but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien

Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)

interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his

Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New

future actuations as a member of the bar should refrain from laying himself

Cesars Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as

open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the

captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the

position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not

law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He

worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take

contends that his appearance as counsel while holding a government

care that his honor remains unsullied.

position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the

suspension or removal of attorneys.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should

prosper

[A.C. No. 7430 : February 15, 2012]

MARTIN LAHM III AND JAMES P. CONCEPCION, COMPLAINANTS, VS. LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO LL.
MAYOR, JR., RESPONDENT.

Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to

be decided in an administrative proceeding as noted in the

Facts:

recommendation of the Solicitor General. Nonetheless, the court held that

On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal Ssdismissal before the Labor
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School,

while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate

Manila which was raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the

for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety.

complainants in the instant case.

Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living

Subsequently Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the

true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use,

Respondents. The latters counsel ask for extension of time to oppose and make a comment to the motion for
the Issuance of TRO/Pre. Inj. Thereafter, respondent issued an order which directed the parties to maintain the

not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence

status quo ante. The complainant sought for a reconsideration. Meanwhile, Toze was reinstated and assumed
his former position as Superintendent. The Illegal Dismissal case was not resolved instead respondent issued

that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to

frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated

an order requiring the parties to appear in his office to thresh out Tozes claim of moral and exemplary
damages.

Hence, the complainants filed a complainant for the disbarment of the respondent for alleged gross misconduct

would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In the case at bench, respondent is found guilty of gross

and violation of lawyers oath. Respondent Mayor argues that the complaint should be dismissed for being

ignorance of the law.

premature and a subterfurge in order to compel him to inhibit in resolving the said illegal dismissal case. Based
on finding, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent to be suspended for a period of six
months which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution. Respondent sought
to reconsider but it was denied, hence, this appeal.

The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the
NLRC(.Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC).

Wherefore, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, with a Warning that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the disposition of a more severe penalty.
Issue : Whether nor not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath
PNB v. ATTY. CEDO
Ruling:

The SC agreed with the resolution of IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.

(A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995)

FACTS:

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the
After having arranged the sale of steel sheets for Mrs Siy, the latter became implicated in a civil

practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath. A member of the Bar who
assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibilitywas not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including
those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public.

case with the complainant PNB. After having stop employment with PNB, respondent Atty. Cedo appeared as
counsel for Mrs. Siy. A similar situation also happene when spouses Almeda were implicated to a case with
complainant PNB counsel for Sps. Almeda is the Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates. Atty. Cedo was AVP of
the Asset Management group of complainant bank, where such loan transaction of Sps. Almeda came under
his purview. Respondent asserted that in the former case, he did not participate in the litigation before the
court, while the latter, it was another partner of the firm that handle the case. IBP made its report and
recommendation for suspension for having deliberate intent to devise ways and means to attract as clients
former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his
former employer.

Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that
are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases
of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative

ISSUE:

cases.
Whether or not respondent Atty. Cedo be held administratively liable.

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less
HELD:

SUSPENDED. According to Canon 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in

violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for
one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealtwith more severely.

which he had intervened while in said service. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent
sought to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction
which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, violated said Canon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.

Comments
CATU VS. RELLOSA (A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008)

HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional
Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to
former governmentlawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong
barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of
the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the punong
barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an
amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed
the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendantsdespite the fact that
he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense,

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of
profession of elective local governmentofficials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and
employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA
7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial

board members

and councilors) are

expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation,
no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they
are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.

respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to
Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to
discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for
the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the

Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or authorization from
the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey
the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not

only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule

FACTS

1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued
a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply
with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG,
on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.

with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by Mendoza.

PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity
of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public

The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits

confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his

former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which

office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as

he had intervened while in said service.

embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTYof professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is

W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?

therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
HELD

NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter under
Rule 6.03.

