
in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from
active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from
the rules applicable to the acts of God. They were negligent
therefore, out of the ambit of FE.
24
(x) Emergency Rule (not in the syllabus)

one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
An individual will nevertheless be subject to liability if the
emergency was brought about by his own negligence.
(Valenzuela v. CA)
NOTE: Applicable only to situations that are sudden and
unexpected such as to deprive actor of all opportunity for
deliberation (absence of foreseeability); the action shall still be
judged by the standard of the ordinary prudent man
FACTORS TO CONSIDER:
Gravity of the Harm to be avoided
Alternative courses of action - If the alternative
presented to the actor is too costly, the harm that may result
may still be considered unforeseeable to a reasonable man
Social Value and Utility of the Action - The act which
subjects an innocent person to an unnecessary risk is a
negligent act if the risk outweighs the advantage accruing
to the actor and even to the innocent person himself.
Person exposed to the risk - A higher degree of
diligence is required if the person involved is a child.
3. Causal relation between act/omission and injury
(i) Plaintiffs own conduct caused the harm
Art. 2179 When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co., supra (1929)

Concept: Plaintiffs own conduct caused the harm
Brief Facts: Guy ran after running street car. Made para.
Motorman eased a little without stopping. Before guy could fully
get into the car, motorman applied full power. Guy slipped off
and right foot had to be amputated.
Doctrine: In order for contributory negligence defeat an action
for damages, it must be the proximate cause of the injury. Del
Prados negligence in attempting to board the moving car was
not the proximate cause. The direct proximate cause was the act
of the motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person
boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of an
injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his
view, but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the
motorman will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the
car before he has boarded.
Manila Electric Co. v. Remonquillo (1956)
Concept: Plaintiffs own conduct caused the harm
Brief Facts: Magno repaired the media agua. Used galvanized
iron sheet to cover leaky portion. Sheet touched an exposed
uninsulated primary wire of Manila Electric. Wire was placed in
the required distance by government. Magno died by
electrocution.
Doctrine: Death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence and by the too close proximity of the edge of the
media agua to the electric wire. Manila Electric is not guilty of
negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Manila Electric cannot
be expected to change the stringing or installation of its wires
whenever the 3 feet distance was violated by a house owner.
Real cause of the accident or death= was the reckless
or negligent act of Magno himself
Fernando v. CA 1992)
Concept: Plaintiff's own conduct caused the harm
Brief Facts: When a group did not win the governments
auction of the service contract for cleaning the citys septic tank,
they decided to take it upon themselves to clean the said septic
tank. However, the group died in their attempt to do so. Their
heirs filed suit against the city for damages.
Doctrine: When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of
one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
do.
25
(ii) Remote cause

Bernal v. House, (1930), supra
Concept: Remote Cause
Brief Facts: Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion
Bernal passed along a public street after a religious procession.
The daughter was allowed to get a short distance in advance of
her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile appeared
from the opposite direction, frightened the child so she ran and
fell at the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this
gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. The child
died of shock due to the burns she sustained.
Doctrine: The negligence of parents is only a remote cause
and cannot be a basis of an action if there intervened between
the remote cause and the injury a distinct efficient cause of the
injury.
(iii) Proximate cause
Bataclan v. Medina (1957)
Concept: Proximate cause
Brief Facts: A bus of the Medina Transportation was plying
Cavite on the way to Pasay when one of the front tires burst. It
fell into a ditch and turned turtle. Gasoline began to leak. One of
the men who responded to the scene brought with him a torch.
This immediately ignited the gasoline, burning the passengers
who were not able to escape from the overturned bus.
Doctrine: The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other
things in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, the final event effecting the injury.
Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing (1957)
Concept: Proximate Cause
Brief Facts: A truck owned by Go Chong Bing was being
driven by his employee Romera. Romera had no drivers license
at the time and only had a students permit. Some persons
boarded the truck, including the policeman Orfanel. Orfanel
took over Romera and drove the truck himself. They came to
another truck that was trying to park at the left side of the road.
Orfanel swerved to the right and run over one pedestrian,
Gregorio, despite Romeras instructions for him to apply the
breaks.
Doctrine: A policeman who took over and drove another
persons truck is the proximate cause of the accident, despite
the fact that the owner of the truck allowed his employee to
drive said truck without a drivers license.
Manila Electric Co. v. Remonquillo, supra

Brief Facts: Magno repaired the media agua. Used galvanized
iron sheet to cover leaky portion. Sheet touched an exposed
uninsulated primary wire of Manila Electric. Wire was placed in
the required distance by government. Magno died by
electrocution.
Doctrine: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the circumstances which result in injury because
of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan
Brief Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice plant
factory. They kept on their premises 2 uncovered water tanks,
which were unguarded. On a relevant date, children entered the
factory premises and swam in one of the water tanks. One of
them drowned and sank in the tank. The factory is now being
held for damages.
Doctrine: One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is
liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if
the child is technically a tresspasser in the premises.
Teague v. Fernandez (1973), supra
Brief Facts: Vocational school for hair and beauty culture.
Building was within the coverage of an ordinance. The
requirement of the ordinance having 2 separate stairways for
schools. They only had one. Fire broke out in a store 10m away
from school, across the street. Students shouted fire and caused
panic. Teachers tried to control panic, failed. A stampede
happened and 4 died and several injured.
Doctrine: The general principle is that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of
the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.
26
To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate

cause of the injury does not the portray the situation in its true
perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it
was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by
requiring that there be 2 stairways instead of 1
Nakpil & Sons v. CA (1986), supra
Brief Facts: Phil Bar Assoc had a building constructed. Plans
made by Nakpil and carried out by a contractor. Earthquake hit,
building destroyed. Contractor did not fully implement plan.
Contractor was saying that the plans were faulty.
Doctrine: One who negligently creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability for the natural and probable
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an
act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to
precipitate the loss.
Gabeto v. Araneta (1921)
Brief Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a
carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo. Agaton Araneta,
stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins,
stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that
he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Pagnaya
pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the
control of Araneta. The bit came out of the horse's mouth, the
horse moved forward. The carromata struck a police telephone
box, the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse
to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street.
Gayetano, who was not able to get out, died in the crash.
Doctrine: The driver has control over the animal. Another
person stopping the rig of the horse was too remote a cause for
the accident. When it has been proven that the rig of the horse
was old and brittle as to easily be removed, such is the
proximate cause of the accident.
NPC v. CA (1988)
Brief Facts: Typhoon Welming hit Central Luzon passing
through NAPOCORs Angat Hydro-Electric Project Dam in
Bulacan. The water level had reach the danger height of 212
meters above sea level and abruptly opened the spillway gates.
This action by NAPOCOR had an extraordinary large volume of
water rushed and hit the installations and construction works of
ECI (Engineering Construction, Inc.) a contractor of NAWASA for
its tunnel in Bulacan. The negligent manner of opening the
spillway gates by NAPOCOR had washed away, lost or
destroyed ECIs facilities and structures.
Doctrine: Negligence is a proximate cause of the injury even if
an act of god intervened between such negligence and the
injury caused.
NPC v. CA (1992)
Brief Facts: During Typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered
the towns near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions
to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the
tragedy to the opening of the 3 floodgates by NPC, without
prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam.
Doctrine: Although the typhoon was an act of God, petitioners
cannot escape liability because their negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss and damage.
NPC v. CA (1993)
Brief Facts: This is a consolidated case comprising of four
separate complaint filed against NPC and Chavez. Plaintiffs filed
a complaint against NPC for the loss of lives and destruction of
property due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water
from Angat dam during the typhoon Kading Benjamin Chavez,
was the supervisor at that time of a multi-purpose hydroelectric
plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Doctrine: The effect of the force majeure in question may be
deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man if there is negligence. Thus, the whole
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed
from the laws applicable to acts of God.
27
Raynera v. Hiceta (1999)

Concept: Causal relation between act/omission and injury;
Proximate cause
Brief Facts: Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home on a
motorcycle on a not well-lit asphalt road at 2AM. He crashed on
the left rear portion of an Izuzu truck (owned by Freddie Hiceta
and driven by Jimmy Orpilla) traveling ahead of him. The truck
was loaded with 2 metal sheets extending on both sides. 2 pairs
of red lights were on both sides of the plates but it had no
taillights. Reynaldo was brought to the hospital but was declared
DOA. Heirs of Reynaldo demanded from Hiceta and Orpilla
damages arising from the death as a result of the vehicular
accident but both refused to pay. The heirs filed with the RTC
Manila a complaint for damages against Hiceta and Orpilla and
sought recovery of damages for the death of Reynaldo, caused
by the negligent operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on
the highway, without tail lights.
Doctrine: The court held that it was Reynaldo who was
negligent and was the direct cause of the accident. Proximate
cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. The
direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim.
Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding
bumping the vehicle in front of him; he was in control of the
situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to
enable him to see what was in front of him. It has been said that
drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are
presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted
by other evidence. and the rationale behind this is that the
driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is
in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
!
Austria v. CA (2000)
Brief Facts: Alberto was driving his Ford Fiera with 10

passengers at around 7pm from Manila International Airport to
Bataan. They suddenly hit a stone on the road causing the
vehicle to go out of control and colliding with the rear end of an
improperly parked cargo truck driven by Rolando Flores. 5
passengers suffered injuries. An information was filed against
Alberto. At the time, Rolando, the truck driver remained at large.
Doctrine: In Albertos direct examination, he admitted that he
did see the trailer 6 meters away but at the same time, stated
that the distance of the focus of his vehicles headlight was 20
meters. Also, in his cross-examination, he claimed that he only
saw the trucks rear end when he bumped it. The inconsistency
of these statements only show that he was driving much faster
than he claimed (he said he was going at 30 kph). Because if he
was indeed driving at that speed, he would not have lost control
when he hit the stone lying on the road. Hence, he did not
exercise the precaution required of him. While the Phoenix case
is factually similar with the case at bar, they could not apply the
ruling and hold only the truck driver to be liable in this case,
since Alberto was negligent as well. The Court cites the CA:
That he had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of HIS own
making and this should not relieve him of his liability.
C. Persons Liable
1. Tortfeasor
Art. 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
-
Holds a person civilly liable for the damage caused by his

act or omission constituting fault or negligence
Liability for personal acts and omissions is founded on that
indisputable principle of justice that when a person by his
act or omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a
juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured
person acquires a right to be indemnified and the
person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damage
o Reason is found in the obvious truth that man should
subordinate his acts to the precepts of prudence and, if
he fails to observe them and causes damage to
another, he must repair the damage
28
Liability may arise either from fault or negligence; by an

act or through an omission
o Fault execution of a positive act which causes
damage to another
o Negligence omission to do acts which result also in
damage to another
o Act or omission must be without intent to cause
damage, because if there is intent to cause damage,
the act or omission becomes a crime and civil liability
for such act or omission will be governed by the RPC
Only juridical fault, but not moral fault, gives rise to liability
for damages
o Lack of charity or of altruism, constituting moral fault,
does not constitute a quasi-delict
o One who folds his arms while another is in danger of
death, is guilty only of moral negligence, but not of
juridical negligence
o HOWEVER, the law still requires prudence and care,
considering the attendant circumstances:
!
Example: The owner of an open ditch by the side
of a street, who does not light it at night, will be
liable to persons who may fall therein in the
darkness (Tolentino, as cited in De Leon)
The tortfeasor may be a natural or juridical person. For
natural persons, apply requisites of Art. 2176 and for
juridical persons, apply vicarious liability provisions (from UP
BOC)
Art. 2181 Whoever pays for the damage caused by his

dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
-
Ultimately the dependents and employees (or whoever is

benefited by Article 2180) should bear the loss caused by
their fault or negligence
The law justly provides that whoever pays for the damage
caused by his dependents or employees may recover from
them what he has paid or delivered
!
2. Vicarious liability
-
It is called the doctrine of imputed negligence, under

Anglo-American law (Tamargo v. CA) it is said to be
imputed if the tortfeasor is different from the person who is
being held responsible
Liability of certain persons who are responsible for the
negligence of others
Art. 2180 provides that liability for quasi-delicts is
demandable not only against the person who committed
the act, but also against the person responsible for the
said actor
Why they are liable: they are morally culpable for those
under their absolute or limited control.
Person who is vicariously liable is solidarily liable with him
However, the responsibility ceases when the persons
vicariously liable prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage
Six Categories of Vicarious Liability

Persons Vicariously Liable
Actor
Father, but in case of death or Minor children who live in
incapacity, the mother
their company
Guardians
Minors
or
incapacitated
persons who are under their
authority and live in their
company
Owners and managers of an Employees in the service of
establishment or enterprise
the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions
Employers
Employees and household
helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are
not engaged in any business
or industry
State
Special agent
Teachers
or
heads
of Pupils
and
students
or
establishments of arts and apprentices, so long as they
trades
remain in their custody
Art. 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
29
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are

likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2181 Whoever pays for the damage caused by his
dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182 If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against him where
a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
Art. 219, FC Those given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n)
!
(i) Parents
Art. 221, FC Parents and other persons exercising parental

authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority subject
to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a
-
Art. 221, FC, provides that persons exercising parental

authority shall be civilly liable for the torts of the children in
their care. Art. 211, FC, then states that parental authority is
exercised by both the father and the mother. Thus, the
distinction in Art. 2180, CC, where the father is liable before
the mother, no longer applies.
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents their parental
authority which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child
Parental liability is based on parental authority
Liability is based on a presumption of negligence on their
part if the child under their parental authority causes injury
Art. 2180 provides that the father, and in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible
o Modified by Art. 221 of the Family Code and now both
parents are liable
o Minor must be under the parents parental
authority
Liability is primary and is subject to the defense of lack of
fault or negligence
The diligence required of parents consists of the
instruction and supervision of the child (Libi v. IAC)
Emancipation which takes place by the attainment of the
age of majority (18 years) shall permanently terminate
parental authority (Arts. 228, 234, FC)
o Parental liability subsists even if the minor is already
emancipated, provided he is below 21 years, because
Art. 236, as amended by RA 6809, provides that
nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate
from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians
for children and wards below 21 years of age
mentioned in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Art. 2180 of
the CC
Art. 220, FC The parents and those exercising parental

authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated
children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate
in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance,
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and
inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
30
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational

materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent
them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the
circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon
parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 216, FC In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 236, FC Emancipation for any cause shall terminate
parental authority over the person and property of the child who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life,
save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age
of twenty-one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the
duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty- one years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (As
amended by RA 6809)
-
This article provides that parents and guardians still have a

duty and responsibility over wards between the ages of 18
to 21 only.
This is based on the Deep Pockets Theoryyoung
Filipinos aged 18 to 21 are usually not yet gainfully
employed and without property. Thus, the injured party may
have difficulty recovering from a tortfeasor between such
ages. The law makes it easier for the injured party to recover
damages by allowing him to pursue action against the
tortfeasors parents.
Elements of Parental Liability for Minor Childs Tort

(Libi v. IAC)
1. Child is a minor;
2. He lives in his parents custody; and
3. There was failure on his parents part to employ diligence in
supervising him or in exercising their parental authority.
Salen v. Balce (1960)
Concept: Persons Liable: Parents
Brief Facts: Gumersindo Balce, single and a minor 18 years of
age, was convicted of homicide filed by the parents of the victim,
Carlos Salen. A writ of execution was issued for payment of the
indemnity but was returned unsatisfied since Gumersindo was
insolvent. The victims parents demanded payment from
Gumersindos father but he refused. The parents then instituted
a claim against Gumersindos father.
Doctrine: A minor who is over 15 who acts with discernment is
not exempt from criminal liability, but the RPC is silent as to the
subsidiary liability of his parents should he be convicted. In that
case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil
Code. To hold that Art. 2180 does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused by criminal intent.
Exconde v. Capuno (1957)
Concept: Persons Liable: Parents
Brief Facts: Dante Capuno, 15, was a member of the Boy
Scouts Organization and a student of Balintawak Elementary
School. He was attending a parade of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city schools supervisor. Dante was allowed to
drive jeepney. They have not gone far when the jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro
Caperina, died as a consequence. It appears that Delfin Capuno,
father of Dante Capuno was not with his son at the time of the
accident nor did he know that his son was going to attend a
parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the
accident that he attended said parade upon instruction of his
teacher. Dante Capuno was accused of double homicdide
through reckless imprudence. Sabina Exconde, as mother of the
deceased Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil
action for damages against the accused. Dante Capuno was
found guilty of the crime charged. Exonde then filed an action
against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante asking for damages.
31
Doctrine: The reason behind the civil liability which the law
impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor
children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing
them in proportion to their means, while, on the other hand,
gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil
Code).
Fuellas v. Cadano (1961)
Concept: Persons liable; Parents
Brief Facts: While Pepito, 13, was studying his lessons in the
classroom, Rico (13) took the pencil of Ernesto (13) and placed it
inside Pepitos pocket. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the
pencil it was Pepito who returned it. This angered Rico and he
held Pepitos neck and pushed him to the floor until a teacher
separated them. After school, Rico attacked Pepito. As a result,
his arm was broken. Two cases were filed by Elpidio Cadano,
father of Pepito. A criminal case against Rico for serious physical
injuries and a civil case for damages against Agapito Fuellas,
father of Rico.Agapito was held liable for damages for the
tortious acts of his minor son, although it was done with
deliberate intent.
Doctrine: Liabilities of parents do not only arise when the acts
committed by minor children consist of fault or negligence, but
likewise arise when the act is committed with deliberate intent.
Such situation is governed by Art. 2180 CC and not by Art. 101
RPC. The void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is
subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may
be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover
equal or identical cases
32
Cuadra v. Monfort (1970)

Concept: Persons liable; Parents
Tamargo v. CA (1992)
Concept: Persons Liable - Parents
Brief Facts: Monfort (13) found a plastic headband while

weeding the grass in their school. Jokingly she said she found an
earthworm and tossed it to Cuadra (12). The object hit Cuadras
right eye. The next day, eye became swollen and Cuadra parents
took her to a doctor for treatment. Cuadra underwent surgical
operation twice, was hospitalized for a total of twenty-three days
and completely lost the sight of her right eye. A civil suit was
instituted by parents of Cuadra- action for damages based on
quasi delict.
Brief Facts: Adelderto Bundoc (10) shot Jennifer Tamargo with

an air rifle which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for
damages was filed against Adelbertos natural parents with
whom he was living with at the time of the incident. A criminal
case of [reckless imprudence resulting in homicide] was also filed
against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted
without discernment Prior to this, the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto. The
petition for adoption was granted on 18 November 1982, after
Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. The natural parents
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
Doctrine: Presumption of fault or negligence is merely prima

facie and may therefore be rebutted. The last paragraph of
Article 2180 states "that the responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage." Attendant circumstances in every individual
case must be considered to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have been
prevented. Nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance
of due care and he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
which caused it. Child was at school, where it was his duty to
send her & she was under the care and supervision of the
teacher. Act was an innocent prank not unusual among children
at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Act did not
reveal any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
Elcano v. Hill (1977), supra
Brief Facts: Defendant was a married minor who killed
petitioners son. He was tried and acquitted, for lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake. Petitioners then filed an action to
recover damages from defendants father, which was dismissed
for three reasons:
(1) Having been extinguished, as per the Rules of Court;
(2) Being barred by res judicata; and
(3) Not having a cause of action, because the defendant had
been emancipated by marriage.
Doctrine: The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which
are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent. Acquittal from criminal negligence,
whether or not for reasonable doubt, does not extinguish civil
liability based on quasi-delict. Neither shall it bar a subsequent
action to recover be based on quasi-delict. Because the accused
is a minor, his parents civil liability subsists in spite of
emancipation by marriage.
Doctrine: The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. The
principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is
not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship
and for whom he is responsible. Parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities
of parents their parental authority which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The civil
liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the
parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were
negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty
closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
In any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural
parents, not the adopting parents.
!
(ii) Guardians
Art. 316 The father and the mother have, with respect to their
unemancipated children:
(1) The duty to support them, to have them in their company,
educate and instruct them in keeping with their means and to
represent them in all actions which may redound to their benefit;
(2) The power to correct them and to punish them moderately.
(155)
Art. 317 The courts may appoint a guardian of the child' s
property, or a guardian ad litem when the best interest of the
child so requires. (n)
Art. 222, FC The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's
property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
child so requires. (317)
-
Guardians are liable for quasi-delicts caused by minors or

incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company
Extent of power of direction and moral influence is less than
that of parents
Responsibility of guardians extend to incapacitated
persons even if they are already of age
o Sec. 2 of Rule 92 uses the word incompetent and
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those
who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation
o Guardians stand in loco parentis and the law
imposes a duty of exercising special vigilance over
the acts of their wards in order that damages to third
persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or
discernment of such wards may be avoided
o Guardians de facto (not legally appointed) generally
would not be responsible because of the absence of
one of the bases for the responsibility the duty to take
care of the child
!
If, however, the injury caused is the result of bad
education or training by the guardian de facto, he
should be held liable
33
Other Persons Exercising Parental Authority (not in the

syllabus)
Art. 221, FC: Persons exercising parental authority are civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by acts or
omissions of their minor children living in their company and
under their parental authority
Art. 216, FC: In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following persons exercise substitute
parental authority (in the order indicated):
o The surviving grandparent;
o The oldest brother or sister, over 21 years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified
o The childs actual custodian, over 21 years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified
Art. 217, FC: In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or
abused children and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial
proceedings to heads
of
childrens
homes,
orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by
the proper government agency
(iii) Teachers
Art. 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute
parental authority:
(1) Guardians;
(2) Teachers and professors;
(3) Heads of children's homes, orphanages, and similar
institutions;
(4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;
(5) Grandparents;
(6) The oldest brother or sister.
Art. 350 The persons named in the preceding article shall
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
Art. 218, FC The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)
Under the Civil Code

Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are
liable for quasi-delicts caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody
Basis of the liability is because they stand, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
So long as they remain in their custody refers to the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise for as long as they are in
attendance in the school
The student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester has
not yet begun or has already ended (Amadora v. CA)
Art. 2180 applies to all schools, academic or not; when the
school is academic, liability will attach to the teacher in
charge; when the school is an establishment of arts and
trades, liability will attach to the head
o Teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
superior supervision over the pupils in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned
o To be liable, the teacher does not necessarily have to
be physically present and in a position to prevent the
injury
o Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in
him as a result of such influence (Amadora v. CA)
o Historically, the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the
head of the academic school
It is not required that the offending student be of minority
age because the teacher is held answerable regardless of
the students age
Liability falls directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades, not on the school itself
Standard of diligence: not as strict as the diligence required
of parents (Amadora v. CA)
o The Court is Not to expect from the teacher the same
measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for
their influence over the child is not equal in degree
o The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the
child than the teacher and so should be held to a
greater accountability than the teacher for the tort
committed by the child.
34
Under the Family Code

Under Art. 218, FC, the following have special parental
authority over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody:
o The school;
o School administrators;
o Teachers; or
o The individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care.
Their authority and responsibility apply to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution
In St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, the Court clarified that
there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
because the negligence must have a causal connection
to the accident
What must be proven
1. Student has committed a tort
2. Student is in the custody of the person responsible
Students covered
Art. 218-219, FC
Minor students only
Art. 2180(7), CC
All students, even those no
longer minors, as long as they
remain in the custody of the
persons responsible

Application of Art. 2180(7)
Teachers
Institution
Academic institutions
Persons
liable
Custody
Rationale
Teacher in charge; not

administrator
Required
Heads of academic
institutions
exercise
only
administrative
authority
over
the
students, and are not
in close proximity to
them.
Heads
Arts
and
trades
establishments
Head of establishment
itself
Heads of establishments
of arts and trades have
apprentices, who they
are in close proximity to.
Therefore, they can be
liable
for
the
tort
committed
by
the
apprentice/student
Defense
Diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage
Responsibility for minor children IN SCHOOL (FC

regime)
School,
Parents, guardians,
administrators,
etc.
teachers, etc.
Provided by
Art. 218
Art. 219
Kind
of Special
parental Parental authority or
authority
authority
substitute
parental
exercised
authority
Liability if tort Principal
and Subsidiary
is committed solidary
in school
How jurisprudence has changed the definition of
custody in Art. 2180(7)
Definition
Effect on
prior case
Mercado v. Student must live and
CA (1960)
board with teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence
on him supersedes those of the
parents
Palisoc
v. Protective and supervisory that Overturned
Brillantes
the
the
(1971)
school and its heads and definition
teachers exercise over the of custody
students for as long as they are in Mercado
at attendance in the school,
including recess time
Amadora v. Not co-terminus with semester: Expanded
CA (1988)
as long as the student is in the
school pursuing a legitimate definition
student objective, exercising a of custody
legitimate student right, or in Palisoc
enjoying a legitimate student
privilege, the teacher-incharge
is liable
Exconde v. Capuno (1957), supra
Concept: Persons Liable: Teachers
Brief Facts: Dante Capuno, 15, was a member of the Boy
Scouts Organization and a student of Balintawak Elementary
School. He was attending a parade of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city schools supervisor. Dante was allowed to
drive jeepney. They have not gone far when the jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro
Caperina, died as a consequence. It appears that Delfin Capuno,
father of Dante Capuno was not with his son at the time of the
accident nor did he know that his son was going to attend a
parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the
accident that he attended said parade upon instruction of his
teacher. Dante Capuno was accused of double homicdide
through reckless imprudence. Sabina Exconde, as mother of the
35
deceased Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil

action for damages against the accused. Dante Capuno was
found guilty of the crime charged. Exonde then filed an action
against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante asking for damages.
Doctrine: The reason behind the civil liability which the law
impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor
children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing
them in proportion to their means, while, on the other hand,
gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil
Code).
Palisoc v. Brillantes (1971)
Concept: Persons Liable Teachers
Brief Facts: Palisoc and Daffon, together with another
classmate Cruz were in the laboratory room of their school
during break time. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were
working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely
looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that
Palisoc was acting like a foreman and because of this Palisoc
slapped him slightly on the face. Daffon gave him a strong flat
blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the
stomach. Palisoc retreated but Daffon followed him and both
exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale
and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not
revived. He was taken to a hospital but soon died thereafter.
Doctrine: Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades should be liable for pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. The
phrase used in the law "so long as (the students) remain in
their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time.
Amadora v. CA (1988)
Concept: Vicarious liability- Teachers
Brief Facts: Alfredo Amadora (17), a prospective high schoo
graduate, was in the auditorium of Colegio de San JoseRecoletos after the semester has ended. He was there to pass his
final Physics project as a requisite for graduation. While inside
the auditorium, a classmate Pablito Daffon fired a gun and
mortally hit Alfredo causing his death. The parents of Alfredo
filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code against the school, rector/ the high school principal, the
dean of boys, physics teacher, Daffon , and 2 other students
through their respective parents.
Doctrine: Article 2180 should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. There is no substantial distinction
between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as
torts committed by their students are concerned. Exconde and
Mercado interpretations are incorrect since provision would
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody
but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no
liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. Same
vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under
his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school
where he is teaching. The head of the school is the one held
liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades
because of the fact that historically the head of the school of arts
and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the
head of the academic school. A student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as it
can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues.
Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1988)
Concept: Persons liable; Teachers
Brief Facts: Abon was a student and an employee of the
armory of the schools ROTC. One night, he shot Napoleon, a
commerce student, within BCF premises using an unlicensed
gun from the armory.
Doctrine: The school and its president cannot be held liable for
damages as Jimmy was no longer in their custody at the time of
the shooting. The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
custody" of the school, as contemplated in Article 2180.
36
Ylarde v. Aquino (1988)

Concept: Specific Cases on the Concept of Fault or
Negligence (Liability of Teachers)
Brief Facts: Ylarde, a 10-year old student, and other fellow
students were asked by Aquino, their teacher, to help him in
burying large blocks of stones. Aquino left them for a while and
told them not to touch anything. After Aquino left, they played
and Ylarde jumped into the hole while one of them jumped on
the stone, causing it to slide into the hole. Ylarde was not able to
get out of the hole in time and died.
Doctrine: The degree of care required to be exercised must
vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for
himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care
as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the
average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The
standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own
protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children
of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience
under the same or similar circumstances.
PSBA v. CA (1992)
Concept: Vicarious Liability of Teachers
Brief Facts: Carlitos Bautista, a 3rd year Commerce student was
stabbed inside the PSBA premises. The assailants, however,
were not PSBA students but elements from outside the school.
Doctrine: Art. 2180 plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. School would not be
liable if injury caused by persons not its pupils or students.
Soliman v. Tuason (1992)
Concept: Persons Liable; Vicarious Liability; Teachers
Brief Facts: Soliman, a student of RCC, was shot by the
assigned security guard and was subsequently killed. The guard
was employed by a security agency contracted by the school to
provide security services.
Doctrine: Article 2180 inapplicable since the person causing
the injury was neither the student nor the employee of the
school. However, school may still be held liable for a breach of
contract.
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos

Concept: Teachers
Brief Facts: Sherwin Carpitanos, a student of St. Marys, was
killed after the jeep he was riding turned turtle on their way to an
enrollment drive. Parents of Sherwin sued the school for
damages. TC and CA granted, based on schools special
parental authority while the minor child is under their
supervision, pursuant to Art. 218 and 219, FC.
Doctrine: Liability of schools and educational institutions under
Art. 218 and 219 would only arise if proximate cause of the injury
is the negligence of defendant-school.
(v) State
Art. 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Sec. 22, LGC Corporate Powers. (a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the
following powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations,
subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other laws.
37
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be

entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local
government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian
concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal
or barangay hall.
(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the
exercise of their proprietary functions and in the limitations
provided in this Code and other applicable laws,
Sec. 38, Admin Code Liability of Superior Officers. - (1) A
public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to
perform a duty within a period fixed by law or regulation, or
within a reasonable period if none is fixed, shall be liable for
damages to the private party concerned without prejudice to
such other liability as may be prescribed by law.chanrobles
virtual law library
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be
civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence,
or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually
authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct
complained of.
Sec. 39, Admin Code Liability of Subordinate Officers. - No
subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts
done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by
him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his
superiors.
-
(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or

change their existing corporate seals: Provided, That newly
established local government units or those without corporate
seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be
registered with the Department of the Interior and Local
Government: Provided, further, That any change of corporate
seal shall also be registered as provided hereon.
-
If a State agent is discharging the functions of his office, and

in so doing, causes the injury to the private individual, there
is NO presumption of negligence on the part of the State.
It is only when the State acts through a special agent that
fault or negligence must be presumed.
A special agent may refer to different kinds, per Sps.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman:
o A public official specially commissioned to do a
particular task that is necessarily foreign to the said
officials usual governmental functions
o A non-public official/private individual commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, in which the State
assumes the role of an ordinary employer
o A private individual commissioned for a special
governmental task
By the use of the word State in the provision, the local
government units are deemed included.
Who may be sued under the State

1. A special agent under 2180
2. Instrumentalities discharging proprietary functions
The power to enter into contracts implies the consent
to be sued
The charter of the instrumentality may expressly
provide that it may be sued
3. Those that consent to be sued (for example, through
legislative enactment)
Definition of special agent
One who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official, so that in representation of the state and being bound to
act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
(Merritt v. Govt of the PI)
Why the State cannot be sued
1. Neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the part
of the State in the organization of branches of public service
and in the appointment of its agents. On the contrary, all
foresight humanly possible must be presupposed, in order
that each branch of service may serve its public purpose.
2. Suing the State will divert its focus from the delivery of
necessary public services.
Suability
Depends on the States
consent to be sued
Suability does not necessarily
mean liability
Liability
Depends on the established
facts and applicable law
State can never be held liable
if it does not first consent to
be sued
Waiver of immunity from suit
does not concede that the
State is liable
Waiver of immunity from suit

means State can be sued and
plaintiff hs the chance to prove
that the State is liable
(Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme, From A2016 Reviewer)
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1916)
Concept: State
Brief Facts: E. Merritt, who was riding a motorcycle, was

involved in a collision with a General Hospital ambulance.
Proximate cause is the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. Act. 2457 was passed by legislature, waiving State's
immunity from suit and allowing Merritt to bring this action
against the government, and directed the court to determine the
amount of damages Merritt may be entitled to.
Doctrine: Under Art. 1903, CC, (now Art. 2180, NCC) the
government may be only liable if it acts through a special agent
so that in representation of the State and being bound to act as
an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
38
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte (1958)

Concept: Vicarious Liability; The State
Brief Facts: Torralba, driver of the District Engr of Ilocos
Norte, ran over Palafox, who died. Heirs filed action for
damages, impleading the Provincial Govt, District Engr and
Provincial Treasurer, along with accused.
Doctrine: In order to make the State liable for acts performed
by its agents/employees, the employee must be a special
agent, and not one upon whom devolved the duty of driving
that truck. Torralba was not a special agent because the tasks he
performed were governmental activities; hence, no liability on
the part of the State.
Republic v. Palacio (1968)
Concept: Persons liable; State
Brief Facts: ISU, an office in RP Government, was held liable
for its tortious inducement of Handong Association to invade
and occupy Ortizs lot. Pump Irrigation Trust Fund was
garnished.
Doctrine: The Pump Irrigation Trust Fund is a public fund and
cannot be made to answer for damages awarded, as the State
can only be made liable for torts committed by special agents
who are specifically commissioned to carry out acts complained
of, outside of such agents regular duties. No proof that ISU was
specifically commissioned to induce Handong Association to
invade and occupy subject lot.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman (1991)
Concept: Vicarious Liability; The State
Brief Facts: Hugo Garcia, driver of NIA, bumped a bicycle
ridden by the son of petitioners. The son died, parents filed an
action for damages, but NIA is raising the defense that it is not
liable because it is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions.
Doctrine: The NIA is a govt agency with a juridical personality
distinct from the State. It is a corporation performing proprietary,
and not governmental, functions. Therefore, it can be held liable
for acts performed by its employees/agents/drivers.
!
(iv) Employers
-
As early as 1918, the Court has already explained that the

liability of employers for their employees under Art. 2180
under the Civil Code is different from that of liability of
employers under Common Law.
o In Cangco v. Manila Railroad, the Court held that the
liability of employers under the Spanish law is not
based from the English Common Law concept of
respondent superior.
o Under respondent superior, the employer would be
liable in every case and such liability would be
unconditional.
o Under the Civil Code, however, as found in OCC Art.
1902 (now embodied in NCC Arts. 2176 and 2180),
which only imposes liability when there is fault or
negligence on the part of the employer in the selection
and the supervision of its employees.
o The employer, under our jurisdiction, is liable for his
own negligence and not for the negligence of the
employee which is wholly different from respondent
superior.
Distinguishing the 4th and 5th Paragraph of Art. 2180

The fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 holds that owners and
managers are liable for injuries cause by their employees in
the service of the branches in which they are employed OR
on the occasion of their functions.
o The person vicariously liable under this paragraph is the
owner or manager of the establishment and the person
he is responsible for is his employee.
o The Court ruled in Phil. Rabbit v. Phil. American that the
term manager in this paragraph is used in the sense
of employer
o The employee must have caused the injury while he was
on the job.
The fifth paragraph of Art. 2180 holds that employers are
liable for the injuries committed by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
Both 4th and 5th paragraphs are applicable for the vicarious
liability of employers with respect to their employees.
However, they can still be contradistinguished from one
another.
o In Castillex v. Vasquez, the Court held that the fourth
paragraph covers negligent acts of employees
committed either in the service of the branches or on
occasion of their functions. Meanwhile, the fifth
paragraph is encompasses the negligent acts of
employees acting within the scope of their assigned
task.
o The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included.
39
The fifth paragraph has a wider scope in that negligent

acts of employers are covered, so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task, though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on
the occasion of their function.
The only criticism in this interpretation is that it effectively
renders the 4th paragraph of Art. 2180 as redundant, given
that employers may just be held liable under the wide and
more inclusive scope of the 5th paragraph.
o
When Applicable
Employer-Employee Relationship
o A requisite in order to hold an employer liable under
Art. 2180 is to prove that there was an employeremployee relationship.
o Such relationship cannot be assumed, and it falls upon
the plaintiff to prove its existence by preponderant
evidence.
o The following requisites must be established:
! That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally, or through another
! That the service to be rendered in accordance with
orders which the employer has the authority to give
at all times
! That the illicit act of the employee was on the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to
him.
o Also, the Court has added that it must be established
that the injurious or tortious act was committed at the
time the employee was performing his functions.
o Specific cases:
! Spouse Jayme v. Apostol: The mere giving of
directions to the driver does not establish that the
passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither
does it render one the employer of the driver. The
Court has also ruled in this case that one employee
who has the power of control over another
employee cannot be held vicariously liable for the
latter employees negligent acts.
! Professional Services v. Agana: The Court cited
Ramos v. CA and said thatfor the purposes of
apportioning responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship, in effect,
exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.
Within the Scope of Assigned Tasks
o The employer need not prove that his employees was
not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the
time of the injury to the plaintiff. It is enough that the
employer denies that his employee was acting within
the scope of his duties.
o The clause, within the scope of assigned tasks,
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of
the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damages.
!
o
Specific cases:
! Labor-only contracting: Art. 2180 is the controlling
provision (and not the Labor Code) in determining a
principals liability in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person for any negligent act
of the employees of the labor-only contractor.
! Employee driving the company car: From American
jurisprudence, there are three recognized cases,
with their own separate consequences, which have
been ruled to be acceptable in our jurisdiction,
despite being anchored on the basis of repondeat
superior.
o Using the company vehicle in going to and
from meals: The employee is not ordinarily
acting within the scope of his assigned tasks,
and therefore, no liability attaches to the
employer. The exception is when it can be
shown that there is some special business
benefit to the employer when the employee
uses the car in this manner. One accepted
special benefit is to allow the employee more
time at work.
o Using the company vehicle in going to and
from work: This is ordinarily a personal concern
or problem of the employee, and in absence
that there is a special benefit to the employer,
no liability will attach to the employer. Again,
the fact that an employee can spend more
time at work is another accepted special
benefit. Also, if the work of the employee
actually requires him to follow a route, he is
considered to be within the scope of his
assigned tasks. However, when he goes out of
his route to pursue a personal errand, he is
outside of the said scope
o When an employer loans the company car for
the employees personal use: No liability
attaches even if there is some incidental
benefit to the employer by the employees use
of the company car
Presumption of Negligence
Once the employee is found liable for a quasi-delict while
acting within the scope of his assigned tasks, his employer is
immediately presumed, juris tantum, to be negligent in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
Hence, this rebuttable presumption will not arise unless the
employees negligence is proven first.
The responsibility of the employer is ultimately based on his
own negligence (in the selection and supervision of the
employee), and not on the actual injurious act of the
employee.
40
Rebuttal of Presumption
To rebut the presumption of negligence, the employer must
present adequate and convincing proof that he exercised
care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his
employees.
In the case of selection:
o Employer must show that he examined the prospective
employees as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records.
! In the case of supervision:
o The law does not require supervision in every activity.
Diligent supervision is enough.
o It essentially requires the employer to
! Formulate standard operating procedures, suitable
rules and regulations and issuance of proper
instructions
! Monitor their implementation
! Impose disciplinary measures in case of breach
o The Court will require concrete proof of the existence
of these requirements.
What must be established for vicarious liability:
1. Existence of an employer-employee relationship between
company and tortfeasor; and
2. Tortiout act had been committed while the tortfeasor was
acting in the normal course of employment
Four-fold test for employer-employee relationship:
1. Selection and engagement of the employee;
2. Payment of wages;
3. Power of dismissal
4. Employers power to control the employees conduct, not
only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to
the means and methods to accomplish it (the most
important element)
Nature of Employers Liability
Direct
The basis of his liability is not his employees
negligence, but his own negligence in hiring and
supervising the employee.
Primary
The amount for which he is liable may be pursued
without having to exhause the employees assets, as
opposed to subsidiary liability under the RPC.
Solidary
He may recover the full amount of the liability from
his employee, as per Art. 2181, and not merely a
prorated amount, unlike in Art. 2184.
Basis of Liability: Not respondeat superior, but pater

familias
Respondeat Superior
Pater Familias
Master is absolutely liable for There is only a presumption of
servants act or omission
negligence on the part of the
employer
No defense of diligence
Defense of diligence available
Embodied in the subsidiary Embodied in primary liability
liability
under
RPCno under Art. 2180, where the
defense of diligence; only lack diligence defense is available
of criminal liability
(Fuellas v. Cadano, From A2016 Reviewer)
Art. 103, RPC
Employers,
teachers,
persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of
industry are liable
Art. 2180(5), NCC

Employers are liable for
damages even though the
former [employees] are not
engaged in any business or
industry.
(Ortaliz v. Echarri, From A2016 Reviewer)
Ortaliz v. Echarri (1957)
Concept: Vicarious Liability of Employers
Brief Facts: Sedan car owned by Echarri figured in an accident
while it was driven by his driver. He raised the defense that his
liability as employer is based on Art. 103, RPC, it being a result of
a delict, and that the complaint is defective for failure to allege
that he was engaged in any business or industry in conjunction
with which he has used the said car.
Doctrine: Cause of action against him is founded in Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176. Par. 5 of Article 2180 expressly
provides that Employers shall be liable even though the
former (employer) are not engaged in any business or industry.
Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co. (1930) Ponente: Malcolm
Concept: Persons liable; vicarious liability; employers
Brief Facts: A 7-year old child was killed after being pinned
some large pieces of lumber which fell from the truck carrying it.
The parents of deceased filed a complaint against the owner of
the truck, who was also the employers of the pahinante. At the
time of the accident, the truck was being rented by NH, another
company.
Doctrine: (1) Four-fold test should be used in determining if
defendant is really the employer of the persons causing the
injury. (2) Article 2180 bases the liability on its own negligence in
supervising the acts of its employees rather than being
responsible for the acts of its servants. (responsibility is
paterfamilias rather than respondeat superior) (3) Article 2180
creates a rebuttable presumption that employer is negligent
when employees causes injury through fault or negligent.
41
China Airlines v. CA (1990)

Concept: Vicarious liability- Employers
Brief Facts: Pagsibigan booked a flight through a travel
agency. Ticketing agent of PAL issued a ticket wherein it is
stated that departure time is 5:20 PM. However, one hour before
the flight, plaintiff was informed that the plane he was supposed
to take left at 10:20 AM that day. He and PAL filed complaint
against China Airlines, who owned the said plane.
Doctrine: Generally, in an agency relationship, the agent is not
liable to third persons. The exception, however, arises when the
agent is sued for torts committed by the agents employees.
Filamer v. CA (1992)
Concept: Liability of Specific Persons Employers
Brief Facts: Funtecha was a working student, a part-time
janitor and a scholar of school Filamer. Even though he only had
a student license, he insisted on taking the wheel of the jeep
from the school driver on the ride home. The driver consented,
and they figured in an accident, hitting Kapunan who was
walking against vehicular traffic.
Doctrine: The Labor Code is not the decisive law in a civil suit
for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student of a school and against the
school itself. The clause "within the scope of their assigned
tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance
of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.
Even if the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit
from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the
employer is determined by answering the question of whether or
not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any
act in furtherance of his master's business.
Dulay v. Court of Appeals
Concept: Employers
Brief Facts: Torzuela, a security guard, shot and killed Atty.
Dulay while on duty. Widow filed action for damages against
Torzuelas employer. TC dismissed complaint for lack of cause of
action, ruling that actions under Art. 2176 not applicable for acts
committed with deliberate intent (homicide)
Doctrine: Employers are directly and immediately liable for acts
committed by their employees, without any need for prior
recourse against negligent employee or his solvency, but is
subject to the defense of diligence of a good father.
42
De Leon Brokerage v. CA (1962) Bengzon

Concept: Persons Liable; Vicarious Liability; Employers
Metro Manila Transit v. CA (1993) Regalado

Concept: Persons Liable; Employers
Brief Facts: Respondent Angeline Steen suffered injuries as a

result of the collision between the jeep she was riding and the
De Leonss cargo truck recklessly driven by employee Luna.
Luna was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of homicide
with physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
After
conviction, Angeline filed in CFI manila an action for recovery of
damages. She presented the conviction in criminal case and
established her claim for damages. De Leons defense is that it
was diligent in the selection and supervision of employees
Brief Facts: Nenita Custodio boarded paying passenger a

public utility jeep driven by defendant Calebag and owned by
co-defendant Lamayo. While the passenger jeepney was
travelling at a fast clip along DBP Avenue, another fast moving
vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp bus driven by defendant
Godofredo Leonardo, was traveling towards Bicutan. Both
vehicles failed to slowdown and slacken their speed. Neither did
they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a
consequence, a collision between them occurred, the jeep
rammed the left side portion of the bus. Nenita hit the front
windshield and was then thrown out. She filed a complaint for
damages.
Doctrine: The owner of an establishment or enterprise is

solidarily liable with the driver for any accident resulting from the
drivers negligence, though the owner may not be riding in the
vehicle at the time.
Clear proof that an employee abandoned his employers
business to engage in a purpose wholly his own will relieve his
employer of liability.
Bahia v. Litonjua (1915) Moreland
Concept: Persons Liable; Employees
Brief Facts: Ramon Ramirez owns and manages a garage in
Manila known as International Garage. His mother, defendant
Litonjua, purchased an automobile and turned it over to the
garage to assist her son in the business. Ramirez rented the
automobile to Mario Leynes, defendant, together with a
chauffeur and machinist for Leynes to travel from Balayan to Tuy
and back. While passing from Balayan to Tuy, the car, due to a
defect in the steering gear, refused to obey the direction of the
driver in turning a corner. As a consequence, it ran across the
street and into the wall of a house against which the daughter of
Bahia. She died as a result of the accident.
Doctrine: Under article 1903 of the (old) Civil Code, if an injury
is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee the law
presumes that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both.
Such presumption is not a conclusive presumption, but is a
rebuttable one; and if the master or employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
Supervision includes, in proper cases, the making and
promulgation by the employer of suitable rules and regulations
and the issuance of suitable instructions for the information and
guidance of his employees, designed for the protection of
persons with whom the employer has relations through his
employees.
Doctrine: Whether or not engaged in any business or industry,

the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts committed by
his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is
necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable,
that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then
that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. The diligence of a good father of a
family required to be observed by employers to prevent
damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the
public
In order that the owner of a vehicle may be considered as having
exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not
have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant
for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and
record of service. These steps appellant failed to observe; he has
therefore, failed to exercise all due diligence required of a good
father of a family in the choice or selection of driver."
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other
hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations
for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to
the business of and beneficial to their employer. Actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
said rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly
report on their supervisory functions.
43
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and

supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and
plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said
company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As
the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the
burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the
selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their
work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures
and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not
sufficient to overcome such presumption.
Doctrine: The denial of an employer-employee relationship

was an evasive and ineffective denial of matters plainly within
their knowledge as to which they could not logically (and with
sincerity) or in good faith pretend ignorance.
Metro Manila Transit v. CA (1998) Mendoza

Concept: Persons Liable->Vicarious Liability-> Employers
Brief Facts: MWD, GOCC, owns and operates 3 recreational

swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman. People are invited
and for which a nominal fee of PHP 0.5 for adults, and PHP 0.2
for children is charged. At the time of incident, there were two
lifeguards on duty at that time. Dominador told his brothers that
he is going to locker room to drink coke. Ruben and Eusebio
went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool, so
they did not see Dominador leave the pool to get a bottle of
coke. Between 4:40 4:45 pm, some boys informed a bather
Hagad that somebody was swimming under water for quite a
long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Abano and Abano
jumped into the big swimming pool to retrieve the lifeless body
of Ong. They immediately applied manual artificial respiration
and soon after male nurse Rule assisted them. Sanitary inspector
Vicente also came carrying the rescusitator and medicine kit.
They also brought in a doctor, however all efforts failed to revive
him. Cause of death: asphyxia by submersion in water.
Brief Facts: Around 1:15 pm, August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus,

driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan
Avenue. The girl was already near the center of the street when
the bus, then bound for the south, hit her. She fell to the ground
upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the bus and
was run over by the left rear tires. Her body was dragged several
meters away from the point of impact. Musa was found guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The spouses Rosales
filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC,
Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino and
GSIS, and included Celebrado, the dispatcher.
Doctrine: In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. On the other
hand, with respect to the supervision of employees, employers
should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches
thereof. To establish these factors in trial involving the issue of
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.
Gutierrez v. CA (1976) Teehankee
Concept: Liability of Specific Persons Employers
Brief Facts: Workers of petitioner Gutierrez (contractor) under
the supervision of Balisalisa (project engineer) of the
construction job, started digging up and later by means of a
crane to speed up the excavation. The earth and mud dug up
were scooped by the crane and dumped against the exterior
side of the adobe stone fence of the A. Mabini Elementary
School along the street. When the pile of earth and mud
reached the height of the fence, the cranes steel scooper was
used to press them down. Because of the stress place on the
fence, a portion of it gave way and collapsed on March 21, 1964,
between 2:30 -3pm. Edna was then playing with other children
inside the school grounds. When the adobe wall collapsed, she
was hit and pinned down by the falling debris of the stone wall
and was buried underneath the piled up earth and mud which
caved in and later on died.
Ineffective denial of the employer-employee relationship failed

to properly tender an issue and the averment of relationship was
deemed judicially admitted by them.
Ong v. Metropolitan Water District (1958) Bautista Angelo
Doctrine: The person claiming damages has the burden of

proving that the damages is caused by the fault or negligence of
the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his
employees
Although the proprietor of a natatorium (swimming pool) is
liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care
in providing for his safety, without fault of the patron, he is not,
however, in any sense, deemed to be the insurer of the safety of
patrons.
The death of a patron within his premises does not cast upon
him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of
negligence.
44
St. Francis High School v. CA (1991) Paras

Mercury Drug v. Huang (2007) Puno

Concept: Persons Liable; Employers
Brief Facts: Students went to a picnic with teachers. It was not

a school-sanctioned activity. One of the teachers were
apparently drowning. Several students, including Ferdinand
came to the rescue. As a result, Ferdinand himself drowned. His
body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him failed. He was
brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and alter to Mt.
Carmel General Hospital where he was pronounced deadon
arrival.
Brief Facts: Mercruy Drug is the owner of a six wheeler 1990

Mitsubishi Truck. It employed Rolando del Rosario as driver.
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents
of Stephen Huang and own the 1991 red Toyota corolla Sedan.
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20,
1996 at around 10:30pm within the municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila. At the time of the accident, Del Rosario only had a Traffic
Violation Receipt. His drivers license had been confiscated
because he had been previously apprehended for reckless
driving. Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head,
face and lung. Despite a series of operations, Huang is paralyzed
for life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and
rehabilitation treatment. Mercurys defense proximate cause was
Huangs recklessness.
Doctrine: Before an employer may be held liable for the

negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused
damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was
in the performance of his assigned tasks.
Professional Services v. Agana, supra (2010) Corona
Concept: Basic Elements of Torts; Specific Cases
Brief Facts: Natividad underwent a surgery headed by Dr.
Ampil in Medical City Hospital to remove the cancer that spread
to her ovaries. After the surgery, Natividad began to feel a
constant pain in the lower region of her body. It was later on
discovered that the pain was caused by two gauze bandages
that were left behind in her body. These bandages were
subsequently removed. The Agana family filed for damages
against the lead surgeon and the hospital.
Doctrine: Three legal relationships: (1) between the hospital
and the doctor practicing within its premises; (2) between the
hospital and the patient being treated or examined within its
premises and (3) between the patient and the doctor. The exact
nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of
the liability of the hospital for the negligence of the doctor.
Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be
held vicariously liable under Article 2176 34 in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior.
Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown
that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its
agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article
2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code
or the principle of apparent authority.
Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the
hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own
negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct
to which it should conform as a corporation.
Doctrine: The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the

Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior
recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the
employee
Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer
is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records. With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance
with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.
45
D. Persons Specifically Made Liable
2. Owner of motor vehicle
Art. 2184 In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable

with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have,
by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.
While any person may be liable for a quasi-delict or tort, the

law has also identified specific individuals as being liable for
particular types of injuries under certain conditions.
1. Possessor or user of animal

Art. 2183 The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
-
Article 2183 provides that the possessor or user of an animal

is responsible for the damage which it may cause, even if
the animal escapes or is lost.
This responsibility ceases only in case the damage should
come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage
Responsibility does not stem from ownership but possession
or use. Possessors responsibility arises from the fact that
the animal is within his control, while the users responsibility
comes from the fact that he benefits from the animal?
Literal interpretation of provision seems to show that the
injured party is allowed to choose to hold either the user or
possessor liable. Assuming this is true, and that that Article
2183 is a kind of quasi-delict, it appears that the user may
raise the defense that it was actually the negligence of the
possessor which caused the damage.
However, Article 2183 does not appear to require that the
possessor or user be negligent, and due diligence on his
part appears to be a defense, unlike in Article 2176. As such,
the basis of the liability under this Article appears to be
based on the user or possessors ability to prevent the
damage or benefits derived from the animal. Therefore, it
appears that liability is based on natural equity and on the
principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for
his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage
which such animal may cause.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of

Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
-
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was

the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence. (Caedo v. Yu Khe
Tai)
On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act
was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor.
The act complained of must be continued in the presence of
the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver act his own. (Chapman v.
Underwood)
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is
not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of
the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to
correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules
before he may own a motor vehicle.
TEST of his intelligence: his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order
to avoid the accident.
Vestil v. IAC (1989) Cruz

Concept: Persons Specifically Made Liable; Possessor/User of
Animal
Art. 2185 Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed

that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
Brief Facts: Theness was bitten by the Vestils dog. She died
later on as a result of broncho-pneumonia, as stated in her death
certificate. Her parents claim that the dog bites were the one
that caused her death while the defendants claim that the cause
of death is not related to the dog bites.
Art. 2186 Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the
proper government office a bond executed by a governmentcontrolled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third
persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed
by the competent public official. (n)
Doctrine: Those who possess or use animals for their benefit

are liable for any injury they may cause. Furthermore, this liability
is strict in nature; it does not depend on the absence or
presence of the due diligence required.
Test of negligence for driver of motor vehicle

It is the omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident (Caedo v.
Yu Khe Tai)
Liability of car owners compared

Under Art. 2180(5)
Relationship
Employer-employee
of owner &
driver
Car owners Not required at the
presence
time of the mishap
Presumption
On owners part,
of negligence
when his driver is
negligent
Defense
Owners
liability
Good father of a
family in employment
and supervision
PrimaryHe
may
recover
the
full
amount from the
driver, as per Art.
2181
Under Art. 2184

Need not establish
employer-employee
relationship
Required at the time
of the mishap
On drivers part, when
he has been found
guilty
of
reckless
driving/violating traffic
violations
at
least
twice within the next
preceding 2 months
Due
diligence
to
prevent
mishap
(greatly subjective)
SolidaryThe
full
amount
may
be
pursued against him,
but he may only
recover the pro rata
share as to the amount
for which he is liable

Registered owner rule
The registered owner of the vehicle is primarily responsible to
the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may have
caused, even if he had already sold the car to someone else. The
policy is for the owner to be identifiable and be held
responsible. This rule applies even if the vehicle is leased to third
persons. (Cadiente v. Macas)
De Leon Brokerage v. CA (1962) Bengzon
Concept: Persons Specifically Made Liable; Owner of Motor
Vehicle
Brief Facts: The private respondent was riding in a passenger
jeepney when it figured into a collision with the truck owned by
the petitioner. In its defense, the petitioner claims that the driver
was instructed to take a certain route but that the driver went
off-course. Hence, they argue, they should not be made liable,
as the driver was going on a personal errand and not acting as
an employee of the petitioner.
Doctrine: A mere imputation or allegation that an employee is
undertaking a personal errand is not enough for the employer to
escape liability. The employer has to present evidence to clearly
show that the employee, at the time of the accident, was not
engaged within the scope of his work and was pursuing a
personal errand. This is for the liability of an owner under Art.
2180, and not under Art. 2184.
46
Chapman v. Underwood (1914) Moreland

Concept: Owner of Motor Vehicles
Brief Facts: Chapman was waiting to board a street car when
he was run upon and over by defendant's automobile.
Defendant owned the vehicle but it was driven by his chauffeur.
TC ruled that while the driver was negligent, the owner was not,
because there was no sufficient time between the negligent act
of the driver and the accident in order for defendant to correct
the chauffeur.
Doctrine: Owners of motor vehicles shall not be liable for the
negligent acts committed by the driver, unless the negligent acts
of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give
the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom..
Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai (1968) Makalintal
Concept: Persons Specifically Made Liable; Owner of Motor
Vehicle
Brief Facts: Caedos and Yu Khe Thais car (driven by Bernardo)
got into an accident, resulting in injuries to the Caedos.
Bernardo was a very negligent driver, but Yu Khe Thai as owner,
was not, because he couldnt have predicted Bernardo would be
negligent (time issue).
Doctrine: The owner of a vehicle will be liable for the negligent
acts of his driver if, given the opportunity to observe his drivers
negligent behavior, he could have had the opportunity to
correct them, but did not do so. In this case, Yu Khe Thai did not
have any reason to believe his driver would be negligent, and in
the moment his driver was negligent, did not have enough time
to correct this negligent behavior.
Duavit v. CA (1989) Gutierrez
Concept: Persons specifically made liable: Owner of motor
vehicle
Brief Facts: Jeep owned by Duavit stolen by Oscar Sabiniano
and thereafter figured in an accident that was due to the
negligence of the latter.
Doctrine: An owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an
accident t involving the said vehicle if the same was driven
without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed
by him.
!
3. Manufacturers
Art. 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,

toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or
injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers. (n)
!
!
Rule makes the manufacturer and processor liable and not

the vendor of the product
In order to be liable under this provision, it is not sufficient
that the product causes death or injury. It is required that
such death or injury be caused by noxious or harmful
substances used in the manufacture or processing of the
product
Provision does not require that manufacturer or processor
knowingly or intentionally use the noxious or harmful
substance
Intended to provide remedy for injured consumers
regardless of how he came to be in possession and use of
the product " absence of a contractual relation is irrelevant
RA 7394 or the Consumer Act

