1)

X Construction Corporation entered into a joint venture with Y Parking Authority for the
construction of a 4,500 square meters parking lot beside the Clark International Airport
for the amount of P60 million pesos. Jose, Executive Director of X sent a letter request
to Y stating that they want to take the extra work for the reclamation project for P35
million. The General Manager of Y replied in writing instructing X to enter to and execute
and agreement for the extended work and to submit the necessary documents and
credit line. Subsequently, the Board of Y disapproved the reclamation project.
X filed with RTC for specific performance contending that the General Manager of Y
approved the reclamation project and that he has the authority to enter into a contract.
Is the contention of X tenable?
Answer:
No. Under Art 1881 of the Civil Code. The agent must act within the scope of his
authority to bind his principal. So long as the agent has authority, express, or implied,
the principal is bound by the acts of the agent on his behalf, whether or not a third
person dealing with the agent believes that the agent has actual authority. Thus, all
signatories in a contract should be clothed with authority to bind the parties they
represent.
(Sargasso Construction vs PPA)

2)
What is the prescriptive period for action of reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust and what is the reckoning period?
Answer:
Action for reconveyance based on implied or reconstructive trust prescribed in 10 years
reckoning from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer
certificate of title.
(Spouses Bejoc vs CA)
3)
X made a bid for the installation of plumbing works in a government building. He was

required to put up the required performance bond after his bid was accepted. X neither
put up the bond nor begun the plumbing works.
In the case filed against him, he proferred that since he did not put up the required
bond, it follows that there was no contract as the condition was not fulfilled. Is X liable
for damages?
(Valencia vs. RFC, 103 Phil. 444)
Yes, X is liable. Whoever is guilty of fraud or bad faith in the performance of obligation
shall be liable for damages. Likewise, any person who wilfully causes damage to
another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall be liable
for damages
4)
Spouses XY obtained a loan for 25 million pesos from B bank. B bank grant the loan
being apllied for provided that it shall be secured by a mortgage. Thus, spouses XY
executed a mortgage contract over their 5 parcels of land located in Quezon City. After a
year, the spouses were able to pay 7 million pesos and asked for the discharge of 2 out
of 5 parcels of land mortgage since they were able to pay 7 million pesos already which
is the amount of the 2 parcels of land they are asking to be discharge. Is the spouses
XY's contention correct?
Ans. No. (indivisibility of mortgage) a mortgage constituted by the debtor on two or more
parcels of land is one and indivisible. The mortgage cannot be divided among different
mortgaged lots( Villar vs. Paderanga). In other words, each parcel of land answers for
the totality of indebtedness.
5)
Apolonio inherited a parcel of land from his parents, Valentin and Dominga Santos.
When Apolonio died, the land was given to his wife, Leonor, and daughter, Juliana, his
only surviving heirs. After Leonors death, her share in the land also went to Juliana.
Fifteen years later, Juliana died intestate without any issue. The land went to Lorna,
Julianas maternal aunt, who adjudicated unto herself the land as the sole surviving heir
of Leonor and Juliana. Upon Lornas death, the grandchildren of Valentin and Dominga
Santos claim that the land should revert to them, in view of its reservable character. Is
the claim of the grandchildren correct?
Answer:
No, the claim of the grandchildren is not correct. The land is not a reservable property
because there is no reserva troncal in this case.

For reserva troncal to exist, the subject property must have been acquired by operation
of law by an ascendant from his descendant, who previously acquired that property from
another ascendant, brother or sister, by gratuitous title. Here, the land was acquired by
Lorna from Juliana, who in turn acquired the land from her father and mother. However,
Lorna is not an ascendant of Juliana. Hence, she cannot be considered a reservista,
who has an obligation to reserve the land for the third degree relatives of Juliana and
who belong to the line from which the property came. Moreover, assuming, ex gratia
agrumenti, that there is reserva troncal in this case, the grandchildren of Valentin and
Dominga Santos are not the third degree relatives of Juliana. They are the first cousins
of Juliana and therefore are her fourth degree relatives. Being fourth degree relatives of
Juliana, they are not entitled to the subject property as reservatarios. (Mendoza vs. De
los Santos, GR 176422, 20 March 2013)

