G.R. No.

158075

June 30, 2006

PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND

HOTEL), Petitioner,
vs.
MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals, by the assailed decision of November 21, 2002, 1 declared the
strike staged by respondent, Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union (the union),
illegal and its officers to have lost their employment status. It ordered, however, among
other things, the reinstatement and payment of backwages to its members.
On November 11, 1996, the union, which was registered on August 19, 1996 before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),2 filed a Petition for Certification
Election3 before the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) seeking certification as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its members.4
The DOLE-NCR denied the unions petition as it failed to comply with legal
requirements, specifically Section 2, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code, and was seen to fragment the employees of petitioner.5
On June 2, 1997, Francis Mendoza (Mendoza), one of the Hotels outlet cashiers, was
discovered to have failed to remit to the Hotel the amount of P71,692.50 at the end of his
May 31, 1997 duty.6 On being directed to explain such failure, Mendoza claimed that
after accomplishing his daily cash remittance report, the union president Jose Leonardo
B. Kimpo (Kimpo) also an outlet cashier, who signed the same and dropped his
remittances.7
Kimpo, who was thus directed to explain why no administrative sanction should be
imposed on him for violating the standard procedure for remitting cash collections,
informed that he was not aware of any such procedure.
Mendoza was subsequently suspended for one week, it being "the responsibility of the
cashier to personally drop-off his remittances in the presence of a witness." 8 In the
meantime or on July 14, 1997,9 he was re-assigned to the Hotels Cost Control
Department.10
Through its president Kimpo, the union later notified petitioner of its intention to
negotiate, by Notice to Bargain,11a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for its
members.

Acting on the notice, the Hotel, through its Human Resource Development Manager
Mary Anne Mangalindan, advised the union that since it was not certified by the DOLE
as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such.12
The union clarified that it sought to bargain "for its members only," and declared that
"[the Hotels] refusal tobargain [would prompt] the union to engage in concerted
activities to protect and assert its rights under the Labor Code."13
By Notice14 to its members dated September 18, 1997, the union announced that its
executive officers as well as its directors decided to go on strike in view of the
managements refusal to bargain collectively, and thus called for the taking of strike vote.
Petitioner thereupon issued a Final Reminder and Warning 15 to respondent against
continuing misinformation campaign and activities which confused the Hotel employees
and disturbed their work performance.
The union went on to file a Notice of Strike16 on September 29, 1997 with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to unfair labor practice (ULP) in that the
Hotel refused to bargain with it and the rank-and-file employees were being harassed and
prevented from joining it.17
Conciliation conferences were immediately conducted by the NCMB on October 6, 13,
and 20, 1997 during which the union insisted on the adoption of a CBA for its members.18
In the meantime, or on or about November 7, 1997, Kimpo filed before the Arbitration
Branch a complaint for ULP against petitioner.19
More conferences took place between petitioner and the union before the NCMB.
In the conference held on November 20, 1997, the union demanded the holding of a
consent election to which the Hotel interposed no objection, provided the union followed
the procedure under the law. Petitioner then requested that the election be held in January
1998.20
The parties agreed to meet again on December 1, 1997.21
In the early morning of November 29, 1997, however, the union suddenly went on strike.
The following day, the National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the strike and openly extended its support to the
union.22 At about this time, Hotel supervisors Vicente T. Agustin (Agustin) and Rowena
Junio (Rowena) failed to report for work and were, along with another supervisor, Mary
Grace U. de Leon (Mary Grace), seen participating in and supporting the strike.23
Petitioner thus filed on December 1, 1997 a petition for injunction before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to enjoin further commission of illegal acts by the
strikers.24

