G.R. No.

169005

January 28, 2013

WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RUDY C. TESORO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the Decision1 dated April 11, 2005 and
Resolution2 dated July 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82751.
In February and March, 2003, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) published an
Invitation to Pre-Qualify to Bid for the construction of the GSIS Iloilo City Field Office (GSIS-ICFO)
Building with an approved budget cost of P57,000,000.00.3 Out of the eight (8) pre-qualified
contractors, only four submitted their financial bids, as follows:
Embrocal Builders, Inc.

P55,350,000.00

NelsonS. Lee Construction

55,125,000.00

F. Gurrea Construction

53,503,013.33

H .S. Oaminal Construction

51,307,146.30

After evaluation of the bids and post-qualification, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) declared
the bid of Embrocal Builders, Inc. (Embrocal) as the "Lowest Calculated and Responsive Bid."
Subsequently, Atty. Henry S. Oaminal requested that they be awarded the contract for having
submitted the lowest responsive bid, while Mr. Felix Gurrea sought clarification of certain bid
instructions. Said bidders were informed of their disqualification only on December 10, 2003 through
a letter signed by GSIS Iloilo Field Office Manager, Jesusa Ruby A. Teruel. 5
In its Resolution No. 01-03 dated November 4, 2003, the BAC recommended to the Senior VicePresident of the Field Operations Group (SVP-FOG), herein private respondent Rudy C. Tesoro, that
the proposed construction of the GSIS-ICFO building be awarded to Embrocal in the amount
of P55,350,000.00 for a contract period of 300 days to be reckoned 15 days from the date of Notice
to Proceed. The Notice of Award dated November 4, 2003 was signed by Manager Teruel, Mateo E.
Basa, Jr., VP Area II-FOG and private respondent. On even date, the Contract for the Construction
of the GSIS-Iloilo Office Building was executed between GSIS represented by private respondent
and Embrocal represented by its President Edgardo M. Brocal. In his letter dated November 20,
2003, Mr. Brocal requested for the release of the 15% mobilization fee pursuant to the terms of the
contract.6
On November 24, 2003, petitioner Winston F. Garcia, then GSIS President and General Manager,
issued Office Order No. 104-03 reassigning private respondent and designating him as SVP,
Corporate Services Group (SVP-CSG), while SVP-CSG Enriqueta P. Disuanco was
designated/reassigned to his post. The said reassignment order, received by the Office of the SVPFOG on November 27, 2003, was to take effect immediately. Meanwhile, private respondent had
approved and signed the Disbursement Voucher for the amount of P7,430,737.50 as mobilization

fee (net of taxes) for the GSIS-ICFO building construction contract. Embrocal received the check
payment and issued the corresponding receipt on November 27, 2003. However, due to several
letters from losing bidders and the protest filed by F. Gurrea Construction, Inc. questioning the
conduct of the bidding, SVP Disuanco investigated the matter.7
The Report8 dated January 26, 2004 prepared by SVP-FOG Disuanco and Alfredo B. Pineda II of the
OSVP-FOG concluded that the bidding process conducted by the BAC was flawed for noncompliance with the strict provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184. It was further observed that the
field office committed oversights such as the presence of unofficial BAC members with no defined
roles and the BACs failure to comply with the requirement of promptly replying to formal queries in
consonance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6713.
On January 28, 2004, Ma. Josefina V. Rivas, Regional Cluster Director, Commission on Audit (COA),
GSIS-Iloilo City, submitted her observations to Manager Teruel recommending that her office explain
the reason for the release of mobilization fee to Embrocal despite non-issuance of the Notice to
Proceed, contrary to Section IB 10.10 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1594. Rivas also noted
that per their ocular inspection conducted in late December 2003 at the project site, there was no
discernible major construction activity nor deliveries of construction materials or presence of
construction crew except for two security guards.9
Under Memorandum dated February 6, 2004, private respondent along with other branch officers
were directed by the GSIS Investigation Unit to submit within three days from receipt their CounterAffidavit/Comment explaining why no administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon them,
pursuant to Section 11 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS).
Private respondent and Mateo E. Basa, Jr. submitted their written explanation under oath on
February 11, 2004.10
On February 16, 2004, the GSIS Investigation Unit submitted its Preliminary Investigation
Report11recommending that administrative charges be filed against the following branch officials and
employees: private respondent, Basa, Jr., Teruel, Branch Attorney Catherine Portia P. Corteza,
Finance Division Chief Adelaida J. Jamantoc, Senior General Insurance Specialist Jose Ma. C.
Capalla and Administrative Division Chief Lita L. Sonalan. It was further recommended that said
officials be placed under preventive suspension.
On February 19, 2004, private respondent was formally charged with Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave
Misconduct and/or Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations as provided under Section
46, paragraphs (3), (4) and (12), Chapter 6, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," in relation to Section 52 (A), paragraphs (2)
and (3), and (C), paragraph (3), Rule IV of the Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-1936
(URACCS). The Formal Charge12 reads as follows:
That on or about November 4, 2003, you approved the award for the construction of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) Iloilo City Field Office (ICFO) building to Embrocal Builders, Inc.
and thereafter entered into contract with the same to the disadvantage of GSIS in view of the fact
that Embrocal Builders, Inc. had submitted the HIGHEST BID during the bid opening conducted at
the ICFO on September 19, 2003;
That on November 27, 2003 you approved the payment of 15% mobilization fee in the amount of
Eight Million Three Hundred Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P8,302,500) to Embrocal Builders,
Inc. in excess and/or without authority and contrary to the Manual on Signing Authorities for
Disbursement Voucher and Check approved by the Board of Trustees of GSIS per Resolution No.
383 dated December 18, 2002. The records show that effective November 24, 2003 you were

already effectively reassigned to the Office of Corporate Services pursuant to Office Order No. 10403 dated November 24, 2003;
That you approved the payment of 15% mobilization fee to Embrocal Builders, Inc. prior to the
issuance of the Notice to Proceed in violation of Section 30.5 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of E.O. 40; and
That you approved the payment of 15% mobilization fee to Embrocal Builders, Inc. contrary to
Section 91 of P.D. 1445, otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines." It
was shown that on November 27, 2003 you were not anymore authorized to approve the payment in
behalf of the GSIS Field Operations Group.
Private respondent was also placed on preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. On
February 23, 2004, he filed his Answer to the charges, in addition to the previous joint explanation
dated February 9, 2004 submitted to the Investigation Unit.
However, on March 15, 2004 during the pendency of formal investigation being conducted by GSIS,
private respondent filed before the CA a Petition With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 82751) 13 In his petition, private
respondent questioned the legality of the formal charge which he claimed was issued without going
through the process of preliminary investigation. He thus prayed that petitioner be permanently
enjoined from "enforcing and implementing the said illegally issued Formal Charge with the order of
preventive suspension."14
On May 24, 2004, petitioner rendered his Decision15 finding private respondent administratively
liable, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent RUDY C. TESORO, is hereby found GUILTY OF
GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT pursuant to Section 46 (b) (3) and (4),
Chapter 7, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987", in relation to Section 52 (A)(2) and (3), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). Consequently, respondent is hereby meted
the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, WITH PERPETUAL PROHIBITION FROM
REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
AND CANCELLATION OF HIS ELIGIBILITY.
SO ORDERED.16
The Board of Trustees of GSIS through Resolution No. 118 dated May 26, 2004, approved the draft
decision. Copy of the decision was served on private respondent on June 2, 2004 but was returned
to the Investigation Unit because private respondent has not reported for work since June 1, 2004. 17
On June 28, 2004, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the May 24, 2004
Decision but it was denied by petitioner in his Resolution dated July 5, 2004. 18
In his Comment19 filed before the CA on June 11, 2004, petitioner contended that private
respondents petition for certiorari is already moot and academic with the rendition of the decision in
the administrative case. Petitioner also pointed out that private respondent is misleading the
appellate court when the petition alleged that the Formal Charge was issued without any preliminary

investigation. Further, petitioner asserted that private respondent violated the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies when he filed the petition for certiorari despite the availability of appeal.
Private respondent filed his Reply to which a Rejoinder was filed by the petitioner.
Aside from the petition filed in the CA, private respondent also appealed the order of preventive
suspension, as well as the Decision dated May 24, 2004 finding him administratively liable for gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC).20
In the meantime, upon reevaluation the GSIS Physical Resources Bids and Awards Committee
(PRBAC) declared a "failure of bidding" pursuant to Section 41 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9184. Embrocal and its counsel were advised that the contract for the
construction of the GSIS-ICFO building entered into with private respondent was null and void ab
initio, and hence Embrocal should return the amount of mobilization fees illegally released to it. 21 The
COA Regional Legal and Adjudication Office later issued a Notice of Disallowance of the amount
released to Embrocal as mobilization fee. Private respondent along with Teruel, Jamantoc, Corteza,
Sonalan, Capalla and Basa, Jr. were all found liable for the disallowed sum. Private respondent has
not filed any motion for reconsideration of the said disallowance. 22
On April 11, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision23 which decreed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed Formal Charge dated 19 February
2004 of the respondent, and his Decision dated 24 May 2004, are hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The administrative offense of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct and/or violation
of reasonable office rules and regulations for which petitioner is charged is hereby set aside,
and modified to the lower administrative offense of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.
(b) The Decision dated 24 May 2004 of herein respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
xxxx
is hereby set aside, and a new one is hereby rendered, finding the petitioner RUDY C. TESORO,
GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY pursuant to Section 52 (B) (I), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). Consequently, petitioner is hereby meted the
penalty of suspension for six (6) months, without pay, the period for which he was preventively
suspended and subsequently dismissed shall be credited for the purpose of serving the penalty
hereof. Accordingly, the respondent is directed to immediately reinstate the petitioner to his last
position, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with payment of backwages inclusive of
allowances and other benefits from the time of his suspension and dismissal exceeding six (6)
months until actual reinstatement. The petitioner is further sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.24
Petitioner received a copy of the above decision on April 22, 2005, and thus had only until May 7,
2005 within which to file a motion for reconsideration. However, on May 4, 2005, it filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File the Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the lawyer in charge of the
case, Atty. Violeta C.F. Quintos of the Investigation Unit, had to immediately take a flight to Cebu City

