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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

WESTERN NEW YORK
A CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION UNDER
42 USC 1983, 1985, 1331, 1343.
Plaintiff
Kevin Patrick Brady
508 Locust Lane
East Rochester, NY 14445
585 381 2063
kpatbrady@rochester.rr.com

DEFENDANTS:
CARLOS RODRIGUEZ
8 Cricket Hill Drive
Pittsford, New York 14534
THOMAS VANSTRYDONK,
c/o Monroe County Clerk
39 W. Main Street, Rochester NY 14614
RICHARD DOLLINGER,
CRAIG DORAN,
c/o New York supreme court
Hall of Justice
Rochester, New York 14614

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JURISDICTION

Subject matter for this action is invoked by 42 USC 1983, 1985,1331, 1343. For
reasons apparent, Rooker Feldman does not apply here. Supplemental jurisdiction is
invoked by 28 USC 1367 and declaratory relief by 28 USC 2201, 2202.

Plaintiff has not come to this Court for a de facto appeal of a final state court judgment,
Plaintiff is not a "state-court loser" inviting district court to overturn or modify
not derive directly from any state court judgment but from the extrinsic fraud1
defendants have committed upon all state trial courts.

"Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court."

It

is, by definition, not an error by a court but a wrongful act committed by the party or
parties who engaged in the fraud.

There is a distinction between "a federal claim alleging injury caused by a state court
judgment" and "a federal claim alleging prior injury that a state court failed to remedy." 2.
A federal court is precluded from considering the former, but not the latter, See
Kougastian , supra

I bring this action NOT to relitigate matters outside district courts authority but because
the reason 42 USC 1983, 1985 was passed was to afford a federal right in federal
courts, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced, and the claims of citizens to enjoy the rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed by the 14th Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
NO COURT has ever adjudicated the rights and issues on which I invoke jurisdiction
1
2

Kougasian v TMSL Inc. 359 F3rd 1136 1140 2004 U.S. App LEXIS 3659 (9th Cir. 2004)
Centres, 148 F.3d at 702

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BE THIS KNOWN.
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff has had firmly established rights of access to
the courts guaranteed by the US Constitution; a fact that was certainly known to every
defendant/legal practitioner.
It is said interference with that right by state agents that "causes loss or inadequate
settlement of a meritorious case" or if official misconduct was so severe as to "render
hollow his right to seek redress," gives rise to a 42 USC 1983 claim 3
This is such a claim
DENIALS OF ACCESS CLAIMS
U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized two [2] variants of right-of-access claims. [1]
where "systemic official action" has frustrated plaintiffs ability to file a suit. The object of
this type of suit is to place plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for relief
once the frustrating condition has been removed."
Such suits are labeled "forward-looking."
[2] In "backward-looking denial claims, the official action caused the loss or inadequate
settlement of a meritorious case. Such claim is viable when official misconduct is so
severe as to "render hollow plaintiffs right to seek redress,4"
The unanimous summary terminations of my actions to effect my claim demonstrates
the systemic extrinsic fraud I have been subjected to.5

Christopher v Harbury, 536 US 403, 414, 122 S Ct 2179, 153 L Ed 2d 413 [2002]; see Sousa v Marquez, 702
F3d 124, 128 [2d Cir 2012]).
4
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir. 1984),
5
Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1978).

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CARLOS RODRIGUEZ
Because plaintiff "(1) engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; [lawfully petitioning
for grievances] (2) Rodriguez subjected me to serial malicious prosecution and (3) the
protected activity was the cause of the retaliation.
As I have deposed ad nauseum
"it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that AAG Carlos Rodriguez has

sentiently set in motion an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial
system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact
or unfairly hampering the presentation of my claims or defense." ***

Rodriguez reckless scheme has blocked Plaintiffs access to courts since March 1996.
Subsequently, every petition for relief has been summarily terminated at the complaint
stage depriving Plaintiff all opportunity to litigate and implicating a constructive
conspiracy to deprive me of a forum in which to redress my injuries.
To wit:
1.
The existence of a continuous, wide spread, and persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct by judges and Department of Law employees
2.
Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by policymaking officials after they were notified of the misconduct and
3.
The custom/policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violations
that have seriously and irreparably injured pro se claimant.
Under the guise of a permanent gatekeeper order[s] state court officers have ignored
Due Process principles mandated by state and federal law. See Memo A & B

Fraud on the Court defined in Aoude v. Mobil, 892 F.2d 1115, (1989)

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In fact, Plaintiffs basic, rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clause[s], Privileges and Immunity Clauses and similar
rights under New York Constitution have been unanimously violated, under color of law
while the alleged guardians of said rights fail to enforce them.
As the result I have been required to file forty [40] or more petitions/motions/writs in
New York courts to rid my life of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud caused by Rodriguez..
Regardless that my pleadings were facially meritorious, included prima facie evidence,
raised triable issues, and despite New Yorks long standing public policy of deciding
cases on the merits, NO COURT has ever adjudicated a single issue on which I invoked
its jurisdiction.
I have paid in excess of $15,000 in fees and production costs, and yet I have NEVER
been given " fair opportunity to litigate any issue.
THE CHEAT IS NOW COMPLETE.
In 2012-2013 Defendant, Richard Dollinger dismissed with prejudice, and foreclosed
plaintiffs non frivolous claims for wrongful criminal and quasi criminal prosecutions,
implicating a: "(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons [non-lawyers] of equal protection of the laws,
and equal privileges and immunities under the laws (3) AND constituting furtherance of
the conspiracy; (4) that has injured and deprived me of fundamental rights of citizenship
of the United States." 7
Although exhaustion of state remedies is not necessary to bring this action, plaintiff is
exhausted beyond articulation from total deprivation of meaningful access to courts.
Since 2007, my annual income has been no higher than $17,500, while in the last
twelve months alone my legal expenses total $3,500 and yet I have NOTHING to
show for it.
7

Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993)

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LIFE ALTERING INJURIES

Due to serial malicious prosecutions and protracted incarcerations I lost my career in
financial services, my professional licenses, credibility and credit rating,
My real property remains encumbered by multiple VOID money judgments obtained by
fraud, attorney fraud, government attorney fraud, fraud on the court[s] perpetuated by
fraud on the court[s], due process violations and unanimous denial of access to courts.
While I once enjoyed success in my profession, family and social life, I am today, at 65,
unemployed and unemployable in said profession. My quality of life deteriorates daily
while court officers fail to provide the relief I am absolutely entitled to. I am alive, but
living in a constructive ghetto.
In May 2013, I was forced into early withdraw of substantially reduced Social Security
benefits thus rendering me no longer eligible for the medical coverage I had been
receiving. So I go without the medicines I need.
In June 2016, I lost my home and property to foreclosure fraud.
I have no income from profession, self employment, rents, dividends, corporate
pension, annuities, disability, life insurance, or inheritance. I have depleted all liquid
assets, retirement accounts and have nothing left of value to sell.
Upon information and belief, defendants enjoy substantial retirement benefits and
income from post retirement employment
After a career of counseling others to a secure retirement, I face my senior years in
abject poverty. This is my punishment for having exercised my state and federal rights.
And from court officers attempt to teach me the lesson of
the FOOL who comes to court without an attorney.

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RODRIGUEZ AND VANSTRYDONCK

Completely without authority. See Memo
The letter of Carlos Rodriguez (June 20,1997 ) is direct evidence of an unconstitutional
motive; 8not merely circumstantial .9

In November 2002, I was ambushed, threatened and accused of non crimes and non
offenses by supreme court judge Thomas Vanstrydonck; acting on hearsay and without
personal and/or subject matter jurisdiction.

Under threat of immediate incarceration Vanstrydonck ordered that I provide evidence

needed by AAG Carlos Rodriguez to prosecute me in a quasi criminal subterfuge that
had no probable cause.

