G.R. No.

168051

September 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HONORATO C. BELTRAN, JR., accused-appellant.

was unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting

him on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused the victim's death.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

When arraigned on 9 November 1999, appellant pleaded "Not

Guilty" to the charge therein.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

Murder is one of the instances when man descends to a level

lower than that of the beast, for it is non-instinctive killing, a
deliberate destruction of a member of the same species for
reasons other than survival.1

The prosecution established its case through the testimonies of

its witnesses, namely: Ever D. Sales, Rolando G. Dalisay, Dr.
Dinah R. Lucero, SPO1 Julian M. de Castro and Normita H.
Concepcion. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 00755, dated 31 March 2005,2affirming with
modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pallocan, Batangas City, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 10525,
dated 9 October 2001,3 convicting the accused-appellant
Honorato C. Beltran, Jr., alias Jun-Jun and Junior, of the crime of
murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of deceased Norman
H. Concepcion, the amount of P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P18,252.00 as
actual damages.

Ever D. Sales (Ever) was a resident of Velasquez Subdivision,

Barangay Sta. Rita, Batangas City. He worked as a gasoline boy
in Caltex Gasoline Station at San Pascual, Batangas City.

On 3 November 1999, appellant was indicted in an

Information4 for Murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about October 25, 1999 at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy. Sta. Rita,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and hack with the said bolo, suddenly and without
warning one Norman Concepcion y Habla while the latter

Ever testified that on 25 October 1999, at about 10:00 in the

evening, he left his workplace and proceeded home using his
bicycle. While traversing the Velasquez Road, he saw appellant
holding a bolo and standing in front of his house situated at the
side of Velasquez Road. On the opposite side of the same road,
he saw Norman H. Concepcion (Norman) standing in front of an
automobile repair shop. Exhausted by the travel, Ever decided to
stop by and rest momentarily at a nipa hut near the same road.
Minutes later, he saw appellant, from a distance of six meters,
stalking Norman who was then walking near the automobile shop.
Appellant approached Norman, and, without a warning, hacked
him with a bolo. Norman tried to avoid the blow by moving
backwards and shielding his face with his left arm. However,
Norman's left hand was hit and wounded by the bolo. When
Norman turned around and ran, appellant hacked him at the back
causing him to fall down on a grassy area. Appellant repeatedly
hacked Norman with a bolo.
Fearing for his own safety, Ever immediately left the nipa hut and
sought help in a nearby sari-sari store. Later, he went to the crime

scene and found no trace of appellant. He also discovered the

bloodied and lifeless body of Norman sprawled on the ground.
Afterwards, he proceeded home and narrated to a relative named
Renato Sales (Renato) what he just witnessed. Later, Renato
informed a certain Carmina Baliwag of the incident, who in turn,
relayed the same to Normita Concepcion (Normita), the sister of
Norman. Ever also declared that he did not know of any reason
why appellant hacked Norman to death.6
Rolando G. Dalisay (Rolando) is a resident of Velasquez
Subdivision, Barangay Sta. Rita, Batangas City, where he is
engaged in a carpentry business.
Rolando supported the testimony of Ever by stating that on 25
October 1999, at around 10:00 in the evening, he was walking
along Velasquez Road to buy some medicines when, at a
distance of about 15 meters, he saw appellant hacking Norman
with a bolo. He noticed that when Norman fell on the ground,
appellant continued his onslaught by relentlessly hacking the
former. Afraid that he might be seen by the appellant, he
immediately went home and informed his wife about the incident.
When the barangay tanod and policemen arrived at the crime
scene, he proceeded thereto and told them what he had
witnessed. Further, he stated that he personally knows appellant
as the latter was a former employee in his carpentry business. He
also personally knew Norman since the latter was a relative of his
wife. Lastly, he testified that appellant and Norman had a
previous quarrel which, however, was subsequently settled in
their barangay office.7
SP01 Julian D. Mendoza was the investigating officer of the
instant case. On 26 October 1999, at about 12:00 midnight, his
station received an information regarding the hacking incident. He
and a certain SPO3 Mario Panaligan rushed to the crime scene.
Upon arriving thereat, he inquired from the people present the
identity of the dead person and of the killer. Rolando approached
him and narrated that the dead person was Norman and the killer
was appellant. Normita also arrived at the crime scene and told

him relevant information. With this lead, they proceeded to

appellant's house but the latter was not there.
On 27 October 1999, a certain Tomas Dimacuha surrendered the
appellant. Later, the brother of appellant, Sherman Beltran,
brought before him the bolo, about three palms in length, used by
appellant in hacking Norman to death.8
Dr. Dinah R. Lucero, Medical Officer IV of the Batangas City
Health Office, testified that she conducted the post mortem
examination on the cadaver of Norman on 26 October 1999 at the
Eternal Memorial Chapel. She declared that, aside from the fact
that Norman's body was almost decapitated, the latter suffered
seven stab wounds and his cause of death was "massive blood
loss secondary to multiple hacking wound."9 The death certificate
issued by Lucero shows that Norman was twenty-two (22) years
of age at the time of his demise.10
Lastly, Normita, sister of Norman, testified that on the evening of
25 October 1999, Carmina Baliwag called her on the telephone
and instructed her to proceed to Velasquez Road. Upon arriving
thereat, she was shocked to discover the dead body of Norman
lying on the ground. She claimed that appellant had a motive to
kill Norman since an altercation occurred between the two on 22
October 1999, which, however, was settled later on 25 October
1999. In establishing her claim for damages, she stated that she
spent an amount of P61,000.00 in connection with Norman's
death, and that the latter worked as an assistant to the electrician
at First Gas Company with a monthly income of P6,000.00. She
also claimed that she was "shocked" at the sudden and
gruesome death of Norman, and that she felt "pity" for him.11
On the other hand, the defense argued its case by presenting the
testimony of the appellant himself and a certain Dr. Luisito
Briones.

Appellant admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but

insisted that he did the same in self-defense. He narrated that on
25 October 1999, at about 10:00 in the evening, he and his
mother were resting inside their house when suddenly, he heard
Norman shouting and insulting him outside their house and
challenging him to a fight. When he came out of the house, he
noticed that Norman was accompanied by several unidentified
persons. Thereafter, he tried to pacify Norman but the latter
slapped the back of his head and pulled out an ice pick from his
pocket. He retreated and looked for something to defend himself.
He found a bolo near a tamarind tree in front of their house and
took the same. When Norman was about to enter appellant's
house, the latter hacked him with the bolo. Norman tried to avoid
the blow but the same hit his left arm. Appellant lost grip of the
bolo and the same fell on the ground. While appellant was
reaching for the bolo, Norman grabbed his head and tried to stab
him with the ice-pick. Appellant, however, eluded the counterattack but he sustained a minor wound on the forehead. Upon
gaining control of the scuffle, appellant took the bolo and hacked
Norman four consecutive times, most of them landed on the
head. When appellant noticed that Norman was no longer
moving, he fled therein and went to his brother, Sherman Beltran,
in Bauan, Batangas, where he stayed that same night and hid
therein the bolo. The next day, he went to his sister's house in
Lipa City. Later that day, he went to the Granja Hospital, also in
Lipa City, for treatment of his wound on the forehead.
Appellant also claimed that on 22 October 1999, he was mauled
by Norman near a sari-sari store; that Norman is taller than him
since he is only 5'4 in height; that he was forced to kill Norman
because the latter insulted him and his mother; and that he was
on his way to Bauan City to surrender to police when he was
apprehended by the barangay officers in Lipa City.12 Appellant
was twenty-nine years (29) of age at the time of his arrest.13
Dr. Luisito D. Briones testified that he treated appellant on the
morning of 26 October 1999 at Granja Hospital in Lipa City for a
lacerated wound on the forehead. He also claimed that the wound

was possibly caused by a knife and that it was already on the

healing stage. He also issued a medical certificate attesting to the
same.14
On 9 October 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision15 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
It reasoned that appellant's claim of self-defense cannot be
sustained in view of the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. In closing, the trial court ruled:
In the light of all the foregoing consideration and upon the
evidence, accused Honorato Beltran, Jr. y Casia alias
"Jun-Jun" is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder charged in the information.
Consequently, the accused is hereby sentenced to
Reclusion perpetua together with all the accessory
penalties inherent therewith and to pay the costs. He is
further directed to indemnify the heirs of Norman
Concepcion in the sum of P61,000.00 as actual damages
and the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages.16
Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal therein on 22
October 2001.17 Subsequently, on 3 January 2003, appellant filed
his Appellant's Brief with this Court assailing the Decision of the
RTC dated 9 October 2001.18Pursuant to our ruling in the case
of People v. Mateo,19 we issued a Resolution dated 8 November
2004, transferring the instant case to the Court of Appeals for
disposition.20 On 31 March 2005, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the assailed
RTC Decision. Aside from reducing the amount of actual
damages awarded by the RTC, it also ordered appellant to pay
the heirs of Norman an amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Aside from moral damages in the
amount of P75,000.00, appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of the deceased, Norman Concepcion, the following

amounts: (a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as civil

indemnity; and (b) Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred
Twenty-Five (P18,525.00) as actual damages.21
Dismayed, appellant appealed the afore-quoted Decision before
this Court by adopting and invoking the same arguments stated in
his Appellant's Brief dated 3 January 2003, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING

EXCESSIVE ACTUAL DAMAGES.22
Anent the first issue, appellant argued that the testimony of
prosecution witness, Ever, is biased, unbelievable and confusing;
that the trial court should not have considered them; that his
acquittal is proper on the ground of self-defense; and that the
elements of self-defense are present in the instant case.