on April 24, 2005 because her father died; she is expected to report for work on May 5, 2005. The
motion for reconsideration was filed on May 16, 2005.25
Private respondent filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and Writ of Execution asserting that the
decision had attained finality for failure of petitioner to file a timely motion for reconsideration or
appeal.26 He likewise filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal in CSC Adm. Case No.
04-001 (Preventive Suspension and Illegal Dismissal)27
By Resolution dated July 20, 2005, the CA, citing the case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japson28 denied petitioners motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration and merely
noted private respondents motion.
The present petition filed on August 10, 2005 alleges that
A. The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled on the merits of the case despite the fact that it did not have the
complete records of the case thus depriving petitioner of due process;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it went beyond the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent and
proceeded to rule on the formal charge and the merits of the case;
C. Factual errors and misapplication of law were committed by the Honorable Court of
Appeals even as the evidence does not support the decision;
D. Petitioners notice to the Court of Appeals of the Decision in the administrative case
rendered the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent moot and academic;
E. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to appreciate and apply the
principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies when it gave due course to the Petition
for Certiorari filed by respondent;
F. There is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy available to petitioner.29
In his Comment,30 private respondent argues that with the denial by the CA of petitioners motion for
extension to file a motion for reconsideration, the April 11, 2005 Decision of the CA is already final
and executory. Hence, he prays for the outright dismissal of the present petition.
As to the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, private respondent contends that this
case falls under the recognized exceptions to the said rule considering the purely legal issue
involved and the violation of his right to due process. He further asserts that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the CA when it modified the charge against him considering that: (1)
there was no document or evidence showing that he received the November 24, 2003 reassignment
order on the date he signed the disbursement voucher (November 25, 2003) for the release of the
15% mobilization fee to Embrocal; (2) even assuming he was informed immediately on November
24, 2003 regarding his transfer, his act of signing the check and disbursement voucher was still valid
and legal since he has not assumed the duties of the new position (SVP-CSG) at that time; (3) he
was not in a position to overturn the decision and recommendation of the BAC and the previous
signatories to the check and voucher; (4) he cannot be charged with gross neglect of duty in relying
on the expert recommendation of the BAC members and his subordinates.

Petitioner counters that the private respondent may not deprive this Court of appellate jurisdiction
over the CAs April 11, 2005 Decision, citing Barnes v. Padilla.31 He reiterates that the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it ruled on the merits of the administrative case despite the absence of
complete records and transformed the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent into an
appeal. The CA also ignored the more than substantial evidence showing that private respondent
was guilty of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct that would justify the imposition of a higher
penalty.
Petitioner stresses that contrary to private respondents assertions, he was the final approving
authority who could accept, modify or completely disregard the BACs recommendation after
evaluation of the bidding process. The CA decision, in fact, had confirmed petitioners finding that
private respondent was really remiss in his job and is actually to be blamed for the anomalous award
to the highest bidder. Moreover, BAC members were not appointed for their expertise in the bidding
process but are employees designated to said committee by virtue of their positions in the Iloilo City
Field Office Department (ICFOD). Private respondents supervision over the ICFOD-BAC, as SVPFOG, includes authority over their recommendations. On his continuing claim that he signed the
disbursement voucher and check on November 25, 2003 prior to his receipt of the transfer order,
petitioner cites the affidavit of Manager Teruel stating that the disbursement voucher and check were
hand-carried from the Iloilo City Field Office to the OSVP-FOG for private respondents signature on
November 27, 2003.
The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson.32 However, in previous cases we suspended this rule in order
to serve substantial justice.33
In Barnes v. Padilla,34 we exempted from the operation of the general rule the petitioner whose
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. In the
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 30, 2004, we
held that:
A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioners counsel was understandably
confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which was
expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the
IRCA. The lawyers negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the petitioner is a
sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.
More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215 in Civil Case No. Q-99-37219, as both are patently
erroneous. x x x
Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension of the rules.
What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law, involving the issue of forum-shopping, and
not a factual matter involving the merits of each partys respective claims and defenses relating to
the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase the subject
property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere
technicalities. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.35(Emphases supplied)

After a conscientious review, we hold that a suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since
the delay of one week and two days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration was not
occasioned by negligence on the part of petitioners lawyer in charge of the case, the latter having a
valid excuse to immediately take leave of absence in view of her fathers sudden demise.
Additionally, the merits of the case impel us to adopt a more liberal stance. There is likewise no
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. As we said in Barnes v. Padilla: 36
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as
to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.
xxxx
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
While private respondent filed his answer to the Formal Charge issued by petitioner, he filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA questioning its validity and the order of preventive suspension, even
before the hearing proper was conducted. The CA found no jurisdictional ground to invalidate the
Formal Charge, and did not make any ruling on the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion
attended the imposition of the preventive suspension order. However, the CA proceeded to review
the merits of the administrative charge against private respondent, concurring with petitioners
finding that private respondent was remiss in his duties and responsibilities but declaring private
respondent liable for the lesser offense of Simple Neglect and imposing on him the lower penalty
therefor. The CA thus exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction when it reviewed the alleged errors of the
disciplining authority not only in finding a prima facie case against the private respondent but also in
determining his guilt. This despite the fact that the rendition of the decision in Adm. Case No. 04-001
by the disciplining authority (GSIS) was earlier brought to the attention of the CA.
A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for
certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure
or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. 37 As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more
than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court,38 and not a petition for certiorari.
Considering that the CA did not declare any act of the petitioner to have been exercised without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of relief to private respondent by
sentencing him to a lower offense with reduced penalty cannot be sustained. Whether the private
respondent may be held liable for Gross Neglect of Duty as stated in the Formal Charge or for the
lower offense of Simple Neglect of Duty should be properly threshed out in Adm. Case No. 04-001
and thereafter in a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission, not in the certiorari proceedings
before the CA seeking nullification of the Formal Charge and preventive suspension order.
In the case of People v. Court of Appeals,39 accused-respondents were convicted by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 and accordingly sentenced with the
prescribed penalty of imprisonment. Instead of appealing the RTC judgment after the denial of their
motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA,

praying for the reversal of their conviction. The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the
evidence on record, its findings of facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA
forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of
conviction, and acquitted one of the respondents of the crime charged.
On appeal by the People to this Court, we reversed and set aside the CAs decision ordering a repromulgation of the RTC decision against the two respondents and acquitting one respondent.
Addressing the issue of whether the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction or without jurisdiction when
it acquitted one of the respondents in a petition for certiorari for the nullification of the trial courts
decision, we held:
x x x. However, instead of appealing the decision by writ of error, the respondents filed their petition
for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the trial court on its merits. They questioned their
conviction and the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt
for the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely hearsay and based on mere
inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition.
It behooved the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course and
granting it.
The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record, its findings of facts, and its
conclusions based on the said findings. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was
utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent
Almuete of the crime charged.
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of
its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived
errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by
appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the
crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular
case only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no
application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a particular
judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, the CA is authorized to entertain
and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.40 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, records showed that private respondent appealed the May 24, 2004 Decision of
petitioner finding him administratively liable for gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct and
imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, to the CSC. He also separately appealed the
preventive suspension order to the CSC. Later, however, private respondent filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Withdraw Appeal (both the preventive suspension and illegal dismissal cases) with the
CSC on May 25, 2005, without mentioning the April 11, 2005 Decision of the CA modifying the
Formal Charge and the aforesaid May 24, 2004 Decision of petitioner.
1wphi1

In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal
power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with
the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse
of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough.41
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within
the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the

particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general
power in respect of it are wanting.42The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ
cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness,
either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing that there is reason for the
Court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the
office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision or
resolution.43
Since petitioner is vested with the requisite legal authority to issue the Formal Charge, after due
investigation in accordance with existing rules and regulations of the Civil Service, and to commence
administrative proceedings against the private respondent,44 and in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of such powers, it behooved the CA to dismiss the petition instead of giving
it due course and granting it. In resolving the merits of the decision rendered in the administrative
case despite the pendency of private respondents appeal before the CSC assailing the correctness
of the same decision, the CA clearly exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for,
accordingly GRANTED. The Decision dated April 11, 2005 and Resolution dated July 20, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 82751 are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO

