EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -

G.R. No. 169641

Promulgated:

RICHARD O. SARCIA,
Accused-Appellant.

September 10, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision [1] dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia
alias Nogi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape [3] committed against AAA,[4] and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties
imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00,
and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old
girl. After almost four (4) years, AAAs father filed a complaint [5] for acts of lasciviousness against herein
accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at
Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.[6] The Information[7] dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan,
Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.[8] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and
Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accusedappellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro,
Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision [9] finding the accused-appellant guilty of
the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the
accused- appellant.[10]
Accused-appellant filed his Appellants Brief [11] on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed its Appellees Brief[12] on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[13] modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in
which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the case was transferred, for
appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We quote
the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y
Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the
amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
(3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern
Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.

SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review. [14]
In our Resolution[15] of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief[16] on April 7, 2006. Having
failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to have waived the filing of its
supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA],
[her cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY
THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of
Saling Crisologos house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAAs cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAAs] shorts and underwear. He also
removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then,
he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an upand-down movement (Nagdapadapa tabi). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and
said aray. She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them,
witnessed appellants dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs cousin] instinctively rushed to the house
of [AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother
answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking
about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on
her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo
where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached
[AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her
cousin] did not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she
feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a
grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAAs cousin]
came to their house and told [AAAs] mother again that appellant had earlier made an upand-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAAs mother], however did not say anything. At that
time, [AAAs] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified
that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination
on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the
result of [AAA]s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural
health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in
said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]s medical findings are as follows:
negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish
vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding negative for
introital bulvar laceration nor scars means, in laymans language, that there was no showing
of any scar or wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the hymen which means
that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise
or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis. [17]
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doa Tomasa,
Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAAs] parents, because
sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know
[AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as
an agriculturist in theMunicipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the
Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in
Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they
transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag while his
mother is from barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in
Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years

old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of
school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school atMasarawag High School. His daily
routine was at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he
would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doa Tomasa about 1
kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his
father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was
most surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the
latters place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion
Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to
him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him
with the docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and
instigated [AAAs] rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger
and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and
two (2) months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in
1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to
learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000
when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge
because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and
have the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he
was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAAs] mother, is also related to his father,
[AAA mothers] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the
lending of money by his father to the AAAs family as the motive for the latter to file the rape
case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan,
Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay
against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of
said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits
relative to said case.[18]
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not
able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and her cousin were
inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date and time of the commission of the
offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why they filed the
said case was to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by said
Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000. Accusedappellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAAs father in filing the said case for
rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats
or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating negative for introital
bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing of any scar or wound.
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAAs and her
cousins testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time of the incident,
while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-appellant invited her to the back of the
house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-appellant doing the pushand-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAAs testimony that
when accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said aray; (3) when the
cousin returned to AAA after telling the latters mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found
AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house;
and (4) the cousin testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified
that there were only four of them who were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is
no person with perfect faculties or senses. [19] The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too
inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution
witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive,
candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently
deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and
when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had
occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by
their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses
commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young
witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason
to accord them ample space for inaccuracy. [20]
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to recall the exact date when the incident in 1996
was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false
testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and
cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness. [21] In People v. Purazo,[22] We ruled:

We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime
of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time
or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we
already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the
crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place
alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to
the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of
limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,[23] the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso
facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or
time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime
is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at
any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is
sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed before and
until October 15, 1994, sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter, sometime in
November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto and on or about and
sometime in the year 1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was
explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15,
1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense
cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month
and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAAs] sworn statement
mention the month and date but only the year.[24]
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against accusedappellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellants claim that the only reason why this case was
filed against him was to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case
of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7,
2000.
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge
nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor
and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused. In People v.
Coloma[25] we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victims father as
understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the
absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill
motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge.Here, the failure of AAAs
parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainants father in the latters
testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your wife told
you that something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that during that
time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When we were able
to save enough amounts, we filed the case.[26]
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof that
he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12
years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place. Proof of force,
intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a
conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve. [27]
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows:
negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there was no
showing of any scar or wound. The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations in the
victims sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact
of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. [28] What is important is that AAAs
testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled
that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.

Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended
party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants defense of
denial and alibi.[29] The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping
AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court
aptly reached the following conclusion:
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAAs family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAAs] parents finally decided to file the rape case because
after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored
is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the testimony of
rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a girl of complainants
age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her family had she not been truly subjected to the
painful experience of sexual abuse.At any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be
expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true. [30] Parents would not
sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of
public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughters transgressor
punished accordingly.[31] Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the
proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, [32] was the governing law at
the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question.Under the said law, the penalty of death
shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of
AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and
proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January
16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the
CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) [33] of
the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24
years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident
could have taken place in any month and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution was not able to
prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to
the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone
declaration of the accused regarding his age.[34]
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However,
for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. [35] Thus, the proper imposable
penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in
case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes, the damages
to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. The issue now is whether the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence
here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of
the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in
order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term indemnification, which is included in the civil
liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential
damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor[36] ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the
offended party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained
in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and
aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory
damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter
being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue
unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court
believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should
follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. In San
Andres v. Court of Appeals,[37] we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category
of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong
(25 C.J.S. 815).[38] (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and
moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the
commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and her
family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appelant could
have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the
date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart
from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the
compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this
Court took in People v. Candelario,[39] a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of
damages. At that time, the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral
damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the
presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome[40] and People v. Quiachon[41] is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for
increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil
indemnity for the victim shallP75,000.00 Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded
without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.However, the trial courts award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current
jurisprudence on qualified rape.
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is
still heinous.Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence,
correctly
awarded
the
following
amounts; P75,000.00
as
civil
indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the
victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral
damages even without proof thereof, x x x

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because,
following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the
actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows not
only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the
court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the
penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of
exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory
damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as
a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner.[42] Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and
moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise
be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. [43]
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be
maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased
to the amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified
rape. Thus, the CA correctly awardedP75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages is increased to P75,000.00[44] and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise
increased to P30,000.00.[45]
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of
his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, theJuvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July
14, 2005, respectively.The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down
by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance withArticle 192
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[46] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-118-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.[47] Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years
of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New
Bilibid Prison,Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and
who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense
for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to
this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine
which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time
of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. [48] The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC)

Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if,
among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. [49] Since R.A. No. 9344 does
not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been
convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child
in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations [50] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or
may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the
child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office
of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the
said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for
a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twentyone (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated,
even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic.[51] However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition
measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law. [52]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accusedappellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;[53] and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the
amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The
award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall
be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA,
G.R. No. 182941
Petitioner,
Promulgated:
- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
July 3, 2009
Respondent
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review on certiorari[1] of the
Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals[4] (CA) that affirmed with modification his conviction for
the crime of qualified rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, in its
decision of April 5, 2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA [5] was playing with her friend BBB in the second floor of her familys
house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play
with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned
to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The
petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the
parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to the barangayoffice. AAA was later subjected to
physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse.
On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged with rape under the
following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latters will and consent.
Contrary to law.[6]
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He
claimed that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape. He also claimed that AAA only
invented her story because she bore him a grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties mother (CCC)
supported the petitioners story; she also stated that AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified
that the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident happened. [7]
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her; she confirmed the
petitioners claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROBERT
SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A.
8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the said juvenile in conflict with
law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim
the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAAs credibility. He also
invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)[9] to exempt him
from criminal liability considering that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioners conviction with modification as to penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting Robert Sierra, the
assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The
award of damages are likewise affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that Robert is not exempt
from liability. First, it was not clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert was
15 years old or below at the time of the commission of the crime. It was incumbent for the
defense to present Roberts birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No.
9344. Neither is the suspension of sentence available to Robert as the Supreme Court, in
one case, clarified that:
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted

from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the

judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the
law
under
suspended
sentence,
without
need
of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the
juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of
P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not
been deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the
intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided
in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable
penalty for which isreclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences
suspended.[11]
The CA denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecutions evidence on his guilt of the crime charged; what
he now assails is the failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1, Section 6 [12]of R.A. No. 9344 under the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9344 on the petitioners
exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense to present the
petitioners birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving his
age lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton[13] thereby
denying the petitioner the benefit of exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the burden of proof for purposes
of determining exemption from criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the time the crime
was committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution as the party who stands
to lose the case if no evidence is presented to show that the petitioner was not a 15-year old minor
entitled to the exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344. [14] He additionally claims
that Sections 3,[15] 7,[16] and 68[17] of the law also provide a presumption of minority in favor of a child in
conflict with the law, so that any doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.
The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on record specifically: the
allegation of the Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never
objected to, and the findings of the RTC established that he was not more than 15 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime.
The Peoples Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the burden
belongs to the petitioner who should have presented his birth certificate or other documentary evidence
proving that his age was 15 years or below. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner is presumed to be
a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence suspended following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton.[18]
THE COURTS RULING
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecutions evidence and the findings of the lower courts on the
petitioners guilt, since the petition opens the whole case for review and the issues before us are predicated
on the petitioners guilt of the crime charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms
of R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not on the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision and the records of the case, to
deviate from the lower courts findings of guilt. The records show that the prosecution established all the
elements of the crime charged through the credible testimony of AAA and the other corroborating
evidence; sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the information charged. [19] As against AAAs
testimony, the petitioner could only raise the defenses of denial and alibi defenses that, in a long line of
cases, we have held to be inherently weak unless supported by clear and convincing evidence; the

petitioner failed to present this required evidentiary support. [20] We have held, too, that as negative
defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail over the credible and positive testimony of the complainant. [21] We
sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility, as we see no compelling reason to doubt the validity of
their conclusions in this regard.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground i.e., exemption from criminal liability under R.A.
No. 9344 that implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made
above, as the defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even inconsistent ones.
We note, too, that the defenses claim of exemption from liability was made for the first time in its appeal to
the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for
reasons of fairness, [22] no essential change is really involved as the claim for exemption from liability is not
incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the lower courts conclusion that the petitioner is
guilty of the crime charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil
liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a
crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law.In
admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that the appeal of a criminal case
(even one made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even on questions that the parties did
not raise.[23] By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance and
resolve every doubt in favor of the accused.[24] It is with these considerations in mind and in obedience to
the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with the
law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law on exemption from
liability compelling because of the patent errors the CA committed in these regards. Specifically, the CAs
findings of fact on the issues of age and minority, premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; it also manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [ 2 5 ]
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the ages of both the
petitioner and the complaining victim are material and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for
purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the
latter is material in characterizing the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that
R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is
to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system
that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a
variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling, probation,
foster care, education and vocational training programs and other alternatives to institutional care.[26] More
importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal
irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, previously provided i.e., from under nine years of age and above nine years of
age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but
below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing
exemption, the new law as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did presumes that the minor
offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed
involuntary ones for which they cannot be held accountable. [27] The current law also drew its changes from
the principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years
and gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention measures.
[28]

In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability because he was not more
than 15 years old at the time the rape took place. The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioners failure
to present his birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344. [29] The CA also found him
disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence because the imposable penalty for the crime of rape
is reclusion perpetua to death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal case,
the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to
prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has
presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by
evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot
otherwise be held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had
done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense
which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt from
criminal liability because of his age when he committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the
prosecution, has the burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he
committed the rape charged.[30]
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not elements of the
crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the burden

of proof on the prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime when clearly they
are not. [31] If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden relates to proof of the age of the
victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape. [32]
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence to Prove the Accuseds Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the petitioner was only
15 years old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age
of a child in conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the
child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provides the implementing details of
this provision by enumerating the measures that may be undertaken by a law enforcement officer to
ascertain the childs age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the childs age, such as
(a) Childs birth certificate;
(b) Childs baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the childs school records,
dental records, or travel papers.
(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such documents,
the law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age by:
(a)

Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e.g. date of
birthday, grade level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of the child (e.g.
relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been passed only in 2006), does not
depart from the jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory
proof of the accuseds minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,[33] we accepted testimonial evidence to prove the minority
and age of the accused in the absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of
birth. This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas[34] where the defendants statement about his age was considered
sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he
committed the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,[35] the Court appreciated the minority
and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense in the absence of any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then,
in People v. Villagracia,[36] we found the testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years old
sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. Morial[37] and David v.
Court of Appeals,[38] and ruled that the allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as
facts upon the prosecutions failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the accuseds minority and
age upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory
evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the
date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and
minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the
prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accuseds and/or his relatives
testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC both testified regarding
his minority and age when the rape was committed. [39] Second, the records before us show that these
pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected to by the prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did
not present any contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime was
committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the
age of the child must be resolved in his favor. [40] Hence, any doubt in this case regarding the petitioners
age at the time he committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. In other words, the testimony that
the petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not more
than 15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and established jurisprudence
in accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA therefore cannot but be in error in not
appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the petitioners and CCCs testimonies relating to the formers
age.

Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344

That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and that he is no longer a
minor (he was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of
total exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants. [41] As we explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68
of R.A. No. 9344[42] in the recent case of Ortega v. People:[43]
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and
below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officers
(LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from
criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICLs age at the time of the promulgation
of judgment but the CICLs age at the time of the commission of the offense. In
short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised
from 9 to 15 years old. [Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended, which
provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not
found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a
habitual criminal.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the accused shall continue to be
civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA
despite his exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he would
have been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, that the
petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of his relationship with AAA within the second civil degree of
consanguinity and the latters minority. [44] Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability corresponding
to qualified rape.
The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not appear to be a disputed
matter. Their mother, CCC, declared in her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her children. The
prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated in the proceedings below that the relationship exists. We
find, however, that AAAs minority, though alleged in the Information, had not been sufficiently proven.
[45]
People v. Pruna[46] laid down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the complainant:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance.
1.
The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony
will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not likewise show that the
petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted AAAs age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither
can his failure to object to AAAs testimony be taken against him.
Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the crime to qualified
rape i.e., relationship within the third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim does not exist.
The crime for which the petitioner should have been found criminally liable should therefore only be simple
rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified rape. The civil liability that can be imposed
on the petitioner follows the characterization of the crime and the attendant circumstances.

Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of P50,000.00 but increase the awarded
exemplary damages P30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. [47]Moral damages are
automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim
suffered moral injuries entitling her to this award. [48]Article 2230 of the Civil Code justifies the award of
exemplary damages because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of relationship between
AAA and petitioner and dwelling. [49] As discussed above, the relationship (between the parties) is not
disputed. We appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on AAAs testimony that the rape
was committed in their house.[50] While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
Information, established jurisprudence holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the
award of exemplary damages.[51]
We modify the awarded civil indemnity of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, the latter being the civil
indemnity appropriate for simple rape[52] on the finding that rape had been committed.[53]
In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need to discuss the petitions third
assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
29, 2008 and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H for rape filed against
petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner isREFERRED to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
9344. Petitioner is ORDERED topay the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Unless
there
are
other
valid
causes
for
petitioners
hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above terms.

continued

detention,

we

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
in Muntinlupa City for its immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed
to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186227

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus Promulgated:
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,
Accused-Appellant.
July 20, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision [1] dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment [2] dated September 14, 2005, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251,
finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report
from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2)
pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseurbuyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo
saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of
shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseurbuyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police
officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S.
Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also
pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on
the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an
inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3)

two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request
was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets
containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the
two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally
received
by
Police
Inspector
Virginia
Sison-Gucor,
Forensic
Chemical
Officer
of
the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The
laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultraviolet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as
RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero
point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). [3]
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero
point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). [4]
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment[5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug,
as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for
in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y
Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing
0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
and accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). SO ORDERED.[6]
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated
September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba
guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.[7]
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the
crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He
also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an
accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took
place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation
was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct
your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that
Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this
Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible
apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request
for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?

