The Rise and Demise of Industrial Agriculture in North Korea PDF

The Rise and Demise of Industrial Agriculture in North Korea
Author(s): Chong-Ae Yu
Source: The Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (fall 2007), pp. 75-109
Published by: University of Washington Center for Korea Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41490234
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The
Rise
and
Agriculture
Demise
of Industrial
in North
Chong-Ae
Korea
Yu
Scholarsconventionally
oneofthree
causesforNorth
Korea'sagricultural
suggest
overalleconomic
decline
in thesocialist
, deficiencies
collapsein themid-1990s:
collective
or
environmental
disaster.
In
contrast
to
these
each
,
system
explanations,
theNorth
Koreanagricultural
characterizes
collapseas an idiosyncratic
ofwhich
to theunsustainable
, thisarticleshowsthatthiscrisiscan be attributed
failure
nature
industrial
hasbeenrootedina thoroughgoing
, which
ofmodern
agriculture
From
modernization
oftheworldwide
projectofthepastcentury.
implementation
was
itsoutset,
North
Korea'sindustrial
growth predicated
agricultural
production
chemicals
and
onthehighconsumption
usedtoproduceagricultural
ofpetroleum
While
North
Koreaachieved
subandirrigation.
energy
formechanization
provide
stantial
successduring
thefirstthreedecadesofitsindustrialization,
agricultural
exteritsmethods
an
unsustainable
levelofphysical
andenvironmental
produced
Korea'sneed
nalities.
Thesubsequent
declineoftheSovietUnionmeant
thatNorth
couldno longerbe met,a stateofaffairs
thatledtothe
forsynthetic
agro-inputs
collapseofthe1990s.Thisanalysisshowsthattheuniqueness
ofNorthKorea's
methods
used,butrather
agricultural
collapseliesnotintheindustrial
agricultural
intheir
With
a
that
indicate
oilproduction
extremity. variety
ofanalyses
declining
ina context
demand
theNorth
Koreancasehas
ofincreasing
forpetroleum
energy,
thatextend
wellbeyond
theKoreanpeninsula.
implications
foragriculture
Until its spectacularcollapse in the mid-1990s,modernagriculturein the
DemocraticPeople's RepublicofKorea (DPRK, hereafter
to as North
referred
was
considered
to
be
a
of
successful
socialist
modKorea)
primeexample
ernization.1
This agriculturalcollapse was one of the factorsin a mammoth
faminethatclaimednearlyone millionlives, out of a totalpopulationof 22
Yuisa PhDcandidate
indevelopment
atCornell
Chong-Ae
sociology
University.
TheJournal
Studies
12,no.1 (Fall2007):75-110
ofKorean
75
Yu
Chong-Ae
76
million.2Despite thetopographicaldisadvantagesof a mountainouscountry,

a shortgrowingseason, themassivedestructioninflictedduringtheKorean
War (1950-53), and decades of economicblockade,NorthKorea reporteda
- 8 milliontons3
- thatfarexceeded the
recordin 1984 in grainproduction
of a populationthathad doubledfrom10 million
consumptionrequirements
how was NorthKorea able
to 22 million.Giventheseproductionconstraints,
to meet its growingconsumptionrequirementsforseveral decades before
A shortansweris itsindusplungingintoa near-totalcollapse in production?
trialmodel of agriculture.
In tracingNorth Korea's grain production,I have used what credible
sources were available. Figure 1 illustratesthe rise and demise of North
Korea's cereal production.Cereal yieldsgrewrapidlyoverthe two decades
from1960 to 1980,fromslightlyover3 milliontonsto over7 milliontons.4
Grain productionreached its heightfouryears later,rapidlyincreasingto
8 milliontons in 1984.5However,a precipitousdrop in grainproduction
down to 6.74 milliontons- came a few years later.In 1993, a year before
thewell publicizedadverseweatherthatimpactedcereal production,North
Korea's productionhad already fallento 5.44 milliontons.6This decrease
reflectsa decline of overall cereal productionby some 20 percentbetween
91
w=
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
1
1
.
.
0J
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
inNorth
Production
Korea,1960-2004
Figure1.Grain
cerealgrains.
areforrice,maize,andallother
Note:Figures
KimII
North
Korean
: Composite
databasedonofficial
Source
including
publications,
intheDPRK(Pyongyang:
andEconomic
NewYearaddresses,
Development
Sung'sannual
"FoodandPolitical
bothcitedinC. Kenneth
Press,1993),
Quinones,
Foreign
Languages
oftheUnited
inNorth
Korea,"
96-103;andFoodandAgriculture
Organization
Stability
Assessment
Mission
tothe
FAO/WFP
Nations
(FAO),SpecialReport
CropandFoodSupply
for1989,1993,and1995.
contained
information
The1995report
DPRK(1995-2004).
inNorth
Korea
TheRiseandDemiseofIndustrial
Agriculture
11
1989and 1993.As thisarticle'sanalysesshow,itseems likelythatthedecline

resultednot frompoor conditions,but insteadfromstructuralproblemsin
NorthKorea's agriculturalindustry.These problemspredatedthe adventof
seriousnaturalcalamities.Controllingfortheclimaticsetbacksof 1995,grain
yieldswould likelyhave been some 3.1 milliontons forpaddy rice and 2.7
millionformaize.7The pointis thatalthoughcropswereaffectedby extreme
morethan
variationsin climaticconditions,yieldsdeclinedby substantially
theseconditionscan explain.
NorthKorea's agriculturalcollapse to
Conventionalexplanationsattribute
overalleconomicdecline,the deficienciesof the socialistcollectivesystem,
failure.By
or environmental
disaster,and view thenationas an idiosyncratic
analyzingnotjust the crisis of the collapse but also the processes involved
in therise and demise of modern,industrialagriculturein NorthKorea, this
articlepresentsa different
viewpoint.Rather,I arguethatNorthKorea's agriculturalcrisis stemsfromthe unsustainablepracticesof modernindustrial
agriculture.NorthKorea owed its threedecades of impressiveagricultural
success to industrialand technologicalinterventions.
However,thesemethods creatednotonlyan increasingneed forsynthetic
inputsbutalso dangerous levels of physicaland environmental
externalities.
NorthKorea paid for
its earlysuccess withthe collapse of the 1990s. Ironically,the same set of
factorsdroveboththesuccess and thecollapse.
Fromtheoutset,itis important
tonotethatdataassessmentandinterpretation
notwithstillremainmajorchallengesin studyingNorthKorean agriculture,
standingthelasttwelveyearssincethefaminein 1995-96,whichnecessitated
humanitarian
aid. These
to secureinternational
greaterprovisionofinformation
difficulties
arise both fromwithinNorthKorea, wheredata is sporadicand
as well as fromoutsideNorthKorea,wheretheWestpoliticizes
idiosyncratic,
information
aboutthe country.Ideologicalskirmishesaboutthe validityand
ofinformation
continue,butsomeprogresshas been made sincethe
reliability
for
humanitarian
crisisin themid-1990s.Therenow existgreateropportunities
UnitedNations(UN) agenciesand othersinvolvedin reliefefforts
to obtainadverifiable
andqualitaditional,independently
empiricaldata- bothquantitative
tive aboutagriculture.
Since thisarticleexaminesthehistoricaldevelopment
ofNorthKoreanagriculture
and itsrelationto thecurrentagricultural
crisis,I
utilizebothNorthKoreanand international
datato illustrate
thistrend.
THREE ARGUMENTS ON THE CAUSE OF
NORTH KOREA'S AGRICULTURAL COLLAPSE
The literatureon the North Korean food and agriculturalcrisis tends to
emphasize threecauses: economic decline, the organizational/institutional
78
Yu
Chong-Ae
deficienciesofthesocialistcollectivesystem,and environmental
factors.The
debateoverthesecauses typicallytakesplace withintheconfinesof seeking
thecausal factorsofthefamineand foodcrisisratherthanunderstanding
the
of
the
itself.
each
of
these
collapse
agriculturalsystem
Although
arguments
partiallyexplainsthe agriculturalcrisis,none providesa causal explanation
of what precipitatedthe collapse of the agriculturalproductionsystem
.I
presentthekeypointsof each argumentin thesectionsthatfollow.
The "General Economic Decline" Argument
Althoughopinionvaries on the cause of NorthKorea's economic decline,
proponentsofthisargumentsharetheview thatdespiteNorthKorea's claim
of being self-reliant
and independent,it was not freefromthe constraints
of the world economy.8North Korea relied heavily on the formerSoviet
Union (Russia) and on China fortradeand technicalassistancein key secin 1989,NorthKorea lost
tors.Once the socialistbloc began to disintegrate
assistanceand preferential-trade
treatment
fromRussia and China. ConseNorthKorea's abilityto importthecriticalinputs- suchas thecrude
quently,
oil, petroleumproducts,cokingcoal, and machinepartsthatwere essential
to the operationof its industrialsector- was drasticallyreduced,whichin
turnseverelystrainedthecountry'sindustrialsector.NorthKorea's modern
as well
agriculturedependedheavilyon its industrialsectorforagro-inputs,
as on importedfuel and petroleumproducts,whichmeantthatthe agriculturaldecline occurredalongsidea generaleconomic contraction.9
Scholars
who supportthis argumentattributeNorthKorea's inabilityto sustainits
agriculturalproductionsystemeitherto shrinkagein macroeconomiccondi- or to thedeterioration
tions- thatis, thedissolutionofthesocialistsystem
ofNorthKorea's industrialsector.
This argumentpresupposesthat if needed inputswere provided,agriculturalproductionwould recoverto its previous levels. Such a recovery,
and environmental
however,is unlikelygiventhe stateof soil fertility
degradationin NorthKorea, theunpredictableglobal ecological impactsyetto
be manifested,
and thesocial changesthathave occurredin NorthKorea as a
resultoftheagriculturalcrisisduringthelast decade.
The Organizational/InstitutionalArgument
The organizational/institutional
argumentfocuseson inherentdeficienciesof
colthesocialistcollectivefarmingsystemas theprimarycause ofagricultural
in
of
the
overcentralization
decision-making agricultural
management
lapse:
andpractices,theinfluenceofan extensiveand inflexiblestatebureaucracyon
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
79
economicand social life,and theabsenceoffarmerincentivesas a resultofthe

