Chia Choo Ling and Another V Phua Chiew Pheng and Another (2010) SGDC 279

7/20/2016
ChiaChooLingandanothervPhuaChiewPhengandanother
[2010]SGDC279
CaseNumber
: DC3240of2007,DistrictCourtAppealNo.25of2010
DecisionDate
: 30June2010
Tribunal/Court
: DistrictCourt
Coram
: TanMayTee
CounselName(s)
: DennisLoh(ChiuCheong&Co)forthepaintiffsLewMeowFah(LewMeowFah&Co)for
thedfendants.
Parties
: ChiaChooLingandanotherPhuaChiewPhengandanother
30June2010
DistrictJudgeTanMayTee:
Background
1ThesubjectmatterofthisactionisaHousingandDevelopmentBoardflatatBlock27LimLiakStreet#04
38 Singapore 160027 (hereinafter the Flat) situated in the Tiong Bahru estate. The Plaintiffs are a married
couplewhowantedtobuytheFlat.TheDefendantsaretheowners,the1stDefendantbeingthedaughterofthe
2ndDefendant.TheDefendantsgrantedanoptiontothePlaintiffstopurchasetheFlatatthepriceof$350,000
(hereinaftertheOption).
2NeitherpartywasrepresentedbyapropertyagenttotransacttheintendedsaleandpurchaseoftheFlat.
2 days before the expiry of the Option, the Plaintiffs could not contact the 1st Defendant. In a state of panic,
theyconsultedsolicitorsthenextday.ThesolicitorsattemptedtoexercisetheOptionbydeliveringacopyofthe
OptiontotheFlatandalsosendingitbypost.ThismethodofexercisingtheOptionwasnotinaccordancewith
thestricttermsoftheOption.
3ThePlaintiffsclaimthattheOptionhadnonethelessbeenexercisedresultinginavalidcontractforthesale
and purchase of the Flat. The Defendants position was that the Option had not been exercised in accordance
withitstermsandaccordingly,nocontractwasreached.
4Thetrialwasontheissueofliabilityonly.Attheconclusionoftheproceedings,Idecidedinfavourofthe
Defendants. The Plaintiffs claim was accordingly dismissed with costs. The Plaintiffs have now appealed to the
HighCourtandIsetouthereinthereasonsformydecision.
Pleadings
5ThematerialfactsaspleadedinthePlaintiffsStatementofClaimareasfollows:
https://www.lawnet.sg/lawnet/group/lawnet/pagecontent?p_p_id=legalresearchpagecontent_WAR_lawnet3legalresearchportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_stat 1/16
7/20/2016
1.Inconsiderationofthesumof$1,000(optionfees)paidbythePlaintiffstotheDefendants,the
DefendantsgrantedtothePlaintiffsanoptiontopurchasedatedthe7June2007(saidoption)forthe
purchase by the Plaintiffs of the Defendants premises known as Block 27 Lim Liak Street #0438
Singapore160027(saidpremises)atapriceof$350,000.00.
2.ThesaidoptionwastobeexercisedbythePlaintiffsbysigningonthesaidoptionanddeliveringthe
said option together with a cheque for $4,000.00 to the Defendant by 4.00 pm on the 22 June 2007
(expirydate).
3.Amongthetermssetoutinthesaidoptionisclause11(clause11)whichprovidesthattheparties
ofthesaidoptionbythePlaintiff(sic.),partiesaretojointlyapplytotheHousingandDevelopmentBoard
(HDB)within30daysoftheexerciseofthesaidoptionforconsentbyHDBtothesaleandpurchaseof
thesaidpremises.
4.Priortotheexpirydatenamelyonthe21June2007thePlaintiffsmadenumerousfruitlessattempts
tocontacttheDefendantsbywayoftelephonecallsaswellasbytheshortmessageservice(sms)for
the purpose of ascertaining their whereabouts so that the duly signed said option could be delivered to
them(sic.)placeofexercisingthesaidoption(sic.).
5. The aforesaid attempts proved to be futile in that the Defendants refused and/or failed and/or
neglectedtorespondand/orreplytothePlaintiffstelephonecallsand/orsms.
6.ByreasonofthemattersaforesaidthePlaintiffsdecidedtoappointM/sLawHubLLC(LawHub)to
exercisethesaidoptionontheirbehalf.
7.LawHubsrepresentativeeventuallyhanddeliveredacopyofthesaidoptiontogetherwithacheque
forthesumof$4,000.00(saidcheque)aswellasLawHubscoveringletter(coveringletter)tothe
saidpremises.
8. The covering letter informed the Defendants among other things that the original copy of the said
option(sic.)retainedbythePlaintiffsforsubmissiontotheHousingandDevelopmentBoardlateronJune
2007.
9.Thecoveringletter,thesaidoptiontogetherwithsaidchequewasreceivedandacknowledgedbya
tenantatthesaidpremisesonthe21June2007at1545hours.
10. By reason of the matters aforesaid a legally binding agreement had been reached between the
PlaintiffsandtheDefendantsforthesaleofthesaidpremisesbythelattertotheformer.
11.TheDefendantisinbreachofclause11oftheagreementinthattheirsolicitorsM/sEasternLaw
Corporation by its letter dated 2 July 2007 expressly intimated to the Plaintiffs that they would not be
proceeding with the application to HDB for consent to the sale of the said premises even though the
Plaintiff(sic.)isready,ableandwillingtodoso.
12.ByreasonoftheaforesaidbreachthePlaintiff(sic.)hassufferedlossand/ordamages...
6 In essence, the Plaintiffs case was premised on the Option having been duly exercised by LawHubs
representative delivering a copy of the Option rather than the original together with a cheque and a covering
lettertotheFlatandwhichwerereceivedandacknowledgedbyatenantatthepremiseson21June2007.The
exercise of the Option meant that the Defendants were bound to sell the Flat to them and the Defendants
failurethereaftertoapplytoHDBamountedtoabreachoftheagreementtoselltheFlatforwhichthePlaintiffs
wereentitledtodamages.
7/20/2016
7 The Defence, as amended, was a rather lengthy pleading running into a total of 32 paragraphs. In
summary,whiletheDefendantsadmittedthattheyhadgrantedtheOptionwhichwasvalidupto4.00pmof22
June2007,theypleadedfirstly,thatthemannerbywhichtheOptionwastobeexercisedwasnotinaccordance
withClause5oftheOption.Clause5prescribedthatabuyermustdothefollowingtoexercisetheOption:
(a)signtheAcceptanceintheOption,
(b)deliverthesignedOption(originalcopy)totheseller,and
(c)paythesellertheOptionExerciseFee.
8 It was the Defendants contention that the Plaintiffs had failed to exercise the Option pursuant to the
mannerstatedinClause5oftheOptionasthePlaintiffshadfailedtodeliverthesignedOption(originalcopy)and
the payment of the Option Exercise Fee of $4,000.00 to the Defendants. This was in fact admitted by the
PlaintiffsasLawHubhadsenttotheDefendantsonlyacopyoftheOption.