M. RETERTA and ELISA
RETERTA, namely: EDUARDO
M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M.
RETERTA, and AVELINA M.
RETERTA,
Petitioners,
- versus -

G.R. No. 159941

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

SPOUSES LORENZO MORES

August 17, 2011
and VIRGINIA LOPEZ,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title
and reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being friar
land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau
(LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion that can be corrected
through certiorari.
The petitioners, whose complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance the
RTC had dismissed, had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground thatcertiorari was
not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal. They now
appeal that ruling of the CA promulgated on April 25, 2003.[1]
Antecedents
On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title
and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983),
[2]
averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land)
situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters,
having inherited the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that
their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and
cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open,
exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years;
that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father
had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and
participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769
had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T64071 had later issued to the respondents.
On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to
dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case

No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal
personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding:[3]
Considering that plaintiffs in this case sought the review of the
propriety of the grant of lot 2938 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Friar
Lands Estate by the Lands Management Bureau of the defendant
Lorenzo Mores through the use of the forged Affidavit and Sales
Certificate No. V-769 which eventually led to the issuance of T.C.T. No.
T-64071 to defendant Lorenzo Mores and wife Virginia Mores, and
considering further that the land subject of this case is a friar land and
not land of the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the law
prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the
exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the
determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the
procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the
Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no
jurisdiction over the nature of this action. On the second ground relied
upon by the defendants in their Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state that
the Court deemed not to discuss the same.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let this instant case be dismissed
as it is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration on February 21, 2002.[4]
On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the
dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on April 25,
2003, holding: [5]
Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to
lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.

In the case at bench, when the court rendered the assailed decision,
the remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to this
Court. But petitioners did not. Instead they filed the present special civil
action for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision of the court a
quo has become final.
The Order dismissing the case was issued by the court a quo on 29
October 2001, which Order was received by the petitioners on
November 16, 2001. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated
November 26, 2001 but the same was denied by the court a quo on 21
February 2002. The Order denying the motion for reconsideration was
received by the petitioners on 20 March 2002.
Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari on May 15,
2002. Certiorari, however cannot be used as a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal.
In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423, the Supreme
Court had the following to say:
We have time and again reminded members of the bench
and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite
the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute
for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners motion for

reconsideration.[6]
Hence, this appeal.
Issues

The petitioners submit that:

I.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS TO DISREGARD THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1,
RULE 41, SECOND PARAGRAPH, SUBPARAGRAPH (a), AND
SECTION 9, RULE 37, 1997 RULES OF COURT;
II.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS TO APPLY THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ROSETE vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 339 SCRA 193, 199, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
ALREADY TOOK EFFECT ON JULY 1, 1997.

III.
IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
COMPLAINT RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE NATURE OF THE ACTION, AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME.[7]

Briefly stated, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
1.
Propriety of certiorari as remedy
against dismissal of the action

The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari,

considering that the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss was a final,
as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was
an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute
for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[8]
Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was
their proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of
procedure, specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
37 of the Rules of Court (An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment
or final order) prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration,
and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
( No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration) expressly declared that an order denying a motion for
reconsideration was not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the instances where the judgment
or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65.
The petitioners position has no basis.
For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was
the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion
for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a
final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for
the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as
the correct remedy.
The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand,
and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] viz:
The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become
final (or executory as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the
merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares

categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task
of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be
done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which among others,
may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking
of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment
once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final
and executory.

xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case,
and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or
denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the

petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the
petitioners motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order
dismissing the action upon the respondents motion to dismiss. The said rule
explicitly states thusly:
Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for

reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and
reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or
presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a

reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues,

contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive;
or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the
decision or final order is contrary to law.[10] By denying a motion for
reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no
reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the
judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial
in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.
The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997
version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the time
when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 included an order
denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion
seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or
any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an
appeal therefrom; and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65. (n)

It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27,

2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of nonappealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be
retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis would not be right
and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force
at the time when it issued its assailed final order.
2.
RTC or MTC has jurisdiction over the action
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when
appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given
due course to and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons,
namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due
course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the
petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to
dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy
despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court hasdeclared that
the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial
judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be
danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and

insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public
interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy
does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making
use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or
speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine
the propriety of certiorari.[12] A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or
resolution of the lower court or agency.[13] It is understood, then, that a litigant need
not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an
order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to
comply with the Rules of Court.[14]
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being
available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on
balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary
disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower
court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. [15] Verily, the
instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to
destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide
breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is not
wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior
courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be granted whenever
necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.[16]
The petitioners complaint self-styled as being for the quieting of title and
reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate, reconveyance
and damages would challenge the efficacy of the respondents certificate of title
under the theory that there had been no valid transfer or assignment from the
petitioners predecessor in interest to the respondents of the rights or interests in the
land due to the affidavit assigning such rights and interests being a forgery and
procured by fraud.

The petitioners cause of action for reconveyance has support in

jurisprudence bearing upon the manner by which to establish a right in a piece of
friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya,[17] in order that a transfer of the rights of a
holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary
that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law authorizes no
other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands.
In other words, where a person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land
transfers his rights thereon, such transfer must conform to certain requirements of
the law. Under Director of Lands v. Rizal,[18] the purchaser in the sale of friar lands
under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the actual owner of the lot
purchased even before the payment of the full payment price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in full
the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that of a mere
lien holder or mortgagee.[19]
Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120, [20] had grantee Teofilo Reterta
perfected his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him and taken
title from him upon his death. By law, therefore, should the execution of the deed
in favor of the respondents be held invalid, the interests of Teofilo Reterta should
descend to the petitioners and the deed should issue in their favor. Adding
significance to the petitioners claim was their allegation in the complaint that they
were in possession of the land. Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners opposition to
the motion to dismiss of the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the
price of the land.[21]
Given the foregoing, the petitioners complaint made out a good case for
reconveyance or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might well
warrant the reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the petitioners. It did
not matter that the respondents already held a certificate of title in their names. In
essence, an action for reconveyance respects the incontrovertibility of the decree of
registration but seeks the transfer of the property to its rightful and legal owner on
the ground of its having been fraudulently or mistakenly registered in another
persons name. There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is
enough that the aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the

claim of the registered owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value.[22] On this score, it is also worthy to stress that
the titleof a piece of a friar land obtained by a grantee from the Government
without conforming with the requirements set by the law may be assailed and
nullified.
Was the petitioners action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the
regular court?
We answer the query in the affirmative.
The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[24] which provides:
[23]

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx

Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to

remove a cloud on ones title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the
RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in
which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive
original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would
be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the
principal relief thereby sought.[25]

The respondents reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to

sustain their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had
exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. The provisions read:
Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give
the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail
that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the
amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided
in this Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands xxx and
that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be
issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one
hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act xxx.
Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by
the Secretary of the Interior.

As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being
limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the
petitioners action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar
land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latters
name. By ignoring the petitioners showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil
Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC
acted whimsically and capriciously.
Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack
of jurisdiction.[26] The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[27]

The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the
petitioners bereft of any remedy to protect their substantial rights or interests in the
land. As such, they would suffer grave injustice and irreparabledamage. In
that situation, the RTCs dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the
task of the remedy was to do justice to the unjustly aggrieved.[28]
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for certiorari; sets aside the
decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 25, 2003; and directs Branch
23 of the Regional Trial Court in Trece Martires City to resume the proceedings in
Civil Case No. TM-983 with dispatch.
The respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 158239

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

January 25, 2012

RAMON C. JAVELLANA,
ET AL.,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the

defending partys motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because
it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter
therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to
execute the order.[1] Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days
from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.[2]
Antecedents
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for
consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of
conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters
located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would
pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon
the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration
being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should
Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma
Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive
the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.[3]
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita
without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the
undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System,
and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein
with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial
subdivision.[4] Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on
February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages
against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 79-M-97 entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented by Atty.
Guillermo G. Blanco v. Priscilla Alma Jose.
In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of the
deed of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and had
taken possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the purchase
price to Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenals representation that Margarita had

needed funds for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax; and
that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the
parcels of land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been
mortgaged but had been sold to him.[5]
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings
and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.[6]
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.[7]
The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998.
However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June
24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of
action against her due to her not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed
of conditional sale for not being a party thereto; that there was no evidence
showing the payment of the balance; that he had never demanded the registration
of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance
against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not
credible.[9]
[8]

Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of

evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and
that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, the facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically admitted and only the
allegations in the complaint should be considered in resolving the motion.
[10]
Nonetheless, he attached to the motion for reconsideration the receipts showing
the payments made to Juvenal.[11] Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no
longer succeed to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had
meanwhile acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she,
as sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them under
the Torrens System.[12]

On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.[13]
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order,
which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of
Appeals (CA).
[14]

In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following

as errors of the RTC,[15] to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED
WITH THE FULL PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY
TAKEN ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF SAID
PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED
OF SALE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE
CIVIL [CODE], PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF
THE TERMS OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTAPPELLEE BEING NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED
OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER MOTHER IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTFFAPPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT BE
COMPELLED TO DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED
OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.

Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that the
appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.
[16]

It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition

for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders
dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455). On August 6, 2001, however,
the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,[17] finding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed,
at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged
orders.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 68259,[18] reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97,
and remanding the records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with
law.[19] The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action;
that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with
respect to the parcels of land; that Margaritas undertaking under the contract was
not a purely personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was
consequently bound to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet
prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible
brought by Javellana who had actual possession of the properties; and that based
on the
complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on his
title had come about only when Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on
the premises.[20]
On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, [21] stating
that it decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because
Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek
an extension of time to file his appellants brief; that current jurisprudence afforded
litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of
technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court
was given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.
Issues

Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not
outrightly dismissing Javellanas appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC order
was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days;
and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition
for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his
appeal pending in the CA. She posited that, even if the CAs decision to entertain
the appeal was affirmed, the RTCs dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless
be upheld because the complaint stated no cause of action, and the action had
already prescribed.
On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by Priscilla
involved questions of fact not proper for the Court to review through petition for
review on certiorari; that the June 21, 2000 RTC order, being a final order, was
appealable; that his appeal was perfected on time; and that he was not guilty of
forum shopping because at the time he filed the
petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68259 was different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 60455.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an
appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no
appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to
be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97.
It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished
between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[22] thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is
well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but
the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertainwhether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to
be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does,
the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether

appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with
the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to
the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable;[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of
remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory
order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which
necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action
during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will
necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there
are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory
orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may
be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of
the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal

is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorariunder Rule 65 allowed
to be resorted to.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final
order
or
judgment
itself;
and
has
expressly
clarified
that the prohibitionagainst appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order.[24]
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She
points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and
filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days);
that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21,
2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days
from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and
that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been
dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary
period.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for

new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)

Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13,
2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely
filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of
appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not
perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however,
considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse
judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.
It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court
of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions
of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file
their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.[26]

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already
retroactively extended the fresh period rule to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.[27] According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[28]
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules
and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer
justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh
period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that
the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following
the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule"
should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period
rule will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000,
as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which
were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties
receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998
will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule while those later rulings of
the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not. [29]

Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed

pursuant to the fresh period rule.
III
No forum shopping was committed

Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice

of appeal and a petition for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier noted, he
denies that his doing so violated the policy against forum shopping.
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re:
Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and
Issuance of Owners Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando
Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:[30]

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an

adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the
special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping
happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of
parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there
is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of
an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c)
the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the
petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?

We are aware that in Young v. Sy,[31] in which the petitioner filed a notice of
appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to
the CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the same orders four
months later, the Court ruled that the successive filings of the notice of appeal and
the petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying the trial courts
dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the dismissal of both
cases. The Court said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a
petition
for certiorari with the CA,
engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal,
only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA
the Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 and which eventually came up
to this Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements
of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. As the CA, through
its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly
the
same
facts
and
refer
to
the
same
subject
matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No.
SP5703 (2000) for
failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal
of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed,
and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment
of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy.
The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals,
and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the
others, she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a
demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy or adequate
enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if
adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in multiple fora,
where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a precautionary
measure for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable
decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping
seeks to put right. InGuaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated
that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule
against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of
two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants,

taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try

their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To
avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules
against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the
dismissal of the case.[32]

The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,[33] which likewise involved
the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to challenge
the same orders, with the Court upholding the CAs dismissals of the appeal and the
petition for certiorari through separate decisions.
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if the
orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition
for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because the appeal and the
petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In his appeal in C.A.G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of
Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific
performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition
for certiorari had the ostensible objective to prevent (Priscilla) from developing
the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is
finally resolved, as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 60455.[34]
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum
shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the
multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize
considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court
or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal,
would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of
the filing of the petition for certiorari.

Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial

approaches to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellanas counsel on
the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his caretakers eviction from the parcels of
land and to prevent the development of them into a residential or commercial
subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly
averred that his appeal was inadequate and not speedy to prevent private
respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee xxx from developing and
disposing of the subject property to other parties to the total deprivation of
petitioners rights of possession and ownership over the subject property, and that
the dismissal by the RTC had emboldened private respondents to fully develop the
property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment case against petitioners
overseer xxx.[35] Thereby, it became far-fetched that Javellana brought the petition
for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the
Court DENIES the
petition
for
review
on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 20, 2002;
and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

MARCELINO
LOPEZ,
FELISA LOPEZ, LEONARDO
LOPEZ and ZOILO LOPEZ,
Petitioners,
- versus JOSE
ESQUIVEL,
JR. andCARLITO TALENS,
Respondents.
x------------------------x

G.R. No. 168734

NOEL
RUBBER
&
DEVELOPMENT
CORP.
doing business under the
name of NORDEC PHIL.
and
DR.
POTENCIANO
MALVAR,

G.R. No. 170621

Petitioners,
- versus JOSE
ESQUIVEL,
JR.,
CARLITO
TALENS,
MARCELINO
LOPEZ,
FELISA LOPEZ, LEONARDO
LOPEZ,
ZOILO
LOPEZ,
ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES,
ATTY. GEORGE A. ANG
CHENG, and
THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA,

Present:

Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 24, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated [1] Petitions for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 168734, namely, Marcelino,

Felisa, Leonardo and Zoilo, all surnamed Lopez (Lopez siblings),
seek to reverse and set aside the Decision [2] dated 14 February
2005 and Resolution[3] dated 27 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 70200. In its assailed Decision, the appellate
court affirmed in toto the Decision[4] dated 11 January 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, in Civil Case
No. 96-4193, which (1) ordered the Lopez siblings to vacate and
to convey to Jose Esquivel, Jr. (Esquivel) and Carlito Talens (Talens)
a parcel of land, measuring 2.6950 hectares, situated in Barrio

dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal[5](subject property); and (2) directed the

Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metropolitan Manila, [6] to divest the
Lopez siblings of their title over the subject property and to issue
title over the same property in the names of Esquivel and
Talens. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied for
lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Lopez siblings.

On the other hand, Noel Rubber and Development

Corporation (Nordec Phil.) and Dr. Potenciano Malvar (Dr. Malvar),
the petitioners in G.R. No. 170621, pray for the setting aside of
the Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 [7]and 16 November
2005[8] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428. The Court
of Appeals, in its questioned Resolution dated 6 October 2005,
dismissed for prematurity the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed by Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar under Rule 47 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the RTC Decision dated
11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, as they were not
impleaded in said case, neither as indispensable nor necessary
parties. The appellate court, in its other questioned Resolution
dated 16 November 2005, denied the Motion for Amendment
and/or Reconsideration of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.

The antecedent facts of both Petitions are recounted as follows:

G.R. No. 168734

Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez
siblings. During Hermogenes lifetime, he applied with the Bureau
of Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land, with an
area of 19.4888 hectares, located in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo,
Rizal. Hermogenes application was docketed as Homestead
Patent No. 138612. After ascertaining that the land was free from
claim of any private person, the Bureau of Lands approved

Hermogenes application. In 1939, Hermogenes submitted his final

proof of compliance with the residency and cultivation
requirements of the Public Land Act. As a matter of course, the
aforesaid parcel of land was surveyed by a government surveyor
and the resulting plan H-138612 was approved by the Director of
Lands on 7 February 1939. The Director of Lands, thereafter,
ordered the issuance of the homestead patent in Hermogenes
name. The patent was subsequently transmitted to the Register of
Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title[9] in Hermogenes name.[10]

Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent

over the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold [11] the same to
Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale[12] dated 31 July 1959.

Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property,

with an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in
survey plan H-138612 of Hermogenes property. The subject
property supposedly formed part of the land owned by Lauro
Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of Hermogenes. Resultantly,
on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim [13] over
his rights and interests to the subject property [14] in Hizons
favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and
Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land[15] dated 26 August 1968.

Hermogenes died[16] on 20 August 1982. The Lopez siblings, as Hermogenes heirs,

filed an action with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, for the cancellation of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959, executed between Hermogenes and
Aguilar, and which involved the entire 19.4888-hectare land. It was docketed
as Civil Case No. 463-A. In a Decision[17] dated 5 February 1985, the RTC
declared the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio as it was made

in violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended. The said RTC Decision was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision[18] dated 18 August 1987 in CA-G.R. CV No.
06242. In a Resolution[19] dated 13 April 1988, this Court denied Aguilars appeal,
docketed as G.R. No. 81092, for being filed late.