collectivefarmingsystem.10
The oft-citedexamples in this line of argumentare the practiceofjuche
and the issue of commonprop(<chuch'e, self-reliance)farmingmethods,11
ertyownership.Criticsofjuche farmingmethodsargue thatsuch methods
are based on politicalreasoning,not on agriculturalsciences,12withfarmers being forcedto implementthemethodsof a rigidpoliticalsystem.North
Korea countersthe criticsby contendingthatjuche methodsare, in fact,
based on agriculturalsciences intendedto raise land productivity
through
intensivecropproductionmanagement.Thoughdiametricallyopposed,both
theargumentand counterargument
ofinduspointto theassumedframework
trialagriculturein NorthKorea. Alternatively,
I would arguethatthefailure
ofjuche methodspointsto the insolvencyof the existingindustrialagriculturalsystemratherthanthemethodsit implements,
whetherit is politically
motivatedor scientifically
based.
The proponentsoftheorganizational/institutional
argumentpostulatethat
a lack of privatepropertyownershipand farmerincentivepreventsfarmers
frommakingan investment
in agriculture,
since underthecollectivesystem,
farmersare de factostate-employed
agriculturalworkers.As such,theycomply withgovernment
plans forproductionat a minimallevel. Furthermore,
bureaucraticintervention
is exogenousto any successfulmanagementof the
farmorganization,and because ofthisbureaucraticimperative,
togetherwith
the individualfarmer'sinabilityto make any decisions on his or her own,
farmershave no incentivesto outperform.13
of decision-makingand
However,if one supposes thatovercentralization
lack of farmerincentivein NorthKorea are the main causes of production
decline in the 1990s, how does one explainthe factthat,formanydecades,
NorthKorea achieved impressiveincreases in agriculturalproductionwith
littlechange to incentivesor planning systems?In reality,agriculturein
NorthKorea has been decentralizedto county-levelsince the mid-1960s,
consistingof a primaryproductionunit(subworkteam) of fifteento twentyfivepeople permanently
In
assignedto a givenarea ofland and implements.14
themid-1980s,the subworkteam was even moredecentralized,comprising
fewerthansevenor eightpeople. Formuchoftheirlives,manyofthefarmers
stayedin a small subworkteam unit,oftenmade up of theirown relatives.
line of argumentprovidesinsights
Certainly,theorganizational/institutional
intothe shortcomings
of the collectivestructureand planned economy,but
itdoes notexplainhow thesystemfunctionedreasonablywell forhalfa centurywithvery littlechange. This line of argumentfrequentlyoffersfamsolution(privatization)as silverbullets,yet
ily farmingand the free-market
economiestella different
experiencesin transition
story.Would"themarket"
80
Yu
Chong-Ae
bringback sustainableagricultureand safe food production,and undo the

damages done by fifty
yearsof industrialagriculture?
The EnvironmentalArgument
The lastofthethreeargumentsexaminedhererestswithintheexistingliteratureas a secondaryfactorcontributing
to NorthKorea's agricultural
decline.15
The NorthKoreangovernment
citeda variantofthisargument,
emphasizing
"naturaldisaster"as thecause,whenitfirstapproachedtheinternational
comin
for
humanitarian
assistance
1995.
In
turn,manynonmunity
September
governmental
organizations(NGOs) and UN agenciesinvokedthis"natural
disaster"explanationas justification
forprovidinghumanitarian
assistanceto
NorthKorea in 1995, 1996, and 1997,16out of politicalconvenience.To be
NorthKorea in thelaterhalf
sure,theseriesofnaturalcalamitiesthatafflicted
of the 1990s had a devastatingimpacton food productionand agricultural
land,notablythefloodsin 1995 and 1996, and droughtsand a tidal wave in
1997 and again in 2000-2001.
Unlike otherscholars,MeredithWoo-Cumingsidentifiesthese negative
the agricultural
ecological impactsas one of theprimaryfactorsunderlying
crisisand ensuingfaminein NorthKorea. Woo-Cumingspositsthata series
ofecologicaldisastersthroughout
theworldnegativelyaffectedfragileeconomies in thelastthreedecades. In the 1990s,NorthKorea was at theepicenter
ofa globalecologicaldisasterthatexplainstheextentto whichitsagricultural
productiondropped.17
thenaturalcalamitiesthatoccurredoverseveralyearsduringthe
Certainly,
mid-1990scontributed
to further
environmental
degradationand a declinein
foodproduction.The environmental
argumentexplainsboththeextentofthe
to
North
Korea's
degradation
agriculturalland and highlightsthe 1995 and
1996 disastersas local manifestations
of global ecological havoc. Together,
theseforcesmayhavetippedthebalance ofNorthKorea's agricultural
conditionduringthisperiod.
accountsforneither
the1980sagriculNotably,theenvironmental
argument
turaldeclinebeforethefloodsof themid-1990s,northecontinueddepressed
in theabsenceofcalamitiesin theyearssince.It is morelikelythat
production
nationalfoodproductionpolicyhad alreadyseriously
yearsofinput-intensive
the
arable
land
in NorthKorea.
degraded
In contrastto the threeconventionalexplanationsjust discussed,each of
which characterizesthe NorthKorean agriculturalcollapse as an idiosyncraticfailure,thisarticleshowsthatNorthKorea's agriculturalcrisiscan be
which
attributed
to theunsustainablenatureofmodernindustrialagriculture,
oftheworldwide
in turnhas been rootedin a thoroughgoing
implementation
modernization
projectofthepast century.
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL
AGRICULTURE
81
IN NORTH KOREA
While NorthKorean agricultureis now consideredto be an utterfailure,its

presentcrisismustbe understoodin relationnotonlyto thecountry'spostcolonialdevelopment,
butalso to thefeverishglobal driveforindustrialagricultureas thedominantmodel forfoodproduction.This model of agricultureis
based on theconcentration
and centralization
of land and capitalthataccomis
monoculture
which
bothmachine-and chemicalpanylarge-scale
farming,
of
and
intensive,
requiringlargeinputs energy
specializationin high-yielding
18
hybridcrops. Soon afterNorthKorea was establishedin 1945, it embarked
on a modernizationprojectthatfundamentally
transformed
its societyfrom
withtheaim ofachievingfoodself-sufficiency.
agrarianto industrial,
A postcolonialsociety,NorthKorea was an emergingsocialiststatewhen,
of two imposingsuperpowers:the
earlyon, it experiencedthe intervention
Soviet Union, politically,and the United States, militarily.North Korea's
as a cornerstone
ofitsnationaldevelopment
emphasison foodself-sufficiency
as a
policycame aftertheKoreanWar.The country'sperceptionofagriculture
basis forits"nationalsecurity"was apparently
forgedfromthedevastationof
itscountryside
andagricultural
base wroughtbytwoforces- blanketbombing
divisionoftheKoreanpeninsulawith
bytheUnitedStates,and thecontinuing
- duringthe
the accompanyingthreatof Cold War-era militaryhostilities
KoreanWar.NorthKorea believedthatwithouta securefoodsupplyitwould
be vulnerableto foreigndominationand militaryaggression.19
Althoughthe
country'sphysicalresourcebase severelylimitedits abilityto become agritheagricultural
rate
self-sufficient,
culturally
doublingand tripling
production
seemedpossiblewiththeaid ofmodernscienceand technology.In the 1950s,
the Green Revolution'spromisesof increasedfood productionalreadyheld
swayin manypartsoftheworld,and NorthKorea latchedontotheidea ofscience-basedagricultural
as a way to move forward.
development
NorthKorea was committedto modernizingtheruralarea throughtechnologicalinnovationand socialistsocialization.The socioeconomicprocessthat
tookplace notonly"upgraded"agricultural
butalso socializedthe
technology,
into
socialist
farmers
as
the
state
peasantry
becoming
graduallyconsolidated
into
common
privateownership
property
ownership.Modernizingagriculture
showedthestate'sattitudetowarddevelopmentin general:themodernization
of thefarmsectorwas synonymouswithindustrialization,
and industrializationwas viewed as the silverbulletto NorthKorea's overalldevelopmental
was a social and politicalproject,
challenges.The technologicalintervention
notjust an economicand technologicalsolutionto developruralproductive
forces.To give a sense of how extensiveand rapidthe agriculturalindustrializationprocesshas been, thenextsectionbrieflyoutlinesthemain componentsofthedevelopment
of industrialagriculturein NorthKorea.
Yu
Chong-Ae
82
Rescaling the Land
In 1943,two yearspriorto the liberationfromJapanesecolonization,44.2