A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there
should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys,
approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the
suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because
in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this
suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and
the marked moneys to the suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00
o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and
informed us that the shabu was already given by the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone
or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional
rights and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did
not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the
search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust
operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100
peso bills as marked moneys.[8]
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the
concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [9] From the
above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug,
as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to
the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police Inspector
Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline
substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in possession of
the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of
suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the
result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as
well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is
positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x[10]
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court
stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. [11] It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of
trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. [12] In People v. Roa,[13] this
Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before
police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 [14] of
Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the
provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for
every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113[15] of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may
rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA.
[16]
A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes[17] is quite
instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,[18] it has been held that prior surveillance is not a
prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the
buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant.
In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-

buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust
operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,[19] that there is no rigid or
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of
good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence
and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.[20]
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. [21]
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is
equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an
incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the
arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant
was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.[22]
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from
him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit
reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered
from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they
also found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that
no money was taken from you because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your
possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were
arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested
for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the said
powder?
A: Yes, sir.[23]
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor
for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence.[24]
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody of
the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed
the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-bust
operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. [25] Its non-compliance will not render an
accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. [26] What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. [27] In this particular case, it
is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact
that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does
not in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of

custody had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the
consummation of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional]
rights and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did
not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness
the search of the suspect.
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of
the barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did you do on
the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces
of P100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the
marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of
sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did
you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory. [28]
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item which,
in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking[29] of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.[30]
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of
his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust
operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the
promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this
case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the
sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code [31] and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, theRule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, [32] the laws that were applicable at the
time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165
is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence
under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act,
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the
same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The
provision states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed
his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant
was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law,
which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to
the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.[34]
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: [35]
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training
Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in
an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98 [36] of the same law. A violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is
provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can
now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon,[37] thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty
for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under
the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as
applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special
laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder,
and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal
Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for
the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to
consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the
period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on
the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to
special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in
the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be
invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law
against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly
punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal
Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law
involved speaks ofprision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the
degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to
the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of
the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are
two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one
or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could
not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some
manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall
proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of
one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree
shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71.

If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three
discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion
temporal,
then
one
degree
lower
would
be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still
one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the
penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda
est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law
may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged
from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly
addressed to Congress.[38]
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority [39] can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. [40] The
ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible
penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's
conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

MICHAEL PADUA,
Petitioner,

- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 168546

Promulgated
July 23, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision [1] dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated June 14,
2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas
petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004[3] and July 28, 2004[4] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC,
Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,[6] otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling dangerous drugs. [7] The Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan
Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. Mike, with the crime
of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par.
(a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a
minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell
any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded
newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found
positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.[8]
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.[9]
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas counsel manifested that his
client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted
to first-time offenders under Section 70[10] of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection.
[11]
Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order[12] stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was
considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision[13] datedFebruary 6,
2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of
[v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i)
thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to
pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation [15] dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a
minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree
No. 968[16] (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as The Probation Law of 1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No.
9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the
said laws.

The RTC in an Order[17] dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to
conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from
receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition
within five days from receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence
Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.[18]
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 [19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person
convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled
thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor
Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde
and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor
Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles
189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended,
which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such
articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an
application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his
sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the
Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under
Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section
11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof
deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of
Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who
was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of
probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder
quoted:
Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act,
regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. (underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua
y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence,
this petition where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE
PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES
IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS
BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT
ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.[22]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its
Comment[23] as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING SECTION 24,
ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.
II.
SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE ON JUVENILES IN
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.[24]
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for
certiorari assailing the trial courts order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep.
Act No. 9344,[25] the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, violated? and (3) Does Section 32[26] of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law have application in this
case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for
certiorari.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[27]
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of
jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[28]
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows that the RTC neither
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered
to principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the
penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. [29] If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech
is the index of intention.[30] Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.[31]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section
24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug
trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11 [32] and 15[33] of the Act. The law considers the
users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence,
while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on
probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.
[34]
The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from
the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the
law could have easily declared so.[35]
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug
users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six
months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep.
Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-118-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law has application in this
case. Section 68[36] of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension
of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 [37] of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child
under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section
40[38] of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence
for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has
already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child [39] for purposes of
applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as
his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
-versusHERMIE M. JACINTO,
Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 182239