Coverage of the Consumer Act
The law covers consumer products and services which are
defined in Art. 4(q) as goods, services and credits, debts or
obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include but not limited to,
food, drugs, cosmetics and devices.
Bases of liability to consumers
1. Either fraud or misrepresentationActionable, based
on Art. 33, CC
Not all expressions of opinion constitute misrepresentation.
Art. 1340, CC, describes the usual exaggerations of trade.
Art. 1341, CC, describes mere expressions of an opinion not
made by an expert. These are strictly not actionable.
Certain provisions of RA 7394 punish misrepresentations,
however. Art. 50 prohibits against deceptive sales acts
or practices (see also Art. 51 for procedure related to this
provision). Meanwhile, Art. 52 prohibits unfair or
unconscionable sales acts or practies.
2. Warranty A representation made by a seller is a warranty if
he is an expert, and the buyer is induced to part with his
money on the basis of this representation. The law on sales
provides for implied warranties against hidden defects, i.e.
Arts. 1547, 1561, 1562, and 1571, CC.
3. Negligence
It is the failure to observe the requisite due care considering
the circumstances, governed by the provisions on quasidelict. Arts. 5-46, RA 7394, establish safety and quality
standards for consumer products. The failure to meet these
standards creates liability based on negligence.
4.
47
Strict liability Instead of the sellers, manufacturers and

processors are liable for death or injury, though no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumer.
There is no requirement that they act negligently; only that
they committed the acts in Art. 2187, CC, and Arts. 97-99,
RA 7394.
Art. 97, 99, 4(on Manufacturer), 98, 100, 101, 102, 106
DTI-Department Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 2002
DTI-Department Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 2006
Coca-Cola v. CA, supra
Concept: Persons Specifically Made Liable; Manufacturers
Brief Facts: Geronimo is a proprietress of a canteen selling
products manufactured by Coca-Cola Bottlers. There were
complaints about her products, and DOH confirmed they were
adulterated. She filed a complaint for damages against CocaCola; they disagreed as to the nature of the action (relevant to
the prescription of the action). Court held, based on the
allegations, it was based on a quasi-delict and hadnt prescribed.
Doctrine: The liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injurycausing products may be based on negligence, breach of
warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
4. Provinces, cities and municipalities
Art. 2189 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision. (n)
Sec. 24, LGC Liability for Damages. - Local government units
and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury
to persons or damage to property.
-
It is not required that the defective road, street, etc. belong

to the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach
o What is required is that either control or supervision
is exercised over the road, street, etc.
The defense of due diligence or even force majeure is
noticeably absent " implies that absence of fault on the
part of the local government unit concerned should not be
a valid defense
At the very least, the absence of this requirement to prove
negligence implies that this provision does not contemplate
a quasi-delict, but a strict liability tort
!
-

In Guilatco v. Dagupan, the basis of the liability of the local
government unit is the fact that it has control and
supervision over the defective public works, as provided in
its charter
o Although it also states in its charter that it is not liable
for damages or injuries sustained by persons or
property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce
the provisions of the charter, the Court ruled that this
provision cannot be used to exempt the city
o Charter only lays down general rules regulating the
citys liability; Art. 2189 applies in particular to the
liability arising from defective streets, public buildings
and other public works
o Based on the ruling here, WON the LGU was negligent
is irrelevant
o Exemplary damages were awarded to serve warning to
the city or cities concerned to be more conscious of
their duty and responsibility to their constituents,
especially when engaging in construction projects
o Often, in the zeal to put up public impact projects
such as beautification drives, the end is more important
than the manner in which the work is carried out;
because of this obsession for showing off, the careless
execution of the projects causes public inconvenience
and invites accidents
In Quezon City v. Dacara, the Court found the negligence of
the LGU relevant
o The Court implied that a finding of negligence is
required for an action based on Art. 2189
o Ruling on the liability of the QC govt based on a
finding of proximate cause implied that Art. 2189 is a
quasi-delict
o The quasi-delict interpretation was further buttressed
by the fact that in determining whether moral and
exemplary damages are proper, the Court applied the
rules applicable for quasi-delicts
City of Manila v. Teotico (1968) Concepcion

Concept: Liability of Specific Persons Provinces, Cities and
Municipalities
Brief Facts: As the respondent was about to board a jeepney,
he fell into an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall caused
him injuries to the head, his eyes, and to the different parts of his
body. He, in turn, sued the City of Manila (petitioner) for the
injuries caused to him, arguing that they should be held liable
for not taking care of the uncovered and unlighted manhole
which caused his accident. The petitioner, in its defense, claims
that it has done the repairs properly and that under their charter,
it cannot be held liable for the failure of its officers to comply
with the laws.
48
Doctrine:
1. The Manila City Charter section 4 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other
law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Article 2189 of the
Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages
for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason"
specifically "of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
2. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road.
Jimenez v. City of Manila (1987) Paras
Concept: Persons Liable; State
Brief Facts: Petitioner injured himself from a nail inside an
uncovered opening in the public market. He became ill after and
suffered physically and economically. He now sues the City of
Manila and the private operator of the market. The City disclaims
liability by the virtue of the contract where the private operator is
the one, they argue, that should be held liable.
Doctrine: Under Art. 2189, the State becomes liable for any
injury caused by defective public works. It does not require that
the State owns the defective public works but only that they have
control and supervision over them.
Guilatco v. City of Dagupan (1989) Sarmiento
Concept: Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
Brief Facts: Guilatco fell into an open manhole found at Perez
Blvd, a national road under control and supervision of the City of
Dagupan. City Engineer Tangco is also an ex-officio Highway
Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway. Court ruled that
while the City did not own the road, ownership over a defective
road is not necessary for liability to attach under Art. 2189. Said
article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised
over the defective road or street, and City Charter expressly
provides that this should be exercised by the city through the
City Engineer.
Doctrine: For liability to attach to a public corporation under
Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the defective road or street to
belong to the said public corporation, since it only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised by the province, city or
municipality over it.
5. Proprietor of building, factory

Art. 2190 The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
(1907)
Art. 2191 Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages
caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care
of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive
substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate
place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or
property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if
not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to
the place. (1908)
Art. 2192 If damage referred to in the two preceding articles
should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned
in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed
only against the engineer or architect or contractor in
accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)
-
Art. 2190 provides that a proprietor of a building is

responsible for an injury resulting from a total or partial
collapse of said building.
In order to hold defendant liable, the plaintiff has to prove
the ff. elements:
o That there was a total or partial collapse of the building
or structure
o That the defendant is the proprietor of the said
building or structure
o That the collapse is due to the lack of necessary repairs
The provision is one of strict liability; it does not really
require the existence of negligence. In this regard, the
provision takes the nature of a strict liability tort and not a
quasi-delict.
o It is not required that the lack repairs be due to
negligence.
o Even if the lack of repairs be due to the intention of the
proprietor, it is still covered by this provision
As for Art. 2191, it also takes the nature of a strict liability
tort, which does not require the existence of negligence for
liability to attach (the general rule for quasi-delicts), with the
exception of the first paragraph.
49
However, as Art. 2192 provides, if the collapse is due to

defects in the construction of the building, then the proper
party to proceed against is the engineer, the architect, or
the contractor of the building, as provided by Art. 1723.
Periods in Art. 1723

Within 15 years
Building must collapse within
this time due to defects in the
plans, ground, or materials, in
order to make engineer,
architect or contractor liable
Within 10 years
Prescription of action against
engineer/architect
or
contracter after the collapse of
the building
Gotesco v. Chatto (1992) Davide, Jr.

Concept: Persons Liable Proprietor of Building
Brief Facts: Respondents bought tickets to see a movie at the
establishment of the petitioners. They were to be seated at the
balcony section. However, the theater was full and they had to
stand while watching the movie. Suddenly, the ceiling of the
balcony collapsed. With the darkness, the theater descended
into pandemonium and chaos as everyone was rushing to get
outside. The respondents were able to get out but were
seriously hurt. They sought medical attention locally and even
resorted to medical attention abroad due to the severity of the
injuries. They filed a case for damages against the petitioner,
trying to hold them liable for the accident and the injuries
sustained. Petitioner tried to disclaim its liability by arguing that
the event was a force majeure.
Doctrine:
1. The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement
impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they
are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract
against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
reasonable means.
2. Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is
wholly and exclusively under the control and management
of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of events would not have happened if proper care
had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or
permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant
!
6. Head of the family
Art. 2193 The head of a family that lives in a building or a part

thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or
falling from the same. (1910)
-
Art.2193 provides that the head of a family that lives in a

building or a part thereof is responsible for injury caused by
things thrown or falling from the same. Thus, if an object is
thrown from the window of a two-story house, and injures a
person outside, the head of the family living in that house
will be responsible for damages, regardless of whoever it
really was who committed the act.
An interesting question arises if the same rule applies if
damage is done by throwing or falling of an object from a
hotel room. The court would have to determine if a family
staying in a hotel room would constitute living in the hotel
room for the purpose of Article 2193. Casis thinks that the
nature of the article covers places of residence of a long
time-nature. Thus, it may not cover situations where a family
rents or leases on a short-term basis.
Liability under this article is in the nature of a strict liability
tort, since the rule merely identifies who will be responsible
for the injury without requiring that such person be actually
negligent, nor is due diligence a defense.
E. Joint and Solidary Liability

Art. 2194 The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
-
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for

a quasi-delict is solidary (Art. 2194, Civil Code).
The person responsible for the act (like the minor), and the
person exercising supervision (like the parents) are solidarily
liable. (Art. 2194; Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil.
529). Indeed, the liability of the guardian or master is
primary and direct, NOT subsidiary. (Barredo v. Soriano, 73
Phil. 607).
Thus, for his own negligence, a driver of a freight truck
which figures in a road mishap is primarily liable to a person
who suffers thereby (Art. 2176, Civil Code); and for the
failure of the owner or operator of the truck to rebut the
legal presumption of negligence in the selection and
supervision of his employee, he, too, is primarily liable (Art.
2180, Civil Code).
The liabilities of the two tortfeasors are solidary (Art. 2194,
Civil Code; Lanuzo vs. Ping, 100 SCRA 205), but the
employer may demand full reimbursement from the
employee (Art. 2181, Civil Code; Gelisan vs. Alday, 154
SCRA 388).
50
NOTE: For breach of a contract of carriage, the driver

cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier.
The contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the
carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger,
even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver
(see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words, the
carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his
driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his.
NOTE: The mother is liable only if the father is dead or
incapacitated, hence, if the father is alive and all right, the
mother should not be joined as party defendant. (Romano,
et al. v. Parias, et al., 101 Phil. 140).
NOTE: If a minor child negligently operates the family car,
the head of the family and owner of the car can be sued for
liability. (Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177).
Fabre v. CA (1996) Mendoza

Concept: Joint and Solidary Liability
Brief facts: School bus driver not equipped for long distance
driving. Figured in an accident; bus turned over and landed on
its left side; Passenger Antonio was pinned down by a chair.
Antonio is now a paraplegic due to injuries sustained.
Doctrine: When the suit is based on quasi delict, Common
carriers are jointly and severally liable for injuries caused by the
negligence of their employees; however, if the suit is based
solely on breach of contract, only the common carrier may be
held liable; negligent employee cannot be held jointly and
severally liable with them
F. Civil Liability Arising from Crime
Rule 111, ROC RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
Sec. 1 Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against

the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in
the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall
be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall
be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information
also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional
filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation
of
the
civil
and
criminal
actions.
Sec. 2 When separate civil action is suspended. After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever state it
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension
shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits rendered in the
civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party,
be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right
51
of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness presented by

the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period
of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Sec. 3 When civil action may proceed independently. In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal
action.
Sec. 4 Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the
delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be
continued against the estate or legal representative of the
accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the
case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Sec. 5 Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for
the same act or omission subject of the civil action.
Sec. 6 Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A

petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed
in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the
same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7 Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a
prejudicial questions are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
1. Distinguished from independent civil actions and
liability for quasi-delict
Cause
of
action
Negligence
Pre-existing
obligation
Quantum
proof
of
Defense
of
good father of
a family
Presumption
of innocence
Need
for
reservation
Suspension
Culpa Aquiliana
Quasi-delict
Culpa Criminal
Delict
Direct, substantive,
independent (Rakes
v AG&P)
None (except the
duty to be careful in
all
human
actuations)
Preponderance of
evidence
Direct,
substantive,
independent
of
contract
None (except the duty
never to harm others)
It is a proper and
complete defense
(insofar
as
employers
or
guardians
are
concerned)
Ordinarily,
the
victim has to prove
the negligence of
the
defendant
because his action is
based on alleged
negligence on the
part
of
the
defendant
Separate
legal
institution; no need
to be reserved
Proceeds
independently
of
the criminal case
Proof of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt (in a
crime)
It is not a proper
defense.
The
employees guilt is
automatically
the
employers civil guilt, if
the former is insolvent
Accused is presumed
innocent
until
the
contrary is proved, so
prosecution has the
burden of proving the
negligence
of
the
accused
Deemed instituted with

the criminal case unless
waived or instituted
before the criminal
case; Must be reserved
to proceed separately
During pendency of the
prosecution
of
the
criminal case
Effect
acquittal
of
Effect of death
of the accused
None
May be recovered
from the estate of
the
accused,
regardless of the
stage
of
the
proceedings
52
No effect, unless the

acquittal includes a
declaration that the
facts from which the
civil liability might arise
did not exist
Before
arraignment:
May still be recovered
from estate of the
accused.
After
arraignment:
Extinguished
Art. 31 When the civil action is based on an obligation not

arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 32 Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against
one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make
such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual

punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
-
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not

the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of
the Penal Code or other penal statute.
NOTE: Rationale for Art. 32: This article further implements
the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and
creates an absolutely separate and independent civil action
for the violation of these civil liberties
Civil Remedies for Violation of Civil Rights

The creation of an absolutely separate and independent
civil action for the violation of civil liberties is essential to the
effective maintenance of democracy for these reasons:
1. In the absence of separate civil actions, the aggrieved
citizen is left to depend upon the prosecuting attorney
for the institution of criminal proceedings, in order that
the wrongful act might be punished under the Penal
Code and the civil liability exacted. Because the fiscal is
burdened with too many cases, or because he believed
the evidence was insufficient, no criminal action is filed.
2. Requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt often
prevented the appropriate punishment. A separate civil
action would afford the proper remedy by a
3. Aggrieved party may file an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages even in those instances
where the act or omission complained of does not
constitute a criminal offense
53
Defense of Good Faith Not Available

!
Under Article 32, person is liable may be any public officer
or employee even in the absence of malice or bad faith
!
The object of the article is to put an end to official abuse by
the plea of good faith
Limited Liability of Judges
!
Judges are not liable unless the act or omission in violation
of civil liberties is a crime.
!
However, a judge exempted from responsibility under
Article 32 may be held liable for refusal or neglect to
perform his official duty under Article 27
Art. 33 In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
-
Rational for Art. 33: This provision creates an independent

civil action for the offenses provided, which may be filed
even if no reservation was made when the criminal action
was filed. This allows the injured individual to enforce his
rights and recover the damages due him, regardless of the
fiscals acts.
Civil Action for Damages in case of Defamation, Fraud, and

Physical Injuries
!
Separate civil action for damages in case of defamation,
fraud, or physical injuries is similar to the action in tort for
libel or slander, deceit, and assault and battery under
American Law
!
Injured party should be permitted to demand reparation for
the wrong which peculiarly affects him even in the absence
of State action
Defamation, Fraud, and Physical Injuries Construed
!
Defamation and fraud must be understood in its generic
sense
!
Physical injures should be understood to mean bodily injury,
not the crime of physical injuries. Civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or
frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death
caused by physical injury
Independent Civil Action for Damages Based on Criminal
Negligence
!
It appears that article 33 does not apply to reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence
!
However, in Madeja v. Caro, the SC ruled that civil action for
damages may proceed independently from criminal action
for criminal negligence
Article 33 Refers to Special Cases

!
Article 33 creates an exception to the general rule that:
once a criminal action is filed, any civil action arising from
the offense charged in the criminal action shall be
suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceedings
has been rendered
!
In the present article, the civil action may be filed even if
there had been no reservation made by the injured party
because the law itself makes such reservation
!
Criminal case need not wait for the civil case or vice versa,
and that one should not be made to depend upon the
outcome of the other
Art. 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
-
This article creates a separate civil action to enforce the

liability of the officer, independent of any criminal
proceeding. It also makes the city or municipality
subsidiarily liable for the omission of its police officers to
render aid or protection to anyone, meaning that liability
can be enforced only when the guilty police officer is
insolvent.
Civil Action for Damages against City or Municipal Police Force

!
Policeman an agent of a person in authority and is
charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property.
!
LGU cannot invoke the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its policemen since this defense
is allowed only to private employers
!
This is only true where the function involved is strictly public
or governmental
!
Above-mentioned defense is available if the function
involved is performed by the city or municipality in its
private or corporate aspect
54
Abellana v. Marave (1989) Fernando

Concept: Distinguished from independent civil actions and
liability for quasi-delict
Brief Facts: A criminal case was filed in the first-level court by
the private respondents against the Francisco Abellana for his
reckless driving, resulting to injuries to the private respondents.
The civil action was reserved. Francisco was then found guilty of
the charge. He appealed the case to the CFI. It was at this point
that that the private respondents filed an independent civil
action against Crispin, as Franciscos alleged employer. Both of
the petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the criminal case was already on appeal. The judge denied the
motion on the ground that an case on appeal from the MTC to
the CFI will be treated in the CFI as if it had been originally filed
there; hence, the reserved civil action might still be filed.
Doctrine: A case on appeal from the first-level court to the trial
court shall be treated in the trial court as if it was a new trial that
was original filed there. An independent civil action shall not be
barred by failure to reserve the civil action during the criminal
proceeding.
Yakult Phil. v. CA (1990) Gancayco
Concept: Civil Liability Arising from Crime, Distinguished from
Independent Civil Actions and Liability for Quasi-Delict
Brief Facts: 5-year old Roy Camaso was sideswiped by a
motorcycle owned by Yakult and driven by its Salvado. A criminal
action for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight
physical injuries was filed against Salvado, then a complaint for
damages (civil action arising from quasi-delict) was filed by the
offended party. Yakult questioned the filing of the separate civil
action because there was no express reservation. Court held that
there was no need for express reservation because there was
even better compliance with Rule 111 by the filing of the civil
action; therefore, offended partys recourse was not improper.
Doctrine: Rule 111 also covers civil actions for quasi-delicts
arising from the same act or omission as a crime. The general
rule is that the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, but there are exceptions: 1) When it is waived; 2) When
there was an express reservation; 3) When the civil action is
instituted prior to the criminal action. The Court classified the
instant case under express reservation, saying the institution of
the civil case was better compliance than an express reservation.
Andamo v. IAC (1990) Fernan

Concept: Civil liability arising from crime distinguished from
independent civil actions and liability for quasi-delict
Brief Facts: The respondent, a corporation, started
construction of waterpaths, contrivances, and even an artificial
lake within its lands in Silang, Cavite. Petitioners, who own the
adjacent lands, filed a criminal action under Art. 324 of the RPC
(Crimes Involving Destruction), claiming that the respondents
construction caused inundation of the petitioners crops and
plants, caused a young man to drown, and other damages.
While the criminal case was pending, the petitioners again filed
a civil case for damages. The RTC, acting on respondents
motion to dismiss or suspend, suspended and eventually
dismissed the civil case as it was filed after the criminal action
and must await its resolution.
Doctrine: The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code,
or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code.
San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. CA (1998) Martinez
Concept: F. Civil Liability Arising from Crime (Art. 2177) > 1.
Distinguished from independent civil actions and liability for
quasi-delict
Brief Facts: A Toyota van, driven by Annie Jao and occupied
by 2 passengers, and a San Ildefonso Lines (SILI) passenger bus,
driven by Eduardo Javier, collided, resulting in injuries to Jao
and the 2 passengers. Javier was charged with multiple physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
Four months after the institution of the charge, the vans insurer
filed a civil case for damages against SILI. SILI countered with a
motion to suspend the civil proceedings, arguing that there is a
pending criminal action and there was a failure to make a
reservation of the civil action of the case. The RTC denied the
motion to suspend and was upheld by the CA, stating that the
civil action of the insurer was in the nature of a separate civil
action wherein reservation is not required. Court granted the
motion to suspend because of the lack of reservation in the
criminal case.
Doctrine: The so-called "independent civil actions" are the
exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil
action as set forth in Sec. 2, Rule 111. However, the
"independent" character of these civil actions does not do away
with the reservation requirement. Prior reservation is a condition
sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can
be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination
apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.
55
2. Effect of acquittal
Art. 29 When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Reason for Article (according to the Code Commission)
Old rule that acquittal also releases accused from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine
legal system it has given rise to miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused
Inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded
But two liabilities are distinctone affects social order, the
other affects private rights; one is for punishment or
correction, and the other is for reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party
Adoption of the reform (not to extinguish civil liability) will
correct a serious defect, will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice
Effect on Prior Jurisprudence
Almeida v. Abaroa was the case which stated that acquittal
extinguishes civil liability
Present article reverses Almeida
SC has applied Art. 29 and held that acquittal predicated on
the conclusion that the guilt of the defendant has not been
satisfactorily established is equivalent to one on
reasonable doubt, and a suit to enforce civil liability for the
same act or omission lies
No Reservation Requirement
Before recent amendatory provisions of 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure were adopted, the action to enforce
civil liability based on Art. 2176, 32, 33 and 34 is deemed
instituted together with the criminal case unless reserved
This is not absent in Sec. 1, Rule 111 indicating that the
action to enforce civil liability based thereon are not
deemed instituted and what is deemed instituted only is the
action to enforce civil liability arising from criminal liability
!
-

SC explained the rules in Avelino v. Laroya (26 August 2002)
and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People (14 April 2004)
o Under Sec. 1 Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with
the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto
o All other civil actions under Art. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 are
no longer deemed instituted and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without
any reservation in the criminal action
o Failure to make a reservation is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action
o Commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
o Suspension in Sec. 2 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such is reserved or filed before
the criminal action
o Offended party can file two separate suits for the
same act or omission: 1) a criminal case where the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and 2) a civil case for quasi-delict " does not
violate the rule on non-forum shopping
o Two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently; criminal will not suspend the civil but
the only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
A civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general
rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except
only (1) when such action arising from the same act or
omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is
waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved; or (3)
such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action
o Even if not reserved or was brought before institution of
the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not
bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based
on a finding that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist
Declaration in Judgment that Acquittal Based on Ground of

Reasonable Doubt
A person acquitted in a criminal case is not relieved from
civil liability for the same act or omission, where the
acquittal is based on the ground that the guilt of the
accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
Acquittal on reasonable doubt is not evidence of innocence
of the accused who may have, in fact, committed the
offense of which he was charged
Acquittal is not due to the non-existence of the crime from
which liability might arise, but because the accused is not, in
the eyes of the court, sufficiently proven as the perpetrator
of the crime
Courts are required by Art. 29 to declare in the judgment
whether or not the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
court may still order the payment of civil damages in the
same case
56
When Civil Action Based on Delict Deemed Extinguished

Our law recognizes 2 kinds of acquittal with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused:
1. Acquittal on the ground that the accused is not
perpetrator of the crime with which he is charged civil
liability in a criminal case cannot exist where the
accused has been found to be not the author of the act
or omission complained of (there being no delict, no
civil liability can arise therefrom)
2. Acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused
If the acquittal proceeds from a finding in a final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist, the civil action based on
delict may be deemed extinguished
Example: if person charged with homicide successfully
pleads self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will
extinguish his civil liability; he has not incurred any criminal
liability. If his acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, for
instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently
identified to be the killer, a civil action for damages may be
maintained
Civil Action Barred by Acquittal
Acquittal may still bar a civil action on the theory of res
judicata
An acquittal on the ground that the accused was not the
author of the act complained of, is a far cry from an acquittal
based merely on a reasonable doubt as to whether the
accused committed the act or not
o 2nd: leaves the way open for a civil action under Art. 29
o 1st: closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the author of an act can never be
held liable for such act
If the judgment in the criminal case declared that the
supposed act attributed to the accused did not exist, this
finding, resulting in an acquittal, would bar a civil action for
damages against the accused
Other Causes for Recovery
Art. 29 also allows a civil action for damages only when the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
There are other cases where a civil action for damages may
lie in spite of an acquittal in a previous criminal case
If accused is acquitted because there is a lack of criminal
intent or the action has prescribed, even if the acquittal is
not on reasonable doubt, an action to recover would lie
against the accused
o Civil action may be based on quasi-delict, on Art. 22 on
unjust enrichment, or Rule 107, Sec. 1 (d) ROC
Jarantillo v. CA (1989) Regalado

Concept: Effect of Acquittal
Brief Facts: Kuan Sing instituted a criminal case (reckless
imprudence) against Jarantilla, wherein the former failed to
reserve his right to a separate civil action and intervened through
a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was later acquitted on reasonable
doubt. Kuan Sing filed a subsequent civil action for damages for
the same act but Jarantilla argues that it is barred because of his
acquittal in the criminal case.
Doctrine: Article 29, NCC allows the subsequent filing of a civil
action for the same act complained of in the criminal case,
wherein the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt.
People v. Ritter (1991) Gutierrez, Jr.
Concept: Effect of Acquittal (Art. 29)
Brief Facts: Ritter brought 2 street children to his hotel room
and performed sexual acts with them, and left them the
following morning. One of the children, 12-year old Rosario, said
something was inserted in her vagina and complained of pain.
Later, it was found there was a portion of a vibrator left in her
vagina. The child later died and the grandmother instituted an
action against Ritter. A case for rape with homicide was filed
against him but he was acquitted. Ritter now appeals the
conviction, saying his acquittal should not make him civilly liable.
Doctrine: It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action.
3. Prejudicial questions
Art. 36 Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall
be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code.
-
A prejudicial question is an issue invoked in a civil case

which is similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action, the resolution of which determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The reason for the concept is to avoid conflicting decisions
in the civil case and the criminal case.
Requisites:
o There must exist exactly two actions: one civil and one
criminal.
o The civil case must have been instituted prior to the
criminal case.
o The civil case involves facts immediately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based.
57
In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil

action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily
be
determined.
The
prejudicial
question/issue must necessarily come from the civil
case.
o The jurisdiction to try the said question must be lodged
in another jurisdiction.
Effects:
o A petition to suspend the criminal action may be filed
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in the
earlier-instituted civil action.
o The prejudicial question accords the civil case a
preferential treatment and constitutes an exception to
the general rule that a civil action shall be suspended
when the criminal action is instituted.
o
Zapanta v. Montesa (1962) Dizon

Concept: Prejudicial questions
Brief Facts: Zapanta charged with bigamy. He says it cannot
proceed without the resolution of the civil case for annulment
that he filed for the second marriage.
Doctrine: There is a prejudicial question. The issue involved in
the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of Zapantas guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy.
Merced v. Diez (1960) Labrador
Concept: Civil liability arising from crimes; prejudicial questions
Brief Facts: Husband filed case for annulment of marriage.
Wife filed criminal complaint for bigamy. Husband filed motion
to hold in abeyance the trial for bigamy on account of a
prejudicial question involved in annulment case
Doctrine:
A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent to the issue
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal
The issue of the validity of the second marriage is a
prejudicial question; it must first be determined in the civil
action, before the criminal action for bigamy can proceed
(see prevailing doctrine below)
PREVAILING DOCTRINE: (Additional info; ruling is already
overturned Ed)
Te v. CA (2000)
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
!
-

Petitioners argument that the nullity of his marriage to
private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case
before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a
declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.
The ruling in People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon
cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab
initio has been overturned.
The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code,
which was already in effect at the time of petitioners
marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said
article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there
is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is
void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding
Ty-De Zuzuarregui v. Villarosa (2010)

Elements of a prejudicial question:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and
(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal
People v. Aragon (1954) Labrador
Concept: Prejudicial Questions
Brief Facts: While Aragons criminal case for bigamy was
pending trial, Palomer (with whom he contracted a second
marriage) filed a civil action in the same Court against him
praying that her marriage with him be annulled. Aragon filed a
motion filed a motion in the criminal case, praying that the
criminal charge be provisionally dismissed on the ground that
the civil action for annulment of the second marriage is a
prejudicial question. SC held that the pendency of the civil
action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Palomer, is
absolutely immaterial to the criminal action filed against
defendant-appellant.
Doctrine: A decision on the civil action for the annulment of
the second marriage is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
58
G. Prescription
Art. 1146 The following actions must be instituted within four
years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity,
or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers
or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest,
detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought
within one (1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
Art. 1145 The following actions must be commenced within six
years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)
When it commences
Article 1146 provides that actions based on quasi-delict
must be instituted within four years from the day the quasidelict is committed.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of
action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect
such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff.
The prescriptive period must be counted when the
last element of commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time
when the cause of action arises, since it is only at that time
that a cause of action arises.
Doctrine of Relations or Relations Back Doctrine
Defined: That principle of law by which an act done at one
time is considered by fiction of law to have been done at
some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of
equitable origin, has a well-recognized application to
proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to promote the
ends of justice or prevent injustice and occurrence of
injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy.
For example, the doctrine should be applied where the
injury was discovered long after the accident. The offended
party should not be prejudiced in such case and the
prescriptive period should commence to run only upon
discovery of the injury. It is not unusual that the effect of the
negligent act is latent and may become apparent only after
quite some time. Thus, if the injury becomes apparent only
after several years, the prescriptive period should
commence to run only after discovery.
!
-