percentof NorthKorean peasants were landless, involvedin tenantfarm(definedas peasantswho had
ing or employedas farmlabor.If part-tenants
some land of theirown and rentedtherest)were includedin thecalculation,
therateoftenancywas 75 percent,withmostfarmsless than 1 hectare,and
This meantthatthree
only 4 percentof the farmslargerthan 5 hectares.20
of fourfarmhouseholdswere eitherlandless or perilouslyclose to being
landless,withtoo small a plotto adequatelysustaina farmfamilyafterrent
was takenout. Againstthisbackdrop,in March 1946, less thana year after
independence,NorthKorea initiatedthe firstof several land reformsthat
eventuallyled to thetotalcollectivizationof itsruralcommunities,in which
to 724,522
nearlyone millionhectaresof confiscatedland wereredistributed
Each
state
under
2
than
with
less
ownership.21 household
households,
percent
benarable
of
1.33
hectares
of
land; the redistribution
receivedan average
of
about
50
or
efitedmorethan70 percentoftheruralpopulation,
percent the
50 percent
more
than
totalpopulationofNorthKorea at thetime,and covered
ofthecultivableacreage.22
another
FollowingthecessationoftheKoreanWar,NorthKorea instituted
notonlylandownerThis time,thechangesaffected
roundofagrarianreform.
wereorganizedand adminship,butalso theway in whichruralcommunities
weretransformed
households
farm
the
istered.From1954 to 1958,
country's
which
into cooperativefarmsthroughthreephases of "cooperativization,"
graduallyled to fullcollectivizationon a "voluntary"basis overthefive-year
inducementsforthosecommunitiesthat
period.Therewere state-supported
however,
became "socialistcooperatives."These phases werenotso clear-cut,
and all threetypesexistedoverthefiveyearsuntil1958,whenthecollectivizationprocess was completedand the entireruralpopulationcame under
workers
exceptfora smallpopulationofagricultural
cooperativemanagement
allowed
was
household
farm
each
employedbythestatefarms.Nevertheless,
around
30
were
to keep a small gardenplot(these"kitchengardens"
p'yrtg,
or 100 square meters)and fruittrees,and to raise small domesticlivestock
The "phase-in"and
and sale at thefarmers'market.23
forfamilyconsumption
as well as to
resistance
minimize
to
seemed
potential
"voluntary"strategies
The historicollectivization.
into
transition
smoother
for
a
preparepeasants
cal timingmightalso have workedto the state'sadvantagein thetransition
fromprivateownershipto cooperativeownership.NorthKorea experienced
highcasualtiesand populationmigrationto SouthKorea duringthewar,conto labor shortagesin the ruralareas. This situation,togetherwith
tributing
toolsand availabledraughtanimalsforindividualfarming
limitedproduction
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
83
in postwarNorthKorea,mighthave encouragedpeasantsto considerpooling

resourcesas a morebeneficialoptionthanindividualfarming.
As collectivizationprogressed,thesize and scale of cooperativesgrew.In
1953 theaveragesize of a cooperativewas 14.7households,and theaverage
size ofa farmaround13.6hectares.The followingyear,thenumberofhouseholds per cooperativedoubledto 32.9, withthe correspondinglandholdings
quadrupling.The trendof the increases in both cooperativesize and landholdingscontinueduntil 1957. In its finalyear,the collectivizationprocess
thebasic, local administrative
unitofri (thesmallestadministraredistricted
tiveunitin NorthKorea's ruralareas,comparableto a townshipin theUnited
States)to includeall cooperativeswithina ri, and thisresultedin enlarging
theaveragesize of a farmfrom105 hectaresto 466 hectares.Table 1 shows
this consolidationprocess from1953 to 1958. One of the main reasons for
theconsolidationappearsto be to createlarge-scalefarming,witha view to
believedto be the
thatthegovernment
"speed up thetechnicalrevolution"24
most advantageousforsocialist construction.To the presentday, cooperativefarmshave remainedthedominantformof farmand ruralorganization
- includingland, farmfacilities,and
in NorthKorea, wherebyeverything
implements is owned collectivelyby cooperativemembers,who are paid
incomesin sharesof whattheyproduce.
Technological Intervention
NorthKorea's totalland area is about 12.3 millionhectares,of which75 percent is mountainousand unsuitableforagriculture.Of the remainingland
area, about 16.4percent(1.99 millionhectares)is arable.25The limitedpotentialforenlargingdomesticfoodproductionthroughfieldexpansionled North
Korea to adopt a strategyof agricultureintensification
throughirrigation,
mechanization,the intensiveuse of agro-chemicals,and thedevelopmentof
hybridseeds, buttressedby fullruralelectrification.
In 1964theNorthKoreangovernment
adopteda watershedpolicy,detailed
in Theses on the Socialist Rural Questions in Our Country
, a document
thatPresidentKim II Sung (Kim Ilsng) forwardedto the EighthPlenary
Meetingof theFourthCentralCommitteeof the Workers'Party,and which
was formallyadoptedon February25, 1964. Accordingto thisnew policy,
NorthKorea abandoned its traditionalagriculture,with its rotationalsystemsand organicfertilizing,
formorecapital-intensive,
mechanizedproduction,reducedlabor,and heavyapplicationof agrochemicals.Since economic
sanctionsdenied NorthKorea the benefitof the West's moderntechnology
and germplasm,the countrybegan to develop hybridseed varietiesof its
staplefoods,rice and maize, whichrequiredlarge amountsof fertilizerand
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inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
85
water.During thisperiod,NorthKorea's industrialand agriculturalsectors

became so irrevocablylinkedthatthe agriculturalsectorbecame a de facto
hostage of the industrialsector.Over the followingtwo decades, untilthe
in theagriculturalsectoracceleratedthe
early1980s,substantialinvestments
pace of buildingnew capital assets in power,irrigation,and the heavy use
of agrochemicalinputs.Undeterredby its topographicallimitations,North
Korea began convertingcoastal lands and swamplands,as well as steephillsides,to agriculturalcultivation,increasingits totalarable land by about 16
percent,from1.8 millionhectaresin 1946 to 2.1 millionhectaresin 1984.26
Rural electrification
was thebasic buildingblock of industrialagriculture
in NorthKorea, and itwas achievedwithconsiderablesuccess. NorthKorea
reportedthatby spring1969,91.2 percentofNorthKoreanruralhouseholds27
and 100 percenthad access to electricity
had access to electricity,28
by 1974.
in NorthKorea tookplace relativelyearlyin itsnational
Ruralelectrification
development,and the systemwas quite extensive.One goal of electrificationwas to fuelruralmechanization,withlimiteduse ofgasoline/dieselfuel.
SinceNorthKorea lackeddomesticpetroleumreservesbuthad abundantcoal
depositsforoperatingthermoelectric
power plants(as well as the capacity
it was
forhydroelectric
generationbecause of its mountainoustopography),
based
on
domestic
morerationaland practicalto builda self-reliant
economy
sourcesof electricpowerthanon importedpetroleum.NorthKorea reported
in which 100 percentof all ruralhouseholds(both
fullruralelectrification,
farmand nonfarm)had access to electricity,
by 1974.29As themechanization
overallmechanizationin agricultureincreasedsignifiprogramintensified,
thethreedecades fromthe 1960sto the 1980s. Specifically,
cantlythroughout
tractorusage morethantripled,goingfrom12,500tractorsin 1960 to 75,000
(15 hp) in 1992.30Accordingto theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
(UNDP), "77 percentof all field-levelagriculturalproductionneeds, including on-farmprimaryprocessing,"had been mechanizedby thelate 1980s.31
A visible, successful mechanizationprogramwas importantto North
mechanizaKorea forbothpracticaland symbolicreasons.Most important,
in theface of laborshortages.
tionwas needed to increaselaborproductivity
reducedpopulation,
The Korean War leftNorthKorea witha significantly
bothfromwar casualtiesand fromthosewho lefttheNorthforSouthKorea.
Withthe developmentof urban centersand an industrialsector,the demographicshiftoccurredin favorof industry,leaving rural areas with labor
shortages.Symbolically,mechanizationrepresentedNorthKorea's progress
- a sign of developmentand a symbol of socialist
towardmodernization
- plowing,transplantachievement.Throughthemechanizationoffieldwork
ing, and transporting
operations the socialist statebroughtreliefto peasantsfrombackbreakingfarmlabor.
86
Yu
Chong-Ae
NorthKorea's land utilizationalso gave impetusto mechanization.After

NorthKorea began expanding
rescalingthe land throughagrarianreforms,
full
of
large-scalefarmingbytaking
advantage mechanization.Farmmechacentered
on
tractor
nization,
usage, was viewed as an efficient
way to transformtraditionalfarmingintoa modernsystem.The numberof cooperatives
fellfrom16,000in 1957to fewerthan4,000 in 1958,whiletheaveragesize of
a cooperative'slandholdingsexpandedto 450-500 hectares,each containing
about300 farmhouseholds.
Timelysupplyof waterwas an indispensablerequirementin the "hybrid
seed-fertilizer-water"
schemeofindustrialagriculture.
NorthKorea's annual
rainfallof 1,000-1,200mm is concentratedin theperiodbetweenMay and
September,halfof it tendingto occur in Julyand August.NorthKorea frein therice-bowl
quentlysufferedfrombothdroughtand floods,particularly
area of the southwestplains,and themeans to controlthewatertherefore
is
vital. An additionalcontributing
factorto the irrigationdrivewas the need
fora supplyof freshwaterfortheland expansionprogramin thewesternsea
reclamationarea.32
Irrigatedland increasedfrom227,000hectaresin 1954 to 1.2 millionhectares in 1988. Accordingto a U.S. government
source,by 1990 NorthKorea
had morethan"1,700reservoirsthroughout
thecountry,
watering1.4million
hectaresof fieldswith a ramifiedirrigationnetworkof 40,000 kilometers,
which irrigatedabout 70 percentof the country'sarable land."33To create
NorthKorea developedvast and complex
thisextensivesystemof irrigation,
networksofwaterwaysthatcoverednotonlygrainfieldsbutalso thepermanentcrop area of around300,000 hectares.34
The majorityof this land was
in uplandareas, withtheirrigationnetworksconsistingof a double-circular
the agriculturalareas, which
systemfordrainageand irrigationthroughout
was intendedto protectagainstbothdroughtand flood.
to a mountainouscountry,and instead of utilizing a
Counterintuitive
suitable
forsuchterrain,
NorthKorea constructed
an elabgravity-fed
system
orateelectricityand diesel fuel-supported
there
are
3,505
pumpingsystem
pumpingstationsfortheexistingmajornetworksalone- to irrigatebothlow
and uplandareas. Frequently,
wateris pumpedintoreservoirs,
from
irrigation
whichitis distributed
to cropsbycanals,a processthatin manycases requires
In addition,NorthKorea introducedan extensivefieldfurther
pumping.35
and
othermethodsof supplyingwaterto fields.36
This elecsprinklersystem
and
diesel
was
what
seemed,in
tricityfuel-dependent
system
supportedby
thecontextofa strongSovietUnion,to be a healthyenergysector.
In additionto capital asset investment,
NorthKorea's high productivity
its
from
1960
to
the
mid-1980swas partlyattributrateduring growthperiod
able to its increaseduse of agrochemicals:chemicalfertilizers,
insecticides,
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
87
herbicides, and so forth.Of all agrochemical inputs in North Korea,