The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to

Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues.He was also cited in the complaint as not

liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No.

paying his professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court. It was also an

107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No.

alleged falsity when he included his IBP-Rizal 259060 where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner

0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.

cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed
and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafabut

The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying
that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different

was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of the
law.

from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

ISSUE:

Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and substantial. We
note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of

Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:

creditors against the GENBANK.

YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion

RATIO:

for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the

Even if he had limited practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues. Rule

Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar

139-A provides:

were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers

of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in

who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee may

such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the

compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the

Roll of Attorneys.

case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005
which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

sides for there were no sides.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749

23JUL

FACTS:

CANON 7

by Roseanne De Jesus

Whether or not Atty. TrebonianTabang violated Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
LEDA v. ATTY. TABANG

(A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992)

HELD:

The court held that Atty. TrebonianTabangis guilty of violating Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
FACTS:

Responsibility and is thus suspended from the practice of law until further notice.The Court held that
Evangeline Leda (complainant) challenges Atty. TrebonianTabangs (respondent) good moral

character in two complaints she filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on January 6,
1982 and the case at hand. It appears that complainant and respondent contracted a marriage in Tigbauan,
Iloilo on October 3, 1976 under as one of the exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code. The
parties agreed to keep their marriage a secret until respondent had finished his law studies and had taken the
Bar examinations. Complainant admits that they have not lived together as husband and wife. After
respondents law studies and bar examinations, complainant blocked his oath-taking (by instituting Bar Matter

respondents declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single"
was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made
answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would
have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral
character.

No. 78) claiming that respondent had acted fraudulently when he filled out his application declaring he was
single and is thus unworthy to take the lawyers Oath for lack of good moral character. Respondent filed his
explanation claiming that he was legally married to complainant but the marriage was not yet made and

Thursday, December 9, 2010

declared public so that he may finish his studies as well as take the bar exams and he therefore believed that
he was still single. Respondent also alleged that he and the complainant has reconciled and prayed that the
case be dismissed (on the ground that complainant confirmed with his explanation as evidence by the affidavit
of desistance made by complainant) which was granted by the Court on August 20, 1982. However, on

Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is not a matter of right.

February 14, 1983, complainant filed an Administrative case and prayed for respondents disbarment on the
grounds that: Respondent used his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage; he mirepresented himself
in his application to take the bar exam; lack of good moral character; and that complainant was deceived into
signing the affidavit of desistance and that the only reason why he reconciled with her is so that she would
withdraw the complaint against him. Complainant also claimed that respondent sent her a letter which proves

No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of
unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

all of her allegations where the respondent states that their marriage was actually void form the beginning.
Respondent denied that he had sent such letter. On March 26, 1984, the Bar Confidants report recommended
indefinite suspension of respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on
respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of
any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending
civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is
alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and

ISSUE:

not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land
subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

 Aug. 5, 1975: Complainants (spouses Erlinda Dalman & Narciso Melendrez) obtained from Atty. Reynerio
Decena (Decena) a loan of P4K. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage.
The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of
Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of

It was made to appear in the REM that the amount borrowed was P5K. Decena assured the spouses that the

public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over
the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

REM was a mere formality, and due to this assurance the spouses signed the REM.

Despite the assurance, Decena collected from the spouses P500/month as usurious interest. The spouses
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his

paid such usurious interest for 3 months.

good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.

Because of their failure to pay the amounts, Decena drafted a new REM

HELD:

o New contract of mortgage in the amount of P10K with interest at 19%/annum

His petition must be denied.

o A special power of attorney authorizing Decena to sell the mortgaged property in public auction

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

Spouses never knew the implications of the new REM. They failed to pay their obligation and so Decena
acquired their property in pulic auction and later sold it to Trinidad Ylanan for P12K

Spouses then went to Decena with P10K in the hopes of getting their property back. Decena then informs
It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free

themthat their debt has soared to P20.4K.

patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of
his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and

With shattered hopes and grief in their hearts (andrama!), the spouses filed this case for disbarment.

where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and
fair dealings.