For example, a doctor negligently transfused blood to a
patient that was contaminated with HIV. If the effect became
apparent only after five (5) years, the four (4) year
prescriptive period should commence only when it was
discovered after five (5) years and not when the negligent
act was committed. At the very least, the filing of an action
after the expiration of the prescriptive period should, by
fiction of law, be considered as having been filed within said
period.
59
Allied Banking v. CA (1989) Gancayco

Concept: Prescription
Brief Facts: Respondent took out a loan from GENBANK,
which was subsequently liquidated. ALLIED acquired it, along
with assets and liabilities including the loan. Liquidation done in
bad faith. Respondent alleges tortious interference and filed
third-party claim to implead ALLIED and liquidator.
Doctrine: Actions for quasi-delict prescribes in 4 years.
Kramer v. CA (1989) Gancayco

Brief Facts: A collision between two ships owned by petitioner
and private respondent occurred in April 1976. The petitioner
submitted their case to the Board of Marine Inquiry, where it was
ultimately determined by the BMI that it was through the fault of
the ship owned by the private respondents that the collision
occurred. It was only at this point, October 1981, that the
petitioners instituted an action for damages against the private
respondent in the RTC. In turn, the private respondents moved
that the case be dismissed for being filed beyond the 4-year
period of prescription of actions arising from quasi-delict.
However, the RTC judge did not dismiss the action, citing the
need for BMIs determination since the collision is of such a
technical nature needing their intervention.
Doctrine: Actions arising from quasi-delict must be filed with
the proper court within the period of 4 years, counting from
when the action accrues: that is, when the quasi-delict occurred.
Doctrine of Relations/Relations Back Doctrine

An act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law to
have been done at some antecedent period.
Rationale of the Doctrine
It is a legal fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or
to prevent injustice and the occurrence of injuries where
otherwise there would be no remedy.
The doctrine, when invoked, must have connection with
actual fact, must be based on some antecedent lawful lights.
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
party. (n)
-
Dumuk v. Daquigan (1990) Gancayco

Brief Facts: Miranda was charged with reckless imprudence
and the offended party, Dumuk, made an express reservation in
1969 to file a separate civil action for damages arising from the
offense, which began the running of the prescriptive period. The
period was interrupted when he asked the fiscal to include his
claim for damages in the information which was filed in 1972.
This action hadnt prescribed yet. However, Dumuk filed another
case in 1976 (earlier in the facts, 1977 daw; sa ruling, 1976) for
damages arising from a quasi-delict. Court held this had
prescribed as it was filed more than 4 years from the time the
acts occurred in 1962.
Doctrine: The period of prescription (4 years) for a civil action
based on quasi-delict begins to run from the time the acts
constituting said QD occurred. In the institution of a criminal
action, the civil action is deemed instituted. Once a reservation is
expressly made, the period of prescription (4 years) begins to
run, and is only tolled upon the filing of the claim.
The tort recognized in Article 1314 is known as interference

with contractual relations. Such interference is considered
tortious because it violates the rights of the contracting
parties to fulfill the contract and to have it fulfilled, to reap
the profits resulting therefrom, and to compel the
performance by the other party. (45 Am. Jur. 2d 280-281).
The theory is that a right derived from a contract is a
property right that entitles each party to protection against
all the world and any damage to said property should be
compensated.
Under the same theory, an agreement that prohibits
interference with existing contracts is a contract that is not
contrary to public policy. Thus, a contract is valid if it
amounts simply to an agreement that those executing the
contract will not induce the employees of those with whom
the contract is made to leave their service. [Dharamdas vs.
Haroomall (1916)]
Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits of his enterprise. He
has no right to be protected from competition, but he has
the right to be free from malicious and wanton interference.
If the injury is a result of competition, it is a case of damnum
absque injuria, unless superior right by contract is interfered
with.
!
-

Injunction is the proper remedy to prevent wrongful
interference with contracts by strangers, where other legal
remedies are insufficient and the resulting injury is
irreparable. [Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (1915)]
Bad faith/Malice is required to make the defendant liable
for DAMAGES in cases of tortuous interference. [So Ping
Bun vs. CA (1999)]
If there is no bad faith, there is no tortious interference;
actual knowledge of the contract is not required so long as
there are facts leading one to investigate.
Proper business interest provides a legal justification to
negate the presence of the third element. [Lagon vs. CA
(2005)]
Elements of Tort Interference (So Ping Bun v. CA)

1. Existence of a valid contract
2. Knowledge by tortfeasor of the contract (May be
constructive, and tortfeasor need not know identity of other
contracting party) (Gilchrist v. Cuddy)
3. Interference of the third person/tortfeasor without valid
legal justification or excuse
Elements of interference:
1. Existence of a valid contract;
2. Knowledge of the third person of the existence of such
contract; and
3. Interference without legal justification or excuse.
RECONCILING THE RULINGS
Why did the Court in Gilchrist and So Ping Bun state
that lack of justifiable motive does not warrant an
award of damages, but declare that the interferers
were still liable?
In both Gilchrist and So Ping Bun, the interferer was found
to have acted out of business interests.
Business interests are not justifiable motive. Via
Gilchrist: Mere right to compete could not justify the
appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away
[Gilchrists] contractual rights.
Despite this, however, business interests do not imply
malice. In So Ping Bun, the lease contracts were nullified,
but Tek Hua was not awarded damages.
Therefore, business interests are not justifiable
motive to interfere with any contract. That means that
business interests fulfill the third requisite of the
So Ping Bun elements: interference without valid legal
justification.
The tortfeasor will still then be held liable for the
interference. The injured party may seek to nullify the act
that interfered with the contract.
But where malice is present, damages may be
awarded in addition to such nullification.
60
Enlightenment from damages discussion

Lack of justifiable motive is not the same as
malice, but it is a requisite to establish tort interference, for
which damages may already be given under Art.
2201, paragraph 1.
But if there was bad faith, malice, or wanton
attitude, as provided in paragraph 2 of the same article,
then additional damages may be awarded.
Gilchrist v. Cuddy (1915) Trent
Concept: Tortious Interference With Contract (Art. 1314)
Brief Facts: Cuddy agreed to rent the film Zigomar to Gilchrist.
Prior to delivery of the movie, Cuddy sent the money back,
saying he made other arrangements rental to Espejo and
Zaldarriaga. Gilchrist asked for an injunction against the new
renters because Cuddy violated their contract.
Doctrine: Inducing one party to violate his contract with
another, even if the inducer does not know the identity of the
other party, makes him liable for damages.
So Ping Bun v. CA (1999) Quisumbing
Concept: Tortious Interference with Contract
Brief Facts: So Ping Bun assumed the leasehold rights of his
grandfather So Pek Giok after his death. In the case before us,
petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute
lease contracts in its favor (instead of Tek Hua), and as a result
petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latters
property right.
Doctrine: A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is
respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex
delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one
person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property.
This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a
party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract.
Yu v. CA (1993) Melo
Concept: Tortious interference with contract
Brief Facts: Yu, the exclusive distributor of Mayfair wall
covering products in the Philippines was by-passed by Unisia
who purchased the same merchandise from FNF Trading (who
was supposed to ship goods to Nigeria) and sold it in the
Philippines. Yu is now seeking for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin Unisia from selling said goods
Doctrine: A wrongful interference with contracts by strangers
to such contracts is an independent act generative of civil
liability
Lagon v. CA (2005) Corona

Concept: Tortious Interference with Contracts
Brief Facts: The private respondent entered into a contract of
lease with Bai Tonina Sepi, slated to start in 1964. It was
provided in the lease that the private respondent would put up
commercial buildings and would be leased to new tenants. The
rentals from these tenants would then answer for the rent for the
contract of lease. In 1974, the lease had already expired but the
buildings had not yet been finished and so the contract of lease
was allegedly renewed. When Bai Tonina died, private
respondent began paying the rent to the court-appointed
administrator but learned that petitioner had been the one
collecting the rentals from the tenants and that he was making a
claim as an owner. Private respondent then filed a complaint of
torts and damages against petitioner for violating his leasehold
rights.
Doctrine: The third requisite, as part of the elements
established in So Ping Bun, for there to be liability for tortious
interference with contracts is that there should be unjustified
interference impelled by malice. This does not, however, bar
interference that is justified or considered valid. And interference
impelled by proper business interest or substantial economic
interest is considered to be justified/valid.
III. HUMAN RELATIONS PROVISIONS

Elements Of Intentional Torts
A tort is intentional when the tortfeasor:
1. Desires the consequence of his act; or
2. He believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from his act.
Originally, in Philippine law, quasi-delicts did not govern
intentional torts. Intentional torts only became punishable if
they constituted a crime (thus, the governing law was the
Revised Penal Code).
But with these provisions, intentional torts became
incorporated in Philippine law.
How is intent proved?
The defendants intent is usually proved circumstantially, or
is inferred from his conduct. If the defendants conduct
causes injury, he is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his act.
61
Intentional v. Negligent Torts

Intentional Torts
Negligent Torts
Harmful consequences are The act or omission merely
substantially certain to occur creates a foreseeable risk or
or are intended
harm, which may or may not
actually be realized
The difference lies in the certainty of the harmful consequences.
Where in intentional torts there is substantial certainty of harmful
consequences, in negligence, the conduct of the defendant
creates a risk or harm which may or may not result. This
comparison is consistent with the definition of negligence, which
consists in a failure to observe the requisite due care given
circumstance.
Intent v. Motive
Intent
Desire to cause the harmful
consequences
Motive
Impelling reason
particular desire
for
that
Will Motive Be Material?

Generally, motive is immaterial. But it may be used to
aggravate or mitigate the harmful consequences resulting
from an intentional tort.
Acts Punished by the Provisions
Art. 19
Art. 20
An exercise of a Willful or negligent
right
acts
that
are
contrary to law
(so long as it is a
violation of law,
there
will
be
liability)
Art. 21
Willful act causing loss
or injury, in a manner
contrary to morals,
good customs, public
order or public policy
(acts contra bonus
mores
or against
good morals)
A. Abuse of Rights
Art. 19 Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Principle of Abuse of Rights
Exercise of rights entails corresponding duties
o Exercise of rights must never be abused, to the
prejudice of another
o When a right is exercised in bad faith for an illegitimate
purpose, or with intention to injure another, even when
the act itself is not illicit, there is an abuse of right,
giving rise to liability for damages
o A person is protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his rights, i.e., he acts with justice,
gives everyone his due, and observes honesty and
good faith
o Absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right
o Good faith is always presumed
!
-

Concept of torts expanded
o Article 19 grants adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law
The old rule was that no person could be held liable for
damages caused to another by the exercise of a right. But
with the introduction of this provision, the law now grants
indemnity for damages where there is an abuse of rights,
even when the act is not illicit.
Norms of human conduct set as guides

Standards in the exercise of rights and performance of
duties
o To act with justice
o To give everyone his due
o To observe honesty and good faith
Right becoming a source of a legal wrong
o When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible
o Articles 19, 20, and 21 are all related to each other
Remedy for violation of rule of human conduct
o Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct and does not
provide a remedy for its violation
o An action for damages under either Article 20 or 21
would be proper
Test of abuse of rights
No hard and fast rule; depends on the circumstances of
each case
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
injure another
Elements of Abuse of Right Under Art. 19 (Albenson v.
CA)
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. Such right or duty was exercised in bad faith;
3. Such exercise was for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.
When is There an Abuse of Right?
Every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socioeconomic purpose, is an abuse that will give right to liability.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh. There must be no intention to
injure another.
However, the power to determine whether the exercise of a
right has been unjust, considering all the facts and
circumstances, is left to the courts sound discretion.
62
When is There NO Abuse of Right?

Though injury may be caused by the following acts exercising
rights, there is no liability:
1. Where a person merely uses a right pertaining to him,
without bad faith or intent to injure, the fact that damages
are thereby suffered by another will not make the former
liable.
2. Absolute rights are certain rights whose exercise can never
be the basis of liability, such as the following:
a. The right of parents to refuse or deny their consent to
the marriage of a minor child;
b. The right to deprive ones legal heirs of an inheritance
by giving all the property of the testator to others, so
long as the legitime is not impaired;
c. The right to set up the nullity of contracts, legal
presumptions, and prescription of obligations;
d. Ordinarily, the refusal to enter into a contract is an
absolute right, and the motive for such refusal cannot
be inquired into.
Definition of Good Faith:
Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, together with an absence
of all information or belief of facts which would render the
transaction unconscientious.
Velayo v. Shell (1956) Felix
Concept: Human Relations Provisions: Abuse of Rights
Brief Facts: CALI became insolvent and discussions were made
as to the order of preference in the payment of its creditors. By
agreement of the creditors, no case were to be filed against
CALI while a Working Committee was created to determine the
distribution of its assets. Shell assigned its credit to its US
counterpart pending the determination of the Working
Committee, and the US counterpart filed a case in California
against CALI for recovery of said assigned credit. CALI filed a
petition for voluntary insolvency and appointed Velayo as its
Assignee. Velayo instituted an action for damages against Shell
for its actions in bad faith. Court held Shell liable for acting in
bad faith in assigning its credit and filing a case against CALI and
attaching said judgment to its C-54 plane.
Doctrine: Art. 19 is a mere declaration of principles,
implemented by Art. 21. Latter provision is anchored on moral
grounds and constitutes a legal remedy for moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in
the statutes.
63
Globe Mackay v. CA (1989) Cortes

Concept: Abuse of Rights
Amonoy v. Gutierrez (2001) Panganiban

Brief Facts: Tobias was accused of his boss, Globe Mackay

General Manager Hendry of being privy to various fictitious
purchases and fraudulent transactions in the company. He was
forced to take a leave, but the police investigators, however,
cleared him from liability. Despite this, Globe Mackay lodged 6
criminal complaints against him. Finding himself with no work,
Tobias sought employment at another company. Hendry, at his
own behest, wrote that company stating that Tobias was
dismissed for dishonesty. The SC ruled that imputation of guilt
without basis, the pattern of harassment during the
investigations, the writing of letter to a prospective employer,
and the filing of the criminal complaints, transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 in relation to
Article 21. The right of the employer to dismiss an employee
should not be confused with the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is
done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages
Brief Facts: Amonoy was lawyer who wanted to recover attys

fees. He was granted them so respondents had to vacate the lot
awarded to Amonoy. Amonoy pursued the demolition of the
houses on the lot despite the TRO issued by the SC.
Doctrine: Article 19, known to contain what is commonly

referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice, to give everyone
his due, and to observe honesty and good faith. However, while
it lays down a rule of conduct, it does not provide a remedy for
its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Articles 20 or 21 would be proper
Albenson v. CA (1993) Bidin
Concept: Human Relations Provisions > Abuse of Rights (Art.
19) / Acta contra bonus mores (Art. 21)
Brief Facts: Mistaken identity. Albenson filed a criminal case
(BP 22) against Baltao for a bouncing check allegedly issued by
the same. It was later found out that the account it was drawn
against was owned by Baltaos sons company. No Malicious
prosecution or abuse of a right because the same was filed in
good faith (based on probable cause).
Doctrine: to constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately
by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. The ff. elements must exist:
1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the actions
was finally terminated with an acquittal
2. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause
3. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice
Doctrine: Principle of Damnum absque injuria does not apply

when there is an abuse of a persons right, or when the exercise
of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court
order.
University of the East v. Jader (2000) Ynares-Santiago
Concept: Abuse of rights
Brief Facts: Attempted to complete a subject in law school.
Failed removal examination. School included him in a list of
tentative graduates and proceeded with graduation and
enrolled in bar review classes. Dropped bar review classes upon
knowledge that he really did not graduate.
Doctrine: Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party
in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction
unconscientious.
Barons Marketing v. CA (1998) Kapunan
Concept: acts contra bonus mores
Brief Facts: Phelps Dodge refused to accept partial payment
from Barons Marketing Corp and instead instituted action for
collection of debt in its full amount. Barons Marketing Corp
alleged that such refusal was an abuse of right done to prejudice
the respondent. The Court held that Barons Marketing Corp has
not sufficiently proven that Phelps Dodge acted in bad faith in
refusing to accept partial payments.
Doctrine: The test for abuse of right is if bad faith can be
imputed on the party exercising such right. Good faith is always
presumed, and burden of proof lies on the party alleging abuse
of right.
Diaz v. Davao Light (2007) Callejo, Sr.

Brief Facts: Diaz and Davao Light filed several cases against
each other. One of the cases ended in a Compromise
Agreement. Two of the cases were Davao Lights initiation of
criminal charges against Diaz. Diaz finally filed a case alleging
abuse of rights and malicious prosecution against Davao Light.
The Court ruled in the negative. Diaz unilaterally installed his
own meter to replace DLPCs meter after it was removed by
DLPC. Whatever damages Diaz may have suffered would have to
be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing
of the complaints against him. There can be no malicious
prosecution on the part of DLPC. DLPC was not motivated by
malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass
petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect its
rights
Doctrine:
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (1) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of the above
provisions.
Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for
damages brought by or against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein.
The following requisites must be proven by petitioner: (1)
the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action
finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3)
that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive. Malice and
want of probable cause must both be clearly
established to justify an award of damages based on
malicious prosecution.
B. Acts contra bonus mores
Art. 21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
-
Under this article, liability may arise from acts which are in
themselves legal or not prohibited, if such acts are contrary
to morals or good customs, public order, or public policy.
This provision is very intimately related to the principle
embodied by Art. 19.
This article fills the gaps in statutes that leave victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they may have actually
suffered material and moral damages.
64
The injury suffered by the plaintiff may refer to any

determinate right or property, whether material or not.
The doctrine of proximate cause must apply, because the
defendant must have caused the injury through his act or
omission. If through the plaintiffs own fault or negligence,
he sustained injury, he cannot recover.
Acts Contra Bonus Mores (Casis)

1. Acts contra bonus mores, in general
2. Moral seduction
3. Public humiliation
4. Malicious prosecution
5. Oppressive dismissal
1. IN GENERAL
Article 21 of the Civil Code is the controlling provision on
acts contra bonus mores; it is part of the set of provisions on
human relations in the Civil Code.
It provides that any person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
The purpose of Article 21 was to provide a remedy for
moral wrongs, which may not be covered by existing
statutes
o It has been held in one case that Article 21 expands the
concept of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction, as
it provides a legal remedy for a great number of moral
wrongs, which are incapable of being specified and
enumerated in statutes.
o In the same case, the Court stated that Article 21
performs this function of expanding the concept of
torts by acting as the catch-all provision that covers all
moral wrongs that falls neither under Art. 2176
(negligent acts or omissions) nor the RPC (intentional
and malicious acts).
In the case of Velayo v. Shell, Article 21 is the result of
adopting moral norms into actual legal rules, which the
Court found as acceptable, as it notes that the conscience
of man has remained fixed to ancient moorings and that
this will impart an enduring quality to our laws, which is a
desirable thing from the Courts perspective.
A reading of the provision may provide an inference of two
requisites for a cause of action under Article 21: (a) that one
willfully causes injury or loss to another and (b) that it was
done in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy. However, the Court in Albenson v. CA
added a third requisite: (c) That the act done to cause injury
or loss must be legal.
The complaint must ask for damages because it
presupposes losses or injuries material or otherwise; if
complaint doesnt ask for damages, Art. 21 cannot be
invoked
Elements: (Albenson v. CA)

1. There is an act, which is legal
2. It is, however, contrary to morals, good custom, public order
or public policy
3. It is done with intent to injure.
Compared with Art. 20 (De Leon)
Art. 21
Art. 20
Act is done willfully (actor was Act is done either willfully or
aware
of
injurious negligently
consequences)
Said act is contrary to morals, Said act is contrary to law
good customs or public policy
Liability for damages may arise Liability for damages arises
even from acts which do not from acts which are a
constitute a violation of statute violation of statute law
law
Compared with Art. 19 (De Leon)
Both involve acts which are intentional
Art. 23 Even when an act or event causing damage to anothers
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
-
This provision imposes liability even without fault, as long as

the injurious act or event benefited the defendant.
Trespass and Deprivation of Property

1. Trespass to and/or Deprivation of Real Property
Committed when a person unlawfully invades real
property of another
Damages may be awarded to real owner if he suffered
damages because he was deprived of possession of his
property by a possessor in bad faith or by a person who
does not have any right whatsoever to the property
2. Trespass to or Deprivation of Personal Property
Commission of crimes of theft or robbery is obviously
trespass
Field of tort: extends to all cases even in the absence of
criminal liability
May include cases covered by accession continua; may
also include deprivation of personal property for the
purpose of obtaining real property (depriving tenants of
water so tenants would vacate lot they were cultivating)
3. Disconnection of Electricity or Gas Service
Unjustified disconnection of electricity service
Electric company has the right to disconnect the service
of a customer; however, the right to disconnect and
deprive the customer of electricity must be exercised in
accordance with law and rules
Must provide prior notice as required by the rules
promulgated by duly authorized government agency
65
Abortion and Wrongful Death

In Geluz v. CA, Court recognized the right to recover
damages against a physician who caused an abortion may
be done if abortion was caused through physicians
negligence or if it was done intentionally without spouses
consent
2. MORAL SEDUCTION
Tanjanco v. CA
o The Court, apart from the requisites of Article 21, also
required the plaintiff to prove deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence AND that the
plaintiff did not succumb to voluntariness and mutual
passion.
Baksh v. CA
o A test was employed in this case: if the promise of
marriage is the proximate cause of promisees consent
to sexual intercourse with the promissor, then the
promissor shall be liable if it can be proven that he had
no intention to comply with the promise at the time it
was made. This can be divided into two elements: (1)
the promise to marry was the proximate cause, and (2)
there was a lack of intent on the part of the prom
o The test, however, is problematic, in that it employs the
concept of proximate cause even if Article 21 cases do
not require the application of proximate cause.
Breach of Promise to Marry
The promise to marry has no obligatory force, so as a rule,
its breach cannot give rise to liability for damages. But a
prospective bride or groom who capriciously breaks an
engagement without reason, and thereby causes moral and
material injury to the other party, is liable for the damages
caused, especially if the break occurs just before the
wedding, and after a long engagement.
Generally, not actionable
Becomes actionable if there are additional circumstances
which make it fall within the purview of Arts. 19-21 or 2176
because in such cases, there is another act independent of
the breach of promise to marry which gives rise to liability
Includes cases where:
o There are preparations for which expenses have been
incurred; or
o There has been seduction or consummation
o There was financial damage
o Social humiliation was caused to one of the parties
o There was moral seduction
If the breach of promise to marry was attended with
seduction, even if the girl was no longer a virgin prior to the
seduction, it is actionable.
Consummation
If a woman parted with her virtue merely based on the
promise of the man to marry, then the consummation is
actionable. If she would have had sex with him out of love
and regardless of the promise, then it is not actionable.
Seduction and Sexual Assault

If the woman who is already of age knowingly gives herself
to a man, there is no injury for which she can recover
indemnity.
But if there is fraud, characterized by willfulness, the action
lies.
Seduction, by itself, without breach of promise to marry is
also an act which is contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy
Defendant is liable if he employed deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence in successfully
having sexual intercourse with another
Liable even if he satisfied his lust without promising to marry
the offended party
May not even matter if plaintiff and defendant are of the
same gender
Defendant would be liable for all forms of sexual assault;
includes crimes defined under the RPC (rape, acts of
lasciviousness and seduction)
Desertation by a Spouse
Spouse has a legal obligation to live with his/her spouse
If a spouse doesnt perform his/her duty, he may be held
liable for damages for such omission
3. PUBLIC HUMILIATION
It is against morals, good customs and public policy to
humiliate, embarrass and degrade a persons dignity.
A person may be held liable under Article 21 if he/she
makes an accusation against another and acts to prejudice
such person, without proof substantiating her accusation.
4. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Art. 21 is one of the provisions that may be a statutory basis
for a suit for damages by a person injured by malicious
prosecution
Philippine jurisprudence adopted common law rules on
malicious prosecution
Under Common Law
Malicious Prosecution is a form of misuse of legal
procedure; other forms are wrongful civil proceedings
and abuse of process
Elements of Malicious Prosecution (Prosser and Keeton)
1. A criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the
defendant against the plaintiff;
2. Termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused;
3. Absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and
4. Malice or a primary purpose other than that of bringing
an offended to justice
66
Element 1: Criminal Proceeding Instituted by the Defendant

Against the Plaintiff
It must be criminal in character and must have been
commenced
Deemed to have been commenced once there has been
official action which sets the law in motion
Element 2: Termination of the Proceeding in Favor of the
Accused
Must have terminated in favor of the accused
It must also reflect the merits and not merely a procedural
victory
Proceeding must be terminated in a manner that it cannot
be revived
Element 3: Absence of Probable Cause for the Proceeding
Under common law, probable cause is not proven even if
there is malice (because prosecution is considered
performing a public obligation)
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground for
belief in the guilt of the party charged
Probable cause is judged by appearances to the defendant
at the time he initiates prosecution, not by facts discovered
later
Element 4: Malice or a Primary Purpose Other Than That of
Bringing an Offended to Justice
There is malice if the defendant acted chiefly to give vent
of motives of ill will or where his primary purpose was
merely something other than the social one of bringing an
offender to justice
It is present if the defendant uses the prosecution of
obtaining any private advantage
Any purpose legitimate in itself will not be malice if it is
clearly secondary and incidental to the disinterested one of
convicting the guilty
Under Philippine Law
Malicious Prosecution (denuncia falsa) has been defined
as prosecution through the misuse or abuse of judicial
processes; or the institution and pursuit of legal
proceedings for the purpose of harassing, annoying, vexing
or injuring an innocent person
More often defined as An action for damages brought by
one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other
legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and
without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein
o This definition doesnt limit an action for
malicious prosecution to criminal action only
o Court has noted that [t]he term has been expanded to
include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and
humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause
of action or probable cause
o The foundation of an action for malicious prosecution
is an original proceeding, judicial in character.
!
-

Art. 2219(8): malicious prosecution is one of the cases
wherein moral damages may be awarded; but statutory
basis for the elements of malicious prosecution is not as
clear
Court has said that legal bases were: Arts. 19, 20, 21, 26, 29,
32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8)
o This was shortened in one case to: Arts. 19, 21, 29, and
35
o In some cases, Court identifies Art. 21 and 2176 as
statutory bases (21 is viable, but 2176 is not because
based on the elements of malicious prosecution, it is
impossible to commit it negligently)
Elements of Malicious Prosecution (based on Philippine

jurisprudence)
1. Fact of the prosecution or that the prosecution did occur
and that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that
he instigated its commencement;
2. That the action finally terminated with an acquittal;
probable cause; and
4. That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
Simply put:
1. Prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant;
2. Termination of prosecution in acquittal
3. Absence of probable cause; and
4. Prosecution motivated by malice
Element 1: Prosecution of plaintiff by defendant
Mere act of submitting a case does not make one liable
(usually, it is the State who undertakes prosecution)
Element 2: Termination of prosecution in acquittal
Action must terminate with acquittal
There was malicious prosecution even if the case merely
reached the level of the fiscal (Yasoa v. Jovencio; Malia Gas
v. CA)
In Que v. IAC, Court ruled that the mere dismissal of the
criminal complaint by the fiscals office did not create a
cause of action because the proceedings did not involve an
exhaustive examination of the elements of malicious
prosecution
In Bayani v. Panay Electric, filing of an action for damages
before termination of case by the Sec. of Justice was
premature (implied that dismissal at level of Sec. of Justice
would constitute an acquittal for purposes of malicious
prosecution)
Element 3: Absence of probable cause
Probable cause defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted
67
An acquittal by itself does not necessarily prove the absence

of probable cause
Court has held that the presence of probable cause
signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice
(Drilon v. CA; Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA; Que v. IAC)
BUT in Buchanan v. Esteban, Court ruled that malice and
want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify
the action
Element 4: Prosecution motivated by malice

The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a
complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the
deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge
that the charges were false and groundless
(Magbanua v. Junsay; Villanueva v. UCPB)
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof
that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless. Consequently, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does
not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Drilon v.
CA; Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA; Que v. IAC; Manila
Gas v. CA)
However, the fact that the fiscal filed the information does
not preclude the presence of malice (Ventura v. Bernabe)
o No doubt, the very purpose of preliminary
investigations is to avoid baseless and malicious
prosecutions, still, whether or not in a particular case
such an objective has been duly pursued is a matter of
proof
o Possibility that the fiscal or judge was somehow misled
by the accusers evidence
o Complainant cannot escape liability merely on the
ground that it was the fiscal who prosecuted the
proceedings in court (Villanueva v. UCPB)
In Que v. IAC:
o Citing Buchanan v. Estaban, one cannot be held liable
in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution
where he acted with probable cause this is the
general rule
o If the charge, although false, was made with an honest
belief in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable
grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the
accusation could not be held to have been false in the
legal sense
o Here, the petitioner Que was not motivated by ill
feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his rights; this
was due to the fact that, based on the circumstances of
the case as he saw them, he was led to this conclusion
(that he needed to protect his rights)
o No deceit was involved; though claim was unfounded,
the mistaken charge was nonetheless, in the legal
sense, not malicious
o The mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the
fiscals office did not create a cause of action
!
-

In Drilon v. CA, Court found that none of the requisites for
malicious prosecution have been alleged
o Being discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and being
granted bail is not the termination of the action
contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant
the institution of a malicious prosecution suit against
those responsible for filing the information against him
o Decision to file the information was not a product of
whim or caprice; it was actually fully justified in an 18page Resolution
In Magbanua v. Junsay, Court held that while generally
associated with unfounded criminal actions, term (malicious
prosecution) has been expanded to include unfounded civil
suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant
despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause
o Aside from enumerating the elements, Court explained
the gravamen of the offense: not the filing of a
complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the
deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge
that the charges were false and groundless
o There is necessity of proof that the suit was so patently
malicious as to award damages under Arts. 19-21 or
that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith
o Mere act of submitting a case does not make one liable
for malicious prosecution
o Here, no proof of a sinister design to vex or humiliate
Rosemarie
5. OPPRESSIVE DISMISSAL
In Quisaba v. Sta. Ines, Court held that the right to dismiss
Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which
the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom
If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, then
there would be a violation of Art. 1701 (which prohibits acts
of oppression by either capital or labor against the other)
and Art. 21 (which makes a person liable for damages if he
willfully causes loss or injury in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy " Sanction, by way of moral
damages, based on Art. 2219(10)
Case was intrinsically concerned with a civil dispute based
on a violation of Quisabas rights as a member of society,
and did not involve an ER-EE relation
Illegal Dismissal
Employer has the right to dismiss an employee in the
manner and on the grounds provided
o Dismissal warranted: EE guilty of misconduct, dismissal
consistent with ERs right to protect its interest in
seeing to it that EEs are performing their jobs with
honesty, integrity and good faith
Exercise of the right to terminate must be consistent with
the general principles in Arts. 19 and 21; if there is noncompliance, ER may be held liable for damages
If dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, ER is
deemed to have violated Art. 1701 and Art. 21
68
May be held liable if manner of dismissing complainant is

contrary to morals, good customs and public policy by
false imputation of misdeed to justify dismissal
Dismissal may also be done with abuse of right, such as if
the ground relied upon is a figment of ERs imagination
Albenson v. CA (1993), supra Bidin

Concept: Human Relations Provisions > Abuse of Rights (Art.
19) / Acta contra bonus mores (Art. 21)
Brief Facts: Mistaken identity. Albenson filed a criminal case
(BP 22) against Baltao for a bouncing check allegedly issued by
the same. It was later found out that the account it was drawn
against was owned by Baltaos sons company. No Malicious
prosecution or abuse of a right because the same was filed in
good faith (based on probable cause).
Doctrine: to constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately
by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. The ff. elements must exist:
1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the actions
was finally terminated with an acquittal
probable cause
3. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice
Wassmer v. Velez (1964) Bengzon, J.P.
Concept: Acts contra bonus mores (Article 21)
Brief Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer were about
to get married. However, 2 days before the day of the wedding,
Francisco left for his hometown, leaving a note with Bea, saying
that he was postponing the wedding due to the disapproval of
his mother. On the following day, she received another note
from him, saying that the wedding was to push through.
However, Francisco never showed up.
Doctrine: While a mere breach of a promise to marry, as a rule,
is not actionable, it has to be considered in conjunction with Art.
21, which holds persons liable whenever they cause injury
through acts that are contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy. When the breach of the promise to marry is of this
character, it becomes actionable under the said provision.
69
Tanjanco v. CA (1966) Reyes, J.B.L.

