Legal Ethics Cases (Page 2-3 Syllabus)

LEGAL ETHICS
[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]
278 Phil. 235

EN BANC
G.R. No. 100113, September 03, 1991
RENATO L. CAYETANO, PETITIONER, VS. CHRISTIAN MONSOD,
HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
AND HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Italics supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of
the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Italics supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
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advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice
of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N. E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105
Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Italics supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
LEGAL ETHICS
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to

proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p.
665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N. E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,
144]). (Italics ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in
the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.'" (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it
has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
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"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation

which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission
on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Commissioner will please
proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section 1 is that 'They must be Members of the Philippine Bar - I am
quoting from the provision 'who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years."
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members
of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?
"MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work: it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
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provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.).
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the

most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"Mr. OPLE, Thank you."
x x x (Italics supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Italics supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone
are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms."
The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpfully defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
"the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task
or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p.
687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is
one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to
the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling,
LEGAL ETHICS
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers

find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work
that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these
special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers'
work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the
way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work.
The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, hereinbelow quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional
concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
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Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in

predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legalpolicy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other corporations have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
LEGAL ETHICS
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. (Italics supplied)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4)
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
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These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Italics supplied)
The practicing lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Italics supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
LEGAL ETHICS
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group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Underscoring supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are
apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Italics supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Italics supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are

undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It
needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant
subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel bear responsibility for
key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not to understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. (Business Star, "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4)..
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will
the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
LEGAL ETHICS
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman
of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as a lawyer
for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar,
Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer
for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning
to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL,
Monsod's, work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accredition hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups,
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of
his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a guasi-judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia-Munoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
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public accountability and the party-list system for the House of

Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Italics supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No.
2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Underscoring
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and
legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Italics supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts,
an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
LEGAL ETHICS
(Italics supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said; 'They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery. (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of
law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor - verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement - that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide." (italics supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground
that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
Page 8 of 115
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so

would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law." (Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists
of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.... (Lacson v. Romero, No.
L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution
which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition
would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or
three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice "... is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous"
or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
LEGAL ETHICS
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others
on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps,
but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten
years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus
in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
Page 9 of 115
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
"No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front
of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood
flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
520 Phil. 538
EN BANC
A.C. NO. 6705, March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CARLOS
B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT
CARPIO, J.:
DECISION
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio

for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private
practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso
Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate.[1] Alfonso Lim is a
stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc.[2]
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.[3] until
his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.[4]
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986,[5] and its operations ceased in
1997.[6]
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat
employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda,
Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240
("criminal complaint").[7] Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of
Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15
July 1997.[8]
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to
conduct the preliminary investigation.[9] He resolved the criminal
complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations[10] for
Page 10 of 115
violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article 116[12] of the Labor

Code of the Philippines.[13]
Complainant now charges respondent with the following
violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations
of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself
from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by
Taggat employees.[14] Furthermore, complainant claims that
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed
and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an
affidavit to support the complaint.[15]
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging
in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainer's fee for the months of
January and February 1995,[16] another P10,000 for the months
of April and May 1995,[17] and P5,000 for the month of April
1996.[18]
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for
defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant's allegations and counters that
complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her
expectation.[19]
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed,
respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years.
[20]
Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided
loyalty to Taggat.[21] Respondent argues that it was his sworn
duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. [22]
LEGAL ETHICS
Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of

impartiality when he performed his duty.[23] Respondent points
out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent
from hearing the criminal complaint[24] but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without
mental reservation.[25]
Respondent states that complainant's reason in not filing a
motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would
exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainant's statement during the hearing conducted on 12
February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn't think he would do
it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father's friend and he was
working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my
father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.
[26]
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist

because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his
official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.[27] Respondent
argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent's act
was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. [28]
Respondent denies complainant's allegations that he instigated
the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat
employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of
proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the
employees or present them for cross-examination.[29]
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment
as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant
but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. [30]
Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his
consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent
submits that consultation is not the same as representation and
Page 11 of 115
that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. [31]

Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid
voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent's asking, intended
as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or
for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate
as a specie of 'conflict of interest'. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the abovementioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees.
[32]
Respondent insists that complainant's evidence failed to prove

that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the
retained counsel or legal consultant.[33]
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and
Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State
Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.
[34]
Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.[35]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Investigating
Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case[36] and allowed the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.[37] Due to IBP
Commissioner Abbas' resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa").[38]
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve
the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting
with modification[39] IBP Commissioner Funa's Report and
Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict
of interests, failure to safeguard a former client's interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years
suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of
Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will
LEGAL ETHICS
require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will
conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see
Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of
Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being
accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p.
2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of
Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel
and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt
with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore,
Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No.
97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the
issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the
mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar
with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein
Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to
"maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil.
640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he
does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It
should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an
immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters
that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations
that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the
Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have
been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if
Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as
Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and
Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
Page 12 of 115
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and
the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the
years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved
are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt
with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat.
Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its
management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy
fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work
while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had
long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited
to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act
of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the
practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic
of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any
activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law,
legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil.
173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod,
201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain
employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal
complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of
interest, failure to safeguard a former client's interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor.[40]
LEGAL ETHICS
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court

as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[41] of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct.[42] Respondent committed unlawful conduct
when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic
Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official duties." [43] A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to]
represent conflicting interests."[44] However, this rule is subject
to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists,
when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client
relationship exists.[45] Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.[46]
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to
engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee
to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official
functions."[47]
Complainant's evidence failed to substantiate the claim
that respondent represented conflicting interests
[48]
In Quiambao v. Bamba,
the Court enumerated various tests to
determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of
interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his
former client any confidential information acquired through their
Page 13 of 115
connection or previous employment.[49] In essence, what a

lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him.[50]
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the
criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent
was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he
resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent
used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential
information acquired through his previous employment. The
only established participation respondent had with respect to
the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted
the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not
necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential
information from his previous employment with complainant or
Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a
sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests. A lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose
upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on
matters that he previously handled for the former client and not
for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence
to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor
LEGAL ETHICS
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."[51]
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to
the public as a lawyer.[52]
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services
to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of
Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without
merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy
services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the
use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of
the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal
services to complainant while working as a government
prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the
payments by Taggat were for "Retainer's fee."[53] Thus, as
correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly
violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary
action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the
violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent's violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondent's admission that he received
Page 14 of 115
from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a

government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with
unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to
Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent
be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from
the practice of the law profession and his name removed from
the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross
violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public.
[54]
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.[55]
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government
employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of
profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year.
[56] We find this penalty appropriate for respondent's violation
in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for
SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 15 of 115
484 Phil. 173

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand
A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student;
since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions
against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his
own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of
his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one
case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange
transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or
not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from
hearing the case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule
on his appearance xxx xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is
misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice
said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.

Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters
act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is
a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a
lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party
litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of
complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently
with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to
threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was
handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the
words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were
uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and
humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit
complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative
violations should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint
filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from
appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom
complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases
including him to further complainants illegal practice of law;
complainants complaint occurred during a judicial
proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent
himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog
thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an
order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared;
because of which, respondent stated: Your honor I would like
to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who
represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which
complainant replied: The counsel very well know that I am
LEGAL ETHICS
not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that

complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge
did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and
complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not
a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he
stated pumasa ka muna out of indignation because of
complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer;
it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a
complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in
a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled
principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
(Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another
malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant
against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares
of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the
appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as
authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which
allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as
counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having
satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A,
Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an
administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said
Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku masama
yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed
by the Honorable Courts Third Division which stated among
others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were
uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to
complainants actuations and taking into account that
complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the
court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was
sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant. Respondent
prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Page 16 of 115
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A.

Navarro recommended respondents suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule
8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the
undersigned noted that respondents averment that the
utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged
communication does not hold water for the same was (sic)
not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial
before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances
he made in open court against the complainant had been the
basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust
Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136
respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation
that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to
practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the
administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on
December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness
in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance
hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone
of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered
are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the
part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the
bar examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in
informing the court if it was his purpose relative to
complainants appearance in court; although the latter
LEGAL ETHICS
appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had

complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and
3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making
utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the
sensitivities of the other party as in this case
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of
the case for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to
observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of
Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by
the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be
promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days
from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of
the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important
function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of
Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of
courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the
decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court
the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case
any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an
assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this
case, reached his judgment through the process of legal
reasoning.[2]
In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving
respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings
Page 17 of 115
of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, noncompliance with the rule would result in the remand of the
case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending
resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could
be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court
has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and
speedy disposition of cases.[3] This case falls within the
exception.
We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear,
pumasa ka muna does not amount to a violation of Rule
8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about
when respondent pointed out to the trial court that
complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression
of complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her
Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a
lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of
such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or
reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the
moment in the course of an argument between them. It has
been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an
account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of
chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court
to condone even contemptuous language. [5]
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not
precluded from litigating personally his cases. A partys right
to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the
foregoing provision, thus:
LEGAL ETHICS
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may

personally do everything during its progress -- from its
commencement to its termination. When they, however, act
as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules
of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law;
otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute
and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are
not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not
practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices
medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,

befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of judicial forum.[9]
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley
Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly,

involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others.
Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other
officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice]
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not
customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as
a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of
law.[7]
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers
are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably
and fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and
Page 18 of 115
LEGAL ETHICS
565 Phil. 165
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER,
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.[1] On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus,
this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar
Confidant
cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission
to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the
bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines
that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
Page 19 of 115
2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has
none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in
the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer's oath to
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[2] It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. [3]
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules
of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any
breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and
clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.[4]
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is
in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice
law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.[5] He
must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of
LEGAL ETHICS
good moral character and that no charges against him,

involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.[6]
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;[7] passing the bar examinations;[8] taking the
lawyer's oath[9] and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to
practice.[10]
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in
good standing is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;[11] payment of the annual
professional tax;[12] compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;[13] faithful observance of the rules
and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control.[14]
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in
the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.[15] Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in
the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship
ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.[16]
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]."[17] Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never
Page 20 of 115
to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no

automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."[18] Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge
to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing
as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the
Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member
of the Philippine bar.SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
451 Phil. 428
EN BANC
B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDWIN L.
RANA, RESPONDENT.
CARPIO, J.:
DECISION
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess

the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oathtaking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law,
and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of
the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the
Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court
ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys
pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but
has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board
of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC
a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Page 21 of 115
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented

himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel
for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter
engaging respondent's services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyer's oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his
"specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan,
not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer
or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May
2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent's
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
LEGAL ETHICS
assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001

Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When
respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant
questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had
not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of
the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent's Comment)
reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
"motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBC's Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the
MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he
took the lawyer's oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondent's misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondent's unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny
his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite
a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as
counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.
Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was
accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However,
the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for
Page 22 of 115
Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the

lawyer's oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as"
counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the
same pleading respondent stated that he was the
"(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC
and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
"retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14
May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal
counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party."
Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LMPPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer's
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
LEGAL ETHICS
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have

been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x
xx
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that "practice of law"
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports
the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called
himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member
of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he
had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In
Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
Page 23 of 115
court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the
law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private
client in any court or administrative body since respondent is
the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11
May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vicemayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." [10] ViceMayor Relox accepted respondent's resignation effective 11 May
2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that
respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission
to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
564 Phil. 1
EN BANC
A.C. NO. 5095, November 28, 2007
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN,
ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG,
DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R.
QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA,
ARTHUR G. IBAEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ AND DENU A.
AGATEP, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3,
1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the
other above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin
Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.
Page 24 of 115
documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not

entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his
legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was
attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized
documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service
Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M.
Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed
with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to
Respondents Comment. They maintain that Atty. Pascuas
omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.[1] On November 16, 1999, we granted their
motion.[2]
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty.

Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the AffidavitComplaint of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as
Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its
Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe
the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic
requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v.
Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the

Affidavit-Complaint of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the
same as Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998,
dated December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26,
1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear
in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry
therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28,
1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized
Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.
Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person
executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx
xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state
on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which
the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised
Administrative Code).
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4,

1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in

his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
LEGAL ETHICS
required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission

(Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject
documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not
recorded in his notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but
due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty.
Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his
notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized
is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he
is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is
far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last
entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document
No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavitcomplaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are
Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No.
243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants
are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely
assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavitcomplaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a
Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of
the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of
his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter
cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of
Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingos
affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative
case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the
CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of
herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another
affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on
Page 25 of 115
December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It

may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are
dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing
any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and
trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272
SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua
is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to
his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred
for any misconduct in his professional or private
capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for
notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or
misconduct in the performance of their duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer
was suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a
period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants
appearing before him, and for notarizing the same
instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court
held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence
in upholding his duties as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who
certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that
some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning
that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In
said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of
disbarment, it being the respondents first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer
was disbarred from the practice of law, after being found
guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 26 of 115
Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his

previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six
months from the practice of law.
a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice

of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a
false declaration in the document she notarized.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a

suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months may be considered enough penalty for him as a
lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas

first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month
suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order.
Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of
notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon
him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended

that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still
existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. [3]
After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to
adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office
of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of
misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of
Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of

misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered
REVOKED.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or

unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.[4] The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. [5]
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct
committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the
vendors were already dead, this Court held that such
wrongful act constitutes misconduct and thus imposed
upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six months, this being his first administrative offense.
Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked the notarial
commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from
the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial
Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of
Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however,
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
557 Phil. 478