Mary Grace, who was directed to explain her participation in the strike, alleged that she
was merely trying "to pacify the group."25 Petitioner, finding her explanation "arrogant"
and unsatisfactory as her active participation in the strike was confirmed by an eye
witness, terminated her services, by communication sent on December 9, 1997, drawing
her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.26 Agustin, who was also
terminated, filed a similar complaint against the Hotel.27
An NLRC representative who conducted an ocular inspection of the Hotel premises
confirmed in his Report that the strikers obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the
Hotel.28
By Order of December 8, 1998, the NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) directing the strikers to immediately "cease and desist from obstructing the free
ingress and egress from the Hotel premises."29
The service upon the strikers of the TRO notwithstanding, they refused to dismantle the
tent they put up at the employees entrance to the Hotel, prompting the Hotels security
guards to, on December 10, 1997, dismantle the same during which the strikers as well as
the guards were hit by rocks coming from the direction of the construction site at the
nearby Land Bank Plaza, resulting to physical injuries to some of them.30
Despite the efforts of the NCMB, which was joined by the Department of Tourism, to
conciliate the parties, the same proved futile.
On January 14, 1998, Rowena, whose services were terminated, also filed a complaint
against petitioner for illegal dismissal.
For its part, petitioner filed on January 28, 1998 a petition to declare the strike illegal.
As then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano Trajanos attempts to conciliate the parties failed,
he, acting on the unions Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, issued on April 15, 1998
an order certifying the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and directing the
striking officers and members to return to work within 24 hours and the Hotel to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.31
On petitioners motion for reconsideration, then DOLE Acting Secretary Jose Espaol,
Jr., by Order of April 30, 1998, modified the April 15, 1998 Order of Secretary Trajano by
directing the Hotel to just reinstate the strikers toits payroll, and ordering that all cases
between the parties arising out of the labor disputes which were pending before different
Labor Arbiters be consolidated with the case earlier certified to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.32 It appears that the said order of the Acting Secretary directing the
reinstatement of the strikers to the Hotels payroll was carried out.
By Resolution of November 19, 1999, the NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and
that the union officers andmembers who were reinstated to the Hotels payroll were

deemed to have lost their employment status. And it dismissed the complaints filed by
Mary Grace, Agustin, and Rowena as well as the unions complaint for ULP.33
On appeal by the union, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution dismissing
the complaints of Mary Grace, Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It modified the
NLRC Resolution, however, by ordering thereinstatement with back wages of
union members. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is granted only insofar as the
dismissal of the union members is concerned. Consequently, the ruling of the public
respondent NLRC to the effect that the union members lost their employment status with
the Hotel is hereby reversed and set aside. Private respondent Hotel is hereby ordered
to immediately reinstate the members with backwages from the time they were
terminated. The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, and
therefore affirms the ruling of the NLRC as follows:
(1) that the strike is illegal;
(2) that the union officers lost their employment status when they formed the illegal
strike; and
(3) That the dismissal of Ms. Mary Grace U. de Leon, Vicente C. Agustin and Rowena
Junio is valid.
SO ORDERED.34 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling, the appellate court noted that petitioner failed to establish by convincing and
substantial evidence that the union members who participated in the illegal strike
committed illegal acts, and although petitioner presented photographs of the striking
employees, the strikers who allegedly committed illegal acts were not named or
identified.35
Hence, the present appeal by petitioner faulting the appellate court:
I
IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT AND THE PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES OF
THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS WHOSE EMPLOYMENT STATUS WERE
PREVIOUSLY DECLARED TO HAVE BEEN LOST BY THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS IN EFFECT
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW WHICH
HAS NOT YET BEFORE BEEN DETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT,
[AND]
II

IN [THUS] DEVIAT[ING] FROM ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES LONG SETTLED BY

CONSISTENT JURISPRUDENCE ENUNCIATED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.36 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that:
IT WAS THE NLRC WHICH DECLARED THAT THE UNION OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF
THEIR STRIKE WHICH IT ALSO DECLARED AND FOUND TO BE ILLEGAL.
SUCH BEING THE CASE, IN THE EVENT THE NLRCs DECISION IS NOT
UPHELD AS FAR AS THE UNIONMEMBERS LOSING THEIR EMPLOYMENT IS
CONCERNED, PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE TO PAY THEIR
BACKWAGES.
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NEITHER CAN PETITIONER BE VALIDLY
DIRECTED TO REINSTATE THEM.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents, upon the other hand, pray for the dismissal of the petition, they arguing
that:
A. Respondent [union members] must be reinstated and paid full backwages because their
strike was legal and done in good faith.
B. Even assuming arguendo, that the strike started as an illegal strike, the unions
unconditional offer to return to work, coupled with the hotels unfair labor practices
during the strike, transformed the strike into a legal strike.
C. Even assuming arguendo, that the strike is illegal, the reinstatement of the strikers and
the payment of full backwages is consistent with the ruling in Telefunken Semiconductors
Employees Union-FFW v. Secretary, 283 SCRA 145 which states that the individual
liability of each of the union officers and members determines whether or not strikers
should be reinstated.
D. Even assuming arguendo, that the strike is illegal, Article 264 of the Labor Code
directs thereinstatement of and payment of full backwages to the
respondents.38 (Underscoring supplied)
As did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, this Court finds the strike illegal.
Article 255 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS
PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING

The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in

an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right,
subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making process of the establishment
where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits
and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management
councils:Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor management
councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said establishment.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As the immediately quoted provision declares, only the labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is admittedly not the exclusive
representative of the majority of the employees of petitioner, hence, it could not demand
from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their behalf.
Respondent insists, however, that it could validly bargain in behalf of "its members,"
relying on Article 242 of the Labor Code. 39 Respondents reliance on said article, a
general provision on the rights of legitimate labor organizations, is misplaced, for not
every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned therein. 40Article 242
(a) must be read in relation to above-quoted Article 255.
On respondents contention that it was bargaining in behalf only of its members, the
appellate court, affirming the NLRCs observation that the same would only "fragment
the employees" of petitioner,41 held that "what [respondent] will be achieving is to divide
the employees, more particularly, the rank-and-file employees of [petitioner] . . . the other
workers who are not members are at a serious disadvantage, because if the same shall be
allowed, employees who are non-union members will be economically impaired and will
not be able to negotiate their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the very
essence and reason of collective bargaining, which is an effective safeguard against the
evil schemes of employers in terms and conditions of work." 42 This Court finds the
observation well-taken.
It bears noting that the goal of the DOLE is geered towards "a single employer wide unit
which is more to the broader and greater benefit of the employees working force." 43 The
philosophy is to avoid fragmentation of the bargaining unit so as to strengthen the
employees bargaining power with the management. To veer away from such goal would
be contrary, inimical and repugnant to the objectives of a strong and dynamic unionism.44

Petitioners refusal to bargain then with respondent can not be considered a ULP to
justify the staging of the strike.
The second ground alleged by respondent to justify the staging of the strike that
petitioner prevented or intimidated some workers from joining the union before, during or
after the strike was correctly discredited by the appellate court in this wise:
. . . a careful study of the allegations of petitioners in their petition reveals that it
contained general allegations that the Management of the Hotel committed unfair labor
practices by refusing to bargain with the union and by alleged acts of union interference,
coercion and discrimination tantamount to union-busting. Since it is the union who
alleges that unfair labor practices were committed by the Hotel, the burden of proof is on
the union to prove its allegations by substantial evidence.
Moreover, while petitioner Union continues to accuse the private respondent Hotel of
violating their constitutional right to organize by busting the Union, this Court cannot
overlook the events that transpired prior to the strike that the Union staged on November
29, 1997. It is beyond argument that a conciliatory meeting was still scheduled to be held
on December 1, 1997 before the NCMB. In this conciliatory meeting, petitioner Union
could have substantiated and presented additional evidences. Thus, as held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Tiu vs. National Labor Relations Commission:
"The Court is not unmindful of this rule, but in the case at bar the facts and the evidence
did not establish events [sic] least a rational basis why the union would [wield] a strike
based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate during the
conciliation proceedings. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer
committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a
prima facie [showing to] warrant [such a] belief."
It is also evident from the records of the instant petition, specifically from the Notice of
Strike, that their principal ground for the strike was the "refusal of the Hotel Management
to bargain collectively with the Union for the benefit of the latters members." In the
instant case, it is not disputed that the petitioner UNION is not a certified bargaining unit
to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with private respondent
Hotel . . . 45(Underscoring supplied)
On top of the foregoing observations, this Court notes that respondent violated Article
264 which proscribes the staging of a strike on the ground of ULP during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike.
Further, the photographs taken during the strike, as well as the Ocular Inspection Report
of the NLRC representative, show that the strikers, with the use of ropes and footed
placards, blockaded the driveway to the Hotels points of entrance and exit, 46 making it
burdensome for guests and prospective guests to enter the Hotel, thus violating Article
264 (e) of the Labor Code which provides:

ART. 264 (e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion
or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the photographs indicate that indeed the strikers held noise barrage 47 and
threatened guests with bodily harm.48
Finally, the police reports mention about the strikers exploding of firecrackers, causing
the guests to panic and transfer to other areas of the Hotel.49
It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not
absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution, provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means
employed are illegal. Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or
coercion in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the rights to property
renders a strike illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property
or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when accompanied by intimidation,
threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance.50
As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging
and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor
Code which provides that ". . .[a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost his employment status . . ."
An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union
officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or
committing an illegal act during a strike.51
The appellate court found no convincing and substantial proof, however, that the strikersmembers of respondent who participated in the illegal strike committed illegal acts.
In the present case, private respondent Hotel failed to established [sic] by convincing and
substantial evidence that these union members who participated in the illegal strike
committed illegal acts. Consequently, they cannot be terminated from service for their