On 4 March 1993, on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale of

Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in
their favor, Esquivel and Talens filed an Application for
Registration of the subject property with the RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 73. It was docketed as LRC Case No. 93-1211. The
Lopez siblings filed an opposition to the application in LRC Case
No. 93-1211, asserting, among other grounds, that: (1) they did
not know the persons and personal circumstances of Esquivel and
Talens who were not the formers adjoining property owners; (2)
the subject property, which Esquivel and Talens sought to have
registered, was already titled under the Torrens system and
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 207990 to No.
207997[20] in the names of the Lopez siblings; and (3) Tax
Declaration No. 04-10304 of Esquivel and Talens covering the
subject property was spurious. The Lopez siblings also moved for
the dismissal of LRC Case No. 93-1211 invoking the final and
executory Decision[21] dated 5 February 1985 of the RTC of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 463-A, which affirmed
Hermogenes title to the 19.4888-hectare land, that included the
subject property.

The RTC rendered its Decision[22] on 4 April 1995 in LRC Case No.
No. 93-1211, granting the Application for Registration of the
subject property filed by Esquivel and Talens. Accordingly, the
Lopez siblings filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said RTC
judgment. Acting on the Motion of the Lopez siblings, the RTC
issued an Order[23] dated 23 May 1996 in which it corrected

several errors in its earlier decision, i.e., a typographical error on

the area of the subject property, and a mistake in the conversion
of the area of the subject property from square meters to
hectares. The RTC also stated in the same Order that it could not
direct the amendment of the TCTs in the names of the Lopez
siblings, to exclude therefrom the subject property which was
adjudged to Esquivel and Talens, as the RTC was sitting only as a
land registration court. The RTC, thus, advised Esquivel and Talens
to file an action for reconveyance of the subject property and only
when Esquivel and Tales succeed in such action can they
subsequently cause the registration of the subject property in
their names.

Following the advice of the RTC, Esquivel and Talens filed with the
RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73, on 2 October 1996, a
Complaint[24] for Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of the
subject property against the Lopez siblings. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-4193.

In their Complaint, Esquivel and Talens alleged that when the

Lopez siblings had the land they inherited from Hermogenes
registered, they included the subject property, which Hermogenes
already conveyed to Hizon in the Quitclaim dated 29 November
1965. Hence, the subject property was erroneously included in
TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997, issued by the Register of Deeds
of Marikina, Metro Manila, in the names of the Lopez siblings. The
subject property is presently occupied and in the physical
possession of the Lopez siblings.[25]

In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the Lopez siblings

denied all the allegations of Esquivel and Talens. As their special
defenses, the Lopez siblings called attention to the non-

compliance by Esquivel and Talens with Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, on non-forum shopping,
considering that there was another case before the RTC of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71,[26] also involving the subject property
and the issues on the genuineness and validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968,
executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens. The Lopez
siblings further averred that the cause of action of Esquivel and
Talens was already barred by the statute of limitations and laches
since they failed to assert their alleged rights to the subject
property for 25 years.[27] The Lopez siblings additionally
interposed that the Quitclaim involving the subject property,
invoked by Esquivel and Talens, was ineffective, because by the
time it was executed by Hermogenes in favor of Hizon on 29
November 1965, Hermogenes had already sold his entire
19.4888-hectare land, of which the subject property was part, to
Aguilar on 31 July 1959. The Lopez siblings finally argued that the
said Quitclaim was a nullity as it contravened Section 17 [28] of the
Public Land Act, as amended.[29]

On 11 January 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case 964193, granting the prayer of Esquivel and Talens for the
reconveyance and recovery of possession of the subject
property. The RTC held that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31
July 1959 between Hermogenes and Aguilar was already declared
null
and
void ab
initio by
a
court
of
competent
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Lopez siblings were estopped from
asserting said Deed to defeat the rights of Esquivel and Talens to
the subject property. The RTC also ruled that Esquivel and Talens
were not guilty of laches because as early as 1986, they had
declared the subject property in their names for taxation
purposes. Moreover, in 1993, Esquivel and Talens filed before the
RTC an application for registration of the subject property, LRC
Case No. 93-1222, where they obtained a favorable

judgment. The RTC lastly found that the action for reconveyance
of Esquivel and Talens was not yet barred by prescription as it was
instituted within the 30-year prescriptive period.
The Lopez siblings filed an appeal of the aforementioned RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
70200.

In their Appellants Brief, the Lopez siblings assigned the

following errors:

1.

The trial court presided by Judge Mauricio M.

Rivera erred in failing to dismiss this case for
reconveyance on the grounds of: (a) prescription of
action; and (b) laches;

2.

[Hermogenes] was no longer the owner of the

property when he executed the [quitclaim] dated
[29 November 1965] because of the previous sale to
third party on [31 July 1959];

3.

There was (sic) no prior records in the Bureau of

Lands or in the assessors office that [Hizon], the
predecessor-in-interest of the [Esquivel and Talens]
is a landholder or a previous tax declarant;

4.

The court a quo thru the same judge indiscreetly

based primarily the appealed decision on its
erroneous findings and conclusions in LRC Case No.
93-1211 contrary to the findings and conclusions of
this Honorable Court among others in CA G.R. CV
No. 07745, entitled Ambrocio Aguilar v. Heirs of

Fernando Gorospe, et al. promulgated on 31 August

1989; in CA G.R. CV No. 06242, entitled Marcelino
Lopez, et al. v. Sps. Ambrocio [Aguilar] and Pelagia
Viray promulgated on 18 August 1987; and the
findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 90380 entitled Santos v. Court of
Appeals promulgated on 13 September 1990 among
others.

5.

Having already erred in favor of the [Esquivel and

Talens], the same presiding judge of the trial court
erringly proceeded to conduct hearing and to decide
this case despite the consolidation of Civil Case No.
95-3693 entitled Angelina Hizon, et al. v. Carlito
Talens, et al., involving the same subject property
and the efficacy and validity of the [quitclaim] solely
relied upon by the [Esquivel and Talens].[30]

On 14 February 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision

dismissing the appeal of the Lopez siblings and affirming in
toto the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001. The appellate court
ruled that the Lopez siblings are barred by the doctrine of
estoppel in pais from challenging the Quitclaim executed by
Hermogenes over the subject property in favor of Hizon on 29
November 1965 on the ground that Hermogenes no longer owned
the subject property at that time. The Lopez siblings themselves,
as Hermogenes heirs, filed with the RTC Civil Case No. 463-A for
the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the
19.4888-hectare land (which included the subject property),
executed by Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar on 31 July 1959. The
Lopez siblings obtained a favorable judgment in Civil Case No.
463-A as the RTC therein declared void ab initio the aforesaid

Deed of Absolute Sale.Hence, the Lopez siblings are now

estopped from asserting the validity of the same Deed of Absolute
Sale so as to void or nullify the Quitclaim executed by
Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar, on which Esquivel and Talens
based their claim to the subject property. Any deviation by the
Lopez siblings from their previous position would definitely cause
injury and prejudice to Esquivel and Talens, who acted relying on
the knowledge that the previous sale between Hermogenes and
Aguilar of the land, which included the subject property, was
already adjudged void ab initio. The Lopez siblings, moreover,
were only subrogated to whatever rights and interests their father
Hermogenes still had over the subject property upon the latters
death in 1982. They were, thus, bound by the Quitclaim
Hermogenes executed in 1965 involving the subject property. [31]

The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision

filed by the Lopez siblings was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 27 June 2005.

The Lopez siblings are presently before this Court seeking

the resolution of the following issues:

I. Whether or not the [Court of Appeals] erred in applying

the rule of estoppel in disregard of the law of the case
doctrine (a) in the Decision promulgated on [13
September 1990] in G.R. No. 90380 entitled Eduardo
Santos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals; (b) in the
Decision [E]n [B]anc promulgated on [24 September
2002] in G.R. No. 123780, entitled In Re: Petition Seeking
for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of
Two (2) Final and Executory but conflicting Decisions of
[this Court] Col. Pedro Cabuay, Jr. v. Marcelino Lopez, et

al; and (c) in the Decision promulgated on [5 March 2003]

in G.R. No. 127827 entitled Eleuterio Lopez, et al. v. The
Hon. Court of Appeals, Spouses Marcelino Lopez and
Cristina Lopez, et al.;

II.

Whether or not the [appellate court] was correct in

applying the rule of estoppel in pais in disregard of the
peremptory and [personal-to-the-applicants-homestead]
provisions of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act
141, as amended;

III.

Are the [Esquivel and Talens] and their predecessor-ininterest barred by the statute of limitations?

IV.

Are the [Esquivel and Talens] and their predecessor-ininterest guilty of laches?

V.

The quitclaim relied upon by [Esquivel and Talens] is

intrinsically void and has violated the provisions of the
Public Land Law.[32]

The Lopez siblings aver that a deeper analysis of the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals will reveal the latters
utter disregard for or deviation from the law of the case set by
this Court in its Decisions in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[33] Group
Commander, Intelligence & Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr.
Malvar,[34] and Lopez v. Court of Appeals,[35] where the issue on the
validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes, father

of the Lopez siblings, was already passed upon. In these three

Decisions, the Court already declared the homestead patent
awarded to Hermogenes valid. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
erred in applying the rule on estoppel in disregard of the doctrine
of law of the case.