9TheDefendantsdeniedtheallegationthattheyhadfailed,refusedorneglectedtorespondtothePlaintiffs
telephonecallsandmessages.The1stDefendanthadbeenillon20and21June2007buton22June2007she
had contacted the 1st Plaintiff in the morning. He was however reluctant to speak with her on the purported
exerciseoftheOption.TheDefendantsfurtherdeniedthatLawHubsrepresentativehadhanddeliveredthecopy
of the Option together with the cheque for $4,000.00 to the premises. What the Defendants received were
copies of the letter dated 21 June 2007 from LawHub together with a photocopy of the signed Option and a
photocopy of the cheque for $4,000.00 sent by ordinary post and Certificate of Posting to the Defendants
premises.
10AsthePlaintiffshadfailedtoexercisetheOptioninthemannerprovidedintheOption,therewasnolegally
bindingagreementbetweenthepartiesforthepurchaseoftheFlat.PursuanttoClause11oftheOption,ajoint
application for approval was to be made to HDB by both seller and buyer after the exercise of the Option.
Accordingly, the Defendants were entitled to cancel the application made unilaterally by the Plaintiffs. The
DefendantshadnoknowledgeofthelossanddamagesallegedtohavebeensufferedbythePlaintiffsanddenied
liabilityforthesame.
11TheDefendantsfurtherreliedonClause4oftheOptionstipulatingthatuponitsexpiry,theOptionbecame
nullandvoid.Also,pursuanttoClause6oftheOption,theDefendantswereentitledtoretaintheOptionfeeof
$1,000.00ifthePlaintiffsdidnotexercisetheOptioninthemannerstatedintheOptionandneitherpartywould
haveanyclaimagainsttheother.
12TheDefendantsalsopleaded,inthealternative,thattheOptiongrantedtothePlaintiffswasnotinthe
prescribedformasrequiredbysection49A(2)oftheHousingandDevelopmentAct(Cap129)whichrenderedit
nullandvoidundersection49A(3)inthat:
(a)thepartieshadagreedontheOptionexpirydatebeingonadaywhichwasnotthe15thcalendardayfrom
theOptiondateasindicatedinthestandardformastheagreeddateof22June2007wasthe16thcalendarday
fromthedatetheOptionwasgrantedon7June2007and
(b) the parties had also signed another form of option to purchase which amounted to a variation or
amendmenttothestandardformwithouttheauthorisationoftheHousingandDevelopmentBoard.
Accordingly,therecouldnotbeavalidcontractbetweentheparties.
7/20/2016
13ThePlaintiffsReplywasunnecessarilyprolixandrepetitiousandcontainedrecitalsofevidence.Itpleaded
interalia that the Plaintiffs had fully complied with the terms of the Option save for Clause 5(b) . They cited
particulars of the 1st Defendants conduct in not responding to their attempts to make contact with her as
reasonfornoncomplianceandtoallegethatcompliancehadbeenwaivedbyhersaidconduct.
14 In the event there was no waiver of Clause 5(b), they pleaded in the alternative that Clause 5(b) was
subject to an implied term that the Defendants must make themselves available and remain contactable to
enablethePlaintiffstodeliverthesignedoption(original)tothemaswellasthesaidcheque.
15 The Plaintiffs further relied on a pleading of estoppel on account of the Defendants conduct which
precludedtheDefendantsfrominsistingonastrictcompliancewiththetermsoftheOptioninparticularClause
5(b).
16Theyalsodeniedthatthe1stDefendanthadbeensickandaverredthatsheonlymadecontactwiththe
1stPlaintiffon22June2007,thedayafterthedatefortheexerciseoftheOption.
17WiththejoinderofissuesatthefilingoftheReply,Icouldnotunderstandwhytherewasanecessityfor
the parties to file a Rejoinder and Surrejoinder in this case. These subsequent pleadings , in my view, added
nothing to the case for either party as they repeated the facts already alleged in the Defence and Reply and
included substantial portions of the evidence that the parties sought to adduce coupled with arguments and
submissionsthereon.Bothcounselhadagreedwithmethatthesepleadingscouldbedisregarded.
Issues
18TheprimaryissuewhichtheCourthadtodeterminewaswhethertheOptionhadbeenproperlyexercised
togiverisetoalegallybindingcontractforthesaleandpurchaseoftheFlat.
19Indeterminingtheprimaryissue,theCourtwasalsoaskedtodecideonthefollowing:
(a) whether strict compliance of the terms of the Option in particular Clause 5.1(b) was required for the
exerciseoftheOptionorcompliancecouldbewaivedbytheconductoftheparties
(b)alternatively,whethertheDefendantswereestoppedbytheirconductfrominsistingonstrictcompliance
withthetermsoftheOption
(c)wastheOptionsubjecttoanimpliedtermthattheDefendantsweretomakethemselvesavailableand
contactabletoenablethePlaintiffstoexercisetheOptionandwhichhadbeenbreachedbytheDefendants?
(d) whether the Option was rendered null and void pursuant to section 49A(3) of the Housing and
DevelopmentActbyvirtueofthemiscalculationoftheOptionexpirydatebeing1daymorethanthenumberof
daysstatedinHDBsprescribedForm
(e) whether the Option was rendered null and void pursuant to section 49A(3) of the Housing and
DevelopmentActbyvirtueofthepartieshavingsignedanotheragreementwhichwasnotonHDBsprescribed
Form.
ThePlaintiffsevidence
20The1stPlaintiffgaveafullaccountoftheeventsleadinguptothedisputeinhisaffidavitofevidencein
chief.Belowisasummaryofthematerialaspects:
7/20/2016
(1)AftersellingtheirHDBflatinChoaChuKanginMay2007,heandhiswifelookedforanotherflattobuyin
TiongBahru,astheywerefascinatedbytheareasrichculturalandhistoricalheritageanditsproximitytothe
city.
(2)Intheirsearches,theycameacrossanonlinepostingbyapropertyagentnamedCalvinYeo.Theycalled
CalvinYeotoinquireandmadearrangementstoviewtheFlat.HewasfirstinformedthattheDefendantsasking
pricewas$300,000.00butwastoldafewdayslaterthattheDefendantswanted$320,000.00instead.
(3)Adate,3June2007,wasfixedtoviewtheFlat.Onthatday,theymetthe1stDefendanttogetherwith
Calvinandoneotheragent,Gary,attheFlat.Aftertheviewing,allofthemwenttotheTiongBahrumarketto
discuss.The1stPlaintiffofferedtothe1stDefendanttobuytheFlatatthepriceof$320,000.00butwasmet
withtheresponsethatshenowwanted$335,000.00.The1stPlaintiffwaspreparedtoagreetothisincreased
pricebutthe1stDefendantsaidshewouldconsider.Todemonstratehissincerity,the1stPlaintiffthroughCalvin
tenderedachequefor$1,000.00tothe1stDefendant.