petroleum-basedfertilizerswere the most significantof syntheticinput.
NorthKorea, however,had no petroleumdeposits,and itwas entirelydependenton petroleumimportsfordomesticfertilizerproductionas well as for
agrochemicals.
The applicationofchemicalfertilizers
grewrapidlybetween1960and 1984.
NorthKorea reportedtherateof applicationto be 160 kg perhectarein 1960
and overone metrictonperhectarein 1975.37
By themid-1980s,NorthKorea
- one ofthe
claimedto havereachedan all-timehighoftwotonsperhectare38
in
use rates theworld.39
NorthKorea also had
highestfertilizer-consumption
highapplicationratesofpesticides,fungicides,and herbicidesfromdomestic
productionand imports,mostlyfromChina and Japan.Figure2 providesa
contextualglimpseintothegrowthtrendin agro-inputsin each area.
In manyways, NorthKorea's industrialagriculturemirroredthatof the
U.S.-led Green Revolution;it emphasizeda "hybridseed-fertilizer-water"
To realizetheGreenRevolutionvariapproachand focusedon monocropping.
eties' fullpotentials,highdoses of syntheticinputsand waterwere applied.
Because of U.S. sanctionsagainst NorthKorea beginningin 1950, North
Korea was unable to take advantageof theGreenRevolution'shybridseeds.
its traditionalseed varietiesin
Accordingly,it embarkedon revolutionizing
the 1960s,and succeededin developingmanydistinctdisease-resistant,
highyieldingvarieties(HYV) ofrice and maize. NorthKoreanagriculturalscientistsalso developedvarietiessuitedto limitingclimaticconditionsand high
altitudes,along with a particularmethodof plantingcold-bed seedlings.40
The development
ofHYV foritsstaplefoodshas been criticalto modernfood
in
North
Korea.
production
The Interdependenceof Agriculture,Energy,and Industry
NorthKorea's industrialagriculturewas possible in large part because of
the developmentof its industrialsector,which suppliedrural cooperatives
and statefarmswithnew technologiesand agrochemicalinputs.The state
providedthematerialand technicalassistanceto undergirdtheindustrialization process, and public investmentin agriculturesteadilyincreased from
an average of 9 percentof state expendituresduringthe Three-YearPlan
(1954-56), to over 12 percentduringthe Five-YearPlan (1957-60), and to
nearly20 percentduringthe Seven-YearPlan (1961-67). Based on these
resourcedevelopmentsin agriculture,
NorthKorea was able to achievemajor
advances in foodproductionand to meet its consumptionneeds until 1990.
Figure3 illustratesthedailyper capita caloric intakeof NorthKorea and its
East Asian neighborsbetween1961and 1990.NorthKorea's abilityto supply

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Calories
Figure3. FoodSupply:
perCapitaperDay,1961-1990
Source:FoodandAgriculture
oftheUnited
Production
Yearbook
Nations,
,
Organization
1985,1991.
itspopulation'sdailycaloricrequirements
was similarto thatofSouthKorea,
and was consistently
higherthanthatof China or the Philippinesover the
entireperiod.
NorthKorea's achievement,
however,sowedtheseed of itsfuturetroubles
foragriculture.NorthKorean agriculturebecame highlycapital intensive
and, consequently,
energydependent.To sustainsuch highgrowth,Korean
industrieshad to supplythe agriculturalsectorwith adequate amountsof
inputssuch as tractors,fuels,and chemicalfertilizers.
Similarly,thegrowth
of industrywas not feasiblewithoutsufficient
food and otheragricultural
production,and bothindustryand agriculturedependedon an adequate and
stableenergysupply.Giventhehighdegreeofinterdependency
betweenagriand energy,one sector'sfailureto provideadequate inputs
culture,industry,
to theothersriskedtriggering
a vicious cycleof economicdownturns.Once
sucha cyclebegan,recoverycould be extremely
difficult
giventherelatively
closed natureof the NorthKorean economy,in which foreigntrade comNorth
prised only 15 percentof the totalGNP. In this economic structure,
Korea could nottakeadvantageof foreigntradeto alleviateeconomicbottlenecksand absorbshocks.41
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
91
THE DEMISE OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE

The Energy Crisis and Its Impact on Agriculture
The precipitousdecline of NorthKorea's economyin the 1990s- its GNP
fellby one-half- and therealignment
of global politicscaused a crisisin the
of
sector.
The
country'senergy
impressivepace oftheeconomicdevelopment
the 1960s and 1970shad alreadyslowedbythe 1980s,priorto a sharpdecline
in the 1990s.42The realignmentof the internationalbalance of power- in
1989,Easternbloc countriesstartedto crumble,and by 1991theywereall but
- had aggravateddifgone, leavingNorthKorea bereftof tradingpartners
ficultiesin theNorthKorean economy.43
China stoppedprovidinginfrastructuresupporteven beforethe Soviets did, and by 1993 China was reluctant
to exportoil to NorthKorea unless it was paid in hardcurrencyat thetime
of transaction.NorthKorea founditselfalone, simultaneouslywithoutkey
or sourcesof cheap energysupplies.
markets,financing,
The decline in importcapacityhad serious consequences forthe energy
sector,whichin turnnegativelyaffectedindustryand agriculture.By 1996,
the totaldomesticproductionof fertilizerfellto less than23 percentof its
previouslevels. The situationwas similarforothercategoriesof inputsand
manufactured
thedecreasein fertilizer
goods. Underlying
productionwas the
2
in
of
crude
oil
Table
shows
the
decline
crudeoil imports
collapse
imports.
in
from1989 to 1996. The data suggestsa significant
crude
oil imports
drop
between1990 and 1991,and by 1996 theimportsweredownto 38 percentof
1989 levels,imposingsevere stressnot only on agriculturalproduction,but
also on thetransportation
and distribution
of agriculturalproducts.
oil
accounts
for
a
small
Although
only
portionofNorthKorea's totalpri- and was limitedto nonsubsti6
about
maryenergyconsumption
percent
tutablessuch as motorgasoline,diesel,kerosene,andjet fuel,44
NorthKorea
Table2. CrudeOil Imports
toNorth
Korea(unit= thousand
metric
tons)
Exporter 1989 1990 1991
China
1,140 1,160 1,100
500
410
Russia
200
Libya
Iran
920
980
220
Total
2,650 2,450 1,890
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996a
1,100
200
220
1,520
830
80
910
1,050
100
210
1,360
1,020
80
1,100
1,000
1,000
ofstatistics
for
the
first
two
of1996.
More
recent
statistics
the
total
was
that
"Extrapolation
quarters
suggest
lower.
probably
considerably
Source:
David
von
Tim
DPRK
2000
andPeter
The
Sector:
Estimated
Year
Hippel,
Savage,
Hayes,
Energy
Balance
andSuggested
toSectoral
Korea
Economics
Energy
(Seoul:
Approaches
Redevelopment
Energy
38.
Institute,
13,2002),
September
92
Yu
Chong-Ae
mustimportall the oil it consumes. For a countrylike NorthKorea, this

seriousvulnerability.
dependencyrepresented
coal
Concomitantly, productiondroppedto a level lowerthanthatin the
early1980s,resultingin erraticsupplydeliveryto all productivesectorsand
low overallutilizationof installedmachinerycapacity;however,coal shortages affectednonemorethantheenergysector.In 1990,NorthKorea's estimatedper capitaelectricity
generationwas 2,500 KWh, on a par withSouth
Korea,45and itsper capitaenergyuse was 71 gigajoulesperperson(approximately67.3 Britishthermalunits(BTUs), or 2.4 tonscoal equivalent/person),
3.1 timesthatof China in thesame year,and overhalfthatof
approximately
Since then,thelevelsofcommercialenergysupplyand consumption
Japan.46
in NorthKorea have droppedby more than one-half,and the crisis in the
intoa tailspin.NorthKorea's
energysectorhas pushedtheeconomyfurther
totalelectricityconsumptionin 2001 was still 58 percentof whatit was in
1991.47No increaseoccurredin theyear-to-year
rateof electricity
consumptionduringtheentireperiod from1992 to 2001, exceptin 1992,whenthere
was a 1 percentincrease.48
In the mid-1990sthe NorthKorean energysystemtook anotherdecisive
blow, this time fromnature.A series of naturaldisasters- hailstormsin
1994,floodsin 1995 and 1996,followedby a drought,and thentidalwaves in
1997- severelydamagedcoal minesand hydroelectric
plants.In additionto
seriousdamage to cropsand agriculturalland,theenergyinfrastructure
was
These
have
been
difficult
for
North
Korea
irrevocablydamaged.49
damages
to reverse,sincerebuildingand reconstruction
requiredheavyequipmentand
fuel. In 1990, thermal(coal- and oil-fired)and hydroelectric
power plants
but afterflood damproducedapproximately
equal amountsof electricity,
ages to largehydroelectric
plants,thermalplantsbecame theprimarysource
ofpowergeneration.
These convergingfactorscaused rapidcontractionoftheenergysectorin
thefirsthalfof the 1990s and an incrementaldecline in thelatterhalfof the
1990s. Specifically,theyresultedin (a) a continuingdecline in thesupplyof
- power
crude oil; (b) continuingdegradationof electricityinfrastructures
generation,electricitytransmission,and distribution and of industrialfacilities;(c) damage to industrialelectricmotorsfrompoor-qualityelectricity (unstable voltage and frequency);(d) continuingdifficultieswith the
in coal production
transportof all goods, especiallycoal; and (e) difficulties
relatedto the lack of electricity.
Most of all, thiscrisis in the energysector
had a detrimental
impacton NorthKorea's highlyindustrializedagriculture,
which was and continuesto be based on its energysupplyand fossil fuel
products.Because NorthKorea's agricultureis closely linked to industry
and the energyregime,the collapse of the lattercreateda dominoeffectin
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
93
and agriculture,both of which depended heavily on