The Lopez siblings further argue that the assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals runs counter to the personal-to-thehomestead-applicant policy[36] provisions embodied in Sections
12, 13, and 17 of the Public Land Act, as amended, that this Court
upheld in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez. The Court precisely
disregarded the rule on estoppel in pais or the principle of trust in
said three cases as it had no room for application under the tenor
or context of the mandatory personal-to-the-homestead-applicant
policy provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. It was, thus,
erroneous for the appellate court to apply estoppel in pais in
ruling against the Lopez siblings in its assailed judgment.

The Lopez siblings additionally avow that in the proceedings

conducted on Hermogenes homestead application by the Bureau
of Lands, it was verified that the land applied for, which included
the subject property, was disposable public land. If it was true
that the subject property was only erroneously included in the
homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes, then such an award
could only be challenged by the government in an action for
reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act, as amended;
or objected to by a private person under Section 102 of the same
statute. Resultantly, Esquivel and Talens could not have availed
themselves of the recourse prescribed by Section 38 [37] of Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, in their action
for reconveyance of the subject property. Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act may only be availed of by an aggrieved owner
whose property was fraudulently included in a decree of

registration. A decree of registration under the Land Registration

Act merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership over private
land
so
as
to
bring
it
under
the
operation
of
the Torrens system. The remedies provided under Sections 101
and 102 of the Public Land Act, on one hand, and Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act, on the other, are exclusive of each
other, considering the basic distinction in the subject matters
thereof, i.e., the award or grant of public land in the former, and
the registration of private land in the latter.

The Lopez siblings also maintain that Hizon, predecessor-ininterest of Esquivel and Talens, who claimed ownership over the
subject property, was duty bound to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family by opposing or taking exception to
Hermogenes homestead application, which included said
property. Even after the homestead patent over the subject
property was already awarded to Hermogenes, Hizon still had
opportunity to protest the same before the Bureau of Lands, prior
to the registration of said homestead patent with the Register of
Deeds. For failing to take appropriate actions, Hizon, and his
successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are now barred from
doing so by the statute of limitations and laches.

Finally, the Lopez siblings assert that the reliance by the

Court of Appeals on the legal efficacy of the Quitclaim involving
the subject property executed by Hermogenes in favor of Hizon is
misplaced. The reason for the renunciation, waiver, or repudiation
by Hermogenes of his rights to the subject property in Hizons
favor, as stated in the said Quitclaim, is not a recognized cause or
consideration for conveyance of a parcel of land subject of a
homestead patent under the prohibitive and mandatory
provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. Moreover,

whatever efficacy the Quitclaim had was already barred by the

ruling of this Court en banc in Cabuay and Lopez.

The instant Petition is meritorious.

Since the issues in this case are interrelated, the Court shall
discuss them concurrently.

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion

delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court passes on a
question and remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the
case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.[38] Thus, the court reviewing the succeeding
appeal will not re-litigate the case but instead apply the ruling in
the previous appeal. This enables the appellate court to perform
its duties satisfactorily and efficiently which would be impossible
if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be
litigated anew in the same case and upon any and subsequent
appeal.[39]

Given the foregoing, it is apparent that the Decisions of this

Court in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, cited by the Lopez siblings in
their instant Petition, cannot be regarded as the law of the case
herein. The law of the case applies only when (1) a question is

passed upon by an appellate court, and (2) the appellate court

remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the
lower court and even the appellate courts on subsequent appeal
of the case are, thus, bound by how such question had been
previously settled. It must be emphasized, therefore, that the law
of the case finds application only in the same case between
the same parties.

The Petition at bar is without question separate and distinct

from Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, although they may all involve, in
varying degrees, the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes
over the 19.8222-hectare land, which included the subject
property. First, Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, directly tackled the
validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes over the
19.8222-hectare land; while, in the instant case, the validity of
the homestead patent thus granted to Hermogenes is no longer in
issue, but it is alleged herein that said patent erroneously
included the subject property. Second, to recall, the instant
Petition originated from Civil Case No. 96-4193, the Complaint for
Reconveyance and Recovery of the subject property filed by
Esquivel and Talens against the Lopez siblings before the RTC of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73. In no instance was a question or issue
in Civil Case No. 96-4193 ever been previously raised to an
appellate court. Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, did not pass upon
any question or issue raised before this Court from Civil Case No.
96-4193. And thirdly, despite the fact that all these cases may
have common antecedent facts and sometimes involved the
same personalities, the Lopez siblings (herein petitioners) and
Esquivel and Talens (herein respondents) were not parties
in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez.
The Court now proceeds to resolve the issue of whether
Esquivel and Talens have a right to the reconveyance of the
subject property based on the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes
in Hizons favor on 29 November 1965.Such determination shall be

dependent on whether the Quitclaim was executed beyond the

period within which encumbrance or alienation of the land
acquired by homestead patent is prohibited; and whether the
Quitclaim effected a valid conveyance of the subject property
from Hermogenes to Hizon.

Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, prohibits

any encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under
homestead provisions from the date of the approval of application
and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of
the patent or grant. The same provision provides that no
alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five
years and before 25 years after issuance of title shall be valid
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds.

In this case, the subject property was included, whether

correctly or erroneously, in the 19.4888-hectare land awarded to
Hermogenes, by virtue of a homestead patent, issued on 7
February 1939. The Quitclaim over the subject property, a
2.6950-hectare portion of the said 19.4888-hectare land, was
executed by Hermogenes in Hizons favor on 29 November
1965. Between the date of issuance of the homestead patent to
Hermogenes and that of the execution of the Quitclaim, more
than 26 years had passed. Therefore, the execution of the
Quitclaim was no longer within the five-year period within which
the land covered by the homestead patent issued to Hermogenes
must not be encumbered or alienated; and was also beyond the
period between five and 25 years following the issuance of patent
within which approval of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources is still necessary to make the alienation or
encumbrance valid.[40]

Although it has been established that the Quitclaim was

executed beyond any of the prohibitive and/or restrictive periods
under the Public Land Act, as amended, the Court must next look
into whether the Quitclaim had the effect of validly conveying the
subject property to Hizon.
The pertinent portions of the Quitclaim in question read as
follows:

2. That it has come to my personal knowledge that a

boundary owner of my above-cited parcel of land by the
name of [Hizon] has duly caused the survey of his land
bordering mine x x x; that after the actual execution of
the survey of the land of said [Hizon], it was found out
that the land which has been in his possession for many
many years or since time immemorial is within my plan
denominated as H-138612;

xxxx

5. That in fairness and in justice to [Hizon], I

herewith renounce, repudiate and unconditionally and
irrevocably waive and quitclaim all my rights, shares,
interests or participations on the above-described parcel
of land in favor of [Hizon], of legal age, Filipino, married to
Angelina Villarosa and a resident of Antipolo, Rizal, and
for this purpose I am agreeable that my plan H-138612 be
duly amended so as to segregate the above-described
portion which is owned by the aforesaid [Hizon].[41]

It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted paragraphs of the

Quitclaim that the intention of Hermogenes in executing the same
was to restore to Hizon the subject property, which Hermogenes
believed to have been mistakenly included in his homestead
patent.

It is worthy to note, however, that the subject property was

part of the 19.4888-hectare land covered by the homestead
patent awarded by the Bureau of Lands to Hermogenes. The
19.4888-hectare land was identified and measured in a survey
conducted by a government surveyor and the resulting plan H138612 was approved by the Director of Lands. The approval of
survey plan H-138612 and the grant of the homestead patent
over the 19.4888-hectare land in favor of Hermogenes, performed
as part of the official functions of the Director of Lands and the
Bureau of Lands, enjoy the presumption of regularity.
[42]
Reasonable doubt is thus cast on the supposed mistake which
resulted in the inclusion of the subject property in the 19.4888hectare land awarded to Hermogenes by virtue of the homestead
patent.

Even assuming that the homestead patent awarding the

19.4888-hectare land to Hermogenes did erroneously include the
subject property, Hermogenes could not simply convey said
property to Hizon, nor could Hizon easily recover the same, by
virtue of a mere Quitclaim. Lands acquired under homestead
patents come from the public domain. If the subject property was
erroneously included in the homestead patent awarded to
Hermogenes, then the subject property must be returned to the
State and not to Hizon. Furthermore, the survey plan conducted
and homestead patent issued in Hermogenes name covered a
19.4888-hectare land; to exclude therefrom the 2.6950-hectare

subject property (since it purportedly belonged to Hizon) would

mean that Hermogenes actually acquired land with an area less
that what he was awarded under the homestead patent. This
complication reveals that any alleged mistake as regards the
subject property is not a simple and private matter between
Hermogenes and Hizon; but is primarily a problem between
Hermogenes and the State, the latter having awarded the
19.4888-hectare land to the former by virtue of the homestead
patent.