I was in fact prosecuted and jailed for either [1] violating Gorskis 1996 injunction or [2]
for failing to pay money to judges as he allegedly ordered, or [3] both.

By the time these co conspirators were through with me I had been falsely accused by
the judge, sua sponte, ordered to appear for a trial and incriminate myself to non-crimes
and non- offenses, under inapplicable statutes and long passed time limitations.

Based on hearsay alone, without cause, without notice, without real party complainants,
without any evidence whatsoever, AND, without personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction proscribed by statute, VanStrydonck prosecuted and jailed me for 90 days.

He then enlarged Gorskis injunction to prohibit me from 'commencing any new litigation
unless represented by an attorney'.
8

844 F Supp 795, 802 (DC 940

Martin v D.C. Metro Police Dept. 812 F.2d 1425, 1435 (1987) Siegert v Gilley 895 F.2d797 800-802 (1990 )
affd 500 U.S.226 (1991).
9

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Without the knowledge or consent of the real judgment parties, he arbitrarily reopened
and prematurely modified Gorskis dormant money award[s] and rolled them into a new
judgment naming substituted parties under title of the void criminal proceedings.
These abusive, fraudulently obtained judgment liens have plagued and discredited me ,
wasted years of my life searching for remedy and obstructed my ability to sell my
property. It led me into an action to foreclose.
As the result of this subterfuge, I suffered the following violations
Fourth Amendment Right against Search and Seizure.
Fifth Amendment right against Self incrimination
Sixth Amendment right to know the nature and cause of the accusation
and to have counsel of choice and to present at trial
Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive and procedural due process of law
SERIAL MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
In February 04, Rodriguez prosecuted me again, ultra vires, for alleged failure to report
to JAIL precisely as ordered. This time I was tried in absentia, declared guilty by FIAT
and jailed for another 30 days.
Rodriguez urged the trial judge [Sirkin] to violate my right to be present at trial.
Upon my release from jail, I discovered that NO RECORD had been filed on which to
appeal. Rodriguez and his colleagues knew, or should have know that the law in New
York has declared
"Attorney General is given no general prosecutorial authority except where specifically permitted
by statute. 10 As Judiciary Law does not specifically authorize said authority, the [AG] had no
authority and could not prosecute in this case.' New York Court of Appeals

10

those specific statutes are: Bus. Corp. Law 1607; Education Law 6514; Energy Law 7905.6(d); Gen Bus
Law 85, 347, 358, 692; Labor Law 214; Real Property Law 338, 442-e, 446-h; Public Health Law
2897-b, 3455; Tax Law 512, 691, 1091; Workers' Compensation Law 132.

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COVER UP
In the years since I have been required to file forty [40] or more petitions/motions/writs
in New York courts to rid my life of infinitely injurious consequences.
EVERY petition for relief included prima facie proof of fatal jurisdictional defects that
destroyed the PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY. Exhibit
EVERY petition was timely served on the Attorney General/Dept of Law.
EVERY petition has been dismissed on sight, 11 without appearance or a hearing,
without answers from state attorneys AND without the MANDATORY relief requested.
I submit this results NOT from pro se incompetence AND it is not an accident. I have
ultimately determined, that judges dont bother reading pro se papers but are rather
inclined to sign any proposed order an opposing attorney sticks under their nose.
In my papers I have cited hundreds of on point legal assertions: all with black ink on
white paper; deposed in the English language. They have ALL been ignored.
EVERY COURT has merely acquiesced to motions for summary dismissal by opposing
government attorneys.
This clearly constitutes breech of Honest Services Fraud 18 U.S.C. 1346
ENJOINED LITIGANTS
In Wolf gram v Wells Fargo,12 the California Supreme Court established that the only
reason pre-filing injunctions pass constitutional muster is by providing an opportunity
for pre-filing review. Absence of such review denies the litigant due process of law.

11
12

at times, sua sponte

61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).

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The Court also said

we presume judges and attorneys obey all laws, particularly state and federal
constitutions which they are sworn to uphold.
and [w]hen an enjoined litigant knocks on the courthouse door with a colorable
claim, he may enter.
Nevertheless, New York gatekeepers feign otherwise. They have turned Gorskis
limited restrictions into a tool for denial, deprivation and oppression. They have granted
themselves leave to interpret the restrictions however they see fit.
They have delegated the role to administrative employees and/or assistant attorneys
general with manifest conflicts of interest.
They pretend not to observe that the restrictions as drafted by Rodriguez are grossly
inconsistent with Gorskis Memorandum Decision. They pretend not to observe that
Vanstrydoncks arbitrary modifications are expressly prohibited by CPLR 5019
NON RESTRICTED SUBJECT MATTER
Gorskis order has been interpreted to block me from defending actions filed against me
and to prohibit me from filing criminal complaints against others.
In 2007, Vanstrydonck blocked me filing a Writ of Error in criminal matter in the
appellate court. Exhibit.
Since 2012, Administrative Judge Craig Doran, has instructed clerks for Monroe county
and supreme courts to refuse any documents I present for filing regardless of subject
matter

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In June 2012, acting on unknown authority and influenced by my infamia facti from the
courthouse grapevine Richard Dollinger; conspired with Doran to cancel the financial
relief I was granted by Judge Lawrence Fisher .The proposed action to vacate fatally
defective criminal convictions was NOT prohibited by any prior orders.
And if the pleadings presented as frivolous, Fisher would not have granted relief.
RICHARD DOLLINGER
In June 2013 I petitioned for leave to file for relief from more than $30,000 in VOID
[not voidable] judgment liens that were encumbering my property and slandering my
credibility . Pursuant to CPLR 5015 relief is authorized and in fact mandatory
"On motion to vacate for want of jurisdiction, the court, on finding *** that service of

process was not made, must vacate the judgment absolutely, and may not impose terms
or conditions upon the vacatur. 13 A.D.2d 813

14

I included prima facie proof that the Vanstrydonck proceedings were VOID.
Dollinger undermined the action immediately. He surreptitiously elevated the States
cross motion to dismiss into a criminal contempt inquiry. He threatened that if I was
found guilty, Id face incarceration and/or lose my license, both of which of are criminal
sanctions
Unless I voluntarily withdrew the petition and purged it from county clerk files he would
fine me $50.00 a day until I did. As of June 2016 this sanction has accrued to $50,000
and chills my inclination to return to supreme court for any reason.

13

Copeland v Gross, 39 Misc. 2d 619; Associates Discount Corp. v Cabell, 164 N.Y.S.2d 189; Levin v
McGovern, 53 A.D.2d 1042; Devonia Discount. v Bianchi, 241 App Div 838; Maxwell v First Port Jefferson
Corp., 31 AD 2d 813
14
No time limitation for motion to vacate judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) Obrycki v. Ryp, 39 Misc.3d
1220(A), 972 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y.Sup. 05/01/2013)

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AAG Hilell Deutsch, [declared by Dollinger to be his attorney] moved without notice for
an order permitting the Department of Law to ignore all further pleadings I may serve on
them. Dollingers order ostracised me completely from the entire adversarial system .
He wrote [R]espondents [the State] and their counsel are not to respond to any papers
filed or served by BRADY in this or any other action he has previously filed or may file in
the future [without permission]
Deutsch had alleged 35 cases and appeals Brady has filed against the State and its
officers. He then affirmed, under penalty of perjury, these cases have been repeatedly
found to be frivolous and without merit
He couldnt support this statement if his retirement benefits depended on it..
Deutsch would have his readers believe that despite 31 or more petitions, plaintiff has
NEVER raised a single justiciable issue to prohibit summary termination. In fact, I have
never been given opportunity to flesh out facts through discovery or to rebut offensive
threshold allegations.
NO REAL PARTY has ever alleged and NO COURT has ever been shown proof of my
long history of frivolous, harassing litigation. These conclusions have been made on
papers alone.
Deutsch claimed Plaintiff has been sanctioned by the New York Court of Claims for his

numerous frivolous and improper filings. He is no longer permitted to file any action in the
Court of Claims absent permission from the Presiding Judge or designate.
This statement is slanderous propaganda.
In fact I have NEVER been sanctioned by the Court of Claims. Its just too easy for
adverse government attorneys to perpetuate unsubstantiated myths while impossible
for an injured pro se litigant to present the other side.