whichmanufacturing
industrialinputs,also collapsed, ultimatelyresultingin human tragedyin
themid-1990s.
The Collapse of Irrigation and Farm Power
IrrigationFailure
It contained large,
North Korea's irrigationsystemwas energy-intensive.
of
several
sources:
each
networks,
pumpingstacomposed
complexirrigation
tunnels.
Water
tions,and reservoirslinkedby canals,pipelines,and
pumping
was requiredat variouspointsin the system,and to pumpwater,thesystem
and/ordiesel fuel.Electricitywas also needed to operate
requiredelectricity
machinetools and otherstationaryequipmenton farms.
The floodsof 1995 and 1996 severelydamagedNorthKorea's agricultural
sector,especially its highlyelectrifiedirrigationnetworksand agricultural
infrastructure.
Althoughwaterwas sourcedfrombothsurfacesuppliesand
groundaquifers,irrigationwas mainlyfromsurfacewater,and waterforall
but300,000 hectaresof 1 to 1.5 millionhectaresof irrigatedarea50had to be
pumpedfromriverswithconsiderableliftsusing electricityand diesel fuel,
to cropsby canals, oftenwithfurther
afterwhichitwas distributed
pumping,
for
particularly uplandcrops.
- reservoirs,pump stationsand ancillary
The bulk of the infrastructure
- was constructed
and drainagesystems
weirs,waterdistribution,
equipment,
duringthe 1960s and 1970s. A large proportionof the 32,000 pumps were
installedmorethanthirtyyears ago.51Consequently,most installationshad
A signifireachedtheendoftheireconomiclifeand weredue forreplacement.
to
the
of
unreliabilcantportionoftheirrigation
had
deteriorated
point
system
leakingdistribution
itybecause ofbroken-down
pumpsets,wornfoot-valves,
and steel deliverypipes, silteddistribution
drainage
systems,dysfunctional
reacheda criticallevel and
systems,and so on. Systemlosses had therefore
had a significant
impacton yield.NorthKorea statedthatsix thousandpump
sets shouldbe replacedeach yearto bringthe sectorback to fulloperational
efficiency.
Withthe energysectorin disarray,even if the agriculturalsectorwere
in electricity
theirrigation
networkdoes nothave
distribution,
givenpriority
sufficient
to
deliver
at
the
time
when
capacity
power
agriculturalproduction
demandsit.Williamset al. arguedthat,givena nationalgeneratingcapacity
of 4.7 GW withan actual online capacityof 3.1 GW in 1996 (afteraccounting forsystemlosses in transmissionand distribution),
irrigationpumping
demand represented"over one-thirdof all" of North Korea's generating
Yu
Chong-Ae
94
of itsenergyinfrastructure,
itwould
Consideringthedeterioration
capacity.52
be unrealisticto expecttheenergysectorto be able to increaseitspowergenerationon demandand redirectgeneratedelectricity
supplyto itsagricultural
sectorat thepeak time.
In summary,energyhad been criticalto the operationof NorthKorea's
and fuelhad made it imposirrigationsystem,butthe scarcityof electricity
sible to guaranteetimelysupplies of water to the field.Natural disasters
- alreadyin precariousconseverelydamaged canals and pumpingstations
dition- whilepumpingstationsand steelpipes used in the systemhave sufferedfroma lack of sparepartsand frompoor maintenance.The breakdown
of theirrigationsystemdue to the lack of sparepartsand electricity
signifito theseveredropin NorthKorea's grainproduction.
cantlycontributed
ShortageofFarm Power
The industrialbase ofNorthKorea enabledthecountryto motorizetheagriculturalsector,potentiallyproviding77 percentof all the farmpowerused
in field-levelproductionand on-farmprimaryprocessingforits two major
crops,rice and maize.53In contrast,undernormalcircumstancesthe agriculturalpopulation,throughits laborforceof 3.4 million,contributes
only9
14
farm
while
draft
animals
contribute
to
the
total
of
power,
percent
percent
agricultural
productionpoweravailability.
The high level of mechanizationin agriculturemeantthatwhen North
Korea could no longersupportits industrialand agriculturalmechanization
base, agriculturefaced seriousconstraintsin production.Two constraintsin
necessaryto keep machinparticularstoodout: a lack of fueland electricity
eryand equipmentrunningduringthe agriculturalproductionprocess,and
a lack of spare parts vital to keep agriculturalmachineryoperating.An
raw materials,consumablemachinetool
acute shortageof fuel,electricity,
volume
tool
and
other
steel),
inputsdepressedthemanufacturing
parts(e.g.,
and thedistribution
ofnew replacementmachineryand equipmentto farms.
There was no need to manufacturenew tractorsand machinery,even if it
were possible, because farmscould not supplyenough fuel to theirexisting fleetsof equipment.By the end of 1998, much agriculturalmachinery
and equipmenthad become inoperable,eitherbecause it had reached the
end of its service life or because of a lack of spare parts. Fuel to operate
the machineryforcriticalmechanizedoperationshad become exceedingly
scarce because fuel allocationswere reducedto perhapsonly20 percentof
precrisislevels.54
The combinedeffectofacute shortagesof fueland vitalsparepartssignifiAtthistime,NorthKorea
cantlyalteredthebalanceoffarmpoweravailability.
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
95
had only20 percentof themotorizedcapacityof farmmachineryand equipment,deeply compromisingthe timelycompletionof fieldoperationsand

leadingto reducedyieldsand increasedharvestingand postharvestlosses.
The Collapse of Soil Fertility
Industrialagriculturerequiresa steadyflowof inorganicchemicalfertilizers
to guaranteehighyields.Priorto 1990,NorthKorea's fertilizer
industrywas
N and
most
of
its
needs
for
the
macronutrients
vibrant,meeting
agricultural
K55
but
was
because
of
a
lack
of
usable
reserve
P,
entirelyimported
potash
in the country.Fertilizerproductionrequirementsof feedstock,equipment,
and spares were also importedfromthe Soviet Union and China priorto
1990; however,since then,therehad been markeddecline in the capacityto
importneeded inputsforfertilizer
production.Some of theproductionunits
and plantswererunningat nominalcapacity,plaguedbynumerousproblems
relatedto plantage, lack ofresourcesforreplacementof equipmentand procurementof spare parts,and the nonavailabilityof petroleum-basedfeedstockand raw materialscoupledwithinefficient
productiontechnology.The
of fertilizer
shortageof electricity
inevitablylimitedtheproductivity
plants.
By 1996, NorthKorean fertilizerproductionhad fallento 130,000 tons,
less than 17 percentof thenationalrequirement,
withessentiallyno imports
availableto supplement
theconsumptionneeds ofitsagriculturalsector.FAO
reportedthattheavailabilityof fertilizerin 1998 was "onlyabout 18 percent
ofthe 1989 level" (FAO/WFPCrop and Food SupplyAssessmentMission to
theDPRK, November12, 1998).
The Collapse of Seed Production
Along withthe overalldecline in otherpartsof the agriculturalsector,seed
productionalso collapsed in the mid-1990s.There were both quantityand
seed proqualityproblemsassociated withseed production.Quantitatively,
ductionlevels have been inadequatesince the crisisbegan. Seed production
in NorthKorea takesplace at thecountylevel and is undertakenby 240 state
seed farms.During theprecrisisperiod these farmsproduced250,000 tons
of seed: 101,000tonsofrice,37,000tonsofmaize, 23,000 tonsof othercereals, 83,000 tonsofpotatoes,400 tonsof vegetables,and 50 tonsof industrial
Similarto otherunits in the agricrops,with othercrops the remainder.56
culturalsector,seed farmsare also affectedby the shortageof agro-inputs
and the lack of an energysupplyadequate forirrigatingor formobilizing
machinesand equipment.Consequently,seed threshing,
cleaning,treatment,
havebeen adverselyaffected,
processing,storage,packaging,and distribution
Yu
Chong-Ae
96
leading to high postproductionlosses. Inadequate irrigationmeans lower

