THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 81389. February 21, 1989.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
RENATO C. DACUDAO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XIV, and REY CHRISTOPHER
PACLIBAR, and NERO DESAMPARADO alias TOTO
DESAMPARADO alias WALDAS, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bernardito A. Florido for private respondents.

committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to
be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence
of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as
the accused to due process.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FIXING OF BAILBOND;
GUIDELINES THEREFOR. Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond
call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of
the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BAIL;
PROSECUTION DEPRIVED OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; ALL
GRANTED TO ACCUSED WITHOUT HEARING. The respondent court
acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, and, as it turned out later, over its strong objections.
The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits
of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing.
Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling
was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was

accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 144, Rules of Court)
It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an exparte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
3. ID.; ID.; BAILS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT; HEARING ON MOTION FOR
BAIL, INDISPENSABLE. Bail is not a matter of rights as regards persons
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence
of guilt is strong. thus, Sec. 5, Art. 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires a hearing before resolving a motion for bail by persons charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua where the prosecution may
discharge its burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
case at bar, which is murder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION LIE IN
CASE AT BAR; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED

DECISION

WITH IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. The general rule is that a motion

for reconsideration should first be availed of before a petition for certiorari
and prohibition is filed. (Cebu Institute of Technology [CIT] v. Ople, 156
SCRA 629 [1987]) However, this rule does not apply when special
circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. A motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this were execution has
been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent (Phil. British
Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1989]).
In the case at bar, the petitioner is left with no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law considering that the respondent court

GUTIERREZ, JR., J :
p

The question presented for resolution in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition is whether or not the prosecution was deprived of procedural due
process on account of the grant of bail to the accused without any hearing
on the motion for bail.
The facts have been summarized as follows;

insists on the continuation of the hearing of the criminal case even while the

"1. On August 11, 1987, an Information for Murder with the

accused is free to roam around. Moreover, there is an allegation that the

qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation

accused is harassing, threatening and coercing witnesses who are now

was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XIV,

afraid to testify. (pp. 87-88, Rollo).

presided by respondent Judge Renato C. Dacudao, against

5. ID.; AMENDMENT OR CHANGING OF INFORMATION; DOUBLE

JEOPARDY WILL NOT ATTACH WHERE ACCUSED HAD NOT YET
PLEADED GUILTY. The defense contends that the Judge did not commit
any error because actually the complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
is for homicide only (Annex A. p. 60, Rollo), and the recommended

accused Rey Christopher Paclibar and Nero Desamparado for the

death of Cesarlito Nolasco. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-11463. Upon arraignment, accused Rey
Christopher Paclibar entered a plea of 'not guilty' to the
offense charged.

Information was also for homicide (Annex B, p. 61, Rollo). We note,

"2. On September 18, 1987, accused Rey Christopher Paclibar

however, that when the same was filed with the Regional Trial Court, it was

filed a motion for bail, furnishing the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu with

already an information for murder. The amendment or changing of an

a copy thereof.

information prior to the plea of the accused is allowed there being no

prejudice to him. Thus, in the case of Gaspar v. Sandiganbayan (144 SCRA
415 [1986]), this Court held that, "no actual double jeopardy exists where
the petitioner had not yet pleaded guilty to the offense.

"3. On September 29, 1987, and without conducting a hearing in

the application for bail, respondent Judge summarily issued the
following Order:
ORDER

"Considering the motion for bail and the opposition thereto,

"'3. To recommit the accused to jail (CPDRC) immediately

and, on the basis of the complaint at bar and the sworn

until such time the Honorable Court shall have resolved the

statement of Patrolman Elpidio Desquitado, Tadeo Abello

Motion to Bail.'

and Romeo Torrizo, all of the Integrated National Police,

Bantayan (Cebu) Police Station, which constitute the
essential evidence (so far) of the prosecution in this case,
this Court hereby resolves to grant the motion for bail
presented by Atty. Bernardito A. Florido, and to this end

"5. Acting on the motion for reconsideration and the opposition

thereto filed by accused Rey Christopher Paclibar, respondent
judge issued on November 20, 1987 the following order:
"'ORDER

hereby fixes the bailbond for the accused Rey Christopher

"'The Court hereby resolves to hold in abeyance its

Paclibar at P50,000.00.

resolution on the Prosecution's motion for reconsideration of

"SO ORDERED

the Court's order dated September 29, 1987 granting bail to

"4. From the foregoing Order, private prosecutor Alex R. Monteclar

filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "THE GRANTING
OF BAIL TO THE ACCUSED WITHOUT A HEARING IS
VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, HENCE, NULL
AND VOID' and thus praying, as follows:

the accused, pending the presentation by the Prosecution of

evidence, which it promised to present, in support of its
proposition that the evidence of guilt against the accused in
this case is strong, and that therefore the accused should
not have been admitted to bail. Unless and until the
prosecution adduces the requisite evidence, the Court sees