I.
The contention is without merit.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EVER SALES
DESPITE OF ITS BEING UNBELIEVABLE AND BIASED,
INSTEAD OF THE SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY
THE APPELLANT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE SAME BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS NOT
ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
SELF-DEFENSE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING IN HIS FAVOR THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY WHICH
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT AND VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER.
IV.

Prosecution eyewitness, Ever, testified that on 25 October 1999,

at about 10:00 in the evening, he left his workplace and
proceeded home using his bicycle. While traversing Velasquez
Road, he saw appellant holding a bolo and standing in front of his
house situated at the side of Velasquez Road. On the opposite
side of the same road, he saw Norman standing in front of an
automobile repair shop. Exhausted by the travel, he decided to
stop by and rest momentarily at a nipa hut near the same road.
Minutes later, he saw appellant, from a distance of six meters,
stalking Norman who was walking then near the automobile
repair shop. Appellant approached Norman, and without a
warning, repeatedly hacked him with a bolo. Although it occurred
late in the evening, the light coming from the moon and the
electric post therein provided him with good visibility to identify
appellant and Norman, and to witness how the heinous act was
executed.23 This testimony was corroborated by another
prosecution eyewitness, Rolando. Thus, the positive identification
and categorical declarations of Ever on the witness stand under
solemn oath deserves full faith and credence.
Appellant, however, posited that there were inconsistencies
between the testimony of Ever in open court and his sworn
statements before the investigators. According to appellant, Ever
testified during his direct examination that he was at a distance of
about six meters, more or less, from appellant and Norman when
the hacking occurred; that the place where the killing occurred
was "lighted" by the moon; and that during his cross-examination,

he stated that there was no other person within the area when he
witnessed the hacking. On the other hand, appellant claimed that
Ever declared in his sworn statements before the investigators
that he was more or less 20 meters from the place where the
hacking took place; that there was light coming from the electric
post and the moon; and that during his cross-examination, he
also stated that the mother of appellant was outside the house
when the hacking took place.24
This Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies
between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn
statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a
reversal of judgment of conviction. Such discrepancies do not
necessarily discredit the witness since ex-parte affidavits are
almost always incomplete. It bears emphasis that a sworn
statement or an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete
compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant.
Sworn statements taken ex-parte are generally considered to be
inferior to the testimony given in open court.25
Moreover, as aptly stated by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), when Ever testified in court that "there was light coming
from the moon, sir" he was not denying what he stated in his
sworn statement that "there was a light from the lamp (electric)
post and the moon."26 The appellant also testified that the place
where the hacking incident occurred was lighted by an electric
post. As the foregoing circumstances clearly established that the
place where the hacking occurred was lighted by the moon and
an electric post, the testimony of Ever as to the identity of the
killer and the victim, and how the killing was executed, must
stand.
Further, the alleged inconsistencies with respect to the presence
of appellant's mother in the place where the hacking took place,
and the distance between the nipa hut where Ever rested and the
area where the hacking took place, are minor inconsistencies and
trivial matters that serve to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of Ever for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed

testimony. Also, they are not material in the instant case since
none of them is an essential element of murder.27
More importantly, the RTC had observed that Ever was candid,
straightforward and credible in giving his testimony on the witness
stand. It found Ever to be unbiased since he was neither a friend
nor an enemy of appellant and Norman but just a mere neighbor.
It also found that there was no ulterior motive for him to testify
against appellant.28
It is a well-settled doctrine in our jurisprudence that when the
credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect
if not conclusive effect.29 This is because the trial court has the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is
in the best position to discern whether they are telling the
truth.30 It is worth stressing at this point that the Court of Appeals
affirmed such findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that
when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court.31 We find no compelling reason to deviate from such
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
On another point, appellant contended that he merely acted in
self-defense when he hacked Norman to death.
We disagree.
Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides for
the elements and/or requisites in order that a plea of self-defense
may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal
liability, viz:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not
incur any criminal liability:

Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,

provided that the following circumstances concur;

Even if this Court were to adopt the version of facts of appellant,

the result or conclusion would be the same.

First. Unlawful aggression;

Appellant alleged that he was resting inside his house when he

heard Norman shouting invectives against him and challenging
him to a fight. When he went outside the house to pacify Norman,
the latter slapped the back of his head and brought out an icepick. Appellant retreated and when Norman tried to follow him
inside the house, he took a bolo and repeatedly hacked Norman.
The foregoing circumstances does not justify the act of appellant
in hacking Norman. Obviously, mere shouting of invectives and
challenging one to a fight does not put one's life in actual or
imminent danger. In the same vein, mere slapping of one's head
does not place a person's life in serious danger such that it
compels him to use a bolo and hack the offender.

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to

prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an
assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and
immediate manner, which places the defendant's life in actual
peril.32 It is an act positively strong showing the intent of the
aggressor and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.33 It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked attack
of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the
person attacked.34
There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he
puts in actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person
invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or
actual use of weapon.35 In order to constitute unlawful aggression,
the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life
and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary.36
In the instant case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part
of Norman that justified the act of appellant in hacking him to
death. There was no actual or imminent danger on the life of
appellant when he came face to face with Norman. As narrated
by Ever, Norman was just walking on the road and was not
provoking appellant into a fight. It was the appellant who
approached and suddenly hacked Norman repeatedly even when
the latter was already fallen on the ground. In short, appellant
was the unlawful aggressor.

As regards the brandishing of an ice-pick, appellant had several

less harmful means of avoiding the same as he was not cornered
or trapped. He could have run inside his house and locked the
door, or, called the neighbors or authorities for help.
Unfortunately, appellant did not avail himself of any of those
options and instead chose to hack Norman. Quite conspicuously,
no convincing evidence was presented to show that Norman was,
indeed, armed with an ice-pick at the time of the incident. In fact,
no ice-pick was found in the crime scene nor in the body of
Norman. There was also no proof adduced showing that Norman
attempted to stab appellant or tried to barge into the latter's
house.37
The fact that appellant sustained an injury on his head, allegedly
caused by Norman's ice-pick, does not signify that he was a
victim of unlawful aggression or that he acted in selfdefense.38 The physician who treated appellant testified that the
latter was diagnosed on 26 October 1999, the day after the
hacking incident; that appellant was discharged on the same day
he was treated in the hospital since he was only an out-patient;
and that at the time he examined the head injury of appellant, it
was already on its healing stage.39 It is clear from the foregoing

that appellant's head injury was not serious or severe. The cause
of the same is likewise doubtful. Thus, the superficiality of the
injury sustained by appellant is no indication that his life and limb
were in actual peril.40
In stark contrast, Norman was almost decapitated and sustained
fatal injuries on the head and neck. All in all, Norman sustained
seven fatal wounds, most of them located at the head and neck.
Based on the foregoing, it is difficult to believe that Norman was
the unlawful aggressor. The gravity, location, and number of
wounds sustained by Norman are eloquent physical evidence
showing a determined effort on the part of appellant to kill
Norman, and not just to defend himself.41
Time and again, we held that unlawful aggression is a sine qua
non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.42 It
is an essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, there can be, in a jural
sense, no complete or incomplete self-defense.43 Without unlawful
aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this
justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated even if
the other elements are present.44 To our mind, unlawful
aggression is clearly absent in the case at bar.
The second element of self-defense requires that the means
employed by the person defending himself must be reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the
victim. The reasonableness of the means employed may take into
account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and
other circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense.45
The act of appellant in repeatedly hacking Norman on his head
and neck was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling
the aggression allegedly initiated by the latter. As stated earlier,
no convincing evidence was presented to show that Norman was
armed with an ice-pick at the time of the incident. In fact, no icepick was found in the crime scene or in the body of the victim.

There was also no proof showing that Norman attempted to stab

appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house.
Granting arguendo that Norman was armed with an ice-pick, the
repeated hackings were not necessary since he can overpower or
disable Norman by a single blow on non-vital portion/s of his
body.
Again, as correctly observed by the OSG, had the appellant
merely wanted to protect himself from what he perceived as an
unlawful aggression of Norman, he could have just disabled
Norman.46 When Norman fell on the ground, appellant should
have ceased hacking the former since the alleged aggression or
danger no longer exists. By appellant's own testimony, however,
he hacked Norman with his bolo even when the latter was already
lying on the ground. It appears, therefore, that the means used by
appellant, which were simultaneous and repeated hackings, were
adopted by him not only to repel the aggression of Norman but to
ensure the latter's death. In sum, such act failed to pass the test
of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or
repelling an unlawful aggression.
Like an alibi, self-defense is inherently weak for it is easy to
fabricate.47 Thus, this Court had consistently ruled that where an
accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he acted in self-defense.48 As the burden of
evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of
self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution.49 In the instant case,
appellant failed to discharge such burden with clear and
convincing evidence. Therefore, his plea of lawful self-defense
must fall.
With regard to the second issue, appellant contended that there
was no treachery that qualified his act to murder in the absence
of direct evidence showing that his attack on Norman was
sudden; that Norman was not deprived of an opportunity to

defend himself; and that appellant did not employ treachery to

insure the execution of the crime.

In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the Information

against appellant. Moreover, all the essential elements/conditions
of treachery were established and proven during the trial.

Appellant's contention is bereft of merit.

Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under
circumstances that render the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack.50 It is as an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the
killing of a person to murder. Article 14, paragraph (16) of the
Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential elements of
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are
aggravating circumstances:
xxxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential
elements/conditions are required in order that treachery may be
appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner
of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or
conscious choice of such means, methods or manner of
execution. Further, it must always be alleged in the information
and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered. 51

Appellant, while holding a bolo, had waited for the dark to set in
before making his move so that nobody, especially Norman,
would notice his impending attack. When he saw Norman, alone
and unarmed, casually walking near an auto repair shop, he
followed him surreptitiously. Later, appellant came out and
approached the unsuspecting Norman, who, in turn, faced the
former. Appellant took advantage of the stunned and hapless
Norman by swiftly hacking him with a bolo. As the assault was
sudden and unexpected, Norman was forced to move backwards
and raise his left arm to shield his face but it was too late.
Norman's left arm was immediately hit by the bolo. When Norman
turned his back on appellant and tried desperately to run,
appellant hacked him again at the back causing him to fall on the
ground. As the bloodied and moaning Norman was lying on the
ground, appellant unleashed his full wrath by repeatedly hacking
him on the neck and head. Upon noticing that Norman was no
longer moving and was, in fact, almost decapitated, he stopped
the hacking and fled the scene.
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the appellant's attack rendered Norman
defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. Appellant's
use of nighttime and a deadly bolo, as well as the sudden attack
and repeated hackings on the vital portions of Norman's body,
were especially adopted by him to immediately cripple Norman
and prevent him from retaliating or escaping. Appellant
deliberately adopted them in order to overpower the much
younger, taller, and larger Norman. Considering that Norman was
alone and unarmed, there was absolutely no way for him to
defend himself or escape. Further, the fact that Norman sustained
several fatal wounds while appellant allegedly sustained a single
superficial wound on his forehead shows that Norman was not
able to retaliate or defend himself. Given the foregoing, there is

no doubt in our minds that appellant intended and was

determined to kill Norman.

voluntary surrender under Article 13 paragraphs (4) and (7) of the

Revised Penal Code, respectively.

Appellant, however, asseverated that there was no treachery

since the attack was frontal or face to face, such that Norman had
been forewarned of the attack and, thus, placed him in a position
where he can defend himself. Appellant also claimed that there
was a quarrel between him and Norman prior to the hacking
incident which, in effect, negate treachery since it disproved the
fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected. We are not
persuaded.

We reject these contentions.

There is no dispute that Norman was facing appellant at the time

of the first blow. Subsequently, however, Norman turned his back
and tried to run but he was hacked at the back, and when he fell
on the ground, he was hacked again repeatedly. It is settled that
treachery is to be appreciated when the victim was initially
attacked frontally, but was attacked again after being rendered
helpless and had no means to defend himself or to retaliate.52 As
long as the attack was sudden and unexpected, and the unarmed
victim was not in a position to repel the attack, there is treachery.53
The quarrel between Norman and appellant prior to the hacking
incident does not negate treachery. It is true that there is no
treachery if the killing was preceded by an altercation or dispute.
The same, however, does not apply in the instant case. The
misunderstanding between the two occurred on 22 October 1999.
This was settled before their barangay officials on the morning of
25 October 1999. Cooler heads then had already set in. In fact,
the two shook hands before the same barangay officials. Thus,
there was no reason for Norman to suspect that appellant still
held a grudge against him and to prepare or anticipate appellant's
retaliation. It must also be noted that no conversation or struggle
occurred between them shortly before the hacking incident.
Appellant argued that if his plea of self-defense cannot be
considered, he is still entitled to the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and

Article 13 paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code provides that

a person's criminal liability may be mitigated if there was a
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
which immediately preceded the crime. Before the same can be
appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) That the
provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to the
crime committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission;
(2) That the provocation or threat must originate from the
offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate
to the commission of the crime by the person provoked.
Norman did not in any way provoke appellant into a fight on that
fateful night. There was no argument or physical struggle that
ensued between them shortly before appellant hacked Norman
with a bolo. Norman was innocently walking along the road when,
all of a sudden, appellant surfaced and hacked him in rapid
succession. The alleged altercation between the two occurred
much earlier (22 October 1999) as to reasonably and sufficiently
incite the appellant to act the way he did. In the absence of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party, appellant's
assertion of mitigating circumstance cannot be sustained.
Moreover, and more importantly, this ordinary mitigating
circumstance cannot offset the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery which is present in the instant
case.
Likewise, appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. Article 13, paragraph (7) of the Revised
Penal Code states that the offender's criminal liability may be
mitigated if he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or
his agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of voluntary
surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested
or apprehended; (2) that the surrender was voluntary and

spontaneous; and (3) that the offender surrendered himself to a

person in authority or his agent.
Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by
the barangay officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over
to the police by a certain Tomas Dimacuha.54 Assuming that
appellant had indeed surrendered to the authorities, the same
was not made spontaneously.55 Immediately after the hacking
incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or
police, went to his brother, Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas,
and the next day, to his sister in Lipa City. It took him three long
days to surrender to the police authorities.56 Moreover, the flight of
appellant and his act of hiding until he was apprehended by the
barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the
spontaneity that characterizes the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.57
As to the last issue, appellant insisted that the trial court has
awarded excessive damages in favor of Norman's heirs. He
argued that there was no proof or justification for the same.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may
be awarded: (1) a civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. 58 Thus, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the award of P50,000.00 for
civil indemnity ex delicto to Norman's heirs is proper without need
of proof other than appellant's commission of murder that resulted
in Norman's death.59 Likewise, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that moral damages should be awarded since Normita testified
during the trial that she suffered moral shock and wounded
feelings because of the brutal and sudden death of Norman.
However, we deem it necessary to reduce the amount of the
same from P75,0000.00 toP50,000.00.
Normita claimed that she spent a total amount of P61,080 for the
burial and funeral expenses of Norman. However, the receipts on
record shows that only an amount of P18,420.82 was spent

therein.60 Normita's claim of expenses for the food, drinks,

flowers, chairs and tables during the funeral and burial of
Norman, as well as the traditional 40 days prayer thereafter, were
not supported by any receipts. These expenses are merely
written, listed, and signed by Normita in one sheet of yellow
paper, and submitted as evidence in the trial court. Thus, as
general rule, Normita is entitled only to an amount of P18,420.82
since actual damages may be awarded only if there are receipts
to support the same. However, in the case of People v. Dela
Cruz,61 this Court declared that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, such as
in the present case, the award of temperate damages
for P25,000.00, is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser
amount. This Court ratiocinated therein that it was anomalous
and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in
proving actual damages to less P25,000.00 only would be in a
worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts
at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages.
Thus, instead of P18,420.82, an amount ofP25,000.00 as
temperate damages should be awarded to the heirs of Norman.
Actual damages for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded
in this case since there was no documentary evidence to
substantiate the same.62Although there are exceptions to this rule,
none is availing in the present case.63
Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
should be awarded in this case since the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was firmly established.64
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31
March 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS: We
award Norman's heirs civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for Norman's
death; moral damages, in the amount of P50,000.00; temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of P25,000.00;
and lastly, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
RUFINO S. MAMANGUN,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 149152

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

February 2, 2007

allegedly committed, per the indicting Information, [2] docketed as

Criminal Case No. 21131, as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of July 1992, in
the Municipality of Meycauyan, (sic) Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused Rufino S.
Mamangun, a public officer, being then a Police
Officer (PO2), duly appointed as such and acting in
relation to his office, armed with a gun, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength, attack, assault and
shoot one Gener M. Contreras with the said gun,
hitting the latter on his body, thereby inflicting (sic)
him serious physical injuries which directly cause
(sic) his death.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CONTRARY TO LAW.

DECISION

On arraignment, petitioner, as accused below, duly assisted by a

counsel de oficio, entered a plea of Not Guilty.

GARCIA, J.:

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented in evidence the

testimonies of Crisanto Ayson (Ayson), an alleged eyewitness, and
Dr. Benito Caballero, then the designated Medico-Legal Officer of
Bulacan who performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim.

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

petitioner Rufino Mamangun y Silverio seeks the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 19, 2001(promulgated on February 13,
2001) of the Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case No. 21131,
convicting him of the crime of Homicide.
The factual backdrop:
On September 12, 1994, herein petitioner, then a police officer, was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Murder,

For its part, the defense adduced in evidence the testimonies of the
accused himself, Rufino Mamangun, his co-policemen at the
Philippine National Police (PNP), namely, PO2 Carlito Cruz, PO4
Hobert O. Diaz and Police Investigator SPO-1 Hernando B. Banez,
all assigned at the Meycauayan Police Station; and those of Lorenzo
S. Abacan and Rogelio Ingco, son and son-in-law, respectively, of
Antonio Abacan, owner of the house on which rooftop the shooting
of the victim took place.

