Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR.
They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to:
1.
2.

Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they
have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.

G.R. No. 175289

August 31, 2011
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
*Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes one
automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended. Lack of criminal
intent is not a valid defense.
FACTS:
Petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Sudaria of
Tagpangi, CDO, Baillo and Boyatac, were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277. City Prosecutor recommended to charge Villarin as well.
The Version of the Defense:
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao,
all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly
with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from
Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the
specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the
timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were
seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, the
security guard on duty. RTC found them guilty. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is punishable.
HELD:
"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations."
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents.
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. "However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi)"
the timber. "Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On
the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and control
of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found."
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite
legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage
without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense
is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal
gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.
Petition denied.

Revaldo v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 170589 April 16, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of
Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of
P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and
regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government. Upon
arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on
1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that motive or
intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives
rise to criminal liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and
seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not have been admitted in
evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when
they went to his house to verify the report that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the
corresponding license
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court
HELD:
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the vicinity of
petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view"
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to
produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his
house and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the
lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber
without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically
admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any
legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house.
Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed
lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner for
violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165711 June 30, 2006
HERMOSO ARRIOLA and MELCHOR RADAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly having lost the confiscated lumber entrusted to their custody, petitioners Barangay Captain
Hermoso Arriola and Barangay Chief Tanod Melchor Radan of Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon were
convicted as principal and accessory respectively by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81
of the crime of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment defined and penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information1 docketed as Criminal Case No. 2064, which alleges
That on, about and during the first week of May, 1996, in barangay Dulangan, municipality of Magdiwang,
province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being
then a duly appointed/elected Barangay Captain and Chief Tanod of Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon and as
such, they have under their custody and control approximately forty four (44) pieces of illegally sawn lumbers
of assorted sizes and species, with an estimated value of P17,611.20, Philippine currency, which were
confiscated or recovered by the elements of the Philippine National Police and DENR personnel and thereafter
turned over the same to accused Brgy. Capt. Hermoso Arriola which he acknowledged to have received the
same and stockpiled at the backyard of accused Chief Tanod Melchor Radans house, and through abandonment
or negligence, they permitted any other person to take the public property wholly or partially, to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the sum of P17,611.20.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. On May 3, 1998, the trial court
rendered its Decision,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds co-accused barangay captain HERMOSO ARRIOLA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or Abandonment
and he is hereby sentenced to not less than 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20
days, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and of a fine of P17,611.20, Philippine Currency, and to pay the sum of P13,209.20 as
indemnification of consequential damages to the government.
Likewise, co-accused barangay chief tanod MELCHOR RADAN is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or Abandonment and he is
sentenced to not less than 6 years, as minimum, to 8 years and 8 months, as maximum, with the accessories of
the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and of a fine of P4,402.80, Philippine
Currency, and to pay the sum of P4,402.80 as indemnification of consequential damages to the government.
No subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine is imposed to both accused under Article 39,
paragraph 3, RPC but either accused is subsidiarily liable for the quota of either in the indemnity for
consequential damages to the government (Art. 110, RPC). Both accused shall pay the costs equally.
The accused are entitled to credit for preventive imprisonment under Article 29, RPC.
The accused are allowed to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bonds during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsmen (Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended.)