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully

no reason to reconsider its order of September 29, 1987

prayed of this Honorable Court to:

which was predicated upon the postulate that the

"'1. Reconsider its order dated 29th September 1987

granting bail to the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar and
set it aside for being null and void;
"'2. To order the immediate hearing of the Motion to Bail to
determine whether the evidence for the prosecution would
warrant the denial of bail;

Prosecution evidence thus far attached to the records does

not make out a very strong case for murder, as this
evidence consists simply of the sworn statement of Pat.
Desquitado, Tadeo Abello and Romeo Torrizo, of the INP,
Bantayan, Cebu, none of whom, by their own account,
witnesses (sic) the slaying of the deceased Lito Nolasco by
the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar.

"'The Court hereby gives the prosecution five (5) days from
receipt of this order within which to submit a pleading or
motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the Court.

The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder

case without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without

"'In the meantime reset the continuation of the hearing of

bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, and,

this case on December 16, 1987 at 2:30 P.M. Fiscal

as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail

Napoleon Alburo, Attys. Alex Monteclar and Bernardito

on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not

Florido, as well as Atty. Amado Olis are all notified of this

one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court

order in open court. The accused is similarly notified. Notify

possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for

the bondsman of the accused.

prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to

"'SO ORDERED.'" (pp. 95-98, Rollo).

The petitioner now advances the following issue: that "Respondent Judge
acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
recommit the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar to jai] during the pendency
of the hearing of the motion to bail." (p. 6, Petition).

engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and

pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be
established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence
of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as

Before resolving this issue, we must stress that a private prosecutor in a

the accused to due process.

criminal case has no authority to act for the People of the Philippines before

Thus, this Court, in People v. San Diego (26 SCRA 522 [1968]), held:

this Court. It is the Government's counsel, the Solicitor General who

appears m criminal cases or the incidents before the Supreme Court. At the
very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity of the Solicitor
General, should have raised the issue before us, instead of the private
prosecutor with the conformity of one of the Assistant Provincial Fiscals of
Cebu. In the interest of a speedy determination of the case, however, and
considering the stand taken by the Office of the Solicitor General whom we
asked to comment, we have decided to resolve this petition on its merits,
with a warning to the private prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Fiscal
to follow the correct procedure in the future.

LLphil

"The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was

deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the
affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the
motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity,

there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order

The effort of the court to remedy the situation by conducting the required

of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.

hearing after ordering the release of the accused may be a face-saving

The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having

device for the Judge but it cannot serve the purpose of validating the void

been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be

order granting bail and stamping an imprimatur of approval on a clearly

considered null and void.

irregular procedure.

"The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be

The defense counsel insists that the accused should be entitled to bail

exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by

considering the abolition of the death penalty in the 1986 Constitution. He

the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be

advances the argument that due to the abolition of the death penalty,

capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or

murder is no longer a capital offense being no longer punishable with death.

refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the

This is erroneous because although the Constitution states that the death

prosecution followed by its conclusion whether of not the evidence

penalty may not be imposed unless a law orders its imposition for heinous

of guilt is strong. The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting

crimes (Constitution, Art. II, Section 19 [1]), it does not follow that all

bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance

persons accused of any crime whatsoever now have an absolute right to

because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented

bail. In Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "capital offenses" is replaced by

by the prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that

the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua."

the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and
substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground,
be allowed to stand." (at p. 524; Italic supplied)

llcd

Bail is not a matter of rights as regards persons charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. thus,
Sec. 5, Art. 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a hearing

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of

before resolving a motion for bail by persons charged with offenses

evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among

punishable by reclusion perpetua where the prosecution may discharge its

them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and

burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The case at bar,

reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the

which is murder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused
is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule 144, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the
trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.

In its comment, the defense interposes an objection to the petition on the

ground that it is premature and therefore, should be dismissed. It contends
that certiorari will not lie unless the inferior court has, through a motion for
reconsideration, the opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it. The
general rule is that a motion for reconsideration should first be availed of

before a petition for certiorari and prohibition is filed. (Cebu Institute of

Technology [CIT] v. Ople, 156 SCRA 629 [1987]) However, this rule does
not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct
action. A motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this

SO ORDERED.
|||

(People v. Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389, [February 21, 1989], 252 PHIL 507-

515)

were execution has been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent
(Phil. British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA

FIRST DIVISION

520 [1989]). In the case at bar, the petitioner is left with no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law considering that the

FIRST DIVISION

respondent court insists on the continuation of the hearing of the criminal

case even while the accused is free to roam around. Moreover, there is an

[G.R. No. 99287. June 23, 1992.]

allegation that the accused is harassing, threatening and coercing

witnesses who are now afraid to testify. (pp. 87-88, Rollo).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

Finally, the defense contends that the Judge did not commit any error

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME

because actually the complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is for

MANUEL, respondents.

homicide only (Annex A. p. 60, Rollo), and the recommended Information

was also for homicide (Annex B, p. 61, Rollo). We note, however, that when

SYLLABUS

the same was filed with the Regional Trial Court, it was already an
information for murder.