Promulgated:
March 16, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victims positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. [1] For it to prosper, the court
must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at
the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[2]
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and
executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground
that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known
as An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes.
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA, [3] appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court
the reversal of the judgment of his conviction. [4]
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 2003 [5] filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1], [6] appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening
more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction

of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim
being only five years old.[7]
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. [8] During pre-trial,[9] the defense admitted
the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3
December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon
presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective
versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,[10] her father FFF,[11] and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito] [12] may be
summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFFs house is along the road. That of
appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by
FFFs house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be every minute [and] every hour. Also,
appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to the
incident.[13]
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time playing at
the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She
and appellant used to be friends until the incident.[14]
At about past 6 oclock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC
to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC.When CCC returned without AAA, FFF
was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita]. [15]
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum. [16] At
the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap. [17] He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short
pants.[18] All of them left the store at the same time. [19] Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch
television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the lower area or
place.[20]
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants [21] when he
held her hand while on the road near the store. [22] They walked towards the rice field near the house of
spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos]. [23] There he made her lie down on harrowed ground,
removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. [24] Already half-naked from waist down,[25] he mounted her,
and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull
movement.[26] She felt pain and cried. [27] Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos. [28] She,
in turn, went straight home crying.[29]
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. [30] She was without slippers.[31] He
found her face greasy.[32] There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head.
[33]
He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black. [34] She had
no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina. [35] AAA told him that appellant
brought her from the store[36] to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos; [37] that he threw
away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast; [38] and that he proceeded
thereafter to the Perochos.[39]
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos. [40] He asked the appellant what he
did to AAA.[41] Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.
[42]
FFF went home to check on his daughter,[43] afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again, [44] and
boxed him.[45]
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the
house of Rita.[46] AAA and her mother MMM arrived.[47] AAA was crying.[48] Julito pitied her, embraced her,
and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her. [49] Julito left and found
appellant at the Perochos.[50]Julito asked appellant, Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of
[MMM]? but the latter ignored his question.[51] Appellants aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen
were coming to which the appellant responded, Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow
(sic) and my knees.[52] Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt. [53]
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered.
FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center. [55] Dr. Bernardita M.
Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical certificate [56] dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
[54]

Injuries seen are as follows:

1.
Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.

Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
Hymenal lacerations at the 5 oclock and 9 oclock position

Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar, [57] AAA submitted herself to another examination at the provincial
hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital,
attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003, [58] the pertinent portion of
which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is
no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)[59]
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his
testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at
the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime. [60] Luzvilla even went further to state that she
actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. [61] In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sisterin-law of appellants aunt, Gloria,[62] testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.
[63]

Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back
of FFFs house.[64] He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road
or to fetch water.[65] He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF, [66] and whenever he was
asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him. [67]
At about 8 oclock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a
birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro
Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellants uncle sent him to the store to
buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to return after
three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .[68]
Appellants aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the
birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that
appellants white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean. [69]
At 6:30 in the evening,[70] Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a
drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors. [71] She went out to relieve herself at the side of
the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos. [72] From where she was, she saw Julito, who was
wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA. [73] AAAs face was covered and she was wiggling.
[74]
This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game. [75] Meanwhile, appellant was still in the
kitchen when she returned.[76] Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,
[77]
running towards the house of Rita.[78] AAA was slowly following behind.[79] Luzvilla followed them.[80] Just
outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her. [81] The child did not
answer.[82]
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed
him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at
appellant. Appellants uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization
(CVO) member admonished FFF.[83]
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening, she was watching the television
along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black
short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA
came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon
Antonias advice, Julito released her and went out of the house. [84]
Appellant further testified that at past 7 oclock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him,
brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 oclock in the
evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter. [85]
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, [86] the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to
pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs [87]
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant
was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was
committed on 28 January 2003.[88] The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua.[89]Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused
is amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.The
penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of
the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review
by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.[90]
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is
ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs. [91]
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants Notice of Appeal.
This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs. [93] Both
parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their respective briefs and
would no longer file any supplement.[94]
[92]