It is not disputed that on July 31, 1992, at about 8:00 in the evening,
in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan a certain Liberty Contreras
was heard shouting,MagnanakawMagnanakaw. Several residents
responded and thereupon chased the suspect who entered the yard of
Antonio Abacan and proceeded to the rooftop of Abacans house.
At about 9:00 oclock that same evening, the desk officer of the
Meycauayan PNP Police Station, upon receiving a telephone call that
a robbery-holdup was in progress in Brgy. Calvario, immediately
contacted and dispatched to the scene the crew of Patrol Car No. 601
composed of Team Leader SPO1 Andres Legaspi, with PO2 Eugenio
Aminas and herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun; and Patrol
Car No. 602 composed of Team Leader PO3 Sandiego San Gabriel,
with PO2 Carlito Cruz and PO2 Hobert Diaz. With the permission of
Abacan, petitioner Mamangun, PO2 Diaz and PO2 Cruz went to the
rooftop of the house whereat the suspect was allegedly taking refuge.
The three policemen, i.e., petitioner, Diaz and Cruz, each armed with
a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop. There, they saw a man whom
they thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner
Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun
once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras
(Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect.
Contreras died from the gunshot wound. The autopsy conducted by
Dr. Benito B. Caballero yielded the following findings:
The cause of death was Shock due to
massive external and internal hemorrhage due to
multiple gunshot wounds in the left arm side of the
thorax, penetrating the left lung and vertebral
column. There were several wounds caused by one
(1) bullet.
As shown on the sketch of human body
attached to the Certificate of Death, and as testified

on by Dr. Caballero, the bullet entered through the

lower third of the left arm, left side of the thorax and
it penetrated the left lung and vertebral column and
that is where the slug was found. From a laymans
appreciation of the sketch, the bullet entered the
outer, upper left arm of the victim, exited through
the inner side of the said upper left arm, a little lower
than the left armpit and the slug lodging on the
victims back where it was recovered at the vertebral
column.[3]
From the foregoing admitted or undisputed facts, the prosecution and
the defense presented conflicting versions as to how the fatal
shooting of Contreras by petitioner Mamangun actually happened.
According to Ayson, the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, he
accompanied the three policemen (Mamangun, Diaz and Cruz) to the
rooftop of Abacans house. He was following petitioner Mamangun
who was ahead of the group. They passed through the second-floor
door of the house to the rooftop. The roof was lighted by an
incandescent bulb from an adjacent house. He was beside Mamangun
when they saw, some four to five arms-length away, a man whom he
(witness) recognized as Gener Contreras. Mamangun pointed his .45
cal. pistol at the man, who instantly exclaimed, Hindi ako, hindi
ako!, to which Mamangun replied, Anong hindi ako? Before he
(Ayson) could say anything, Mamangun fired his gun, hitting the
man who turned out to be Contreras. He (witness) approached the
victim who was then lying on his left side unconscious. He brought
down the victim and they rushed him to the hospital where he died at
about 10:00 oclock that same evening.
The defense has
actually transpired.

its

own

account

of

what

purportedly

PO2 Mamangun, along with PO2 Cruz and PO2Diaz, denied the
presence of Ayson at the rooftop during the shooting
incident. Corroborating one another, the three testified that they were
the only ones at the scene of the shooting, and that it was dark. They
claimed that each of them, with Mamangun on the lead, went on
separate directions around a water tank. As they met each other at the
other side of the tank, PO2 Cruz pointed to a person crouching at the
edge of the roof of the garage. Thinking that the person was the
suspect they were looking for, Mamangun chased said person. They
announced that they were police officers but the person continued to
run in a crouching position until Mamangun caught up with him and
shouted, Pulis. Tigil, whereupon the person suddenly stopped, turned
around, faced Mamangun, and raised a stainless steel pipe towards
the latters head but Mamangun was able to evade the attack. This
prompted Mamangun to shoot the person on the left arm. All three
claimed that it was only at this point that PO2 Cruz and Diaz
approached Contreras who told them, Hindi ako. Hindi
ako. Mamangun went near Contreras and asked, Why did you go to
the rooftop? You know there are policemen here. Contreras was
thereafter brought to the hospital where he died. After the shooting
incident, Mamangun reported the same to the desk officer, POI
Filomeno de Luna, who advised him to remain in the police station.
De Luna directed Police Investigator Hernando Banez to investigate
the incident. That same evening, Investigator Banez went to the place
where the shooting happened. Banez allegedly found a steel pipe
about three (3) feet long on the depressed portion of the roof.
On January 19, 2001, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan
came out with its decision [4] finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of only the crime of Homicide. In so finding, the
Sandiganbayan did not appreciate the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength to qualify the killing to Murder. But even as the
said court rejected the petitioners claim that the shooting was
justified by self-defense, it nonetheless ruled that the crime of
Homicide was attended by an incomplete justifying circumstance of

the petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty as a

policeman, and also appreciated in his favor the generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Dispositively, the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused, RUFINO S.
MAMANGUN, is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal
Code, and taking into account the attendance of one
(1) privileged mitigation (sic) circumstance, one
generic circumstance and no aggravating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of from Three (3) Years and Three (3)
Months of prision correctional as minimum, to
Seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs (parents) of Gener Contreras in
the total amount of P352,025.00, and to past the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Unable to accept the judgment of conviction, petitioner is
now with this Court via the present recourse alleging that the
Sandiganbayan committed reversible error in failing to apply
paragraph 5, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code, which
would have absolved him from criminal liability on the basis of his
submission that the shooting in question was done in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
First off, petitioner insists that the shooting, which ultimately caused
the demise of Contreras, was justified because he was repelling
Contreras unlawful attack on his person, as Contreras was then about
to strike him on the head with a steel pipe.

We are not persuaded.

Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are
conclusive upon the Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures;
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts and the findings of fact are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [5] None of these
exceptions obtains in this case.
Having admitted[6] the fatal shooting of Contreras on the night of July
31, 1992, petitioner is charged with the burden of adducing
convincing evidence to show that the killing was done in the
fulfillment of his duty as a policeman.
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5,
Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the
defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or
lawful exercise of such duty.[7]

to shoot Contreras. The latter was unarmed and had already

uttered, Hindi po ako, Hindi po ako before the petitioner fatally shot
him on the left arm. Prosecution witness Ayson, who was then behind
the petitioner when the latter shot Contreras, testified that to the
victims utterances, the petitioner even responded, Anong hindi
ako, and immediately shot Contreras.[8] As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan:
Besides being self-serving (with respect to
the accused) and biased (with respect to his copolicemen-witnesses), We find (1) the claim of the
accused and his co-policemen-witnesses that the
victim (Contreras) attacked the said accused and (2)
their seemingly positive identification of the
stainless steel pipe (more of a rod) as his weapon, to
be of doubtful credibility, for the following reasons:

Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a

police officer, was responding to a robbery-holdup incident. His
presence at the situs of the crime was in accordance with the
performance of his duty. However, proof that the shooting and
ultimate death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of the due
performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him
from criminal liability.
As we see it, petitioners posturing that he shot Contreras
because the latter tried to strike him with a steel pipe was a mere
afterthought to exempt him from criminal liability.

(1) We have no doubt that, as claimed by PO2

Carlito Cruz and PO2 Hobert Diaz, the three
policemen appropriately identified themselves as
police officers as they started chasing the man they
saw crouching, and, as claimed by accused PO2
Rufino Mamangun, that, as he was about to catch up
with said man, he shouted, Pulis! Tigil! With all
these introductions and forewarnings, it is utterly
incredible and contrary to human experience that,
that man, later identified to be Gener Contreras and
admittedly not the person they were looking for,
purportedly armed only with a stainless steel lead
pipe (more of a rod) would suddenly stop, turn
around and attack one of the three policemen who
were chasing him, one after the other, with drawn
guns.

We see no plausible basis to depart from the

Sandiganbayans findings that there was no reason for the petitioner

(2) When the victim (Gener Contreras) fell down

after being shot by accused PO2 Mamangun, and as

the latter went near the fallen victim, said accused

asked, Why did you go to the rooftop. You know
there are policemen here. He admits that he did not
ask the victim, Why did you try to hit me, if you are
not the one? This admission clearly belies the claim
of the police-witnesses that Gener Contreras
attacked the accused policeman with an iron pipe
when he was shot, for the accused should have asked
the latter question.
(3) The location of the entry of the bullet fired by
accused Mamangun which is at the outer left arm at
about the bicep of the victim and its trajectory as it
penetrated his body hitting his vital organs along the
way belies the claim of the accused that the victim
was facing him and had just missed his head with an
iron pipe, as instead the victim must have
instinctively shielded his body with his left arm.
Moreover, petitioners pretense that Contreras struck him with a steel
pipe is intriguing. As it is, petitioner did not report the same to Police
Investigator Banez when he reported back to the police station after
the shooting incident. It was only when a lead pipe was recovered
from the scene and brought to the police station that petitioner
conveniently remembered Contreras trying to hit him with a
pipe. Such a vital information could not have escaped the petitioners
mind. We are thus inclined to believe that the alleged actuation of
Contreras, which could have justified petitioners shooting him, was
nothing but a concocted story to evade criminal liability. Indeed,
knowing that he shot Contreras, the least that the petitioner should
have done was to bring with him to the police station the very pipe
with which Contreras tried to attack him. As borne by the evidence,
however, it was only after a police investigator referred to the scene
that the lead pipe surfaced.

Petitioner would likewise argue that the testimony of prosecution

witness Ayson was incredible and riddled with inconsistencies.
The alleged contradictions cited by the petitioner, i.e. where
the victim was shot, where he died, and as to whether Ayson left his
house after the shooting incident, are but minor details which do not
affect Aysons credibility. We have held time and again that few
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness
referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the
central fact of the crime, do not impair his credibility. Quite the
contrary, such minor inconsistencies even tend to strengthen
credibility because they discount the possibility that the testimony
was rehearsed.[9]
For sure, the record reveals that Aysons answers to the
questions propounded by the defense counsel are clear and
categorical. As to where the victim died, Ayson clarified that the
victim was already at the rooftop even before the arrival of the police
officers. As to why he was not able to warn Mamangun that the
victim was his relative, Ayson explained that he was not able to utter
any word because when Contreras said Hindi ako. Hindi ako,
petitioner
suddenly
fired
at
the
latter.[10] As to the
claim that Ayson was also on the roof, record shows that the robberyholdup happened at around 8:00 in the evening. Before the
policemen arrived, Ayson and Contreras were already pursuing the
robber.[11] Ayson also testified that when the victim was shot by the
petitioner, the former fell on his left side unconscious; that he did not
leave his house after the incident because he was afraid that the
policemen would detain him.[12]
Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated
as a valid justifying circumstance in this case. For, from the above
admitted, uncontroverted or established facts, the most important
element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to justify a
claim of self defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary
element of unlawful aggression, petitioners plea of self-defense,
complete or incomplete, must have to fail.