(4) The next day he received a call from Calvin telling him that the 1st Defendant was now asking for
$350,000.00.Despitethisincrease,thePlaintiffswerestillkeenontheFlat.
(5)On7June2007,hereceivedacallfromthe1stDefendantaskingifhewasstillinterestedintheFlat.She
arranged to meet the Plaintiffs at Golden Hill Condominium that evening and informed him that she had
dischargedheragents,CalvinandGary.
(6)Thepartiesmetat8.00pmatthefunctionroomofGoldenHillCondominium.The1stDefendantrefused
tobudgefromheraskingpriceof$350,000.00andthePlaintiffsrealisingthatfurthernegotiationswerefutile
decidedtoacceptthisprice.
(7)The1stDefendantthendrewupadocumenttitledOptiontoPurchasewhichwassignedbybothparties.
Followingthat,the1stDefendantwenttohercondominiumandreturnedwithasetoftheHDBstandardformof
OptiontoPurchasewhichshethenfilledupandsigned.ThePlaintiffshandedoverachequefor$1,000.00being
theoptionfee.
(8) The Option was handed to the 1st Plaintiff by the 1st Defendant on 8 June, the next day as the 1st
Defendantneededtogetthe2ndDefendantssignaturethereon.NotallpagesoftheOptionwerehandedoverto
thePlaintiffs.
(9)On20June2007at8.36a.m.the1stPlaintiffsentamessageonhismobilephonetothe1stDefendant
informingherthattheywerereadytoexercisetheOptionandrequestingameetingat9.30pmthatnightto
handoverthesignedOptionandcheque.Therewasnoresponsefromthe1stDefendant.The1stPlaintiffsent3
more messages that day and tried 6 times to contact the 1st Defendant on her mobile phone but without
success.
(10)Thenextmorning,thePlaintiffswenttotheHDBHubtoseekadvice.TheyweretoldbytheHDBofficer
thataccordingtohiscalculationtheOptionwouldexpireon21Junehealsoemphasisedthattheoriginalcopyof
theOptionwasneededforsubmissiontoHDBfortheirfirstappointment.
(11)The1stPlaintiffsentanothermessagetothe1stDefendantandmadefurthercallstoherwhichwere
unanswered as she had turned off her phone. The couple then sought legal advice from LawHub LLC. It was
decided they deliver only a copy of the Option together with the cheque and inform the Defendants that the
originalOptionwasbeingretainedforthepurposeofsubmissiontoHDB.
7/20/2016
(12) On 21 June 2007 at 1545 hours, LawHubs clerk delivered a copy of the Option, the cheque and
LawHubs covering letter to an occupant of the Flat. That same night at 2200 hours they made an online
applicationtoHDBforapprovaloftheirpurchaseoftheFlat.
(13) On 22 June 2007 the 1st Plaintiff received at least 5 calls from the 1st Defendant from an unlisted
number.The1stDefendantaskedforameetingwiththemon24June2007asshewantedtoraisetheselling
price.The1stPlaintiffrefusedtodiscusspricingandtoldherthathehadengagedsolicitorstoexercisetheOption
ontheirbehalf.Healsoaskedthe1stDefendanttoreturnhimtheBuyerscopyoftheOption.
(14)On24June2007,the1stPlaintiffcalledthe1stDefendantandwhoagaininformedhimtoincreasehis
price.Whenherefused,the1stDefendantofferedtoreturnhimthechequefor$1,000.00inexchangeforthem
notpursuingthedeal.
(15)TheDefendantswrotetoHDBtocanceltheapplicationforapprovalandon2July2007,theDefendants
formersolicitorswrotetoLawHubLLCstatingthattheDefendantsdidnotconsenttotheirapplicationtoHDBfor
thesaleandpurchaseoftheFlatandthatthePlaintiffshadnotproperlyexercisedtheOptionasonlycopiesof
theOptionandcopiesofthechequeweredelivered.
21InrelationtothemannerinwhichtheOptionwasexercised,thePlaintiffsreliedonthetestimonyofTan
SiewTiong(PW1),oneofthesolicitorsfromLawHubLLCwhomtheyconsultedon21June2007,andLawHubs
serviceclerk,oneRahmatbinAbdulWahab(PW2),whohadattendedattheFlattodeliverthedocument.
22PW1wastheauthorofthecoverletterwhichcontainedthecopyoftheOptionsenttotheFlat.Theletter
addressedtotheDefendantsstatedasfollows:
EXERCISEOFOPTION
BYHAND,ORDINARYPOST&
CERTIFICATEOFPOSTING
Re:OptiontoPurchase
Blk27LimLiakStreet#0438Singapore160027(theProperty)
1.WeactforChiaChooLingandMaYuHong,thepurchasersoftheProperty.
2.Wehavebeeninformedbyourclientsthattheyhavetired(sic.)tocontactyoutoexercisetheOption
to Purchase but have not been able to reach you on your handphone and cannot find you on the said
premises.
3.Onourclientsbehalfandasinstructed,weherebyexercisetheOptiontoPurchasebyenclosingthe
following:
(i)OptiontoPurchaseandAcceptanceCopydulysignedbyourclients
(ii)Ourclientschequeno.672572forS$4,000.00beingtheDeposit(lesstheOptionFee)issued
infavourofPhuaChiewPheng.
4.Pleasecontactourclientsat(HPnumber)or(HPnumber)forsubmissionforfirstappointment.
7/20/2016
5. Please note that the original Option to Purchase is in our clients possession, for purposes of
submissiontotheHDBforthefirstappointment.
6.Allourclientsrightsareexpresslyreserved.
23 The original of the aforesaid letter together with a copy of the Option and the Plaintiffs cheque was
deliveredbyPW2totheFlat.Inhisaffidavitofevidenceinchiefhestatedasfollows:
Onthe21stJune2007atabout1545hours,IattendedatBlock27LimLiakStreet#0438Singapore
160027{Property}andpersonallydeliveredacopyoftheOptiontoPurchase{saidOption}together
withanoriginalchequeforthesumof$4,000.00{saidcheque}aswellasLawHubscoveringletter{
coveringletter}toanoccupierattheProperty.
Theaforesaidoccupieracknowledgedreceiptofthecoveringletterbysigningonthecopyofthecovering
letter.
24ThecopyofthecoveringletterexhibitedtoPW2saffidavitofevidenceinchiefshowedsomehandwriting
withthedateandtime21/6/200715.45pmandunderneaththatasquigglethatcouldrepresentapersons
signature. There was however no name nor any information given in this handwritten acknowledgment to
indicate the identity of the recipient. Neither was there any contemporaneous endorsement by PW2 as the
serviceclerkofhisattendanceattheFlat.