The lack of inputsand equipmenthas substantially
contributed
cropyields.57
to the decrease in available seed quantity,and thismeans thatfarmershave
to postponeseed renewalofnonhybrids
forextendednumbersofseasons and
use lower-yielding
retainedseeds.
The qualityof available seeds has been problematicforbothhybrid-seed
productionand traditionalrenewalvarieties.Hybridizationof seeds is based
on plantgermplasm;however,the local germplasmsuffersfroma narrow
geneticbase, and traditionalmajorvarietiesare in need of renewalafterten
to fifteen
yearsofuse. NorthKorea's seed multiplication
systemis relatively
less developedcomparedwithinternational
and
the qualityconstandards,
trolsystemis also consideredto be in need ofimprovement.
One oftheissues
NorthKorea's abilityto access international
affecting
germplasmand technologies is U.S. economic sanctionsagainstNorthKorea. As notedearlier,
U.S. economicsanctionsconstrainNorthKorea fromaccessingmanyof the
international
agriculturalresearchcentersthatreceiveU.S. funds.
In addition,cooperativesareusinghigherratesofseedingto mitigateseedqualityproblemsand theeffectsofcold weather.In NorthKorea,plantdensitiesare high,and theseed applicationrateis 125 kgperhectareforpaddyand
45 kg per hectareformaize. However,the FAO reportsthatseed rateswere
increasedto 150 kg per hectareforpaddyand 60 kg per hectareformaize in
1998 because the supplyof plastic sheetsneeded to cover seed beds during
cold weatherwas limited.58
It has been notedthatno morethan60 percentof
theseed quantityactuallyused by cooperativeswouldbe needed ifitwereof
highquality.59
In summary,seed productiondecreasedbecause ofthelack ofagro-inputs;
thehybridand traditionalseeds beingproducedsufferfromlow qualitydue
to a narrowgeneticbase and nonrenewal.In turn,the lack of agro-inputs,
suchas plasticsheets,and poor qualityseeds forcecooperativesto use higher
amountsoftheshrinkingsupplyof seeds.
The EnvironmentalFactors
As notedearlier,in 1995and 1996NorthKorea was struckbytorrential
rains,
tidalwaves, and floods,whichengulfeda largepartof its agriculturallands.
These catastrophesseverelyaffectednotonlytheyear'sagriculturalproducsuch as the
tion,but more important,
damaged agriculturalinfrastructures
the
networks
and
and
irrigation
transportation
system,60 pushed
country's
capacityto produce food furtherinto the margins.In 1995 NorthKorea
recorded23 inchesofrainin tendays,and in someareas as muchas 18inches
of rainfellin a singleday,bringingfloodsthatwere consideredtheworstin
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
97
Table3. Agricultural
LandDamagedbyFloodsin1995and1996inNorth
Korea
(unit= thousand
hectares)
Year
1995
1996
Land
Land
Washed Land
Submerged Away Buried
331.0
273.1
10.7
9.7
18.2
15.0
Total
Damaged
359.9
297.7
Total Damaged
Arable Arable
Land
Land(%)
1,853.0
1,853.0
19
16
Sources:
Information
extracted
from
draft
tothe
ofThematic
on
Roundtable
report
presented
participants
andEnvironmental
Protection
inDPRKorea,"
inGeneva,
Switzerland,
(AREP)
"Agricultural
Recovery
hosted
1998.
Information
alsooriginates
from
Flood
North
Korea's
28-29,
byUNDP,
May
Damage
Rehabilitation
Committee
ofDPRKorea,
hosted
United
Nations
des
bythe
(Palais
Development
Program
Nations,
Geneva,
28-29,
May
1998).
a century.61
Damage was extensive:1.2 millionhectaresof agriculturallands
were affected,1.9 milliontons of grainswere lost,and the totalcost of the
flooddamages reached$15 billion.621996 was no less severe;in fact,floods
hitareas thathad alreadybeen struckbythepreviousyear'sfloods.The agriculturallands were hitespeciallyhard since the bulk of the rain fellon the
westernplains,wherethe country'smostfertilelands were located. Table 3
indicatesthedamages sustainedin agriculturalland in 1995 and 1996.
Althoughofficialgovernment
reportsdifferon theexact toll thatthe 1995
and 1996floodstookon NorthKorea, foreignobserversagreedthatthedisastersdevastatedNorthKorea's industrialand agriculturalinfrastructures.
The
epic floodswere followedby severe droughtsin 1997,2000, and 2001 and
whichexacerbatedNorthKorea's reduced
complementedby cold winters,63
to
food.
ability produce
These naturaldisasterscontributedto and hastened,ratherthancreated,
the collapse of agriculturein North Korea. Natural calamities took their
devastatingtoll on NorthKorean agriculturebecause of the human-made
ecological disasterthathas been progressingever since the modernization
projectacceleratedin the 1960s. Precedingthenaturaldisastersof themid1990s,in 1991theUNDP voiced itsconcernoverNorthKorea's intensiveuse
ofchemicals,statingthatsuchpracticeshad led to land degradationvis--vis
erosionand acidification,
and waterpollution.64
decliningsoil fertility,
CONCLUSION
Fromthe 1950s to the late 1980s, agriculturein NorthKorea underwenta
drastictransformation
to become bothmodernand industrial.NorthKorea
abandonedtraditionalrotationalsystemsand largelyended the practiceof
98
Yu
Chong-Ae
using organic fertilizers.From the outset,food-grainproductionwas an

undertaking,designedto succeed only when energywas
energy-intensive
Modern farmingpracticesemphasized the use of inoravailable.
readily
fertilizer
and
other,usually petroleum-based,
agrochemicals,without
ganic
due considerationofthedevastatingimpactsuchtechnologicalinterventions
wouldhave on ecological relations.Paddyand maize fieldswere designedto
takefulladvantageofthepotentialformechanization,and irrigation
systems
All
land
on
surface-water
pumping.
dependedheavily electricallypowered
withany potentialforrice and maize productionwas broughtinto cultivationwithoutalternating
cropsor fallowing.Increasinglyexpensiveand enviand drainageprojectswere
ronmentally
problematictidelands-reclamation
undertakento increasearableland. The modernsystemof intensiveagricultureintroducedin NorthKorea enabledcontinuousproduction,
includingthe
of
cereals.
double-cropping
For almosthalf a century,NorthKorea's agriculturalsectorwas able to
meetnationalneeds forfood graindespitethetopographicaldisadvantages,
a harshclimate,and a growingpopulationthatdoubledin size from10 million to 22 million.This seemingsuccess,however,was based on thefragile
balance ofa complexsetof social, ecological,political,and economicforces;
ifany one ofthesefactorsbecame unstable,theentiresystemwould shatter.
In themid-1990s,NorthKorea's agriculturecollapsed,and theensuingfood
crisisbecame a large-scalefamine.
EvenbeforenaturaldisastersbroughtdevastationtoNorthKorea,thecountrywas experiencinga declinein production,due to bothinternaland external resourcedepletion.Industrialagriculturepracticesrequiredincreased
inputseach time,as soils continuedto deteriorateand plantdiseases tended
to proliferate
and to wipe outthemonoculturecrops.Atthesame time,North
amountsofhighenergy,
Korea's agriculture
industry
requiredever-increasing
and
as
a
result
of
increasingchemicalinputs
especiallypetroleumproducts,
the soil became acidified.In an effortto expand its arable land area, North
Korea initiatedreclamationprojectsand theterracingofhills.These projects,
in turn,contributed
to further
environmental
degradation.
AlthoughNorth Korea strovefor a self-relianteconomy,in realityits
industrialagriculturewas criticallydependenton imports.Direct imports
needs and providedmostotheragro-chemicalsas well
helpedmeetfertilizer
as petroleumand fuel forfarmmachinery.Domestic industrialsectorproductionin supportof agriculturealso relied on importsof raw materials,
rangingfrompetroleumfeedstockforthe fertilizerindustryto coke forthe
The demise of the socialistbloc
steelneeded formachinerymanufacturing.
Korea
bereft
of politicalallies and trading
and the Soviet Union leftNorth
partnersand led to theresultantagrariancrisis.
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
99
At thesame time,afterseveraldecades of extensiveand intensiveagriculturalmodernization,environmental