EN BANC
JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
RE: NON-DISCLOSURE BEFORE THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE FILED AGAINST JUDGE JAIME V.
QUITAIN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE THEN ASST. REGIONAL
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL
OFFICE XI, DAVAO CITY.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17,
2003.[1] Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that
administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge
Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11,
Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the
service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10,
1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)[2] submitted to the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared
that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438,
18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the
Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative
case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court
Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified
copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases. [3] On even
date, letters[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for
certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative
complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183
Page 27 of 115
dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise,
DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged
misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.
[5]
In a letter[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished

the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No.
183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from
the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the
amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his
claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183
DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL
DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11
This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega
Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave
Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217
of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law)
filed by the NAPOLCOM.
xxxx
After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above
findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.
It was established that the falsification could not have been
consummated without respondent's direct participation, as it
was upon his direction and approval that disbursement vouchers
were prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent
endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only
shows his complete disregard for the truth which per se
constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By
any standard, respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit
to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a
public office is a position of trust and public service demands of
every government official or employee, no matter how lowly his
position may be, the highest degree of responsibility and
integrity and he must remain accountable to the people.
LEGAL ETHICS
Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence in support of his

defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final
reminder to him that the government is serious enough to
[weed out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be
irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of
personalities involved. Accordingly, respondent's continuance in
office becomes untenable.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM,
Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and
benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of
our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.
(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)
By the President:
(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Executive Secretary[7]
In a letter[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock,
Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation
before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the
members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal
cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and
not about the administrative case simultaneously filed against
him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of
the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him
from the service.
Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within
ten (10) days from notice why he did not include in his PDS,
which was sworn to before a notary public on November 22,
2001, the administrative case filed against him, and the fact of
his dismissal from the service.[9]
In his letters[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004,
respondent explained that during the investigation of his
administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one
of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the
government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that
Page 28 of 115
following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable

resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993[11] which was
immediately accepted by the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the
case in his PDS because he was of the "honest belief" that he
had no more pending administrative case by reason of his
resignation; that his resignation "amounted to an automatic
dismissal" of his administrative case considering that "the issues
raised therein became moot and academic"; and that had he
known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should
not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he
would never be appointed.
Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable,
then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
member of this Court) and then DCA Lock submitted a
Memorandum[12] dated September 3, 2004 to then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:
In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate
the matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the records of
the subject administrative case against Judge Jaime V. Quitain,
particularly the matter that pertains to Administrative Order No.
183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the
records of said administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM,
Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of
pertinent documents.
After careful perusal of the documents and records available,
including the letters- explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain, this
Office finds that there are reasonable grounds to hold him
administratively liable.
An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by
Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bibiano M.
Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001, reveals that
he concealed material facts and even committed perjury
in having answered "yes" to Question No. 24, but
without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from
the government service. Question No. 24 and his answer
thereto are hereunder quoted as follows:
LEGAL ETHICS
24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or

otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any
law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal or
any other government office, agency or instrumentality
in the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty
of an administrative offense or imposed any
administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is
"Yes" to any of the questions, give particulars.
But all dismissed (acquitted) Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases
Nos. 18438, 18439 Date of [Dismissal] - August 2, 1995
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814 Date
of [Dismissal] - July 17, 2000
As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not
disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data
Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of
the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order
No. 183 dismissing him from the government service. Based on
the certified documents secured from the Office of the
NAPOLCOM, the following data were gathered:
1. In compliance with the "Summons" dated 19 March 1993,
signed by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman,
Ad Hoc Committee of the NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his Answer
(dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint
lodged against him by the Napolcom;
2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the
"Notice of Hearing" of even date, signed by Mr.
Canonizado, in connection with the formal hearing of the
subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;
3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain
from the service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April
1995, newspaper items relative to the dismissal of Judge
Quitain were separately published in the Mindanao Daily
Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which
read as follows:
Mindanao Times:
Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal
Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional
Page 29 of 115
director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for understanding to

those allegedly behind his ouster from his post two years ago.
Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterday's Kapehan sa
Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on
his dismissal from government service.
Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from
the Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991, a
series of administrative charges were hurled against him by
some regional employees.
"I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due
process," Quitain said.
He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are
behind the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.
"Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only
appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me the chance to
clear my name, the only legacy that I can leave to my children,"
Quitain said in his statement.
"It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of
the administrative case," he also said.
Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom
in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the
recommendation of Secretary Santos. He was later designated
Napolcom acting regional director for Region XI.
Mindanao Daily Mirror:
Quitain vows to clear name
Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National
Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear his
name in court from charges of tampering with an official receipt.
Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed
confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court against
the group that plotted his ouster from office: He said his only
appeal was for Interior and Local Government Secretary Rafael
LEGAL ETHICS
Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the charges.

"Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven
them," Quitain said.
"Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the
only legacy that I can give my children," Quitain said.
While the records of the subject administrative case on file with
the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt of
Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge Quitain, the same does
not necessarily mean that he is totally unaware of said
Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted newspaper
clippings, Judge Quitain even aired his appeal and protest to
said Administrative Order.
xxxx
Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with
the JBC had he known that he was administratively charged and
was consequently dismissed from the service since he will not
be considered. But this may be the reason why he deliberately
concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare the
administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his
honest belief that there is no administrative or criminal case
that would be filed against him by reason of his resignation and
the assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no administrative
case will be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him
to state that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an
automatic dismissal of whatever administrative case filed
against him because when he resigned and relinquished his
position, the issues raised therein became moot and academic.
He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal
dismissal of the administrative case because of said belief. All
these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself from
administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant and
material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member of the
Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM
would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have
incurred[,] much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal
of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of
his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation
of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the
Page 30 of 115
case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from

administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning
from the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly
believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic dismissal
of his administrative case, the least he could have done was to
personally verify the status thereof. He should not have relied
on the alleged assurance made by the NAPOLCOM.
On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled
the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that he had a
clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His prior
dismissal from the government service is a blot on his record,
which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because of
his concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it
could have been taken into consideration when the Council
acted on his application. His act of dishonesty renders him unfit
to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a judge. It even
appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for
misconduct and dishonesty.
Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative
case against respondent be docketed as an administrative
matter; and (2) that he be dismissed from the service with
prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits.
Respondent was required to Comment.[13]
In compliance with the Court's Resolution respondent filed his
Comment[14] contending that before he filed his application for
RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no knowledge that he was
administratively dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as the
case was "secretly heard and decided." He averred that:
1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral
Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in
Davao City and the surrounding provinces, he was
recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor
Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his
LEGAL ETHICS
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the

National Police Commission, Region XI;
After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG
Secretary, the political followers of his successor, who
were the same followers involved in the chain of
corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly
pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant
Regional Director;
Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal
integrity, his detractors went to the extent of filing
criminal charges against him;
Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he
was being convinced to resign in exchange for the
dismissal of said criminal charges, but when he refused
to do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or "exiled" at the
DILG central office in Manila;
Upon his "exile" in Manila for several months, he realized
that even his immediate superiors cooperated with his
detractors in instigating for his removal. Hence, upon
advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their
pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in
NAPOLCOM on condition that all pending cases filed
against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be
dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;
From then on he was never formally aware of any
administrative case filed against him. Hence, when he
submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the Judicial and
Bar Council in support of his application as RTC judge, he
made the following answer in Question No. 23:
23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative
(including disbarment) case or complaint filed against
you pending before any court, prosecution office, any
other office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?
He could only give a negative answer since there was no
pending administrative case filed against him that he
knows;
Had he known that there was an administrative case filed
against him he would have desisted from applying as a
judge and would have given his full attention to the said
administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing
embarrassment; and
Page 31 of 115
8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well

as the proceedings had thereon and the decision
rendered therein, without his knowledge, could have
probably occurred during his "exile period" when he was
detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the
said administrative case are null and void since he was
denied due process.
Respondent's Comment was submitted to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[15]
OCA submitted its Memorandum[16] dated August 11, 2005
stating therein that it was adopting its earlier findings contained
in its Memorandum dated September 3, 2004. Based on the
documents presented, it can not be denied that at the time
Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of
A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from government service.
Considering that Judge Quitain's explanations in his Comment
are but mere reiterations of his allegations in the previous
letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that
Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to
his reappointment to any position in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the
recommendation of the OCA.
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to
apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his
fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may
reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications
specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3),
Article VIII of the Constitution.[17]
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was
administratively charged and dismissed from the service for
grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no
less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that
on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his
verified PDS in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had
no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due
process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed
LEGAL ETHICS
against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17,

2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his
administrative case had become moot and academic.
Respondent's contentions utterly lack merit.
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that
Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he
deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had
no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items
published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the
Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,[18] Judge Quitain stated in
one of his interviews that "I was dismissed from the (Napolcom)
office without due process." It also reads: "Quitain, who was one
of the guests in yesterday's Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept
unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his
dismissal from the government service." Neither can we
give credence to the contention that he was denied due
process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the
OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman
Ad Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993
informing him that an administrative complaint had been filed
against him and required him to file an answer.[19] Then on March
29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo,
filed an Answer.[20] In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an
opportunity to explain one's side or opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
[21]
Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge
Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his resignation
does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint
filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it
render said administrative case moot and academic. [22] Judge
Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was
found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service
is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a
member of the Bench.
More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately
misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the
Page 32 of 115
Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,[23]

this Court stressed:
x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to
inform the appointing authority and this Court of the
pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the
position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His
record did not contain the important information in question
because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His
lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for the
suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would
have been taken into account against him if it had been
disclosed."
Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. "Dishonesty"
means "disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack
of integrity."[24]
Section 8(2), Rule 140[25] of the Rules of Court classifies
dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules,
provides the following sanctions:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in
no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or
3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,[26]
we held:
By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public
service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken
into consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube
committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be
appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has
tarnished with his falsehood.
LEGAL ETHICS
WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial

Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately
executory.
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on
the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. [27] We
have often stressed that the conduct required of court
personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of
court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from
any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will
never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice, which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even
just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. [28]
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty
of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of
dismissal.
However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from
Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is
tendering his irrevocable resignation effective immediately as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao
City. Acting on said letter, "the Court Resolved to accept the
irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective
August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the
administrative case."[29]
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by
the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic
the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court
had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is
not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his
resignation and its consequent acceptance - without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of
this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the
respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant
with dreadful and dangerous implications.[30] Indeed, if innocent,
Page 33 of 115
the respondent official merits vindication of his name and

integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well
and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.[31]
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V.
QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have
warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned
during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the
penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to
apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the
Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to,
and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement
and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of
the government, including government-owned and/or controlled
corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V.
Quitain's 201 File.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
558 Phil. 398
Page 34 of 115
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48,

id.); and
EN BANC
ADM. CASE NO. 2984, August 31, 2007
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ISMAEL F.
MEJIA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative
Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of
law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventyone years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen
years.
The antecedent facts that led to Mejia's disbarment are as
follows.
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his
retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for
payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to
Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I;
and
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for
payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the
registration of title of Bernardo to another property in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985,
purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par.
51, complainant's affidavit dates October 4, 1989);
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses

Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo's favor (Annex Q,
par. 52, id.);
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the
bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the
amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check
with others known also to be insufficiently funded. [1]
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a
Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and
hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending
finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the
Bar Confidant's Office, and notice thereof furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court
Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts
concerned of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be
allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999,
the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the
petition for reinstatement.
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for
review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or
opposition was filed against the petition.[2]
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of
the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court
decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will continue to be preserved even
with the applicant's reentry as a counselor at law. The
LEGAL ETHICS
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,

satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character,
a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take
into consideration the applicant's character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent
to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. [3]
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the
law profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since
Mejia's name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the
age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and
pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long
repented and he has suffered enough. Through his
reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and
redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his
disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a
publication containing his religious and social writings. He
also organized a religious organization and named it "El
Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind."
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen
years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe
penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly
take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it also cannot close its
eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years.
While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during
which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not
the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the
Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since
his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he
has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is
ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also
knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed
has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
Page 35 of 115
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct

offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the
practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice
law.[4]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is
hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
528 Phil. 763
Page 36 of 115
A.C. No. 6697
EN BANC
A.C. NO. 6697, July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
LEONARD S. DE VERA, RESPONDENT.
[BAR MATTER NO. 1227]
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,
INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD
S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR
[A.M. NO. 05-5-15-SC]
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY.
LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO
FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION
UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY
REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR
FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and
Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The
first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's
moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar,
the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule
his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case
concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of
the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will
determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term
2005-2007.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to

make an investigation, report and recommendation on
subject case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as
follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo
Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following
grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the
suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of
California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation
rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating
for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have
performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing
Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department - San Francisco,
State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429.
Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to
resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said
state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks
the moral competence necessary to lead the country's most
noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent
violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for in
Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent
failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised
that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the
purpose of becoming the next IBP National President.
Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from
assuming office as IBP National President.
LEGAL ETHICS
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent

stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint
were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case
filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according
to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed
and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision
dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In
Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent
prayed that the instant administrative complaint be
dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of
the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of
their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005,
complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence
showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and
depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment.
Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that
he used his client's money. Complainant argued that the
respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme
Court of California accepted the latter's resignation and even
if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should
not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res
judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that
the first administrative case filed against the respondent was
one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de
Vera's letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking
as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other
hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National
President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz)
furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May
Page 37 of 115
2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board

and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board
and the IBP in general.[2]
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of
Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3
vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board
approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court
docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo
I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. - Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to
question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges
and justices, and to increase filing fees. [3]
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution
approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition
were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and
Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court
of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the aforementioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the
IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de
Vera's request for oathtaking as National President, was filed.
The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697,
the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera. [6]
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th
National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay
Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where
Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board's
Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of
Republic Act No. 9227.[7]
LEGAL ETHICS
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining

Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as
IBP National President.[8]
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP
National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the
removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for
having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board
and the IBP.[9]
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board
held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3
vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP
Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. [10]
Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said
Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as
a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice
President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos
and blatant lies in public about the Supreme
Court and members of the IBP Board of
Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP
10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at
CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22
April 2005, making it appear that the decision of
the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the
PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The
Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the
Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108",
was due to influence and pressure from the
Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP
Page 38 of 115
Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in

public contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which
mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others", by making untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies during
the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National
Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters
to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the
latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President,
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary
Session of the 10th National Convention in
Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of
Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION,
thereby creating the wrong impression that the
IBP National President deliberately prevented
him from taking the appropriate remedies with
respect thereto, thus compromising the
reputation and integrity of the IBP National
President and the IBP as a whole.[11]
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this
Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring
Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to
the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de
Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely
Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately
Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less
Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment
Without Formal Investigation."[12]
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically
LEGAL ETHICS
denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its

Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified lettercomplaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted
to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete
disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
Pertinent portions of his letter read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a
grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as
the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am
scheduled to assume my position as National President of the
IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized
by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges
formally or in writing. The complaint against
me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges
within a reasonable period of time after
receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the
accuser and the witnesses against me. I
challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I
could question him. He refused. I offered to
testify under oath so I could be questioned. My
request was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses
on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge.
Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes
even more evident because when his motion to
expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his
inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for
another round of voting so he can vote to
support his own complaint and motion to expel
me.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
Page 39 of 115
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May

2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board
explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de
Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect
itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited
and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media
campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to
condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to
withdraw the PETITION, all with the end in view of
compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to
reconsider the decision to withdraw the PETITION.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the
IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President in
public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National
Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated "solicited"
speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera "fanned
the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making
untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about
the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board
of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to
provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to
engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose
the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos
and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the
IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal
of the petition (without mentioning names) because
"nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang
Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court."
He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors
approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to
"influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court. [15]
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during
the Plenary Session was "the last straw that broke the
LEGAL ETHICS
camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of

the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to
remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies
of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP
Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP.[16]
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice
Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the
EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took
note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought
about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared
as IBP EVP.[17]
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election
of Atty. Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago
voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter
addressed to the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during
its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in
the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace
Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a
letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this
Court Atty. Salazar's election.[20] IBP National President Cadiz
also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's
election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as
National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred
or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal
from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is
approved by this Court.[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera
protested the election of Atty. Salazar.[22]
In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera
maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis
to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his
Page 40 of 115
removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his

removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was
likewise executed without due notice and without the least
compliance with the minimum standards of due process of
law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly
false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at
the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although
undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in
their language and exhortations, not once undermining the
stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors
in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with
the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary
Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected
member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to
remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech
or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of
withholding a copy of this Court's Resolution granting the
withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic
Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such
remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de
Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was
contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning
national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the
Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two
years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their
second year in office and until their successors shall have
been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his
functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice
President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal
of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as
Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the
event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the
LEGAL ETHICS
President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of

Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for
the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of
disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers
and employees appointed by the President with the consent
of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or
for such term as the Board may fix.[24]
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both
the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are
disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an
Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP
was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is
contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly
removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from
Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the
Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the
IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP
Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27
January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient
power and authority to protect itself from an intractable
member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP ByLaws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the
IBP Board's position but because of the various acts that
he committed which the IBP Board determined to be
inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by
invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because,
as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe
Page 41 of 115
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial

officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera,
observed the fundamental principles of due process. As
the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of
the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May
2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's LetterComplaint the day before the said meeting; was
furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was
allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser,
Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required
number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to
remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and
as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come
from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation
rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP ByLaws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera,
who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP;
and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the
same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or
viable; and, finally, that (vii Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus,
)
should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National
President.[25]
The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant
tendered the following issues for the consideration of the
Court:
I.
LEGAL ETHICS
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S.

DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED
TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE
OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS
ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S.
DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY
BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT
OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE
TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the
resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with
the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of
the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant
opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or
disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded
on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the
suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in
California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation
rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Page 42 of 115
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues

in an earlier administrative case against the respondent.
Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties
in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon
by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in
Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one
of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which
in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to
practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet
no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative
charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are
mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was
not considered by the investigating officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered
by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the
charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator
and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We
find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case,
the petitioners have not shown how the administrative
complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run
for governor.
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 43 of 115
wishes to transfer.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified
for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao.
His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a
member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP
Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of
attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national
presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of
Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws
that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member
of the chapter where his place of residence or work is
located. He has the discretion to choose the particular
chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he
does not register his preference that he will become a
member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or
maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In
fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is
allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions
set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that
the transfer must be made not less than three months prior
to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer

of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001.
One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar
wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr.,
Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of
respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the
necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a
substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in
Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer
was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3
September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the
IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of
every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27
February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes
respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than
three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27
February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco
(Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this
Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's]
administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was
dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly
prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the
bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only
P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed
against the respondent on the basis of the same incident.
Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no
longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This
Court held that while the respondent is in effect being
LEGAL ETHICS
indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount
to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly
administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first
case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring
court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over
courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a
lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over membersof
the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears
that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in
the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William
Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court
ruled that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases,
it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to
penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he
had already answered for."
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B.
Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and
Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404,
14 December 2004), this Court held that:
Page 44 of 115
party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in

privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in
a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be
permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over
again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At
the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets.
Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes
the rule of law."
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated

by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have
been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any
subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the
same cause. It provides that
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues

raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this
Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant's
contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply
in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for
disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is
one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least
credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant
administrative complaint is denominated as one for
suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the
suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead
merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office
as IBP National President.[28]
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No.
6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election"
and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a
bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties
in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No.
6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the
issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring
the application of res judicata.
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to

apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the
judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior

judgment, the present administrative case becomes
dismissible.
xxx
LEGAL ETHICS
disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the

merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second
action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of causes of action.[29] In the absence of any one of
these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his
favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve
different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case
No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de
Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint,
the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first
administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty.
de Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP Bylaws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of
action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same
relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent
Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by
complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally
sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial.
The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties'
rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein
that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as
Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP Bylaws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP
governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had
no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the
complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the
suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which
the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a
written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement,
therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the
ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum.
Page 45 of 115
Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election

disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a
hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him
from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case
that There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that
one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the determination
of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment
of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on
each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate
and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the
basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment
of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by
the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise,
every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional
Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to
disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the
IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file
the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against
the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in
the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and
substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not
barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only
issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can
be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and
the evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer
of the State Bar of California, standing
alone, is not proof of malpractice.
LEGAL ETHICS
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In

The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,[31] we were
confronted with the question of whether or not a member of
the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a
foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice
of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction
committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the
case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law
in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his
practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty.
Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment
was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation
of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to
practice law before his case could be taken up by the
Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension
against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not
grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the
Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action
includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the
foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
Page 46 of 115
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,
[32]
we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity
of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign
forum."
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign
judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera.
Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts
upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was
based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that
these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of
malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera
independent of the recommendation of
suspension by the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
LEGAL ETHICS
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of

any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension.[33]
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the
court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation
of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be
taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court
over its officers cannot be restricted.[35]
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a
special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice." [36]
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion
that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. [37]
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates
the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession.[38]
Now, the undisputed facts:
Page 47 of 115
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera

was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It
arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in
an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera
was authorized by the elder Willis (father of
Julius who was given authority by the son to
control the case because the latter was then
studying in San Diego California) for the release
of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de
Vera received a check in settlement of the case
which he then deposited to his personal
account;[39]
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative
case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three
years;[40] and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar
which resignation was accepted by the Supreme
Court of California.[41]
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do
not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the
latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the
same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not
consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the
elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera
might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and
attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly
admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in
the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited
said amount in his personal account and not in a separate
trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for
personal purposes.[42]
LEGAL ETHICS
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before

administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [43] It means
such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. [44]
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his
client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in
nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty,
fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its
fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every
lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client
that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall
account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of
Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust
property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not under
Page 48 of 115
any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used

by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the
funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs
the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are
in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those
who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases
supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that
he used his client's money for personal use, he has
unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission
constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice.
Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting
the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly
authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for
the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had
restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the
filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar
of California.[46]
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we
cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that
indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of
his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
LEGAL ETHICS
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the

hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that
he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."
As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility
of the document containing this statement, he is now
estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis
"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was
not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by
Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of
the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his
client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the
character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was
perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to
his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is
conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear
that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account
and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He
caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble
profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that
the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays
their trust and confidence.[48] Respondent violated his oath to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to
disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution. [49] Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty.
Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for
depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal
account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;
[51]
Castillo v. Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the
respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing
to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00;
Page 49 of 115
P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for

their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v.
Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of
P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a
writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for
two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter
where the lawyer is not a resident of is not
a ground for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of
membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter
is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the
sole purpose of becoming IBP National President.
Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of
Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of
transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his
disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is
allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the
qualification only that the transfer be made not less than
three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his
membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical
conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue
that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein
case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP
chapter that --based on the rotation rule - will produce the
next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National
Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit
nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President
and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such
goal.
LEGAL ETHICS
Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No.
05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:
I.
Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de
Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May
2005.
i.
Whether the IBP Board of Governors
complied with administrative due
process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii.
Whether the IBP removed Atty. De
Vera for just and valid cause.
II.
Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected

as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP
for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its
removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP
Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members
pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which
states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. - If the Board of Governors
should determine after proper inquiry that any of its
members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become
unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the
Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position
vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may
be removed for cause, including three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the
remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.
Page 50 of 115
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever

cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote,
elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to
which the resigned governor is a member to serve as
governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP
Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by
two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the
Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds.
He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due
process recognized by the Honorable Court even in
administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in
writing and within reasonable time, the right to present
witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de
Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine
the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and
that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made
him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de
Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited
himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his
inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the
necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera
asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support
his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present
during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and
heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal
hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed
and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an
opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed
against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a
copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board
Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against
him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the
LEGAL ETHICS
opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did

argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on
due process safeguards life, liberty and property. [55] It cannot
be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within
the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to
security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is
required to remove any member of the board of governors
for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining
members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully
invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. [56]
At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due
process of law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed
meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the
doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice
rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more
than one general statement."[57] The phrase is so elusive of
exact apprehension,[58] because it depends on circumstances
and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the
situation.[59]
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical
with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not always
essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due
process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure
and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain
proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice
or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair
hearing before a regularly established administrative agency
or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the
making of a determination if thereafter, there is available
Page 51 of 115
trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to

the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process
requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the
functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of
due process.[61] Nor is an actual hearing always essential [62]
especially under the factual milieu of this case where the
members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the
determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is
placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court - all
witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National
Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the
complaint against him and that he was present when the
matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was
removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair
opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made
by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that
Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also
voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but
when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the
necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and
that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP
Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion (including Atty.
Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be
removed for cause, including three consecutive absences
from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution
LEGAL ETHICS
adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the

Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor
is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining
members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant member and the
respondent member. The reason therefore is that such
members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be
unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case,
the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off
which means that only the votes of the seven remaining
members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining
members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it
which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as
IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what
constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has not
been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it
includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it
is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself
from an intractable member whose removal was caused not
by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various
acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as
inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in
disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove
or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of
Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that
the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not
recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping
with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its
Page 52 of 115
public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that

Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious
or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees
of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life
of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are
said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other
organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its
governing body for then there would be the impression that
the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does
not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative
fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and
repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must
thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to
free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal
cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a
mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the members have
been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not
efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a
contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the
dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can
speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing
board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the
majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the
board.[63]
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing
Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during the 10th
National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the
IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP
Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive
unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the
LEGAL ETHICS
Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the

standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness
and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who
insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due
discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board
as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements
are resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept
the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that
he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his
heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary
action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of
the Board of Governors ipso facto meant
his removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of
Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well.
Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a
member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera's removal
from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him
from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary
to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the
Resolution of the IBP Board to remove
Atty. de Vera since it was rendered without
grave abuse of discretion
Page 53 of 115
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an

extensive power of supervision over the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic
that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion
especially in the administration of its internal affairs
governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws
were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the
powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its
organizational structure, and govern relations and
transactions among its officers and members. With these ByLaws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the
IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the
Court's interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and
activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of
Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as
delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The Board acts as a collegiate
body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority.
The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP
Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its
individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of
the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable
presumption[66] of validity, which shall continue, until and
unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually
declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any
allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted
without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of
discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set
aside the Board's action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to
remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 44 [67] of
the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP
Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to
remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and
EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de
LEGAL ETHICS
Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with

due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority
and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we
find no reason to interfere in the Board's resolution to remove
Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP
Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty.
De Vera was conducted in accordance with
the authority granted to the Board by the
IBP By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action
taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a
special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the
removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a
purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of
discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and
By-Laws of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of
the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also
removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants
to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising,
in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of
the Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section
44 (Removal of members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),[71]
Section 48 (other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of Office)
[73]
of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient
guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the
vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith
and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical
competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007
Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the
IBP Rules and By-Laws.
Page 54 of 115
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a

new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 20052007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted
to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII,
Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically
become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase
"for the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the
EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the
next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the
members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in
A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano
Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President
because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall
succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June
2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June
2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov.
Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty.
De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP
was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from
Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set
forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the
EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among
the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar
Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
"ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP
President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors
(composed of the governors of the nine [9]
IBP regions) from among themselves (as
LEGAL ETHICS
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP

By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive
Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which
was abolished by this Court's resolution
dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287)
should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year
term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of
president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves.
The position of Executive VicePresident shall be rotated among the
nine (9) IBP regions. One who has
served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the
rotation of the presidency among the
nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)"
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP
which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors.
The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result
of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the
Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to
the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule
pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the
Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession
rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with
since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of
the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus,
Page 55 of 115
the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the

supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor
and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule
had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de
Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license
to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic
succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the
latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP
leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP
National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters
without having to expend valuable time for the usual
adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time
that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on
matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and
indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It
should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from
among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are
serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at
large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to
assume the highest position in the IBP must have been
exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national
leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of
the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to
assume the post of IBP President. By electing the
replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005
Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of
the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 - in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his
assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the
automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005
will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes
LEGAL ETHICS
that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a

month before the expiration of the term of office of the 20032005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor
would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for
two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as
much as practicable" to clearly indicate that the rotation rule
is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by
Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be
assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from
where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the
intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft
of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one
who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the
IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in
accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as
IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the
IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would
have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the
IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the
practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality
of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached
to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera,
dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the
disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice
Page 56 of 115
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said

Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty.
Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the
term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance
with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take
his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in
accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII,
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
123 P.3d 652 (2005)