Drilon v. CA (1997) Hermosisima, Jr.

Concept: Acts contra bonus mores
Brief facts: Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal knowledge

with Santos because of his promise to marry the latter. They
engaged in sexual intercourse for 1 year, as a result Santos
conceived a child. Tanjanco now refuses to make good his
promises. Santos filed an action for damages under Article 21
Brief Facts: Adaza was one of those charged with the crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder, based
on the finding of the preliminary investigation that there was
probable cause to hold respondents for trial for such a crime.
Adaza filed a complaint for damages because he felt aggrieved
by the institution of the proceedings against him. Adazas case
was one for malicious prosecution, but since it failed to state a
cause of action (by failing to allege the presence of any of the
elements), it must be dismissed.
Doctrine: For Santos to have a cause of action under Article 21,

there must have been deceit on the part of Tanjanco. This is the
essential feature of seduction. Maintaining sexual relations for 1
year negates seduction, and instead reflects voluntariness and
mutual passion.
Baksh v. CA (1993) Davide, Jr.
Brief facts: Iranian citizen succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of a Filipina waitress through his promises of
marrying the latter. Upon learning that Iranian would not honor
his promise, Filipino waitress left him.
Doctrine: Where a mans promise to marry is the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman, and his
representation to fulfill said promise is the proximate cause of
the womans assent to have carnal knowledge with him, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her, and that the
promise was only a fraudulent scheme to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages under Article
21, not because of such promise to marry, but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation. Such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Que v. IAC (1989) Cruz
Brief Facts: Que sold strollers to Nicolas who issued checks for
them. Strollers were allegedly defective, so Nicolas ordered stop
payment on them; when Que tried to encash, they were
dishonored. Que filed a complaint for estafa with the fiscal of
Caloocan, which was dismissed. Nicolas filed a complaint for
damages based on malicious prosecution against Que. TC
amended decision ruled in Ques favor (no malicious
prosecution), which was overruled by the IAC.
Doctrine: The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities
for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. Proof and motive that the prosecution or institution
of an action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate must be clearly and preponderantly established.
Adverse result of an action does not per se make the act
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. Dismissal by the fiscal of the complaint did not create
a cause of action because the proceedings were not exhaustive.
Doctrine: The elements of malicious prosecution are absent in

this case. Being released by habeas corpus and being granted
bail is not the termination of the action required in the elements.
The prosecutors had probable cause to believe that Adaza could
be held for trial for the crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and frustrated murder and that it could be differentiated
from the Hernandez doctrine. Said officers enjoy a presumption
of regularity in their duties, and were found not to have been
impelled by malice in instituting said action against Adaza. The
presence of probable cause, as legal consequence, signifies the
absence of malice.
Magbanua v. Junsay (2007) Chico-Nazario
Brief Facts: Magbanua, a househelper, was impleaded as an
accused in a robbery case filed by her employer, Junsay. When
she was acquitted, she filed for damages against Junsay for
malicious prosecution. The SC held that there was probable
cause in filing the criminal complaint against her, as she
admitted her participation. That her admission was later
declared inadmissible does not detract from that fact. Also,
there was no proof that the filing of the complaint was impelled
by legal malice
Doctrine: Malicious prosecution is an action for damages
brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit,
or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and
without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant.
Thus, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff
must prove that: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the
defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its
commencement, (2) the criminal action finally ended with an
acquittal, (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause, and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal
malice, an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of
malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on
the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an
action with the knowledge that the charges were false and
groundless
70
Carpio v. Valmonte (2004) Tinga

Garcia v. Salvador (2007), supra Ynares-Santiago

Brief Facts: Valmonte was the coordinator in the wedding.

Carpio was an aunt of the bride. She accused Valmonte of
stealing her diamond jewelry. She also caused the searching of
her personal belongings. Valmonte, when the police arrived, was
bodily searched, interrogated, and trailed. She filed for damages
against Carpio. The SC held that Carpio's accusation was
uncalled for and without proof, and by any standard of law,
impermissible and contrary to morals and good customs, in
violation of Article 19 in relation to Article 21.

Doctrine: Complementing Article 19, Articles 20 and 21provide

the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who
suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of
some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a
transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
C. Illegal Acts
Art. 20 Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
-
Article 20 provides that any person who, contrary to law,

willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
In Garcia v. Salvador, the Court explained that Art. 20 was
included in the Civil Code so as to provide a remedy for
those who suffered damage from anothers violation of
some legal provision.
The scope of the provisions coverage is broad enough to
cover all legal wrongs: from those done willfully to those
done negligently or with fault.
o What is required is that the act be done voluntarily, in
order that liability under Article 20 may arise. Provided
that the act was done voluntarily, it is covered by Article
20, regardless of whether it was done willfully, or with
negligence or fault.
o It should also be noted that there must be damage,
actual or otherwise, for the action to prosper. Filing an
action for the purpose of mere recognition will not
suffice as a cause for filing the suit.
This article gives a general sanction for all other provisions
which do not especially provide their own sanction. It is
broad enough to cover all legal wrongs that do not
constitute violations of contract.
Doctrine: The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for

the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever
one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. Award
of moral damages is reasonable bearing in mind the mental
trauma suffered by Ranida who thought she was afflicted by
Hepatitis B. Exemplary damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
D. Violation of human dignity
Art. 26 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations
of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
Rights Protected Under Article 26:
(1) Right to personal dignity (No. 4.);
(2) Right to human personality which includes the right to
personal security;
(3) Right to privacy (Nos. 1 and 2.);
(4) Right to peace of mind;
(5) Right to family relations (No. 2.); and
(6) Right to social intercourse. (No. 3.)
Note:
- The acts enumerated in Article 26 do not exclude similar
acts for which an injured person may sue for relief, i.e.,
action for action for damages, prevention, or other relief.
Moral damages may be recovered for the acts mentioned.
(Art. 2219 [10].)
- Liability is incurred though the acts may not constitute a
criminal offense.
- No allegation of bad faith is necessary.
Purpose of Article 26 (Code Commission)

- The present laws, criminal and civil, do no adequately cope
with the interferences and vexations mentioned in Article 28
[now 26]. The privacy of ones home is an inviolable right. Yet
the laws in force do not squarely and effectively protect this
right.
- The acts referred to in No. 2 are multifarious, and yet many of
them are not within the purview of the laws in force.
Alienation of the affection of anothers wife or husband,
unless it constitutes adultery or concubinage, is not
condemned by the law, much as it may shock society. There
are numerous acts, short of criminal unfaithfulness, whereby
the husband or wife breaks the marital vows, thus causing
untold moral suffering to the other spouse. Why should not
these acts be the subject-matter of a civil action for moral
damages? In American law they are.
- Again, there is the meddling of so-called friends who poison
the mind of one or more members of the family against the
other members. In this manner many a happy family is broken
up or estranged. Why should not the law try to stop this by
creating a civil action for moral damages?
- Of the same nature is that class of acts specified in No. 3:
intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends.
- Not less serious are the acts mentioned in No. 4: vexing or
humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical defect or other personal
condition. The penal laws against defamation and unjust
vexation are glaringly inadequate.
- Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap
obloquy and disrepute upon another by reason of the latters
religion.
- Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt
because of the latters lowly station in life. To a certain extent
this is inevitable, from the nature of the social make-up, but
there ought to be a limit somewhere, even when the penal
laws against defamation and unjust vexation are not
transgressed. In a democracy, such a limit must be
established. The courts will recognize it in each case. Social
equality is not sought by the legal provision under
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety.
- Place of birth, physical defect and other personal conditions
are too often the pretext of humiliation cast upon persons.
Such tampering with human personality, even though the
penal laws are not violated, should be the cause of civil
action.
- The article under study denounces similar acts which could
readily be named, for they occur with unpleasant frequently.
(Report, pp. 32-34.)
71
St. Louis v. CA (1984) Aquino

Concept: Violation of human dignity
Brief Facts: St Louis published an ad with the photo of the
house of Dr Aramil but features a different family who owns it. St
Louis only published a rectification, but never apologized to Dr
Aramil. Dr Aramil sued.
Doctrine: Dr Aramil can recover damages because acts in
Article 26 shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the
Philippines (2003) Bellosillo
Concept: Violation of human dignity
Brief Facts: Article in Bulgar stated that pigs were sacred and
idolized as gods by members of the Muslim religion.
Respondents filed a class suit. SC said that since no particular
individual was identified, there was no cause of action and it was
not an intentional tortious act causing mental distress.
Doctrine: Libel or defamation, when directed against a large
group, will not lie because then the all then the alleged libelous
statement is considered to have no application to anyone in
particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. As the
size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such
groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive.
This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public
policies: first, where the group referred to is large, the courts
presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements
as so literally applying to each individual member; and second,
the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom
of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a
sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental
interests involved in libel cases.
E. Dereliction of duty
Art. 27 Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages
and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
damages:
publication;
process of law;
72

DERELICTION OF DUTY
REQUISITES:
1. Defendant is a public officer charged with a performance of
a duty in favor of the plaintiff;
2. He refused or neglected without just cause to perform the
duty;
3. Plaintiff sustained material or moral loss as a consequence
of such non-performance;
4. The amount of such damages, if material. [Amaro vs.
Sumanguit]
Coverage
Applies only to acts of nonfeasance or the nonperformance
of some acts which a person is obliged or has responsibility
to perform.
The duty of the public servant must be ministerial in
character. If the duty is discretionary, he is not liable unless
he acted in a notoriously arbitrary manner.
Defense of good faith is not available
The reason of its unavailability is that an officer is under
constant obligation to discharge the duties of his office, and
it is not necessary to show that his failure to act was due to
malice or willfulness.
action.
Art. 34 covers a situation where:

1. There is danger to the life or property of person;
2. A member of a city or municipal police force who is present
in the scene refused or failed to render aid or protection to
the person; and
3. Damages are caused whether to the person and/or property
of the victim.
Nature of liability
1. Of the police officer Primary
2. City or municipality Subsidiary
Note: The defense of having observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage is not available to the
city/municipality
Amaro v. Sumanguit (1962) -- Makalintal
Plaintiff: Cornelio Amaro and Jose Amaro
Defendant: Ambrosio Sumanguit
Concept: Dereliction of duty (Art. 27)
Brief facts: Cornelio and Jose Amaro filed a suit against
Sumanguit because they were harassed and terrorized. Claim of
relief was based on Sumanguits refusal to give assistancehis
duty as an officer of the law.
Doctrine: Refusal to give assistance, when it is his duty as an
officer of the law, is an actionable dereliction. The allegation that
the defendant Chief of Police is about to order the arrest of the
plaintiffs to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of
the policemen is a statement of the defendants dereliction,
which is actionable under Art. 27, CC.
F. Unfair competition
Art. 28 Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive
or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage.
Unfair competition in enterprises or in labor
Above provision is necessary in a system of free enterprise
Unfair competition may constitute a criminal offense (Art.
186-189 RPC) but likewise gives rise to an action for
damages independent of the criminal action
Whether competition is fair or unfair depends principally on
the method used, and not on the damage caused
IV. TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

A. Violation of Civil and Political Rights
damages:
publication;
73

process of law;
Rationale for Art. 32
This article further implements the civil liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution, and creates an absolutely separate and
independent civil action for the violation of these civil liberties.
Malice not required

To require that a person act with malice before he is held liable
under this article would defeat the purpose to protect individual
rights. The object of the article is to put an end to official abuse
under the guise of being done in good faith.
Who is held liable
1. Private persons
2. Public officials, whether the acts/omissions of #1 and #2
constitute a criminal offense
3. Judges, only when their act or omission constitutes a
criminal act
Persons Responsible
Not only public officers but also private individuals can incur
civil liability
Not the actor alone, but also the person indirectly
responsible, who has to answer for the injury caused to the
aggrieved party
XPN: If the defendant is a judge, responsibility is not
demandable unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute
Malice or Bad Faith Not Required
Not necessary that the defendant under this Article should
have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would
defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of
individual rights
Intent of the Code Commission:
o Main purpose of Art. 32: effective protection of
individual rights
o Object of Art. 32: to put an end to official abuse by the
plea of good faith
In Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, Court appears to
have ruled that the absence of an allegation of bad faith is
necessary in a complaint based on Art. 32, but it did not
overturn the doctrine that bad faith is not an essential
element
Nature of Acts Covered
Necessary that there is a violation of the constitutional right
of the plaintiff, and that such right must be one of those
listed under Art. 32
WON the defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages
74
Rationale for Article 32

In Aberca v. Ver, Court explained that the purpose of Art. 32
is to protect the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution
In MHP Garments v. CA, Court found that MHP and De
Guzman were indirectly involved in transgressing the right
of Respondents against unreasonable search and seizure
o Art. 32 encompasses those directly, as well as indirectly,
involved for its violations
o That MHP and De Guzman instigated the raid and at
their instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid
and effected the illegal seizure
o De Guzman stood by and apparently assented thereto,
so he is liable to the same extent
o MHP even received for safekeeping the goods
unreasonably seized
In Silahis v. Soluta, Court pointed out that the Code
Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only
public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for
violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil
Code
o Why it is not even necessary that the defendant should
have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would
defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights
o Suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional
right of the plaintiff
o Even if the person conducting the search owns the
premises, it can still violate Art. 32 if the person
searched is a lawful occupant
In Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, Court ruled that a public officer
is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal
capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the
scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions
o The clear intention of the legislature was to create a
distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation
of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or
intent of the defendant
o Art. 32 deals specifically with violation of constitutional
rights
o Court seems to have required the allegation of bad
faith on the part of Vinzons-Chato even though the
action was anchored on Art. 32
o The MR issued by the Court, penned by J. Nachura, is
disagreed with by Prof. Casis
!
It distinguished between two types of duties, but
actually distinguished between two types of
officers " but Art. 32 applies to all public officers
and employees without distinction
!
It said that if the duty is to the public, said public
officer would be exempt from liability " even
worse than the GF defense that the framers did not
allow
It said that a plaintiff must allege that it suffered a

particular or special injury on account of the nonperformance by a public officer (that there must be
actual pecuniary damage) " Court seems to say
that there was no injury to Fortune because it did
not pay additional tax; but this does not mean
there was no injury because Fortune still incurred
legal fees
!
Does Art. 32 require the plaintiff to allow himself to
suffer the constitutional violation before it can seek
damages? (Prof. Casis question #1)
!
Is not the enactment of legislation which violates a
persons constitutional rights sufficient as basis of
an action under Art. 32 or is it required that such
law be first enforced against he plaintiff before the
cause of action can arise? (Prof. Casis question #2)
!
Court held here in this case that an allegation of
bad faith was essential " This case should not be
used as an authority for arguing that bad faith must
be alleged in actions based on Art. 32 (Prof. Casis
comment)
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, Court said that a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another may be validly sued for damages under Art. 32 of
the CC even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or
bad faith
o Public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity
o Applies where public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff
!
75
Cojuangco v. CA (1999) Panganiban

Concept: Violation of Civil and Political Rights
Brief Facts: Horse race winnings were put on hold because of
PCGG instruction. PCSO Chairman Carrascoso carried out the
instruction of the PCGG to put winnings on hold. Carrascoso was
not acting in bad faith because he merely carried out orders
from the PCGG, but even if he did not act of bad faith,
petitioners constitutional right against the deprivation of
property without due process of law caused the respondent to
be held liable for damages under A32 of the Civil Code.
Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and
exemplary damages and for attorneys fees for acts done in the
performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that
these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been
so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal
damages if they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
Silahis v. Soluta (2006) Carpio-Morales
Concept: Violation of Civil and Political Rights
Brief Facts: Alleged illegal acts done in union office in a hotel.
An illegal search was done and the accused were acquitted due
to the inadmissibility of evidence. Union officers were entitled to
damages because of the illegality of the search and because of
the violation of their constitutional right.
Doctrine: A violation of a constitutional right can be used to
hold a person liable for damages.
MHP Garments v. CA (1994) Puno

Concept: Violation of Civil and Political Rights (Art. 32)
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune (2007) Ynares-Santiago

Concept: Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries
Brief Facts: MHP was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell

and distribute official Boy Scouts Uniforms. Respondents were
apparently selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without
any authority, and an MHP employee (De Guzman) was tasked to
conduct surveillance and report to the Philippine Constabulary.
De Guzman and the constabulary men went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market, and without any
warrant, seized items being sold, and turned these over to MHP
for safekeeping. A complaint for unfair competition was filed
against private respondents, which was dismissed, and the items
ordered dismissed (but they werent despite demands).
Respondents filed a case for sums of money and damages.
Doctrine: The very nature of Art. 32 is that the wrong may be
civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be
malice or bad faith. The law also speaks of an officer or
employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages. Art. 32 makes the persons who
are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
Brief Facts: Liwayway Vinzons-Chato, as Commissioner of

Internal Revenue issued RMC 37-93, classifying the tobacco
company Fortune as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brandsubject to the 55% valorem tax instead of the
original 20-45%. RMC 37-93 was subsequently declared defective
in the case CIR v CA. Fortune now sues Vinzons-Chato, in her
private capacity, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
or violation of the constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process.
Doctrine: Article 32 of the Civil Code states a cause of action
specifically arising from acts in violation of constitutional rights.
B. Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries
Art. 33 In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil

action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Rationale for independent civil action

This provision creates an independent civil action for the
offenses provided, which may be filed even if no reservation was
made when the criminal action was filed. This allows the injured
individual to enforce his rights and recover the damages due
him, regardless of the fiscals acts.
Effect of failure of civil action
Though the criminal action will not be prejudiced and will
continue, the issue of civil liability has ceased to be involved in
the trial of the criminal action. Thus, civil recovery can no longer
be allowed.
Definition of physical injuries
The phrase must be understood in its general sense, and not in
its RPC sense. It therefore includes all bodily injuries: slight/less
serious/serious physical injuries, attempted/frustrated homicide,
etc.
Concept
Article 33 provides that a separate civil action may be filed
in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries.
Actions filed under this provision are considered separate
and distinct from the criminal action and will require only a
While these specific acts are recognized by Article 33 to be
covered under torts, they are also necessarily criminal acts.
In Madeja v. Caro, the Court supported this characterization
with three arguments:
o The provision itself recognizes the nature of these acts
with the use of the following terms: criminal action
and criminal prosecution.
o The Code Commission has explained that the
underlying purpose of the inclusion of this provision in
the Civil code is to allow a plaintiff to bring an action to
enforce his rights, regardless of the action of the State
with respect to these specific cases.
o Tolentino has also opined that the provision creates an
exception to the general rule that the civil aspect is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and unless
the right to file it separately is reserved, no civil action
from the same offense may be filed. The provision now
amounts to a reservation in favor of the plaintiff.
However, the nature of this action is independent and
may proceed regardless of the developments in the
criminal action.
76
An action based on Art. 33 will require the plaintiff to prove

the elements of the offense. However, the plaintiff will only
need to surmount the quantum of preponderance of
evidence.
Acquittal of the accused in the criminal action is not a bar to
prosecute their liability under this provision
Defamation
The Court has defined defamation to be the offense of
injuring a persons character, fame, or reputation through
false and malicious statements.
There are some rules laid down by our jurisprudence in
dealing with defamation cases in general:
o In defamation cases, the words used in the statement(s)
in question should be construed in their entirety and
also taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning,
as they would be naturally understood by persons
reading or hearing them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense.
o Words that are merely insulting are not actionable as
libel or slander per se, and mere words of general
abuse, however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious,
whether written or spoken, will not serve as a cause of
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation
for special damages.
o The fact that the plaintiff finds the language used is
offensive does not, by itself, make it actionable.
o The defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or
ascertainable person and that person must be the
plaintiff. The name of the plaintiff need not be
mentioned; it is sufficient that it can be shown that the
plaintiff is the one alluded to in the defamatory
statement.
Libel is one of the forms of defamation and, hence,
actionable under Art. 33. Its elements are:
o An allegation or imputation of a discretable act
or condition concerning another
o Publication of the imputation
o Identity of the person defamed
o Existence of malice
There are some rules laid down by our jurisprudence in
dealing specifically with libel cases:
o The element of publication does NOT require that
there be wide circulation/publication; it merely
requires that a person, other than the author
of the publication of the libelous statement
and the offended party, takes notice of such
publication.
o In dealing with group libel or libel directed against a
group or class of persons, the Court has laid down
further rules/principles in the leading case of MVRS:
!
Unless there are circumstances specifically pointing
or alluding to a particular member of a group or
class, no member of such group or class has a right
of action against declarations made towards such
group or class.
Should an individual want to pursue his claim

against a statement towards a group/class that he
belongs to, it is essential that the said statement
be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in the group/class OR that it be
sufficiently specific so that each member of that
group/class can prove that the statement
specifically pointed to the said individual.
!
Defamation of a large group does give rise to a
cause of action on the part of an individual unless it
can be shown that he is the target of the
defamatory statement.
!
If the group is a large one, then the alleged
libelous statement is considered to have no
application to anyone in particular.
!
As the size of the group increases, the chances for
members of such groups to recover damages
become more elusive. This is for two reasons: first,
the courts will presume that no reasonable reader
would take the statement to be literally applicable
to each and every member and second, this
limitation will safeguard freedom of speech and of
the press.
The burden imposed in proving that a cause of action
exists in group libel cases is set so high, in order to
protect the equally important right to free speech and
expression and also the freedom of the press.
There are also several things to note with the concept
of malice in libel cases:
! There are two types of malice. Malice in law is a
disputable presumption of law; it dispense with the
requirement of proof that malice was present when
the defamatory statement was uttered/made. On
the other hand, malice in fact speaks of the
positive desire and intention to annoy or injure
another; it denotes that the defendant was actuated
by ill will or personal spite in uttering/making the
defamatory statement.
! These arises malice in law/disputable presumption
of malice in every case of defamatory imputation,
where there is no justifiable motive or good
intention in making such imputation.
! There however exceptions, provided in Art. 354 of
the Revised Penal Code: (a) private communication
made pursuant to a legal, moral, or social duty or (b)
a fair and true report of any legislative or other
official proceedings that are confidential in nature or
the performance of the respective functions of
public officers (fair commentary on matters of public
interest). These are known as qualifiedly
privileged communications.
! Qualifiedly privileged communications enjoy
freedom from the presumption of malice (malice in
law) even when they contain what would otherwise
be considered as defamatory. However, they can be
held as actionable upon showing that actual malice
!
77
(malice in fact) is present. It only enjoys a prima facie

presumption that there was no malice.
Actual malice is considered to be existing when
either one of these obtains: (a) author has
knowledge of the publications falsity OR (b) there is
reckless disregard with respect to the falsity or
authenticity of the contents of the publication
This is quite different from absolutely privileged
communications, which are completely not
actionable, even when made with actual malice.
The exception extended to fair commentaries on
public matters will not apply if the subject is a
private person and not a public figure. A public
figure is one who has thrust themselves into the
public controversies in order to influence the issues
involved, inviting attention and comment to
themselves.
Malice in law will apply when an author directs a
defamatory statement against a private person.
When directed against a public figure, a proof of
actual malice, however, will be required to render
the statement actionable.
Fraud
The Court, in Prudential Bank v. IAC, has ruled that estafa
falls under the contemplation of fraud under Article 33. A
separate civil action may be filed from it.
However, estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation without sufficient funds therefor
needs to be distinguished from a violation of BP 22.
Under Rule 111, Section 1(b), the civil aspect CANNOT be
reserved and even a separate civil action may NOT be filed,
in cases of violation of BP 22. This was intended to help the
speedy disposition of BP 22 cases which were clogging the
courts.
o The only instance allowing the filing of a separate civil
action based on a violation of BP 22 is when it is
instituted before the criminal action.
Physical Injuries
The physical injuries contemplated under Article 33 is not
limited to the specific definition of the term given in the
Revised Penal Code; it is also understood to mean bodily
injury, even those resulting in death.
Distinction must also be made for physical injuries
caused by reckless imprudence or negligence; these
physical injuries are NOT covered under Article 33, as the
term is understood in the provision.
o Article 33, assumes that the fraud, defamation, or
physical injuries was intentionally committed.
o Criminal negligence by nature lacks such intent.
Moreover, criminal negligence is not included in the
enumeration under the provision and, hence, a
separate civil action based from it may not be
instituted.
78
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists (2004) Carpio-Morales

released from claims for damages because of the compromise

agreement.
Brief Facts: Romy Morales, a reporter of Peoples Journal

Tonight was published an article in the said newspaper
regarding the alleged abduction and rape of Emelita Despuig by
NIAS director Catalino Arafiles. Morales was in the police station
when Emelita filed a complaint.
Doctrine: The term physical injuries, as used in Article 33,

include those injuries that ultimately result into death. And as a
separate civil action, an action under Article 33 must be brought
within four (4) years of the occurrence of the defamation, fraud,
or physical injuries.
Doctrine: A published work alleged to contain libelous material

must be viewed as a whole.
C. Neglect of Duty
MVRS v. Islamic (2003), supra Bellosillo