degradationof productionsitesbecame
more inputsjust to maintainprevious
more
and
visiblyapparent,requiring
Korea's
Green
Revolutionbrought"ghostacreof
North
levels productivity.
was built.To
age,"65on whicha glass house of greaterfood self-sufficiency
bringghostacres intoproduction,fossilfuelbecame as vitalto NorthKorean
agricultureas land and waterresources.
Understandingthe cause of the resultingagriculturalcollapse is important,not onlybecause NorthKorea is one of the least understoodcountries
in theworld,butalso because its industrializedagricultureis an exampleof
modernagriculture.To begin
whatcan happento highlyenergy-dependent,
with,NorthKorea has shown the worldthatmodernagricultureis unsusIt damtainable- economically,politically,socially,and environmentally.
And all
the
environment.
water
and
the
land,
polluting
draining
supplies
ages
thisrequiresgreaterand greaterfossilfuel inputsto pump irrigationwater,
to providepest protection,to remediatethe environto replace nutrients,
maintain
and
to
ment,
crop productionlevels. This necessaryfossil
simply
fuelinputcrashesheadlongintodecliningfossilfuelproduction.In the last
- as ithas done in other
century,oil dominatedmuchof modernagriculture
sectors and an eventualcontractionofpetroleumsupplieswill likelyresult
in reducedfoodproductionelsewherein theworld,as we have seen in North
Korea overthepast seventeenyears.
NOTES
and
GordonWhite(ed.,withRobinMurray,
1. Amongothers,theeconomists
in theThirdWorld[Sussex,
SocialistDevelopment
Christine
White,Revolutionary
UK: Wheatsheaf
Books,1983]),JonHalliday("TheNorthKoreanEnigma,"inRevointheThirdWorld
Socialist
, ed. GordonWhite,RobinMurlutionary
Development
Review
Joan
Robinson
Christine
and
and
("KoreanMiracle,"Monthly
White),
ray,
to
North
In
after
a
visit
held
this
view.
9
all
no.
1965,
16,
1965]:541-49)
[January
andachievements
Korea,JoanRobinsonclaimedthatKorea'sdevelopment
put"all
theeconomicmiraclesofthepostwarworldintheshade"("KoreanMiracle,"546).
has notreleasedan official
2. TheNorthKoreanGovernment
figureforthetotal
offamine-related
deaths.Claimsby foreign
number
observers,
especiallyin those
deathsvarywidely,from
in theUnitedStates,aboutthenumberoffamine-related
staffers
MarkKirk,PeterBrooks,and
200,000to 3.5 million.U.S. Congressional
MariaPica place thefigurebetween900,000and 2.4 millionfrom1995-98(see
Relations
Final ReportoftheVisittoNorthKorea and Chinato theInternational
Peter
Committee
the
U.S.
House
31,
1998).
Hayesof
ofRepresentatives,
August
of
theNautilusInstitute
putsthefigurebetween200,000to 300,000andtwomillion
100
Yu
Chong-Ae
"NewsHourwithJimLehrer,"
(see interview,
February11,1999).MarcusNoland
thefaminedeathtollto be between2.8 millionand3.5
andhiscolleaguesestimate
million(see Noland,ShermanRobinson,and Tao Wang,FamineinNorthKorea:
D.C.: Institute
forInternational
Causesand Cures[Washington,
Economics,1999]
Accessed December22, 2004);
<http://iie.com/publications/wp/1999/99-2.pdf>
administrator
of USAID, placedthefigurebetweentwo
AndrewNatsios,current
andthreemillion( TheGreatNorthKoreanFamine:Famine, Politics
, andForeign
Institute
of
D.C.:
United
States
Peace,
2001],201).TwoAmeriPolicy[Washington,
thenumber
tobe
DanielGoodkindandLorraineWest,estimated
candemographers,
between600,000andonemillion("TheNorthKoreanFamineandItsDemographic
Review27, no. 2 [June2001]:219-38).A
Impact,"Populationand Development
Yi Sk("1994-2000-nyn
Pukhankign:Ch'okwasamangja
SouthKoreanscholar,
kyumowa chiykpylin'gupynhwa"[NorthKoreanFamine,1994-2000:The
Change],KukkaChllyak10,no. 1
Scope of Deathsand RegionalDemographic
thefamine-related
deathsat 25,000to 1.17
[Spring2004]: 117-44)- whoestimates
millionbetween1994to2000,witha perannumrateof36,000to 167,000(p. 38)number
offamine-related
deaths
on theestimated
thestrongest
argument
presents
in
the
debates
about
famineinNorthKorea.However,
all figures
as
facts
presented
drawn
relateddeathsinNorthKoreaareestimates
only,oftenbasedon information
fromfragmented
dataandspeculation.
8 milliontonsis milled
3. NorthKoreaclaims10millionmetrictonsunhusked;
estimated.
conversion
ratio,conservatively
grain,ata 65 percent
ton(MT) measurement.
4. Thisarticleusesthemetric
5. Quinonesestimates
7.4millionMT in 1984.See "FoodandPoliticalStability
inNorthKorea,"96-103.
oftheUnitedNations(hereafter
6. FoodandAgriculture
FAO),SpeOrganization
Missionto theDPRK
cial ReportFAO/WFPCropand Food SupplyAssessment
December22, 1995.
UnitedNations,
in 1994- andcalculated
7. FAOuses 1993as thebaseyear- therewasa hailstorm
In thetwo-year
a rateofstructural
declinein agriculture.
periodbetween1993and
and
ofpaddyriceis assumedto havedecreasedby 10percent
1995,theproduction
theannualrateplusa factorforan increasing
Thisrepresents
maizeby 15percent.
rateofdecline.See FAO,SpecialReportFAO/WFPCropandFood SupplyAssessDecember22, 1995,UnitedNations.
ment,
8. See Kim,Ch'olgyu.Pukhanui nongpwigiwa singnyang
munje:Ksiyksa
and
Food
Problem:
MacrohistoriKorea's
Crisis
chkchpkun
(North
Agricultural
TheEnd of
Sahoe 12,no. 1 (2002);NicholasEberstadt,
cal Approach).
Nongch'on
D.C.: AEI Press,1999);Nolandet al.,FamineinNorth
NorthKorea(Washington,
orSelf-destruction?
Success
Korea:CausesandCures',
PhillipH. Park,Self-reliance
andFailuresoftheDemocratic
Strategy
People'sRepublicofKorea'sDevelopment
"Juche"(New York:Routledge,
2002); JamesH. Williams,David
ofSelf-reliance
vonHippel,andPeterHayes,Fuel and Famine:RuralEnergyCrisisintheDPRK,
of
andCooperation
Institute
onGlobalConflict
California
PolicyPapers,University
1-46.
Research
California
Unit,
2000,
Multi-Campus
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
101
9. See FAO,SpecialReportFAO/WFPCropandFood SupplyAssessment,

September
6 andDecember6, 1996,UnitedNationsDevelopment
(hereafter
Programme
Reform,"
PapersSeries3, comCountry
UNDP), "DPRK: FromCrisisto Tentative
at the
Schoolof Economics,presented
missionedbytheUNDP to theStockholm
on Transition
International
Economies,May 31-June1, 2004,
PolicyConference
Hanoi,Vietnam;andNolandetal.,FamineinNorthKorea: Causesand Cures.
in CenTransition
10. See MarkusBremand KyungRyangKim,Agricultural
traland EasternEurope- Lessons forKoreanPeninsula(Ch'unch'on:Kangwon
'aekkwa
Pukhaninongpchngch
NationalUniversity
Press,2002);Ch'oeSuyng,
and
North
Korea's
on
Policy Food
Agricultural
munjeyon'gu(Research
singnyang
96-25
(Seoul:
MinjokT'ongil
Problem),
Yn'guwn
yon'gu
pogos
MinjokT'ongil
etal.,"TheCollapseofSovietandRussianTradewith
1996);Eberstadt
Yn'guwn,
Nolandetal.,FamineinNorth
NorthKorea,1989-1993:ImpactandImplications";
Pukhanhyptong
Korea: CausesandCures;KimYngyun,
pannongjangkaebyn
Cooperative
gan e taehanyn'gu(Researchon PossibleDirectionsforReforming
FarmsinNorthKorea),(Seoul:MinjokT'ongilYn'guwn,
2002);andNamSnguk,
nan
kwa
Pukhan
iti
nongjangkaehyk(Contempohyptong
singnyang
Hyndae
ofCollectiveFarms),(Seoul:Hanl
ofNorthKoreaandReform
raryFoodShortage
2004).
Academy,
11. Juchemethodsare variouscultivation
techniquesthatemphasizesuitable
continuous
for
suitable
cultivation,
land,
crophigh-density
timely
planting,
crops
fertilization.
ping,andsystematic
: Silsangkwapalchnpanghyang
etal.,Pukhanuinongp
12. See Pu Kyngsaeng
Sul taehakkyo
nongp
(NorthKoreanAgriculture:
RealityandFutureDirections)
Unihaksulehongsche-2ho(Seoul:SeoulNational
kwahak
yn'guwn
saengmyng
andLifeSciencesAcademicSeries,no.2),
forAgriculture
ResearchInstitute
versity
"
2001);and KwnT'aejin, Taebuksingnyang
(Seoul: Sul Taehakkyo
Chulp'anbu,
toNorthKorea!
moduuisalkilinga?" (FoodAssistance
Nambuk
chiwn!
nongmin
at
Conference
inBothSouthandNorth?)
Farmers
Is Ita Wayto Support
presentation
November
kwa
taech'aek
ui
ui
Pukhan
,
nongp,
nongoch'on silsang
Chnhwan'gi
November
17,2003).
17,2003(Seoul:TongilNongsusan
Yn'guwn,
Chngch'aek
Transition
in Centraland EasternEurope;
13. See BremandKim,Agricultural
chkihae: Singnanui
To Hngyl,Pukhannongch'onsahoe ui sahoe simnihak
oftheNorthKoreanRuralSociUnderstanding
p'agiiphyogwa(Sociopsychological
Sahoe 11,no. 1 (2001):205-40; andNam,HyndaePukhanuisingety),Nongch'on
ofNorth
FoodShortage
(Contemporary
nongjangkaehyk
nyangnankwahyptong
ofCollectiveFarms).
KoreaandReform
14. See EllenBrun,andEllenandJacquesHersh,SocialistKorea: A Case Studyin
ReviewPress,1976).
theStrategy
(NewYork:Monthly
ofEconomicDevelopment
15. See Nolandet al., Faminein NorthKorea: Causes and Cures,
; and Kwn,
modui salkilin'ga?"(FoodAssischiwn!Nambuknongmin
"Taebuksingnyang
inBothSouthandNorth?).
Farmers
tancetoNorthKorea!Is Ita Wayto Support
Mis16. See FAO,SpecialReportFAO/WFPCropandFood SupplyAssessment
andFood
sionto theDPRK, 1995-2004;UnitedNationsDevelopment
Programme
102
Yu
Chong-Ae
andAgriculture
oftheUnitedNations(hereafter
DPR
UNDP/FAO),
Organization
Korea: Agricultural
Protection(AREP) Program:
Recoveryand Environmental
, vols.1-3(November
20, 1998).
Identification
ofInvestment
Opportunities
17. See Meredith
"PoliticalEcologyofFamine:TheNorthKorean
Woo-Cumings,
and Its Lessons,"Tokyo:ADB Institute
ResearchPapers31 (January
Catastrophe
1-51.
the
in sub-Saharan
cites
Africain
2002):
Woo-Cumings
devastating
droughts
- whensimultathe1970sand 1980s.Shealso notestheEl Nifioeventsof 1972-73
neousdroughts
occurredaroundtheworld,affecting
foodproduction
in theSoviet
Australia,
Union,China,India,CentralAmerica,
Indonesia,
Brazil,West
Argentina,
- andthedevastating
return
ofEl Nioona largerscalein 1982
Africa,andEthiopia
andagainin 1997-98.To support
herargument,
Woo-Cumings
providesevidence
inthe1990s,andarguesthatNorthKorea
ofNorthKorea'saberrant
weather
pattern
affected
Oscillation(ENSO) of 1997-98,
was profoundly
bytheEl Nio Southern
Formore
saidtobe oneoftheworstinsomethreehundred
yearsofrecorded
history.
ENSO details,see MikeDavis,Late Victorian
Holocausts
: El NioFaminesandthe
(London:Verso,2001).
MakingoftheThirdWorld
in 1948,in realitythede
18. Although
NorthKoreawas officially
established
in August1945,immediately
factostatewas established
theliberation
of
following
colonization.
In thisarticle,
theKoreanpeninsulafromthirty-five
yearsofJapanese
I use 1945as thedateofNorthKorea'sestablishment.
19. See Kim Skpin,ed., Uri nara nongch'onmunjehaegylui ryksachk
ofSolvingtheAgrarian
QuestioninOurCountry),
(Historical
kynghm
Experience
SahoeKwahakCh'ulp'ansa,1988).
(Pyongyang:
: Structure
20. JosephSang-hoon
andDevelChung,TheNorthKoreanEconomy
Calif.:
Institution
Hoover
5.
Press,1974),
(Stanford,
opment
21. KimSkpin,ed.,Urinaranongch
'onmunjehaegyluiryksachkkynghm
175.
QuestioninOurCountry),
(Historical
Experience
ofState,NorthKorea:A Case Studyin theTech22. UnitedStatesDepartment
D.C.: UnitedStatesGovernment
Office,
niquesofTakeover
(Washington,
Printing
1961),56.
23. Robinson,
"KoreanMiracle,"546.
24. Kim II Sung,On Our Country's
Experiencesin theSolutionof theRural
onJuly28,1978(Pyongyang:
: TalkwithStateandEconomicFunctionaries
Question
45.
House,1984),
ForeignLanguagesPublishing
25. Pu etal.,Pukhanui nongp:silsangkwapalchnpanghyang
(NorthKorean
and
Future
12.
Directions),
Reality
Agriculture:
Pukhankyngjetonggye
26. Republicof Korea Ministryof Unification,
chip
1986(Collection
ofStatistics
oftheNorthKoreanEconomy,
1986)(Seoul:Ministry
ofUnification,
1992).
27. Ruralhouseholds
includebothagricultural
andnonagricultural
users.Thisis
where
is a selfdueto thedecentralized
of
each
community
pattern development,
contained
unit.
A StudyofSocio28. MunWoongLee, "RuralNorthKoreaunderCommunism:
PhD
in
dissertation
cultural
(Rice
1975),72-73.
University,
Change,"
anthropology
inNorth
Korea
Agriculture
103
29. Lee, "RuralNorthKoreaunderCommunism,"