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Department attorneys play the frivolous card at every opportunity. They are blissfully
ignorant and oblivious to the fact that the contributions of Carlos Rodriguez are the
cause of all the litigation and that CPLR 5015 is a valid, cognizable remedy.
In the final analysis, nothing establishes the systematic official wrongdoing better than
the conspiratorial uncivilized dismissals of Richard Dollinger. By time I left his courtroom
on October 8, 2013, Dollinger had dismissed the petition as a sanction, with prejudice,
and without adjudicating the issues.
The agenda is to prevent me from terminating the Vanstrydonck action in my favor.
Regardless that supreme court had no discretion to refuse to vacate the jurisdictionally
void proceedings (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120c.) Dollinger, without a second
thought, and under color of law, swept the years of fraud Id been subjected to under
the judicial carpet .
This is how conspiring court officers have rendered the right to petition into punishing
exercises in futility
GOVERNMENT IMMUNITIES
I have never disputed that judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity for acts taken in the
scope of their judicial duties. But the evidence demonstrates that Rodriguez, Thomas
Van strydonck, Doran and Dollinger have acted OUTSIDE of that scope.
The phrase under color of law in 1983 includes acts not authorized and/or precluded
by statute and/or by state law. See Memo.
The evidence of conspiracy includes the Attorney Generals spurious Brief on Appeal to
the Third Department. Sept. 2008 15

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#504967

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While the carefully chosen cases cited in the Brief all constitute legitimate applications
of government immunities
Murray v Brancato 290 NY 52, 55. Salzano v Town/Poughkeepsie 300 A.D.2d 271
Bardascini and Reedy 51 AD 2d 271. Rosenstien v State 37 AD 3d 208
Bowles v State 208 AD 2d 440. Levy v State 86 AD 2d 574
they are spurious and irrelevant to pro se Plaintiffs claims.
The Court of Appeals said in Della Pietra v State 71 NY2d 792
[19] In the usual case where the government professes entitlement to absolute
sovereign immunity, no question arises concerning the authority of its officials to act
(see, e.g., Arteaga v State of New York, 72 N.Y.2d 212, Tango v Tulevech, at 41-42).
The sole question, ordinarily, is whether the official actions constitute discretionary
conduct which sufficiently manifests the attributes of judicial decision-making to merit full
immunity (Arteaga v State of New York, at 217; Tarter v State of New York,, at 518-519;
Santangelo v State of New York, 101 A.D.2d 20, 28-29).
Where, however, the official "has stepped outside the scope of his authority" (Teddy's
Drive In v Cohen, 47 N.Y.2d 79, 82) and acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or
without a colorable claim of authority, there is plainly no entitlement to absolute
immunity, even if the underlying acts are prosecutorial or quasi-judicial in nature (see,
Rudow v City of New York, 822 F2d 324, 327-328 [2d Cir]; Ybarra v Reno Thunderbird
Mobile Home Vil., 723 F2d 675, 678 [9th Cir]; Prosser and Keeton, Torts 132, at
1058-1059 [5th ed]).
[20]

With few exceptions, the Legislature has delegated the responsibility for

prosecuting persons accused of crime solely to the District Attorney, the public officer
entrusted with the general prosecutorial authority for all crimes occurring in the county
where elected (County Law 700, 927; Matter of Darvin M. v Jacobs, 69 N.Y.2d 957,
also, Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App Div 253, 257).

14

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The Attorney General by contrast, is given no prosecutorial authority, and except where
specifically permitted by statute has no power to prosecute criminal actions (see, Matter
of B. T. Prods. v Barr, 44 N.Y.2d 226, 236, supra; People v Di Falco, 44 N.Y.2d 482,
485-486; People v Rallo, 39 N.Y.2d 217, 221-223).
Here, plaintiffs tortfeasors have simply concocted their story and are sticking to it.
Plaintiff says that it isnt possible for the Department to NOT know that
Court Claims Act 11[a][i] identifies the Attorney-General as the "officer responsible for
the investigation and litigation of the claim" ( Andriola v. State, 53 AD2d 966, Matter of
Welch v. State, 71 AD2d 494, Exec. Law 63[1] and who must ascertain the agency's
liability.
Court of Claims Act Art III, 20-a says the attorney general shall cause a review to be
made within the department of law of all cases filed in the court of claims to determine
which cases are appropriate for possible settlement.
Nevertheless, Court of Claims Judge Richard Sise opined
"in the absence of permission to file his claim, movant did not commence an action
against the State and, thus, the State had no duty to answer or respond"
PETITION TO THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT
In March 2014, I requested permission from Appellate Chief Justice Henry Scudder to
attack Dollingers overt abuses by Article 78. Responding letters from the court implied
that as long I followed procedure there would be no impediment
Once the action was filed [OP- 0573] AAG Frank Brady moved for dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action; a patently frivolous allegation. Nevertheless, the Court
acquiesced and terminated the action.

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The June 25, 2016 order strongly suggests that the pro se petition was not diligently
read or considered, and is entirely consistent with the unanimous previous terminations
I have suffered.
"Government action is presumed regular and valid until the contrary is shown.
(McKinney's Cons Laws, Book 1, Statutes 150 [b].) The ** **aggrieved person/body
must overcome that presumption ** and show the determination to be arbitrary and
capricious and invalid by a CPLR Article 78 proceeding or some other appropriate action
or proceeding" . Matter Schultz v State 633 N.Y.S.2d 915, 167 Misc. 2d 404
Thus, the question is what must a pro se party to do before officers of the courts will take
cognizance of prima facie evidence of VOID, not voidable proceedings when
government motions and affirmations are accepted at face value16 and contrary to
established and controlling principles of law, ?
Statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not sufficient for motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment. Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D.C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647.
"Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered in disposition of [a] case."
U.S. v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752,`
In May 2016, I requested permission to file from Chief Judge Gerald Whelan.
Whelan refused to review the proposed petition alleging a long standing policy of the
court. I responded by advising that no such policy had ever been asserted before and
was contrary to New York case law
A motion must be addressed to a pending action Niagara Mohawk v Great Bend
Aggregates, A.D. 2d [Mar. 13, 1992]; Kenford Co. v County of Erie, Legislature of the
County 587 N.Y.S 2d 877, 185 A.D 2d 658. [1992]
In fact; his refusal violated defendants right under Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 Due Process
16

Dollinger refers to AAGs as his attorneys.

See Rosenblum v Borough of Closter, 333 N.J.Super, 385 333 NJ Super 385, 755 AD 2d 1184, 755 AD 2d
1184 {NJ Super App. Div ()7/20/2000)
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IT IS NOT THAT PLAINTIFFS PETITIONS ARE FRIVOLOUS, OR LACK MERIT

ITS THAT GATEKEEPERS DONT LIKE THE REPULSIVE SUBJECT MATTER..
Officers of the Unified Court System WILL NOT perform judicial services for pro se
litigants injured and aggrieved by systematic official wrongdoing. They have clearly
granted themselves leave to ignore the rights and assertions of pro se litigants. They
have rendered the right to petition a punishable exercise in futility.
"[U]nless [constitutional] rights are to become merely precatory," ** "litigants who allege
their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who have no effective means to
enforce these rights, other than the judiciary must be able to invoke existing jurisdiction of
the courts for ... protection." Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168
L.Ed.2d 389 (2007)
The unanimous failures of court officers to note such nonfeasance implicates a pattern
or practice by court officers of discrimination against a pro se litigant.
My unanimous ostracism by state courts demonstrates, an unconscionable scheme
calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter
by improperly influencing the gatekeepers or unfairly hampering the presentation of my
claims or defense." ***

18

The consequences were best expressed in Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 470
(9th Cir. 1990).
We cannot predict what harm might come to [enjoined party] and he should not be forced
to predict it either. What he does know is that a Sword of Damocles hangs over his hopes
for federal access for the foreseeable future." [Frivolous, Vexatious] labels can poison
courts against non lawyer litigants. They can invoke a witch-hunt that frees judges to
express their natural antipathy for them.