Brief Facts: Article in Bulgar stated that pigs were sacred and
idolized as gods by members of the Muslim religion.
Respondents filed a class suit. SC said that since no particular
individual was identified, there was no cause of action and it was
not an intentional tortious act causing mental distress.
Doctrine: Libel or defamation, when directed against a large
group, will not lie because then the all then the alleged libelous
statement is considered to have no application to anyone in
particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. As the
size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such
groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive.
This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public
policies: first, where the group referred to is large, the courts
presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements
as so literally applying to each individual member; and second,
the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom
of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a
sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental
interests involved in libel cases.
Capuno v. Pepsi Cola (1965) Makalintal
Brief Facts: In Jan 1953, vehicular collision occurred in Apalit,
Pampanga, involving the truck of Pepsi and driven by Jon Elordi,
and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision killed Cipriano
Capuno as well as his two passengers, the Sps. Buan. The driver
of Pepsi was later charged with triple homicide through reckless
imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The information was later
amended to include claims for damages in favor of the heirs of
the three victims. While the criminal action was pending, the
heirs of the Sps. Buan filed a civil case for damages including a
claim for indemnity under the Workmens Compensation Act. A
compromise agreement between the heirs of the spouses and
the respondents led to the dismissal of the case. In 1958, it was
the petitioner (Ciprianos widow) who filed a civil case for
damages of her own against the respondents. Respondents
moved for the dismissal which the Court granted for being
barred by prescription and that the respondents were already

action.
Art. 35 When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special
law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting
attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should
be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall
be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
-
Art. 35 provides that a member of a city or municipal police

force shall be primarily liable for damages if he refuses or
fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of
danger to life or property. In such case, the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible. The civil action
shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a
preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
Article 34 is intended to afford a remedy against police
officers who connive with bad elements, are afraid of them
or are simply indifferent to duty. (1 Capistrano 38).
A policeman is an agent of a person in authority and is
charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property. If a member of
a city or municipal police force refuses or fails, without just
cause, to perform his duty he is primarily liable, and the city
or municipality subsidarily, in case of insolvency of the guilty
peace officer.
!
-
The local government unit cannot invoke the

defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its policemen since this defense is
allowed only to private employers. But this is true only
where the function involved is strictly public or
governmental (e.g., preservation of peace and order,
collection of taxes, establishment of schools). The defense
would be available if the function involved is
performed by the city or municipality in its private
or corporate aspect (similar to a business corporation)
like when it operates, for instance, public utilities (e.g.,
electric, waterworks) and public markets.
A peace officer guilty of non-performance of duty is already
liable for damages under Article 27 but Article 34 authorizes
the bringing of a separate civil action to enforce that liability
independent of any criminal proceedings. A preponderance
of evidence shall also suffice to such action.
V. NUISANCE
Art. 694 A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Art. 695 Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance
affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private
nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.
Art. 696 Every successive owner or possessor of property who
fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a
former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner
as the one who created it.
79
Art. 700 The district health officer shall take care that one or all
of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of.
Art. 701 If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance
of a public nuisance, such action shall be commenced by the city
or municipal mayor.
Art. 702 The district health officer shall determine whether or
not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy
against a public nuisance.
Functions of Mayor v. District Health Officer
Mayor
District Health Officer
Takes care that one or all of
the remedies against public
Brings action for a public nuisances are availed of
nuisance
Determines
whether
abatement of the public
nuisance is the best remedy
Art. 703 A private person may file an action on account of a
public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself.
Art. 704 Any private person may abate a public nuisance which
is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without
committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.
But it is necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of
the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer
and executed with the assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three
thousand pesos.
Art. 705 The remedies against a private nuisance are:
(1) A civil action; or
(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 698 Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether

public or private.
Art. 706 Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it

by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the
peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable
that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public
nuisance by a private person be followed.
Art. 699 The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance:
or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 707 A private person or a public official extrajudicially

abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages:
(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not
a real nuisance.
Art. 697 The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the

right of any person injured to recover damages for its past
existence.
Concept of Nuisance
Anything that works hurt, inconvenience, or injury
Applied to that class of wrongs which arises from the
unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person of
his own property and which produces such material
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt, that the law
will presume a consequent damage
Embraces both intentional harms and those caused by
negligence or recklessness
Negligence is not an essential ingredient, but to be liable
for a nuisance, there must be resulting injury to another in
the enjoyment of his legal rights
Nuisance and negligence distinguished
Nuisance
Negligence
Breach of duty
Breach of duty
Creation or maintenance of a Negligence is a violation of a
nuisance is a violation of an relative duty, the failure to use
absolute duty, the doing of an the degree of care required
act is wrongful in itself
under particular circumstances
in connection with an act or
omission which is not wrongful
in itself
Liable for the resulting injury Liability based on want of care
regardless of the degree of
care or skill exercised to avoid
the injury
Damage is the necessary
consequence of what the
defendant is doing, or is
incident to the business itself
or the manner in which it is
conducted, whether there is
proper care or not
When rules on negligence applicable
Where the acts or omissions constituting negligence are the
identical acts which give rise to a cause of action for
nuisance, the rules applicable to negligence will be applied
Extrajudicial abatement
The remedy of extrajudicial abatement is available:
1. When there is a public nuisance; or
2. When there is a private nuisance, but the destruction of the
thing must not exceed P3,000. In both cases, the requisites
below must be followed.
80
Requisites of the right to extrajudicially abate

nuisances
1. The right must be exercised only in cases of urgent or
extreme necessity, and if such nuisance is especially
injurious to him. The summary abatement should be
resorted to within a reasonable time after knowledge of the
nuisance.
2. Demand to abate the nuisance must be made on the owner
of the property originating the nuisance, and such demand
must have been rejected.
3. Notice of the intention to abate must be given to the one
causing the nuisance, within a reasonable time.
4. The abatement must be approved by the District Health
Officer.
5. The local police must assist in the exercise of the right to
abate extrajudicially.
6. The means employed must be reasonable, without causing
any breach of peace or unnecessary injury. The property
must not be destroyed, unless it is absolutely necessary to
do so.
Liability for extrajudicially abating a nuisance
1. Done with unnecessary injury
2. Thing abated is later declared by the courts to not be a
nuisance
A. Nuisance per se and nuisance per accidents
Nuisance Per Accidens v. Nuisance Per Se
Per Accidens
Per Se
Nuisance by reason of the Nuisance at all times, under all
circumstances
circumstances
Nuisances have been divided into two classes:
!
Nuisance per se
o To this belongs those which are unquestionably and
under all circumstances nuisances
o E.g. Gambling houses, houses of ill fame, etc.
o The number of such nuisances is necessarily limited
!
Nuisance per accidens
By far the greater number of nuisances are such
because of particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the otherwise harmless cause of the
nuisance
Whether a particular thing is a nuisance is generally a
question of fact, to be determined in the first instance
before the term nuisance can be applied to it. [Iloilo Ice
and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council (1913)]
B. Public and private nuisance
Monteverde v. Generoso (1928) Malcolm

Concept: Nuisance
Public Nuisance
The doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously
affects safety, health, or morals of the public, or works some
substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public
Causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage to the public
generally, or such a part of the public as necessarily comes
in contact with it in the exercise of a public or common right
A condition of things which is prejudicial to health, comfort,
safety, property, sense of decency or morals of citizens at
large, resulting either from an act not warranted by law, or
neglect of a duty imposed by law
Private Nuisance
One which violates only private rights and produces
damage to but one or a few persons
Public and private nuisance
Public Nuisance
Affects public at large or such
of them as may come in
contact with it
Indictable offense
distinguished
Private Nuisance
Affects the individual or a
limited number of individuals
Actionable
either
for
abatement or for damages, or
for both
Mixed nuisances
It may be a public nuisance because it violates public rights
to the injury of many persons, and it may also be private in
character in that it produces special injury to private rights
to any extent beyond the injury to the public
Example: a house abutting on a street railway track is a
private nuisance to the railway company and a public
nuisance because it obstructs the street
Public v. Private Nuisance
Public Nuisance
Affects a community or
neighborhood or any
considerable number of
persons, although the
Definition
extent of the annoyance,
danger, or damage upon
individuals
may
be
unequal
Criminal prosecution
Civil action (abatement,
Remedies
damages, injunction)
Who may City or municipal mayor
institute
Private person ONLY IF
the
the nuisance is especially
complaint injurious to him
81
Private Nuisance
Anything not covered
by the definition of a
public nuisance
Civil action (abatement,

damages, injunction)
Any private person
injured by the nuisance
Brief Facts: Tomas Monteverde is the owner of several

fishponds made on the Agdao River which is adjacent to his
lands. The said river is navigable, placing it under the ambit of
public dominion. Later on, citing the reasons of public health
and also Sec. 24 of the Law of Waters, the provincial govt
ordered Monteverde to remove the fishponds, under the pain of
the office of district engineer doing the removal itself and at
Monteverdes cost. Monteverde tried to obtain an injunction
from the CFI of Davao but such was not granted to him.
Doctrine: There are two classes of nuisances: nuisance per se
and nuisance per accidens. Nuisance per se entails that such is a
nuisance by nature and is such at any and all times and
circumstances; it is subject to summary abatement. Nuisance per
accidens, on the other hand, is only a nuisance because of
attending circumstances and may not be abated without judicial
proceedings.
Salao v. Santos (1939) Moran
Concept: Public and private nuisance
Brief Facts:
The present action was instituted by Rufina Salao and Lucio
Lucas to restrain defendant, Teofilo C. Santos, from enforcing
compliance with his letter dated October 22, 1935, where said
plaintiffs were directed to observe the requirements of
Ordinance No. 23, series of 1929, of said municipality, on the
matter of the operation of their smoked fish factory (umbuyan).
Doctrine:
There are two kinds of nuisance: nuisance per se and nuisance
per accidens. The first one is a nuisance by all circumstances, no
need for determination since it presents a direct menace. The
second one however is a nuisance depending upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question
of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance.
Gancayco v. City Govt. of Quezon City (2011) Sereno

Concept: Public and private nuisance
Brief Facts:
The MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco
alleging that a portion of his building violated the National
Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code) in relation to
Ordinance No. 2904. Judge Gacayno did not comply therefore
MMDA proceeded to demolish the party walls/ wing walls.
Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
RTC of Quezon City. MMDA alleged that said property was a
public nuisance.
Doctrine:
The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does
not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. A nuisance per se
is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law
of necessity. MMDA does not have the power to declare a thing
a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine
whether a thing is a nuisance.
82
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 2195 The provisions of this Title shall be respectively
applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.
Art. 2196 The rules under this Title are without prejudice to
special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this
Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case
of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Rules
governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed
insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code.
Art. 2197 Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
Art. 2198 The principles of the general law on damages are
hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this
Code.
Part II DAMAGES
A. Concept of Damages
Damage v. Damages
Damage
Damages
Actionable loss, hurt, or Sum of money that the law awards
harm that results from or
imposes
as
pecuniary
the
unlawful
act, compensation, recompense, or
omission, or negligence satisfaction for an injury done or a
of another
wrong sustained as a consequence
of either a breach of a contractual
obligation or a tortuous or illegal act
Definition
May refer to either monetary award to the person injured by
the legally recognized harm caused by another or to the loss
caused to such person by the violation of his legal rights
o Monetary award:
! The pecuniary compensation, recompense, or
satisfaction for an injury sustained
! The pecuniary consequences which the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or violation of some
rights
! Not synonymous to fine, penalty, punishment,
revenge, discipline, or chastisement
o Loss
! Actionable loss, injury or harm which results from the
unlawful act or omission or negligence of another
Damages in tort constitute the money awarded to the
person injured by the tort of another
Governing laws on damages

1. Civil Code provisions on damages
2. Contracts between the parties, e.g. penal clauses (which
take the place of damages)
3. Special laws, e.g. compensation for employees in case of
death, injury, or illness
Kinds of damages (MENTAL)
1. Moral
2. Exemplary
3. Nominal
4. Temperate or moderate
5. Actual or compensatory
6. Liquidated
Elements of damages recoverable

1. Time losses loss of wages or the value of any lost time or
earning capacity where injuries prevent work
2. Injury expenses expenses incurred by reason of the injury
recoverable as damages; may also include expenses
incurred to minimize damages
Personal injury cases usually involve medical expenses
and similar items
Injury to property cases usually measured by the loss
in value of the property or the cost to repair or replace,
whichever is less; may also involve consequential losses,
such as diminished profits
3. Pain and suffering include emotional distress and
consciousness of loss
Evidence of fact, amount, and cause of damages
1. Fact and amount of the damage proved by clear and
satisfactory evidence; competent proof that damages had
been suffered and the amount thereof
2. Cause of the damage the act or omission of the defendant
must have been the proximate cause, and not a remote
cause of the injury
3. Proof of the damage the fact, amount, and cause of the
damage must be proved by preponderance of evidence;
proof of the substantive right, its breach, and the amount of
damages which flowed from that breach
a) Evidence to prove fact and cause reasonable
certainty and not mere speculation
b) Evidence to prove amount all recoverable damages are
subject to some uncertainties especially when those
damages seek to compensate the plaintiff for future
injuries. Therefore, only reasonable certainty is required
in proving the fact and cause of the injury, but the
amount of damagesonce their cause and fact have
been shownneed not be proved with the same degree
of certainty
General classification of damages
1. Compensation damages and Punitive damages (i.e.
exemplary or corrective)
2. Liquidated or conventional and Non-conventional
Liquidated if stipulated by parties in a contract
Non-conventional if not agreed upon or
predetermined
3. Statutory and Judicial
Statutory fixed by law
Judicial fixed by courts
4. Ordinary and Special
Ordinary those which necessarily and by implication
of law result from the act or omission complained of
Special those which result directly but not necessarily
or by implication of law, from the act or omission and
exist only because of special circumstances
83
People v. Ballesteros (1998) Romero

Concept: Concept of Damages
Brief Facts: Accused Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were
charged with the crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder. After trial, they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Court
held that absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to
convict a person of criminal charge. Actual damages are
awarded because these were substantiated by receipts
presented to the Court. The order granting compensatory
damages must be amended. Consistent with the policy of the
Court, the amount of PHP 50,000.00 is given to the heirs of the
victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.
As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain,
damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although
inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its
discretion.
Doctrine:
- Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as
otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which he
law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right.
- Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained
- Moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical
suffering, moral shock, and so forth, and had furthermore
shown that these were the proximate result of the offenders
wrongful act or omission.
- Consistent with the policy of the Court, the amount of PHP
50,000.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of
indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.
Carticiano v. Nuval (2000) Panganiban

Concept: Concept of Damages
Brief Facts: Petitioner Zacarias was driving the car of his father,
Rosendo, traversing the Coastal Road going to Cavite, while
Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to
Paraaque. Darwin was driving an owner-type jeepney owned by
respondent Mario Nuval. When the two vehicles were about to
pass one another, Darwin veered his jeep to his left causing a
head-on collision with Rosendo's car. Darwin fled the scene.
Zacarias suffered injuries that required hospitalization. Nuval
offered compensation for the injuries caused, but petitioners
refused to accept the amount. Petitioners then filed a criminal
case against driver Darwin and a civil suit against Nuval for
damages. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and against
Darwin and Nuval. The latter were ordered to pay the
petitioners, jointly and severally, actual, compensatory, moral,
and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees. On appeal,
however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision insofar as
Darwin was concerned and reversed as it pertained to Nuval.
The Supreme Court granted this petition and reinstated the trial
court's decision, except that the award for lost income was
deleted. Nuval failed to prove that Darwin was no longer in his
employ at the time of the accident and the theory that the latter
stole the keys as well as the vehicle was farfetched and not
supported by proof. From the totality of the evidence, the Court
was convinced that Darwin was Nuval's driver at the time of the
accident. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers
shall be liable for damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in
the case at bar showed that Darwin was acting within the scope
of the authority given him as driver when the collision occurred.
Hence, the trial court was correct in ordering that Nuval was
solidarily liable with Darwin for all the damages to which the
petitioners were entitled.
Doctrine: Employers shall be liable for damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one
is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injry. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases: (2) Quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries.
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
84
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages

need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court
may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition
to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he
would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages.
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are
awarded.
B. Review of damages, damage and injury

Damages, damage, and injury distinguished
Damages
Damage
Injury
The recompense or The loss, hurt, or The legal invasion
compensation
harm which results of a legal right
awarded for the from the injury
damage suffered
-
There can be damage without injury in those instances in

which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne
by the injured person alone.
Damnum absque injuria (Loss without injury)
o The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong
Bases for award of tort damages

1. Breach of duty by defendant
Plaintiff must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to him
Concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it
2. Injury to plaintiff proximately resulting from the breach
There must first be a breach before damages may be
awarded
The breach of such duty should be the proximate cause
of the injury
3. Compensation to plaintiff commensurate with his loss
One injured by a breach of contract or by a wrongful or
negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just
compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained
as a consequence of defendants acts
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for
an injury that will put the injured party in the position in
which he had been before he was injured (pertain to
those injuries or losses susceptible of measurement)
Custodio v. CA (1996) Regalado

Concept: Review of damages, damage and injury
Brief Facts: Petitioners built fence on their property but this
caused the narrowing of the passageway from Mabasas
apartment to the street. Tenants of Mabasa vacated the
apartment so Mabasas heirs are asking for damages.
Doctrine: There was no legal injury. The proper exercise of a
lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no
legal right has been invaded.
C. Distinguished from restitution and injunction
Restitution
Requires defendant
to restore any gains
he made in a
transaction, or by
his act or omission
Injunction
Forbids threatened
actions or requires
the defendant to
alter
harmful
conduct or repair
its consequences
Damages
The
pecuniary
consequences
which
the
law
imposes for the
breach of some
duty or violation of
some rights
II. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

Art. 2199 Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation
is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Art. 2200 Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not
only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits
which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)
Art. 2201 In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for
which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could
have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)
Art. 2202 In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
85
Art. 2203 The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question.
Art. 2204 In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances.
Art. 2205 Damages may be recovered:
(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial
credit.
Art. 2206 The amount of damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called
to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration
to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Art. 2207 If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or
loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained
of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of
the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person
causing the loss or injury.
Art. 2208 In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and

expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and
employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from
a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must
be reasonable.
Art. 2209 If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
(1108)
Art. 2210 Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be
allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
Art. 2211 In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the
damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion
of the court.
Art. 2212 Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it
is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent
upon this point. (1109a)
Art. 2213 Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
claims or damages, except when the demand can be established
with reasonably certainty.
Art. 2214 In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
86
Art. 2215 In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the

court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances
other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the
following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the
contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the
contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that
the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) (5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has
done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.
A. Concept of actual or compensatory damages
Definition of actual or compensatory damages
Those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury
or loss he suffered. They cannot be presumed, but must be
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Exception to the rule of proving actual damages
Civil indemnity for death caused by crime or quasi- delict, as
provided by Art. 2206, is the exception to the rule that an
award of actual damages presupposes that the pecuniary
loss must be proven.
Requisites of actual or compensatory damages
1. They must be alleged and proven with certainty;
2. They must have proximately resulted from the injury; and
3. They must not be speculative.
ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Article 2199 of the Civil Code describes actual or
compensatory damages as the damages awarded to a
person
as
compensation/indemnity
for
such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved.
By pecuniary, it denotes that the loss is a loss of money, or
something from which money or something of monetary
value may be acquired
By indemnity, it has been held to include compensation
for everything that was on, about, or belonging to the
person, as well as for all bodily injuries, which are proven to
be the result of the accident.
!
-

The main purpose of the law in awarding actual damages is
to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for
the injury inflicted, and NOT to impose a penalty. Actual
damages, hence, are neither dependent nor determined by
the intent with which the wrongful act was done.
o They simply make good or replace the loss caused by
the wrong
o Actual Damages proceeds from a sense of natural
justice, and are designed to repair what was deprived
from an individual by the wrong of another.
As for compensatory damages, they generally refer to
damages awarded as compensation for wrongful conduct or
breach of contract
o It covers all losses recoverable as a matter of right and
includes all damages other than moral, nominal,
temperate/moderate,
liquidated,
and
exemplary/corrective damages.
There are some rules laid down by our jurisprudence
regarding the proof required in proving actual or
compensatory damages:
o For actual or compensatory damages to be awarded, it
must rest upon satisfactory proof and cannot be
awarded when the proof is flimsy, unsubstantial or if
they are remote and highly speculative
o The amount of actual damages must be proven with
a reasonable degree of certainty supported by
competent proof and the best evidence that is
obtainable by the plaintiff.
o Receipts are one of the best forms of evidence
to prove actual damages.
o Where, however, the amount claimed as actual
damages are admitted by the defendant, it should
be granted even in the absence of receipts.
o In essence, however, it is not necessary to prove the
exact amount of the loss but only that the fact of loss is
established by competent evidence and that the
damages awarded by the court is fair and reasonable.
o The court must not award exorbitant damages. In no
case may it give more than the damages actually
proven by the plaintiff.
o There are, however, certain cases where in the
plaintiff does not need to prove his loss as the
law itself will presume that there is damage or
loss. Libel cases are a good example where the law
already presumes damage on the part of the plaintiff
because injury to the reputation of the said plaintiff is a
natural and probable consequence of the defamatory
words.
There are some further rules regarding the nature of actual
and compensatory damages, also from our jurisprudence:
o Only actual or compensatory damages may be
executed pending an appeal; other kinds of
damages cannot be regarded as fixed until final
judgment.
o Inconvenience or sentimental value is not an element in
the determination of actual damages.
87
The appellate court cannot grant the plaintiff, who did

not appeal, more than the actual damages granted by
the lower court even if during the appeal it was found
that the actual damages suffered exceeded such
amount already granted.
Basilan Lumber Co. v. Cagayan Timber Lumber (1961) Labrador

Concept: Abuse of rights
Brief Facts: Basilan entered into a contract with Cagayan for
logs. Basilan then sold the logs to a Japanese buyer. Cagayan
was not able to comply with the order thus Basilan is now faced
with the charges due to the shortage od the delivery. Court held
that damages were not proven by Basilan for them to be entitled
to recovery.
Doctrine: Actual and compensatory damages. Damages must
be duly proven.
Geluz v. CA (1961) Reyes, J.B.L
Concept: Concept of Actual or Compensatory Interest
Brief Facts: Nita Villanueva had three abortions. The first one
was before her marriage with Oscar Lazo. The second one was
during her marriage, but since she was working for COMELEC,
her pregnancy proved to be an inconvenience. On her third
abortion, her husband Lazo, was in Cagayan campaigning for a
seat in the provincial board, and did not know about the
abortion. The third abortion prompted Lazo to file this case. TC
and CA awarded PHP 3,000 damages, but the Court reversed.
Doctrine: Minimum award of PHP 3,000 for the death of a
person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for
such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. Even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity). Parents are entitled to damages, but such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Parents would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus (on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss and the
disappointment of their parental expectations.) They are also
entitled to moral damages, if the circumstances should warrant.
B. Kinds of compensatory damages
C. Measure of damages
(i) Contracts
There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: (a)

actual loss (aka dao emergente or damnum emergens) and
(b) unrealized profits (aka lucro cressante or lucrum cesans).
The first type contemplates a loss of what the plaintiff
already has in his possession.
The second type of damages, on the other hand, covers
those pecuniary benefits pertaining to him which he failed
to receive on account of the wrongful act against him.
o By the nature of lucrum cesans, those damages
enumerated in Article 2205 of the Civil Code are
included in the coverage of this type of damage: (a) loss
or impairment of earning capacity and (b) injury to
business standing or commercial credit.
G.A. Machineries v. Yaptinchay (1983) Gutierrez, Jr.

Concept: Kinds of compensatory damages
Brief Facts: Horacio Yaptichay (HY) bought a Fordson diesel
engine from G.A. Machineries Inc. (GAMI) with representations
that such engine was brand-new. However, a week after delivery,
engine sprang oil leaks and was taken for repair to GAMIs shop
several times until it eventually broke down. HY filed a compliant
for damages against GAMI. CFI ruled in favor of HY and awarded
actual damages in amount of Php54,000.48. GAMI disputes the
award saying that such were not duly proven by evidence
presented by HY. SC ruled in favor of GAMI and deleted the
award of actual damages.
Doctrine: In order to recover actual damages, the plaintiff
must produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible
and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been
damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable
certainty have anticipated but for the defendants wrongful act,
he is entitled to recover (Cereno v. Tan Chuco) (Test for
recovery of actual damages)
General Enterprises, Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging (1964) Bautista
Angelo
Concept: Kinds of compensatory damages
Brief Facts: General distributes logs supplied by Lianga. Lianga
stopped supplying logs so General sued them. SC ruled in favor
of General so Lianga must pay damages.
Doctrine: Actual damages awarded by CFI was reasonable
estimate according to the SC. Indemnification for damages
comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but also the
profits which the creditor fails to obtain (lucrum cessans).
88
Art. 2201 In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for

which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could
have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)
-
Article 2201 governs the rules in determining the amount

damages to be awarded when the case involves a breach of
contract
It contemplates two situations: the obligor/debtor acting in
good faith or in bad faith.
o Good faith liability is limited to those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach, and
those which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
o Bad faith liable for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation. There is no necessity that the damages are
the natural and probable consequence of the breach nor
is it required that they were foreseen or could have been
reasonably foreseen, as long as a clear relation of cause
and effect is established between the damage and the
breach.
Effect of Good Faith and Bad Faith

Good Faith
Applicable
Par. 1
paragraph
Obligors
Attended with good
conduct
faith
Extent
liability
of
Natural
and
probable
consequences
of
the breach of the
obligation, and which
the
parties
have
foreseen or could
have
reasonably
foreseen at the time
the obligation was
constituted
Under Art. 2201

Bad Faith
Par. 2
Attended with fraud,
bad faith, malice, or
wanton attitude
All damages which
may be reasonably
attributed to the nonperformance of the
obligation
Ordinary v. Special Damages

Ordinary Damages
Special Damages
Necessary consequences of Are imposed on
wrongful act or omission, such ordinary damages
as a breach of contract which
would lead to loss of profits
and an award of actual
damages
89
Rodriguez v. Findlay & Co. (1909) Moreland

Concept: Measure of Damages: Quasi-Contracts
top
of
(ii) Quasi-contracts (Same as Contracts)

Lim Siengco v. Lo Seng (1924) Street
Concept: Measure of damages: quasi-contracts
Brief Facts: Lim Siengco contracted to buy from Lo Seng a
quantity of alcohol. The latter delayed in making deliveries. Lim
Siengco is now recovering damages for breach of contract but
offered no proof that he was compelled to purchase the
undelivered alcohol in the open market, and the prices paid
therefor
Doctrine: Correct measure of damages is to be found in the
difference between the contract price and the price prevailing in
the market at the time and place stipulated for the deliveries.
The circumstance that Lim Siengco may or may not have been
compelled to buy from another in order to meet the default of
delivery on the part of Lo Seng does not affect the right to
recover damages for the breach
Cariaga v. Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company (1960) Dizon
Concept: Measure of Damages: Quasi-Contracts
Brief Facts: Rodriguez bought machinery from Findlay, relying

completely on the expertise of Engineer Swann, save for the
concern he had about the speed, which his vessel Constancia
should have. When the machinery was delivered and installed,
the propeller, instead of giving a speed of 9 knots, only gave
less than 7 knots. Rodriguez filed a complaint for breach of
contract against Findlay, grounding the breach on the failure of
the propeller to give the required speed.
Doctrine: The measure of damages is not limited to the
difference in value of the goods as warranted, and as they prove
to be but profits lost and expenses incurred, because of the
breach may be recoverable. The damages to be awarded should
be offset by the balance due from the buyer.
(iii) Crimes
Art. 2202 In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
-
Article 2202 is the controlling provision in cases dealing with

crimes or quasi-delicts.
It provides that the defendant may be held liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences
of the act or omission complained of.
The rule regarding these cases follows that of the liability of
a contractual dector who acted in bad faith.
The recovery allowed under these cases, in the absence of
circumstances that will merit a punitive manner of awarding
of damages, will be limited to no more than the just and
adequate compensation for the injury suffered, and will not
be awarded an amount more than the actual loss that was
inflicted..
o Again, the purpose of actual or compensatory damages
is not to penalize the defendant but to indemnify the
plaintiff.
Brief Facts: The bus of LTBC, in which Cariaga was riding in,
collided with the train belonging to MRC. As a result, Cariaga
and the other passengers sustained several injuries. The lower
court held that it was the LTBC bus who was responsible for the
accident and it adjudged LTBC to be liable for compensatory
damages but NOT for actual and moral damages. Now, both
LTBC and Cariaga appeal that judgment, with regard to the
finding of liability and the non-award of moral damages,
respectively.
Doctrine: Moral damages are not recoverable when the cause

of action falls under breach of contract/culpa contractual. Art.
2219 which provides the instances wherein moral damages may
be awarded does not include breach of contract as an allowable
instance.
Doctrine of avoidable consequences

A party cannot recover damages for consequences that it may
have avoided. This is embodied in Art. 2203.
Lazam 45 Phil (1954) = fracture of a bone in the wrist, but
plaintiff refused to undergo operation to remove a decaying
splinter of bone " a series of infections w/c required
constant expensive treatment
Vs. contributory negligence = comes before/during
wrongful act or omission
Avoidable Consequences v.
Avoidable Consequences
A wrongful act or omission
causing injury has already
taken place, but the avoidable
consequences come after such
act or omission
The negligence comes before
or during the wrongful act or
omission that causes injury
Actual/Compensatory Damages
Delictu
Actual
or
Compensatory
Damges
Basis
Civil Code
Proof
Actual
pecuniary
required damages, except if
resulting in death
v. Civil Indemnity Ex
Civil
Indemnity
Delictu
Ex
Revised Penal Code

Damage or injury (proof
of commission of felony
itself)
People v. Narvaez (1983) Makasiar

Concept: Measure of Damages - Crimes
Brief Facts: Narvaez killed Fleischer and Rubia when the latter
tried to fence their property, and at the same time, denying the
former access to the highway. Narvaez argued self-defense. SC
found that the elements of self-defense were lacking.
Doctrine: Damages may be mitigated if the offended party
instigated the incident through unlawful aggression.
(iv) Quasi-delict
(Same as Delict)
(v) Crimes and Quasi-delict resulting in death
Civil/Death Indemnity
Art. 2206: amount of damages for a death caused by crime
or quasi-delict shall be at least P3000
This has been gradually increased through the years
Referred to as civil indemnity or death indemnity it is
mandatory and granted to the heirs without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime
In crimes resulting in death, it is inconsistent whether award
is P50,000 or P75,000
o P75,000 if the penalty would have been death had it not
been for the abolition of the death penalty
o P50,000 if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
o P50,000 for robbery with homicide, regardless of any
qualifying aggravating circumstances
In Crisostomo v. People, Court explained that the awards
are mandatory without need of allegation and evidence
other than the death of the victim owing to the fact of
commission of the crime
90
Loss of Earning Capacity

Art. 2206: defendants liability for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased
Should be awarded in every case unless the deceased had
no earning capacity on account of physical disability (not
caused by defendant)
Award is not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity
to earn money
Gen. rule: Documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate claim for damages
Exceptions:
o The deceased was self-employed and earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which
case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceaseds line of work, no documentary evidence is
available; or
o The deceased was employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws
o (Pleyto v. Lomboy) Testimonial evidence suffices to
establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and
reasonable estimate for the loss of earning capacity
Heirs must present unbiased proof of the deceaseds
average income. A self-serving, hence, unreliable statement
is not enough
To determine loss of earning capacity under Art. 2206, Court
has employed the Villa Rey formula even though the case
did not involve a crime or quasi-delict (to put it within the
coverage of Art. 2206)
In Philippine Hawk v. Lee, Court explained that only net
earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered
o Net earnings are total of earnings less expenses
necessary for the creation of such earnings or income,
less living and other incidental expenses
o In the absence of documentary evidence, it is
reasonable to peg living expenses at 50% of the income
Principle in Pleyto (on the 3rd exception) has its roots in the
ruling in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, and there is
sufficient jurisprudence to justify the principle being applied
to future cases
o Prof. Casis: Perhaps, as an exception to the rule
requiring documentary evidence, the Pleyto principle
should only be applied to those cases where the
testimony provided is highly credible and there is no
reason to suspect that the witness is deliberately trying
to inflate the amount
Other cases:
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. CA (1970) Concepcion

Concept: Measure of Damages Other Cases
Abesamis v. Woodcraft Works, Ltd. (1969) Makalintal

Brief facts: TC sentenced Woodcraft to pay Abesamis P145k as
actual damages and P50k representing the latters loss of credit
in the operation of his business. SC held that the P50k award was
baseless. Other than a few letters of demand for payment of
money accounts received by Abesamis from his creditors and
presented as exhibits, there is nothing to go upon, and the mere
fact that such demands were made does not necessarily prove
loss of credit. The item was thus eliminated from the award of
damages.
Doctrine: Actual or compensatory
established by clear evidence.
91
damages
must
Brief Facts: Policronio Quintos Jr., a passenger of a Villa Rey

bus died in a collision between said bus and a bullcart. Villa Rey,
in a petition for certiorari, assails the computation for damages
of the lower court. The Court held that life expectancy, although
not the sole element determinative of the amount of damages, is
an important factor and cannot be disregarded.
Doctrine: Life expectancy is an important element in
computing the damages to be awarded.
People v. Quilaton (1992) Feliciano
be
Siguenza v. CA (1985) Gutierrez, Jr.