(2nd cause of action)

Spouses filed a case for estafa against Reynaldo Pineda for recovery of P2K
Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting
several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

Decena entered into a compromise agreement with Pineda. Pineda then paid P500 to Decena. This
settlement was never brought to the attention of the spouses nor were they ever consulted about such.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also
been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

90 MELENDRES v DECENA

Facts:

Issue:

W/N Decenas acts show gross misconduct and should therefore be disbarred

(1st cause of action)

Held: Yes, Decena shall be disbarred

 The acts of Decena as to the 1st cause of action constitute deception, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a

IBP Board of Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for

member of the bar.

Clarificatory Questioning with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with
the Supreme Court.

As to the 2nd cause of action, Decena clearly failed to get the consent of the spouses before entering into
acompromise. Decena also failed to inform the spouses or turn over to them the P500 given to him by Pineda
as downpayment for the settlement of the case.

Decenas failure to turn over to the spouses the money underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing
with his clients

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent be disbarred for immorality

(2) Whether or not respondents act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to
FACTS: Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was

his client, is a violation of the Code.

introduced to her by her former classmate. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support
case she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and
respondent started having sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug, respondent also gave her
sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as
counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.

HELD:

(1) NO. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that anapplicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign anAffidavit of Disclaimer which the

otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. The Court has held that to justify

latter signed without reading the saidaffidavit. On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant

suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly

that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical

immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as

expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check in

to be reprehensible to a high degree. On sexual relation and on respondents subsequent marriage, by his own

the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However,

admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a

sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because

lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court find credence in

he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the

respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage,

2nd District of Pampanga

complainants allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment
cases.

Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an
administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It was then

(2) NO. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after

recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be

explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases

ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The same was approved by the

but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will

G.R. No. L-12611, August 7, 191838 Phil 124

admit of a fair settlement. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she
cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is
not enough in the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has
regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

FACTS:

On February 27 1904, Anastasio Alano, Jlose Alano and Florencio Alano executed in favor of the

plaintiff, Dra. Marcela Marino a document stipulating that the Alanos as testamentary heirs of deceased Rev.
Anastacio Cruz, would pay the sum of P2, 730.50 within one (1) year with interest of 12 percent per annum
representing the amount of debt incurred by Cruz. Moreover, the agreement provided that the Alanos are to

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and

convey the house and lot bequeathed to them by Cruz in the event of failure to pay the debt in money at its

impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the

maturity.

future will be dealt with more severely.

No part of interest or principal due has been paid except the sum of P200 paid in 1908 by Anastacio
Alano. In 1912, Anastasio died intestate. On August 8, 1914, CFI of Batangas appointed Crisanto Javier as
administrator of Anastasios estate. On March 17, 1916, the plaintiffs filed the complaint against Florencio, Jose
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

and Crisanto praying that unless defendants pay the debt for the recovery of which the action was brought,
they be required to convey to plaintiffs the house and lot described in the agreement, that the property be
appraised and if its value is found to be less than the amount of the debt, with accrued interest at the
stipulation rate, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the balance.

ISSUE: The issue is whether or not the agreement that the defendant-appellant, at the maturity of the debt, will
pay the sum of the money lent by the appellees or will transfer the rights to the ownership and possession of
the house and lot bequeathed to the former by the testator in favor of the appellees, is valid.

HELD:

This stipulation is valid because it is simply an alternative obligation, which is expressly allowed by law.
The agreement to convey the house and lot on an appraised value in the event of failure to pay the debt in
money at its maturity is valid. It is simply an undertaking that if debt is not paid in money, it will be paid in
another way. The agreement is not open to the objection that the agreement is pacto comisorio. It is not an
attempt to permit the creditor to declare the forfeiture of the security upon the failure of the debtor to pay at its
maturity. It is simply provided that if the debt is not paid in money, it shall be paid by the transfer of the property
at a valuation. Such an agreement unrecorded, creates no right in rem, but as between the parties, it is
perfectly valid and specific performance by its terms may be enforced unless prevented by the creation of
superior rights in favor of third persons.
Oblicon

Felipe Agoncillo vs. Crisanto Javier

The contract is not susceptible of the interpretation that the title to the house and lot in question