participation in an illegal strike. Moreover, private respondent Hotel presented as

evidence photographs of the striking employees, the question that comes to our mind is:
why were these strikers who allegedly participated in illegal acts not identified or named?
Instead the arbitral tribunal found it worthy of credence to summarily dismiss all the
union members without them being named or identified . . . 52
This Court finds otherwise. As reflected above, the photographs show that some of the
workers-strikers who joined the strike indeed committed illegal acts blocking the free
ingress to and egress from the Hotel, holding noise barrage, threatening guests, and the
like. The strikers were, in a list53 attached to petitioners Position Paper54 filed with the
NLRC, named.
The list failed to specifically identify the ones who actually committed illegal acts,
however. Such being the case, a remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter, through the
NLRC, is in order for the purpose only of determining the respective liabilities of the
strikers listed by petitioner. Those proven to have committed illegal acts during the
course of the strike are deemed to have lost their employment, unless they have been
readmitted by the Hotel, whereas those not clearly shown to have committed illegal acts
should be reinstated.
Whether those ordered reinstated are entitled to backwages is, however, another matter.
For the general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in an economic strike on the
principle that "a fair days wage" accrues only for a "fair days labor." 55 Even in cases of
ULP strikes, award of backwages rests on the courts discretion and only in exceptional
instances.56
Thus, J.P. Heilbronn Co. v. National Labor Union,57 instructs:
When in case of strikes, and according to the C[ourt of] I[ndustrial] R[elations] even if
the strike is legal, strikers may not collect their wages during the days they did not go to
work, for the same reasons if not more, laborers who voluntarily absent themselves from
work to attend the hearing of a case in which they seek to prove and establish their
demands against the company, the legality and propriety of which demands is not yet
known, should lose their pay during the period of such absence from work. The age-old
rule governing the relation between labor and capital or management and employee is
that of a "fair days wage for a fair days labor." If there is no work performed by the
employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was able, willing and
ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended. It is hardly fair or
just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employers
time. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This Court must thus hearken to its policy that "when employees voluntarily go on strike,
even if in protest against unfair labor practices," no backwages during the strike is
awarded.

In Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUC) v. Court of Industrial

Relations,58 this Court made a distinction between two types of employees involved in a
ULP: those who are discriminatorily dismissed for union activities, and those who
voluntarily go on strike even if it is in protest of an ULP. Discriminatorily dismissed
employees were ordered entitled to backpay from the date of the act of discrimination,
that is, from the day of their discharge, whereas employees who struck as a voluntary act
of protest against what they considered a ULP of their employer were held generally not
entitled to backpay.59
Jurisprudential law, however, recognizes several exceptions to the "no backwages rule,"
to wit: when the employees were illegally locked to thus compel them to stage a
strike;60 when the employer is guilty of the grossest form of ULP; 61 when the employer
committed discrimination in the rehiring of strikers refusing to readmit those against
whom there were pending criminal cases while admitting nonstrikers who were also
criminally charged in court;62 or when the workers who staged a voluntary ULP strike
offered to return to work unconditionally but the employer refused to reinstate
them.63 Not any of these or analogous instances is, however, present in the instant case.
Respondent urges this Court to apply the exceptional rule enunciated in Philippine
Marine Officers Guild v. Compaia Maritima 64 and similar cases where the employees
unconditionally offered to return to work, it arguing that there was such an offer on its
part to return to work but the Hotel screened the returning strikers and refused to readmit
those whom it found to have perpetrated prohibited acts during the strike.
It must be stressed, however, that for the exception in Philippine Marine Officers
Guild to apply, it is required that the strike must be legal.65
Reinstatement without backwages of striking members of respondent who did not commit
illegal acts would thus suffice under the circumstances of the case. If reinstatement is no
longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike,
the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of
reinstatement, is in order.66
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals is, in
light of the foregoing ratiocinations, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that only
those members of the union who did not commit illegal acts during the course of the
illegal strike should be reinstated but without backwages. The case is, therefore,
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, which is hereby directed to, with
dispatch, identify said members and to thereafter order petitioner to reinstate them,
without backwages or, in the alternative, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, that they
be given separation pay at the rate of One (1) Month pay for every year of service.
G.R. No. 104556 March 19, 1998
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner,
vs.

THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

AND HIJO PLANTATION INC., (HPI),respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor) was chosen the bargaining agent of rankand-file employees of the Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) in Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del
Norte at a certification election held on August 20, 1989. Protests filed by the company
and three other unions against the results of the election were denied by the Department
of Labor and Employment in its resolution dated February 14, 1991 but, on motion of the
company (HPI), the DOLE reconsidered its resolution and ordered another certification
election to be held. The DOLE subsequently denied petitioner NFL's motion for
reconsideration.
The present petition is for certiorari to set aside orders of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment dated August 29, 1991, December 26, 1991 and February 17, 1992, ordering
the holding of a new certification election to be conducted in place of the one held on
August 20, 1989 and, for this purpose, reversing its earlier resolution dated February 14,
1991 dismissing the election protests of private respondent and the unions.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file
employees of the Hijo Plantation, Inc. resulting in the choice of "no union." However, on
July 3, 1989, on allegations that the company intervened in the election, the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations nullified the results of the certification election and
ordered a new one to be held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the supervision of the DOLE
Regional Office in Davao City with the following results:

Total Votes cast

Associated Trade Unions (ATU)
RUST KILUSAN
National Federation of Labor (NFL)

1,012
39
5
876

Southern Philippines Federation of Labor

SANDIGAN

UFW

15

No Union

55

Invalid

13

The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-KILUSAN (TRUST-Kilusan), the United
Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union and the
Hijo Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the results of the certification election on
the ground that it was conducted despite the pendency of the appeals filed by Hijo Labor
Union and ULGWP from the order, dated August 17, 1989, of the Med-Arbiter denying
their motion for intervention. On the other hand, HPI claimed that it was not informed or
properly represented at the pre-election conference. It alleged that, if it was represented at
all in the pre-election conference, its representative acted beyond his authority and
without its knowledge. Private respondent also alleged that the certification election was
marred by massive fraud and irregularities and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913,
representing 54% of the rank-and-file workers of private respondent, were not able to
vote, resulting in a failure of election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio dela Serna directed the MedArbiter, Phibun D. Pura, to investigate the company's claim that 54% of the rank-and-file
workers were not able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the election of
August 20, 1989 because of confusion caused by the announcement of the company that
the election had been postponed in view of the appeals of ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union
(HLU) from the order denying their motions for intervention. In addition, the election
was held on a Sunday which was non-working day in the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the election. It was possible that
some people could have voted for those who did not show up. The election was
conducted in an open and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot had been violated.
Management representatives were not around to identify the workers.

3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the representation officer, did not
tally with the 41-page listings submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit. The list contained
1,008 names which were checked or encircled (indicating that they had voted) and 784
which were not, (indicating that they did not vote), or a total of 1,792. but according to
the representation officer the total votes cast in the election was 1,012.
Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed eleven employees who claimed that they
were not able to vote and who were surprised to know that their names had been checked
to indicate that they had voted.
But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres complaining that it had not been
informed of the investigation conducted by Med-Arbiter Pura and so was not heard on its
evidence. For this reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed by the Labor Secretary to hear
interested parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its petition
for the annulment of the results of the certification election. Hijo Labor Union manifested
that it was joining private respondent HPI's appeal, adopting as its own the documentary
evidence presented by the company, showing fraud in the election of August 20, 1989. On
the other hand, petitioner NFL reiterated its contention that management had no legal
personality to file an appeal because it was not a party to the election but was only a
bystander which did not even extend assistance in the election. Petitioner denied that
private respondent HPI was not represented in the pre-election conference, because the
truth was that a certain Bartolo was present on behalf of the management and he in fact
furnished the DOLE copies of the list of employees, and posted in the company premises
notices of the certification election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the workers voted in the election. It
claimed that out of 1,692 qualified voters, 1,012 actually voted and only 680 failed to cast
their vote. It charged management with resorting to all kinds of manipulation to frustrate
the election and make the "Non Union" win.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the DOLE upheld the August 20, 1989
certification election. With respect to claim that election could not be held in view of the
pendency of the appeals of the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from the order of the
Med-Arbiter denying their motions for intervention, the DOLE said: 1
. . . even before the conduct of the certification election on 12 November 1988 which was
nullified, Hijo Labor Union filed a motion for interventions. The same was however,
denied for being filed unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as one of the
choices in the said election. After it has been so disqualified thru an order which has
become final and executory, ALU filed a second motion for intervention when a second
balloting was ordered conducted. Clearly, said second motion is proforma and intended to
delay the proceedings. Being so, its appeal from the order of denial did not stay the
election and the Med-Arbiter was correct and did not violate any rule when he proceeded