6)
The lease contract of a property has expired and the lessee refuses to leave despite
demands from the owner. While the lessee is possession of property, the owner
entered into possession thereof and claims that the action is justified by the doctrine of
self-help. Can the doctrine of self-help be invoked by the owner?
A:No, because the doctrine finds no application when occupation was effected through
lawful means such as in this case where lessees possession is through a lease
agreement. The lessees continued unauthorized occupation of the property may have
been illegal but it was incumbent upon the owner to abide by the express provision of
Article 536 of the Civil Code requiring recourse to the proper court prior to ousting the
lessee from the property. (Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134239, May 26,
2005)

7)
X promised to donate a property to Y. Y constructed his house on the property before
the donation was made. If the property was not donated to him, can Y be considered a
possessor in good faith to entitle him to reimbursement for the value of the
improvements?
Answer:
The mere promise to donate the property does not convert Y into a builder in good faith
for at the time the improvement was built, such promise was not yet fulfilled. At best, it

was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not materialize making Y a mere
possessor by tolerance. A person whose occupation is by mere tolerance of the owners
are not possessors in good faith. Y is not entitled to the value of the improvements build
on Xs property. (Verona Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134329, January
19, 2000)

8)
A and her late husband B had two children, R and P. One summer, her mother-in-law,
aged 70, took the two children, then aged 10 and 12, with her on a boat trip to Cebu.
Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the three were never found.
None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her mother-inlaw's estate, A files a claim for a share of her estate on the ground that the same was
inherited by her children from their grandmother in representation of their father, and she
inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper?
ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the
three are deemed to have died at the same time and there was no transmission of rights
from one to another, applying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Under Article 43 of the New Civil Code, inasmuch as
there is no proof as to who died first, all the three are presumed to have died at the
same time and there could be no transmission of rights among them. Her children not
having inherited from their grandmother. Cristy has no right to share in her mother-inlaw's estate. She cannot share in her own right as she is not a legal heir of her motherin-law. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to
the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue involved is not succession.
9)
Felipe and Felisa, both Filipino citizens, were married in Malolos, Bulacan on June 1,
1950. In 1960 Felipe went to the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1975. In 1980
they obtained a divorce from Felisa, who was duly notified of the proceedings. The
divorce decree became final under California Law. Coming back to the Philippines in
1982, Felipe married Sagundina, a Filipino Citizen. In 2001, Filipe, then domiciled in Los
Angeles, California, died, leaving one child by Felisa, and another one by Sagundina.
He left a will which he left his estate to Sagundina and his two children and nothing to
Felisa.
Sagundina files a petition for the probate of Felipes will. Felisa questions the intrinsic

validity of the will, arguing that her marriage to Felipe subsisted despite the divorce
obtained by Felipe because said divorce is not recognized in the Philippines. For this
reason, she claims that the properties and that Sagundina has no successional rights.
A. Is the divorce secured by Felipe in California recognizable and valid in the
Philippines? How does it affect Felipes marriage to Felisa? Explain. (2%).
B. What law governs the formalities of the will? Explain. (1%)
C. Will Philippine law govern the intrinsic validity of the will? Explain. (2%)
ANSWER:
A.
(1.) The divorce secured by Felipe in California is recognizable and valid in the
Philippines because he was no longer a Filipino at that time he secured it, Aliens may
obtain divorces abroad which may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they
are valid according to their national law (Van Dorn V. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985];
Quita v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998]; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345
SCRA 595 [2000] ).
(2). With respect to Felipe the divorce is valid, but with respect to Felisa it is not. The
divorce will not capacitate Felisa to remarry because she and Felipe were both Filipinos
at the time of their marriage. However, in DOJ Opinion No. 134 series of 1993, Felisa is
allowed to remarry because the injustice sought to be corrected by Article 26 also
obtains in her case.
ANSWER:
B. The foreigner who executes his will in the Philippines may observed the formalities
described in:
1. The Law of the country of which he is a citizen under Article 817 of the New Civil
Code, or
2. the law of the Philippines being the law of the place of execution under Article 17 of
the New Civil Code.
ANSWER:
C. Philippine law will not govern the intrinsic validity of the will. Article 16 of the New
Civil Code provides that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by
the National Law of the person whose succession is under consideration. California law
will govern the intrinsic validity of the will.