To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not

completely justify the petitioners firing the fatal gunshot at the
victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a
reported robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a
police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the arrest of the
suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit
the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary
justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty,
there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating
circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity for the
killing of Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot
before pulling the trigger against Contreras who was one of the
residents chasing the suspected robber.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the
Sandiganbayan
in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide attended by the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance of having acted in the performance of his duty as a
policeman and the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the

assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in all
respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
CELERINO SANCHEZ, G. R. No. 161007
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO, TINGA,
- versus CARPIO MORALES,
And
VELASCO, JR. , JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 6, 2006
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Celerino Sanchez (Sanchez) assails the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated May 7, 2003 which affirmed his conviction
of the crime of Homicide but modified the penalty imposed by the
trial court, and its Resolution[2] dated October 21, 2003 which denied
reconsideration for lack of merit.
[3]

The case stems from an Information dated March 24, 1994,

docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-10-430, indicting Sanchez for the
death of Felix Jamero(Jamero). The Information reads:
That on September 4, 1993, at 7:00 oclock
in the morning, more or less, in Barangay San Jose,
Municipality
of Mahayag,
Province
of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,

the above-named accused, with intent to kill and
armed with a long sharp bolo, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault[,]
attack, hack and stab one FELIX JAMERO,
inflicting upon the victim multiple stab wounds in
the different parts of his body which cause his
instant death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Sanchez pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Trial
proceeded after which the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur rendered
a
Decision,
[5]
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the
evidences admitted at the trial, this Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide, and hereby imposes the indeterminate
penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor
as minimum, to fifteen years, of reclusion temporal
as maximum, of imprisonment, and to pay the heirs
of the deceased victim the sum of P165,000.00,
itemized as follows:
Moral
damages
--------------------------P 50,000.00
Exemplary
damages
-------------------- 50,000.00
Funeral
Expenses
----------------------- 65,000.00
Total ------------------------------P165,000.00
SO ORDERED.[6]

On appeal, Sanchez averred that the trial court erred in not

ruling that he acted in self-defense and in failing to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation. Finding that unlawful aggression as an element of selfdefense was not present, the Court of Appeals affirmed Sanchezs
conviction. However, it decreased the penalty imposed in view of the
mitigating
circumstance
of
voluntary
surrender. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered partly granting the
instant appeal. The decision of the trial court is
MODIFIED in so far as the penalty is concerned
which should be SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) day
of Prision Mayor as Minimum to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum. All other aspects of the decision are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Sanchezs account of the facts shows that he
and Jamero were tenants of adjacent lots located in San
Jose, Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur.[8] At about 7:00 oclock in the
morning of September 4, 1993, Sanchez saw Jamero destroying the
dike which served as the boundary between the two lots. Sanchez
confronted Jamero and told the latter that he was encroaching on his
land. Jamero struck him with a shovel. The shovel got stuck in the
mud so Jamero resorted to throwing mud at Sanchez. Fighting back,
Sanchez hacked Jamero with a bolo, resulting in the latters death.
[9]
Sanchez then proceeded to the municipal building to surrender
upon the advice of his son-in-law.[10]

Based on these facts, Sanchez insists in his

Petition[11] dated November 17, 2003, that he acted in self-defense.
According to him, Jamero was the unlawful aggressor having struck
him with a shovel. Had he not fought back by hacking Jamero with a
bolo, he would have been the one killed.
In its Comment[12] dated September 16, 2004, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the plea of self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, should fail because there was no
longer any unlawful aggression on the part of Jamero when Sanchez
hacked him.
According to the OSG, Jameros attack on Sanchez was
unsuccessful because the latter was able to evade it
and Jameros shovel got stuck in the mud. Jamero fled toward
the rice field when Sanchez unsheathed his bolo. Sanchez pursued
him and struck his head with a bolo. Jamero fell down but was able
to stand up again. He ran away but after a short distance, fell down
again. Sanchez approached him and stabbed him several times. Not
satisfied, Sanchez pushed Jameros face down into the knee-deep
mud. After Jameros aggression ceased when he fled and left his
shovel stuck in the mud, there was no longer any justification for
Sanchez to go after him and hack him to death.
Sanchez filed a Reply to Respondents People of the
Philippines Comment[13] dated November 11, 2004, reiterating that he
acted in self-defense.
We sustain the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers
exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily
shown. Self-defense requires: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the

accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
[14]

Having admitted that he killed Jamero, the burden of

evidence that one acted in self-defense shifted to Sanchez. It is
textbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of
evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified
and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not
be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing. Hence, he must prove the essential requisites of self-defense
aforementioned.[15]
In this case, Sanchez failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. The positive and categorical eye-witness account
of Saturnino Umambac (Umambac) that Jamero ran away from
Sanchez but that the latter pursued Jamero, caught up with him and
hacked him to death negates Sanchezs plea of selfdefense. Umambac testified:
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
Q: While the three (3) of you were working at that
time on that date and time, could you recall
if there was an unusual incident that
happened?
A: There was.
Q: Please tell the Court.
A: There was a person who arrived.
Court
Q: How many person who [sic] arrived?
A: Only one (1).

Q: Do you know the name of the person who

arrived?
A: Yes[,] Sir.
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
Q: Who [sic] is the name of that person?
A: Celerino Sanche[z].
Court
Q: Was he bringing anything at that time?
A: Yes[,] Sir, a bolo was tucked at his waist.
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
Q: What happened when Celerino Sanche[z] arrived
at the place where the three (3) of you were
working?
A: Celerino Sanches said: Lex, do not cut grasses on
my land, look at our boundary.
Q: And then?
A: Felix Jamero continued shovelling dirt
and
grumbling at the same time as if angry.
Q: And what transpired next?
A: He
then
acted
as
if
to
strike.
([W]itness demonstrated raising his hand
holding a shovel.) [A]t the same
time Celerino S. Sanche[z] pulled out his
bolo.
Court

Q: Who raised up the shovel?

A: It was Felix Jamero.
Q: And how far was the accused to Felix Jamero at
that time?
A: Two (2) to three (3) meters.
Q: Felix Jamero was on the act of striking the
accused with the shovel?
A: Yes[,] Sir.

A: No[,] Sir, going away.

Q: Was he following the cement of the rice field
or did he run across the rice field?
A: He was running right inside the rice field.
Q: And the rice field then at that time[,] was [it]
full of water or was it dry?
A: With water, Sir.
Court:

Court:
Proceed
Proceed
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
Q: Now,
you
said
that
at
that
instance Celerino Sanche[z] pulled his
bolo, what did he do after he pulled it?
A: He hacked Felix Jamero.
Q: Was Felix Jamero hit?
A: No[,] Sir.
Q: Now, since Felix Jamero was not hit, what
happened next?
A: He ran away.
Q: Who ran away?
A: Felix Jamero.

Q: Now, while Felix Jamero was running on the

rice field, what did Celerino Sanche[z] do
if anything?
A: He chased him, Sir.
Q: What happened when Celerino Sanche[z]
chased Felix Jamero?
A: He was able to catch up with Felix Jamero.
Q: And what happened when Celerino Sanche[z]
was able to catch up with Felix Jamero?
A: He hacked him.

Q: To what direction did Felix Jamero run away?

A: In [sic] his rice land.

Q: Who hacked who?

A: It
was Celerino Sanche[z]
Felix Jamero.

Court

Court:

Q: Towards the direction of Celerino Sanche[z]?

who

hacked

Q: Was Felix Jamero facing Celerino Sanche[z] at

the
time
he
was
hacked
by Celerino Sanche[z]?
A: Yes, Sir, they were facing each other.
([W]itness demonstrated)
Q: And Felix Jamero was still bringing the shovel
[when]
he
was
about
to
strike Celerino Sanche[z]?
A: Not any more, Sir.

Q: How many times did he hack Felix Jamero?

A: I was not able to count, Sir, but many times.
Q: How many times did Celerino Sanche[z] stab
Felix Jamero?
A: I was not able to count also, Sir.
Court:
Proceed

Q: What was then being brought by Felix Jamero?

A: Mud.

Atty. Pedro S. Jamero

Court:

Q: On
Proceed.

Atty. Pedro S. Jamero

Q: Now, you said, at the time Celerino Sanche[z]
hacked Felix Jamero, was Felix Jamero hit?
A: Yes[,] Sir.
Court
Q: What part of the body was he hit?
A: At the head. ([W]itness pointing at the head.)
Q: And what happened to Felix Jamero?
A: He was able to stand up and ran away but a
distance away he fell down.
Q: And what did Celerino Sanche[z] do?
A: He approached him and hacked him and
stabbed him.

those
occasions
when
you
said Celerino Sanche[z] hacked and stabbed
Felix Jamero, the number of which you
could no longer count, what was the exact
position
of
FelixJamero relative
to Celerino Sanche[z]?
A: He fell down on the mud.
Court
Q: The rice field was then very muddy at that time?
A: Yes[,] Sir.
Q: What did you do then at that time?
A: We were afraid to go near. So, we only watched
them. We were only hired help, Sir.
Court:
Proceed
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero

Q: What transpired after that?

A: He then rode on top of Felix Jamero and pushed
him to the mud, Sir.

Q: What about Felix Jamero, what happened to him?

A: He was left on the mud where he was hacked and
we and his wife carried him. [16] [Emphasis
supplied]

Court
Q: And then after that?
A: Greg, the son-in-law
arrived.

of Celerino Sanche[z]

Q: And then?
A: His bolo was taken away.
Q: Who took the bolo of whom?
A: Greg, [sic] took the bolo of Celerino Sanche[z].
Q: And

what did he do with the bolo

of Celerino Sanche[z]?
A: I did not notice what he did with the bolo, only
that it was he who get the bolo.
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
Q: After Greg took the bolo of Celerino Sanche[z],
do you know where did Celerino Sanche[z]
go?
A: He ran away but I do not know where he ran
away.