SO ORDERED.3
Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which referred the same to the public respondent
Sandiganbayan on a finding that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.4 On June 29, 2004, the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan resolved5 thus
Notwithstanding the referral of this case to this Court by the Court of Appeals, it appearing that no correction
was made of the correct appellate court by the appellant, this Court is constrained to DISMISS the instant case
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, stating insofar as pertinent, that
"(a)n appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall
be dismissed outright," and the ruling in the case of Moll vs. Buban, et al., G.R. No. 136974 promulgated on
August 27, 2002, that the designation of the correct appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to
appeal.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied6 by the Sandiganbayan; hence, this petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan in dismissing their appeal. They maintain that the trial
court committed the following errors:
I. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA IS AN ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC
OFFICER WITH RESPECT TO CONFISCATED ILLEGALLY LOGGED LUMBER, BY REASON OF THE
DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.
II. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MISAPPROPRIATED OR
CONSENTED OR, THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OR ABANDONMENT, PERMITTED ANOTHER PERSON
TO TAKE THE CONFISCATED LUMBER.
III. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MALICIOUSLY OR
FRAUDULENTLY ATTEMPTED TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE MISSING LUMBER WERE FOUND
AND RECOVED (sic).
IV. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MELCHOR RADAN IS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE
CRIME WHO SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-PETITIONER.
V. IN RULING THAT THE GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY
EVIDENCE OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
At noon on April 22, 1996 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Forest Rangers Efren
Mandia (Mandia) and Joepre Ferriol, Senior Inspector Noel Alonzo, the team leader of Task Force Kalikasan
together with the Chief of Police of Magdiwang, Romblon SPO3 Agustin Ramal and some other police officers,
confiscated 44 pieces of illegally sawn lumber totaling 1,174 board feet with an estimated value of P17,611.20.8
Mandia scaled the lumber and made notches on most of the pieces before issuing the seizure receipt9 and
turning over its custody to petitioner Arriola in the presence of petitioner Radan. Arriola acknowledged receipt
thereof and signed10 accordingly. Mandia subsequently discovered the lumber missing on May 5, 1996.11
He went back to Barangay Dulangan on May 14, 1996 accompanied by several police officers and Foresters
Gerardo Sabigan and Glenn Tansiongco. They requested petitioners to turn over custody of the confiscated
lumber but the latter claimed that the same were taken away without their knowledge. Subsequently, petitioners
produced lumber and claimed that these were the ones they recovered. Upon closer inspection however, Mandia
noted that the lumber produced by petitioners were different from those previously confiscated.
The subsequent investigation conducted by Mandia together with Forester and Officer-in-Charge Gerardo
Sabigan, SPO1 Jose Fabrique, Jr., and some members of the Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committee
showed that the missing lumber was actually hauled to and used in the Magdiwang Cockpit where petitioner
Arriola is a stockholder.12
On June 10, 1996, a complaint was filed against petitioners before the Romblon Provincial Prosecution Office.

In his defense, Arriola asserts that contrary to the finding of the trial court, he is not an accountable officer
insofar as the confiscated lumber is concerned. He maintains that none of the powers, duties and functions of a
Barangay Captain as enumerated in the Local Government Code13 (R.A. 7160) directly or by inference suggests
that as such Barangay Captain, he is an accountable officer with respect to the custody of illegally sawn lumber
confiscated within his territorial jurisdiction.
He insists that the confiscated lumber was placed in his custody "not by reason of the duties of his office" as
Barangay Captain, thus he is not legally accountable to answer for its loss so as to make him liable for
Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners claim that they did not misappropriate,
abandon or neglect the confiscated lumber and insist that the same were stolen. Arriola claims he visited the
stockpiled lumber regularly so the theft probably occurred at night.
With respect to the replacement lumber they subsequently produced, petitioners believed in good faith that the
various lumber found scattered in a nearby creek were the missing confiscated lumber left by the thieves who
failed to transport them across.
Before going into the merits of the case, we must first resolve the procedural issue of whether the
Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the appeal. The Sandiganbayan anchored its dismissal on this Courts
pronouncement in Moll v. Buban14 that the designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the
validity of the notice of appeal. However, the designation of the proper court should be made within the 15-day
period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be
allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court would apply, the relevant portion of which states:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.
xxxx
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright.
In this case, the records had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals which endorsed petitioners appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. However, petitioners failed to designate the proper appellate court within the allowable time.
We cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for dismissing the appeal outright for it was merely applying the law and
existing jurisprudence on the matter. Appeal is not a vested right but a mere statutory privilege; thus, appeal
must be made strictly in accordance with provisions set by law.15 Section 2, Rule 50 clearly requires that the
correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.
However, the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been
adopted to help secure not override substantial justice.16 This Court has repeatedly stressed that the ends of
justice would be served better when cases are determined, not on mere technicality or some procedural nicety,
but on the merits after all the parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses. Lest it be
forgotten, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.17
Having resolved the procedural issue, we shall now proceed to the merits of the case. The issue boils down to
whether or not petitioners Arriola and Radan are accountable officers within the purview of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to the confiscated items.
To find an accused guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
a.] The offender is a public officer;
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.