211 Ariz. 458
In the Matter of James Joseph HAMM, Applicant.
No. SB-04-0079-M.
Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.
December 7, 2005.
*654 James Joseph Hamm, Tempe, In Propria Persona.
Monroe & McDonough, P.C., by Lawrence McDonough, Tucson,
and Juan Perez-Medrano, Phoenix, Chair Attorneys for the
Committee on Character & Fitness.
Charles W. Wirken, President, Helen Perry Grimwood, Presidentelect, Jim D. Smith, First Vice President, Daniel J. McAuliffe,
Second Vice President, Edward F. Novak, Secretary-Treasurer,
Robert B. Van Wyck, Chief Bar Counsel, Phoenix, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae State Bar of Arizona.
Michael D. Kimerer, Marty Lieberman, Amy L. Nguyen, Phoenix,
Carla Ryan, Andrew Silverman, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus
Curiae, Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice.
Andrew P. Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney, by Andrew P.
Thomas, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County
Attorney's Office.
OPINION
McGREGOR, Chief Justice.
1 James Hamm petitioned this Court, pursuant to Arizona
Supreme Court Rule 36(g), 17A A.R.S.,[1] to review the
recommendation of the Committee on Character and Fitness
(the Committee) that his application for admission to the State
Bar of Arizona (the Bar) be denied. Having reviewed the record
and the Committee's report, we conclude that James Hamm has
failed to establish the good moral character necessary to be
admitted to the practice of law in Arizona and deny his
application.
I.
2 In September 1974, James Hamm was twenty-six years old
and living on the streets of Tucson. Although he previously had
attended divinity school and worked as a part-time pastor,
Hamm describes his life in 1974 as reflecting a series of
personal and social failures. In 1973, he had separated from his
wife, with whom he had a son. Although he had no criminal
record, he supported himself by selling small quantities of
marijuana and, again according to Hamm, he used marijuana
and other drugs and abused alcohol.
Page 57 of 115
3 On September 6, 1974, Hamm met two young men who

identified themselves as college students from Missouri. The
two, Willard Morley and Zane Staples, came to Tucson to buy
twenty pounds of marijuana. Hamm agreed to sell it to them,
but apparently was unable to acquire that quantity of marijuana.
Rather than call off the transaction, Hamm and two
accomplices, Garland Wells and Bill Reeser, agreed to rob
Staples and Morley of the money intended for the purchase. On
September 7, Wells gave Hamm a gun to use during the
robbery. Later that day, Wells and Hamm directed Morley and
Staples to drive to the outskirts of Tucson, purportedly to
complete the drug transaction; Reeser followed in another
vehicle. Both Wells and Hamm carried guns; Morley and Staples
were unarmed. Hamm sat behind Morley, the driver, and Wells
sat behind Staples. At some point, Hamm detected that Staples
was becoming suspicious. As Morley stopped the car, and
without making any demand on the victims for money, Hamm
shot Morley in the back of the head, killing him. At the same
time, Wells shot Staples. Hamm then shot Staples in the back as
he tried to escape and shot Morley once again. Wells also shot
Morley, then pursued Staples, whom he ultimately killed outside
of the car. Hamm and Wells took $1400.00 from the glove
compartment, fled the scene in the van driven by Reeser, and
left the bodies of Morley and Staples lying in the desert.
4 Hamm took his share of the money and visited his sister in
California. At the hearing held to consider his application to the
Bar, he told the Committee that he "was compelled to come
back to Tucson," despite knowing he probably would be caught.
Police officers arrested Hamm shortly after his return. While in
custody, he told the police that Morley and Staples were killed in
a gun battle during the drug deal. Initially charged with two
counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery,
Hamm *655 pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and
was sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of parole for
twenty-five years.
5 Once in prison, Hamm began taking steps toward
rehabilitation and became a model prisoner. After spending one
year in maximum security, he applied for and received a job in a
computer training program that allowed him to be transferred to
medium security. Once in medium security, Hamm apparently
took advantage of any and every educational opportunity the
prison system had to offer. He completed certificates in yoga
LEGAL ETHICS
and meditation and, on his own, studied Jungian psychology. He

helped fellow inmates learn to read and write and to take
responsibility for their actions. He obtained a bachelor's degree
in applied sociology, summa cum laude, from Northern Arizona
University through a prison study program.
6 After Hamm completed six years in medium security, prison
officials transferred him to minimum security, where he worked
on paint and construction crews. He received a significant
degree of freedom, which allowed him to live in a dormitory
rather than in a cell and occasionally to drive unaccompanied to
nearby towns. He testified that he was the only inmate
permitted to head a work crew. Hamm reported to the
Committee that he played an instrumental role on various
prison committees, particularly the committee that developed a
new grievance procedure within the Department of Corrections.
In addition, he wrote grant proposals for libraries, for
handicapped prisoners, and for obtaining greater legal
assistance for prisoners.
7 While in prison, he met and married Donna Leone. She and
Hamm founded Middle Ground Prison Reform (Middle Ground), a
prisoner and prisoner family advocacy organization involved in
lobbying for laws related to the criminal justice system and
prisons. Middle Ground also provides public education about
those topics.
8 In 1989, the Governor, acting on the recommendation of the
Arizona Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board), commuted
Hamm's sentence. When he had served nearly seventeen years,
in July 1992, the Board released Hamm on parole, conditioned
upon no use of alcohol or drugs, drug and alcohol testing, and
fifteen hours of community service each month. In December
2001, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency[2] granted
Hamm's third application for absolute discharge.
9 Between his release in August 1992 and his absolute
discharge in December 2001, Hamm performed thousands of
hours of community service. He advocated for prisoners' rights
in various forums by writing position papers, appearing on radio
programs, testifying in legislative hearings, and speaking at
churches, schools, and civic organizations. He also appeared in
a public service video encouraging children not to do drugs or
join gangs. Hamm now works as the Director of Advocacy
Services at Middle Ground Prison Reform.
Page 58 of 115
10 While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State

University College of Law. In July 1999, Hamm passed the
Arizona bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and
Fitness Report with the Committee.
II.
11 The Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona establish the
process through which the Committee and this Court evaluate
applications for admission to the Bar, and prior case law clarifies
the burden an applicant must satisfy to establish good moral
character. We begin with a review of the rules.
A.
12 Rules 34 through 37 define the requirements for admission
to the Bar.[3] The *656 Committee may recommend an applicant
for admission only if that applicant, in addition to meeting other
requirements, satisfies the Committee that he or she is of good
moral character. Rule 34(a). The applicant bears the burden of
establishing his or her good moral character. In re
Greenberg, 126 Ariz. 290, 292, 614 P.2d 832, 834 (1980)
(citing In re Levine,97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964)). In
determining whether an applicant's prior conduct indicates a
lack of good moral character, the Committee must consider the
following non-exhaustive list of factors:
A. The applicant's age, experience and general level of
sophistication at the time of the conduct
B. The recency of the conduct
C. The reliability of the information concerning the conduct
D. The seriousness of the conduct
E. Consideration given by the applicant to relevant laws, rules
and responsibilities at the time of the conduct
F. The factors underlying the conduct
G. The cumulative effect of the conduct
H. The evidence of rehabilitation
I. The applicant's positive social contributions since the conduct
J. The applicant's candor in the admissions process
K. The materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations by the
applicant.
Rule 36(a)3.
13 When prior conduct involves the commission of a violent
crime, the Committee must, at a minimum, hold an informal
hearing. Rule 36(a)4.E. If three or more Committee members
who attended the hearing or who have read the entire record do
not recommend admission of an applicant, the Committee must
LEGAL ETHICS
hold a formal hearing to consider whether to recommend the

applicant for admission to the Bar. Id.
14 If the applicant fails to convince the Committee of his or
her good moral character, the Committee has a duty not to
recommend that person to this Court.In re Klahr, 102 Ariz. 529,
531, 433 P.2d 977, 979 (1967); Levine, 97 Ariz. at 91, 397 P.2d
at 207 ("If the proof of good moral character falls short of
convincing the Committee on Examinations and Admissions, it is
its duty not to recommend admission."); In re Courtney, 83 Ariz.
231, 233,319 P.2d 991, 993 (1957) ("In this it has no discretion;
if the members entertain any reservations whatsoever as to the
applicant's good moral character, it should not make a favorable
recommendation to this court."). After the Committee submits
its report, an aggrieved applicant may petition this Court for
review. Rule 36(g).
B.
15 This Court then independently determines whether the
applicant possesses good moral character and, based upon that
determination, grants or denies the candidate's application.
Although we give serious consideration to the facts as found by
and the recommendation of the Committee, "[t]he ultimate
decision in this difficult matter rests with the Supreme Court." In
re Kiser, 107 Ariz. 326, 327, 487 P.2d 393, 394 (1971) (holding
applicant possessed good moral character); see also Levine, 97
Ariz. at 92, 397 P.2d at 207 (holding the Court must, "using our
independent judgment, de novo determine whether the
necessary qualifications have been shown"). We do not limit our
independent review to matters of law; we have "the ultimate
responsibility for determination of fact and law." In re
Ronwin, 139 Ariz. 576, 579, 680 P.2d 107, 110 (1983); see
also In re Walker, 112 Ariz. 134, 137,539 P.2d 891, 894 (1975)
(making a finding regarding the credibility of testimony,
although in agreement with the Committee).
16 The ultimate question in cases such as this is whether the
applicant has established good moral character, a concept with
which we have wrestled as we have attempted to define its
boundaries. Greenberg, 126 Ariz. at 292, 614 P.2d at 834. As
Hamm asserts, the rules and standards governing admission to
the practice of law in Arizona include no per se disqualifications.
Instead, we consider each case on its own
merits. Id. In Walker, we described the principles on which we
rely as follows:
Page 59 of 115
`Upright character' * * * is something more than an absence of

bad character. *657 * * * It means that he [an applicant for
admission] must have conducted himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, should, or does. Such character
expresses itself not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing
if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong.
112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895 (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Farmer, 191 N.C. 235, 131 S.E. 661, 663 (1926)).
17 We also agree with Hamm that, under the Rule applicable
to Hamm's application, our concern must be with the applicant's
present moral character. InGreenberg, we explained that "it is
[the applicant's] moral character as of now with which we are
concerned." 126 Ariz. at 292, 614 P.2d at 834; see also Rule
36(a)3. Past misconduct, however, is not irrelevant. Rather, this
Court must determine what past bad acts reveal about an
applicant's current character.
III.
18 In compliance with Rule 36(a)4.E, the Committee
conducted a formal hearing to consider Hamm's application. The
Committee heard testimony on May 20 and June 2, 2004.
Hamm, representing himself, and his wife presented extensive
testimony. In addition, the Committee heard from three licensed
attorneys who had worked with Hamm and who recommended
his admission and also considered letters from those opposed to
and in support of Hamm's application. In detailed findings, the
Committee specifically considered the various factors set out in
Rule 36(a) to determine Hamm's character and fitness to be
admitted to the Bar. In its report, the Committee stated that, in
reaching its conclusions, it considered the following:
1) Hamm's unlawful conduct, which included the commission of
two violent "execution style" murders and his testimony as to
the facts surrounding the murders.
2) Hamm's omissions on his Application and his testimony in
explaining his failure to disclose all required information.
3) Hamm's neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or
violation of a longstanding child support court order and his
testimony as to his failure to comply with the court order.
4) Hamm's mental or emotional instability impairing his ability
to perform the functions of an attorney including his testimony
as to any diagnosis and treatment.[4]
LEGAL ETHICS
19 After reviewing all these factors, the Committee concluded

that Hamm had not met his burden of establishing that he
possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to
the Bar and accordingly recommended that his application be
denied. We now consider the Committee's findings, together
with pertinent facts.
A.
20 The serious nature of Hamm's past criminal conduct is
beyond dispute. Hamm acknowledges that no more serious
criminal conduct exists than committing first-degree murder.
Our society reserves its harshest punishment for those
convicted of such conduct. See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v.
Rubiaz,21 Ariz. 221, 231, 187 P. 568, 572 (1920) (describing
murder as "the most serious crime known to the law").
21 Hamm's past criminal conduct and the serious nature of
that conduct affect the burden he must meet to establish good
moral character. He must first establish rehabilitation from prior
criminal conduct, a requirement that adds to his burden of
showing current good moral character. See In re Adams,273 Ga.
333, 540 S.E.2d 609, 610 (2001) ("Where an applicant for
admission to the bar has a criminal record, his or her burden of
establishing present good moral character takes on the added
weight of proving full and complete rehabilitation subsequent to
conviction...."); In re Allan S., 282 Md. 683,387 A.2d 271, 275
(1978) ("Although *658 a prior conviction is not conclusive of a
lack of present good moral character, ... it adds to his burden of
establishing present good character by requiring convincing
proof of his full and complete rehabilitation.").
22 The added burden becomes greater as past unlawful
conduct becomes more serious. In In re Arrotta, we considered
an application for reinstatement from an attorney who, eight
years earlier, pled guilty to mail fraud and bribery. 208 Ariz.
509, 96 P.3d 213 (2004). We noted there that "the more serious
the misconduct that led to disbarment, the more difficult is the
applicant's task in showing rehabilitation." Id. at 512 12, 96
P.3d at 216. An applicant for initial admission to the Bar who is
attempting to overcome the negative implications of a serious
felony on his current moral character likewise must overcome a
greater burden for more serious crimes. We agree with the New
Jersey Supreme Court, which recognized that "in the case of
extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation
may be virtually impossible to make." In re Matthews, 94 N.J.
Page 60 of 115
59, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (1983). Indeed, we are aware of no

instance in which a person convicted of first-degree murder has
been admitted to the practice of law.
23 To show rehabilitation, Hamm must show that he has
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. Hamm fully
recognizes his need to make this showing. Indeed, he states
that his rehabilitation could not have proceeded absent such
acceptance. We recognize the Committee's concern that Hamm
has not yet fully accepted responsibility for the two murders.
Hamm says he has done so, repeatedly and strongly, but some
of his other statements indicate to the contrary. The
inconsistencies among his various statements related to
accepting responsibility are most evident when he discusses
Staples' murder. Although he told the Committee that he
accepts responsibility for Staples' murder, in fact he consistently
assigns that responsibility to his accomplice. His testimony
revealed almost no attention to the commission or aftermath of
Staples' murder. Hamm concedes that he has focused on his
role in Morley's murder rather than on his role in Staples'
murder. The difference in approach, he explains, resulted from
one postcard written to him by Morley's grandmother and his
decision to use his connection to Morley to provide motivation to
overcome difficulties. We have no reason to doubt that Hamm's
focus on Morley's murder aided him, using his words, in
"accomplishing things that people have been telling me I can't
do and we're [Hamm and Morley] still doing it today." That fact,
however, does nothing to assure us that Hamm has taken
responsibility for Staples' murder, as he must if he is to establish
rehabilitation.
24 We also give serious consideration to the Committee's
finding that Hamm was not completely forthright in his
testimony about the murders.[5] Hamm has insisted in his filings
with this Court that he did not intend to kill, but only to rob, his
victims. The agreed facts, however, lead directly to the
inference that Hamm intended to kill. He conspired with his
accomplices to rob the victims; he accepted the gun provided
by Wells and took it with him in the car with the victims; he
testified that, although he did not intend to kill the victims, he
was "afraid" they would be killed when he got in the car; he shot
Morley without ever attempting a robbery and shot him a
second time to make certain he was dead; and he also shot
Staples to prevent his escape. The Committee observed Hamm
LEGAL ETHICS
testify and was able to judge the credibility of his testimony in

light of uncontested facts. We agree that the record shows that
Hamm, despite his current protestations to the contrary,
intended to kill the victims. His failure to confront the fact that
these murders were intentional undermines his statements that
he fully accepts responsibility for his actions.
25 As did the Committee, we give substantial weight to
Hamm's attempts at rehabilitation. In Section I, supra, we
described in some detail the activities Hamm has undertaken,
both while in and since his release from prison. We are
impressed with the *659 sincerity and fervor of those who
testified or submitted letters on Hamm's behalf. Were
rehabilitation the only showing Hamm must make to establish
good moral character, we would weigh those factors tending to
show rehabilitation against those tending to show a lack thereof.
Under the facts of this case, however, we need not decide
whether the facts of record establish rehabilitation.
26 When an applicant has committed first-degree murder, a
crime that demonstrates an extreme lack of good moral
character, that applicant must make an extraordinary showing
of present good moral character to establish that he or she is
qualified to be admitted to the practice of law. Even assuming
that Hamm has established rehabilitation, showing rehabilitation
from criminal conduct does not, in itself, establish good moral
character. Rehabilitation is a necessary, but not sufficient,
ingredient of good moral character. An applicant must establish
his current good moral character, independent of and in addition
to, evidence of rehabilitation. We conclude that Hamm failed to
make that showing.
B.
27 We share the Committee's deep concern about Hamm's
longstanding failure to fulfill, or even address, his child support
obligation to his son, born in 1969, four years before Hamm and
his first wife separated. Not until he prepared his application for
admission to the Bar in 2004 did Hamm make any effort to meet
his responsibility to provide support for his son. During the
Committee hearing, Hamm advanced several explanations for
his failure to do so. Like the Committee, we find none of his
explanations credible.
28 Although Hamm attempts to excuse his failure to pay child
support by pointing out that he never received a copy of a final
divorce decree, Hamm scarcely can claim that he lacked
Page 61 of 115
awareness of his obligation. A few months after he and his wife