TheDefendantsevidence
25The1stDefendantsaccountofthetransactionwasasfollows:
(1) The Plaintiffs had approached her through their property agent and offered to purchase the Flat at the
priceof$335,000.00butshedidnotwanttosell.Subsequently,thePlaintiffsdismissedtheirpropertyagentas
theydidnotwanttopaycommissionandcontactedherdirectly.
(2)TheDefendantsgrantedthePlaintiffstheOptionandthepartiesagreedontheexpirydatebeing22June
2007.
(3)The1stPlaintiffhadmadeattemptstocontactheronherhandphoneon20and21June2007.However,
shewassickonthose2daysandhadbeengrantedmedicalleaveduetohereyeconditionandshehadswitched
offherhandphoneforthose2days.
(4)Onthemorningof22June2007,whensheswitchedonherhandphone,shecametoknowofthe1st
Plaintiffsattemptstocontacther.Shecalledthe1stPlaintiffatabout9.00a.m.andinformedhimofherillness
fortheprevious2daysandtoaskhimaboutthepurportedexerciseoftheOption.However,the1stPlaintiffwas
veryunhappyandgrumbledthathehadbeenmadetospendmoneyonlawyersinordertoexercisetheOption.
He refused to talk to her on the issue of the exercise of the Option and simply told her that his lawyers had
writtentoherandtoopenupherletterboxtoreadtheirletter.
(5)Whenshewenthomethatevening,sheopenedupherletterboxandfound2letters,onesentbyordinary
postandtheotherbyCertificateofPosting.AttachedtoeachoftheletterswereaphotocopyoftheOptionand
photocopy of the cheque. There was no third letter received by hand. After the unpleasant telephone
conversationshehadhadwiththe1stPlaintiffthatmorning,shewasshockedtoreceiveonlyphotocopiesofthe
Optionandofthecheque.Withregardtothethirdlettersentbyhand,the1stDefendantdidnotreceiveit.Her
testimonyinCourtwasasfollows:
7/20/2016
Q:
On22June2007,yousaidthatwhenyouwentdowntoyourhouseatLimLiakStreetyou
saw2copiesoftheOptionToPurchasesentbyOrdinaryPostandCertificateofPosting.
DidyounoticeontheletterfromLawHubdated20June2007thattherewasathirdmodeof
deliveryandthatwasByHand?
A:
IbelievethatLawHubsletterwasdated21June,Ididntseeonedated20June.
Q:
Sorrymyapologyits21June.
A:
Canshowmetheletter?
Q:
PB26.
A:
I found 2 in my letterbox. I noticed its written here By Hand. I checked my letterbox

thoroughly,thereisnothirdcopy.
Atthattime,mythoughtwasifLawHubhadsentsomebodytodeliverByHandandnoone
wasathome,thedeliverymancanslotitintomyletterbox.
Q:
Sowhatdidyoudonextafteryoufoundcopies?
A:
IdiscoverednooriginalOption,nooriginalcheque.Iwasverysurprised.Iwastellingmyself
inthemorningyousaidtomethosethingsandyetyoudidntwanttoexerciseOption.
AfterthatIwenttomyFlat,openedthedoor,stillcheckwhetherundermydooranyletters,
therewasnone.
Q:
Didyoualsonoticeparagraph4oftheletterandwhatdidyoudowithparagraph4?
A:
WhenIreadparagraph4,IwasthinkingMrChiadidntwanttoexerciseOption,sentme
photocopies of Option and cheque, why should I call him to talk about submitting for first
appointment.
Q:
Didyoualsonoticeparagraph5?
A:
On22June2007whenIreadparagraph5,IcouldnotunderstandwhyMrChiakeepsthe
originalOption.Until24JuneconversationthenIgatheredfromhimthathesthekiasutype
ofpersonandhefeelssafer,onlysafethathekeepsoriginalOptionwithhim.
Thatswhyon24June,Ihighlighttohimthatheswrong.
Q:
Whythendidyounotcallhimstraightawayandwaituntil24June?
A:
You imagine on 22 June morning he grumbled at me, scolded me on 22 June night I

discoveredthatIdidntevengettheoriginalOption,originalcheque.Anaturalhumanbeing
willfeelverycheesedoff,sowhyshouldIcallhim?
ThemoreIthinkofit,evenon23June,themorecheesedoffIwas.
7/20/2016
(6)NothavingreceivedtheoriginalsignedOptionnorthechequefor$4,000.00,the1stDefendanttookthe
positionthatthePlaintiffshadnotexercisedtheOption.Whenthe1stPlaintiffcontactedheron24June2007,
sherealisedthathehadkepttheoriginalOptionwithhim.Shesubsequentlyfoundoutthatthethirdcopyofthe
Optiondeliveredbyhandwasreceivedbyaman.SinceherFlathadnomaleoccupant,thethirdcopycouldnot
havebeendeliveredtotheFlat.TheonlyotheroccupantwasoneChuaHiongHui,afemaletenantofoneofthe
roomsattheFlat.
(7)AsshedidnotreceivetheoriginalOptionnorachequefor$4,000.00beingtheOptionExerciseFeeshe
maintainedthattheOptionhadnotbeendulyexercised.UponnotificationbyHDBofthe1stappointmentdate,
shehadwrittentoHDBtoinformthemthattheoriginalOptionandchequehadnotbeenreceivedbyherandto
requestHDBnottoprocessanyapplicationfortheresaleoftheFlat.
(8)The1stDefendantdeniedthatshehadaskedthe1stPlaintifftoincreasehispricefortheFlat.Shealso
had no knowledge of the Flats valuation. Since the earlier Option had not been properly exercised she had
informedthe1stPlaintiffthatanyintendedpurchaseoftheFlatwouldhavetobeanewdealandonanewprice.
Afterherunpleasantencounterwiththe1stPlaintiffon22June2007,shewashowevernolongerkeentosell
theFlattothem.
(9)Itwasthe1stDefendantscasethatshehadneverpreventedthePlaintiffsfromexercisingtheOptionand
there was no reason for her to have done so particularly since the price offered by them at $350,000.00 was
muchhigherthantheresalepricesofsimilarflatsinthevicinity.
26 With regard to her medical condition, the 1st Defendant secured the testimony of the Registrar of the
Singapore National Eye Centre, one Dr Khor Wei Boon (DW1) who affirmed an affidavit to state that the 1st
Defendant was given 2 days medical leave on 20 and 21 June2007 due to her eye discomfort and eyestrain
problem.Althoughhewasnotthe1stDefendantstreatingdoctor,Ifoundnobasistorejecthisevidencewhich
wasgivenbasedonthemedicalnotesandrecordsoftheSingaporeNationalEyeCentre.Takentogetherwiththe
1st Defendants testimony in Court and my observance of her demeanour, I found no basis to disbelieve her
consistentaccountthatshewasillonthe2days,20and21June2007,andhadswitchedoffhermobilephone
forthatreason.HeractofswitchingoffherphonewasnotcalculatedtopreventthePlaintiffsfromcontacting
hertoexercisetheOption.
