Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 08-4071
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:07-cr-00211-RBH-1)
Argued:
Decided:
PER CURIAM:
Christopher
Crain
appeals
from
the
district
courts
by
three
years
special
conditions,
of
supervised
including
the
release
with
requirement
certain
that
Crain
ordering
the
special
condition
of
release
because
the
is
resident
of
Tennessee.
He
was
originally
minor
across
state
lines
with
the
intent
to
The
girl
from
Florence,
South
Carolina.
The
the
another.
victim
sent
nude
photographs
themselves
to
one
Crains
house,
fourteen-year-old
They returned to
engaged
victim.
At
in
the
sexual
time
conduct
the
with
sexual
the
conduct
the
night
of
January
19,
2007,
after
the
victims
parents reported her missing and learned she was with Crain,
local Sheriffs deputies went to Crains residence and found the
victim.
herself as being seventeen years old and that he did not learn
her
true
age
until
the
police
picked
her
up
at
his
house.
the first indictment charging Crain with violating the Mann Act,
1
crime
that
sentence.
carries
with
it
statutory
minimum
five-year
of
his
supervised
release,
Crain
was
As a
ordered
to
probation
officer.
At
the
sentencing
hearing,
Crain
requirement
that
subjects
[him]
to
the
sex
offender
The
district
court
overruled
the
objection.
The
appeal.
B
1
Before
register
as
this
a
sex
Court,
Crain
offender
in
argues
his
that
state
requiring
of
him
residence
as
to
a
We
discretion.
addition
to
the
mandatory
conditions
of
supervised
any
other
condition
of
release
it
considers
to
be
and
characteristics
of
the
defendant,
18
U.S.C.
deterrence
3553(a)(2)(B);
(3)
to
the
criminal
conduct,
18
need
the
imposed
for
sentence
U.S.C.
to
3553(a)(2)(C);
and,
(4)
the
need
for
the
sentence
or
manner.
(setting
other
correctional
treatment
18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(D).
forth
statutory
factors
to
in
the
most
effective
sentence
must
be
reasonably related).
Section
3583(d)
further
provides
that
condition
can
F.3d at 260-61.
restrict
fundamental
narrowly
tailored
rights
and
is
when
the
directly
special
related
to
condition
deterring
is
[the
Id.
at 127.
Crandon is instructive here.
In Crandon, a thirty-nine-
Id.
en
route
to
New
Jersey
Id.
with
the
minor
female
Id.
victim,
child pornography through the mail, based upon his having taken,
on a prior visit to Minnesota, sexually explicit film photos of
the
minor
developed.
female
Id.
victim
On
which
appeal,
he
sent
Crandon
by
U.S.
challenged
mail
the
to
be
special
the
Internet.
He
that
the
argues
Id.
condition
that
it
bears
no
logical
Crandons
Internet
Id.
as follows:
In this case, Crandon used the Internet as a means to
develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young
girl over a period of several months.
Given these
compelling circumstances, it seems clear that the
condition of release limiting Crandon's Internet
access is related to the dual aims of deterring him
from recidivism and protecting the public.
Id. at 127-28.
1299,
1307
(10th
Cir.
1999)(holding
that
the
district
court
state
of
was
sex
offender
supervised
"unlawful
registration
release,
sexual
whether
behavior
requirements
or
not
under
as
defendants
the
states
statutory definition).
This circuit has upheld discretionary special conditions of
supervised release in similar contexts.
F.3d at 260-61.
plethysmograph
defendant
commerce
was
pleaded
child
reasonable
guilty
to
pornography
where
the
attempting
videotape,
record
to
and
showed
receive
the
in
criminal
also,
482
United
States
v.
Wesley,
81
F.3d
(4th
Cir.
1996)(upholding
supervised
abstention
release
embezzlement
from
from
where
the
alcohol
defendant
Veterans
as
condition
of
guilty
to
pleaded
Administration
and
had
been
Crains
categorically
as
crime
a
sex
of
conviction
offense
in
may
not
every
be
defined
instance,
Crain
activities
included
his
contacting
and
Crains
beginning
actions
in
determining
that
Crain
should
register
as
sex
the
nature
and
circumstances
of
[Crains]
offense.
18
U.S.C. 3553(a)(1).
Requiring that Crain register with his state sex offender
registry, as directed by his probation officer, provides the
public with a description of Crain, his residential information,
and
alerts
the
public
and
local
law
enforcement,
of
Crains
status
as
Registration
sex
offender.
may
also
See
deter
Crain
18
U.S.C.
from
3553(a)(2)(C).
engaging
in
future
18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B).
2
Crain
ordering
also
him
contends
to
that
register
the
with
district
the
court
state
erred
sex
in
offender
directed
Tennessee,
by
the
probation
does
not
require
officer,
because
registration
for
his
his
state,
underlying
insofar
it
compels
states
to
administer
Id.
court
of
the
applicability
of
SORNA
to
Crains
F.3d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).
Under
this
standard
of
review,
we
may
correct
an
error
not
seriously
reputation
of
affects
judicial
the
fairness,
proceedings.
integrity,
or
public
Owens-Illinois,
Inc.
v.
Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 630-631
(4th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
730 (1993)).
person
required
Registration
and
to
register
Notification
Act
under
the
[SORNA],
Sex
that
Offender
the
person
18 U.S.C. 3583(d).
Here, the district court did not determine that Crains offense
of conviction was a sex offense as defined by SORNA, nor did
the district court order, as an explicit condition of supervised
release,
that
Crain
comply
with
the
requirements
of
SORNA.
offender
in
his
state
of
residence
10
as
directed
by
the
probation officer. 3
the
constitutional
raised
infirmities
by
of
Crain
SORNA
concerning
are
not
the
properly
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district
courts
judgment
and
sentence
because
we
conclude
that
the
11