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Fraud on the Court defined in Aoude v. Mobil, 892 F.2d 1115, (1989)

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And in De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 08/30/1990)

Restricting access to the courts is, however, a serious matter. " [T]he right of access to
the courts is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution." Delew v. Wagner, 143
F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998).
The U.S Supreme Court declared unanimously n Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
[1] "a judges opinion of whether a litigant will prevail or not is irrelevant', [2] it is a gross
violation of procedures to dismiss a lawsuit at the complaint stage" and [3] "fundamentally
unfair to dismiss ** before the whole body of facts can be revealed through discovery. 19
and the Second Circuit says:
" [a] pro se complaint should not [be] dismiss[ed] without [the Court] granting leave to
amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a
valid claim might be stated." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)
America jurisprudence says

'the First Amendment would be a hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or
erode its guarantees by indirect restraints as long as no law is passed prohibiting free
speech, press, petition, or assembly as such.
Plaintiff says The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every

individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the
first duties of government is to afford that protection. Government[s] have been
emphatically termed government[s] of laws, and not of men.

19

534 U.S. (2002),

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SUMMARY AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

When government makes it more difficult for members of one group to benefit than
others, it violates the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE / Fourteenth Amendment.
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 362
I bring this action NOT to relitigate any matter outside this courts authority, but because,
by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws will not be
enforced for me as they are for others; neither by the courts or New Yorks Highest law
enforcement agency.
Under color of law, they have enabled defendants to trespass on my rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the final analysis, I have not caused the repugnant subject matter. In fact I have no
complicity for it whatsoever. I have nevertheless wasted two decades of my life
pleading to a just us system that apparently has only so much justice to go around.
Consequently pro se victims need not apply. But I have sacrificed too much.
NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
I am asking this Court to review the trespasses ONLY to confirm the facts and the
merits and to restore my civil rights. If the State wont make me whole, I come for
judgments against my tortfeasors.

The Judiciarys role is limited to helping litigants who have suffered, or will imminently
suffer, actual harm Chief Justice John Roberts, Feb 2016
Annexed and incorporated here is a MORE DEFINATE STATEMENT and a proposed
financial relief to be allocated by defendants complicity.

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KEVIN PATRICK BRADY

508 Locust Lane
East Rochester, New York 14445
585 381 2063
I do hereby depose under penalty of law that everything contained herein is correct and
truthful to the best of my knowledge except for matters alleged on information and
belief, and I believe those matters to be true.

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'PRE FILING' REVIEW IS ADMINISTRATIVE

NOT JUDICIAL
The gatekeepers left in charge of my access to the courts have unanimously feigned
excuses to deny me access to courts. They have acted pursuant to a custom or usage
with force of law in the state 20that appears lawful only because they are cloaked with
authority.
They have obstructed me of timely redress and recovery for the unfathomable injuries I
have suffered. I submit this constitutes ministerial nonfeasance and extrinsic fraud that
is actionable under 42 USC 1983.
While the role of gatekeeper is often performed by a judge, it is not necessarily
performed by a judge or performed exclusively by a judge. Because it does not present
a controversy between two or more parties for resolve, it is not a judicial function.
CONTINUOUS ACTS
New York law holds the continuing violation doctrine can be satisfied when specific acts
of discrimination are permitted to go un-remedied for so long as to amount to a policy or
practice. 21
The doctrine also provides "the existence of a continuous policy or practice delays the
commencement of the statute of limitations until the last discriminatory act in furtherance
of that policy or practice." 22
The Supreme Court has also held that state tolling statutes, which provide a plaintiff
with an additional period of time in which to bring a lawsuit equal to the period of time in
which the plaintiff was legally disabled, apply to section 1983 cases (Board of Regents

v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440 [1980]).
20

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970)]
Bloom v NYC Board Ed. 2003 WL 1740528 (SDNY 2008) Clark v State, 302 AD 944 (4th Dept. 2003)
Branch v Guilderland School Dist. 239 F.Supp 242 (NDNY 2003)
22
Salgado v. City NY, 2001 WL 290051 (S.D.N.Y.). Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, (2d Cir, 1994).
21

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MORE DEFINING STATEMENT

In 1994, I filed a civil rights action in the WNY District Court alleging, inter alia, that
family court officials, acting in administrative capacities, had arbitrarily suspended my
parental rights, refused to provide me a vindication hearing, and threatened me with
criminal prosecution for having exercised my right to represent myself.
The incident became Ground Zero of the unfathomable injuries to come.
The action was ultimately dismissed by U.S district court judge David Larimer without
appearances, who cited [1] on going state proceedings that [2] implicate important
states interests. He opined that [3] the state forum [ostensibly] offered me an
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.
Larimer wrote '[p]laintiff made no showing that his constitutional claims could not be
adequately adjudicated in the state courts' AND "[a]lthough defendants allege plaintiff
engaged in extensive, harassing litigation, there is no evidence of such pattern in the
record before me.
I then filed in New York supreme court, only to be summarily dismissed again, on
papers alone, AND, permanently 23 disfranchised of my right to free court access by a
multi- defective pre-filing injunction issued in violation of due process, contrary to rules
of the court, AND which left me with ambiguous commencement procedures.
The Memo Decision of Judge Jerome Gorski dated February 1996 states;
This Court will grant an injunction that Plaintiff may not bring any other lawsuits, in any
court [state or federal] based on the family court matter, or its progeny, without prior
permission from that courts presiding judge or designee. A violation shall subject
[plaintiff] to possible imposition of further sanctions, costs and fees.

23

The word permanently was arbitrarily drafted into the final order by AAG Carlos Rodriguez.

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I submit that the injunction did not intend to prohibit all future free access to courts.
Gorskis recitation suggests that it was influenced more by Rodriguez hysterical,
unsubstantiated allegations that the child was suffering intense family adversity than it
was for alleged frivolous petitions
Gorskis Memo also said;
To the extent that the parties opposing plaintiffs complaint incurred actual attorneys
fees and/or actual expenses, same will be reimbursed. Said parties shall submit detailed
affidavits in support of claimed fees.
Although none of the opposing parties incurred actual fees or expenses,24 nor did any
submit detailed affidavits, Rodriguez drafted the final judgment to his own liking. He
appointed himself beneficiary and receiver of the unsubstantiated claims.
To wit:
[BRADY], within 30 days of entry and service of this order, shall pay the sum of
$2,767.00 to Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Carlos Rodriguez, Asst. AG, payable to
the New York State Department of Law, for reasonable attorneys fees and costs on
behalf of the defendant judges
Gorskis remedial money awards are VOID for inconsistency with his Memorandum
decision.
New York Law says"[a] written order must conform strictly to the court's decision, * *
*when there is conflict between the two, decision controls" (Di Prospero v Ford Motor105
AD2d 479, [1984])

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Indemnified by Public Officers Law Sec. 17

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Judgments are also VOID for having ordered payment of attorneys fees and costs
arising from petitioners frivolous conduct in this and in previous actions. A court cannot
fine, punish and/or sanction a party retroactive to cases already concluded.
And are VOID for failing to dispose of all issues
"An order or judgment is deemed "final" if it "disposes of all of the causes of action
between the parties in the action or proceeding and leaves nothing for further judicial
action apart from mere ministerial matters" (Burke v Crosson, 85 NY2d 10, 15).
Despite timely objections to these fatal defects, Gorski signed the order as submitted. In
the subsequent seven [7] years the only attempt to collect the money was by
Rodriguez.
Although timely notice of appeal was filed and served upon all respondents, all parties
appeared before Gorski in the summer [1996] to settle the record for appeal.
Nevertheless, on or about September 1996, Rodriguez deposed falsely to the Fourth
Department that Brady failed to file timely Notice causing the appeal to be dismissed.
Pursuant to CPLR 5525 appellant either serves or files a timely notice of appeal or
notice ofmotion for permission to appeal Rodriguez made his power to influence
known by letter dated July 1997.
CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT
October 2001
An additional VOID judgment derived from child support proceedings that were
wrongfully severed from the main action for a change of custody in September 99.
Respondent [Mom] answered the action by cross petition seeking an increase of
support for the child she had so alienated that the child ceased all contact with her
father upon barely reaching adolescence
Later, Mom amended her cross petition to charge [Dad] with willful failure to pay.