10)
Hans Berber, a German national, and his Filipino wife, Rhoda, are permanent residents

of Canada. They desire so much to adopt Magno, an 8-year old orphaned boy and a
baptismal godson of Rhoda. Since the accidental death of Magno's parents in 2004, he
has been staying with his aunt who, however, could hardly afford to feed her own family.
Unfortunately, Hans and Rhoda cannot come to the Philippines to adopt Magno
although they possess all the qualifications as adoptive parents.
Is there a possibility for them to adopt Magno? How should they go about it? (5%)
ANSWER:
Yes, it is possible for Hans and Rhoda to adopt Magno. Republic Act No. 8043 or the
Inter-Country Adoption Act, allows aliens or Filipinos permanently residing abroad to
apply for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child. The law however requires that only
legally free child, or one who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
DSWD or any of its accredited agencies, may be subject of inter- country adoption. The
law further requires that aside from possessing all the qualifications, the adoptive
parents must come from a country where the Philippines has diplomatic relations and
that the government maintains a similarly accredited agency and that adoption is
allowed under the national law of the alien. Moreover, it must be further shown that all
possibilities for a domestic adoption have been exhausted and the inter-country
adoption is best for the interest of the child.
Hans and Rhoda have to file an application to adopt Magno, either with the Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over Magno or with the Inter-Country Adoption Board in
Canada. Hans and Rhoda will then undergo a trial custody for six (6) months from the
time of placement. It is only after the lapse of the trial custody that the decree of
adoption can be issued.

11)
Flor and Virgillo were married to each other in Roxas City in 198O. In 1984, Flor was
offered a teaching Job in Canada, which she accepted. In 1989, she applied for and was
granted Canadian citizenship. The following year, she sued for divorce from Virgilio in a
Canadian court. After Virgilio was served with summons, the Canadian court tried the
case and decreed the divorce. Shortly thereafter, Flor married a Canadian.
Can Virgilio marry again in the Philippines? Explain.
ANSWER:
Yes. Virgilio can remarry but he must first institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage capacitating him to remarry. Such
remarriage is not automatic.

12)
Two (2) months after the death of her husband who was shot by unknown criminal
elements on his way home from office, M married her childhood boyfriend, and seven
(7) months after said marriage, she delivered a baby. In the absence of any evidence
from M as to who is her child's father, what status does the law give to said child?
Explain.
ANSWER:
The child is legitimate of the second marriage under Article 168(2) of the Family Code
which provides that a "child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration
of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the
former marriage.

13)
A is the acknowledged natural child of B who died when A was already 22 years old.
When B's full blood brother, C, died he (C) was survived by his widow and four children
of his other brother D. Claiming that he is entitled to inherit from his father's brother C. A
brought suit to obtain his share in the estate of C.
Will his action prosper?
ANSWER:
No, the action of A will not prosper. On the premise that B, C and D are legitimate
brothers, as an illegitimate child of B, A cannot inherit in intestacy from C who is a
legitimate brother of B. Only the wife of C in her own right and the legitimate relatives of
C (i.e. the children of D as C's legitimate nephews inheriting as collateral relatives) can
inherit in intestacy. (Arts. 992, 1001, 1OO5 and 975, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action of A will not prosper. Being an illegitimate, he is barred by Article 992 of the
Civil Code from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of his father.