A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to

public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public
Land Act, as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any
citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a
family, and who is not the owner of more than 24 hectares of land
in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must show that he
has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality
where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least onefifth of the land applied for.[43]

In this case, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes

application for homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land
after finding him qualified for the same. In contrast, the only
evidence supporting Hizons claim to the subject property was the
Quitclaim. There is no other proof that Hizon possessed,
cultivated, and introduced improvements on the subject
property. Neither is there any showing that after the execution of
the Quitclaim, Hizon himself applied for a homestead patent over
the subject property. In fact, it is undisputed that the subject
property has always been in the possession of Hermogenes, then
the Lopez Siblings. Hizon and Esquivel and Talens never came into
the possession of the subject property even after the execution of
the supposed deeds of conveyances in their favor.

The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been
held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is
the rule that a homestead applicant must personally comply with
the legal requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead
applicant himself must possess the necessary qualifications,
cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It would be a
circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply
in behalf of another, as the latter may be disqualified or might not
comply with the residency and cultivation requirements. [44]

In the end, the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965 could not

have validly conveyed or transferred ownership of the subject
property from Hermogenes to Hizon. It is null and void for being
contrary to the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended. As
a result, Hizon acquired no right over the subject property which
he could have sold to Esquivel and Talens; and the Deed of
Absolute
Sale
of
Unregistered
Land
dated 26
August
1968 executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens, is
similarly void for lack of an object.

Even granting arguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and

transferred ownership of the subject property from Hermogenes
to Hizon, the latter and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and
Talens, are now barred by the statute of limitations and laches
from asserting their rights to the subject property, after failing to
exercise the same for an unreasonable length of time.

Laches has been defined as the failure of or neglect for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
or to assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a

presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned

it or declined to assert it. Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes
that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what
should have been done, but failed to do so. [45]
In the instant case, when Esquivel and Talens filed with the
RTC their application for registration of the subject property on 5
March 1993, 28 years had passed since the execution by
Hermogenes of the Quitclaim covering the subject property in
favor of Hizon on 29 November 1965; and 25 years elapsed from
the execution by Hizon of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject
property in favor of Esquivel and Talens on 26 August
1968. During these periods, without providing any reasons
therefor, neither Hizon nor Esquivel and Talens took possession of
the subject property or exercised in any other way their rights
over the same.
Finally, concerning this Petition, is the issue of whether the
Lopez siblings are estopped from questioning the validity of the
Quitclaim, as ruled by the Court of Appeals? It bears to point out
that the question of estoppel is relevant only if the Lopez siblings
are challenging the validity of the Quitclaim on the ground that
when Hermogenes executed the same, he had already previously
sold his 19.4888-hectare land, which included the subject
property, to Aguilar. In recollection, the Lopez siblings successfully
had the said sale of the land by Hermogenes to Aguilar
nullified. Since the Court herein refuses to give effect to the
Quitclaim in question on other grounds already discussed above,
the issue of estoppel actually loses relevance and need not be
resolved anymore.

Considering the pronouncements of this Court that the

Quitclaim covering the subject property executed by Hermogenes
in favor of Hizon is null and void for being contrary to the
provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended, on homestead

grants; and that the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property
executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens is null and void
for lack of a proper object, then Esquivel and Talens have no basis
to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. Hizon never
owned the subject property and could never have sold the same
to Esquivel and Talens.

G.R. No. 170621

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment was filed with the Court of

Appeals by Nordec Phil., a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines; and Dr. Malvar, President and
General Manager of petitioner Nordec Phil., docketed as CA G.R.
CV No. 91428.

The Lopez siblings, Esquivel, and Talens, were named respondents

in CA-G.R. CV No. 91428 (and also herein), being the parties
in Civil Case No. 96-4193, wherein the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 73, rendered the Decision dated 11 January 2001, which
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar was seeking to have annulled by the
Court of Appeals. Atty. Sergio Angeles (Atty. Angeles) and Atty.
George A. Ang Cheng (Atty. Ang Cheng) were similarly impleaded
as respondents in said petition before the appellate court on
account of their involvement as counsels for the parties in Civil
Case No. 96-4193.

In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193,

the RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject
property to Esquivel and Talens. The subject property, however,

was already supposedly sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and

Dr. Malvar.
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment
of Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of
Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land
situated at Overlooking, Sumulong Highway, Barangay Sta. Cruz,
(formerly Barrio dela Paz), Antipolo City, Rizal, covered by plan
(LRC) Psd-3289610, with a total area of 19.4888 hectares.
[46]
Among these parcels of land were Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8,
covered by TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997 [47] of the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina City, with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares,
and which constituted the subject property. [48]

Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased

the afore-mentioned lots from the Lopez siblings and their
assigns, namely, Atty. Angeles and Rogelio Amurao (Amurao),
[49]
as evidenced by several Deeds of Absolute Sale and Deeds of
Conditional Sale. Immediately after making such purchases,
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar introduced large scale improvements
on the subject property, among which were several business
establishments[50] with a cost of no less than P50,000,000.

In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No.
96-4130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74,
entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was
Atty. Angeles who represented and protected the interest of
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in said case by filing a Motion to
Dismiss.[51] In Cabuay, Jr., wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez
siblings were named the respondents in the Petition Seeking for
Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of the Two (2)
Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of this Court
involving the subject property, it was also Atty. Angeles who
appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar.

Sometime after 2 August 2004, Atty. Angeles again informed

Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was another case filed
against the Lopez siblings involving the subject property. The said
case was the action for reconveyance filed by Esquivel and Talens,
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-4193 before RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 73, but which was already, by then, the subject of
an appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 70200 (and which would eventually reach this Court in G.R.
No. 168734). Atty. Angeles, however, belittled this most recent
case involving the subject property, and even showed to Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar the Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August
2004, which he filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 70200, together with the
Brief for the Lopez siblings. Yet, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
conducted their own inquiry, and were surprised to discover that
the Decision rendered by the RTC on 11 January 2001 in Civil Case
No. 96-4193 was actually adverse to their rights and interest; and
despite this, they were neither impleaded nor represented
therein. Even Atty. Angeles, the supposed counsel for Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar, did not lift a finger to protect their rights in
said case.

Further intensive investigation revealed to Nordec Phils. and Dr.

Malvar that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 96-4193 was rendered under circumstances amounting to
extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process, insofar as said
Decision adversely affected their rights and interests to the
subject property. Among the circumstances which allegedly
amounted to extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process,
were described by Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar as follows: (1)
when Esquivel and Talens instituted Civil Case No. 96-4193, they
personally and through their caretakers, already knew that Nordec
Phils. and Malvar already bought and took possession of the
subject property, but Esquivel and Talens, through their counsel

Atty. Ang Cheng deliberately failed to implead Nordec Phils. and

Dr. Malvar; and (2) Atty. Angeles, who was supposed to protect
the rights and interests of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, as their
counsel, had an adverse personal interest in the subject property
as he unconscionably taken, by way of champertous attorneys
fees, almost the whole of the 19.4888-hectare land inherited by
the Lopez siblings from Hermogenes.

Given the foregoing circumstances and the unsuccessful attempt

of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar to intervene in CA-G.R. No. 70200,
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar opted to file with the Court of Appeals
a Petition to annul the Decision dated 11 January 2001 of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 96-4193, granting the reconveyance of the
subject property to Esquivel and Talens. Their Petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 91428. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar
prayed in their Petition that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 be annulled for the reason that they
were not impleaded therein even as they were necessary, if not
indispensable, parties. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar additionally
prayed that any writ of execution and other orders, which may
have been or may thereafter be issued to enforce the said RTC
decision, be declared ineffective, insofar as they and their assigns
are concerned.

On 6 October 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed

Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428 dismissing the Petition of
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar. According to the said Resolution, the
RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193
could not be the proper subject of the said Petition for Annulment
of Judgment given that the very same decision was still pending
appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 168734 and, thus, was not yet
final and executory. In addition, should the Court of Appeals take

cognizance of such a Petition, it could result in contrary and

inconsistent rulings by the appellate court and this Court.

Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar filed a Motion for Amendment and/or
Reconsideration of the dismissal of their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
91428, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 16 November 2005.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar then filed the instant Petition
assailing the Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428.

In their Memorandum before this Court, Nordec Phils. and Dr.

Malvar raised the following issues:

I. Do [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] have good standing

and substantial defenses?

II. In

view of all the documented and unrebutted

circumstances detailed in the petition not to
mention the obviously pre-conceived and even
incompatible claims of private respondents [Lopez
siblings] and [Atty. Angeles] in their Comment that
the sale to [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] is void and
defective from the very start being signed by only
one of the co-owners, simulated and only partially
paid and that petitioners rights have prescribed was
there extrinsic fraud and lack of due process insofar
as [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] are concerned?

III. Considering all the foregoing and, more significantly, the

admission of [Esquivel and Talens] in their separate
Comment that they (as plaintiffs) purposely did not
implead [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] because it
was from the [Lopez siblings] alone that they are
trying to recover the [subject property], is
annulment of the judgment proper, at least insofar
as the rights and interests of [Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar] are concerned?

IV. Inasmuch as [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] were not

impleaded as defendants and were not parties to the
appeal of the judgment affecting [the subject
property], hence, the remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available to them and so even their
motion for intervention was not allowed is it
improper or premature for them to file an action for
annulment of the judgment while further appeal by
the impleaded [Esquivel and Talens] is pending with
this [Court]?