separated in 1973, Hamm was arrested on a misdemeanor
charge of failing to pay child support. On May 6, 1974, James
and Karen Hamm's divorce decree set Hamm's child support
payments at $75.00 a month. Hamm made no effort to learn the
extent of his financial obligation to his son from 1974, when
Hamm was twenty-six years old, until 2004, when he was fiftyfive. During those nearly thirty years, he gained sophistication
and attended law school. He must have known, and certainly
should have known, that he had long avoided a basic parental
obligation.[6]
29 Hamm also attempted to excuse his inattention to his
obligation by explaining that he learned, first from a private
investigator hired by his wife in 1988, and later from his son,
that his former wife's new husband had adopted his son. His
reliance on the private investigator's 1988 report to excuse his
failure is surprising, given the fact that his son was only months
from the age of majority when Hamm learned of the report; he
provides no explanation for his lack of concern prior to that
date.
30 Hamm further explained that only when he applied for
admission to the Bar in 2004 did he discover that his son had
not been adopted and then "calculated the child support
payment [due] over the years." Hamm determined that he owed
$10,000.00 and, even though the statute of limitations barred
an action to recover past amounts due,[7] contacted his son and
set up a repayment schedule.
*660 31 "Behavior of such long duration cannot be considered
as a temporary aberration...." Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d
at 895; see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 493 Pa.
519, 426 A.2d 1138 (1981) (holding that even when an attorney
made belated restitution for funds taken from clients, because
"[s]uch actions cannot be said to be consistent with high ethical
standards of the profession, with a lawyer's fiduciary
responsibility to his client, with a character that is beyond
reproach, or with truth, candor and honesty," the attorney could
not continue to practice law). Hamm's failure to meet his
parental obligation for nearly thirty years makes it more difficult
for him to make the required extraordinary showing that he "has
conducted himself as a man ordinarily would, should, or
does." Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895.
LEGAL ETHICS
32 We also agree with the Committee that Hamm did not

display honesty and candor in discussing his failure to pay child
support with the Committee. Hamm testified both that his son
told him personally that he had been adopted and that his son
"adamantly refused" to accept interest payments on the unpaid
child support.
33 Hamm's son testified, however, that he had never been
adopted, that prior to his contact with Hamm he had changed
his name himself, and that he had not told Hamm he had been
adopted. Hamm's son also did not report adamantly refusing
interest payments. In response to a question from the
Committee about interest payments, he said:
Discussions about interest? Seems like whenever we were
talking about it, you know, he said it was a large amount, and it
seems like the subject of interest did come up. I can't remember
exactly, you know, what we said about it. But, you know, I didn't
push the issue or anything, say, well, you know, you're going to
pay me interest for this or what, or is there any interest. It
wasn't really an issue or important to me.
34 We discern no reason that Hamm's son would have been
other than forthright about these matters, while Hamm had
every reason to present himself in the best possible light.[8] Like
the Committee, we find the testimony of his son to be more
credible.
C.
35 We further conclude that Hamm did not adequately explain
his failure to disclose an incident involving him and his current
wife, Donna, when he submitted his application to the
Committee.
36 In 1996, Hamm and Donna engaged in a physical
altercation outside a convenience store. Donna "yelled the word
`kidnap' out of the window" of the vehicle Hamm was driving,
causing him to pull over and leave the vehicle. During their
tussle, Donna tore Hamm's shirt. Both called the police, who
arrested neither Hamm nor Donna. The incident and what
Donna describes as her "embellishments" caused such great
concern to the Hamms, particularly because Hamm was on
parole, that Donna submitted to a polygraph administered by a
private company to demonstrate that Hamm had not kidnapped
her. The two also underwent marital counseling.
37 Nonetheless, when filling out his Character and Fitness
Report, Hamm failed to disclose the incident to the Committee.
Page 62 of 115
Question 25 on the report asks specifically whether the

applicant, among other things, *661 has been "questioned"
concerning any felony or misdemeanor.[9] Hamm told the
Committee that, in reading the application, he missed the word
"questioned" in the list of encounters with law enforcement that
Question 25 directs an applicant to report.
38 Hamm's explanation strains credulity. In Walker, this Court
inferred that the son of an Army officer would understand the
requirement to register for the draft. 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d
at 895. Likewise, we infer from Hamm's knowledge of the law
and his efforts in 1996 to document a defense for the domestic
incident that he fully understood its importance and must have
known that the incident would be of interest to the Committee.
His failure to include it in his initial application further affects his
ability to make the needed extraordinary showing of good moral
character.
D.
39 Hamm's actions during these proceedings also raise
questions about his fitness to practice law. The introduction to
Hamm's petition before this Court begins:
The consequences of this case for Petitioner take it out of the
ordinary realm of civil cases. If the Committee's
recommendation is followed, it will prevent him from earning a
living through practicing law. This deprivation has consequences
of the greatest import for Petitioner, who has invested years of
study and a great deal of financial resources in preparing to be a
lawyer....
This language repeats nearly verbatim the language of the
United States Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. 252, 77 S. Ct. 722,1 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1957), in which the
Court wrote:
While this is not a criminal case, its consequences for
Konigsberg take it out of the ordinary run of civil cases. The
Committee's action prevents him from earning a living by
practicing law. This deprivation has grave consequences for a
man who has spent years of study and a great deal of money in
preparing to be a lawyer.
Id. at 257-58, 77 S. Ct. 722. If an attorney submits work to a
court that is not his own, his actions may violate the rules of
professional conduct. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics &
Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 2002)
("[P]lagiarism constitute[s], among other things, a
LEGAL ETHICS
misrepresentation to the court. An attorney may not engage in

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation."); see also Rule 42, ER 8.4(c) (defining
professional misconduct as including "engag[ing] in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"). We
are concerned about Hamm's decision to quote from the
Supreme Court's opinion without attribution and are equally
troubled by his failure to acknowledge his error. When the
Committee's response pointed to Hamm's failure to attribute
this language to Konigsberg, he avoided the serious questions
raised and refused to confront or apologize for his improper
actions, asserting instead: "From Petitioner's perspective, any
eloquence that might be found in the Petition does not derive
from any prior case decided in any jurisdiction, but rather from
the gradual development of his own potential through study,
reflection, and devotion to the duty created by his commission
of murder." Hamm apparently either does not regard his actions
as improper or simply refuses to take responsibility. In either
case, his actions here do not assist him in making the requisite
showing of good moral character.[10]
*662 E.
When Hamm committed first-degree murder in 1974, he
demonstrated his extreme lack of good moral character.
Although this Court has not adopted a per se rule excluding an
applicant whose past includes such serious criminal misconduct,
we agree with those jurisdictions that have held that an
applicant with such a background must make an extraordinary
showing of rehabilitation and present good moral character to
be admitted to the practice of law. Perhaps such a showing is, in
practical terms, a near impossibility. We need not decide that
question today, however, because Hamm's lack of candor
before the Committee and this Court, his failure to accept full
responsibility for his serious criminal misconduct, and his failure
to accept or fulfill, on a timely basis, his parental obligation of
support for his son, all show that Hamm has not met the
stringent standard that applies to an applicant in his position
who seeks to show his present good moral character.
IV.
40 Hamm asserts that he was denied due process of law
because two members of the Committee may have prejudged
the merits of his application. Both members, however, left the
Committee proceedings when their potential bias came to light,
Page 63 of 115
and neither played any role in the Committee's findings and

recommendation.
41 Hamm, like all applicants for membership in the Bar, is
entitled to receive due process of law. "The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18(1976)
(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct.
1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965)). Also, "due process requires that a
party be given a `fair trial in a fair tribunal.'" United States v.
Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 280, 697 P.2d 658, 673 (1985)
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L.
Ed. 942 (1955)). Both the Committee and this Court have
provided Hamm ample opportunity to be heard through
hearings and written arguments. Moreover, this Court, and not
the Committee, made the ultimate decision on Hamm's
application. Hamm received a full opportunity to be heard
before a fair tribunal.
V.
42 Because James Hamm has failed to meet his burden of
proving that he is of good moral character, we deny his
application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona.
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 64 of 115
556 Phil. 4
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. NO. P-07-2337 (FORMERLY A.M. OCA IPI NO. 04-2060-P),
August 03, 2007
ROLLY PENTECOSTES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, CLERK OF COURT VI, OFFICE OF
THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KABACAN,
NORTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI
of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kabacan, North Cotabato, stands administratively
charged with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a
public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a
criminal case which was placed under his care and custody.
The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a
sworn affidavit-complaint[1] filed on November 11, 2004 by
Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki
motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of M'lang, North Cotabato
from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for
carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at Branch
22, RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato.
On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M'lang,
North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent
who acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.
After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of
the motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order[2] of November
15, 2000 for its release to Pentecostes.
Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the

motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him to wait
and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the
complaint.
In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave
the following explanation:
After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the M'lang chief
of police on August 1, 1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a
utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after
which he issued an acknowledgement receipt thereof.
He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to
the Kabacan police station for which he (respondent)
prepared a receipt.
He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every
time a hearing on the criminal case was conducted. When
the court finally ordered the release of the motorcycle to
Pentecostes on November 15, 2000, the latter refused to
receive it, claiming that it was already "cannibalized" and
unserviceable.
From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him,
demanding that he be responsible for reconditioning the
vehicle. During the latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the
executive judge, he accompanied Pentecostes to the
Kabacan police station only to discover that the motorcycle
was missing.
As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police
chief Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he prepared a lettercomplaint requesting for assistance in the recovery of the
motorcycle and for the conduct of an investigation.
Pentecostes refused to sign the letter, however.
He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the
record of the criminal case and the page of the blotter where
LEGAL ETHICS
the turnover was recorded were missing. Hence, he

submitted the sworn statements of Pedroso [4] and SPO4 Alex
Ocampo[5] who confirmed the transfer of the vehicle from his
custody to that of the Kabacan chief of police.
Belying respondent's averments, Pentecostes, in his
"Rejoinder,"[6] contended as follows:
The vehicle was in good running condition when it was
delivered to respondent by police operatives [7] of M'lang.
Respondent's act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan
was a clear case of hand washing as the records showed that
respondent was responsible for the safekeeping of the
motorcycle. It was for this reason that he (Pentecostes)
refused to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan
protesting the loss. Moreover, the police blotter of PNP
Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn over.
By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the
case to the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his
findings and recommendation for the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against respondent.[9]
In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied
any knowledge about the turnover of the motorcycle to the
PNP of Kabacan.
On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge
found that the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP of
M'lang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred
it to the PNP of Kabacan.
To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual
physical condition of the motorcycle when it was turned over
to the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no
Page 65 of 115
proof of Pentecostes' claim that the vehicle was

"cannibalized" from the time it was under respondent's
custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.
In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the
late 1990s and in the early part of 2000 and the absence of a
suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that
respondent had made a wise decision in turning over the
custody of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.
To Judge Rabang's report and recommendation, Pentecostes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] in which he assailed the
conclusion that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and
was already "cannibalized" when it was delivered to the
office of the clerk of court from the M'lang police station.
Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover
of the motorcycle to the police station of Kabacan was
irrelevant because the proper custodian of the vehicle was
respondent who should be held responsible for its eventual
loss.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the
investigating judge's recommendation to be sufficiently
supported by the evidence. [11]
The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabang's
recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent, subject to certain qualifications with respect to
the physical condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to
respondent and the latter's lack of authority for the turn over
of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.
While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the
actual condition of the motorcycle at the time it was turned
over to respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence
presented during the investigation supported a finding that
the vehicle had missing parts when it was delivered to
respondent.
LEGAL ETHICS
From the testimony of Pentecostes' witness SPO2 Servando

Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle was loaded into a
service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact,
according to the OCA, could only mean that the vehicle could
not run by itself.
Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that
the evidence sufficiently proved that the vehicle was turned
over to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that
respondent failed to ask prior authority from the trial court to
transfer its custody. Only when respondent was having
problems with Pentecostes did he bring the matter to the
attention of the executive judge, the OCA added.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be
reminded to secure prior authority from the court before
evidence is turned over to any authorized government office
or agency and that he be warned to be more careful to
prevent any similar incident from arising in the future.
The finding of the OCA insofar as respondent's lack of
authority to transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on account
of which respondent is administratively liable for simple
misconduct.
It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records,
papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his
charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For
Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI
of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:
All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court
and before the case/s involving such evidence shall have
been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping
of the Clerk of Court.
Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. - The clerk shall safely keep
all record, papers, files, exhibits and public property
Page 66 of 115
committed to his charge, including the library of the court,

and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of
the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody
and safekeeping of Pentecostes' motorcycle, and to keep it
until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that
would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior
authority of the trial court.
No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for
turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was,
respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with
and approval of the trial court.
Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment
receipt evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the
trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the
records of Criminal Case No. 1010,[13] with nary a lead as to
who was responsible for it. This circumstance is viewed with
disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court
records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.
With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery
to respondent, the evidence indicates that it was still
serviceable when it was delivered by the M'lang police to
respondent and at the time it was turned over by respondent
to the Kabacan police station. The Joint Affidavit [14] of SPO2
Guadalupe and Police Inspector Romeo Banaybanay
categorically stated that the motorcycle was in "good running
condition" when they delivered it to respondent. Later during
his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he was the "the
driver of the service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was on
board the motorcycle" when the vehicle was turned over to
respondent on August 1, 1995.[15]
Even respondent's following testimony that:
"x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for
safekeeping, he immediately delivered together with Alex
Pedroso [sic] because it could be noted that respondent
do[es] not know how to drive a motorcycle, I requested x x x
LEGAL ETHICS
Alex Pedroso to accompany me and deliver [it] to [the] chief

of police of Kabacan"[16] (Italics supplied)
suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when
respondent took and subsequently transferred its custody to
the Kabacan police.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are
essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who
perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice.[17] Their duties include the efficient
recording, filing and management of court records and, as
previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public
property committed to their charge.
Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court
and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one
pretext or another.[18] They cannot err without affecting the
integrity of the court or the efficient administration of justice.
[19]
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to

violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must
be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple, as in this case.
The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999)
classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense,
punishable by suspension of One Month and One Day to Six
Months. Considering that this is respondent's first offense
and no taint of bad faith has been shown by his actuations, a
15-day suspension without pay is deemed appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo
Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple Misconduct. He is
SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a stern
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in

view of their exalted positions as keepers of public faith. [20]
The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon
court employees are reflective of the premium placed on the
image of the court of justice, and that image is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of court
personnel.[21] It becomes the imperative and sacred duty of
everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts' good name
and standing as true temples of justice. [22]
By transferring Pentecostes' motorcycle without authority,
respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty of
keeping it under his care and possession. He must, therefore,
suffer the consequences of his act or omission, which is akin
to misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite
rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by
the public officer.[23] The misconduct is grave if it involves any
Page 67 of 115
LEGAL ETHICS
543 Phil. 1
EN BANC
A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1831 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 99-796-RTJ),
February 02, 2007
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS.
HON. VICENTE A. PACQUING, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 28
AND MARIO ANACLETO M. BAEZ, JR., CLERK OF COURT, RTC,
SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson)
borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel
mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the payment of the
amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where
it emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 [1] to annul the
extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge
Antonio Fineza, declared the foreclosure void and directed
petitioner to restore to Bengson the foreclosed properties,
pay damages and costs of suit.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA affirmed with modification the trial court's decision
and remanded the case for reception of evidence on the
costs of suit and determination of the replacement value of
the properties should petitioner fail to return them. The CA
decision became final and executory on February 10, 1988.
Page 68 of 115
When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the

new presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent Judge Vicente
A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value
of the foreclosed properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that
it be permitted to present evidence on the costs of suit. On
April 6, 1995, the trial court directed petitioner to pay
Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. This order became final
on April 24, 1995.
Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a
quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, went on
AWOL and never informed it of respondent judge's order. [2]
This motion, treated as petition for relief from judgment by
respondent judge, was dismissed on January 16, 1997. [3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but
respondent judge denied the same on April 23, 1998.
Petitioner then instituted a special civil action for certiorari in
the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47669[4] assailing the
court a quo's denial of its petition for relief from judgment.
The CA, however, dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 for having
been filed out of time as three years had elapsed since the
order awarding Bengson P31 million as costs of suit became
final and executory.[5]
Petitioner filed an MR of the above decision and, while it was
pending resolution at the CA, respondent judge, on
December 16, 1998, issued an alias writ of execution
ordering petitioner to pay Bengson the P31 million. [6]
Pursuant thereto, respondent Atty. Mario Anacleto M.
Baez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26, executed the writ and
levied on petitioner's shares of stock in San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) worth P6.2 million. The garnished shares
were later sold at public auction with Bengson as the only
bidder.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground
that its funds and properties were exempt from garnishment,
levy and execution under Section 39 of RA 8291. [7]
LEGAL ETHICS
Respondent judge denied the motion stating that only funds

and properties that were necessary to maintain petitioner's
actuarial solvency, like contributions of GSIS members, were
exempt from garnishment, levy and execution under RA
8291.[8]
Petitioner filed its MR of the trial court's denial of its motion
to quash the writ but this was rejected as well.
Via a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order (TRO), petitioner came to us questioning the
garnishment and sale on execution of its SMC shares. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 136874.[9]
We referred G.R. No. 136874 to the CA for consideration and
adjudication on the merits. In the CA, it was re-docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 51131 and was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP.
No. 47669.[10]
Later, the CA dismissed both petitions. [11]
Petitioner questioned the CA's dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No.
47669 via a petition for review in this Court docketed as G.R.
No. 137448,[12] the ultimate issue of which was the existence
of grounds for relief from the P31 million costs of suit
judgment by respondent judge.
Later, petitioner filed another case, a special civil action for
certiorari in this Court, this time contesting the CA's dismissal
of its petition in CA-G.R. No. 51131. Docketed as G.R. No.
141454,[13] the petition ascribed grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CA for upholding the trial court's issuance of
the alias writ of execution and the subsequent garnishment
and sale of its shares in SMC.
Petitioner also filed this administrative complaint[14] against
respondents for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and
for violation of RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner alleged:
Page 69 of 115
In fine, [respondent judge] refused to take cognizance of

[Section 39, RA 8291]. He refused to await an authoritative
and definitive resolution of the issues [on the exemption of
GSIS's funds and properties] from execution or the issue of
whether GSIS is entitled to a relief from judgment of his [P]31
million peso cost[s] of suit. ...[H]e was in a hurry, as Bengson,
to execute the P31 million costs of suit...[O]n the other hand,
Sheriff Mario Anacleto M. Baez, seemed to have the same
objective when he refused to take heed of [GSISs request]
to hold in abeyance the execution sale on the basis of
Section 39 (RA 8291).
The foregoing only shows [respondent judge's] deliberate
disregard of the express provisions of [RA 8291], specifically
Section 39...and his bias, given his exorbitant award for
cost[s] of suit, bereft, as it is, of any legal basis. It evidently
reveals a malicious scheme that seriously undermines the
very integrity and impartiality of his court.
The same can be said of the acts of Sheriff Baez in
garnishing and selling [GSIS's shares of stock in SMC] to
Bengson, characterized by an unusual swiftness and in clear
disregard of the express provision of Section 39, RA 8291... [15]
We referred the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In its report[16] to the Court, the OCA found
nothing in the records to support petitioner's accusations
against both respondents. According to the OCA, even
assuming that respondent judge erred in interpreting RA
8291, such error did not constitute gross ignorance of the
law. It added that the records also failed to prove malice,
fraud, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of respondent
judge in issuing the assailed alias writ of execution.
On petitioner's allegations against respondent Atty. Baez,
the OCA likewise found no reason to hold him liable for failing
to defer the execution of the writ.
The OCA then recommended the dismissal of petitioner's
complaint against respondents.[17]
LEGAL ETHICS
On petitioner's motion, we referred the case to the CA for

further investigation. It was assigned to Associate Justice
Roberto A. Barrios, who acted as investigating officer. Before
a hearing on the case could be conducted, respondent judge
died.[18] The hearing proceeded but we withheld his benefits
pending the completion of the investigation of his case by
Justice Barrios.
Subsequently, Justice Barrios submitted his report [19] to us
agreeing with OCA's findings that petitioner's complaint
against respondents was unfounded. According to Justice
Barrios:
Assuming for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in
issuing the Order of 16 December 1998 without awaiting the
resolution of [petitioner's motion for reconsideration], and in
holding that [its] properties are not exempt from execution,
these would not be errors that are gross and patent, or done
maliciously, deliberately or in evident bad faith. [Petitioner]
has not presented proof to the contrary, which with the
factual milieu would call for administrative sanctions
against [respondent judge]. As a matter of public policy, the
acts of the judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a
judge charged with ignorance of [the] law can find refuge. [20]
He added that the filing of the administrative charges against
respondents was premature because this Court at that time
had yet to decide G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. He
thus recommended the dismissal of the administrative
charges against respondents.
On January 31, 2002,[21] we handed down our decision in the
above cases nullifying the CA's resolutions dismissing G.R.
Nos. 51131[22] and 47669.[23] In the same decision, we set
aside respondent judge's January 16, 1997 order dismissing
petitioner's petition for relief from judgment and his April 23,
1998 order denying the MR.[24]
Page 70 of 115
Notwithstanding the nullification of respondent judge's

orders, we are adopting the findings and recommendations of
the OCA and Justice Barrios.
For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the
law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent. [25] To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not
only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also
motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. [26] That
certainly does not appear to be the case here as petitioner's
complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of
opinion between petitioner and respondent judge as to the
legal issues and applicable laws involved. [27] Petitioner also
proffered no evidence that respondent judge's acts were
imbued with malice or bad faith.
In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither
biased nor partial against petitioner when he issued the alias
writ of execution. Petitioner's assertion that respondent judge
precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the
records. On the contrary, the records indicate that the writ
was issued more than three years from the finality of the
order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs
of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. In
the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge
believed that the issuance of the alias writ had become
forthwith a matter of right following the finality of said order.
The rule is that once a judgment becomes final, the winning
party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance
thereof becomes a court's ministerial duty.[28]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in
issuing the alias writ, his act would still not merit
administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith. [29] Bad
faith does not simply connote poor or flawed judgment; it
imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious
doing of a wrong.
Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand,
petitioner should have demonstrated that respondent
LEGAL ETHICS
judge's decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources

or from some bases other than what he had learned from his
study of the case.[30] Decisions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings, although they appear erroneous, are not
necessarily partial as long as they are culled from the
arguments and evidence of the parties.[31] The party who
alleges partiality must prove it with clear and convincing
evidence. Petitioner failed in that aspect.
Interestingly, this Court, in our decision in G.R. Nos. 137448
and 141454, nullified the orders of respondent judge only to
give petitioner another chance to seek redress from the gross
negligence and mistake of its then counsel, Atty. Terrado. We
did not at all declare respondent judge's orders as erroneous
or tainted with malice or bad faith. In our decision, we said:
It is readily apparent that part of [petitioner's] predicament
stemmed from the negligence or mistake, to put it mildly, of
its former counsels.
Indeed, it is undisputed that despite ample opportunity,
[petitioner's] counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, did not rebut
BENGSON's evidence on the costs of suit or, at the very least,
verify the schedule of costs and cross-examine BENGSON's
witnesses. Much worse, he allowed the 6 April 1995 Order
awarding BENGSON P31 million costs of suit to attain finality
by not filing a motion for reconsideration with the trial court
or a petition with the Court of Appeals. Instead, he went
AWOL without informing petitioner of the said Order. These
acts constituted gross negligence, if not fraud, and resulted
in the deprivation of petitioner of an opportunity to move to
reconsider or appeal the adverse order.
...[A]s a general rule, the negligence or mistake of a counsel
binds the client for otherwise there would be never be no end
to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who
could allege and show that the former counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. But if under the
circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office
as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief
enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
Page 71 of 115
thereto and prevent miscarriage of justice. In other words,

the court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice
require it.
Moreover, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the
proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived
to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient remedy exists.[32] The actions against judges should
not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or
substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of
by a party in a case.[33]
Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Baez,
the Court finds no basis to hold him liable for executing the
assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult
phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. [34]
Charged with this task, he must act with considerable
dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a judgment, if not
executed at once, would just be an empty victory on the part
of the prevailing party.[35] In executing the writ, Atty. Baez
merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had no discretion to
implement the writ or not.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for ignorance of the law, bias
and partiality, and violation of RA 8291 against the late Judge
Vicente A. Pacquing and Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Baez, is
hereby DISMISSED.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Office of the
Court Administrator so that the benefits due the late
respondent judge can be promptly released to his heirs,
unless there exists some other lawful cause to withhold the
same.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
546 Phil. 431
Page 72 of 115
criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of

the car.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. NO. 7204, March 07, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ERNESTO M.

MACABATA, RESPONDENT.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Cynthia
Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata,
charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia
Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty.
Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel
and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December
11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas
Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the
complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did
not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner,
respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to
step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her
on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning,
she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue,
Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in
Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which
he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant
was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just
got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue
immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent
stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her
lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant
even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to

respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case
with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder
from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her
cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant At 5:33:46 pm
replied by
respondent at
6:16:11 pm
sent by complainant at 6:17:59 pm
forget the case. I

decided to refer it
with other lawyer
"does this mean I can
not c u
anymore"(Does this
mean I cannot see
you anymore)
I feel bad. I can't
expect that u will
take advantage of the
situation.
Follow-up message
Sent by
complainantAt
6:29:30 pm
wrong to kiss a girl

especially in the lips
if you don't have
relationship with her.
Replied by
respondent At
6:32:43 pm
Follow up message
by respondentat
"I"m veri sri. It's not

tking advantage of
the situation, 2 put it
rightly it s an
expression of feeling.
S sri' (I'm very sorry.
Its not taking
advantage of the
situation, to put it
rightly it is an
expression of feeling)
I'm s sri. Il not do it
again. Wil u stil c me
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 73 of 115
s I can show u my
sincerity' (I'm so
sorry. I'll not do it
again. Will you still
see me so I can show
you my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another
message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying 'I don't know wat
2 do s u may 4give me. 'Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo. (I
don't know what to do so you may forgive me. I'm really sorry.
Puede bati na tayo).
restaurant.
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then

another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying
"Ano k ba. I'm really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba.
I'm really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear
manifestation of admission of guilt.[2]
In his answer,[3] respondent admitted that he agreed to provide
legal services to the complainant; that he met with complainant
on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant
matters relative to the case which complainant was intending to
file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for
collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions,
complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed
complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him;
and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue,
where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to
commit the acts imputed to him.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated

20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms
of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating
with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months.[5]
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent
committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there

was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by
complainant against respondent pending before the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of
complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains
married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the
nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the
Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living
with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never
bothered to discuss respondent's fees and it was respondent
who always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we
deal with respondent's actuations shall have a rippling effect on
how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry
from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.
6:42:25 pm
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.
B. Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation,[4]
recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month
suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I - x x x
LEGAL ETHICS
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession
of good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve
their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for
remaining in the practice of law.[6] In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,[7] we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and
good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected
at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever
it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right
but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its
officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar,
to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from
its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard
the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.[8]
We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol[9] that, "as officers of the
Page 74 of 115
court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character

but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
[10]
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[11] good moral character was defined

as what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character
has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public;
(2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect
prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.[12]
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on
the lips.
In his Answer,[13] respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you
goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my
left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed
her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her
left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly
pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on
her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 75 of 115
lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything

happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except
saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP
Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent
candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met ... I fetched her I should say,
somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it
was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my
car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I
was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I
said ... she opened my car and then she went inside so I said,
would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said
yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas
Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we
ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay
for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered
two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters
about her case, so I said ... it's about 9:00 or beyond that time
already, so I said okay, let's go. So when I said let's go so I stood
up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she
followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She
told me just drop me at the same place where you have been
dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at
the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went
down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left
cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right
hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and
when she's already facing me I lightly kissed her on the
lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, that's
it.
corner. So before she went down , before she opened the door
of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her
again.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
In Toledo v. Toledo,[17] a lawyer was disbarred from the practice

of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said let's go because I have
an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and I
said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again
and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit
her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and
that's it. x x x.[14] (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.[15]
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[16] we reiterated the definition of immoral
conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not
simply be immoral, but . It must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as
constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,[18] a lawyer was disbarred after

complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained
an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court
declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree
of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
LEGAL ETHICS
In Dantes v. Dantes,[19] respondent's act of engaging in illicit

relationships with two different women during the subsistence of
his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions.
Complainant's testimony, taken in conjunction with the
documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,[20] it was ruled that it was highly
immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of
medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go
with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under
the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she
refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[21] respondent lawyer was disbarred
when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an
innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself
as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[22] respondent entered into multiple
marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them.
There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by
respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family,
institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival
and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of
our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that
awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,[23] respondent contracted marriage with
another married woman and left complainant with whom he has
been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute
"a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely
low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession,"
warranting respondent's disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] respondent married complainant while
his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and
Page 76 of 115
subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting

the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required
by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being
admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,[25] respondent lured an innocent woman
into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We
held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality
and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the
bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.[26]
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or
beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and
camaraderie,[27] forms of greetings, casual and customary. The
acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant
towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However,
such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot
be considered grossly immoral.
Complainant's bare allegation that respondent made use and
took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to
have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden
of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the
case against the respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof,[28] disclosing a case that is free from doubt as
to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. [29]
Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must
prove."[30] As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on
the party who makes the allegations-ei incumbit probation, qui
decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis
probation nulla sit.[31] In the case at bar, complainant miserably
failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation
is not synonymous with guilt.[32]
LEGAL ETHICS
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant

on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to
this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed
her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a
cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended
an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message.
The exchange of text messages between complainant and
respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where
there were several people in the vicinity considering that
Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If
respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he
could have brought her to a private place or a more remote
place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent''s
acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant
disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed
against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires
consideration of a number of factors.[33] When deciding upon the
appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary
purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to
foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of
the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.[34] Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting
the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out
this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [35]
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular
sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it
should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled
by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict
compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his
brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great
caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear
Page 77 of 115
cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and

character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character
should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer
should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such
nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's
unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
character of the act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated
before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the
offense should also be considered.[36]
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of
misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor
infraction of the lawyer's duty to the court or the client. [37] In the
Matter of Darell Adams,[38] a lawyer was publicly reprimanded
for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse
which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and
conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and
considering that this is respondent's first offense, reprimand
would suffice.
We laud complainant's effort to seek redress for what she
honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was
difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and
accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own
assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and
surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to
be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with
a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 78 of 115
LEGAL ETHICS
463 Phil. 385

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON
LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP
GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP
ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA AND TONY
VELEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA AND IBP
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia,
Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the
disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from
being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th
Intergrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") Regional Governors'
elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the
Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez
are the past President and the incumbent President,
respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP
Board") was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP
National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The
election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI
of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At
least one month before the national convention, the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their
Page 79 of 115
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be

rotated among the chapters in the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution[2] No. XV2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the elections to May 31,
2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of
the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along
with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, sent a letter[3] dated 28 March 2003, requesting the
IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their
Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the
mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election
of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the
national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being
politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise
lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political
practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will
render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving
protests in the election for governors not later than May 31,
2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. Any nominee desiring to
contest an election shall, within two days after the
announcement of the results of the elections, file with the
President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth
the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the
President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the
outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the
protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the
following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for
reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.[4]
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been
adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners
filed a Petition[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board
seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional
Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and (2)
the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being
LEGAL ETHICS
elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region."

The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on
May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first,
the postponement of the elections for regional governors
and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no
compelling justification for the postponement of the elections
especially considering that preparations and notices had
already been completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty.
Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be
premature considering that no nomination has yet been
made for the election of IBP regional governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it
hereby resolves, to deny the petition.[6]
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on
their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the
petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court,
seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition
before the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the
petitioners' application, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents,
representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to
cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the
IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.[7]
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the
mechanics for the selection of the IBP officers from the
Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting
the IBP Board which is its highest policy-making body, as well
as the underlying dynamics, to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for
Page 80 of 115
a term of two years. The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect

their respective Regional Governors following the rotation
rule. The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon,
Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia,
Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and
Western Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2)
years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending
on the 30th of June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an
Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be chosen, also on
rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the
election of both the Regional Governors and the Vice
President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP, to
avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the ByLaws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will automatically be the
National President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions,
except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2) National
Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be
elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in
the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically
become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005.
For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20,
2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically
assume the post of IBP National President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent
De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to
Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the
IBP presidency.[8] The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan
del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and
misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule
and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it
implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and
willing to serve the IBP.[9]
LEGAL ETHICS
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the

offices of regional governor, executive vice-president and
national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De
Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them,
respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court
for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices
during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the
plunder law. They add that he could have been disbarred in
the United States for misappropriating his client's funds had
he not surrendered his California license to practice law.
Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for
the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP
National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited
act under the IBP By-Laws.[10]
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June
9, 2003 a Respectful Comment [11] on the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He
argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present
controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of
the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of
those who want to serve the organization, is purely an
internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and
exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.
Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners' legal
standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a
provision for the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for
the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it
provides for is only an election protest under Article IV,
Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can
validly lodge an election protest which is to be made after,
not before, the election. He posits further that following the
rotation rule, only members from the Surigao del Norte and
Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for Governor
for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the
petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are
not thus qualified to be nominees. [12]
Page 81 of 115
Meeting the petitioners' contention head on, respondent De

Vera avers that an IBP member is entitled to select, change
or transfer his chapter membership.[13] He cites the last
paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV
of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise
registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer
shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province,
city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises
all members registered in its membership roll. Each member
shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated
on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another
Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided
that the transfer is made not less than three months
immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera
stresses, is also recognized in Section 4, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the
above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his
preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city,
political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and
members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he
transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits
that it is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his
membership transfer was done for convenience and as a
mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao
governorship.[14]
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies
that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its
LEGAL ETHICS
members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of

the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed
against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law
in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his
California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot
serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack
of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that
there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the
administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee
which are recommendatory in character similar to the
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was
not considered by the investigating officer. Finally, on the
alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National
Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is
baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because
he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for
governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the
petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their
claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from
his region at the Century Park Hotel.[15]
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply[16] to the
Respectful Comment of respondent De Vera who, on July 15,
2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder. [17]
In a Resolution[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed
the other respondent in this case, the IBP Board, to file its
comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General
Counsel, filed a Manifestation[19] dated 29 August 2003,
reiterating the position stated in its Resolution dated 29 May
2003 that "it finds the petition to be premature considering
that no nomination has as yet been made for the election of
IBP Regional Governors."[20]
Page 82 of 115
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the

main issues, to wit:
(1)
whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present
controversy;
(2)
whether petitioners have a cause of action against

respondent De Vera, the determination of which in turn
requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De
Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws;
and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to
bring this suit;
(3)
whether the present Petition is premature;
(4)
assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and

that the present petition is not premature, whether
respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of
the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent
De Vera contends that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De
Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP,
including the determination of the qualification of those who
want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
LEGAL ETHICS
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,

the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise
all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its
officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its
origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof
granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure
are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935
Constitution and the similarly worded provision in the
intervening 1973 Constitution[21] through all the years have
been the sources of this Court's authority to supervise
individual members of the Bar. The term "Bar" refers to the
"collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys."[22] Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court
initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on
October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which
was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.[23] Not long after, Republic Act No. 6397[24] was
Page 83 of 115
enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to

effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January
1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned
"In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines,"
we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in
accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we
promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the
1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De
Vera in asserting IBP independence from the Supreme Court,
ironically recognizes the full range of the power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one,
Section 77[25] of the IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power
to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu
propio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of
the IBP. Also in Section 15,[26] the Court is authorized to send
observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section
44[27] empowers the Court to have the final decision on the
removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the
Supreme Court looked into the irregularities which attended
the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter
No. 491 entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989
Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines" the Court
formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989
elections. The results of the investigation showed that the
elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal
candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section
14 of the IBP By-Laws.[28] The Court invalidated the elections
and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as
explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP members
who were found involved in the irregularities in the elections,
in order to "impress upon the participants, in that electoral
exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it
and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this
Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP
and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive
electioneering."
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 84 of 115
not available to just anybody.

The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP ByLaws. First, it removed direct election by the House of
Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b)
IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second,
it restored the former system of the IBP Board choosing the
IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from
among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the ByLaws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP
to the position of the President upon the expiration of their
common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and
39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected
by the members of their respective House of Delegates and
that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated
among the different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the
Supreme Court over the IBP and establish without doubt its
jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the
petitioners have no cause of action against him, respondent
De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions
to disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it
authorizes are election protests or post-election cases under
Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. Any nominee desiring to
contest an election shall, within two days after the
announcement of the results of the elections, file with the
President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth
the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the
President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the
outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the
protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the
following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which
sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors.
The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the
election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the

disqualification of nominees for the position of regional
governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section
39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. Any question
relating to the eligibility of a candidate must be raised prior
to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by
the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to
the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve the
appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands.
The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections
shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors
may be had in accordance with Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on
nomination and election of the Board of Governors. Before,
members of the Board were directly elected by the members
of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every
other year.[29] The election was a two-tiered process. First, the
Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote,
not less than two nor more than five nominees for the
position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the
nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were
written on the board within the full view of the House, unless
complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed
to all the Delegates.[30] Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his
absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for
Governor for each Region.[31] The nominee from every Region
receiving the highest number of votes was declared and
certified elected by the Chairman.[32]
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the
1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it best to amend the
nomination and election processes for Regional Governors.
The Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor
is nominated and elected by the delegates of the concerned
region, and adopted the rotation process through the
following provisions, to wit:
LEGAL ETHICS
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar

of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one Governor for each region to be
elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. At
least one (1) month before the national convention the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election
process and thus made it less controversial. The grounds for
disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the
pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is
diminished as the rotation process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Court's
vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-political [33] and
effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the
standards of the legal profession, improving the
administration of justice and contributing to the growth and
progress of the Philippine society.[34]
Page 85 of 115
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws

to the present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties
to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only
nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written
protest setting forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by
respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP
members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are
qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the
16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant
to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections
37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera
and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be
nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of
the present petition.
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to

remove the provision on disqualification proceedings.
Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant
petition has no firm ground to stand on.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is
premature for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of
respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the
Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected
governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this
case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the
post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet
by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern
Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De
Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the
nomination.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the

aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are
not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not
qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional
governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following the
rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as
amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and
Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for

the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His
place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a
member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP
Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of
attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national
presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
LEGAL ETHICS
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of

Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. ....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the
Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area
where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more
than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws
that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member
of the chapter where his place of residence or work is
located. He has the discretion to choose the particular
chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he
does not register his preference that he will become a
member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or
maintains his office. The only proscription in registering one's
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than
one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In
fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is
allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions
set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership The Chapter comprises all
members registered in its membership roll. Each member
shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated
on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another
Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided
that the transfer is made not less than three months
immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that
the transfer must be made not less than three months prior
Page 86 of 115
to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer

wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer
of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001.
One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar
wrote a letter[35] addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr.,
Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of
respondent De Vera's transfer and advising them to make the
necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a
substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in
Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Vera's transfer
was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and
September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of
the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over
the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP
By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers
and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February
of every other year.[36] Between September 3, 2001 and
February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This
makes respondent De Vera's transfer valid as it was done
more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held
on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is
disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy the
position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets
the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he
cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes
to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a
member in good standing of the IBP;[37] 2) he is included in
the voter's list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the
Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by
the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs; [38] (3) he
does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor
has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a
new season or cycle;[39] and (4) he is not in the government
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 87 of 115
service.[40]
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that
one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the determination
of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual
judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to
nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter
possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another,
basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of
moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves
moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera
on the basis of the alleged sanction imposed by the Supreme
Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the
plunder law, is apparently referring to this Court's Decision
dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats
Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case
Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.[41] In this case, respondent
De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and
was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper
articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the
pertinent portions of the report, with De Vera's statements
written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it
would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estrada's lawyers to
declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed
vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by
the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over
the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two other
justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said
Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant
groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camp's effort to coerce, bribe,
or influence the justices- considering that it has a P500
million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will
most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the
Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague," the group
said.[42]
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally
charged." said lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal Justice
for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada
Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal
rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger
mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng"
scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor turned out to
be true.
"People wouldn't just swallow any Supreme Court decision
that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. " [43]
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De
Vera admitted to have made said statements but denied to
LEGAL ETHICS
have uttered the same "to degrade the Court, to destroy

public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute." [44] He
explained that he was merely exercising his constitutionally
guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that
the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening
the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law.[45]
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De
Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of
indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines [46] cited in Villaber v.
Commission on Elections,[47] the Court defines moral
turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals."[48] The determination of whether an act involves
moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on
the circumstances attending the violation of the statute. [49]
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one's
opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did
not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the
public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. [50]
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the
administrative case as evidence of respondent De Vera's
alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered
by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the
charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator
Page 88 of 115
and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We

find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. [51] In this
case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative
complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run
for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his
handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in
the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy,
again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate
the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under our Rules of Court.[52]
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty.
Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined
the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in
Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP
Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election
with proper notice and with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
G.R. No. 97239

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97239, May 12, 1993
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PETITIONER, VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION)
AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the
question of whether a conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and
corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide
involves moral turpitude.
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international
organization recognized by the Philippine government and
accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally granted
to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired
private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby
became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations,
the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz:
"C. Conviction and Previous Separation
1. x x x
2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal
offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the
service.'"
On February 6, 1987, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo
Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baos, Laguna.
Page 89 of 115
On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of

homicide. During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa
voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation
Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director
General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he had
to disapprove Micosa's application for separation because of
IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like
him possess.
On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however,
in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of
(a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus
the total absence of any aggravating circumstance.
Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence
under the Probation Law.
On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote
Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed,
making him a regular core employee whose appointment was
for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated
except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent
provisions of the Philippine Labor Code."
On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development
Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from
employment in view of his conviction in the case for
homicide.
On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No.
II wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office found
Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was
evaluated "to possess desirable social antecedents in his
life."
On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no
intention of resigning from his job at IRRI.
On April 22, 1990, J.K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter
insisting that the crime for which he was convicted involves
moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged
LEGAL ETHICS
of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's