Findings
27Fromtheevidenceadducedbytheparties,Imadethefollowingfindings:
(1)TheDefendantshadgrantedthePlaintiffstheOptionon7June2007whichwasduetoexpireon22June
2007at4.00p.m.
(2)ThePlaintiffshadmadeseveralattemptstocontactthe1stDefendantforthepurposesofexercisingthe
Optionon20June2007andthemorningof21June2007.
(3) After seeking legal advice, the Plaintiffs then decided to exercise the Option by delivering a copy of the
Optioninsteadoftheoriginalandachequeundercoveroftheirthensolicitorsletterof21June2007andalso
sentcopiesofthesamebyordinarypostandcertificateofposting.
(4)ThecopyoftheOptionandthechequedidnotreachthe1stDefendantasithadbeendeliveredbythe
solicitorsclerktoamanwhoseidentitywasnotascertained.
(5)The1stDefendantonlyreceivedcopiesofthesignedOptionandcopiesofthechequetogetherwiththe
coverletterfromLawHubLLC.
7/20/2016
(6)The1stDefendantwasonmedicalleaveon20and21June2007andhadnotswitchedonherhandphone
forthose2days.Heromissionofnotkeepingherhandphoneonwasnotdeliberatenorcalculatedtopreventthe
PlaintiffsfromexercisingtheOptionwhichwasduetoexpireon22June2007.
(7)Onthemorningof22June2007shehadcontactedthe1stPlaintiffuponswitchingonherhandphoneand
discoveringthatthe1stPlaintiffhadbeentryingtocontacther.
(8)The1stPlaintiffexpressedhisannoyanceatthe1stDefendantinthattelephoneconversationandhad
refusedtodiscusstheexerciseoftheOptionbuthadtoldthe1stDefendanttocheckherletterbox.
(9)The1stDefendantdiscoveredontheeveningof22June2007thatshehadreceivedonlycopiesofthe
Optionandcopiesofthecheque.
(10)The1stDefendantrequestedHDBtocancelthePlaintiffsapplicationforapprovalofthesaleoftheFlatas
shehadnotreceivedtheoriginalOptionandthechequefor$4,000.00.
28InrelationtotheeventsthattranspiredpriortothegrantoftheOptionon7June2007,thePlaintiffshad
alleged that it was the 1st Defendant who had discharged her agent/s (Calvin and/or Gary) as she wanted to
saveoncommission.The1stDefendanthadmadeasimilarallegationagainstthePlaintiffs.SincethePlaintiffs
bear the overall burden of proof, they could easily have called the agent/s as their contact particulars were
available.Theirfailuretodosomeantthatthe1stDefendantsversionwaseffectivelyequallyprobable.
29 In relation to the events that transpired on and after 22 June 2007, weighing the testimonies of the
parties, I found it difficult to believe the Plaintiffs account that the 1st Defendant had continued to raise the
askingpriceoftheflatevenuptoasumof$70,000.00abovethevaluation.Havingheardandobservedthe1st
DefendantinCourt,itwasunlikelythatshewouldhavebeeninconversationswiththe1stPlaintiffintelephone
callslastingmorethananhourasclaimedbythe1stPlaintiff.The1stDefendanthadtestifiedthatshewasnot
evenawareofthevaluationwhichhadbeencommissionedbythePlaintiffs.Noevidencewasadducedthatthe
valuationfigureof$307,000.00accordingtothePlaintiffshadbeendisclosedtothe1stDefendant.
Optionnotproperlyexercised
30ThemaincontentionoftheDefendantswasthatthePlaintiffshadfailedtoexercisetheOptionaccordingto
theexpressrequirementsoftheOption.Clauses4and5oftheOptionstatedasfollows:
4.ExpiryofOption
4ThisOptionwillexpireontheOptionExpiry.IftheBuyerdoesnotexercisethisOptioninthemanner
setoutbelow,thisOptionwillbenullandvoid.
5.ExerciseofOptionbyBuyer
5.1ToexercisethisOption,theBuyermustdoallofthefollowingonorbeforetheOptionExpiry:
(a)signtheAcceptanceinthisOptionand
(b)deliverthesignedOption(originalcopy)totheSeller*and
(c)paytheSeller$4000(OptionExerciseFee).
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The Option Fee and the Option Exercise Fee together (the Deposit) must not
exceed$5,000.
*IftheSellerwishestoauthoriseanotherpartytoreceivethesignedOptionandOptionExerciseFee,he
mustcompleteFormAinthisOption.
5.2ThisOptionandtheAcceptancesignedbytheBuyerwillformabindingcontractforthesaleand
purchase of the Flat. The Deposit will form part of the Purchase Price to secure the performance of the
termsandconditionsinthisOptionandcompletionofthesaleandpurchase.
31 The Defendants relied on the High Court decision of Seah Kiat Seng v Amtel Exports Pte Ltd [1996] 2
SLR(R)636inwhichthedefendantswhoweretheownersofthepropertyhadgrantedtheplaintiffanoptionin
considerationofpaymentoftheoptionfeeof$15,800being1%ofthesalepricetoselltothemthedefendants'
right,titleandinterestintheproperty.Thepreambletotheoptionwhichsetoutthetimeframeandthemanner
inwhichthepurchaserwastoexercisetheoptionreadasfollows:
ThePurchasermayacceptthisofferbysigningtheportionofthisoptionmarked'ACCEPTANCECOPY'and
delivering it within two (2) weeks from the date of this option by 4pm (the acceptance date) to the
vendor's solicitors, Messrs Assomull & Partners, together with payment of 10% of the sale price (the
deposit),lesstheoptionfeewhoshallforthwithreleasethemoneystothevendor.Theoptionfeewillform
partofthedeposit.
Ifthisofferisnotdulyacceptedbytheacceptancedate,itshallimmediatelylapsewhereupontheoption
feeshallbeforfeitedbythevendor.
Upontheacceptanceofthisoffer,thetermsandconditionsofthesalehereinbelowshallforthwithbindthe
vendorandthepurchaser.
32 The plaintiff purportedly exercised the option on the last day and forwarded a cheque for 9% of the
purchasepricetothedefendant.Thechequewasdishonouredandthedefendantstreatedtheoptionashaving
expired without being validly exercised and forfeited the option fee. On receiving notice of the dishonour, the
plaintiffhadimmediatelyforwardedacashier'sorderforthesameamounttothedefendantsbuttheyrejectedit.
Theplaintiffappliedforadeclarationthattheoptionhadbeenvalidlyexercisedandthattherewasinexistencea
binding contract for the sale and purchase of the property despite the dishonoured cheque. The plaintiff
contended that a cheque once received ought to be treated as cash and even if the cheque were to be
dishonoured,therelieflaynotintreatingtheoptionashavingexpiredbutinbringinganactiononthecheque.
He claimed that the dishonour was unintended and not within his control. The defendant contended that the
dishonourofthechequerightlyentitledittotreattheoptionashavinglapsedsincetimeforpaymentunderthe
optionwasoftheessence.