A building of the plaintiff was insured against fire by the defendant in the sum of P30,000.00 as well as

was to be transferred to the creditor ipso facto upon the mere failure of the debtors to pay the debt at its

the goods and merchandise therein contained in the sum of P15,000.00. The house and merchandise insured

maturity. The obligations assumed by the debtors were in the alternative, and they had the right to elect which

were burnt early in the morning of February 28, 1923 while the policies issued by the defendant in favor of the

they would perform. The conduct of parties shows that it was not their understanding that the right to discharge

plaintiff were in force.

the obligation by the payment of the money was lost to the debtors by their failure to pay the debt at its
maturity. The plaintiff accepted the payment from Anastacio in 1908, several years after the debt matured.

The appellants contend that under clause 14 of the conditions of the policies, it amay rebuild the house burnt
and although the house may be smaller, yet it would be sufficient indemnity to the insured for the actual loss

It is quite clear therefore that under the terms of the contract, and the parties themselves have interpreted

suffered by him.

it, the liability of the defendant as to the conveyance of the house and lot is subsidiary and conditional, being
dependent upon their failure to pay the debt in money. It must follow therefore that if the action to recover the
debt was prescribed, the action to compel a conveyance of the house and lot is likewise barred, as the
agreement to make such conveyance was not an independent principal undertaking, but merely a subsidiary

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant company may perform the alternative obligation despite the fact that

the plaintiffs consent was not secured.

HELD:

alternative pact relating to the method by which the debt must be paid.
It must be noted that in alternative obligations, the debtor, the insurance company in this case, must
notify the creditor of his election, stating which of the two prestations he is disposed to fulfill, in accordance with
the law. The object of this notice is to five the creditor, that is , the plaintiff in the instant case, opportunity to
expr3ss his consent. The record shows that the appellant company did not give a formal notice of its selection
to rebuild and while the witnesses speaks of the propped reconstruction of the house destroyed, yet the plaintiff
id d not give his assent to the proposition, for the reason that the new house would be smaller and of materials
of lower kind than those employed in the construction of the house destroyed.

LEGARDA VS MIAILHE

GR No. L-3435 April 28, 1951

FACTS:

On June 3, 1944, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the original defendant William J.B. Burke, alleging
Ong Guan Can vs. The Century Insurance Company, Ltd.

defendants unjustified refusal to accept payment in discharge of a mortgage indebtedness in his favor, and
praying that the latter be order (1) to receive the sum of P75,920.83; (2) to execute the corresponding deed of

G.R. No. 21196, February 6, 1924 46 Phil 592

release of mortgage, and; (3) to pay damages in the sum of P1,000. The Court then decided in favor of plaintiff
Legarda. After the war and the subsequent defeat of the Japanese occupants, defendant filed a case in court

FACTS:

claiming that plaintiff Clara de Legarda violated her agreement with defendant, by forcing to deposit worthless
Japanese military notes when they originally agreed that the interest was to be condoned until after the

occupation and that payment was rendered either in Philippine or English currency. Defendant was later

ISSUE:

What is the nature and effect of the actionable document mentioned above?

substituted upon death by his heir Miailhe and the Courts judged in defendants favor. Plaintiff now assails said
RULING:

decision.

ISSUE

Is the tender of payment by plaintiff valid?

The decisive question at issue, therefore, is whether the second part of the written obligation, in which
the obligors agreed and promised to deliver a mortgage over the parcel of land described therein, upon their

RULING:

failure to pay the debt on a date specified in the proceeding paragraph, is valid and binding and effective upon
the plaintiff-appellee, the creditor. This second part of the obligation in question is what is known in law as a

On February 17, 1943, the only currency available was the Philippine currency, or the Japanese Military

facultative obligation, defined in article 1206 of Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

notes, because all other currencies, including the English, were outlawed by a proclamation issued by the
Japanese Imperial Commander on January 3, 1942. The right to election ceased to exist on the date of
plaintiffs payment because it had become legally impossible. And this is so because in alternative obligations
ART. 1206. When only one prestation has been agreed upon, but the obligor may render another

there is no right to choose undertakings that are impossible or illegal. In other words, the obligation on the part
of the debtor to pay the mortgage indebtedness has since then ceased to be alternative. It appears therefore,

in substitution, the obligation is called facultative.