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Following a hearing on March 27, 2000, the hearing examiner [support magistrate]
issued the following Findings of Fact.

Respondents request for upward modification of support was DENIED.

Petitioner was declared guilty not for failure to pay basic child support, but willful
failure to reimburse [R] for incidental medical costs incurred for the child.

Willfulness was said to be prima facie pursuant to Powers v Powers, thus

an award of attorney fees was [allegedly] mandatory

TIMELY WRITTEN OBJECTIONS

[Dad] filed timely written objections [FCA 439] to the willfulness finding which
purportedly mandated an award of attorney fees because the authority cited; 'Powers v
Powers had no instant application.
A prima facie willful violation is not made by a non-custodial parents failure to
reimburse expenses that are [1] subject to qualification and [2] contingent upon
precursory action by the custodial parent.
They become obligations only after these conditions are met.. Mom did not meet them.
Also willful is tantamount to criminal contempt that requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. County of Rockland v. Civil Service Employ Assoc., Inc. 62 N.Y.2d 11,14 [1984]
As hearing examiners [support magistrates] are non-judicial employees 25 they cannot
adjudicate controversies or impose punishments. They must refer contests to the family
court judge.
a hearing examiner shall have the authority to determine that any person before the said
examiner is in violation of an order of the court as authorized ***** subject to confirmation
by a judge of the court * FCA Sec. 439
25

see 22 NYCRR S 205.32 (b)(1);

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[Dads] timely written objections included the lack of fact-finding of his request to
suspend or cancel ALL child support based on visitation as a defense which was not
properly referred to the assigned judge. [Donofrio]
One of the issues [examiners/magistrates] cannot hear is ** visitation as a defense,
which must be referred to a Judge. FCA 439 [a]
All litigation between the parties concluded with Donofrios order on August 16, 2001.
The order was amended on August 17 for the sole purpose of denying attorney fees.
Having been superseded by Donofrios order in the plenary action, the contested child
support judgment lost full force and effect.
"Pending review of the objections and rebuttal, if any, the order ***shall be in full force
and effect and no stay of such order shall be granted. FCA 439(e).
When Attorney Steven Feder entered the superceded judgment in county clerks office,
he knew it was void and unenforceable.
However, Dad had to seek higher authority and wound up in the courtroom of Thomas
VanStrydonck on Nov. 13, 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF NEW YORK v KEVIN PATRICK BRADY
# 2002/13647
In September 2002, I requested and was granted leave to file action in supreme court to
compel family court judge, Ann Marie Taddeo, to inter alia disclose the reason for
blocking my facially meritorious petitions to obtain the hearing I was entitled to under
FCA 439.
Petition for Writ was warranted because Taddeo had willfully ignored my right to a
hearing mandated by FCA 439 which then allowed Steven Feder to enter the void child

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support order in October 2001 causing an unacceptable stain on my personal and

professional credibility.
The action ; Brady v Taddeo commenced when I paid the fee, obtained an index
number and served the papers on the New York Department of Law. This is referred to
in New York as commencement by filing system.
With permission from the court, I appeared in the courtroom of Thomas VanStrydonck
on Nov 13, 2002 to argue the merits for 'Brady v Taddeo, et al". In less than two [2]
minutes it became clear that VanStrydonck had a different agenda in mind.
What I expected to be a civil action turned into a jurisdictionally defective quasi criminal
prosecution entitled 'the People by Eliot Spitzer v Kevin Patrick Brady'.
VanStrydonck, acting as judge of his own cause, accused me, sua sponte, of malicious
use of the courts and failing to pay money to supreme and family court judges. He
ordered me to appear for trial on Dec. 10, 2002. He then adjourned Brady v Taddeo
According to court dockets that was the first and only time Brady v Taddeo was heard
On Nov 27th, Rodriguez joined into conspiracy by filing a special proceedings; a Motion
to Punish for Contempt which had already scheduled to be heard on Dec 10, 2002.
From that point forward, without my knowledge, all proceedings were docketed under
the criminal title.
The fatal defects are identified in Memo AA

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SERIAL PROSECUTION AND TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

# 03-11838

In October 2003, while Vanstrydonck had me incarcerated, Rodriguez initiated another

malicious criminal prosecution against me under the same title, with docket #03-11838.
He asked that I again be punished by incarceration for failing to report to jail on October
2nd as Vanstrydonck allegedly ordered.

Rodriguez knew, or should have known, that NO COGNIZABLE CAUSE EXISTED

because the underlying proceedings were proscribed by statute. He knew he was
acting again under color of law, and outside the scope of his employment duties.

New York Attorneys General have absolutely NO PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY

under Judiciary Law, other than 467.

His petition requested NO REMEDIAL RELIEF whatsoever, only punishment.

BRADY V VANSTRYDONCK, RODRIGUEZ. [Docket # unassigned]

In April 2003 I attempted to file an urgent petition in the appellate division to arrest the
lawless, jurisdictionally void proceedings occurring in supreme court. Despite facially
valid allegations and liberalized pleading standards, appellate court clerk shipped all
eleven [11] copies straight back to me citing instructions of Justice Eugene Pigott.

In January 2004 I attempted to file another urgent petition in the appellate court to
arrest the second jurisdictionally void prosecution below. Apparently, NO ONE in the
appellate observed, that "*the Attorney General is 'without any prosecutorial power
except when specifically authorized by statute'"

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IN RE KEVIN PATRICK BRADY, PETITIONER, v. HON. JEROME C. GORSKI, et al.,

This action to compel was filed in the Fourth Dept. in Sept. 2004. When permission was
granted Notice was timely served on the Attorney General.
Subsequently, without notice, it was transferred sua sponte to the First Dept. Upon the
failure of the Attorney General to timely respond in either court, I moved for summary
judgment.
The Order of the First Department reads;
Application for an order pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR denied, cross motion granted
and the petition is dismissed, without costs or disbursements. Petitioner's request for
sanctions denied. All concur. No opinion. Order filed.
NOTE: there was no cross motion to dismiss; 26 tardy or otherwise. AND, dismissal
without answers, without opinion, and without the mandatory relief requested is NOT
among the options limited by statute.
CPLR 3011. There shall be a complaint and an answer.
CPLR 3012. answer or reply shall be made within twenty [20] days after service of
pleadings
CPLR 3012 (d) the court may extend the time to appear or plead, or compel
acceptance of a pleading untimely served.
However, no said extension was requested or granted

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' the time prescribed for a motion to dismiss in CPLR article 78 proceeding coincides with the time to
answer" . (see CPLR 7804(f) Perez v Perez, 131 A.D.2d 451, 516 N.Y.S.2d 236

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CPLR 7804 [e] says Should the body or officer fail either to file and serve an answer or
to move to dismiss, the court may either issue a judgment in favor of the petitioner or
order that an answer be submitted.
"Where affirmative words in the statute are explicit, peremptory and used in
contradistinction to permissive words in another section of the same statute, it will be
deemed the intention of the Legislature to make such section imperative"

27

NOTE: unless the petition demonstrated at least one cognizable cause of action
permission would not have been granted by the Fourth Department.. This aggrieved
party was expected to believe that five [5] honorable justices of the appellate court
failed to observe that fact.
And yet all concurred in violation of procedural statutes to summarily dismiss.
BRADY v VANSTRYDONCK, RODRIGUEZ, et all
In November 2005, I purchased index # 2005-904 for a Title 42 1983 civil rights
complaint and sent it to VanStrydonck for permission. I provided a copy to the
Department of Law.
VanStrydonck never responded. Neither did the Department of Law.
BRADY V VANSTRYDONCK, RODRIGUEZ. [Docket # 10367/04]
It is undeniable that the allegations enunciated in my September 1994 petition to the
Fourth Department [Article 78] were facially meritorious and raised triable issues. But
said issues were usurped by the states Motion to Dismiss and dismissal as a sanction
by Judge John Lane.