14)
A entered into a contract with B for the supply of electrical lighting equipment. When the
obligation became due, A was unable to pay but was able to convince C, a third party, to
pay for its obligations. B agreed to such but reserved its right to seek payment from A in
the event that C is not able to fully pay. Was the obligation of A completely

extinguished?
ANSWER:
No, the obligation of A to pay B was not completely extinguished by novation and B can
still demand payment from A. In this case, there was no novation that resulted in the
extinguishment of the obligation of A. The mere substitution of debtors will not result in
novation, and the fact that the creditor accepts payment from a third person, who has
assumed the obligation, will merely result in the addition of debtors and not novation.
(S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada, 705 SCRA 584)

15)
A and B (husband and wife) entered into a loan agreement with CBC Bank. The loan
agreement provided that the interest rate of the loan would be based on the prevailing
market rates. The agreement also contained an escalation clause, which gave CBC
Bank the authority to increase the interest rate of the loan. Is the escalation clause
valid?

ANSWER:
No, the escalation clause contained in the loan agreement is void. Article 1308 of the
Civil Code provides that a contract must bind both parties and its validity or compliance
cannot be left to the will of just one party. Any contract that appears to be heavily
weighed in favor of one party so as to lead to an unconscionable result is void. In this
case, the escalation clause which grants CBC Bank an unbridled right to adjust the
interest rate independently and upwardly is void since it negates the element of
mutuality in contracts and is not based on the essential equality of the parties to a
contract. (Juico v. China Banking Corporation, 695 SCRA 520)

16)
At age 18, Marian found out that she was pregnant. She insured her own life and named
her unborn child as her sole beneficiary. When she was already due to give birth, she
and her boyfriend Pietro, the
father of her unborn child, were kidnapped in a resort in Bataan where they were
vacationing. The military gave chase and after one week, they were found in an
abandoned hut in Cavite. Marian and Pietro were hacked with bolos. Marian and the
baby delivered were both found dead, with the baby's umbilical cord already cut. Pietro
survived.

Can Marian's baby be the beneficiary of the insurance taken on the life of the mother?
ANSWER:
Yes, the baby can be the beneficiary of the life insurance of Marian. Art. 40 NCC
provides that "birth determines
personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided that it be born later with the conditions specified in Art. 41.
Article 41 states that "for civil purposes, the fetus shall be considered born if it is alive at
the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twentyfour (24) hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. The act of naming
the unborn child as sole beneficiary in the insurance is favorable to the conceived child
and therefore the fetus acquires presumptive or provisional personality. However, said
presumptive personality only becomes conclusive if the child is born alive. The child
need not survive for twenty-four (24) hours as required under Art. 41 of the Code
because "Marian was already due to give birth," indicating that the child was more than
seven months old.

17)
The Ifugao Arms is a condominium project in Baguio City. A strong earthquake occurred
which left huge cracks in the outer walls of the building. As a result, a number of
condominium units were rendered unfit for use. May Edwin, owner of one of the
condominium units affected, legally sue for partition by sale of the whole project?
Explain.
ANSWER:
Yes, Edwin may legally sue for partition by sale of the whole condominium project under
the following conditions: (a) the damage or destruction caused by the earthquake has
rendered one-half (1/2) or more of the units therein untenantable, and (b) that the
condominium owners holding an aggregate of more than thirty percent (30%) interests
of the common areas are opposed to the restoration of the condominium project (Sec 8
[b], Republic Act No. 472 Condominium Act).

18)
In the early afternoon of 28 June 1991, a barge owned by LS corporation is being towed
down by 2 tugboats, "Drogon" and "Viserion" belonging to the same corporation. The

barge ramned against one of the wooden panels of Nagtahan bridge, smashing the
posts and causing the bridge to list.
The river at that time was swollen and its current swift on account of the heavy
downpour in Manila in the past two days.
When LS corporation was sued by the government, it disclaimed liability on the grounds
that the damage to the bridge was due to force majeure and that the Nagtahan bridge is
an obstruction to navigation. Is LS corporation's contention correct?
(Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring, L-21749, September 29,1967)
No, the contention is bereft of merit. Force majeure is any unforeseen event or which
though foreseen is inevitable. To be exempt from liability by reason of fortuitous event or
force majeure, it must be independent of the will of man. Likewise, the defendant must
be free from any participation or aggravation on his part which is not in the instant case.