While Jamero was inceptually the unlawful aggressor by his

act of raising his shovel to strike Sanchez, the unlawful aggression
ceased to exist when Jameroturned and ran towards the rice
field. Sanchez himself admits that he was not hit by Jameros shovel
because he was able to step back and the shovel got stuck in the
mud. He testified:
Atty. Pedro Jamero
Q: It is not a fact[,] Mr. Witness, that when you were
first allegedly hit by Felix Jamero with his
shovel you were not hit, is that correct?
A: Yes[,] Sir, because I was able to step back.
Q: And the shovel that was used by Felix Jamero in
hacking you stuck to [sic] the mud and he
was not able to recover it, is that correct?
A: No[,] Sir, he was not able to pull the shovel back
because it was stuck hard in the mud.
Q: And that was the time that Felix Jamero threw
mud on your face, is that correct?
A: Yes[,] Sir.

Court
Q: Who ran away?
A: It was Celerino Sanche[z].
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero

Q: And after Felix Jamero threw mud at your face

that was the time that you hacked him
several times which you said you could not
remember anymore because you lost
consciousness or you went black out?

A: Yes[,] Sir.
Court
Q: How did the spade get at [sic] the mud?
A: The shovel got stuck at the mud. (Witness
demonstrating that the face of the shovel
was the one that got stuck in the mud,
sideways).
Q: That point of the shovel was directed at you but
you were able to evade [it]?
A: Yes[,] Sir.
Q: And because of the force, the spade got buried at
[sic] the mud?
A: Yes[,] Sir, because of the force the shovel got
stuck to [sic] the mud and he was not able to
pull it anymore, so he threw mud at me.
Court:
Proceed.

There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless

the accused proves the first essential requisite unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden and unexpected or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
person a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.
There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical
injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and positively strong
so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause
injury. Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression
warranting self-defense.[18]
In this case, the twin circumstances of Jameros shovel
getting stuck in the mud and his running away from Sanchez
convincingly indicate that there was no longer any danger to the
latters life and limb which could have justified his pursuit
of Jamero and subsequent hacking and killing of the latter.
Sanchezs failure to prove unlawful aggression
by Jamero and the prosecutions evidence conclusively showing that
it was Sanchez who was the unlawful aggressor completely discounts
Sanchezs claim of self-defense. Even incomplete self-defense by its
very nature and essence would always require the attendance of
unlawful aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be
shown.[19]

Atty. Pedro Jamero

Q: When the shovel of Felix Jamero got stuck to
[sic] the mud and he was not able to pull it,
that moment did it not occur to your mind to
go away from him to avoid further trouble?
A: After he threw the mud at me[,] Sir, he pulled the
shovel but the shovel was buried at the mud
[and] he was not able to entirely pull it, so I
hacked him.[17]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 2003 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
JOVITO CABUSLAY, G.R. No. 129875
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN (Third
Division),
Respondents.
Promulgated:
September 30, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review [1] under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the Decision[2] dated 25
June 1997 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
19586 finding Jovito Cabuslay, petitioner herein, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and
sentencing him as follows:

WHEREFORE, accused Celso G. Regencia,

Rosello Canoy, Nilo Montebon and Gerry
Cane are ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. Accused Jovito Cabuslay is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
Ten (10) years and One (1) Day of prision
mayor as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years,
Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law,
and to indemnify the heirs of Pacquito
Umas-as in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) for actual damages and
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for
moral damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]

In an Information[4] dated 10 August 1993, petitioner

SPO2 Jovito Luna Cabuslay, Senior Inspector Celso
Gomera Regencia, SPO4 Rosello Rodriguez Canoy, C2C
Nilo Rico Montebon and C2C Gerry Orillaneda Cane
were charged with murder, committed as follows:
That on or about August 5, 1992, in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the
said
accused,
SENIOR

INSPECTOR CELSO G. REGENCIA, SPO4

ROSELLO
CANOY,
SPO2
JOVITO
CABUSLAY, C2C NILO MONTEBON AND
C2C GERRY CANE, all public officers,
being then members of the Philippine
National Police assigned at the PNP
Provincial Headquarters of Lanao del
Norte, acting in the capacities aforesaid
and conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, while manning a
mobile checkpoint at Libertad, Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, thus committing the
offense in relation to office, and with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously
shoot PAQUITO UMAS-AS, with their
firearms, thereby inflicting mortal wounds
upon the latter which caused his
instantaneous death.[5]

Paquito Umas-as, 34, was one of the four children of

Generoso Umas-as of Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City. Still
single, Paquito earned a living as a collector of payments
for assorted articles such as jackets, mats, thermos and
plates that he sold on credit. Paquito collected as much
as P70,000.00 for a period of four months and the net
profit of such collections was divided equally between
him and his employer. [6]

On arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused all

pleaded not guilty. Forthwith, trial ensued with the
prosecution presenting as witnesses Dr. Tammy Uy,
Bernabe Purificacion Arenga, Leoncio Tagapulot
Zaragosa and Generoso Caayao Umas-as.
The prosecution
following as facts:

presented

evidence

proving

the

In collecting payments, Paquito used a motorcycle he

bought on credit from his employer.[7] His collection
brought him to such places as Manticao, Iligan and
Kolambogan.[8] He rented a house in Iligan City but every
fifteenth (15th) day of the month, Paquito would go home
to his family to give them a sack of rice.[9]
At around 8:30 in the morning of 5 August 1992,
Leoncio Tagapulot Zaragosa, a refrigeration technician
helper and resident of Roosevelt Street, Iligan City, was
conversing with Felix Lauriana[10] near the school
building in Lapayan, Libertad, Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte when a Hammer (Hummer) truck parked in front
of them.[11] Four policemen alighted, followed by a driver.
The police thereafter halted the collector who was riding
a motorcycle from Lapayan. The collector was wearing a
blue denim jacket with folded sleeves and blue denim
pants.[12]

The police asked the collector to show his identification

card (ID). The collector took the ID out of his left pocket
and when it reached the front man, one of the
policemen, who Zaragosa later verified as the petitioner,
opened fire at the collector whose right hand was then
raised. The four other policemen meanwhile had their
firearms pointed at the collector. [13]
Petitioner, who was four meters away from the collector,
consumed the entire magazine of his M-16 armalite in
firing at him. The collector fell to the ground and was
still moving when the police placed him on board a
vehicle and brought him to Kolambugan.[14] One of the
policemen rode on the collectors motorcycle and likewise
headed for Kolambugan.[15]
Upon the request of Pedro P. Legaspi, barangay captain
of Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City,[16] NBI forensic chemist
Bernabe P. Arenga examined the victims body, later
identified as Paquito Umas-as, on 10 August 1992 to
determine the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his
hands. Arengas report revealed that the victim was
negative for gunpowder nitrates.[17] Arenga opined that
on the average, nitrates would be lost within a seventytwo (72)-hour period; that there had been instances
when the substance would remain on a living person up
to nine days; that nitrates could not penetrate rubber
gloves; that no amount of washing can remove the
nitrates; and that even the application of formalin does
not affect the presence of nitrates in the hands of a
person.[18]

On 11 August 1992, Dr. Tammy Uy, a medico-legal

officer of the NBI in Cagayan de Oro City, conducted a
post-mortem examination on the body of Paquito Umasas. At the time of examination, the victims body had
already been cleaned and embalmed. Dr. Uys
examination disclosed that the cause of death was
severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds. There were eight (8) gunshot wounds and each
wound was considered fatal.[19]
To prove damages, Generoso Umas-as testified that he
lost consciousness upon learning of the death of his son
Paquito. Paquitos family spent P8,000.00 for the wake
and P10,000.00 for his burial. Paquito had left his
father P12,000.00 to pay for some appliances the former
had bought; but the latter, to underwrite funeral
expenses, still had to sell his land for P100,000.00
only P25,000.00 of which had been paid in advance by
the buyer. However, Generoso could not remember where
he placed the receipts for the wake and burial expenses.
[20]

The defense presented a different version of the

commission of the crime. Petitioner presented as
witnesses Julmunier Akbar Jubail, Celso Gomera
Regencia and Jovito Luna Cabuslay.
Police Superintendent Julmunier A. Jubail, Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Lanao
del Norte Command stated that he had received a

reliable intelligence report of a plot to assassinate the

Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
and Governor Abalos and his family. In response to the
intelligence report, he dispatched a team of PNP
personnel to conduct mobile checkpoints along the
national highways in several municipalities and to check
on people who would possibly carry out the plot. Jubail
claims that the intelligence report was proven accurate
after a few months because the Vice-Mayor of
Kauswagan was killed in Samborong, Linamon and in
December of the same year, Governor Abalos was
assassinated in Iligan City.[21]

sweatshirt and gloves that covered the half portion of his

fingers.[24]
Regencia testified that he signaled the motorcycle rider
to stop at the right side of the road. He asked for the
identification card of the motorcycle rider who pretended
to reach for his wallet, but instead pulled out a gun. He
heard a shot and his thigh went numb. As he rolled to
the ground, he heard a volley of gunshots after which
petitioner approached him. Regencia then approached
the motorcyclist and removed his bonnet to be able to
identify him. Regencia later found out that the motorcyle
rider was shot by petitioner. [25]

