Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance

[G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003]

ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourteenth Division, Manila, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision [1] dated May 31, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 18358, which affirmed with modification the judgment [2] dated August 25, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 36223. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property, and sentenced him to (a) suffer imprisonment for one
month and one day of arresto mayor, (b) pay private complainant, Mrs. Sheila Seyan, the amount of fifty one thousand
pesos (P51,000) for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw jeepney, and one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000)
for her hospital and medical expenses, and (c) pay the costs of suit. The CA increased the prison term imposed on
petitioner to four months ofarresto mayor.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing the road along
Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu
pick-up, driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it
was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to
its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at
Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with
the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to
separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally
astride the center of the road.
Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. [3] Seyan was profusely bleeding from her nose
and was in a state of shock with her eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989, she was
transferred to St. Pauls Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined. Her medical certificate revealed that she suffered a
fracture on the right femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and
lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney.[4] She was discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990.
Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss
was computed at P80,000.
A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious physical injuries was filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Barotac Nuevo against petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran. [5] Probable cause was
found against petitioner, while the complaint against Iran was dismissed. [6]
Consequently, an Information was filed against petitioner charging him with serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence, thus:
That on or about November 29, 1989, in the Municipality of Barotac Nuevo, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Rogelio Engada driving an Isuzu Pick-up with Plate
No. SAR 117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with reckless
imprudence drive said pick-up in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner with disregard of traffic laws and regulations,
and as a result of such negligent and reckless driving the Isuzu Pick-up driven by the accused bumped a Toyota Tamaraw
jeep with Plate No. FBF 601 owned by Joelito and Sheila Seyan and driven by Edwin Iran thereby causing damage to the
Toyota Tamaraw in the amount of P80,000.00 and serious physical injuries to Mrs. Sheila Seyan who was riding said
vehicle, the injuries barring complications will heal in more than 30 days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance

After trial, the court rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Imprudence resulting [in]
physical injuries and damage to property defined and penalized in Article 263, paragraph 4 and in relation with Article
365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of
ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor.
Accused is further ordered to pay complainant Mrs. Sheila Seyan the amount of P51,000.00 for the total destruction of the
Toyota Tamaraw Jeepney and P110,000.00 for indemnification of hospital and medical expenses, and to pay the cost of
the suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
with modification the trial courts decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification as to the penalty imposed upon the accused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4)
MONTHS of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, wherein petitioner raises
the issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE OR BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS RESULTING IN A MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN
INFERENCE SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND WHOSE ACT
WAS IT.[10]
Petitioner claims innocence and seeks acquittal. He contends that in this case we should relax the rule that only legal
questions can be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the Court of
Appeals misapprehended the facts, and erred in its conclusion as to the proximate cause of the collision. He insists that the
Court of Appeals erred when it found him negligent for occupying the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney, and then failing to
return to his original lane at the safest and earliest opportunity.
Petitioner further contends that the CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to go back to his lane
by flashing the pick-ups right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more
reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left, according to petitioner, the collision would have been
avoided. It was Iran who was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[11] petitioner avers that although his act of occupying the Tamaraws lane was the initial act in the chain of events,
Irans swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted a sufficient intervening event, which
proximately caused the eventual injuries and damages to private complainant.
Petitioner also claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the pick-up approached the Tamaraw at a
fast speed. He maintains that this was not borne by the evidence on record.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in
convicting the accused, now petitioner herein. Petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, according
to the OSG, for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no justifiable reason occupied the opposite lane. Second, while
on the wrong lane, petitioner was driving the Isuzu pick-up fast, and he returned to his own lane only at the last minute.
This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, with no opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the accident. Irans
swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioners wrongful act, which appropriately calls for the application of the
emergency rule. The rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a sudden emergency might have no time
for thought, and he must make a prompt decision based largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to the
same standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that he made the wrong
decision. Clearly, under the emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to Iran, concludes the OSG.

Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance

As to petitioners claim that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up was running very fast, the OSG avers that
this is rebutted by the testimony of Seyan and Iran who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a fast speed when
it encroached on their lane immediately before the collision.
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio Engada, was the proximate cause of the
collision? This is the crux of the present petition.
In our view, petitioners attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, for the vehicular collision
is unfounded. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioners pick-up, which was already on a head to head position
going against Irans Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. This fact has been established by the
evidence on record. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of the Tamaraw, Iran, could have
avoided a head-on collision.
We note that petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney. Prosecution witness
Nelson Alobin, one of those who went to the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when he arrived at the place
where the collision took place, he saw the pick-up positioned diagonally at the center of the road. [12] Its head was towards
the direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were just a few inches beyond the center of the lane. [13] Moving
backwards facing Barotac Nuevo, at two arms length away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12 inches long
and located at the left side of the center line going to the right side. [14]
The above circumstance corroborates the testimony of both Seyan and Iran that, immediately before the collision, the
pick-up was not on its proper lane but on the other lane (the left lane rather than the right) directly on collision course with
the Tamaraw jeepney. The tire mark reveals the short distance between the two vehicles when the Isuzu pick-up attempted
to return to its proper lane.
It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
[15]
This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line
of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly
visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in
safety.
In the present case, there was only a distance of 30 meters from the Tamaraw jeepney when the Isuzu pick-up
abandoned its lane and swerved to the left of the center line. [16] In addition, petitioner was running at a fast clip while
traversing this lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran, unrebutted by petitioner. The resulting damage to the
Tamaraw jeepney, at the point where the head and chassis were separated from the body, bolsters this conclusion that
petitioner was speeding. In our view, petitioner was negligent in several ways, and his negligence was the proximate cause
of the collision. In abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the opposite lane was free of oncoming traffic and
was available for a safe passage. Further, after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did not slow down, contrary
to the rule set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC,[17] thus:
[O]r if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the passage in safety, the
latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if necessary.
For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner
must be held liable.
Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left. Petitioners acts had put Iran
in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. [18]
Petitioner tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of last clear chance. He avers that between
him and Iran, the latter had the last clear chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.

Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance

The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
of the accident.[19] But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his
invocation of the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper
application of the emergency rule.Petitioners act of swerving to the Tamaraws lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and
driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the
situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding petitioner
responsible for the vehicular collision and the resulting damages, including the injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and
the total loss of the Tamaraw jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of four (4) months
of arresto mayor.[20]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 18358 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. 153076

June 21, 2007

LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LADECO), HENRY BERENGUEL,

and APOLONIO R. DEOCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
MICHAEL RAYMOND ANGALA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 25 July 2001 Decision2 and 11 March 2002 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51134.
The Antecedent Facts
On 4 May 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-903 driven by Apolonio Deocampo
(Deocampo) bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala
(respondent) and driven by Bernulfo Borres (Borres). Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO)
owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez (Mendez). Deocampo was the driver and
bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards
Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorneys Fees against LADECO, its administrative officer
Henry Berenguel4 (Berenguel) and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten
kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the
crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent
alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at
the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a
blinking light while looking at the speedometer.5

Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance

Respondent sent a demand letter to LADECO for the payment of the damages he incurred because of the accident but he
did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.
Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were both running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was
running along the outer lane. The pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the left. Deocampo
testified that he did not see any signal from the pick-up. 6 Deocampo alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-up but he was
unable to avoid the collision. Deocampo stated that he did not apply the brakes because he knew the collision was
unavoidable. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 3 March 1995 Decision,7 the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 (trial court) ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants LADECO and Apolonio Deocampo to
solidarily pay the plaintiffs the following sums:
1. Twenty three thousand two hundred (P23,200.00) pesos as actual damages.
2. Ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
3. Ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos as attorneys fees.
4. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court found that the crewcab was running very fast while following the pick-up and that the crewcabs speed was
the proximate cause of the accident. The trial court observed that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the point of
impact despite Deocampos claim that he stepped on the brakes moments after the collision. The trial court ruled that
Deocampo had the last opportunity to avoid the accident.
The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab.
LADECO and Deocampo (petitioners)9 filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied petitioners motion in its
13 June 1995 Order.10
Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts decision.
The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the trial court that Deocampo was negligent. The Court of Appeals applied
the doctrine of last clear chance and ruled that Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding the pick-up.
The Court of Appeals also sustained the solidary liability of LADECO and Deocampo. The Court of Appeals ruled that
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the negligence of the driver is presumed to be the negligence of the owner of the
vehicle.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision of the
Court a quo in Civil Case No. 22067-93 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 March 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for lack of merit.

Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance

Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
The issues before the Court are the following:
1. Whether the provisions of Section 45(b) of Republic Act No. 4136 12 (RA 4136) and Article 2185 of the Civil
Code apply to this case; and
2. Whether respondent is entitled to the damages awarded.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Both Drivers are Negligent
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Deocampo was at fault because he was driving very fast prior to
the collision. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that Deocampo was running more than the normal
cruising speed. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals noted that the crewcab stopped 21 meters away from the
point of impact. Deocampo admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision.
Petitioners allege that Borres did not take the proper lane before executing the U-turn. Petitioners allege that Borres
violated Section 45(b) of RA 4136 and it was his recklessness that was the proximate cause of the accident.
Section 45(b) of RA 4136 states:
Sec. 45. Turning at intersections. x x x
(b) The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left shall approach such intersection in the lane for traffic to the
right of and nearest to the center line of the highway, and, in turning, shall pass to the left of the center of the
intersection, except that, upon highways laned for traffic and upon one-way highways, a left turn shall be made
from the left lane of traffic in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding.
Petitioners further allege that since Borres was violating a traffic rule at the time of the accident, respondent and Borres
were the parties at fault. Petitioners cite Article 2185 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
We rule that both parties were negligent in this case. Borres was at the outer lane when he executed a U-turn. Following
Section 45(b) of RA 4136, Borres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest to the center of the
highway. However, Deocampo was equally negligent. Borres slowed down the pick-up preparatory to executing the Uturn. Deocampo should have also slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. Deocampo admitted that he noticed the
pick-up when it was still about 20 meters away from him. 13 Vehicular traffic was light at the time of the incident. The
pick-up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road. 14 Deocampo could have avoided the crewcab if he was not
driving very fast before the collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. We sustain this finding
since factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on this
Court.15 Further, the crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. It would not have happened if Deocampo was
not driving very fast.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Applies
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. 16 In this case, Deocampo had

Overtaking doctrine of last clear chance

the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the
situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. 17Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding
bumping the vehicle in front of him.18 A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning,
compared to running straight ahead.19 Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while
following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon
seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
Petitioners are Solidarily Liable
LADECO alleges that it should not be held jointly and severally liable with Deocampo because it exercised due diligence
in the supervision and selection of its employees. Aside from this statement, LADECO did not proffer any proof to show
how it exercised due diligence in the supervision and selection of its employees. LADECO did not show its policy in
hiring its drivers, or the manner in which it supervised its drivers. LADECO failed to substantiate its allegation that it
exercised due diligence in the supervision and selection of its employees.
Hence, we hold LADECO solidarily liable with Deocampo.
Respondent is Entitled to Moral Damages
We sustain the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means, diversion, or
amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action. 20 The
trial court found that respondent, who was on board the pick-up when the collision took place, suffered shock, serious
anxiety, and fright when the crewcab bumped his pick-up. We sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in ruling that
respondent sufficiently showed that he suffered shock, serious anxiety, and fright which entitle him to moral damages.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any justification for the award of attorneys fees. Awards of
attorneys fees must be based on findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of the trial court. 21Further, no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.22 Hence, we delete the award of attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 25 July 2001 Decision and 11 March 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 51134 with MODIFICATION by deleting the award of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales* , Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., On official leave.