LexLib

The amendment or changing of an information prior to the plea of the

accused is allowed there being no prejudice to him. Thus, in the case
of Gaspar v. Sandiganbayan(144 SCRA 415 [1986]), this Court held that,
"no actual double jeopardy exists where the petitioner had not yet
pleaded guilty to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The order granting bail is

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEAS; PLEABARGAINING CONSTRUED. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1237). It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a
multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver

SET ASIDE and the accused is ordered recommitted to jail pending the

charge.

hearing on the bail application.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE; RULE. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is

made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the

law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea

which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to

thereafter. Thus. Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof,

change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of

provides: "Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with

homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in

the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial

the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now

court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is

Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was

necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of

not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise,

lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or

much less bargaining." The trial court need not wait for a guideline from the

information is necessary. "A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent

Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to

to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE SOUND

DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. The acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is

or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study
the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and
of the public will be served.

addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel v.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE THEREOF, DEEMED IMPROPER AND

Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc Resolution).

IRREGULAR IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDING ON THE WEIGHT OF

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AFTER PROSECUTION RESTED CASE; RULE;

PURPOSE; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, the private respondent
(accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution
had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided
the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which
their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow
such a Plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People
v. Parohinog(G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377),
then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or
the law: ". . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on

THE EVIDENCE ON HAND. A reading of the disputed rulings in this

case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's
evidence. Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of
the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by the court
and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It
must be recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the
prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction
of the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because
of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight
of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES CONSENT FROM BOTH FISCAL AND

THE CHANGE OF PLEA. The right against double jeopardy given to the

OFFENDED PART; REASON THEREFOR. The consent of both the

accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where

Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of

both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's

guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full

change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent

control of the prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v.

cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable

Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991).

provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117. Under this rule, the private

Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any

respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of

lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the

Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the

former. It is not correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes

Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More

under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not

importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and

wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon

improper.

the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and
the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No.

DECISION

70998, October 14, 1986, 14S SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt
not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result,
society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the
ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended
party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government
files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public
interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the

MEDIALDEA, J :
p

This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated
February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide" for violation

person directly injured by the offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil.

of Section 16, Article III, RA 6425, as amended.

691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the

Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the
government.
7. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY NOT APPLICABLE WHERE FISCAL DID NOT CONSENT TO

On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of
Section 16 , Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in
the said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to

twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos.

secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, the private

The information against him reads:

respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On

"That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality

of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 15, Rollo)

During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested
its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally
manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change
his former plea of 'not guilty' to that of 'guilty' to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section
provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day
to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand

February 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued another order (Annex "D,"
p. 19, Rollo) postponing the promulgation of decision to February 25,
1991 to give private respondent further opportunity to secure the consent
of the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his
Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex
"E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested
its case on November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private
respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the
strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the
court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On
February 21, 1991, private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with
Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex F, p. 21,
Rollo), alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is
allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on February
25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the accused's
motion, to wit:

pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist,

veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the
records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure
involves a regulated drug. That same day, the respondent Judge issued
an order (annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing private respondent to secure
the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the
promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991,
respondent Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to
February 18, 1991 to give private respondent another opportunity to

"It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the accused is
not availing of the 'voluntary plea of guilt' as a mitigating
circumstance envisioned under Article 13, paragraph 7 of
the Revised Penal Code. The accused simply wants to avail of
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty. Fernando
Fernandez of the PAO, there is nothing in the said provision which
requires that the same be availed of prior to the presentation of the

evidence for the prosecution. It is conceded though, as pointed out

favor of the Government and be turned over to the Dangerous

by the prosecution, that such is a waste of time on the part of the

Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of according to law.

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and of the Court, nonetheless,

this Court, having in mind Section 2 of Rule 1 which provides that
the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding and also

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 24-25)

Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

aforestated decision but the same was denied in the order of March 13,
1991, which states:

for humanitarian considerations, hereby APPROVES and GRANTS

"It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule 116 of

the Motion at bar.

the Rules should not be interpreted to the letter in 'victimless

"Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates his

crimes' such as this case, possession of regulated drugs, which is

submission to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform.