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE [95] by invoking
the principle that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt,
then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction. [96]
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three
well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.[97]
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to
convict the accused.[98] More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the
examining physician.[99]
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the perpetrator of the
crime,[100] except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at
the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[101]
I
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in
the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority.[102]
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in
the insertion of appellants organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the
physicians sufficiently proved such fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx

Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what
else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.[103]
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in
order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all she had been
raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape
was committed.[104] Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty. [105]
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo [106] revealed that the hymenal
lacerations at 5 oclock and 9 oclock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that
the redness of the introitus could have been the result of the repeated battering of the object; and that
such object could have been an erect male organ.[107]
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration conclusively
established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.[108]
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the
commission of the crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.[109]
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him
during the commission of the crime.[110] AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA
even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus[111] that it would be impossible for
the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused,
whom she called kuya and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house,
and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing
and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito
Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was
accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her. [112]
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of
the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has the opportunity to
observe the witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full
realization of their oath, [113]unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted.[114]
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the
crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainants positive
identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that
on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him What is this
incident, Pare?, thus corroborating the latters testimony that he confronted accused after
hearing of the incident from the child. [115]

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial
and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies
were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the appellants very
testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay;
that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought
Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On crossexamination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident
because he was then at work.[116] He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the second
time and boxed appellant.[117] It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy
Tanduay.[118] Further, the drinking session started only after the appellants errand to the store. [119]
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to
Glorias statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvillas testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia
Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvillas claim that Julito wore a
white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA
and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a
sleeveless shirt, Luzvillas recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to
white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvillas story that she saw AAA walking towards Ritas house three (3) minutes
after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of
Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial courts appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her
father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry
among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court
believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla
Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita
Lingkay could take a look at her just as Julito Apiki said. [120]
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having
been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot
qualify as such, they being related or were one way or another linked to each other. [121]
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts,
still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
[122]

Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs
criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene
of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. [123]
In People v. Paraiso,[124] the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of
the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.
[125]
Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court
disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left
to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the
accused slept all throughout.[126]
In People v. Antivola,[127] the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant
that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this
Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellants part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellants
sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellants physical presence in the
fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellants
house where the rape occurred, was a stones throw away from the fishpond. Their
claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4,
1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for
almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of
counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was
50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the

appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out
unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and
ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.[128] (Emphasis supplied.)
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight,
save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover,
considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it
would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos
down the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant
could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncles
house.[129] Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he
was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime. [130]
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at
the time and place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic
Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years
before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:[131]
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344][132] allows the retroactive application of the Act to
those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this
said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction
by the lower court is still under review. [133] (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case,
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with the Act shall be observed. [134]
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of
his unlawful act.[135] Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. [136]
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong.[137] Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and
the minors cunning and shrewdness.[138]
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: (1) choosing an isolated and dark
place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense
are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellants mental capacity to fully understand the
consequences of his unlawful action.[139]
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA [140] shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she
was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death
penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old [141] applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the
imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; [142] and (2) the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one
degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. [143]
Relying on People v. Bon,[144] the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties
provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. [145]Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion
perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months ofreclusion
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.[146]
We differ.

In a more recent case,[147] the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18
years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.[148] (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless
of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[149]
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on
the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family. [150] The respective awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.[151]
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in
the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence,[152] the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of
Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even
if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held
that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, [154] the aforestated provision
does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.[155]
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,[156] overturning
the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by
the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D.
and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply
to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish
between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been
convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty
of a heinous crime.[157]
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations [158] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous
crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict
with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could
be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos]

proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding;

but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or
primary consideration.Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)[159]
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict
with the Law, which reflected the same position.[160]
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no
longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[161] Section 40[162] of the law and Section 48[163] of the
Rule are clear on the matter.Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare
of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who hasexceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The
age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance
with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.[164]
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,[165] the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect
appellants confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant is
reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.