Brief Facts: Quimbos were awarded compensatory damages
by CFI and affirmed by CA because of the breach of contract of
sale of 2 lots with Siguenzas. They were prevented from
constructing their house worth P100K, and if it were to be
constructed now, it will be worth 300% more.
Doctrine: SC removed the award for compensatory damages
because no proof whatsoever was presented or could be
presented by Quimbos to show that they had actually suffered
pecuniary loss. They have not even started the construction of
their house on the disputed lots.
Sun Life Insurance Co. of Canada v. Rueda Hermanos & Co.
(1918) Johnson
Concept: Measure of Damages: Other Cases
Brief Facts: There has been a dispute between Delgado and
RHC as to who will receive the proceeds of the life insurance
policy. One of the issues raised by Delgado in the dispute was
that he suffered damages when RHC did not deliver to him an
amount it received in his favor, and applied it instead to his debt.
Doctrine: Actual and compensatory damages have to be
proven with competent evidence and using the best evidence
available. Claims that are too remote, and speculative will not be
entertained.
Brief Facts: Appellant Gumercindo Quilaton was found guilty

of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and required to pay the heirs of the offended party
various amounts of money. The Court analyzed the computation
for damages.
Doctrine: Life expectancy is an important element in
computing the damages to be awarded. However, there are
several other factors to be considered in determining the
amount of damages to be awarded.
Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos (1969) Barredo
Concept: Measure of Damages: Crimes and Quasi-delict
resulting in death
Brief Facts: Respondent was charged with the murder of
Raymundo Castro. The trial court found him guilty of homicide
and credited him 2 mitigating circumstances. It awarded the
heirs P6,000 without prejudice to whatever the accused is
entitled from GSIS for his 26 years of service as a public school
teacher. The heirs appealed to CA which upheld the conviction
and the award of moral damages of P6,000, and added P13,380
as compensatory damages for the loss of earnings of the
decedent (annual salary of P2676). However, upon motion for
reconsideration of the accused, CA removed the award moral
and compensatory damages when it exercised its discretion
(without citing any law as legal basis for removal of the award) in
appreciating the two mitigating circumstances.
Doctrine: When the crime committed involves death, Art 2206
provides that the amount of damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict shall be at least PHP 3,000.00, which was
later increased to PHP 6,000 and later on to PHP 12,000, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances. This
amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be
adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss. The
assessment of the moral damages is left to the discretion of the
court, according to the circumstances of each case. Defendant
shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and

awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death. If the deceased was
obliged to give support according to Art. 291, the recipient who
is not an heir called to the decedents inheritance by law of
testate or intestate succession may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court. The spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. Exemplary damages may
also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has
been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances,
such damages being separate and distinct from fines and shall
be paid to the offended party. Exemplary damages cannot
however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will give
decide whether or not they should be given.
People v. Aringue (1997) Puno
Concept: Measure of Damages: Crimes and Quasi-delict
resulting in death
Brief Facts: Michael Cabal, Perciverando Pitao and Guillermo
Aringue were charged for the murder of a certain Nicomedes
Salas. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch
1, convicted Pitao and acquitted Aringue. It awarded a lump sum
of PHP 2M for damages. In this appeal, appellants Pitao and
Cabal contend that the trial court erred in convicting them
inspite of the inadmissible nature of their confession and based
on facts which are contrary to the testimony of the witnesses,
both by the prosecution the defense. The Court affirmed the
conviction of the accused but modified the award for damages,
with breakdown on the lost earning capacity, actual damages,
PHP 50K for indemnity by reason of death, moral damages, and
attorneys fees.
Doctrine: Net earning capacity = life expectancy x (gross
annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses
(50%). No proof of pecuniary loss is required in the assessment
of moral damages. Award is not meant to enrich the victim at the
expense of the defendant
Rodriguez-Luna v. IAC (1985) Abad Santos
Concept: Damages and award of attorneys fees
Brief Facts:
As a result of a collision between a go-kart, driven by Roberto
Luna, and a Toyota car, driven by minor Luis dela Rosa (13),
Roberto Luna died. His heirs filed a suit for damages and was
awarded 1,650,000 as unearned profits and 50,000 as attorneys
fees with no legal interest by CFI Manila. CA affirmed but upon
MR, it modified the award of unearned profits to 450,000. Heirs
appealed to SC for increase in damages awarded and for legal
interest of the award of attorneys fees. This was granted by SC.
92
Doctrine:
The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in
a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part
thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See
Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the
interest should accrue only from the date of the trial court's
decision.
D. Subrogation
Art. 2207 If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or
loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained
of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of
the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person
causing the loss or injury.
Subrogation of Insurer to Rights of Insured in Property
Insurance
Doctrine of Subrogation
It is a process of legal substitution: the insurer, after paying
the amount covered by the insurance policy, steps into the
shoes of the insured, as it were, availing of the latters rights
that exist against the wrongdoer at the time of the loss
It is rooted in equity designed to compel the ultimate
payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity and good
conscience ought to pay
Right Applicable Only to Property Insurance
Does not apply to life insurance because the value of human
life is unlimited and no recovery from a third party can be
deemed adequate to compensate the insureds beneficiary
Pecuniary value of a human life to the beneficiary can
seldom be determined with accuracy except when the
insurance is taken by a creditor on the life of a debtor to
insure a debt
Life insurance contracts are not ordinarily contracts of
indemnity
Right of Insured to Recover from Both Insurer and Third Party
Right of subrogation prevents the insured from obtaining
more than the amount of his loss
Right exists after indemnity has been paid by the
insurer to the insured who can no longer go after the third
party (he can only RECOVER ONCE)
IF the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully
cover the injury or loss, it is the aggrieved party (insured)
who is entitled to recover the deficiency from the person
responsible
93
Right of Insurer Against Third Party Limited to Amount

Recoverable From Latter by Insured
As the insurer is subrogated merely to the rights of the
insured, it can necessarily recover only the amount
recoverable by the insured from the party responsible for
the loss
Insurer cannot recover in full the amount it paid to the
insured if it is greater than that to which the insured could
lawfully lay claim against the person causing the loss
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must

be reasonable.
Vector Shipping Corporation v. American Home Assurance

Company and Sulpicio Lines (2013) Bersamin
Concept: Subrogation
Brief Facts:
Vessels M/T Vector, owned by Vector Corp. and M/V Doa Paz,
owned by Sulpicio Lines, collided in open sea. The vessels sank
and as result, the entire petroleum cargo of Caltex on board M/T
Vector was lost. American Home Assurance (AHA) indemnified
Caltex for the loss of the petroleum cargo. AHA filed a complaint
against Vector, Soriano, and Sulpicio Lines, Inc. to recover the
full amount it paid to Caltex. CA absolved Sulpicio and held
Vector and Soriano solidarily liable to AHA.
Doctrine: Subrogation under Article 2207 of the Civil Code
gives rise to a cause of action created by law. For purposes of
the law on the prescription of actions, the period of limitation is
ten years.
E. Attorneys Fees
Art. 2208 In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and
employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a
crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered.
If any of the conditions provided are present, attorneys fees

may be awarded.
The attorneys fees referred to under this article is not
payment for services rendered by a lawyer but one
wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not his
counsel, and the litigant is the judgment creditor who may
enforce the judgment by execution.
Because attorneys fees and expenses of litigation are
recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, these
must be specifically prayed for and may not be deemed
incorporated within a general prayer. The courts must also
explicitly state in the body of the decision the legal reason
for the award of attorneys fees.
General rule for attorneys fees

Attorneys fees are generally not recoverable, except in the
cases stated in Art. 2208.
Attorneys fees go to the litigant, and not the lawyer.
They are a form of compensatory damages, awarded to the
litigant who incurred expenses in order to protect his
interests.
They cannot be awarded without being claimed and without
their basis being stated in the decision.
In all cases, attorneys fees must be reasonable.
Considerations in awarding attorneys fees
1. Amount and character of services rendered
2. Labor, time, and trouble involved
3. Nature and importance of litigation and business in which
the services were rendered
4. Responsibilityimposed
5. Amount of money and value of property affected by
controversy
6. Skillandexperiencecalledfor
7. Professional character and social standing of attorney
8. Results secured
Why use these standards?
Standards under the CPR are equally applicable, because
these are essentially the same standards to judge the
litigants expenses.
The CPR governs the contract between the lawyer and
litigant anyway.
94
Quirante v. IAC (1989) Regalado

Concept: Attorneys fees
Frias v. San Diego-Sison (2007) Austria-Martinez

Concept: Attorneys Fees
Brief Facts: Atty. Quirante files motion for confirmation of his

attorneys fees while the main case involving the award of
damages which was the basis of said fees was still pending in
court.
Brief Facts: Frias and San Diego-Sison entered into a MOA

with option to buy property, in consideration of P3M. Frias
received P2M in cash, to be returned if San Diego-Sison decides
not to purchase the property (which she eventually decided),
which consideration became a loan. Frias failed to repay the
P2M, so San Diego-Sison filed a complaint for sum of money.
RTC granted attorneys fees, amongst other monetary awards,
which the CA affirmed.
Doctrine: An attorneys fee cannot be determined until after

the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery
is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorneys fees
only arises when something has been recovered from which the
fee is to be paid.
Yu v. Ngo Yet Te (2007) Austria-Martinez
Concept: Measure of Damages: Attorneys Fees
Brief Facts: The checks issued by spouses bounced and
hence, Te sued for collection along with a prayer for a writ of
attachment; said attachment was granted and served upon the
spouses. Aggrieved, the spouses questioned the issuance of the
writ and filed a counterclaim for damages. The SC ultimately
ruled that there was no ground for the writ and as a result, it was
wrongfully issued. However, despite the SCs ruling, the trial
court refused to grant the damages prayed for in the
counterclaim. Hence the case.
Doctrine: The award of attorneys fees is the exception, rather

than the rule. In order to award it, such must be backed by
findings of facts and law, and must be explained in the body of
the decision, and not just the dispositive portion. On appeal, the
CA cannot just supplement the award in the absence of the TCs
justification for the same.
BPI Family Bank v. Franco (2007) Nachura
Brief Facts: BPI froze the account of Franco and denied his
withdrawals based on the suspicion that he is involved in a
scheme to defraud the bank of P80M. Franco filed complaint for
damages.
Doctrine: As a general rule, attorneys fees CANNOT be

granted when moral and exemplary damages are not awarded.
The exception is when the party who has prayed for it in his
pleadings incurs expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of
attachment.
Doctrine: Award of attorneys fees may be deemed to

reasonable in view of the complexity of the issues involved and
the time it has taken for a case to be resolved.
Gomez v. Gomez-Samson (2007) Chico-Nazario

Art. 2209 If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of

money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
(1108)
Brief Facts: After denying that they fraudulently prepared

Deeds of Donations, respondents prayed for moral,
compensatory and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys
fees against petitioner Gomez. TC dismissed petitioners
complaints and awarded moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees to respondents. SC affirmed the dismissal of
petitioners complaints but deleted the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Doctrine: In the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages, no exemplary damages can be
granted, for exemplary damages are allowed only in addition to
any of the four kinds of damages mentioned. Attorneys fees
should be deleted in the absence of a clearly unfounded civil
action or proceeding.
F. Rules on interest
Art. 2210 Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be

allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
Art. 2211 In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the
damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion
of the court.
Art. 2212 Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it
is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent
upon this point. (1109a)
Art. 2213 Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
claims or damages, except when the demand can be established
with reasonably certainty.
Monetary v. Compensatory Interest

Monetary Interest
Compensatory Interest
Stipulated by the parties for Compensatory interest kicks in
the use or forbearance of when there is a breach, as
money
in
writing
(not compensation for the default
considered monetary interest by the party; it may be
if not in writing)
imposed by law or by courts as
penalty or indemnity for
damages
Not considered monetary
interest if not in writing
Monetary v. Compensatory Interest
Monetary Interest
Compensatory
Interest
Who may The parties through Law or the courts
impose it
their stipulation
When
When there is a use or Kicks in when there is a
applicable
forbearance of money
breach
Form
Not
considered May either be oral or
monetary interest if written
not in writing
Purpose
Compensation
fixed Compensation for the
by the parties
default by the party in
breach
Right to Interest
Arises only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages
for delay or failure to pay the principal loan on which
interest is demanded.
Determination of legal interest
(1) When an obligation, regardless of its source (i.e., law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts) is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
(2) With regard particularly to an AWARD OF INTEREST in the
concept of actual and compensatory damages, the RATE of
interest, as well as the ACCRUAL thereof, is imposed, as
follows (Eastern Shipping Lines vs. CA, (1994) as modified by
Nakar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871 (2013)):
BASE
a.
When
the
obligation
is
breached, and it
consists
in
the
PAYMENT OF A
SUM OF MONEY,
i.e., a loan or
forbearance
of
money, the interest
due should beb. Furthermore, the
INTEREST
DUE
shall itself earn
c.
When
an
obligation,
NOT
constituting a loan
or forbearance of
money,
is
breached,
an
interest on the
AMOUNT
OF
DAMAGES
awarded may be
imposed at the
discretion of the
court.
The actual base for
the computation of
legal interest shall
be on the amount
finally adjudged.
95
RATE
a) That which may
have
been
stipulated
in
writing.
b) In the absence of
stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be
6% per annum
(legal interest)
ACCRUAL
To be computed
from default, i.e.,
from JUDICIAL or
EXTRAJUDICIAL
demand under and
subject
to
the
provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil
Code.
Legal interest
From the time it is

JUDICIALLY
demanded
If claim or damages
are LIQUIDATED,
from default, i.e.,
from judicial or
extrajudicial
demand. (Art. 1169,
Civil Code)
6% per annum
If UNLIQUIDATED,
from the time the
demand can be
established
with
reasonable
certainty.
Hence,
the interest shall
begin to run only
FROM THE DATE
THE JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT IS
MADE (at which
time
the
quantification
of
damages may be
deemed to have
been
reasonably
ascertained).
From
FINALITY
UNTIL
ITS
SATISFACTION,
this period being
deemed to be an
equivalent to a
forbearance
of
credit.
d.
When
the 6% per annum
JUDGMENT of the
court awarding a
sum
of
money
becomes final and
executory, whether
or not the case
consists
in
the
payment of a sum
of money
Note: The new rate of legal interest (6%) in Nacar does not apply
to judgments that have become final and executory prior to July
1, 2013.
(From UP BOC Reviewer 2014)
Start of Delay
(1) Extrajudicial: Demand letter
(2) Judicial: Filing of complaint
(3) Award
Applicability of 12% v. 6% Interest Rates
12% interest per annum
6% interest per annum
Applicable interest for loans or Applies for any other breach
forbearance of money, where that is not a loan or
there is no stipulation fixing forbearance of money
another rate (penalty clause);
counted from the date of
demand
Definition of forbearance of money
Contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain,
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower
or debtor to repay loan or debt that is due and payable.
Computation in Eastern Assurance v. Calumpang
[Principal payments made]a
+ [(remaining balance x 12% p.a. x number of years after
demand)b
+ (interest on principal computed from the time of judicial
demand x 12% p.a. x number of years from due date)]c
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE
a Remaining balance from the amount originally due
b Legal interest on the remaining balance
c Legal interest on the monetary interest due
This computation contemplates a situation after judicial demand,
so the interest rate applied is 12% per annum.
After final judgment: Total amount due (d) + [d x 12% p.a. x
number of years from finality to satisfaction].
IMPORTANT
NOTE
REGARDING
APPLICABLE
INTEREST
Central Bank Circular 416 imposing a 12% per annum
interest rate on all loans or forbearances of money, goods,
or credit, and 6% per annum interest rate on all other
obligations applies in the cases below. However, effective 1
July 2013, BSP Monetary Bank Circular No. 799-2013 was
issued, providing that the legal interest for loans or
forbearances of money shall be 6%, thereby creating the 66-6 rule.
This was applied in Nacar v. Gallery Frames (G.R. No.
189871; 13 August 2013). (See Eastern Assurance v.
Calumpang for further discussion.)
6-12-6 Rule v. 6-6-6 Rule

6-12-6 (Eastern Assurance
three-step rule)
1. When the obligation is
breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due
should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to
the provisions of Art. 1169 of
the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not
constituting
a
loan
or
forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except
when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with
reasonable
certainty,
the
interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169) but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the
demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from
the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time
the quantification of damages
may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The
actual
base
for
the
computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
96
6-6-6
(Nacar
rules,
applying
new
Circular
799-2013)
1. When the obligation is
breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due
should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to
the provisions of Art. 1169 of
the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not
constituting
a
loan
or
forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages, except
when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with
reasonable
certainty,
the
interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169), but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the
demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from
the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time
the quantification of damages
may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The
actual
base
for
the
computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the

court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls
under
paragraph
1
or
paragraph 2, above, shall be
12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed
to be by then an equivalent to
a forbearance of credit.
3. When the judgment of the

court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls
under
paragraph
1
or
paragraph 2, above, shall be
6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed
to be by then an equivalent to
a forbearance of credit.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA (1994) Vitug

Concept: Rules on interest
Brief Facts: Insurer-subrogee Mercantile sued carrier Eastern
Shipping because one drum from the shipment was damaged.
Eastern questions the grant of interest on Mercantiles claim
which was 12% from the date of filing of the complaint because
Mercantiles claim was unliquidated.
Doctrine: When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, the interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. When such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment
of the court. It becomes 12 % when the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory.
Nacar v. Gallery Frames (2013) Peralta
Concept: Rules on interest
Brief Facts: Dario was dismissed without valid or just cause and
was awarded backwages and separation pay. He filed Motion for
Correct Computation because monetary award must be
computed up to finality of SC Resolution on May 27, 2002.
Respondents invoked immutability of judgment. Dario also
petitioned for payment of interest from the finality of the
decision until full payment of monetary claim.
Doctrine: Interest must be at 12% of the total monetary awards,
computed from May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013 and then
modified to 6% from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction due
to Circular No. 799 of the BSP Monetary Board.
97
III. OTHER KINDS OF DAMAGES

A. Moral Damages
Art. 2217 Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Art. 2218 In the adjudication of moral damages, the
sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be
considered.
-
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a

complainant at the expense of the defendant. Its award is
aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to
the suffering inflicted. [Visayan Sawmill vs. CA (1993)]
Mental suffering means distress or serious pain as
distinguished from annoyance, regret or vexation.
Mental anguish is intense mental suffering. Generally,
damages for mental anguish are limited to cases in which
there has been a personal physical injury or where the
defendant willfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally
caused the mental anguish. [Bagumbayan Corp. vs. IAC
(1984)]
Moral damages in criminal offenses under Art. 2219 may be
recovered even without prior judgment
In Mercado v. Lim, (prior to Air France v. Carrascoso), breach
of contract cannot be considered included in the phrase
analogous cases used in Art. 2219; Art. 2220 already
provides for the damages caused by contractual breach
Requisites:
1. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually
established;
3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Art. 2219. [Villanueva vs. Salvador (2006)]
Art. 2219 Moral damages may be recovered in the following

and analogous cases:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
Illegal search;
Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in Article 309;
Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,

referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the
order named.
When awarded:
Awarded when injury consists of:
(a) Physical suffering
(b) Besmirched reputation
(c) Mental anguish
(d) Fright
(e) Moral shock
(f) Wounded feelings
(g) Social humiliation
(h) Serious anxiety
(i) Similar injury
Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
If such is the proximate result of defendants act or
omission.
98
General Principles of Recovery

(1) Moral damages must somehow be proportional to the
suffering inflicted.
(2) In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages
may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or
was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and,
exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is
constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
(3) By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206,
moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a
passenger results from a breach of carriage.
(4) In culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict,
(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or
(b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral
damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies
to contracts when breached by tort.
(5) In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due
when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries,
lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary
detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation.
(6) Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral
damages. The term analogous cases, referred to in
Article2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be
held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law.
(7) Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can
at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's
fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held
not to be a ground for an award of moral damages.
[Expertravel & Tours vs. CA, (1999)]
(8) The burden rests on the person claiming moral damages to
show convincing evidence for good faith is presumed. In a
case involving simple negligence, moral damages cannot be
recovered. [Villanueva vs. Salvador, 2006]
(9) Failure to use the precise legal terms or sacramental
phrases of mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings or moral shock does not justify the
denial of the claim for damages. It is sufficient that these
exact terms have been pleaded in the complaint and
evidence has been adduced [Miranda-Ribaya vs. Bautista
(1980)]
(10) Even if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in
the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such
damages are not deemed admitted. [Raagas, et al. vs. Traya
et al. (1968)]
(11) An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review and this 'includes the review of the penalty,
indemnity and damages. Even if the offended party had not
appealed from said award, and the only party who sought a
review of the decision of said court was the accused, the
court can increase damages awarded. [Sumalpong vs. CA,
1997]
(12) It can only be awarded to natural persons.
Considerations in Determining Amount of Moral

Damages
1. Official, political, social, and financial standing of offended
parties
2. Business and financial position of offender
Art. 2220 Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
Kierulf v. CA (1997) Panganiban
Concept: Moral Damages
Brief Facts: A Pantranco bus driving on the westbound side of
EDSA crossed over to the eastbound side and collided with the
vehicle of the Kierulfs driven by Legaspi. Lucila Kierulf suffered
extensive injuries.
Doctrine: A husband may claim an award for damages suffered
due to loss of marital consortium. However, this loss must be
duly proven in court.
Flordelis v. Mar (1982) Panganiban
Brief Facts: Mar and Ligan filed an administrative case against
Flordelis who happened to be the school administrator. After
Flordelis was exonerated from the same, a case was now filed
against the two teachers for perjury. Flordelis suspended the two
teachers and removed their teaching load and stopped their
salaries. SPOILER: They were not entitled to damages in this
case.
Doctrine: For the award of moral damages, a justification
should be shown that the Civil Code in Article 2219 sanctions
such.
Bagumbayan Corp. v. IAC (1984) Aquino
Brief Facts: The Sea family went to see a Show in Tropical
Palace Hotel, Paraaque, Metro Manila. While eating at the
hotels restaurant, a waiter spilled drinks on Lelisa Sea. She
sued Babumbayan Corp. as employee of the waiter for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages.
Doctrine: The grant of moral and exemplary damages is devoid
of legal justification because it was not predicated upon any of
the cases enumerated in the Civil Code. Where there is no willful
or wanton wrong, there can be no recovery for mental suffering
unless there is also physical injury.
99
UCPB v. CA (2003) Callejo, Sr.