with the election even with the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need not rule on the
motion as it has already been disposed of with finality.
The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP. The latter withdrew as a
party to the election on September 1988 and its motion to withdraw was granted by the
Med-Arbiter on October motion for intervention filed before the conduct of a second
balloting where the choices has already been pre-determined.
Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to participate in the election
through valid orders that have become final and executory even before the first
certification election was conducted. Consequently, they may not be allowed to disrupt
the proceeding through the filing of nuisance motions. Much less are they possessed of
the legal standing to question the results of the second election considering that they are
not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter that the certification election
was marred by massive fraud and irregularities. Although affidavits were submitted
showing that the election was held outside the company premises and private vehicles
were used as makeshift precincts, the DOLE found that this was because respondent
company did not allow the use of its premises for the purpose of holding the election,
company guards were allegedly instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE
representation officers to enter the company premises, and notice was posted on the door
of the company that the election had been postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that a majority of the rank-andfile workers had been disfranchised in the August 20, 1989 election and that the secrecy
of the ballot had been violated, first, because the NFL was not given notice of the
investigation nor the chance to present its evidence to dispute this finding and, second,
the Med Arbiter's report was not supported by the minutes of the proceedings nor by any
record of the interviews of the 315 workers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the report
did not state the names of the persons investigated, the questions asked and the answers
given. The DOLE held that the report was "totally baseless."
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a reiteration of the rule that the
choice of the exclusive bargaining representative is the sole concern of the workers. It
said: "If indeed there were irregularities committed during the election, the contending
unions should have been the first to complain considering that they are the ones which
have interest that should be protected." 2
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to annul the election filed by the
ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU and the HPI and instead certified petitioner NFL as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of private
respondent HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, on August 29, 1991, reversed his
resolution of February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL filed a motion for reconsideration but its

motion was denied in an order, dated December 26, 1991. Petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in another order dated February 17, 1992. Hence,
this petition.
First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the sole concern of the employees
and the employer is a mere bystander. The only instance wherein the employer may
actively participate is when it files a petition for certification election under Art. 258 of
the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain collectively. Petitioner says that this is
not the case here and so the DOLE should not have given due course to private
respondent's petition for annulment of the results of the certification election.
In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he was reversing his
earlier resolution because "workers of Hijo Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with
their letter-appeal, either made singly or collectively expressing their wish to have a new
certification election conducted" and that as a result "the firm position we held regarding
the integrity of the electoral exercise had been somewhat eroded by this recent
declaration of the workers, now speaking in their sovereign capacity."
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in reversing its earlier
rulings was not the petition of the employer but the letter-appeals that the employees sent
to his office denouncing the irregularities committed during the August 20, 1989
certification election. The petition of private respondent was simply the occasion for the
employees to voice their protests against the election. Private respondent HPI attached to
its Supplemental Appeal filed on September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of more or
less 784 employees who claimed that they had been disfranchised, as a result of which
they were not able to cast their votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the protests
of employees which moved the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of February
14, 1991, upholding the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the conduct of the election.
Private respondent is the employer. The manner in which the election was held could
make the difference between industrial strife and industrial harmony in the company.
What an employer is prohibited from doing is to interfere with the conduct of the
certification election for the purpose of influencing its outcome. But certainly an
employer has an abiding interest in seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly
and credible.
Second. The petitioner argues that any protest concerning the election should be
registered and entered into the minutes of the election proceedings before it can be
considered. In addition, the protest should be formalized by filing it within five (5) days.
Petitioner avers that these requirements are condition precedents in the filing of an
appeal. Without these requisites the appeal cannot prosper. It cites the following
provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code:

Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question. The

Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of
the election. The interested party may however, file a protest with the representation
officer before the close of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be contained in the minutes
of the proceedings.
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. Where the protest is
formalized before the med-arbiter within five (5) days after the close of the election
proceedings, the med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20) working days from
the date of its formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest
shall be deemed dropped. The decision may be appealed to the Bureau in the same
manner and on the same grounds as provided under Rule V.
In this case, petitioner maintains that private respondent did not make any protest
regarding the alleged irregularities (e.g., massive disfranchisement of employees) during
the election. Hence, the appeal and motions for reconsideration of private respondent HPI
should have been dismissed summarily.
The complaint in this case was that a number of employees were not able to cast their
votes because they were not properly notified of the date. They could not therefore have
filed their protests within five (5) days. At all events, the Solicitor General states, that the
protests were not filed within five (5) days, is a mere technicality which should not be
allowed to prevail over the workers' welfare. 3 As this Court stressed in LVN Pictures,
Inc. v.Phil. Musicians Guild, 4 it is essential that the employees must be accorded an
opportunity to freely and intelligently determine which labor organization shall act in
their behalf. The workers in this case were denied this opportunity. Not only were a
substantial number of them disfranchised, there were, in addition, allegations of fraud and
other irregularities which put in question the integrity of the election. Workers wrote
letters and made complaints protesting the conduct of the election. The Report of MedArbiter Pura who investigated these allegations found the allegations of fraud and
irregularities to be true.
In one case this Court invalidated a certification election upon a showing of
disfranchisement, lack of secrecy in the voting and bribery. 5 We hold the same in this
case. The workers' right to self-organization as enshrined in both the Constitution and
Labor Code would be rendered nugatory if their right to choose their collective
bargaining representative were denied. Indeed, the policy of the Labor Code favors the
holding of a certification election as the most conclusive way of choosing the labor
organization to represent workers in a collective bargaining unit. 6 In case of doubt, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the holding of a certification election.
Third. Petitioner claims that the contending unions, namely, the Association of Trade
Union (ATU), the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), as well as the representation

officers of the DOLE affirmed the regularity of the conduct of the election and they are
now estopped from questioning the election.
In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,
. . . The representative of the Association of Trade Unions really attest to the fact that we
cannot really identify all the voters who voted on that election except some workers who
were our supporters in the absence of Hijo Plantation representatives. We also attest that
the polling precinct were not conducive to secrecy of the voters since it was conducted
outside of the Company premises. The precincts were (sic) the election was held were
located in a passenger waiting shed infront of the canteen across the road; on the yellow
pick-up; at the back of a car; a waiting shed near the Guard House and a waiting shed
infront of the Guard House across the road. Herein private respondents also observed
during the election that there were voters who dictated some voters the phrase "number
3" to those who were casting their votes and those who were about to vote. Number 3
refers to the National Federation of Labor in the official ballot.
ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any protest because it expected workers who had
been aggrieved by the conduct of the election would file their protest since it was in their
interests that they do so.
Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-appeals were written almost two years after
the election and they bear the same dates (May 7 and June 14, 1991); they are not
verified; they do not contain details or evidence of intelligent acts; and they do not
explain why the writers failed to vote. Petitioner contends that the letter-appeals were
obtained through duress by the company.
We find the allegations to be without merit. The records shows that as early as August 22
and
30,
1989,
employees
already
wrote
letters/affidavits/
manifestoes alleging irregularities in the elections and disfranchisement of workers. 7 As
the Solicitor General says in his Comment, 8 these affidavits and manifestoes, which
were attached as Annexes "A" to "CC" and Annexes "DD" to "DD-33" to private
respondent's Supplemental Petition of September 5, 1989 just 16 days after the August
20, 1989 election. It is not true therefore that the employees slept on their rights.
As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991 and June 14, 1991 bear these same dates
because they were prepared by private respondent HPI and employees were merely asked
to sign them, suffice it to say that this is plain speculation which petitioner has not proven
by competent evidence.
As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to say that technical rules of evidence are not
binding in labor cases.
The allegation that the letters did not contain evidence of intelligent acts does not have
merit. The earlier letters 9of the workers already gave details of what they had witnessed
during the election, namely the open balloting (with no secrecy), and the use of NFL

vehicles for polling precinct. These letters sufficiently give an idea of the irregularities of
the certification election. Similarly, the letters containing the signatures of those who
were not able to vote are sufficient. They indicate that the writers were not able to vote
because they thought the election had been postponed, especially given the fact that the
two unions had pending appeals at the time from orders denying them the right to
intervene in the election.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the questioned orders of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 97622 October 19, 1994
CATALINO ALGIRE and OTHER OFFICERS OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA
TEXTILE MONTHLY SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION
(URTMSEU), petitioners,
vs.
REGALADO DE MESA, et al., and HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.
C.A. Montano Law Office for petitioner.
Cabio and Ravanes Law Offices and Jaime D. Lauron for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated January 31,
1991 of the Secretary of Labor which reversed on appeal the Order dated December 20,
1990 issued by Med-arbiter Rolando S. dela Cruz declaring petitioners as the duly-elected
officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees union (URTMSEU)
as well as the order dated March 5, 1991 denying petitioner Catalino Algire's motion for
reconsideration.
The case arose out of the election of the rightful officers to represent the union in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the management of Universal Robina
Textile at its plant in Km. 50, Bo. San Cristobal, Calamba, Laguna.
Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union, (URTMSEU), through
private respondent Regalado de Mesa, filed on September 4, 1990 a petition for the
holding of an election of union officers with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). Acting thereon, DOLE's med-arbiter Rolando S. de la
Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing that such an election be held.
In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be
conducted on November 15, 1990 between petitioners (Catalino Algire, et al.) and private