33 In his judgment, Rubin J first dealt with the legal character of an option as explained in Malaysian and
English cases as being a conditional contract and an irrevocable offer respectively. Citing the following portion
fromthejudgmentofLordDenningMRinUnitedDominionsTrust(Commercial)LtdvEagleAircraftServices,Ltd
[1968] 1 All ER 104 at 107 which had been approved and applied by the House of Lords in United Scientific
HoldingsLtdvBurnleyBoroughCouncil[1978]AC904
...Inpointoflegalanalysis,thegrantofanoptioninsuchcasesisanirrevocableoffer(beingsupportedby
considerationsothatitcannotberevoked).Inordertobeturnedintoabindingcontract,theoffermust
beacceptedinexactcompliancewithitsterms.Theacceptancemustcorrespondwiththeoffer.
thelearnedJudgewentontoholdthattheoptiongrantedbythedefendants,whicheverwayonelooksatit,be
itdescribedasaconditionalcontractoranirrevocableoffer,theplaintiffwasrequiredundertheexpresstermsof
the option to make certain payments within two weeks from the grant of the option. Unfortunately for the
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plaintiffthechequewhichwaspresentedforpaymentturnedouttobeworthlessasithadbounced.Therewas
nobindingcontractduetothefailureoftheplaintifftocomplywithanagreedessentialtermoftheoption.His
Honourexplainedasfollows:
Havingregardtotheexpressionsusedinthepreambletotheoption,thespecificationscontainedtherein
as to the mode of acceptance and the clearly spelt out consequences if those specifications were not
compliedwith,itseemedtomethatthelegalnatureofthedocumentunderreferencewasnomorethan
an"irrevocableoffer"aswasheldbyLordDenningMRinUnitedDominionsTrust(supra)andinorderfor
ittobeturnedintoabindingcontract,thesaidoffer,inmyopinion,mustbeacceptedinexact
compliancewithitsterms.
Inthecontextoftheexpresslanguageusedintheoptiondocument,Iwasunabletoholdthattherecould
be any binding contract between the parties when there had been a failure to comply with an agreed
essentialtermoftheoptionbytheoptionholderwithinthestipulatedtime.Theirrevocableoffermadeby
the vendor lapsed by the failure of the option holder to underpin the cheque issued with the required
funds.Inmyjudgment,timefortheperformanceofthepaymentobligationisoftheessenceandhaving
regardtotheverynatureofthedocument,thetimeallowedcouldnotbeextendedbyreferencetoany
equitable principle. This conclusion is in conformity with the principles approved by the Privy Council, as
being manifestly reasonable and as warranted by authority, in Aberfoyle Plantations Ltd v Khaw Bian
Cheng[1960] MLJ 47at 49DF (left column) in relation to completion dates stipulated in conditional
contracts.
(emphasismine)
34ApplyingtheholdinginSeahKiatSeng,whichisbindingonthisCourt,tothefactsintheinstantcase,the
DefendantswerefullyjustifiedbytheexpresslanguageoftheOptiontotakethepositionthattheOptionhadnot
beenproperlyandvalidlyexercised.Clause5.1madeitabundantlyclearthattoexercisetheOption,theBuyer
mustdoalloftheactslistedtherein,namely(1)signtheAcceptance,(2)delivertheoriginaland(3)paytheSeller
$4,000.Asadmitted,theyhadfailedtocomplywithcondition(2)todelivertheoriginal.Theyhadalsofailedto
paytheSeller$4,000asrequiredbycondition(3)asdeliveryofLawHubsletterandenclosurestotheunknown
and unidentified occupant could not be equated as delivery to the Seller or their agent. On a plain reading of
Clause5,thelanguageemployedwasevenmoreemphaticthanthepreambletotheoptioninSeahscase.It
providedthatTo exercise this Option, the Buyer must do all of the following on or before the Option Expiry.
This,tomymind,wasclearlyanimperativetotheBuyer.ThecharacteroftheOptionbeinganirrevocableoffer
inlawrequiredanacceptanceinstrictcompliancewiththetermsoftheofferforittobeturnedintoabinding
contractastheOptionitselfprovidedinClause5.2.
WerePlaintiffspreventedbyDefendantsfromcomplyingwithClause5.1?
35 The Plaintiffs claim that they had been prevented by the 1st Defendant from exercising the Option in
accordance with its express terms by being uncontactable through her handphone on 20 and 21 June 2007.
Theycontendthattheconductofthe1stDefendantinswitchingoffherhandphonetherebypreventingthem
from contacting her to deliver the Option operated as a waiver of the strict terms of the Option and/or an
estoppel.
36 The Plaintiffs sought to rely on the principle that contracting parties are obliged to cooperate with each
othertosecuretheperformanceofthecontractanditscorollaryprinciplethatapartyinbreachordefaultofthis
obligationtocooperatecannottakeadvantageofhisownwrong.Thispropositionoflawwasrecentlyelucidated
uponintheHighCourtdecisionofEvergreatConstructionCoPteLtdvPresscreteEngineeringPteLtd[2006]1
SLR(R)634.Thefactsarestraightforwardtheplaintiffwasthemaincontractorforaconstructionprojectwhile
the defendant was the subcontractor appointed by the plaintiff to design, supply and install the micropiling
foundation. Disputes arose between the parties and they subsequently agreed to resolve their differences
throughanindependentassessor(IA)fromtheconstructionindustrywhowouldassesstheirrespectiveclaims
asanexpertratherthanasarbitrator.CounseljointlysettledandsubmittedaConsentOrderwhichstated,inter
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alia,thattheIAwasatlibertytodetermineallissuesofprocedurefortheassessmentwhichshallbefinal,and
that his decision and findings on all issues of procedure, liability and quantum were to be final. Both parties
unequivocallyacceptedthevarioustimelinesassetoutbytheIAforproceduralmatters.However,apartfrom
filing its Claim and its response to the defendants Counterclaim, the plaintiff failed to comply with any of the
remaining directions of the IA, failed to attend any of the scheduled hearings and failed to pay the IA its half
shareofhisprofessionalfees.Thedefendant,ontheotherhand,compliedwithalloftheIAsdirectionsapplicable
toit.Subsequently,theIAinformedtheparties,interalia,thathewouldmakeareasonedawardonthebasisof
theevidencebeforehimassubmittedbythedefendant.TheIAalsomadeafinalpleatotheplaintifftosubmit
anydocumentssubstantiatinganyofthemattersraisedbytheplaintiffeitherinsupportofitsclaimand/orto
rebutthedefendantscounterclaim.However,theplaintiffignoredtheIAsrequest.TheIAthenissuedhisaward
(the award), which stated, inter alia, that in the absence of any evidence that the work was rejected or
disputed, there was no ground to deny payment for work done. Soon after the IA published the award, the
plaintiff engaged new solicitors who applied to court to set aside the IAs award, on the basis that the IA had
failedtoassesstheliabilityofpartiesashadbeenagreedinthetermsofreference.TheHighCourtdismissed
the application, holding the plaintiff was in patent breach of its obligation to cooperate with the defendant in
facilitatingtheassessmentprocess.VKRajahJexplainedtheprincipleasfollows:
48 hen parties make and seal a contract, they are deemed to have done so on the basis that they
intendanddesirethecontracttobeperformedandtakentoitsconclusion.Asfarbackasthedecisionin
StirlingvMaitland(1864)5B&S841122ER1043at[852],CockburnCJdeclared:
Ilookonthelawtobethat,ifapartyentersintoanagreementwhichcanonlytakeeffectbythe
continuanceofacertainexistingstateofcircumstances,thereisanimpliedengagementonhispart
that he shall do nothing of his own motion to put an end to that state of circumstances, under
whichalonethearrangementcanbeoperative.