27

McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes, 177, p. 262; see Matter of Talbot v. Board of Educ. of
City of N. Y., 171 Misc. 974, 979-980; cf. Rosenblum v. Gorman, 21 App. Div. 618).

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Contrary to Lanes findings, the action WAS commenced in the appellate division
because the respondent judges had acted without jurisdiction. AND, because the
pleadings raised triable issues, summary dismissal as a sanction or otherwise, was
prohibited.
The Attorneys General/Department of Law knew or should have known that is public
policy in New York that cases be resolved on the merits. The question is therefore why
they brought such a Motion in the first place and why Judge Lane acquiesced to it.
"Dismissal is the most drastic sanction contemplated by the CPLR and should be
imposed only when the offensive conduct is willful, contumacious, or in bad faith."
AND Due Process mandates that such conduct be established in a hearing and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, Lane summary dismissed because petitioner failed to comply with earlier
orders to first obtain permission.
In the final analysis, the need for permission is the excuse for keeping very repugnant
subject matter from being proved on the record. In fact the unanimous summary
dismissals rise to the level of extrinsic fraud, fraud on the court, and failure to perform a
ministerial act specifically required by law to be performed.
THE NEW YORK COURT OF CLAIMS
Judge Richard E. Sise terminated every timely filed, duly served claim since March
2006. 28 Despite countless pages enunciating overt constitutional and ministerial torts
inflicted by officers of the Unified Court System, Sise purports that I failed to state even
a single cognizable claim.

28

Docket #s M-71491 M-72717, M-72812, M-72976, M-73333, M-73540, M-73541, M-73707, M-73867, M74024, M-76775 , M-77760, M-77631, M-77632, M-80869

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Sise cited the injunctions as his authority to subjugate every claim into a motion to
permit late filing and then terminated every motion, sua sponte, without notice, without
opportunity to amend and without requiring answers from State attorneys.
Despite countless on-point case citations supporting his unconstitutional application of
the gatekeeper injunctions, Sise and state attorneys concocted their story and stuck to
it.
To wit:
"in the absence of permission to file his claim, movant did not commence an action
against the State and, thus, the State had no duty to answer or respond"
This FIAT has no legal authority whatsoever. The role of gatekeeper is simply to
review the complaint for facial sufficiency, NOT to provide excuse for blocking injured
non-lawyers from court to protect the State.
Sise clearly advocated for the State and perpetuated my infamia facti by comments
such as "[w]hen it becomes clear that courts are being used for harassment by an
experienced pro se party' *** ,

29

In this case however no real party has ever alleged

legal harassment.
He wrote: [Bradys] conduct in repeatedly attempting to litigate the same issue is
frivolous. In law, NOTHING is litigated unless the parties get into court. Given the
chronic extrinsic fraud in practice here this comment was reckless and irresponsible.
Sise concluded; '[these] proposed claim[s] [are] meritless on it's face** ** judicial officers
*** are entitled to absolute immunity *** [A]ctions ** associated with the prosecutorial
phase are ***quasi-judicial ** and invoke ** absolute immunity

29

McFadden v State UID #2003-032-070, Claim Nos. 103390, et al., Motion Nos. M-66233, et al., June 30,
2003, Hard, J., see also Moore v State, UID #2001-028-0511, Claim No. 100767, 2001, Sise, J.)

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This conclusion alone presents a controversy sufficient to invoke preliminary

jurisdiction. [ Sise cites Lau v Cooke, 282 AD2d 877 for district attorney immunity.]
Without further inquiry Sise had no authority to declare by FIAT the injurious actions to
have been "legitimate and issued by appropriate judicial officers who were consequently
cloaked in absolute judicial immunity."
If he had read the pro se pleadings without agenda he would have learned that the
actionable conduct were NOT judicial acts, AND that the Claimant had been
unanimously deprived of any judicial forum.
Failure to acquire jurisdiction cannot serve to insulate the State from its continued liability
for false arrest. Houghtaling v State 11 Misc 2d 1049 Nurembeer v State 40 A.D.2d 939
Harty v state 52 Misc.2d 255, Maracle v state 50 Misc 2d 348
His conclusion [t]here can be no dispute that in ruling on the prior motions for
permission to file this Court was exercising its judicial function.30
Sise remained so fixed on his erroneous interpretation of the void injunctions that he
failed to recognize the role of gatekeeper is not a judicial function. It is administrative.
Insofar as every proposed action and/or claim presented as facially meritorious, every
refusal to allow it to proceed 31 is a failure to perform a ministerial act specifically
required by law.

30

the prior motions were in fact arbitrarily subjugated timely claims.

Brady v Kearns, CAF 00086-88 Brady v Taddeo, 02/10624 Brady v VanStrydonck, 02/13647 Brady v
Gorski, Brady v State
31

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Sise other Opinions # 1 32

"Movant, who must obtain Court permission to commence an action, has moved for a
default judgment, contending the submission he filed and served was not an application
for permission to file but, rather, the claim itself.
Opinion # 2: " [I]nasmuch as "Movant" cannot commence an action without the Courts
permission, and no such permission has been granted, there is no Claim that must be
answered, and Defendant is not in default.
In fact, the controlling principles establish otherwise. In fact, in his recitations include his
own separate observation33
***New York practice, *** does not expressly give courts authority to dismiss even
frivolous actions, *** there is scant authority for such dismissals, no matter what the
reason. *** " As a general rule, ** sua sponte dismissals are discouraged and ultimately
invalidated. 34
Clearly NOT however where this pro se litigant is concerned.
A cognizant claim was established when Gorski signed the order despite the
inconsistencies with his Memorandum Decision. There has never been inquiry or
concern for what that has meant for the injured party to such nonfeasance.
Court Claims Act 11[a][i] identifies the Attorney-General as the "officer responsible for
the investigation and litigation of the claim" ( Andriola v. State, 53 AD2d 966, Matter of
Welch v. State, 71 AD2d 494, Exec. Law 63[1] and who must ascertain the agency's
liability.
32

M-73540
Frasier v. State, 11 Misc.3d 497, 810 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y.Ct.Cl. 11/21/2005)
34
see also discussion in Myung Chun v N.A. Mortgage Co., 285 AD2d 42, 46 [1st Dept 2001]["sua sponte
dismissal must be restricted to the most extraordinary circumstances"]).
33