72-73.
30. Republicof Korea Ministryof Unification,
Pukhankyngjetonggyechip
1986(Collection
ofStatistics
oftheNorthKoreanEconomy,
1986),215.
DPR Korea:Agricultural
Protec31. UNDP/FAO,
and Environmental
Recovery
tion(AREP)Program:Identification
, vol. 2, Working
ofInvestment
Opportunities
20, 1998),1.
Paper2 (November
32. OfNorthKorea'stotalarablelandareaof1.99millionhectares,
about980,000
hectares
hadirrigation,
as of1998.See UNDP/FAO,
DPR Korea: Agricultural
Recovand
Environmental
Protection
Investment
(AREP)Program:Identification
ery
of
, vol.2, Working
20, 1998),6.
Opportunities
Paper1 (November
33. See AndreaMatlesSavada,ed.,NorthKorea:A Country
Study(Washington,
D.C.: GPO fortheLibrary
ofCongress,
1993)<http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/>
AccessedDecember22,2004.
34. UNDP/FAO,
DPR Korea:AREPProgram1998, vol.1 (November
29,1998),6.
35. UNDP/FAO,
29,1998),7.
36. UNDP/FAO,
29,1998),7.
37. KimSkpin,ed.,Urinaranongch
'onmunjehaegylitiryksachkkynghm
315.
(Historical
Questionin OurCountry),
Experience
38. Savada,North
Korea: A Country
Study<http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/>
39. See FAOProduction
YearbooksinHeatherSmithandYipingHuang,"Achievon KoreanPeninsula:Enhancing
ingFood Securityin NorthKorea,"Conference
andInternational
di
Stability
Dialogue,June2000 (Rome:Ladau Network/Centro
CulturaScientifica
a Volta),<http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/corea/proc/039.pdf>
AccessedDecember22, 2004.
40. Farmers
thatenables
plantriceseedlingsin protected
drybeds,a technique
themtobegingrowing
theirricecropbeforethenormalcropping
season.
41. See PhillipH. Park,Self-reliance
orSelf-destruction?
SuccessandFailuresof
theDemocratic
Koreas
People'sRepublicof
Development
Strategy
ofSelf-reliance
"Juche"
(NewYork:Routledge,
2002).
42. Reasonsfortheslowdown
includedlargeincreasesin military
due
spending
to theheightened
in
the
Korean
in
the
late
1960s
politicalatmosphere
peninsula
tension
withSouthKoreaandtheUnitedStatesintheColdWar);
(escalatedmilitary
theglobaloil crisesofthe1970sandtheslowdownoftheworldeconomy;andthe
debtNorthKorea incurred
to OECD countries
in theearly1970s.North
foreign
Koreastruggled
torepaythedebtinitially
inthelate1970s,andthencontinued
with
theterms,
butthedebtcrisisultimately
cameto a head.Western
banks
renegotiating
declaredNorthKoreatobe a debt-defaulted
nationinthemid-1980s.
43. TheSovietUnionprovided
50 percent
ofNorthKorea'sforeign-trade
volume,
China15percent,
andall socialistcountries
about70 percent.
together
44. UnitedStatesDepartment
ofEnergy,
: NorthKorea,
Country
AnalysisBriefs
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html>
45. UNDP/FAO,
DPR Korea: AREP Program1998,vol. 1 (November
29, 1998),
35.
104
Yu
Chong-Ae
46. See Williamsetal.,Fuel andFamine:RuralEnergyCrisisintheDPRK, 4.

47. UnitedStatesLibraryof Congress,Country
: NorthKorea, Federal
Profile
ResearchDivision,December2004 <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_
AccessedDecember22,2004; 10.
Korea.pd>
48. UnitedStatesDepartment
ofEnergy,
: NorthKorea,
Country
AnalysisBriefs
Accessed
December
7,2004.
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html>
50. Like manyotherfactsaboutNorthKorea,thereare conflicting
reportson
andestimates
ofitsirrigated
landarea.Mostrecentestimates
the
U.S.
of
by
Library
landat 1.4million.P. Doll and
CongressNorthKorea Country
Studyputirrigated
in 1999.See
S. Siebert
estimate
1.46millionhectares
byusingFAOSTATinformation
theirA DigitalGlobalMap ofIrrigated
Areas, KasselWorldWaterSeries1,Report
A9901(Kassel,Germany:
CenterforEnvironmental
SystemsResearch,
University
in
ittohavebeenabout1 millionhectares
ofKassel),33.TheUNDP/FAOestimated
1998(UNDP/FAO,
29,1998),6.
DPR Korea:AREPProgram705,vol.1 (November
51. UNDP/FAO,
29,1998),14.
53. UNDP/FAO,DPR Korea: AREP Program1998, workingpaper,vol. 2
anddomes29,1998),1.Thisdoesnotincludepowerneedsforirrigation
(November
ticelectricity
supplies.
54. UNDP/FAO,
29,1998),6.
in certainamounts
ofconcentrations
and
areformulated
55. Inorganic
fertilizers
combinations
ofthreemainnutrients:
(P), andpotassium
(N), phosphorus
nitrogen
(K).
DPR Korea:AREP Program1998, vol. 1 (November
56. UNDP/FAO,
29, 1998),
35.
DPR Korea:AREP Program1998, vol. 1 (November
57. UNDP/FAO,
29, 1998),
35.
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photosynthesis,
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Overshoot
, 43).
swamps(Catton,
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The Rise and Demise of Industrial Agriculture in North Korea

million.2Despite thetopographicaldisadvantagesof a mountainouscountry,

1989and 1993.As thisarticle'sanalysesshow,itseems likelythatthedecline

economicand social life,and theabsenceoffarmerincentivesas a resultofthe

bringback sustainableagricultureand safe food production,and undo the

While NorthKorean agricultureis now consideredto be an utterfailure,its

In 1943,two yearspriorto the liberationfromJapanesecolonization,44.2

in postwarNorthKorea,mighthave encouragedpeasantsto considerpooling

water.During thisperiod,NorthKorea's industrialand agriculturalsectors

NorthKorea's land utilizationalso gave impetusto mechanization.After

herbicides, and so forth.Of all agrochemical inputs in North Korea,

THE DEMISE OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE

mustimportall the oil it consumes. For a countrylike NorthKorea, this

and agriculture,both of which depended heavily on

had only20 percentof themotorizedcapacityof farmmachineryand equipment,deeply compromisingthe timelycompletionof fieldoperationsand

leading to high postproductionlosses. Inadequate irrigationmeans lower

using organic fertilizers.From the outset,food-grainproductionwas an

At thesame time,afterseveraldecades of extensiveand intensiveagriculturalmodernization,environmental

9. See FAO,SpecialReportFAO/WFPCropandFood SupplyAssessment,

29. Lee, "RuralNorthKoreaunderCommunism,"

46. See Williamsetal.,Fuel andFamine:RuralEnergyCrisisintheDPRK, 4.

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