...
50tisplainthattheplaintiffwasinpatentbreachofitsobligationtocooperatewiththedefendantin
facilitatingtheassessmentprocessseealsoExpertDetermination([33]supra)atparas9.3.3and9.15.9.
The plaintiff has by its conduct repudiated its obligations under the terms of reference embodied in the
ConsentOrder.Thedefendantshouldbeabsolvedfromtheconsequencesoftheplaintiff'sconduct...
...
In essence, even if the parties expressly provide that the contract shall ipso facto determine upon the
happeningofacertainevent,suchaprovisionistobeconstruedsubjecttotheprinciplethatnomancan
takeadvantageofhisownwrong,sothatonepartymaynotbeallowedtorelyonsuchaprovisionwhere
theoccurrenceoftheeventisattributabletohisownactordefaultChittyonContractsatpara22054.
This principle is also referred to as the "prevention principle" and is wedded to notions of fair play and
commercialmorality.Itoffendsallsensiblenormsofcommercialintercoursetoallowapartyinbreachof
itscontractualobligationstorelyonitsverybreachtoeitherevaderesponsibilityor,evenmorefarcically,
toassertthattheothercontractingpartymustalsowillynillyacceptorsustaintheconsequencesofthat
breach.
52nordertoinvokethisprincipleitmustbeshownthatthecontractualrightorbenefitthatapartyis
asserting or claiming is a direct result of that party's prior breach of contract. The relevant breach, the
factualconsequencesflowingfromthebreachandtheadvantagethecontractbreakerisseekingtoraise
must be identified. The principle seeks to prevent the contract breaker from seeking an "advantage"
arisingfromhisdefault..
37Asexpoundedabove,thepreventionprinciplewouldapplyifthefactsshowedthatthecontractualright
or benefit that a party is asserting or claiming is a direct result of that party's prior breach of contract. The
questiontobeaskedintheinstantcasewaswhetherthePlaintiffsfailuretodelivertheoriginaloftheOption
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and to pay the Defendants the Option Exercise Fee of $4,000 a direct result of the 1st Defendants act of
switchingoffherhandphone.WasthePlaintiffsnoncomplianceofClause5.1oftheOptionwhollyattributableto
the1stDefendantsactofswitchingoffherhandphone?Icouldnotfindthistobethecaseonexaminationof
the1stPlaintiffsevidence.
38Fromthe1stPlaintiffstestimonyinCourt,itwasrevealedthathehadattendedattheHDBsofficeand
was informed that the original copy of the Option had to be submitted at HDBs first appointment. In fact, his
counsel had submitted that the Plaintiffs realised the importance of delivering the original option when the
PlaintiffsmetupwithaHDBofficerontheearlymorningof21June2007,anditwasontheadviceoftheHDB
officerwhotoldthePlaintiffsthattheoriginaloptionwasneededatthe1stappointmentdatethatthePlaintiffs
decidedtoretaintheoriginaloption...Afterseekinglegaladvice,hehaddecidedthatonlyaphotocopyofthe
Optionwouldbesentratherthantheoriginal.Thisnoncomplianceonhispartcouldnotthereforebesaidtobe
thedirectconsequenceofthe1stDefendantbeingincommunicadoforthe2dayspriortotheOptionexpirydate.
ItappearedthatthePlaintiffshadoperatedonthepremisethattheycouldonlyexercisetheOptionbymeeting
uppersonallywiththe1stDefendanttohandovertheOptionandthecheque.Whentheycouldnotcontactthe
1stDefendanttoproceedonthisbasis,theythenchosetovarythestricttermsimposedbyClause5.1which
theywerenotatlibertytodo.
39 Although in the normal course of property transactions in Singapore, exercising an option is usually
effected by a delivery by hand to the seller, this did not preclude an option holder from exercising it by other
means available including by post so long as it could be shown that the acceptance and option fee payable
reachedthesellerbeforetheexpirydate.Astheevidenceofthe1stDefendantrevealedinthiscase,thecopyof
theoptionandthecopyofthechequeinfactreachedthe1stDefendantshandontheoptionexpirydate.Had
therealchequeandoriginalcopyoftheOptionbeendespatchedinsimilarfashion,theywouldhavereachedthe
1stDefendanton22June2007andtheOptiondulyexercisedinaccordancewithitsterms.
40Further,therewasnocompellingreasonwhythe1stDefendantwouldconductherselfinsuchmanneras
tojeopardisethesaleoftheFlat.TheHDBrecordswhichwereinthepublicdomainclearlyshowedthattheprice
offeredbythePlaintiffswasconsiderablyhigherthantherecentlytransactedpricesforflatsinthesamevicinity.
TheStraitsTimesreportofaflatthatwentfor$720,000.00whichthePlaintiffssoughttoadducetoattribute
sinisterconductonthepartofthe1stDefendantwasnotafaircomparisontotheFlat.
41EvenifIwerewrongontheabovepointandthePlaintiffsnoncompliancewithClause5.1(b)waslegally
justified,thePlaintiffshadalsotoprovethattheyhadcompliedwithClause5.1(c)inhavingpaidtheDefendants
theOptionExerciseFee.TherewasnopaymentwhichaccompaniedthecopiesoftheOptionreceivedbythe1st
Defendantinhermailboxsinceonlyacopyofthechequewassent.TheonuswasonthePlaintiffstoshowthat
theactualchequehadreachedtheDefendantsthemselvesorsomeoneauthorisedtoreceiveitontheirbehalf.
ThePlaintiffsStatementofClaimhadpleadedthattheletter,copyofOptionandchequehadbeenreceivedand
acknowledgedbyatenantoftheFlat.ThePlaintiffsReplyevenwentsofartostate,
Thecopyofsignedoptionaswellasthesaidoriginalchequewasacceptedandacknowledgedbyatenant
of the said premises at 1545 hours on the 21st June 2007 after the tenant had informed LawHubs
serviceclerkthattheDefendantsdidnotresideatthesaidpremisesbuthadtenantedoutthesameto
him.