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Court of Claims Act Art III, 20-a says the attorney general shall cause a review to be
made within the department of law of all cases filed in the court of claims to determine
which cases are appropriate for possible settlement.
I submit that if the State legislature wanted to exclude pro se litigants cheated of their
claims by extrinsic fraud it could have said so. In fact the Attorney General HAS NEVER
admitted or denied this injured state residents injuries.
Given controversy as to what Gorskis injunction says is in fact a triable issue, the Depts
failure to conceded is conspiratorial.
APPEAL OF SUA SPONTE DISMISSALS
Consider the findings in Brown v. State 35 in which Third Dept. held "the Court of
Appeals has left no room for doubt that " * * " no right of appeal exists from **** order[s]
entered sua sponte.
The Third Dept has also said Claimants' remedy was to move to vacate the sua sponte
order and, if denied, appeal the denial as of right (Sholes v Meagher, 100 NY2d 333]
But it held to a different standard in the pro se appeal of Brady v State Its order in
January 2009 says only 'affirmed on the opinions of Judge Richard Sise'.
The problem is that this affirmation conflicts absolutely with the unanimous declaration
of the U.S Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
[1] "a judges opinion of whether a litigant will prevail or not is irrelevant', [2] it is a gross
violation of procedures to dismiss a lawsuit at the complaint stage" and [3]
"fundamentally unfair to dismiss ** before the whole body of facts can be revealed
through discovery.
35
36

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9 A.D.3d 23, 776 N.Y.S.2d 643 ( 05/13/2004)

534 U.S. (2002),

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Sise invoked a standing rule to subjugate ALL my claims, regardless of timeliness or

facial merit into Motions to Permit Late Filing. This violates the prohibition against
PRIOR RESTRAINT.
Although the prohibition ** is not absolute, it comes with "a 'heavy presumption' against
its constitutional validity" 37 and may be imposed only in the most "exceptional cases" 38
JUDGE FRANK WILLIAMS
Having been blocked from Monroe County courts for more than a decade, without
income and quickly depleting assets, I sought emergency relief in September 2008 by
petition to Saratoga County Supreme Court. I pleaded as follows:
"As of April 2007, I am no longer bondable and thus no longer employable in my chosen
profession. Void judgments on my record have destroyed my professional credibility and
credit rating and block my access the equity in my property. ****
To avoid further economic loss by foreclosure and/or bankruptcy, I must remove these
clouds immediately and sell it as quickly thereafter. For reasons deposed within, this
action, in this venue, is the only remedy I have.
Despite my financial emergency, this action was dismissed, sua sponte, without notice,
before service, as a sanction by Judge Frank Williams, and citing only an 'excerpt' from
the 1996 injunction. Upon information and belief, no attempt was made to verify that the
thirteen [13] year old injunction, [or the one page excerpt], even remained in effect.

37

Organization for a Better Austin v Keefe, 402 US 415, 419, 91 S Ct 1575, 29 L Ed 2d 1 [1971], quoting
Carroll v President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 US 175, 181, 89 S Ct 347, 21 L Ed 2d 325 [1968]; see
Bantam Books, Inc. v Sullivan, 372 US 58, 70, 83 S Ct 631, 9 L Ed 2d 584 [1963]),
38
Near v Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 US 697, 716, 51 S Ct 625, 75 L Ed 1357 [1931]; accord CBS Inc. v
Davis, 510 US at 1317; see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241, 259, 94 S Ct 2831, 41 [
N.Y.S.2d Page 459 ] L Ed 2d 730 [1974] [White, J., concurring]

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Williams summarily aborted the action, then attempted to foreclose future actions by
writing 'matters not decided are denied'. However, this did not make it valid, res judicata
or otherwise. Williams acted solely in administrative capacity.
JUDGE BARRY KRAMER
In March 2009, I applied for permission from district administrative judge Vito Caruso
who assigned the petition to Judge Barry Kramer,.
Before RJI had even been filed, Kramer summarily dismissed, sua sponte, as a
sanction citing the void injunction of Judge VanStrydonck. Kramer failed to disclose
how this had come to his attention since I made no mention in pleading. .
Upon information and belief, following service on him, AAG Rodriguez [or accomplice]
simply phoned up Kramers office and urged dismissal. This constituted an ex-parte
conspiracy to commit and perpetuate extrinsic fraud.
Kramer also raised, sua sponte; statute of limitations, what would have been a waivable
defense. He then purported to decide the defense in favor of defendants.
His 'ruling' was not even factual. In New York, the doctrines of equitable tolling or
equitable estoppel "may be invoked to defeat a statute of limitations defense when the
plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a
timely action."
There should be absolutely no doubt as to its application here.
JUDGE JOHN ARK
No judge has demonstrated more obstinacy and smoldering contempt for a pro se
litigant in his courtroom than the Hon. John Ark. From the outset, Ark has failed to
adjudicate even a single issue/defense I raised to an overtly fraudulent foreclosure.

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Under CPLR 3211(e), objection or defense based on a ground set forth in subdivision
(1), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of CPLR 3211(a) must be raised in an answer or in a motion
made before the answer is due, or it is waived.
Despite my objection and failure to rebut lack of standing. His unilateral dispositions
enabled the putative plaintiffs to proceed
It is well established in New York that the proponent of a summary judgment motion
"must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law,
tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact"
(Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York,
49 N.Y.2d 557 [1980]). The failure to make such a prima facie showing requires the
denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad

v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851 [1985]).

This defect was ultimately confirmed by WFBs motion to omit material pleadings in
March 2014
The reason for this motion was to omit the fatal pleading defects in the commencing
pleadings while appearing to comply with administrative order 548-10 and 431-1. Arks
ex parte order of April 2014 knowingly ratifies perjured documents and allowed the
pleadings to be materially altered, nunc pro tunc.
This scheme was noted by the Fourth Department in Wells Fargo Bank N.A v Podeswik
, 39
when presenting its nunc pro tunc motion, at worst, Wells Fargo perpetrated a FRAUD

ON THE COURT and at best, engaged in misconduct by not revealing all of the facts to
the court..
Ark ignored a threshold jurisdictional challenge raised in defendants answer until
issuing vague findings June 2013 which declared Standing was necessarily decided
39

2014-01045 [ 2/14/2014]

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against defendant . Such decision does not appear on the record because there has
never been a basis for such decision
Defendants answer not only raised a non-waivable jurisdictional challenge of plaintiffs
lack of standing, but sought remedy by cross motion pursuant to
RPAPL 202[1] says where such parties have an interest; the instant complaint
shall set forth: [d]etailed facts showing the particular nature of the [state's] interest in
or lien on the real property.
RPAPL 1313 the state may be made a party defendant to an action for the
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property where it has an interest in or a lien on the
property subsequent to the lien of the mortgage sought to be foreclosed in said
action, in the same manner as a private person.
Ark ignored the cross motion and on Dec. 17, 2009 granted summary judgment by
signing a proposed order which also declared no one was heard in opposition.
There is sufficient reason to believe Ark has also been influenced by the courthouse
grapevine as demonstrated during my appearance on June 18, 2014. Without notice,
without hearing and without cause he declared that if I wish to make further motions to
the court, his permission would be required.
Ark has rendered me essentially invisible from the outset

It is a fundamental in law that a party to be affected by a personal judgment must have

his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed
629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law

upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial
decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

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In the end he has attempted to sabotage my appeal by refusing to settle the record. He
knows, or should know, that absent a sufficient record cause the immediate dismissal
of my appeal,
His refusal to perform multiple ministerial acts required by law constitutes a very
injurious Due Process violation and where the judge has not performed his judicial
function -- where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted 40 a
FRAUD ON THE COURT.
Please note the annexed decision of the Fourth Department.

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H.K. Porter Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.)

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JURISDICTIONALLY VOID CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

Since January 1995, I have been criminally prosecuted four [4] times in Monroe County
courts, convicted by ill-informed juries, fined, incarcerated and ordered to report to
probation officers for years thereafter. As a matter of New York constitutional law every
accusatory instrument failed to state a crime or offense cognizable in New York.
Although I asserted these defects at every arraignment or in pre-trial motion, the
court[s] and prosecutors ignored them and proceeded to trial. Despite having been
found GUILTY, [with one exception] there is NO EVIDENCE in any trial record to
support conviction.
In the final analysis, EVERY conviction is absolutely void. EVERY court and EVERY
prosecutor knowingly proceeded without trial and/or subject matter jurisdiction.
This petition comes to show proof of

Actual and Factual Innocence a.k.a Ordinary Injustice 41

Constitutional rights violations

Lack of jurisdiction in the trial courts

Ineffective representation at the trial and appellate level due to pro se prejudice

Prosecutorial misconduct, including fraud on the courts

Please take judicial notice of the following controlling principles of law.