Personnel Manual.
On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the
slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987 arose out of
his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that
his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he
opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of
the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to
him.
On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's
Grievance Committee who recommended to the Director
General, his continued employment. However, on May 21,
1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's
employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990.
On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena
rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal
and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the
date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The
dispositive portion of the same is hereunder quoted:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are
hereby entered:
1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal;
2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute
to reinstate complainant Nestor B. Micosa to his former
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appurtenant thereto immediately upon receipt hereof;
to pay complainant Nestor B. Micosa his full backwages
computed from the date of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up
to actual reinstatement based on his latest salary rate of
P4,068.00 per month.
to pay complainant's counsel the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos P5,000.00, representing his attorney's fees; and
5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Page 90 of 115
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was

basically in agreement with the findings and conclusions of
the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31,
1991, it affirmed the appealed decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with
modification deleting the award of attorney's fees.
"SO ORDERED."
Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the
following issues:
1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY
OTHER CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF THE SAME IS NOT AMONG
THOSE ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE.
2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
"THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE
PERSONNEL MANUAL IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON
THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE
CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE.
The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of
the crime of homicide, which is a crime involving moral
turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the
Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy
Regulations.
In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue
rules and regulations including those concerning employee
discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid
personnel manual, petitioner justifies its action as a
legitimate act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa's
interests -- in his employment and means of livelihood -- are
adversely affected; that a convict should not be
LEGAL ETHICS
discriminated against in society and that he should be given

the same opportunities as those granted to other fellow
citizens but claims that at times, one's right is deemed
superior than that of another. In this case, petitioner believes
that it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or
standard not only to forestall any internal problem hampering
operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility
that said problems could occur considering that it is an
international organization with concomitant obligation to the
host country to avoid creating disturbance or give occasion
for such disturbance..
It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an
appointment with an assurance from the IRRI's Director
General that as regular core employee he "may not be
terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the
pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code. Thus, IRRI
could not remove him from his job if there existed no
justifiable cause as defined by the Labor Code.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes
wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Verily,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of
these justifiable causes. Neither may said ground be justified
under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or
willful breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative under
Article 282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of
the employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him
absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
by his position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust
must be related to the performance of the employee's
function. On the other hand, the commission of a crime by
the employee under Article 282 (d) refers to an offense
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative.
Analogous causes must have an element similar to those
Page 91 of 115
found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article

282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its
relation to his work or to his employer.
In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide
was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been
committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a
non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for
homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no
relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or
committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.
Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa
would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of its
employees, its reputation and standing in the community and
its special obligations to its host country. It did not present
evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill
without provocation or that he posed a clear and present
danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary,
the records reveal that Micosa's service record is
unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that he was
involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on
that fateful night of February 6, 1987. In fact, even after his
conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his
confidence in him when he disapproved his application for
special separation in a letter dated January 8, 1990 and when
he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to the
status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate
increases in benefits in a letter dated February 8, 1990.
Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying
that they were mere pro-forma communications which it had
given to numerous other workers. But whether or not such
letters were "form letters," they expressed the message that
were meant to be conveyed, i.e., that Micosa is fit for
continued employment. In addition, the employees at IRRI's
Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of
Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his
LEGAL ETHICS
conviction showing that the very employees which IRRI

sought to protect did not believe that they were placing their
very own lives in danger with Micosa's retention.
Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found
guilty as charged, was also found worthy of probation. This
means that all the information regarding his character,
antecedents, environment, as well as his mental and physical
condition were evaluated as required under Section 8 of the
Probation Law and it was found that there existed no undue
risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period
of probation and that his being placed on probation would be
to the benefit of society as a whole.
In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted
on Micosa's termination. Certainly, said termination cannot
be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual basis
as well.
Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the
dismissal of Micosa on the ground of his conviction for
homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions
of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI
simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not
subscribe to this view.
Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing citing In Re
Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic] as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals.
As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme
Court to determine. Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI
that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime
which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from
Page 92 of 115
an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so

classified as involving moral turpitude.
IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa
involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is
conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not
merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the
victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.
IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their
totality. The facts on record show that Micosa was then
urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his
fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the
victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife
from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at
the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that
Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to
defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and
intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide
do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. While xxx generally but
not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while
crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying
a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there
LEGAL ETHICS
are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore,
that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite
term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of
discretion by the National Labor Relations Commission in
affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa
was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the
very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil and common traditions. The abuse of
discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Page 93 of 115
LEGAL ETHICS
515 Phil. 635

EN BANC
A.C. NO. 6792, January 25, 2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MANUEL
DIZON, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit [1] for the disbarment of
Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the
Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction
of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together
with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; [2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. [3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to
the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004,
informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte
hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. [4] After that
hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the
case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. [5]
Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,
which he did on July 27, 2004. [6] Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa
rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent
Page 94 of 115
had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for
frustrated homicide, [7] which involved moral turpitude,
should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent's conviction were
summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and
was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his
trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street,
a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not
knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not
just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the
Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets.
The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and
held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver
forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been
drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the
accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car
to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood
up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist
blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The
accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about
to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned
his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until
he could be pacified and then released him. The accused
went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver
was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up
intending to return them to the accused. But as he was
handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting
him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the
latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated
LEGAL ETHICS
that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto

Soriano." [8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to
the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital.
Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the
left side of his neck, [9] complainant would have surely died of
hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance,
according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,
Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused
paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his
job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29,
2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application
for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities
imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party,
Roberto Soriano." [10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty.
Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular
undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals. [11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been
convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an
obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following
facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault
Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had
overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted
Page 95 of 115
assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped

the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who
was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed
him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming
evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he
claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two
unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent
has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant." [12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final
action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of
Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction
for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of
justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character. [13] In the instant case, respondent has been found
guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been
established and is no longer open to question, the only issues
that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his
crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)
whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
LEGAL ETHICS
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social

duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals." [14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, [15] a labor case concerning
an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
Court rejected the employer's contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it
did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRI's
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the
attendant circumstances, the employer made a
pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not
for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. x x x." [16] (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not
involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence
of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision,
the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI
employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when
the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim
then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that
Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that
he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
Page 96 of 115
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on

Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times.
These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the
victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his
favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or
unjust." [17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly
found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude
of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and
shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of
aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the
fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant.
Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions
clearly intended to fend off the lawyer's assault.
We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a
further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He
shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to
defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault
was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely
returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not
to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of
moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were,
he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His
overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was
definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
LEGAL ETHICS
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant,

we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert
a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
firearm [18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.
[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the
lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his
attorney's oath [20] and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the
land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is
wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his
sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been
four years [21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities
to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in
refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity
and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple
traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity,
good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon
begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never
even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate,
not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly
to their good moral character. [22] Where their misconduct
outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show
them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law,
the court may be justified in suspending or removing them
from that office. [23]
We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent displayed an
utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law.
Page 97 of 115
Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed

dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial
court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainant's family.
[25]
But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant's
family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his
referral to a neurosurgeon. [26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to
fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled
by complainant and two other persons. [27] The trial court had
this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three
(3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his
allegation that three people including the complainant helped
each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he
sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were
bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On
the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant's version of
the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the
accused on the chest. x x x." [28]
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for
bar membership is more important than truthfulness. [29] The
rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Hence,
lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by
any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in
good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public
perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral
turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble
profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must
at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
LEGAL ETHICS
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach." [31]
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the
depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function be competent, honorable and reliable
-- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
[32]
Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall
not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and that disbarment should never be
decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot
extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so
despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society
and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser
penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for
the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining
exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein
respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide,
the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their
conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in
the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a
Page 98 of 115
member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby
DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
Page 99 of 115
550 Phil. 543

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. ALBERTO MINA,
HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law,
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the
Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil
Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 001705;[1] and the RTC's Order dated June 5, 2002 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner)
filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v.
Judge Cruz, Jr.[2] that a non-lawyer may appear before the
LEGAL ETHICS
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The

petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with
the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in
the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC
denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should
take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.[3]
Page 100 of 115
de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that

therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not
legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly
provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant,
even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a

Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the
Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to
interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is
the Supreme Court alone.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for

Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with
the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial
Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No.
730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June
10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the
outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the

Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC

denied the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration
and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground
that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance
of petitioner before the MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to

restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari
proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002,
resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the
ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this

Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion
when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of
injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having
established the necessity of granting the writ;
LEGAL ETHICS
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON
THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT,
FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE
OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE
ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE
LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic]
THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC'S).[4]
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling
reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.[5]
Considering that this case involves the interpretation,
clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19
governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan,
the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law
Page 101 of 115
student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent

or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule
as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his
appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant
in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney
duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of
the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution[6] dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter
No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior
courts, a law student may appear in his personal
LEGAL ETHICS
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section

34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court
of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.[7] (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar
Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of
a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule
138, thus:[8]
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court
of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally
or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed
his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25,
2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5
of the Rules of Court, the term Municipal Trial Court as
used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section
34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a
party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
Page 102 of 115
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an

agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the
courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section
34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused
by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not
have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission
to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the
simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the
petitioner's appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified
in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held
that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the
crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion
had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of
the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that
there was no claim for civil liability by the private
complainant for damages, and that the records of the case
do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that
therefore, petitioner's appearance as private prosecutor
appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense,
LEGAL ETHICS
such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an

enemy country, and crime against popular representation.
[9]
The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.[10]
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no
reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect
in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil
aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted
with the criminal action, and, hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil
aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is
DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private
prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the
public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 103 of 115
LEGAL ETHICS
174 Phil. 55
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1928, August 03, 1978
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY
OF ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the
Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution, notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano
B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following

June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it
shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
Page 104 of 115
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary

of the Chapter concerned."
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the
IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment; on March
24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After
the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's
pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the
Court Rule)[1] in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to
the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name
from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2, Section 24, Article III
of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to
issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court
Rule, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. -- Subject to the

provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
LEGAL ETHICS
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the

IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
"SECTION 1. Organization. -- There is hereby organized an

official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear
or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court."
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
following words of the Court Rule:
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated

Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that
as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP
By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court
to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that
the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court
relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably
come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to
Page 105 of 115
regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such

practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the
legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised
in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative
Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners."
The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case
in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
".... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study

of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained
in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable' ...."
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the
Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to
do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of
a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
LEGAL ETHICS
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment

of the offending member.[2]
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to
such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies
the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal
interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.[3]
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation
directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested
right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an
officer of the court.[4] The practice of law being clothed with
public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a
degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. As the U.S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public
interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 [5]
authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court
in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
Page 106 of 115
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of

pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for,
as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supremo lex." The
public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle
of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty
is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from
all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines
is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and

procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar xxx",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
LEGAL ETHICS
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively."
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without
the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to
the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require hini to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already
fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court
is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right
of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.[6]
Page 107 of 115
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of

which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.[7] All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.[8]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the
lawyers.[9]
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion
is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. [10]
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership
fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) - which power the respondent acknowledges - from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives
and purposes of integration.[11]
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the
penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property
right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
LEGAL ETHICS
license to practise a profession, we do not here pause to

consider at length, as it is clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court
to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
[12]
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a

property right but a mere privilege, [13] and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion.[14]
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the
report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power
to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not
depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court - appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the
argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less
real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where,
as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public
Page 108 of 115
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is

itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
prostituted..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . .
." (Article X, Sec. 5(5)) The power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court
139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense
of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as
he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
LEGAL ETHICS
497 Phil. 535

EN BANC
B.M. NO. 1370, May 09, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil
Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in
the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP
dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of
one's profession while in government service, and neither
can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the
USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment [3]
stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on
the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be
included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be
a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member
is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Page 109 of 115
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court

as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules
of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP
members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of
an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP
Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is
but an implementation of the Court's directives for all
members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of
integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted
that what petitioner could have done was to inform the
secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus,
his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also
alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for
its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors
and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from
payment of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends
that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not
they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He
asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment
of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due
process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of
the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be
oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive
status and is without income derived from his law practice.
He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual
membership dues would constitute deprivation of property
right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that nonpractice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is
neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers
in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive
LEGAL ETHICS
lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled
to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that
he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in
the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad
from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the
Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
Page 110 of 115
subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme

Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits
the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar [8] - which
power required members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, [9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members
does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for
regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to
put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily
carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the
privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience
to a member resulting from his required payment of the
annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
LEGAL ETHICS
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues

subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice,
the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption
from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of
the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he
left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the
IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the
situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty
of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without
due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty.
Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court
to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
Page 111 of 115
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a

property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, [11] one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from
payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership
fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period
of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning
that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the
practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
LEGAL ETHICS
379 Phil. 569

SECOND DIVISION
A.C No. 4749, January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, RESPONDENT.
Page 112 of 115
10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual

dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment
of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997,
complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of
the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your
attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has
not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data
(date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for
at least three years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996
and 1997: (originals available)
Anne - "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated
xA
December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC
Anne - "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated
xB
November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC
Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Anne - "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of
xC
Time to File Required Comment and Opposition"
dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil
Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138,
Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted
member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and

appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports
to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for
payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28,
suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the
Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing
some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per
Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 ( in SCRA )
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision
dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated
February 14, 1995 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the
Court of Appeals).
LEGAL ETHICS
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated

December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17,
1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end
thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above
his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal
259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction,
in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated
March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to
cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on
the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after
which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his commentmemorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim
that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No.
259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an
admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned
was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the
October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and
the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article
316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
Page 113 of 115
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal

decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was
even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in
Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed
the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside
and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege
to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that
respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per
his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only
a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return,
his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30
hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at
Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being
a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in
the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues
with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In
fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to
vote and be voted upon.
LEGAL ETHICS
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered

by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to
fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as
again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for
vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay
such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food
faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed
a resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which
found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and
until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the
IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant
to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is
here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering
respondents suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as
follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents
non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in
his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060
for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24,
1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud
Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991."
categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and

cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes
as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the
present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in
the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned
since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax
Return up to the present time that he had only a limited
practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly
dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent
has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in
his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has
engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBPRizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting
that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt
number for the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited"
practice and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
While these allegations are neither denied nor
Page 114 of 115
LEGAL ETHICS
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the

Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set
aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members
thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can
engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and
it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is
true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings
and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter,
respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Page 115 of 115
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the
law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from
the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

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LEGAL ETHICS

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

278 Phil. 235

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the

public accountability and the party-list system for the House of

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

520 Phil. 538

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio

violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article 116[12] of the Labor

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist

that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. [31]

Respondent insists that complainant's evidence failed to prove

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court

connection or previous employment.[49] In essence, what a

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

484 Phil. 173

Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that

In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A.

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

This provision means that in a litigation, parties may

emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly,

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

565 Phil. 165

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

good moral character and that no charges against him,

to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

451 Phil. 428

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess

Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented

[INTRODUCTION . . . REQUIREMENTS . . . (PAGE 2-3 syllabus)]

assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001