that the tender of payment in Japanese Military notes was a valid tender because it was the only currency
permissible at the time and its payment was tantamount to payment in Philippine currency.
There is nothing in the agreement which would argue against its enforcement. it is not contrary to law or
However, payment with the clerk of court did not have any legal effect because it was made in certified
check, and a check does not meet the requirements of legal tender. Therefore, her consignation did not have
the effect of relieving her from her obligation of the defendant.

public morals or public policy, and notwithstanding the absence of any legal provision at the time it was entered
into government it, as the parties had freely and voluntarily entered into it, there is no ground or reason why it
should not be given effect. It is a new right which should be declared effective at once.

PH CREDIT CORP VS CA
QUIZANA VS REDUGORIO

GR No. L-6620 May 7, 1954

FACTS:

This is an appeal to this Court from a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Marinduque,
wherein the defendants-appellants are ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellee the sum of P550, with interest from
the time of the filing of the complaint, and from an order of the same court denying a motion of the defendantsappellants for the reconsideration of the judgment on the ground that they were deprived of their day in court.

GR No. 109648 November 22, 2001

FACTS:

PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales, Thomas H. Van Sebille and
Federico C. Lim, for [a] sum of money. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-17751 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Manila. After service of summons upon the defendants, they failed to file their
answer within the reglementary period, hence they were declared in default. PH Credit Corp., was then
allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. The RTC judged in favor of PH Credit Corp.

On July 27, 1990, a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed and on October 12, 1990,
the same was granted. The writ of possession itself was issued on October 26, 1990. Said order and writ of

liability of the six respondents in a case adjudicated by the NLRC is solidary despite the absence of the word
"solidary" in the dispositive portion of the Decision, when their liability should merely be joint.

possession are now the subject of this petition. Petitioner claims that Respondent Judge erred in applying the
presumption of a joint obligation in the face of the conclusion of fact and law contained in the decision showing

ISSUE

that the obligation is solidary.

ISSUE

Is the petitioners contention tenable?

RULING:

Is the petitioners liability pursuant to the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated March 10, 1987, solidary
or not?

RULING

In the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter, the word "solidary" does not appear. The said fallo
expressly states the following respondents therein as liable, namely: Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation,
The Rules of Court requires that all available objections to a judgment or proceeding must be set up in

Gerardo Sicat, Antonio Gonzales, Industrial Management Development Corporation (petitioner INIMACO), Chiu

an Omnibus Motion assailing it; otherwise, they are deemed waived. In the case at bar, the objection of private

Chin Gin, and Lo Kuan Chin. Nor can it be inferred therefrom that the liability of the six (6) respondents in the

respondent to his solidary liability became available to him, only after his real property was sold at public

case below is solidary, thus their liability should merely be joint.

auction. At the time his personal properties were levied and sold, it was not evident to him that he was being
Moreover, it is already a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that, when it is not provided in a

held solely liable for the monetary judgment rendered against him and his co-respondents. That was why his
objections then did not include those he asserted when his solidary liability became evident.

judgment that the defendants are liable to pay jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may
be compelled to satisfy in full said judgment. Granting that the Labor Arbiter has committed a mistake in failing
to indicate in the dispositive portion that the liability of respondents therein is solidary, the correction -- which is
substantial -- can no longer be allowed in this case because the judgment has already become final and

In the dispositive portion of the January 31, 1984 Decision of the trial court, the word solidary neither

executory.

appears nor can it be inferred therefrom. The fallo merely stated that the following respondents were liable:
Pacific Lloyd Corporation, Thomas H. Van Sebille, Carlos M. Farrales and Federico C. Lim. Under the

INCIONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

circumstances, the liability is joint, as provided by the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 96405, June 26, 1996
INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT VS NLRC
FACTS:
GR No. 101723 May 11, 2000
On February 3, 1983, petitioner Baldomero L. Inciong, Jr. together with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D.
FACTS:

Pantanosas signed a promissory note in the amount of P50, 000.00 holding themselves jointly and severally
liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications. The promissory note was due on May 5, 1983.