19)
Segundo Dy died, survived by his wife and five children. During his lifetime, Segundo
executed a document entitled Kasulatan sa Pag-aalis ng Mana, which was entirely
written, dated and signed by Segundo, disinheriting one of his children, Segismundo, for
cause. In said document, Segundo explained that Segismundo spoke hurtful words to
him in the presence of his other children; that Segismundo borrowed millions of money
from a bank using Segundos name without paying the loan thereby bringing great
shame to the family; and that Segismundo pirated the customers of the family business
when he opened his own business. Upon the death of Segundo, Selena, his eldest
daughter, filed a petition for the probate of the document entitled Kasulatan sa Pagaalis ng Mana. Segismundo moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo Dy does not
contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the
definition of a will; that all the other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy; and
that in any case, the cause for his disinheritance is not allowed by law.
a) Should the petition for probate be dismissed?
b) Is there a preterition in this case?
c) Is the cause for Segismundo's inheritamce allowed by law?
Answer:

a)
No, the probate proceedings should not be dismissed.
The subject document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It was
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of Segundos property, the disinheritance of
Segismundo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Segismundo. The document was Segundos last
testamentary act. Unless such is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
(Seangio vs. Reyes, GR 140371-72, 27 November 2006)
b)
There cannot be preterition in this case. Segundo did not institute an heir, to the
exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The will only contains the disinheritance of
Segismundo, thereby showing an intention of the testator to bequeath his estate to all
his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Segismundo. (Seangio vs. Reyes, GR
140371-72, 27 November 2006)
c)
The disinheritance of Segismundo is based on a valid cause under Article 919 of the
Civil Code. The reasons stated by Segundo in his will for disinheriting Segismundo,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Segismundo, which is a valid cause for the disinheritance of a child. (Seangio vs.
Reyes, GR 140371-72, 27 November 2006)

20)
In the certification- of- no- marriage license of the local civil registrar, he omitted to put
the phrase stating that he exerted earnest efforts in searching for the marriage license.
The spouse nevertheless failed to show proof of the existence of the marriage license.
a.) Is the omission in the certification enough to conclude that no diligent effort was
made?
ANSWER:
NO, without proof of non-diligence, the presumption of regularity of official actions will
be maintained. Hence the local civil registrar may be presumed to have made the

diligent search.
b.) Can the marriage be voided in the absence of any showing by other credible proof
that the marriage license existed?
ANSWER:
YES , despite the presumption or regularity, if there are no convincing proofs that there
was indeed a marriage license, a marriage can still be voided on the ground of
absence of a marriage license. (Abbas vs. Abbas, GR No. 183896, January 30, 2012)

21)
Nene asked Juan to handle her civil case for recovery of her land in Angono, Rizal
against a well-known property developer on a contingent fee basis. Juan asked for 40%
of the land that may be recovered or 40% of whatever monetary settlement that may be
received from the property developer as his only fee contingent upon securing a
favorable final judgment or compromise settlement. Nene signed the contingent fee
agreement.The case eventually reached the Supreme Court which promulgated a
decision in favor of Nene. This time Nene refused to convey to Juan 40% of the litigated
land as stipulated on the ground that the agreement violates Article 1491 of the Civil
Code which prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase properties and rights which
are the object of litigation in which they take part by reason of their profession.
Is Nenes refusal justified? Explain.
Answer: No, Nenes refusal is not justified.
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase or
assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which
they intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition applies only during the
pendency of the suit and generally does not cover contracts for contingent fees where
the transfer takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment.
In Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek Liong v. Mauricia Meer Castillo, et al. (G.R. No. 176425, June
5, 2013.), a case involving the same situation, the Court held that an agreement which
is executed in exchange for the legal services that a lawyer provides and concerns the
transfer of 40% of the avails of the suit in favor of the latter in the event of a favorable
judgment in a case does not fall within the purview of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code.
22)