An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who, by reason of his office is accountable for
public funds or property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No. 1455)
defines accountable officer to be every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the
possession or custody of government funds or property and who shall be accountable therefor and for the
safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.18
In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the nature of the duties which he performs and not
the nomenclature or the relative importance the position held which is the controlling factor.19
Is petitioner Arriola, who signed as custodian in the seizure receipt for the confiscated lumber an accountable
officer with respect to its loss?
Chapter IV, I-E, (4) of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging states that:
In cases where the apprehension is made by the field DENR officer, the forest products and the conveyance
used shall be deposited to the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED office, as the case may be, for safekeeping,
wherever it is most convenient. If the transfer of the seized forest products to the above places is not
immediately feasible, the same shall be placed under the custody of any licensed sawmill operator or the nearest
local public official such as the Barangay Captain, Municipal/City Mayor, Provincial Governor or the PC/INP;
at the discretion of the confiscating officer taking into account the safety of the confiscated forest products x x
x. In any case, the custody of the forest products shall be duly acknowledged and receipted by the official taking
custody thereof.
In the case of United States v. Lafuente,20 the accused was a Municipal Secretary and a member of the auction
committee. A public auction for the sale of fishery privileges was held pursuant to the provisions of the
Municipal Law and a municipal ordinance. When the auction was concluded, the bidders deposited the amount
of their respective bids with the accused. The latter embezzled the money for his personal use. It was held that
the accused is guilty of misappropriation of public funds. Although a Municipal Secretarys duties do not
normally include the receipt of public funds, the accused in this case was nonetheless held accountable for the
same because the money was deposited with him under authority of law. The obligation of the secretary was to
safeguard the money for the Government.21
In the instant case, Arriola knowingly and willingly signed the seizure receipt for the confiscated articles. By
affixing his signature in said document, he undertook to safeguard the lumber on behalf of the Government. The
receipt contains a provision which states that as custodian, Arriola "obliges himself to faithfully keep and
protect to the best of his ability the said seized articles from defacement in any manner, destruction or loss and
that he will never alter or remove said seized articles until ordered by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources or his duly authorized representative or any court of Justice in the Philippines."
Although his usual duties as Barangay Captain do not ordinarily include the receipt of confiscated articles on
behalf of the Government, by virtue of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging, which had for its basis Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705,22 he may be called on to take custody thereof as the need arises. Furthermore,
by affixing his signature in the seizure receipt which clearly enumerates his obligations as a custodian therein,
he effectively becomes an accountable officer therefor.
The records show that prior to its confiscation by the DENR officers on April 22, 1996, the lumber was
previously apprehended by Arriola on April 19, 1996.23 Thus, even without the seizure receipt where he signed
as custodian for the said lumber, Arriola was accountable therefor because he was the one who originally took
possession of it on behalf of the government.
His claim that the trial court erred in holding him liable for malversation through negligence or abandonment
lacks merit. The lumber curiously turned up at the Magdiwang cockpit structure where he happens to be a
stockholder. Also, Arriola admitted that he already knew about the missing lumber long before the DENR
officers came back to get it but he did not inform them about its loss because "somebody advised me not to
report because the one who got the lumber might panic and tuluyan na ang lumber."24
He even produced 44 pieces of lumber and passed it off as those missing. The evidence showed however that
the species was of a cheaper quality and did not bear the markings made by the apprehending officers of the
DENR. All told, his alibi and denials cannot prevail over the credible testimonies of government witnesses