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution dated September 4, 1991 issued by the National

Said due date expired without the promissors having paid their obligation.

Labor Relations Commission in RAB-VII-0711-84 on the alleged ground that it committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the Labor Arbiter
which deviated from the dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 10, 1987, thereby holding that the

On November 14, 1983 and on June 8, 1984, private respondent sent petitioner telegrams demanding
payment thereof. On December 11, 1983, private respondent also sent registered mail a final letter of demand
to Rene C. Naybe. Since both obligors did not respond to the demand made, private respondent filed on

January 24, 1986 a complaint for collection of the sum of P50, 000.00 against the three (3) obligors. On

FACTS:

January 27, 1987, the lower court dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas as prayed by herein
private respondent. Meanwhile, only the summons addressed to petitioner was served for the reason that
defendant Naybe had gone to Saudi Arabia.

On 1 December 1997, Eparwa and LDCU, entered into a Contract for Security Services. On 21
December 1998, 11 security guards (security guards) whom Eparwa assigned to LDCU from 1 December
1997 to 30 November 1998, filed a complaint before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. 10 in Cagayan

The lower court rendered its decision holding petitioner solidarily liable and to pay herein respondent

de Oro City. The complaint was filed against both Eparwa and LDCU for underpayment of salary, legal holiday

bank the amount of P50, 000.00 plus interest thereon. Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of

pay, 13th month pay, rest day, service incentive leave, night shift differential, overtime pay, and payment for

Appeals. The respondent court, however, affirmed the decision of the lower court. The petitioner moved for

attorneys fees.

reconsideration, which was later on denied by the respondent Court of Appeals.

The Labor Arbiter found that the security guards are entitled to wage differentials and premium for holiday and
ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint against Naybe, the principal debtor, and against

Pantanosas, his co-maker, constituted a release of his obligation.

rest day work. The Labor Arbiter held Eparwa and LDCU solidarily liable pursuant to Article 109 of the Labor
Code. LDCU filed an appeal before the NLRC. LDCU agreed with the Labor Arbiters decision on the security
guards entitlement to salary differential but challenged the propriety of the amount of the award. LDCU
alleged that security guards not similarly situated were granted uniform monetary awards and that the decision
did not include the basis of the computation of the amount of the award.

HELD

The dismissal of the complaint against Naybe and Pantanosas did not constitute a release of

ISSUE:

petitioners obligation, especially because the dismissal of the case against Pantanosas was upon the motion
of private respondent itself. Petitioner signed the promissory note as a solidary co-maker and not as a
guarantor. A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation,
and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. The promissory note involved in this case

Is LDCU alone ultimately liable to the security guards for the wage differentials and premium for holiday
and rest day pay?

expressly states that the three signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them
may be proceeded against for the entire obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine

RULING:

against whom he will enforce collection

Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code, when there are two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation, the presumption is that the obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable only for a
proportionate part of the debt. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the
law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.

ESPARWA SECURITY, v. LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY

Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code read:Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an
employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of
the contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this
Code.Article 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project. Article 109. Solidary liability.

G.R. No. 150402 Nov 8, 2006

The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be
held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For

purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct
employers.

This joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to
assure compliance of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum wage [Article 99, Labor Code].
The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal, on the other hand, is
made the indirect employer of the contractors employees for purposes of paying the employees their wages
should the contractor be unable to pay them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees,
payment of the workers performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection
as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. For the security guards, the actual source of the payment of their wage

HELD:

differentials and premium for holiday and rest day work does not matter as long as they are paid. This is the
import of Eparwa and LDCUs solidary liability. Creditors, such as the security guards, may collect from anyone
The Supreme court held that the Deed of Absolute Sale is an indivisible contract founded on an

of the solidary debtors. Solidary liability does not mean that, as between themselves, two solidary debtors are
liable for only half of the payment.

indivisible obligation. As such, it being indivisible, it can not be annulled by only one of them. And since this suit
was filed only by the estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. without including the estate of Aurea Poblete, the

LDCUs ultimate liability comes into play because of the expiration of the Contract for Security Services. There

present suit must fail. The estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. can not cause its annulment while its validity is

is no privity of contract between the security guards and LDCU, but LDCUs liability to the security guards

sustained by the estate of Aurea Poblete. An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in

remains because of Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. .

parts, whatever may be the nature of the thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers to the

NAZARENO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

prestation and not to the object. The Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to
Natividad. The obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts,

G.R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000

otherwise the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are mistaken in basing the indivisibility of a
contract on the number of obligors. In any case, if petitioners only point is that the estate of Maximino, Sr.

FACTS

alone cannot contest the validity of the Deed of Sale because the estate of Aurea has not yet been settled, the
Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while

Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28. Upon
the reorganization of the courts in 1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite.
Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo
discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor
of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by
Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970 for the total amount of P47,800.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Deed of Absolute of Sale can be equated as a divisible obligation.

argument would nonetheless be without merit. The validity of the contract can be questioned by anyone
affected by it. A void contract is inexistent from the beginning. Hence, even if the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone
contests the validity of the sale, the outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at
all.

Respondents contract with the petitioners have the force of law between them. Respondents are thus
bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein. Items 11 and 12 of the Compromise Agreement
provided, in clear terms, that in case of failure to pay on the part of the respondents, they shall vacate and
surrender possession of the land that they are occupying and the petitioners shall be entitled to obtain
immediately from the trial court the corresponding writ of execution for the ejectment of the respondents. This
ALONZO VS SAN JUAN

provision must be upheld, because the Agreement supplanted the Complaint itself. When the parties entered
into a Compromise Agreement, the original action for recovery of possession was set aside and the action was

GR No. 137549 February 11, 2005

FACTS:

A complaint for recovery of possession was filed by Aurelio P. Alonzo and Teresita A. Sison against Jaime
and Perlita San Juan docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29415 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon

changed to a monetary obligation. Once approved judicially, the Compromise Agreement can not and must not
be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.

Tan vs. Court f Appeals

G.R. No. 116285, October 19, 2001

City, Branch 77. In their Complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land. At
around June of 1996, plaintiffs discovered that a portion on the left side of the said parcel of land with an area

367 SCRA 571

of one hundred twenty-five (125) square meters, more or less, was occupied by the defendants for more than a
year, without their prior knowledge or consent. A demand letter was sent to the defendants in August of 1996
requiring them to vacate the property but they refused to comply; hence, the filing of the Complaint. During the
pendency of the case, the parties agreed to enter into a Compromise Agreement which the trial court approved
in a Judgment.

Alleging that they failed to abide by the provisions of the Compromise Agreement by their failure to pay
the amounts due thereon, plaintiffs sent a letter demanding that the defendants vacate the premises. Plaintiffs
subsequently filed an Amended Motion for Execution. Acting on the motion, the trial court issued its Order
dated 11 August 1998 denying the motion.

ISSUE: Is the RTC decision correct?

FACTS:

On May 14, 1978, petitioner Antonio Tan obtained two (2) loans in the total principal amount of four (4)
million pesos from respondent Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), evidenced by 2 promissory notes with
maturity dates on May 14, 1979 and July 6, 1979, respectively. Petitioner defaulted but after a few partial
payments he had the loans restructured by respondent CCP, and petitioner accordingly executed a promissory
note on August 31, 1979 in the amount of P3,411,421.32 payable in five (5) installments. Petitioner Tan,
however, failed to pay any of the supposed installments and again offered another mode of paying restructured
loan which respondent CCP refused to consent.

On May 30, 1984, respondent, thru counsel, wrote petitioner demanding the full payment, within ten
(10) days, from receipt of the letter, of the latters restructured loan which as of April 30, 1984 amounted to P6,

RULING:

In herein case, the respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving payment. Even assuming that

088,735.03.