The team headed by Senior Inspector Celso G. Regencia

included SPO4 Rosello Canoy, SPO2 Jovito Cabuslay,
C2C Nilo Montebon and C2C Gerry Cane. Their area of
responsibility consisted of the twenty-two (22)
municipalities of Lanao del Norte. In full military outfit,
save for Canoy as he was assigned to the Intelligence
Operatives Command, the men established a mobile
checkpoint on 5 August 1992 at the national highway,
Barangay Libertad, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the
purpose of intercepting armed men who intend to carry
out the assassination plot.[22]

Regencia ordered his men to load the motorcycle rider to

the truck. The victim later identified as Paquito Umas-as
was still alive when he was loaded on the hummer
vehicle to be brought to a hospital, but was pronounced
dead on arrival by Dr. Caga, the attending physician.
Regencia then asked that he be given first-aid treatment
for the wounds he sustained. He thereafter turned over
the riders motorcycle, sunglasses and revolver to the
police station at Kauswagan. And after bringing the
victims body to a funeral home in Kolambugan, he
proceeded to Baroy General Hospital where his wounds
were treated by a certain Dr. Fabin.[26]

At about 8:30 in the morning, a man riding on a red

Honda motorcycle[23] going to the direction of Pagadian
City approached the mobile checkpoint. The motorcycle
rider was allegedly wearing a black bonnet, sunglasses,

To prove that he was wounded during the incident,

Regencia showed to the court a quo the scars caused by
the gunshot wounds. There were three scars, one of
which was the entry of the bullet and the other two were
splinter wounds. He said that the bullet used was the

kind that splinters upon hitting an object. He presented

a medical certificate under the signature of Dr. Demterio
U. Opamen, Jr.[27]
For his defense, petitioner confirmed Regencias
testimony that the latter had directed an approaching
motorcyclist to stop at the right side of the highway. He
heard Regencia ask the motorcycle rider in Visayan
dialect to show his identification card. Cabuslay then
saw Paquito Umas-as shoot Celso Regencia. This and his
belief that he was the next target prompted him to shoot
the motorcycle rider with his M-16.[28]
Police Superintendent Jubail was immediately informed
of the incident and on the basis of Regencias account,
he sent out a Spot Report[29] to inform Recon 9 and 13.
The report is couched as follows:
SPOT REPORT x x x CMM SPO2 JOVITO
CABUSLAY CMM INSP REGENCIAS
BACK-UP OPEN FIRE (sic) HITTING AND
FATTALY
(sic)
WOUNDING
SAID
UNIDENT(IFIED) PERSON WWITH (sic)
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS IN HIS
BODY AND DIED ON THE SPOT PD
RESPONDING
PNP
ELEMETS
RECOVERED FROM THE VICTIMS
BODY ALFA CAL. 38 REVOLVER SMITH
AND WESSON (HM) SN 236701 WITH
ONE (1) EMPTY SHELL AND 5 UNSPENT
AMMO x x x

The incident found its way to the police blotter of the

police station of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. [30] It is
embodied in a Certification[31] signed by Inspector
Fulgencio dela Pena Raguine, Chief of Police, issued at
the request of Atty. Arthur Abundiente for trial purposes
and formulated in this wise:
Police Blotter Page Nr. 496-Entry Nr. 9187 &
9188=
050810H Aug 1992 SPO3 Nestor S Ortiz,
Intel NOR this station, left stn with
elements from Lanao del Norte PNPC
under INSPECTOR CELSO G REGENCIA
PNP
and
proceeded
to
Libertad,
Kauswagan, LN to follow-up suspects
allegedly hired for killing Mpl Mayor
Myron B. Rico of Kaus, LN.
050835H Aug 1992 SPO3 Nestor Ortiz PNP
returned station informed that suspects
were intercepted at Libertad, Kaus, LN
but when confronted by the PNP team,
fired and shot INSPECTOR CELSO G
REGENCIA PNP using cal. 38 revolber
(sic) (Homemade) hitting on his right
thigh prompting SPO3 Cabustay (sic),
fired back to the suspect hitting at the
chest causing the instantaneous death of

the suspect. One cal. 38 revolber (sic)

(Homemade) with 5 live ammos and one
empty shell at the chamber, one rayban
(sunglass) and one motorcycle (HondaCamel backtype) color red with out plate
Nr.
Police Blotter
Nr.9191=

Page

Nr.

497-

Entry

081240H Aug 1992 Romeo Umas-as, 42 years

old x x x.
Police Blotter Page Nr. 501-Entry Nr.9228=
251315H
Aug
1992
Impounded
Honda
Motorcycle x x x.
Police Blotter Page Nr. 508-Entry Nr. 9100=
021130H Oct 1992 COP Bartolini RD got the one
deposited rev. cal. 38 SW S#236701 w/
(4) four live ammo and one empty shell
past 30th day of Sep 92 for NBI
examination at Cagayan de Oro City.

Petitioner justified the shooting of Paquito Umas-as

because he believed that he would be the next person to
be shot at by the victim; and having acted in defense of
his person and that of his superior officer, he asserted
before the court a quo that he has no criminal liability

because
of
the
attendance
of
the
following
circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of
the victim; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part,
and in the case of defense of his superior officer, he was
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motives. All of these requisites being present, petitioner
claimed there was legal justification for shooting Paquito
Umas-as.[32]
The Sandiganbayan however grave credence to the
version of the prosecution and rejected the version of
petitioner. So, it found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide. It accorded full faith and
credence to the testimony of Zaragosa as it was
categorical,
straightforward,
spontaneous
and
consistent. Moreover, it observed that no proof was
adduced to show that Zaragosa was moved by some evil
motive to falsely testify against the accused Cabuslay.[33]
The Sandiganbayan likewise noted grave deficiencies in
the evidence of the defense as follows: (1) The physical
existence of the handgun allegedly used by the victim
Paquito was not established as the same was not
presented before the court during the trial; [34] (2) The
affidavit executed by Gualberto Dayot Pascopresented
by the defense to impeach the credibility of
Zaragosawas taken under intimidating and dubious
circumstances, which fact creates doubt as to the
affidavits voluntariness and credibility;[35] (3) The

medical certificate purportedly evidencing that Regencia

had been shot has no probative value as the doctor who
executed the same did not testify during trial. Notably,
the medical certificate was executed by a doctor different
from the one who treated Regencias wound;[36] (4) The
number of gunshot wounds inflicted upon the victim
betrays petitioners claim of reasonable necessity of the
means used to repel the unlawful aggression allegedly
displayed by the victim.[37]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition before the
Court, insisting that the Sandiganbayan erred in not
crediting him the justifying circumstance of self-defense
or defense of a stranger or the lawful exercise of a right
or office.[38]
Pursuant to the Courts Resolution[39] dated 3 September
1997, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submitted before the Court a Manifestation and Motion
In Lieu Of Comment[40] to aid the resolution of the instant
petition. In said manifestation, the OSG stated that it is
the Office of the Ombudsman which should represent
the People in cases elevated to the Court from the
Sandiganbayan except in cases filed under Executive
Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A issued in 1986.
Nevertheless, it opined that the conviction of petitioner
should be reversed because the evidence of the
prosecution when pitted against that of the defense may
not stand close scrutiny. It also asserted that
the ponente of the appealed decision was not yet a
member of the Third Division when the witnesses

testified and when the parties presented their evidence;

hence,
the
applicability
of
the
[41]
Courts ruling in People v. Gutual, that no respect can
be accorded to the trial courts findings of fact where the
judge who penned the questioned decision heard only
one of the witnesses and only at the sur-rebuttal stage.
[42]

In its Comment,[43] the Office of the Ombudsman through

the Office of the Special Prosecutor seeks the denial of
the instant petition on the ground that the defense failed
to impeach the credibility of Zaragosa. It agrees with
respondent court that petitioners story was contrary to
human experience and hence, it correctly debunked selfdefense and defense of a stranger as grounds for
petitioners acquittal.[44]
The petition is without merit.
While the rule that the factual findings of the court a
quo are generally not disturbed on appeal because the
trial judge had the best opportunity to observe them and
the manner by which they testify is concededly not
applicable to the instant case considering that the
ponente of the assailed Decision was not the one who
heard all the witnesses, nevertheless, after a careful
review of the records of the case, the Court finds no
reason to disturb the conclusions reached by respondent
court. As held in Hugo v. Court of Appeals, [45] the efficacy
of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that
the ponente only took over from a colleague who had
earlier presided over the trial. For it does not follow that

a judge who was not present during the trial cannot

render a valid and just decision.
Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan,
which functions in divisions of three Justices each, is a
collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of view and ideas, and the
concurrence of the required majority vote.[46]
Simply put, the ponente of the assailed Decision is not
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. He alone does
not speak for and on behalf of his Division. Each
Division of the Sandiganbayan is a three-man body
whose members each have one vote to cast in every
deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein
that is within its jurisdiction.
We
have
minutely
scrutinized
the
assailed Decision and find it amply supported by the
evidence on record.
Petitioner claims that he acted in self-defense and in
defense of Regencia.
One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for
the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the
accused who must then prove the justifying
circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in
defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and
convincing evidence, all the following elements of selfdefense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on

the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the

means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming
self-defense.[47]
Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be
concocted. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that once
an accused has admitted that he inflicted the fatal
injuries on the deceased, it is incumbent upon him in
order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying
circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the
weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his
own evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution
were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself had admitted the killing.[48] Thus, petitioner
must establish with clear and convincing evidence that
the killing was justified, and that he incurred no
criminal liability therefor.
In order that defense of a stranger may be appreciated,
the following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or
other evil motive.[49]
Unlawful aggression is the first and primordial element
of self-defense. Of the three requisites, it is the most
important. Without it, the justifying circumstance

cannot be invoked. If there is no unlawful aggression,

there is nothing to prevent or repel.[50]
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack or a threat to
attack, positively showing the intent of the aggressor to
cause injury. It presupposes not merely a threatening or
an intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, which
imperils ones life or limb. Thus, when there is no peril,
there is no unlawful aggression.[51]
It is crucial to ask whether the victim Paquito was an
unlawful aggressor. We answer this question in the
negative. Aggression to be unlawful, must be actual and
imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm
to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom
that person is seeking to defend.
Petitioner asserts that he was the victims next target,
thus the need to shoot the victim in self-defense. His
claim should be disbelieved. As he himself had explicitly
testified before respondent court, the hummer jeep was
behind him and was parked about three to four meters
from the national highway.[52] He also stated that Paquito
could not have seen the hummer jeep because it was
obscured by Muslim houses.[53] It only follows that if
from Paquitos perspective, he cannot see the hummer
jeep which is a fairly large vehicle, then he could not
have seen petitioner as well. If Paquito cannot see
petitioner from where he was positioned, then Paquito
could not have possibly aimed to shoot at petitioner.