(Vide: People vs. Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966)
"Let it be made of record however that the Court is not putting a
premium on the change of heart of the accused in mid-stream.
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @
Manny guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, he is
hereby sentenced to a straight prison term of two (2) years and one
(1) day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full
with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
"Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, let the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in

more of a 'social disease' case so to speak and in the light of (the)

provision itself that 'with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal.' Is the fiscal the offended party?
"Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
has not been very consistent on this 'lesser offense plea' thing. It
would perhaps be in consonance with justice that a guideline be
laid down by the said Office, if only to apprise the public, the Court
and the accused on when said consent is to be given by the fiscal
as a matter of course and when it will be withheld. For to leave the
same undefined is in the mind of this Court, not conducive to a
'just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 41-42)

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

cdrep

"I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN

GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST TO PLEAD

GUILTY TO A LESSER OFFENSE BECAUSE THE REQUEST

"Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with the

WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE CONSENT THERETO OF

consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the

THE PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT

trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether

OBTAINED.

or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is

"II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN

CONVICTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE LESSER

cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No

amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 17, REPUBLIC ACT NO.

"A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of

6425, AS AMENDED, INSTEAD OF THE OFFENSE ORIGINALLY

the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 16 OF THE SAME LAW,

IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID CHANGE OF PLEA."
(Rollo, pp. 74-75)

However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under

the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right
but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial

In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining

court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En

order to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned

Banc Resolution).

judgment in the aforesaid criminal case (Rollo, p. 86).

The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and
the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1237).
It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a
lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, pleabargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings.
However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change

In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to
a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such
situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the
Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA
437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a Plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio
Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:

cdrep

his plea thereafter. Thus. Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof,

". . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on

provides:

which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the
appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty

to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less

latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial court could

than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being

allow the accused to change his plea.

that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which
a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have
been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less
bargaining."

We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The

consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense (see Manuel v.
Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has

As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline

full control of the prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v.

from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's

Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991).

motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment

Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any

whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to

lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the

assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the

former (see People v. Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion of then Justice

circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the

Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393,

end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A

395-396).

reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength
or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment
under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste
of valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed
by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be recalled that the
other two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already
rested its case and that the possibility of conviction of the private
respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the
strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of
the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the
fiscal is needed in crimes involving violation of RA 6425 as
amended because there is no offended party to speak of and that even the

It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes
under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not
wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon
the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and
the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No.
70998, October 14, 1986, 14S SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt
not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result,
society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the
ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended
party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government
files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public
interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the
person directly injured by the offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil.

691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the

state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the

consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party;

government.

xxx xxx xxx."

LLpr

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted

Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private

under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as

respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of

amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also

violation of Section 17,RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to

represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the

review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be

trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and

violated.

improper.

Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to
the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases
where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and
applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:
"SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to
another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order

of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156
dated February 25 and March 13, 1991 respectively in Criminal Case No.
1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
said criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of
trial on the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended. The temporary restraining order issued in this case is
made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||

(People v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 99287, [June 23, 1992])

offense charged in the former complaint or information under any

of the following instances:
(a) . . .;

PEOPLE VS JUDGE VILLARAMA

(b) . . .;

Double Jeopardy: requisites

FACTS:
The petitioner herein did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control 0/08 grams of Methampethamin Hydrochloride wrapped in aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.

During the arraignment petitioner plead not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued, and the counsel for the petitioner
on that time, was willing to change the please of not guilty to guilty to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 17 RA No 6425, as amended. The trial judge of the lower court granted the plea of guilty to the
lesser offense
The prosecutor however, filed Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds:
1. the prosecution already rested its case.
2. the possibility of conviction of private responded for the crime originally charged was high because of
strong evidence of the prosecution.
3. the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste.

However the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily included the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances..
1. ....,
2. ....,
3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and the offended party.
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of RA No 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the
offended party.

Hence this petition.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in convicting private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of
section 17, RA No. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of
the same law, in view of the absence of a valid change of plea.
HELD:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to the approval of the court. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of multi-count indictment in return
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Section 2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense - The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

People vs. Judge Villarama

People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992)

FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After

A conviction under the plea of guilty to a lesser offense, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense
charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

the prosecution rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open

The Supreme Court held that the rules allow such plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged.

guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425.

The counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his
conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No 4625, as amended is no longer open to
review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.

Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the

Such disposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this
privilege.

The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.

Section 7, Rule 117 is more applicable.

alleging that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an

court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of not guilty to that of

prosecutor to the change of plea.

Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense,
accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accuseds

motion and convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an

17, Republic Act No. 6425 thus this instant petition for review.

offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information

Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondents change of plea and

under any of the following instances:

his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no
longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be
violated.

(a) . . . ;

ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?

HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule

(b) . . . ;

116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party
consent to the private respondents change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the
private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of
the offended party;

xxx xxx xxx

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of
violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial courts
approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.