It is well established in New York that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to
be prosecuted on a jurisdictionally valid accusatory instrument. 42

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'Ordinary Injustice' results when a community of legal professionals becomes so accustomed to a pattern of
lapses that they can no longer see their role in them. Amy Bach. Metropolitan Books 2009
42

People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227,738 N.E.2d 773,715 N.Y.S.2d 369 People v Sobotker, 61 NY2d 44,

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"A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a non-waivable prerequisite to a criminal

prosecution" (People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). The factual portion of an
information "must contain a statement of complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary
character supporting or tending to support the charges" (CPL 100.15 [3]), which facts, if
true, must establish every element of the offenses prima facie (CPL 100.40 [1] [b], [c];
People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 261-262 [2007]).
The Court of Appeals says that 'an information MUST allege every element of the
offense charged and defendants commission thereof. People v Tarka (1990)
A PRIMA FACIE CASE
In fact, the Court says; ' the failure to make a "prima facie case" pursuant to CPL 100.40
(1) (c) and CPL 100.15 (3) is a non-waivable jurisdictional defect . 43
And, "[because] the information charging defendant with [an intentional crime] fails to
allege the essential element of * intent ** the information is jurisdictionally defective and
MUST be dismissed"
The failure to comply with the "prima facie case" requirement for facial sufficiency is a
jurisdictional defect in accord with our decisions in [People v Hall (48 N.Y.2d 927),
People v Case (42 N.Y.2d 98). People v Miles (64 N.Y.2d 731)
People v Jones 44 "because the factual allegations in the accusatory *** failed to
establish a prima facie case, the conviction should be vacated and the information
dismissed". See also People v. Alejandro; 511 N.E.2d 71; 70 N.Y.2d 133
The Pittsford information failed to allege any facts tending to support the charge.

43
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People v Alejandro (70 N.Y.2d 133) People v Tarka (1990) 75 NY2d 996.
People v. Jones No. 145 (11/20/2007) 2007 NY Slip Op 09070, 2007.NY.0011618

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Unlike a felony complaint , an information must demonstrate both reasonable cause and
a legally sufficient case against the defendant. People v Fletcher Gravel Co. (05/07/75)
68 N.Y.S.2d 392; 82 Misc. 2d 22. Comn Staff Notes to CPL 100.40
"[B]ecause the factual allegations in the accusatory *** failed to establish a prima facie
case, the conviction should be vacated and the information dismissed". 45
The rationale of this distinction is, in part, that the felony complaint is not the instrument
of ultimate prosecution and must be followed by a grand jury proceeding and an
indictment based upon legally sufficient grand jury evidence" 46
The Commissions Staff notes elaborate:
"The lodging of the information is not, as with a felony complaint, followed by a
preliminary hearing and a grand jury proceeding, and nowhere at any time prior to
pleading or trial are the People required to present actual evidence demonstrating a
prima facie case.
Under the circumstances, the least that should be required of them is an information
containing sworn allegations of an evidentiary nature which, if given in the form of trial
testimony, would spell out a legally sufficient case."
In Alejandro, Judge Bellacosa explained:" this is a small price to pay for upholding the
logic of the statutory framework. It supplies elemental fairness to defendants prosecuted
for less serious crimes, but crimes nevertheless, which affect ordinary people and
produce lifetime criminal records.
The Rule in the Fourth Department is that a count *** that omits an element of an
offense from its factual allegations is deficient under the CPL, notwithstanding its
reference to the title and statutory citation of the offense. People v. Santos, (N.Y.Sup.
08/12/2008)

45
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People v. Jones No. 145 (11/20/2007) 2007 People v. Alejandro; 511 N.E.2d 71; 70 N.Y.2d 133
People v.Bridget Alejandro; 511 N.E.2d 71; 70 N.Y.2d 133

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Another Fourth Dept. is rule says "if the instrument is not legally sufficient, the court has
no authority at all to proceed with the arraignment" 47

AND, "where the statute has no application, the authority of the court to correct its own
error of law or fact is not restricted. 48

"Of course, in the context of an intentional crime, the factual part of the information must
include allegations that, if true, establish the essential element of intent." People v. Khan,
15 Misc.3d 1131(A) (N.Y.City Crim.Ct. 05/07/2007)

A mere "conclusory statement ** does not meet the reasonable cause requirement"
(People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 [2009]).

an accusatory is jurisdictionally defective if the acts it accuses ** simply do not

constitute a crime or fails to allege act[s] constituting every material element of the crime.
(People v Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98) see People v McGuire, 5 N.Y.2d 523).

PENAL LAW 240.30 HAD NO APPLICATION

The Pittsford accusatory lacks pleading prerequisites for Aggravated Harassment

'There is minor difference in the culpable mental state of 'harassment' and 'aggravated
harassment'. Harassment requires an intent to 'harass, annoy or alarm" Aggravated
harassment adds in the alternative an intent to 'threaten". McKinney's Practice
Comments 240.30 (page 389).

47

Fitzpatrick v. Rosenthal, (02/03/2006) also Preiser, Practice Comments, McKinney's Cons Book 11A,
CPL 170.10 at 12; see Matter of Dyno v Hillis, 274 AD2d 908, 909,
48
People v. Wroten, 732 N.Y.S.2d 513 ( 11/09/2001)

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ROCHESTER CITY COURT

In June 2007, your deponent was arrested again, prosecuted and jailed for 100 days by
Rochester City Judge, Teresa Johnson, on the following allegations:
"Defendant sent a letter to your complainants private address in which he wrote, in sum
and substance, complainant better stay out of his business or he would do something
even the courts could not reverse'. Complainant took this as a threat and became
alarmed"
Because complainant, JoAn Wahl; was chief clerk of the appellate court the following
procedure was mandatory, NOT criminal.
"Assessment of every 'threat' reported is made by specially trained uniformed supervisors
in consultation with the Judiciarys Chief of Public Safety and local law enforcement.
These individualized assessments gauge all the circumstances of the 'threat', including
precise language, timing and means of delivery * 49
Regardless of how rude and/or threatening Wahl believed the letter to be, neither its
content or the alleged breach of her private address constitutes a crime under Penal
Law 240.30 [1].
In fact, the accusatory failed to specify whether the crime was by conduct or content,50
It also failed to allege the element of intent, AND, in the absence of a true threat, it
violated defendants right of free speech and expression.
Wahls statement ' I took this as a threat' is her chosen personal conclusion and
'conclusory statements do not fulfill the requirements of CPL 100.40 (1) (b), (c) and
100.15 (3)'. 51
49

NY Task Force on Court Security, October 2005

A count charging more than one offense is duplicitous and must be dismissed. (People v. Damsky, 177
Misc.2d 828, 677 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y.Sup. [1998) People v Davis, 72 NY2d 32, 38; People v Keindl,
50

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People v Dumas,68 N.Y.2d 729 [1986]

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PERINTON TOWN COURT

New York Village and Traffic courts have NO JURISDICTION over vehicles not owned
and registered in this state.
SUMMARY
In the end,. Richard Dollingers interference with my Due Process was unconscionable.
It constituted "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because [he] is clothed with state authority. 52 Every information upon which I was
charged, prosecuted and punished was constitutionally insufficient
I hereby depose that everything alleged herein is to the best of my knowledge true and
complete except where alleged on information and belief, and I believe those matters to
be true. Nothing is intended to be frivolous, vexatious, and/or completely without merit
as defined by 22 NYCRR 130.1.

KEVIN PATRICK BRADY

508 Locust Lane
East Rochester NY 14445

52

United States v. Classic, (1941)

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