Brief Facts: This is a case of two people bearing the same
name. Teofilo C. Ramos instituted a complaint for damages
against UCPB. He alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of
land covered by TCT 275167. However, he was not the judgment
debtor in a civil case where the land was levied. The judgment
debtor in the civil case is his namesake, Teofilo Ramos, Sr.
Without any legal basis, UCPB and sheriff Villapana caused the
annotation of a notice of levy in his property which caused the
disapproval of the loan from UCPB. This made him lose an
opportunity to participate in a bidding, and he suffered sleepless
nights, moral shock, mental anguish and a heart attack due to
high blood pressure. UCPB admitted that he made a mistake in
causing the annotation of notice of levy on the TCT of Ramos,
however it was not motivated by malice or bad faith.
Doctrine: For the award of moral damages to be granted, the
following must exist: (1) There must be an injury clearly sustained
by the claimant, whether physical, mental or psychological; (2)
there must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
(3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4)
the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated
in Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.
Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways (1973) Concepcion
Concept: Moral damages
Brief Facts: Rafael Zulueta, a passenger of Pan American
World Airways got into an alteration with the pilot after almost
being left by the plane on a stopover in Wake Island. He and his
family were subjected to insulting language and disrespectful
conduct. Rafael was subsequently left by the plane on Wake
Island.
Doctrine: Treatment of Zulueta by Pan American justify an
award for moral damages.
Panay Electric v. CA (1982) Melencio-Herrera
Brief Facts: Florentino Sarabia was a bill collector for Panay
Electric. Relying on an erroneous report from SGV about
shortages incurred in his collections, Panay Electric Co.
dismissed Florentino and filed a suit for reimbursement for the
amount of the alleged shortage amounting to Php 12,155.68.
The trial court found that the amount of shortages was only Php
41.85, ordered his reinstatement plus exemplary and moral
damages and attorneys fees.
Doctrine: The award of moral damages is uncalled for where
the company filing suit for reimbursement had not acted with
malice, fraud or in bad faith.
Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc. (2009) Tinga

Brief Facts: Pantaleon, while on a guided tour of Europe,
bought jewelry in a store in Amsterdam using his American
Express credit card. However, there was a long delay in the
approval of the transaction, causing the Pantaleons to be late in
returning to the guided tour, which in turn delayed the whole
group of the guided tour. Upon return to the Philippines, they
sued AmEx for the humiliation from the incident.
Doctrine: Moral damages avail in cases of breach of contract

where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Also,
whenever the breach of contract would lead to the particular
injuries enumerated under Art. 2217, moral damages should be
awarded. As for the amount, there is no hard-and-fast rule and
must be determined with the particular facts and circumstances
of the case, and it must be commensurate with the injury as well.
Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc. (2010) Brion

Brief Facts: (see above; this is a resolution on the motion for

reconsideration by AMEX)
Doctrine: In cases where the plaintiff voluntarily assumes the
risk and it is shown that there is no breach on the part of the
defendant, nor bad faith or willful intent, there can be no award
of moral damages as it is a proper case of damnum absque
injuria. The plaintiff should bear his own losses.
100
Nominal damages may be awarded when:

o There is a breach of an obligation arising from any
source enumerated in Art. 1157: law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts and quasi delicts
o There is an invasion of any of plaintiffs property rights
They are awarded in lieu of all other kinds of damages (e.g.,
actual/compensatory, moral, etc.) when the violation of a
right has been established but actual losses are: a) uncertain
or not susceptible of proof, b) too remote, conjectural, or
speculative and there is no basis for establishing any
measure for damages
There have also been cases where the Court has awarded
them under considerations of equity, as it did in the case of
Sps. Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la.
The amount awarded under nominal damages is left for the
courts to determine, bearing in mind the facts of the case;
o The amount awarded under nominal damages has
been held to be small but substantial and that which
is commensurate to the injury.
Nominal damages are incompatible with the other kinds of
damages and cannot be awarded anymore when there has
already been an award of actual/compensatory, moral,
and/or exemplary damages.
An award of nominal damages terminates the issue upon
the right involved, as well as all the accessory questions and
precludes award of actual/compensatory, moral, or
exemplary damages. This shall also be binding upon the
heirs and assigns of all the parties involved.
Robes-Francisco v. CFI (1978) Muoz-Palma

Concept: Nominal damages
B. Nominal Damages
Art. 2221 Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222 The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or
in every case where any property right has been invaded.
Art. 2223 The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude
further contest upon the right involved and all accessory
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective
heirs and assigns.
-
They are awarded whenever a right of the plaintiff

has been violated or invaded; it is awarded to
vindicate or recognize such right and does not
serve to indemnify the plaintiff for the loss sustained by
him.
Brief Facts: Robes Realty agreed to sell to Millan a parcel of

land in Caloocan City. Millan complied with her obligation and
paid the installments. After which, she made repeated demands
for the execution of the final deed of sale and the issuance of the
TCT over the lot. The parties executed a deed of absolute sale.
The deed had the provision that the seller warrants that the TCT
shall be transferred in the name of the buyer within 6 months
from full payment. After 6 months, seller corporation failed to
cause the issuance of the TCT. Millan filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against the seller
corporation.
Doctrine: Nominal damages are awarded when there is delay
amounting to non-performance of the obligation. There is a
violation of the buyers right, and this entitles her at the very
least to nominal damages.
Francisco v. Ferrer (2001) Pardo

Concept: Nominal Damages
Brief Facts: Cebu Fountainhead failed to deliver a wedding
cake they were obligated to. Ferrers file a complaint for
damages, are awarded moral damages in six figures by the CA.
Bakeshop owner appeals.
Doctrine: Nominal damages are awarded when a legal right
has been technically violated, and now must be vindicated
despite there being no actual substantial loss. In breaches of
contract, the same may be awarded when no substantial loss is
proven. The same were awarded for the insensitivity that gave
rise to the Ferrers anxiety.
Gonzales v. People (2007) Quisumbing
Brief Facts: On June 26, 1997 Joel Gonzales allegedly set fire
to a building owned by Carlos Canlas. The fire spread to other
properties and as a result 9 other properties were destroyed. He
was convicted of arson and trial court awarded nominal damages
to 3 eyewitnesses who testified in court.
Doctrine: (relevant to class) Generally, nominal damages by
their nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to
the extent of the harm done to the injured party. However, it is
generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if
based upon the violation of a legal right; in such a case, the law
presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages
are not proven.
MCC v. Ssangyong (2007) Nachura
Brief Facts: MCC and Ssangyong entered into a contract
where Ssangyong promised to deliver 220 MT of stainless steel
to MCC for USD 1,860 per MT upon opening of letter of credit.
MCC had difficulty opening letter of credit, despite extensions
and discounts given by Ssangyong. Ssangyong was also having
problems because of MCCs failure to open letter of credit.
Finally, MCC was able to open only a partial letter of credit.
Ssangyong then filed for action to recover damages for breach
of contract.
Doctrine: Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal
right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or
where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial
injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown.
101
C. Temperate or Moderate Damages

Art. 2224 Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the
case, be provided with certainty.
Art. 2225 Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
-
Included within the context of compensatory damages

Code Commission: because there are cases where from the
nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot
be offered, although the Court is convinced that there has
been such a loss " that damages shouldnt be denied for
that reason; that judges should be empowered to calculate
moderate damages rather than the plaintiff suffer without
redress
When Awarded
1. According to Art. 2224, when the amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty
2. According to jurisprudence, when the actual amount of
loss was not proven with certainty, even if the nature
of the case allows for the possibility of pecuniary loss being
proven with certainty
In Republic v. Tuvera, the Court acknowledged that
temperate damages may be awarded even in cases
where the amount of loss could have been proven with
certainty
In Pleno v. CA, the SC agreed with the TC when it
awarded temperate damages for loss of earning
capacity because the injureds actual income was not
sufficiently established
o Prof. Casis: This ruling may be interpreted as
another exception to the rule requiring
documentary evidence for the award of loss or
earning capacity
In Tan v. OMC Carriers, the Court rule that absent
competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a
party still has the option of claiming temperate
damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from
the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss
cannot be adduced although the court is convinced
that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss
o Court cited Pleno v. CA, People v. Singh, and
People v. Almedilla, where it granted temperate
damages in place of actual damages for either
failing to sufficiently prove plaintiffs income or
failing to present sufficient evidence of the
deceaseds income
Court said that although temperate damages have

been awarded for actual damages not proven, it
may no longer be awarded if nominal damages
have been awarded for the same purpose
In Ventanilla v. Centeno, Court said that although
Ventanilla was not entitled to actual or compensatory
damages, he was awarded nominal damages, and this
precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate
damages
In addition to actual damages although claim for
both actual and temperate damages is internally consistent,
Court said it is possible if there was sufficient basis for
temperate damages
a. Chronic and continuing injury
In Ramos v. CA, Court ruled that temperate
damages can and should be awarded on top of
actual or compensatory damages in instances
where the injury is chronic and continuing
That no incompatibility arises because the
damages cover 2 distinct phases
b. In addition to civil indemnity
Temperate damages may be awarded in addition
to civil indemnity
In People v. Yrat, Court awarded civil indemnity
and temperate damages (because loss of earning
capacity and funeral expenses lacked evidentiary
basis)
c. In addition to other actual damages proven
Court has awarded temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages not proven
In People v. Magallona, Court deleted actual
damages for lack of evidentiary basis, but awarded
temperate damages because the family of the
deceased suffered pecuniary loss but the amount
couldnt be proved with certainty
o
3.
Factors in Determining Amount

In General
The amount should be:
o More than nominal but less than compensatory
damages; and
o Reasonable under the circumstances
Receipts Amounting to Less than P25,000
If the amount of actual damages proven by receipts amount
to less than P25,000, the award of temperate damages for
P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages
Even if the claim for actual damages didnt exceed P25,000,
the Court awarded temperate damages in an amount in
excess of the amount of actual damages prayed for as
actual damages (Serrano v. People; People v. Gidoc)
o Awarded P25,000 even if there was no indication that
the total amount of actual damages would have
exceeded P25,000 in any case
102
In People v. Villanueva, Court held that if the amount of

actual damages proven exceeds P25,000, temperate
damages may no longer be awarded " actual damages
should instead be granted
No Receipts Provided
Award of P25,000 even where no receipts are presented in
evidence
In People v. Gidoc, award was proper when there was no
evidence of burial and funeral expenses presented
In People v. Surongon, Court justified it by saying no
receipts were presented to prove the loss of actual
damages, but it was shown that the heirs were entitled to
the same; hence, they were awarded
In People v. Abrazaldo, Court may have explained why
amount is pegged at P25,000
o Because of the decisions saying civil indemnity for
death was fixed at P50,000, then the temperate
damages should be of it (P25,000)
In People v. Almedillai, Court said that although
compensation for lost income requires unbiased proof of
the deceaseds average income, it awards P25,000 as
temperate damages in view of the lack of proof of average
income
Because of the jurisprudence awarding temperate damages
in lieu of actual damages not proven (or actual damages in a
lesser amount proven), the amount of actual damages
awarded in any case cannot be less than P25,000
Necesito v. Paras (1958) J.B.L. Reyes
Concept: Temperate or Moderate Damages
Brief Facts: Severina Garces and Precillano Necessito (1 year
old) boarded Philippine Rabbit at Agno, Pangasina. The
truck/bus fell into a creek. Severina drowned, Precillano suffered
injuries. The money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were
lost.
Doctrine: A carrier is liable to its passengers for damages
caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance. There are
cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is
convinced that there has been such loss. In such cases, the judge
should be empowered to calculate moderate damages, rather
than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the
defendants wrongful act.
103
PNR v. Brunty (2006), supra Callejo, Sr.

negligence, which they believed to have cause the injury to

Erlinda.
public safety demands that said device are installed
Doctrine: While the general rule is that temperate damages will

not
be
awarded
when
there
has
already
been
actual/compensatory damages awarded, temperate damages
may still be awarded on top of actual/compensatory damages
when the nature of the injury is chronic and continuing. The
actual/compensatory damages indemnify the plaintiff for
pecuniary loss incurred and proven up to the time of the trial,
while the temperate damages shall answer for pecuniary loss in
the future which is certain to be suffered but cannot be made
with certainty; they cover two different phases of the injury.
Doctrine: Actual and temperate damages cannot be awarded

based on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to its amount,
but must depend on competent proof that they have suffered,
and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Because of the
failure to present evidence for such damages, actual damages
may not be awarded. However, because the heirs of the
deceased Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and
burial, the Court deemed it proper to award temperate damages
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence (P25K).
Republic v. Tuvera (2007) Tinga
Brief Facts: The original case was for the sequestration of the
assets of Twin Peaks on the ground that all the assets of the
corporation are ill-gotten wealth for having been acquired
directly or indirectly through fraudulent and illegal means. Trial
on the case against the Tuveras proceeded separately before
the Sandiganbayan. After the Republic had presented its
evidence, the Tuveras successfully moved for the dismissal of the
case on demurrer to evidence.
Doctrine: (on temperate damages) Notwithstanding Article
2224, a line of jurisprudence has emerged authorizing the award
of temperate damages even in cases where the amount of
pecuniary loss could have been proven with certainty, if no such
adequate proof was presented. The allowance of temperate
damages when actual damages were not adequately proven is
ultimately a rule drawn from equity, the principle affording relief
to those definitely injured who are unable to prove how definite
the injury.
D. Liquidated Damages
Art. 2226 Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the
parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227 Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable.
Art. 2228 When the breach of the contract committed by the
defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine
the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
-
Actual and Temperate Damages Awarded

Ramos v. CA (1999) Kapunan
Concept: Actual and Temperate Damages
Brief Facts: Erlinda Ramos was scheduled to have her
operation for the removal of a gallstone. On the day of the
operation, the intubation procedure was unsuccessful and left
the oxygen supply to Erlindas brain cut for 4-5 minutes, causing
her to sustain irreversible brain damage and for her to go into
comatose. The Ramos family filed a case against the
anesthesiologist, the lead surgeon and the hospital for their
Article 2226 defines liquidated damages as those agreed

upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of
breach thereof. As such, liquidated damages can only exist
if there is a contract or an agreement between the parties.
Even if the term liquidated damages is not used, any
provision in a contract that requires a party breaching the
contract to pay an amount to the non-breaching party or
parties may be treated as a provision on liquidated
damages.
It is actually common for liquidated damages to be referred
to as attorneys fees. Such attorneys fees refer not to the
fees recoverable as between attorney and client but those
that are imposed as penalty in case of breach.
A provision on liquidated damages in a contract will not
necessarily apply in case of breach. Article 2228 provides
that when the breach committed by the defendant is not the
one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the
liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of
damages and not the stipulation. This means that liquidated
damages do not necessarily answer for all types of breach
but only those contemplated by the parties.
If the contract is oral, yet outside the Statute of Frauds and
can be duly proven, then even an oral agreement as to
liquidated damages will suffice
Purpose
Article 2227: purpose of liquidated damages can be either
as indemnity or penalty. This means that the sum of money
stipulated can either be intended (i) to compensate the nonbreaching party for the injury caused by the other partys
breach or (ii) to punish the breaching party. It can be said
therefore,
that
liquidated
damages
are
either
compensatory or punitive in nature.
A stipulation for liquidated damages does not necessarily
mean that other types of damages may no longer be
recovered.
Reducing the amount
1. When iniquitous or unconscionable
- Article 2227 provides that liquidated damages shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable. Iniquity means a gross injustice or a
wicked thing, and also defined as extremely immoral and
unfair while Unconscionable is defined as something
excessive, unreasonable or shockingly unfair or unjust.
- Such reduction in both cases is warranted under Article
1306 since those stipulations are contra bonus mores.
- Determining WON the amount stipulated is iniquitous or
unconscionable can be difficult because of the
subjectivity of the standards. In some cases, the court
would simply say that the stipulated amount is
unconscionable or iniquitous but not explain why.
2. Possible Tests in reducing damages
a. Apply rules on Penalty Clauses
- Court may consider a number of factors including,
but not limited to the type, extend and purpose of
the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of
breach and its consequences, the supervening
realities, the standing and relationship of the parties
b. Apply the rules on the Award of Attorneys
Fees
c. Applying precedent
d. Proportionality to Purpose
- If the purpose is to compensate, the amount must
correspond to the actual injury suffered. If purpose is
punitive, then it becomes a policy decision and the
injury suffered by the innocent party need not be
taken into consideration. What is determinative is the
proper penalty for the breach which happened.
e. Necessity Test
- If there are other stipulations in the contract, such as
payment of interest, service fee, etc. the court may
go into the question WON the amount stipulated is
still necessary as indemnity or penalty.
f. When in pari delicto
- Court may reduce the liquidated damages if other
party is also guilty of breach
g. Consider actual damages
- If actual damages sustained would also include the
interest and penalties, then liquidated damages may
be reduced.
104
Liquidated Damages vs. Penalties

It has been held that there is no difference between a
penalty and liquidated damages, as far as legal results are
concerned. In either case, the injured party need not prove
his damages in order that the sum stipulated may be
demanded.
a. As distinguished from liquidated damages, a penalty
is a sum inserted in a contract, not as the measure of
compensation for its breach, but rather as a punishment
for default, or by way of security for actual damages
which may be sustained by reason of non-performance.
It involves the idea of punishment.
b. A penalty is an agreement to pay a stipulated sum on
breach of contract, irrespective of the damage
sustained. Its essence is a payment of money stipulated
as a deterrent to the offending party, while the essence
of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted preestimate of damages.
A provision for payment of a specified sum as compensation
for acts contemplated by the contract as opposed to
compensation for injury resulting from breach of the
contract is neither a penalty nor liquidated damages. Also to
be distinguished from both a penalty and liquidated
damages is a contractual limitation of liability.
Determining Character of Stipulated Sum
The question of whether a stipulated sum is a penalty or for
liquidated damages is answered by the application of one
or more aspects of the following rules.
1. Liquidated damages. A stipulated sum is for
liquidated damages only:
a. where the damages which the parties might
reasonably anticipate are difficult to ascertain
because of their indefiniteness or uncertainty; and
b. where the amount stipulated is either a reasonable
estimate of the damages which would probably be
caused by a breach or is reasonably proportionate
to the damages which have actually been caused by
the breach.
2. Penalty. Ordinarily, a stipulated sum will be
regarded as a penalty:
a. where it is evident that the sum was fixed to evade
the usury laws, or any other statute, or to cloak
oppression;
b. where the defaulting party is rendered liable for the
same amount whether the breach is total or partial,
or where the sum is set without regard to the extent
of performance where, in the nature of the
promises, the extent of the performance would be
important in determining the amount of actual
damages which would result; and
c. where the contract provides for the payment of a
fine in addition to the amount of any damage
caused by a breach, such fine cannot be considered
as liquidated damages but must be regarded as a
penalty which cannot be recovered.
!
3.
Partly liquidated damages and partly penalty.

A stipulation in a contract to forfeit a certain sum for
a breach of its terms cannot be separated, and a part
discarded as a penalty, and the remainder treated as
liquidated damages. But the parties to a contract may
agree that certain elements of damages for its breach
which are difficult to estimate shall be covered by a
provision for liquidated damages and that other
elements shall be ascertained in the usual manner.
National Power Corp. National Merchandising Corp. (1982)

Aquino
Concept: Liquidated Damages
Brief Facts: NPC entered into an agreement with Namerco
(ICCs agent) for sulfur. ICC told Namerco not to enter into the
contract because it was having difficulties in securing vessels for
transport, Namerco still entered into the contract. Said contract
had a stipulation for liquidated damages. ICC was not able to
ship sulfur because of the lack of transport. NPC is now claiming
for liquidated damages.
Doctrine: A sellers agent that exceeded his authority in
negotiating is liable for liquidated damages incurred from
contract that he has entered into in beyond his authority. Stated
otherwise, the principal is not bound to answer to contracts
entered into by his agent acting beyond his authority.
Titan Construction Corp. v. Uni-Field enterprises, Inc. (2007)
Carpio
Concept: Liquidated damages
Brief Facts: Titan and Uni-field had been engaged in business
for several years. In their contract, it was stipulated that Titan
promises to pay (1) interest of 24% per annum on overdue
accounts, compounded with the principal obligations as they
accrue; (2) 25% liquidated damages based on the outstanding
total obligation; and (3) 25% attorneys fees based on the total
claim including liquidated damages. Titan defaulted in the
payment of an amount and Uni-Field filed a complaint for the
collection of money with damages.
Doctrine: The attorneys fees here are in the nature of
liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a
penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation
does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly
binding upon defendant. The attorneys fees so provided are
awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. Award reduced
because Courts may reduce the award if iniquitous or
unconscionable.
105
E. Exemplary or Corrective Damages

Art. 2229 Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230 In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of
the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the
offended party.
Art. 2231 In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted
if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Art. 2232 In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Art. 2233 Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.
Art. 2234 While the amount of the exemplary damages need
not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court
may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the
plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Art. 2235 A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are
renounced in advance shall be null and void.
-
In common law, these damages were termed punitive.

Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as
a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
[PNB vs. CA (1996)]
Exemplary damages cannot be awarded if no other kind of
damages have been awarded
When a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of
P25,000 as exemplary damages is justified under Art. 2230
(People v. Rottes)
If the circumstance is an alternative one (Art. 14, RPC),
exemplary damages may be awarded if it is found to be
aggravating
Rationale of Exemplary Damages (From People v. Torres)

This kind of damage is intended to serve as deterrent to
serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication for undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or
as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct
WHEN RECOVERABLE
IN CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall
be paid to the offended party.
o Award of exemplary damages is part of the civil liability,
not of the penalty.
o Damages are paid to the offended party separately
from the fines.
IN QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
IN CONTRACTS AND QUASICONTRACTS
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.
REQUISITES TO RECOVER EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AGREED UPON
The plaintiff must show that he/she is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages:
If
arising When exemplary
from
damages are granted
Art. 2230
Crimes
The crime was committed with
an aggravating circumstance/s
Art. 2231
Quasi-delicts
Defendant acted with gross
negligence
Art. 2232
Contracts and Defendant acted in a wanton,
Quasi- contracts fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner
REQUISITES
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages,
the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
106
LIMITATIONS
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are
renounced in advance shall be null and void.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(1) Exemplary damages cannot be awarded alone: they must
be awarded IN ADDITION to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.
(2) The purpose of the award is to deter the defendant (and
others in a similar condition) from a repetition of the acts for
which exemplary damages were awarded; hence, they are
not recoverable as a matter of right.
(3) The defendant must be guilty of other malice or else
negligence above the ordinary.
(4) Plaintiff is not required to prove the amount of exemplary
damages.
(a) But plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damage; that is,
substantial damages, not purely nominal ones. This
requirement applies even if the contract stipulates
liquidated damages.
(b) The amount of exemplary damage need not be
pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot be
proved. It is merely incidental or dependent upon what
the court may award as compensatory damages.
Conditions for Award of Exemplary Damages (From
Octor v. Ybaez)
1. Imposed by way of example or correction only in addition,
among others, to compensatory damages;
2. Cannot be recovered as a matter of right;
3. Wrongful act accompanied by bad faith, i.e., award would
be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner
Lao v. Standard Insurance Co. (2003) Quisumbing
Concept: Exemplary Damages
Brief Facts: Rudy Lao insured his truck. It figured in an accident
during the effectivity of the insurance policy. Standard Insurance
denied the claim alleging that it violated the authorized driver
clause because the drivers license showed that he was not
authorized to trucks weighing more than 4,500 kg. Both lower
courts ruled in favor of Standard Insurance Company and
ordered Rudy Lao to pay 50,000 exemplary damages.
Doctrine: Entitlement to the recovery of exemplary damages
must be shown; they cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
they also need not be proved. But a complainant must still show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether
or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Sociedad Europea De Financiacion S.A. v. CA (1991) Narvasa

Concept: Exemplary or Corrective Damages
Brief Facts: SEF owned 89.75% over Capital, an insurance
company. Capital had a sister company Capital Life which had
34.05% outstanding shares in Capital. Garrido was the General
Manager of both insurance firms. Araneta was also part of the
management. Upon Garrido and Aranetas suggestion, Capital
obtained a loan of P600,000 from PCB with SEFs shares as
security with Garrido and Araneta assuring that loan will not be
used and be placed in a time deposit. When PCB issued a
certificate of time deposit, Garrido assigned all rights over it to
PCB. A year and a half later, PCB foreclosed SEFs share and
acquired it through auction. SEF, Muoz, and Amat sued
Garrido, Araneta and PCB for breach of trust and
mismanagement and prayed for damages.
Doctrine: (on exemplary damages) Court here increased the
exemplary damages from P100,000 to P600,000 (same amount as
loan) because both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
found that the (they) had concocted a scheme "to divest plaintiff
SEF of its interests in Capital Insurance and for themselves to
own the controlling interest therein," and carried out that illicit
objective.
Munsayac v. De Lara (1968) Makalintal
Brief Facts: Munsayac suffered injuries as a result of a vehicular
accident caused by the reckless negligence of the driver of the
jeepney she was riding. TC awarded exemplary damages in
addition to actual damages. Basis thereof was the fact that De
Lara, as employer of the negligent jeepney driver, did nothing to
lessen the suffering of Munsayac
Doctrine: The causative negligence in accident cases involving
common carriers is personal to the employees actually in charge
of the vehicles, and it is they who should be made to pay this
kind of damages by way of example or correction. The employer
may only be held liable for exemplary damages if it be shown
that the he participated in the doing of the wrongful act of the
employee, or that he has previously authorized or subsequently
ratified it with full knowledge of the facts
107
friends. However, the Business Class was already full. In the end,
the spouses acquiesced to the upgrade when they were told that
they would not be allowed to board the plane if they refused.
Upon their return, the spouses filed an action for damages.
Doctrine: Nominal damages may be awarded when plaintiffs
rights have been violated but actual/compensatory, moral, or
exemplary damages cannot be awarded. Moreover, the trial
court should avoid the award of excessive damages.
Pan Pacific Co. v. Phil. Advertising Corp. (1968) Concepcion
Brief Facts: Phil. Advertising bought bowling alleys and other
accessories from Pan Pacific, which the latter duly installed.
However, aside from paying the down-payment, Phil. Advertising
made no other payments despite demands by Pan Pacific, so the
latter was constrained to file an action to recover sums of money
from the former.
Doctrine: Acting in a wanton, oppressive, and fraudulent
manner in the performance of an obligation (showing gross and
evident bad faith) and failing to give/pay what is due entitles the
innocent party to moral and exemplary damages. This is because
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229).
Such may be awarded when the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art.
2232).
People v. Domingo (2007) Nachura
Concept: Exemplary Damages
Brief Facts: Dominguez raped a 10 year old girl. He was
convicted of statutory rape but trial court failed to award
exemplary damages.
Doctrine: Pursuant to People v. Malones, exemplary damages
should be awarded in cases of statutory rape.
IV. COURTS DISCRETION

Cathay Pacific Airways v. Vasquez (1960) Davide, Jr.
Brief Facts: The Spouses Vasquez were members of the Marco
Polo Club of Cathay Pacific Airways and for being part of such a
club, they were to be given priority whenever there would be a
need to upgrade a passengers flight seats. On their flight back
from HK to MNL, the spouses were flying with their friends as
well as their maid and all of them were booked at the Business
Class. When the spouses checked in, the ground stewardess
informed them that their seats were upgraded to First Class; the
spouses refused as they wanted to remain seated with their
Art. 2216 No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that

moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages,
may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except
liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according
to the circumstances of each case.
Discretion of courts to award damages
OCC- Only damages that can be recovered are
compensatory damages and those agreed upon in a penal
clause
!
-

NCC
o Courts can award moral, nominal, temperate, and
exemplary damages, according to the circumstances
of each case through the discretion vested in the court
o But no discretion to fix the amount of liquidated
damages. They cannot be awarded where the parties
did not stipulate on that kind of damages, although,
when agreed upon by the parties, they shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Proof of pecuniary loss in the award of damages

No pecuniary proof is required in the award of moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary damages
Nevertheless, it is essential that there should be a clear
showing of the facts giving rise to such damages
Mercury Drug v. Baking (2007) Sandoval-Gutierrez
Concept: Courts Discretion
Brief Facts: Sebastian was sold a sleeping tablet by Mercury
Drug instead of medicine for his blood sugar. He figured in an
accident because he fell asleep while driving. SC ordered
Mercury to pay moral damages but reduced the amount given
by TC.
Doctrine: No hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be
a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar facts. However, it must be
commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.
Cebu Country Club v. Elizagaque (2008) Sandoval-Gutierrez
Concept: Courts Discretion (Art. 2216)
Brief Facts: TC and CA awarded damages to Elizagaque
because petitioners committed fraud and bad faith in
disapproving his application. SC reduced the damages for being
excessive.
Doctrine: Moral damages should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. They are not intended to impose a
penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the
expense of the defendant. Exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions. Attorneys fees and litigation
expenses must be reasonable, just and equitable.
Philippine Airlines v. Lopez (2008) Quisumbing
Brief Facts: Lopez was downgraded from his business class
seat to economy in his return flight from Bangkok to Manila. PAL
averred that he did not protest the seat given to him when the
change in accommodations was read to him by the person who
received his phone confirmation.
108
Doctrine: In allowing the courts to determine the amount of

damages to be awarded, it must be remembered: There is no
hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and
reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts. However, it must be
commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.
Northwest Airlines v. Chiong (2008) Nachura
Brief Facts: On the day he was supposed to fly to LA, Chiong
was not allowed to check in and was not issued a boarding pass
at the Northwest check-in counter to accommodate a certain
W.Costine.
Doctrine: An award of moral damages, in breaches of contract,
is in order upon a showing that the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith. In this case, Chiong was given the run-around at
the Northwest check-in counter. Exemplary damages are
awarded because Northwest acted in an oppressive manner
thereof Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest, or
where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.
Note: There was no mention of Art. 2216. But I GUESS, based
on the case, the Court still awarded damages despite no proof
of pecuniary loss / no pecuniary loss on the part of Chiong.
Japan Airlines v. Simangan (2008) R.T. Reyes
Concept: Courts discretion
Brief Facts: Simangan wanted to donate a kidney to his cousin
in the US. In order to travel there he was issued a parole visa by
the US government. He booked a round trip ticket from Japan
Airlines to go to USA via Narita, Japan. In the airport, his travel
documents were subjected to rigid immigration procedures and
he was allowed to board the flight. However, after he was
already settled in his seat, the airlines personnel suspected him
of carrying a falsified travel document. After protest, he was
bumped off the flight and was left behind. He waited in the
airport for 3 hours until his travel documents were cleared. He
then filed for an action of damages against the airlines.
Doctrine: When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed on a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of
carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that
he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then
the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage.
The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a
sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by Japan
Airlines (JAL)

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With love,

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Art. 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

Scope of Philippine Tort Law (according to Antonio

Art. 2177 Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Elements of Actionable Conduct (Garcia v. Salvador)

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Yamada v. Manila Railroad Co. (1915)

Garcia v. Salvador (2007)

Brief Facts: Yamada and friends hired a taxi from Bachrach. On

Brief Facts: Salvador underwent a medical exam which showed

SC held that the taxi driver was negligent. A prudent driver

Doctrine: For healthcare providers, the test of the existence of

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

2. Concept and scope of quasi-delict

o It provided a spectrum: on the one hand, there is the narrow

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Elcano v. Hill (1977)

Mendoza v. Arrieta (1979)

Brief Facts: Defendant was a married minor who killed

SC held that Acquittal only extinguishes civil liability if such

SC held that The action against the truck owner is based on

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

- However, these statements from the Court in Barredo should

Covers only acts punished by

Art. 100, RPC Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined,

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition

Effect of Circumstances Under RPC on Civil Liability

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a

Barredo v. Garcia, supra

Civil Liabilities Compared

Brief Facts: A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Manliclic v. Calaunan (2007)

A lack of the diligence Existence of contract

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Manila Railroad Co. v. Cia. Transatlantica (1918)

Brief Facts: Manila Railroad had a contract with Compania

Common carriers are liable for death of or injury to passengers:

Doctrine: The existence of a contract between Manila Railroad

By simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Batal v. San Pedro (2006)

Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. CA (1993)

Brief Facts: Northern portion of the fence constructed around

Brief Facts: Geronimo sues Coca-Cola Bottlers for having sold

Doctrine: Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two

Doctrine: Existence of contract does not preclude liability

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Rakes v. AG&P (1907)

B2017 FINALS REVIEWER | LAW 104 TORTS | PROF. TAN

Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co. (1929)

Wright v. Manila Electric Co. (1914)

Brief Facts: Del Prado attempted to board the street car

Brief Facts: Wright (intoxicated), on his way home via a calesa,

Doctrine: MECs liability arises from a breach of a contractual

Doctrine: Mere intoxication is not negligence per se, nor does