Dielle, Karlo and Una are general partners in a merchandising firm. Having contributed
equal amounts to the capital, they also agree on equal distribution of whatever net profit
is realized per fiscal period. After two years of operation, however, Una conveys her
whole interest in the partnership to Justine, without the knowledge and consent of Dielle
and Karlo.
1. Is the partnership dissolved?
2. What are the rights of Justine, if any, should she desire to participate in the
management of the partnership and in the distribution of a net profit of P360.000.00
which was realized after her purchase of Una's interest?
ANSWER:
1. No, a conveyance by a partner of his whole interest in a partnership does not of itself
dissolve the partnership in the absence of an agreement. (Art. 1813. Civil Code)
2. Justine cannot interfere or participate in the management or administration of the
partnership business or affairs. She may, however, receive the net profits to which Una
would have otherwise been entitled. In this case, P120.000 (Art. 1813, Civil Code)

23)
A, upon request, loaned his passenger Jeepney to B to enable B to bring his sick wife
from Paniqui. Tarlac to the Philippine General Hospital in Manila for treatment. On the
way back to Paniqui, after leaving his wife at the hospital, people stopped the passenger
Jeepney. B stopped for them and allowed them to ride on board, accepting payment
from them just as in the case of ordinary passenger Jeepneys plying their route. As B
was crossing Bamban, there was an onrush of Lahar from Mt Pinatubo, the Jeep that
was loaned to him was wrecked.
1) What do you call the contract that was entered into by A and B with respect to the
passenger Jeepney that was loaned by A to B to transport the latter's sick wife to
Manila?
2) Is B obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger jeepney?
3) Is B liable to A for the loss of the Jeepney?
ANSWER:
1) The contract is called "commodatum". [Art. 1933. Civil Code). COMMODATUM is a
contract by which one of the parties (bailor) delivers to another (bailee) something not
consumable so that the latter may use it for a certain time and return it.
2) No, B is not obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger Jeepney because

commodatum is essentially gratuitous. (Art. 1933. Civil Code]

3) Yes, because B devoted the thing to a purpose different from that for which it has
been loaned (Art. 1942, par. 2, Civil Code)

24)
DT and MT were prominent members of the frequent travelers club of FX Airlines. In
Hongkong, the couple were assigned seats in Business Class for which they had bought
tickets. On checking in, however, they were told they were upgraded by computer to
First Class for the flight to Manila because the Business Section was overbooked.
Both refused to transfer despite better seats, food, beverage and other services in First
Class. They said they had guests in Business Class they should attend to. They felt
humiliated, embarrassed and vexed, however, when the stewardess allegedly
threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade. Thus they gave in, but
during the transfer of luggage DT suffered pain in his arm and wrist. After arrival in
Manila, they demanded an apology from FXs management as well as indemnity
payment. When none was forthcoming, they sued the airline for a million pesos in
damages.
Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? Explain briefly.
ANSWER:
FX Airlines committed breach of contract when it upgraded DT and MT, over their
objections, to First Class because they had contracted for Business Class passage.
However, although there is a breach of contract, DT and MT are entitled to actual
damages only for such pecuniary losses suffered by them as a result of such breach.
There seems to be no showing that they incurred such pecuniary loss. There is no
showing that the pain in DT's arm and wrist resulted directly from the carrier's acts
complained of. Hence, they are not entitled to actual damages. Moreover, DT could have
avoided the alleged injury by requesting the airline staff to do the luggage transfer as a
matter of duty on their part. There is also no basis to award moral damages for such
breach of contract because the facts of the problem do not show bad faith or fraud on
the part of the airline. (Cathay Pacific v. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [2003]). However, they
may recover moral damages if the cause of action is based on Article 21 of the Civil
Code for the humiliation and embarrassment they felt when the stewardess threatened
to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If it can be proved that DT's pain in his arm and wrist occasioned by the transfer of

luggage was caused by fault or negligence on the part of the airline's stewardess, actual
damages may be recovered.
The airline may be liable for moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 (10) if the cause of
action is based on Article 21 or an act contrary to morals in view of the humiliation
suffered by DT and MT when they were separated their guests and were threatened to
be offloaded.