which corroborated each other. His defenses did not withstand the onslaught of clear and obvious physical,
documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution.
With respect to petitioner Radan, the trial court erred in judging him liable as an accessory.
Article 19, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code defines accessories as those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove Radans liability as an accessory were
neither clear nor convincing. His presence during the time when the DENR officers turned over the custody of
the seized items to Arriola is not enough proof of complicity, nor the fact that the confiscated lumber was placed
behind his fathers house. The assertion that he was responsible for the alleged transport of the confiscated
articles to the cockpit in Dulangan was a mere conjecture.
In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the accused.25
When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of
innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.26
We now come to the penalty which should be imposed on petitioner Arriola. According to Article 217,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for malversation is reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than P12,000 but less than P22,000. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum
imposable penalty shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 5 months and 20
days, while the minimum shall be within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. The trial
court therefore properly imposed the penalty of imprisonment to petitioner Arriola ranging from 14 years and 8
months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum.
Under the second paragraph of Art. 217, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled, which in this case is P17,611.20. There will be no subsidiary imprisonment because the
principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional.27
WHEREFORE, the May 3, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 in
Criminal Case No. 2064 finding petitioner Hermoso Arriola guilty of Malversation of Public Property thru
Negligence or Abandonment and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment to not less than 14 years
and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories of the law,
with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P17,611.20 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that the imposition of consequential damages on petitioner Hermoso Arriola is ordered
DELETED for lack of legal basis. Petitioner Melchor Radan is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Almuete vs. People

G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013
FACTS: Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
705, otherwise known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as amended by Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 277.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, provides that: Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
without License shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code. The RTC held the accused, Almuete, Ila and Lloren guilty, each are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18
years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum period (as prescribed in Article 310, RPC).
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning among others the correctness of the
penalty imposed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty as prescribed in Article 310, RPC which is two degrees higher than those
specified in Article 309, RPC should be imposed.
HELD: No, Article 310, RPC would apply only if the theft was committed under any the following
circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances is
present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be that which is prescribed under
Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is P57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed in its maximum period plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000 pesos in excess of P22,000.00 or three more years. Thus,
the correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower than that prescribed by
the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Accordingly, the Courts "primordial and most important duty is to render justice. It cannot be gainsaid that
what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner hence, the Decision of the RTC was modified insofar as the

penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The accused Almuete, Ila and Lloren are each sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the
crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry
Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former
offense or a "nonexistent crime."
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order
No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican, 1 Ruben
Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case
No. 9543, the information reads:
That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of
Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber

on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00),
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other
forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into
beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law
is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing
forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. 2
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the
wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber"
should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution
was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber
from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the
issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law. 3
On September 24, 1991, the lower court, 4 guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly
against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an order quashing the
information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics
as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product
while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting,
gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance
with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated
that:
Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by
being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68
cannot be made to apply to lumber.
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that
the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues. 5
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal
Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it
may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate
transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not
criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land
Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin
indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the
product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the
product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale
invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another. 6
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is
erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in
Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized
under that section. 7
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from
taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.
On June 10, 1992, the lower court 8 issued the herein questioned order setting aside the quashal Order of the
previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the
possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated
that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal
documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition
arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the
quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither
specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then
President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty,
be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (Emphasis supplied.)
Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the recent case of Mustang, Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 9 this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market ." Simply put , lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the
expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for
the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the
vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to
certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines;
and

WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our
forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; . . .
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself.
A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted
as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain
words of the law. 10 After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to
reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the
lower court said:
Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition,
still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal
documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3(q) of PD 705 as amended or
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., . . .
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If
we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it
will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any
forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an
interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then
surely, lumber is wood. . . . .
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their
possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal
documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest
products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and
penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without
lawful authority.
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of
the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown
that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 11 Grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. 12
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. 13 Where the court has jurisdiction over the
case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 14 As this Court said:
. . . When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be
a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari. 15
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. 16
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that
what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the
information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in
case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to
present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision
is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 17
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate
recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the
motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect
which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. 18 The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 19 An interlocutory order may be assailed by
certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. 20 However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards

interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by
certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts. 21
Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan 22 for his contention that a denial of a motion to
quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the
one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, 23
this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to
quash.
With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider,
24
this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for
judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, 25 this Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as
the application of the statute or general law. 26
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering
that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by
causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the
interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the
people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just
balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised
Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to
petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to
have been jeopardized.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is
enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately
executory. Costs against, petitioner.
SO ORDERED.