On August 29, 1984, respondent CCP filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for a collection of a sum

payments were made, it has not been shown to the full satisfaction of this Court whether the payments were

of money. Eventually, petitioner was ordered to pay said amount, with 25% thereof as attorneys fees and

made specifically to satisfy respondents obligation under the Compromise Agreement, nor were the

P500, 000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, reduced the attorneys fees to 5% of

circumstances under which the payments were made explained, taking into consideration the conditions of the

the principal amount to be collected from petitioner and deleted the exemplary damages.

Compromise Agreement.

Still unsatisfied with the decision, petitioner comes to this Court seeking for the deletion of the

ISSUE:

attorneys fees and the reduction of the penalties.

ISSUE: The issue is whether or not interests and penalties may be both awarded in the case at bar.
Did respondents violate the Rules of Court?
HELD:

YES. Article 1226 of the New Civil Code provides that in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty
shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance, if there is
no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is

RULING:

guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation. The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. In the case at bar, the promissory note expressly provides for the

By serving notices of garnishment on Citibank, N.A., HSBC and PNB, Sheriff Regalado violated EPCIBs

imposition of both interest and penalties in case of default on the part of the petitioner in the payment of the

right to choose which property may be levied upon to be sold at auction for the satisfaction of the judgment

subject restructured loan, and since the said stipulation has the force of law between the parties and does not

debt. Thus, it is clear that when EPCIB offered its real properties, it exercised its option because it cannot

appear to be inequitable or unjust, the said stipulation must be respected.

immediately pay the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees in cash, certified bank check
or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee.

PCI vs Ng Shueng Ngor

In the case at bar, EPCIB cannot immediately pay by way of Managers Check so it exercised its option
A.M. No. P-05-1973. March 18, 2005

to choose and offered its real properties. With the exercise of the option, Sheriff Regalado should have ceased
serving notices of garnishment and discontinued their implementation. This is not true in the instant case.

FACTS:

Sheriff Regalado was adamant in his posture even if real properties have been offered which were sufficient to
Complainant EPCIB is the defendant in Civil Case No. CEB-26983 before the Regional Trial

satisfy the judgment debt.

Court (RTC), Branch 16, Cebu City, entitled, Ng Sheung Ngor, doing business under the name and style Ken
Marketing, Ken Appliance Division, Inc. and Benjamin Go, Plaintiffs, vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Aimee Yu and
Ben Apas, Defendants for Annulment and/or Reformation of Documents and Contracts.

Respondents Antonio A. Bellones and Generoso B. Regalado are the sheriffs in Branches 9 and 16,
respectively, of the RTC of Cebu City.

For garnishing accounts maintained by Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) at Citibank, N.A., and
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC), allegedly in violation of Section 9(b) of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, a complaint for grave abuse of authority was filed by Atty. Paulino L. Yusi against Sheriffs
Antonio A. Bellones and Generoso B. Regalado. There was an offer of other real property by petitioner.
PACITA REFORMINA v TOMOL, JR.

NO. L-59096 October 11, 1985

FACTS:

An action for Recovery of Damages for Injury to Person and Loss of Property was filed. RTC
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the former. On appeal, the decision was modified. In the computation of the legal interest decreed
sought to be executed, petitioners claimed that it should be at 12% per annum invoking Central bank Circular.
The respondents, however, insist that said legal interest should be at the rate of 6% per annum pursuant to
Article 2209 of the New Civil code

ISSUE:

How much by way of legal interest, should a judgment debtor pay the judgment creditor?

RULING:

The judgment spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearances
of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment does not fall within the coverage of the
said law for it is not within the ambit of authority granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not
tread on forbidden grounds. To make Central Bank Circular No. 416 applicable to any case other than those
specifically provided for by the Usury Law will make the same of doubtful constitutionality since the Monetary
Board will be exercising legislative functions which are beyond the intendment of PD No. 116.

The petition is without merit, the same is dismissed with costs against petitioners.