25)
Silvestre leased a car from Avis-Rent-A-Car Co. at the Mactan International Airport. No
sooner had he driven the car outside the airport when, due to his negligence, he
bumped an FX taxi owned and driven by Victor, causing damage to the latter in the
amount of P100,000.00. Victor filed an action for damages against both Silvestre and
Avis, based on quasi-delict. Avis filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action. Resolve the motion.
ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted, AVIS is not the employer of Silvestre; hence,
there is no right of action against AVIS under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Not being
the employer, AVIS has no duty to supervise Silvestre. Neither has AVIS the duty to
observe due diligence in the selection of its customers. Besides, it was given in the
problem that the cause of the accident was the negligence of Silvestre.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion should be denied. Under the Public Service Law, the registered owner of a
public utility is liable for the damages suffered by third persons through the use of such
public utility. Hence, the cause of action is based in law, the Public Service Law.

26)
Gigi and Ric, Catholics, got married when they were 18 years old. Their marriage was
solemnized on August 2, 1989 by Ric's uncle, a Baptist Minister, in Calamba, Laguna.
He overlooked the fact that his license to solemnize marriage expired the month before
and that the parties do not belong to his congregation. After 5 years of married life and
blessed with 2 children, the spouses developed irreconcilable differences, so they
parted ways.
While separated, Ric fell in love with Juliet, a 16 year-old sophomore in a local college
and a Seventh-Day Adventist. They decided to get married with the consent of Juliet's
parents. She presented to him a birth certificate showing she is 18 years old. Ric never
doubted her age much less the authenticity of her birth certificate. They got married in a

Catholic church in Manila. A year after, Juliet gave birth to twins, Aissa and Aretha.
(1) What is the status of the marriage between Gigi and Ric valid, voidable or void?
Explain.
ANSWER: Even if the Minister's license expired, the marriage is valid if either or both
Gigi and Ric believed in good faith that he had the legal authority to solemnize marriage.
While the authority of the solemnizing officer is a formal requisite of marriage, and at
least one of the parties must belong to the solemnizing officer's church, the law provides
that the good faith of the parties cures the defect in the lack of authority of the
solemnizing officer (Art. 35 par. 2, Family Code; Sempio-Diy, p. 34; Rabuya, The Law on
Persons and Family Relations, p. 208).
The absence of parental consent despite their having married at the age of 18 is
deemed cured by their continued cohabitation beyond the age of 21. At this point, their
marriage is valid (See Art. 45, Family Code).
(2) What is the status of the marriage between Ric and Juliet valid, voidable or void?
ANSWER: The marriage between Juliet and Ric is void. First of all, the marriage is a
bigamous marriage not falling under Article 41 [Art. 35(4)Family Code], A subsisting
marriage constitutes a legal impediment to re- marriage. Secondly, Juliet is below
eighteen years of age. The marriage is void even if consented to by her parents [Art.
35(1), Family Code]. The fact that Ric was not aware of her real age is immaterial.
(3) Suppose Ric himself procured the falsified birth certificate to persuade Juliet to
marry him despite her minority and assured her that everything is in order. He did not
divulge to her his prior marriage with Gigi. What action, if any, can Juliet take against
him? Explain.
ANSWER: Juliet can file an action for the declaration of nullity of the marriage on the
ground that he willfully caused loss or injury to her in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy [Art. 21, New Civil Code]. She may also bring
criminal actions for seduction, falsification, illegal marriage and bigamy against Ric.
(4) If you were the counsel for Gigi, what action/s will you take to enforce and protect her
interests? Explain.
ANSWER: I would file an action to declare the marriage between Juliet and Ric null and
void ab initio and for Ric's share in the co-ownership of that marriage to be forfeited in
favor and considered part of the absolute community in the marriage between Gigi and

Ric [Arts. 148 & 147, Family Code]. I would also file an action for damages against Ric
on the grounds that his acts constitute an abuse of right and they are contrary to law
and morals, causing damages to Gigi (See Arts 19, 20, 21, New Civil Code).