respondents (Regalado de Mesa, et al.) under the supervision of DOLE through its duly
appointed representation officer.
The official ballot contained the following pertinent instructions:
Nais kong pakatawan sa grupo ni:
LINO ALGIRE REGALADO
and DE MESA
his officers and his
officers
1. Mark Check (/) or cross (x) inside the box specified above who among the two
contending parties you desire to be represented for the purpose of collecting bargaining.
2. This is a secret ballot. Don't write any other markings. 1
The result of the election were as follows:
Lino Algire group 133
Regalado de Mesa 133
Spoiled 6

Total votes cast 272

On November 19, 1990, Catalino Algire filed a Petition and/or Motion (RO 400-9009AU-002), which DOLE's Med Arbitration unit treated as a protest, to the effect that one
of the ballots wherein one voter placed two checks inside the box opposite the phrase
"Lino Algire and his officers," hereinafter referred to as the "questioned ballot," should
not have been declared spoiled, as the same was a valid vote in their favor. The group
argued that the two checks made even clearer the intention of the voter to exercise his
political franchise in favor of Algire's group.
During the schedules hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the envelope containing
the spoiled ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one ballot contained two (2) checks
in the box opposite petitioner Algire's name and his officers.
On December 20, 1990, med-arbiter de la Cruz issued an order declaring the questioned
ballot valid, thereby counting the same in Algire's favor and accordingly certified
petitioner's group as the union's elected officers. 2
Regalado de Mesa, et al. appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the Secretary of
Labor in Case No. OS-A-1-37-91 (RO 400-9009-AU-002). On January 31, 1991, the
latter's office granted the appeal and reversed the aforesaid Order. In its stead, it entered a

new one ordering "the calling of another election of officers of the Universal Robina
Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU), with the same choices as in the
election
of
3
15 November, 1990, after the usual pre-election conference."
Director Maximo B. Lim of the Industrial Relations Division, Regional Office No. IV of
the DOLE set the hearing for another pre-election conference on March 22, 1991, reset to
April 2, 1991, and finally reset to April 5, 1991.
Catalino Algire's group filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. It was denied for
lack of merit and the decision sought to be reconsidered was sustained.
Algire, et al. filed this petition on the following issues:
(1) the Secretary of Labor erred in applying Sections 1 and 8 (6), Rule VI, Book V of the
Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code to the herein case, considering that
the case is an intra-union activity, which act constitutes a grave abuse in the exercise of
authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
(2) the assailed decision and order are not supported by law and evidence.
with an ex-parte motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order, alleging that the
assailed decision of the office of the Secretary of Labor as public respondent is by nature
immediately executory and the holding of an election at any time after April 5, 1991,
would render the petition moot and academic unless restrained by this Court.
On April 5, 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of
another election of union officers pursuant to the January 31, 1991 decision. 4
There is no merit in the petition.
The contention of the petitioner is that a representation officer (referring to a person duly
authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in accordance with Rule VI of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on onthe-spot questions arising from the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the
validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence. Therefore, any ruling made
by the representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is deemed an absolute
nullity because such is the allegation it was done without or in excess of his
functions amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant, what
was agreed to be held at the company's premises and which became the root of this
controversy, was a consent election, not a certification election.
It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election
and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to

determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate
collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with
the import and effort of a certification election. 5
The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is spoiled
is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action by such
officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed in the written
instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit unauthorized markings thereon
other than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the votes in order to preserve
the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the contending parties.
If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that
the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the canvass
of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a waiver of
any defect or irregularity arising from said election. Moreover, petitioners even question
at this stage the clear instruction to mark a check or cross opposite the same of the
candidate's group, arguing that such instruction was not clear, as two checks "may be
interpreted that a voter may vote for Lino Algire but not with (sic) his officers or
vice-versa," 6 notwithstanding the fact that a pre-election conference had already been
held where no such question was raised.
In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that should
best represent them in the forthcoming collective bargaining negotiations should be
achieved through the democratic process of an election, the proper forum where the true
will of the majority may not be circumvented but clearly defined. The workers must be
allowed to freely express their choice once and for all in a determination where anything
is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation is
minimized, if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or maneuvering.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.