Petitioners contention therefore that there was an

imminent threat of bodily harm coming from Paquito
upon his person is at best illusory. There was no
peril, ergo, there was no unlawful aggression.
It should also be recalled that at the time, Cane was on
top of the hummer jeep manning the machine gun. [54] If
Regencia had indeed been shot as the defense insists,
then Cane was better situated to defend Regencia. It is
implausible how an officer like him, in such a strategic
position and trained in the operation of the said weapon
could have omitted firing a shot in Regencias defense.
More to the point, it is beyond credulity that the
outbursts of gunfire hardly elicited any reaction from the
other police officers who were only a few meters away
from the crime scene and who continued conducting
their search on the bus which was then about to pass
the checkpoint.[55]
Likewise noteworthy is the fact that after the second
burst of fire on Paquito, knowing that Paquito was still
alive[56] and in all probability was still holding a
handgun,[57] petitioner chose to assist Regencia instead
of making sure that Paquito had been immobilized and
disarmed, basic to a policemans training.
In addition, the claim of the defense that Paquito shot
Regencia on his right thigh is untenable. Petitioner
would have the Court believe that Paquito dared
challenge five policemen, four of them in full battlegear,
at a checkpoint and armed with only a handgun. This is

contrary to ordinary human experience, as well as the

human instinct which is to flee for dear life and seek
safety. If indeed Paquito was armed and had criminal
designs in his mind, the natural tendency upon seeing a
checkpoint ahead would be to abort ones plans and
leave the premises immediately. Petitioners story not
only was contrary to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life, in all appearances it was also
contrived.[58] Respondent court was correct in rejecting
it.
We also confirm that the medical certificate presented by
Regencia to prove that he had been shot by the victim
has no probative value. The physician who signed the
same was never presented as witness for the defense. We
also note that the physician who signed said medical
certificate, a certain Dr. Demterio U. Opamen, Jr., is
different from the doctor who according to Regencia had
treated his wounds.[59]
It is also worthy of note that the defense never presented
in evidence the gun Paquito allegedly use to shoot
Regencia. The gun was also not clearly identified.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim must be
positively proved and said gun would have been a vital
evidence to establish this requisite.
Petitioner, however, insists that he would have
presented the gun had not respondent court pressured
him to rest his case and submit it for decision. Such
contention hardly inspires belief. Records reveal that

petitioner never made it known to respondent court that

the defense would be presenting the gun allegedly used
by Paquito. What the defense did manifest was their
intention to present one Major Bartolino to testify that
he had received the gun allegedly used by Paquito and
that he had brought it to the NBI on 30 September 1992
for examination. It should be underscored that the
defense was not even sure that there was an NBI report
on said examination. The counsel for the defense
manifested before respondent court, as follows:
ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
xxx
I intended, Your Honor, Please, to
present two more witnesses, Major
Bartolini who received the gun and he
will testify on this particular testimony
that he was the Station Commander of
the municipality of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte at the time of the incident and
then he received this gun from the team
of Capt. Regencia on August 5, 19 (sic)
and that he took the gun for NBI
Examination sometime in the month of
October, 1992, no, on the 30th day of
September, 1992.
CHAIRMAN:

This was covered by police blotter?

ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHAIRMAN:
You dont need the testimony of Bartolini,
but do you have the report of the
NBI?

CHAIRMAN:
Does it matter whether you can
prove the examination report of
the NBI or not?
ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
I dont know if there was a report of the
NBI examination . . .

ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:

CHAIRMAN:

That is why, Your Honor, because we

have not received any
communication from Bartolini . . .

Precisely . . .[60]

CHAIRMAN:
How did you come to know that Bartolini
sent this firearm to the NBI for
examination? . . .
ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
Because it is stated in the blotter, Your
Honor, . . . dated September 1992
for NBI examination in Cagayan
de Oro City, Entry No. 91000,
page 108 . . .

The defense was well aware of the relevance of the NBI

report to prove their allegations that the victim was
carrying a gun and used the same on Regencia,
especially since the victim was reported to be negative of
nitrates on his hands. No cogent reason could be
thought of for the failure to secure a copy of the report
or even know of its existence. It should be noted that the
examination was made as early as September 1992. A
partys failure to produce evidence, which if favorable
would naturally have been produced, is open to the
inference that the facts were unfavorable to his case.
[61]
This Court can only conclude that said gun never
existed, and this explains the failure of the defense to
present it before respondent court. Thus, it is

immaterial to delve on the issue raised by the petitioner

on the discrepancy of the make of the gun as noted by
respondent court in its Decision.
Parenthetically, petitioner stresses that the victim had
tested negative for gunpowder nitrates as the latter had
been wearing gloves at the time of the incident. This
claim runs counter to his[62] and Regencias[63] testimony
that the only things recovered from Paquito and which
were turned over to the Provincial Police Command were
the victims motorcycle, sunglasses and the alleged gun.
The police blotter reporting the incident confirms their
testimonies. Interestingly, said police blotter also makes
no mention that gloves were recovered from the victim.[64]
Anent the credibility of Zaragoza, the sole prosecution
eyewitness on whose testimony the version of the
prosecution is anchored, we find that petitioner failed to
impeach his credibility. No evidence was shown that
Zaragoza was actuated by an improper motive. As such,
there is no cogent reason why the Court should deny
Zaragozas testimony the full faith and credit it deserves.
On the alleged inconsistencies in Zaragozas testimony, it
is relevant to state that a witness is not expected to
remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of the
minute details. Thus, even the most
truthful of witnesses may err and often give confusing
statements. What is important is that Zaragosa
unwaveringly, forthrightly and unequivocally declared
that petitioner shot at the victim. Neither did he falter in
identifying the gunman.[65]
All in all, petitioner has failed to prove unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. Without this

essential element, petitioner cannot successfully invoke

self-defense. Even assuming that he tried to defend a
stranger, his defense would not prosper. In defense of a
stranger, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is
also indispensable. In both self-defense and defense of a
stranger, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.
Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression,
we find that petitioners contention that he employed
reasonable means to repel the aggression must fail. It is
settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed
does not imply material commensurability between the
means of attack and defense. What the law requires is
rational equivalence.[66]
Also, the nature and number of wounds suffered by
Paquito negate any claim of self-defense or defense of a
stranger. The Court notes that the victim sustained eight
gunshot wounds which were all fatal as they affected
vital organs.[67] Petitioner testified that he pulled the
trigger of his armalite twice.[68] He aimed at the front of
his body, at the chest, up to the stomach. [69] Had
petitioner merely defended himself from the victims
unlawful aggression, one shot to immobilize him would
have been enough. There was no reason for petitioner to
shoot him seven more times, even aiming at his vital
organs. It bears repeating that the nature and number
of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and
unremittingly considered as important indicia which
disprove a plea for self-defense or defense of stranger
because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the

victim and not just defend oneself.[70] In the instant case,

Paquitos wounds serve to tell us that petitioner was
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive and
that he was set on killing the victim.
Petitioners avowal that his first shot was single but went
automatic on the second shot is likewise unbelievable.
[71]
Petitioners armalite has a selector that switches it
from single shot to automatic. Since it was petitioner
who was in possession of the firearm and he admitted
that he fired the shots, we reasonably conclude that it
was he who switched the firearm to automatic firing.
All told, petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of
self-defense and defense of a stranger to justify the
shooting of Paquito.
Next, petitioner contends that the killing of Paquito
resulted from the lawful performance of his duty as
police officer. However, such justifying circumstance may
be invoked only after the defense successfully proves
that the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and
the injury or offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise
of such duty.[72] These two requisites are wanting in this
case. The victim was not committing any offense at the
time. Petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the
victim had indeed fired at Regencia. Killing the victim
under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise
be considered a valid performance of a lawful duty by a
man who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to
protect the lives of the people. As aptly held in People v.
de la Cruz,[73] Performance of duties does not include

murder. Murder is never justified, regardless of the

victim.
A final word on the civil liability. An appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it
becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in
the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject
of an assignment of error or not. Therefore, we delete the
award of P50,000.00 as actual damages. To seek
recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence obtainable. Since the prosecution did not
present receipts to prove the actual losses suffered, such
actual damages cannot be awarded.[74]
On the other hand, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence, we award P50,000.00 by way of
indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of Paquito. When death
occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased
are entitled to such amount as indemnity for death
without need of any evidence or proof of damages.[75]
We also affirm the award of moral damages in view of
the finding that Generoso Umas-as lost consciousness
and suffered anguish and sorrow because of the
incident.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 25 June 1997
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 19586
finding petitioner GUILTY of homicide is partially

AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the

award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as actual
damages is deleted; and (b) petitioner is ordered to pay
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity ex
delicto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.