MENDOZA v ARRIETA

June 29, 1979 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Petition for Review on Certiorari | General Provisions> Sources of Obligations>
Quasi-Delicts
PETITIONER: Edgardo Mendoza
RESPONDENT: Hon. Abundio Arrieta, Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar
SUMMARY: As a result of a three-way vehicular accident, two separate information for Damage to Property
thru Reckless Imprudence were filed. Montoya, Timbols employee was found guilty in the case between him
and Salazar, pronouncing him responsible for the collision. Consequently, in the case between Mendoza and
Salazar, Salazar was acquitted. Mendoza then filed a civil case against Timbol and Salazar, which was dismissed
by Judge Arrieta on the ground of lack of cause of action, and failure to make reservation during the criminal
case. The Court said that, in the case of Timbol, as the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict, a reservation
need not be made. Hence, the civil case is not barred. As opposed to Salazar, who was acquitted, the civil case
was barred.
DOCTRINE: A civil action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. No reservation need be made.

FACTS:
1. In a three-way vehicular accident in MacArthur
Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, a private jeep hit a car
after being bumped from behind by a sand truck.
Jeep driver: Salazar; Car driver: Mendoza; Truck
driver: Montoya; Truck owner: Timbol
2. As a result, two separate information for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were
filed: (1) Salazar against Montoya, for hitting the
jeep; and (2) Mendoza against Salazar, for hitting
the car.
3. CFI of Bulacan found Montoya guilty of the crime
of damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
Consequently, Salazar was acquitted, absolving
him of any liability, civil or criminal.
4. After the termination of the criminal cases,
Mendoza filed a civil case against Salazar and
Timbol, either in the alternative or in solidum as he
was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to
relief against both or only one of them.
5. Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss on account of bar
by a previous judgment and lack of cause of action.
Salazar also filed the same.
6. Judge Arrieta dismissed the case against Timbol
and Salazar, saying that an express reservation of
the civil action should have been done in the
criminal case; otherwise, the former would be
barred.

2. [MAIN] Mendoza's cause of action against Timbol

is based on a quasi-delict, under Art. 2180, in
realtion to Art. 2176. This is due to him being the
employer of Montoya, whose lack of skill or
negligence in driving the truck caused the jeep to
swerve and collide with Mendozas car.
3. Hence, accdg to Art. 31, this civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. No reservation need be made in the criminal
case.
4. Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the ROC is inoperative for
being inconsistent with Art. 2177, and for being
substantive in character (not within the power of
the SC to promulgate).
5. Hence, the civil action against truck owner Timbol
is not barred by the lack of reservation.

ISSUE:
WON the civil action was barred - NO for Timbol; YES for
Salazar

RULING: Civil case against Timbol is ordered to proeed

with hearing on the merits; Order dismissing the civil
case against Salazar upheld.

RATIO:
1. [Timbol's case] No double jeopardy as there was
lack of identity of cause of action, Neither Timbol
nor Montoya was prosecuted for the damage to
Mendoza's car as his criminal complaint was only
against Salazar.

6. [Salazar's case] As Mendoza did not make any

reservation or waiver, the civil action was deemed
instituted with the criminal action. In that case,
Salazar was already acquitted, and an acquittal not
based on reasonable doubt at that; the trial court
held that he cannot be held liable for the damages
sustained by the car as it was the fault of Montoya.
Hence, the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. The civil action is barred.