27)
A Filipino couple, Mr. and Mrs. BM, Jr., decided to adopt YV, an orphan from St. Claires
orphanage in New York City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate child for they
have none of their very own. However, BM, Jr., died in an accident at sea, followed to
the grave a year later by his sick father, BM, Sr. Each left a sizable estate consisting of
bank deposits, lands and buildings in Manila. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from
BM, Jr.? May she also inherit from BM, Sr.? Is there a difference? Why? Explain.
ANSWER:
YV can inherit from BM, Jr. The succession to the estate of BM, Jr. is governed by
Philippine law because he was a Filipino when he died (Article 16, Civil Code). Under
Article 1039 of the Civil Code, the capacity of the heir to succeed is governed by the
national law of the decedent and not by the national law of the heir. Hence, whether or
not YV can inherit from BM, Jr. is determined by Philippine law. Under Philippine law, the
adopted inherits from the adopter as a legitimate child of the adopter.
YV, however, cannot inherit, in his own right, from the father of the adopter, BM, Sr.,
because he is not a legal heir of BM, Sr. The legal fiction of adoption exists only
between the adopted and the adopter. (Teotico v. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 [1965]). Neither
may he inherit from BM, Sr. by representing BM, Jr. because in representation, the
representative must be a legal heir not only of the person he is representing but also of
the decedent from whom the represented was supposed to inherit (Article 973, Civil
Code).

28)
Ana Rivera had a husband, a Filipino citizen like her, who was among the passengers
on board a commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean ten (10) years
earlier and had never been heard of ever since. Believing that her husband had died,
Ana married Adolf Cruz Staedtler, a divorced German national born of a German father
and a Filipino mother residing in Stuttgart. To avoid being required to submit the
required certificate of capacity to marry from the German Embassy in Manila, Adolf
stated in the application for marriage license that he was a Filipino citizen. With the
marriage license stating that Adolf was a Filipino, the couple got married in a ceremony

officiated by the Parish Priest of Calamba, Laguna in a beach in Nasugbu, Batangas, as

the local parish priest refused to solemnize marriages except in his church. Is the
marriage valid? Explain fully.
ANSWER:
No. The marriage is not valid. Art. 41 FC allows the present spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage provided that: (a)
his prior spouse in the first marriage had been absent for four consecutive years; (b)
that the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, and (C) present spouse instituted a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of absent spouse. Otherwise, the second marriage shall be null and
void. In the instant case, the husband of Ana was among the passengers on board a
commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean. The body of the deceased
husband was not recovered to confirm his death. Thus, following Art. 41, Ana should
have first secured a judicial declaration of his presumptive death before she married
Adolf. The absence of the said judicial declaration incapacitated Ana from contracting
her second marriage, making it void ab initio.

29)
Simona Pascual died, survived by her niece, Petronila, and six grandchildren, who are
the illegitimate children of her legitimate son, Anselmo, who predeceased her. Petronila
filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration in her favor relative to the
intestate estate of Simona Pascual. The grandchildren of Simona opposed the petition
and moved for the exclusion of Petronila in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Simona on the ground that the heirs of Simona are her six grandchildren. Should
Petronila be excluded from the intestate estate of Simona?
Answer:
No, Petronila should not be excluded because, in fact, she is the only legal heir of
Simona. The six grandchildren of Simona cannot inherit from her because of the
doctrine of absolute separation between legitimate and illegitimate family. The six
grandchildren were the illegitimate children of Anselmo, who was the legitimate child of
Simona. These grandchildren are barred by law to represent their father in the estate of
their grandmother. (Diaz vs. CA, GR 66574, 21 February 1990)

30)
B was an informal settler on a parcel of land owned by A. A requested B to desist from
building a house of the said land unless he is interested in purchasing the land. B

informed A that he was willing to by the land at a certain price. This offer was rejected
due to the low price offered by B. B again made an offer in a letter on which A made the
following note: an offer has been received/acknowledged but processing to take effect
upon the partial amount of Php 150,000.00 on or before April 15, 1993. Was there a
binding contract between A and B?
ANSWER:
No, there is no perfected contract between the parties. A contract of sale is perfected at
the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price. In this case, the notation on the letter cannot be
considered to be consent to a contract. It is merely an acknowledgement that the letteroffer has been received and is subject to the other partys accepting the said offer
contained in the letter. (Robern Development Corporation v. Peoples Landless
Association, (693 SCRA 24)