Thisassertionoffactwasnotborneoutbytheevidenceoftheserviceclerk(PW2).Theidentityofthemanwho
purportedly signed to acknowledge receipt of the documents and cheque remains a mystery. It was the 1st
Defendantstestimonythathertenantatthematerialtimewasawomanandtherewerenomaleoccupantsat
the Flat. Without the identity of the recipient who had signed the acknowledgment, the Plaintiffs could not
establishonabalanceofprobabilitiesthattheOptionhadbeendeliveredandthechequerepresentingtheOption
ExerciseFeepaidtotheDefendants.
Optionnullandvoid?
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42HavingfoundfortheDefendantassetoutabove,thiswouldhavesufficedtodisposeoftheaction.Iwill,
however, for completeness, deal with the alternative defences raised. The Defendants had also put up the
alternative defence that the Option was null and void pursuant to section 49A(2) and (3) of the Housing and
Development Act in that the Option Expiry Date was wrongly calculated to be 1 day later than the prescribed
numberofdaysinthestandardformofoption,andasideagreementhadbeenenteredintobytheparties.For
convenience,Isetouttheprovisionbelow:
49A. (2) Unless otherwise authorised by the Board, every contract, agreement or other document
relatingtothesaleofanysuchflat,houseorotherbuildingwhichismadebetweentheowneroftheflat,
houseorotherbuildingandapurchaserotherthantheBoardshallbeintheprescribedform.
(3) ny contract, agreement or other document which is made on or after 20th November 1998 in
contraventionofsubsection(1)or(2)shallbenullandvoid.
43ItisnotdisputedthatpartieshadusedHDBsprescribedformfortheOptioninthiscase.TheOptiondate
statedandagreedbybothpartieswas7June2007.Theprescribedformhadaspecificboxforpartiestofillinthe
OptionExpirydateandtime,andasguidanceforcomputationofthedate,theformcontainedthisinstruction
Date:State15thcalendardaystartingfromOptionDate.Basedonthisinstruction,theOptionExpiryshould
have been stated as 21 June 2007 being the 15th calendar day starting from 7 June 2007. Both parties had
howeveragreedontheOptionExpirydateas22June2007.WouldthismiscalculationrendertheOptionnulland
void?Inmyview,theanswermustsurelybeNoasamatteroflawaswellascommonsense.
44TheformusedbythepartieswastheprescribedformundertheAct.Theprescribedformcameaboutby
wayofanamendmenttotheHousingandDevelopmentActin1998.Theobjectivefortheinclusionofsection
49A and the prescribed form was stated by the then Minister for National Development Lim Hng Kiang at the
SecondReadingoftheBillinParliamenton12October1998asfollows:
...Next,theBillempowerstheMinistertomakerulestorequirethatallagreementsforprivatesalesof
HDBflatsshallbeinaprescribedformandthatallotherformsofagreementshallbevoid.Thepurposeof
thisamendmentistoprotectbothbuyersandsellersofHDBflats.
45Itbearsnotingthattheprohibitionspeltoutinsection49A(2)isnotanabsoluteone.Thewords,Unless
otherwise authorised by the Board indicate that agreements not in the prescribed form could very well still
receive the endorsement of the Board and be given the requisite legal effect in contract. In any case, the
deviationifatallinthiscasewasaveryminoroneonwhichthepartieswereinfactadidem.
46Further,themiscalculationcouldbeattributedtotheambiguityinthedirectioncontainedintheprescribed
formitself15thcalendardaystartingfromOptionDatecouldverywellsuggestthattheoptiondateitselfwas
tobeexcludedfromthereckoning,meaningthatonestartstocountfromthedayfollowingtheOptionDate.In
thiscase,itappearedthatthepartieshadcountedthe15thdayfrom8June2007andarrivedat22June2007.
Noprejudicebeingoccasionedtoeitherparty,andbearinginmindthelegislativeintentofsection49Abeingthe
protectionofbuyersandsellers,itwasinconceivableinmyviewthattheBoardwouldrefusetoapprovethesale
andpurchaseoftheFlatforthesolereasonthatthepartieshadmiscalculatedtheoptionexpirybyamere1day.
47Thepartieshadalsosignedonahandwrittendocumentpreparedbythe1stDefendantstatingthatIfdate
ofcompletionandhandoverofkeysisearlierthantheterminationoftenancycontract,therentwefcompletion
datewillbelongtobuyer.Thiswasintendedtocatertothesituationofthe1stDefendantstenantbeinginthe
Flat after the change in ownership. Again, both parties were ad idem on this additional term in their bargain
ancillarytothecontractcontainedintheOption.IftherewereanycontraventionbythepartiesthattheBoard
hadnoticeof,theapprovalforthesaleandpurchasewouldinalllikelihoodbegivensubjecttocomplianceofthe
Boards terms and conditions. The signing of the additional Option document would not render the Option a
nullity as contended by the Defendants unless the additional term was inconsistent with the terms and
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conditionsoftheOption.Sincetheadditionaldocumentwasmerelytoprovideforaneventualitythatmightnot
materialise,itcouldnotberegardedasacontraventionofHDBsstandardtermssuchthattheOption(signedon
HDBsprescribedform)wouldberenderedvoid.
48 A similar argument had been raised with regard to the form of agreement that was to be used for
commercialpropertiesundertheSaleofCommercialPropertiesAct(Cap281)intheCourtofAppealdecisionof
Mt Elizabeth Hospital Ltd v Allan Ng Clinic for Women and another appeal[1994] 1 SLR(R) 821. The Court of
Appealheldthatalthoughtheoptionusedwasnotintheprescribedformbutinsteadasimpleopencontractfor
thesaleandpurchaseoftheunitsinquestion,suchanagreementwasnotvoidundertheparticularActorthe
Rules.TheActdoesnotproscribeanagreementforthesaleandpurchaseofcommercialpropertywhichwasnot
madeinaccordancewiththeRules,exceptanytermsthereofwhichareinconsistentwiththoseprescribedbythe
Rules. Since nothing in the agreement was inconsistent with the terms as prescribed by the Rules, the
agreementwasvalidandcapableofenforcement.
49 Applying the reasoning in Mt Elizabeth Hospital Ltd (supra), the handwritten agreement signed by the
partieshadnotermswhichwereinconsistentwiththetermsandconditionssetoutintheOption.Forthesame
reason,themiscalculatedOptionExpirydatecouldbynomeansbeconsideredinconsistentwiththetermsinthe
prescribed form to nullify the Option. Neither of these deviations would have affected the enforceability of the
OptionhaditbeenvalidlyexercisedbythePlaintiffs.
Conclusion
50 The Plaintiffs case as pleaded was not proven on a balance of probabilities. In the result, the Plaintiffs
actionwasdismissedwithcoststobeagreedfailingwhichtobetaxed.
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I found 2 in my letterbox. I noticed its written here By Hand. I checked my letterbox

You imagine on 22 June morning he grumbled at me, scolded me on 22 June night I

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