Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 14-7746
Director
of
Department
of
Corrections;
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:13-cv-01117-LMB-JFA)
Argued:
December 8, 2015
Decided:
brought
alleging
this
that
action
a
pursuant
prison
to
official
42
U.S.C.
violated
the
1983
Eighth
summary judgment.
I.
Raynor, an inmate at Sussex II State Prison, suffers from
medical ailments, including seizures, blackouts, blood issues,
heart issues, and breath[ing] issues.
Raynor,
who
was
housed
with
inmate
K.
In November 2012,
Mullins,
asked
prison
who
had
conditions.
with
G.
That
day,
volunteered
to
assist
him
with
his
health
Pugh,
Pugh
the
Prison
informed
Housing
Mullins
Manager
that
he,
for
Raynors
instead
of
unit.
Raynor,
to
Raynor,
Mullins
then
threatened
Raynor
in
front of Pugh, saying, its on, that they were both going to
seg[regated
housing],
and
that
[Raynor].
he
would
physically
assault
he did not care what Mullins did and ordered both men back into
their cell.
did not call for assistance or take any action until after the
attack
had
ended.
Raynor
also
alleges
that
he
sustained
In addition to temporary
result
of
that
spinal
injury,
he
alleges
that
he
now
complaint
pursuant
Raynor
alleges,
and
Pughs
deliberate
to
42
realleges
U.S.C.
in
indifference
to
an
1983
amended
Raynors
against
Pugh. 1
complaint,
safety,
and
that
the
As
evidence
submitted
of
verified
Pughs
deliberate
complaint
and
indifference,
corroborating
Raynor
affidavit
To support
of
the
following
materials
from
the
prison:
the
Pugh
not
dispute
inmates
had
gotten
before
along
the
in
other
assault,
the
past,
and
he
fact
attacked
Raynor.
presence
every
Mullins
he
Pughs
essentially
that
Raynor,
in
disputes
does
alleged
because
had
no
the
by
two
reason
to
Pugh
also
maintains
that,
even
if
he
had
been
present
during
an
noted
in
the
assault.
Pugh
argues
medical
that
report
Raynor
from
suffered
the
day
of
ongoing
the
spinal
immunity
defense.
Raynor
opposed
both
motions,
district
court
denied
Raynors
motions
and
granted
qualified
immunity
defense.
6
Seven
months
later,
still
judgment.
The
court
acknowledged
that
the
parties
between
plaintiff
and
Mullins
and
whether
that
lack
these
of
disputes
were
evidentiary
not
support
However, it
genuine,
for
Raynor
due
Raynors
to
an
claims.
II.
The Eighth Amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments imposes certain basic duties on prison officials.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
These include
maintaining
including
humane
conditions
of
confinement,
the
(internal
corrections
violence
quotation
officers
at
the
have
hands
a
of
marks
duty
other
omitted).
to
Specifically,
protect
prisoners
prisoners,
for
from
[b]eing
at
832,
834
(internal
quotation
omitted).
7
marks
and
alterations
Makdessi
v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks
omitted).
plaintiff
must
satisfy
two-part
test,
772
F.3d
340,
346-47
(4th
Cir.
2014)
Danser v.
(internal
This
of
deliberate
511
indifference
U.S.
at
834
to
inmate
(internal
health
quotation
or
safety.
Farmer,
marks
omitted).
The
also
draw
(emphasis added).
actual
knowledge
the
inference.
Farmer,
511
U.S.
other
words,
837
substantial
risk
in
the
at
factfinder
may
conclude
usual
ways,
Id. at 842.
that
prison
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
risk was obvious.
However,
Id.
prison
officials
who
actually
knew
of
Id.
(8th Cir. 1995); see also Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 532
(4th
Cir.
1997)
(en
banc)
constitutionally required.).
([S]uch
heroic
measures
are
not
deliberate
indifference.
Winfield,
106
F.3d
at
532;
see
also, e.g., Odom v. S.C. Dept of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 773 (4th
Cir. 2003) ([A] correctional officer who stands by as a passive
observer and takes no action whatsoever to intervene during an
9
cf. Prosser,
indifference
70
F.3d
where
prison
at
1008-09
guard
ran
(finding
to
get
have
found
that
corrections
officers
no
help
Thus,
failure
to
Cir. 2002).
III.
With
these
principles
in
mind,
we
consider
whether
the
granted
summary
judgment
to
Pugh.
We
review
Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011).
Summary
Fed. R. Civ. P.
justifiable
inferences
are
to
be
drawn
in
his
favor.
the
objective-injury
prong,
Raynor
alleges
specific
requests
to
the
prison
for
medical
attention,
He
He hit so
hard he bounced off the floor and then landed again after going
about
three
or
four
inches
off
the
floor.
Mr. Raynor
then
proceeded to slowly get up off the floor and had a dazed, pain
[sic] look on his face.
Of course, Pugh does not concede the truth of these facts.
Rather, Pugh maintains that Raynor suffered no more than mild
abrasions on [his] face and cheeks.
Appellees Br. at 6.
Pugh
ultimately
contrary
agree
evidence
as
with
to
Pugh,
material
but
A fact finder
Raynor
facts
has
offered
concerning
the
preventing
the
grant
of
summary
judgment. 3
In
his
true,
establishes
that
Pugh
had
actual
knowledge
of
an
347; see e.g., Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
2000); Street v. Corr. Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 815-16
(6th Cir. 1996).
Independent of this fact, Raynor also alleges that Pugh had
actual knowledge of the attack as it was happening because Pugh
watched the entire incident.
that the plaintiff had never mentioned having any problems with
Mullins, and that the two men got along well -- apparently
crediting
only
Pughs
factual
assertions
while
ignoring
Raynors.
But, of course, the nonmoving party is entitled to
have . . . his version of all that is in dispute accepted, all
internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him, [and] the
most favorable of possible alternative inferences from it drawn
in his behalf. Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406,
414 (4th Cir. 1979).
13
behind the first set of chase doors smil[ing] with a two way
radio in his hand . . . which he never used.
Pugh again disputes this version of events.
He asserts
that he was outside of the housing unit during the assault and
saw no part of it.
judgment
cannot
lie.
Davis,
600
F.2d
at
459-60
guard
claimed
he
was
not
present);
see
also
Pressly
v.
of
Raynors
claim.
See
Anderson,
477
U.S.
at
248
14
nonmoving party).
IV.
For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
district
court
and
remand
the
case
for
further
proceedings
erred
because
Raynor
should
have
been
afforded
an
complex
medical
history
causation
opinion,
regarding
the
he
cause
and
has
of
his
not
his
improper
yet
reliance
raised
alleged
injury.
genuine
on
lay
dispute
Nevertheless,
present
record
that
Mullins
attack,
rather
than
other
Raynors complex
Prior to
before
and
after
the
describe
Raynors
back
16
his speculation regarding the causes of his back pain and his
falls after the attack, constitute conclusory and inadmissible
lay opinion on issues requiring scientific, technical, or other
specialized
knowledge.
Fed.
R.
Evid.
701(c).
layperson
the
multilevel
lower
lumbar
facet
arthrosis
testimony,
lay
juror
would
be
and
the
Thus, without
unable
to
determine
injury,
medical
such
an
history
is
inference
is
sufficiently
unavailable
complex
that
here.
a
lay
juror could not rationally infer the cause of his existing back
problems.
months
following
the
attack.
Nothing
in
the
record
17
establish
causation.
material
facts
supporting
Raynors
claim
of
this appeal.
18