V.

In view of the undisputed circumstances

showing extrinsic fraud and in view of the
consolidation of G.R. No. 170621 with G.R. No.
168734, it is now proper or imperative for [this
Court] to resolve the issues presented by annulling
the impugned judgment of the [RTC of Antipolo City,
Branch 73] without having to remand the case to the
Court of Appeals.

Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar asseverate that they were not
impleaded as defendants in Civil Case No. 96-4193 where the RTC
rendered its Decision dated 11 January 2001, affecting the rights
and interest of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar to the subject
property. The remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are also no longer available to Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar because of the extrinsic fraud committed
upon them by the Lopez siblings, Esquivel, Talens, Atty. Angeles,
and Atty. Ang Cheng; and of the lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 96-4193 and to
render the 11 January 2001 Decision therein.Even the Motion for
Intervention of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in CA-G.R. No. 70200,
the appeal of the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC, was not
allowed by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, it is neither improper
nor premature for Nordec Phil. and Malvar to file a Petition for the
annulment of the said 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 96-4193, even though the said Decision, after being
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, is now pending appeal
before this Court.

Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar additionally argue that the Court
of Appeals resolved the question of procedure in a manner that
was patently not in accordance with the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly, when it held that (1) Rule 47 does not
cover the judgment of the RTC in this particular case; and (2)
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar still had an adequate remedy in
seeking intervention in G.R. No. 167834, the appeal to this Court
of the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar insist that since Rules 37, 38
and 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on motion for new

trial, petition for relief, and appeal, respectively, simply mention

judgments or final orders, without making any distinction as to
whether or not the same is final and executory; it should follow
that where only the words judgments or final orders are similarly
used in Rule 47 on annulment of judgments, then such words
should be understood to also refer to all judgments or final orders,
regardless of whether they are final and executory.

The issues and arguments raised by Nordec Phils. and Dr.

Malvar all boil down to the question of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for Annulment of
Judgment for being premature since the judgment sought to be
annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet final and
executory.

The Court answers in the negative.

The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or

reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are
remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the
assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a
person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to
appear therein, cannot make use of a petition for relief from
judgment.[52] Indubitably, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot
avail themselves of the aforesaid ordinary remedies of motion for
new trial, petition for relief from judgment, or appeal, because
they were not parties to the proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193
in which the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 sought to be
annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar also cannot
seek the annulment of the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 96-4193.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law

independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the
final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a
renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic
fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it
is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he
would be adversely affected thereby.[53]

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud

lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial
or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration
when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.[54]

It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for

Annulment of Judgment is to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. If
the judgment sought to be annulled, like in this case, is still on
appeal or under review by a higher court, it cannot be regarded
as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the
litigation is actually still open and on-going. In this light, the
arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or

final orders need not be final and executory for it to be annulled

must fail.

This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the

Court of Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed
by Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar, on the ground of
prematurity. Given that the 11 January 2001Decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 96-4193 was still pending appeal before this Court,
the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance of the Petition for
annulment of the same judgment, for if it had done so, then it
would risk promulgating a ruling which could be contrary to and
inconsistent with the ruling of this Court on the appeal of the
judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

(a) The Petition in G.R. No. 168734 is GRANTED. The

Decision dated 14 February 2005 and Resolution dated 27 June
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.70200, affirming in
toto the 11
January
2001Decision
of
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, in Civil Case
No. 96-4193, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Jose Esquivel, Jr. and
Carlito Talens in Civil Case No. 96-4193 is DISMISSED; and

(b) The Petition in G.R. No. 170621 is hereby DENIED. The

Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November 2005 of the
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
91428
are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

JULIO B. PURCON, JR., G.R. No. 182718

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. and
MIGUEL L. RIVERA/MARITIME Promulgated:
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT,
Respondents. September 26, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
R E S O LUTIO N
REYES, R.T., J.:
A PETITION for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It may be availed of only after
a judgment, final order, or other proceeding was taken against petitioner in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.[1]

Before Us is a petition for relief from judgment[2] filed by Julio B. Purcon,

seeking to set aside Our July 16, 2007 Resolution,[3] which denied his petition for
review, as well as the October 9, 2007 Entry of Judgment.[4] He pleads for the
Courts leniency on account of the negligence and inefficiency of his counsel,
which resulted in the late filing of the petition and in filing defective pleadings
within this Court.
The Antecedents
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of
medical expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with
prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees before
the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that on January 28, 2002,
respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. hired him as a seaman on board the vessel M/T
SARABELLE 2. He signed a contract for three (3) months with a monthly salary
of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day activity that
required exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked overtime due to the
pressure of his work. His contract was extended for another three (3) months. On
the second week of June 2002, he felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After
being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was diagnosed with
hernia. On June 26, 2002, he was repatriated due to his ailment.
Upon petitioners return to the Philippines, he was examined by Dr. Alegre,
the company physician, who prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr.
Alegre declared that he was fit to resume work. When he reported
to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told
that there was no vacancy for him.
On September 17, 2003, he consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, an internistcardiologist of Philippine Heart Center. On March 3, 2004, after a thorough
medical examination and evaluation, he was diagnosed with EPIDIDYMITIS,

LEFT; UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH INPEDIMENT

GRADE XIV.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that since petitioners ailment,
hernia, is not work-related, he is not entitled to disability benefit and related
claims. In fact, he was declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the
company-designated physician. Respondents likewise argued that his ailment is not
to be considered a permanent disability as this is easily correctable by simple
surgery. More importantly, petitioner signed a Quitclaim and Release which was
notarized.
On March 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its
decision[5] dismissing the complaint for utter lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
explained that petitioner was fit to resume work as a seafarer as of July 23, 2002 as
his hernia was already cured or non-existent. In fact, petitioner was ready to
resume work. Unfortunately, he was not accommodated due to lack of
vacancy. The fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean that he was
suffering from disability.
On May 5, 2005, complainant-appellant (petitioner) filed a memorandum of
appeal with the NLRC Third Division.
On September 30, 2005, the NLRC Third Division issued a resolution [6] as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and

the assailed decision dated March 31, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[7]

On December 20, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was dismissed for
lack of merit. On January 27, 2006, the NLRC resolution became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.

On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of

the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). However, on June 7,
2006, the CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities.Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution became
final and executory.
On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the June
7, 2006 and September 5, 2006 Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his
petition for certiorari.
In Our Resolution[8] dated July 16, 2007, We denied the petition for the
following reasons: (1) the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time docket and
other fees and deposit for costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to
Section 5(c) of Rule 56; and (3) insufficient or defective verification under Section
4, Rule 7.
We likewise held that petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA
committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to
warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction. He was not
able to convince this Court why the actions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the
CA, which have passed upon the same issue, should be reversed.Consequently,
on October 9, 2007, an Entry of Judgment was issued.
On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment
interposing the following grounds:
I. The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed a GROSS MISTAKE when
he based his decision on the fit to work certification issued by the
company-designated physician and on the Quitclaim and Release
executed by the complainant;
II. The Honorable Labor Arbiter further committed a GROSS MISTAKE
when he adopted the irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the
respondents and by adopting it in his decision;

III. The Honorable NLRC Third Division also committed a GROSS

MISTAKE when it affirms the ERRONEOUS decision of the
Honorable Labor Arbiter;
IV. The factual findings of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, and the
Honorable NLRC Third Division, are not based on substantial
evidence and that their decisions are contrary to the applicable law
and jurisprudence; and
V. The collaborating counsel of the petitioner committed a GROSS
MISTAKE in filing defective pleadings to the prejudice of the herein
petitioner.[9]
The threshold issue before Us is Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution
denying his petition for review?

We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an

available remedy in the Supreme Court.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final
order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party
in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases
cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. Only petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings
against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court.

A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56
cases originally cognizable by this Court.
In Dela Cruz
v.
Andres,[10] We
reiterated Our pronouncement
[11]
in Mesina v. Meer, that a petition for relief from judgment is not an available
remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court explained that
under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be

filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or
other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing
the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case
may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered
the decision, viz.:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.[12] (Underscoring supplied)

Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.

As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the
order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the
judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, viz.:
Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from
judgment of inferior court. When a judgment is rendered by an inferior
court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or
has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the
Court of First Instance of the province in which the original judgment
was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the case tried
upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the
judgment or other proceeding thereof. When a judgment order is entered,
or any other proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First
Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he

may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the
judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform

procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial Courts[13] and designation of
Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.[14]
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court. [15] It may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through
resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised
Internal Rules of the CA[16] allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.

There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief
applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55,
with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the
remedies available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final
orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial
(Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in
the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme
Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are
beyond the concerns of this Court.
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must
still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to
excusable negligence. Petitioners lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without
demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis
for judicial relief. For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing
short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.

The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was
due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a
mistake of procedure by counsel.
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it
amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity to
vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially
since petitioner has squandered the various opportunities available to him at the
different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and
a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no
purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken
mode of procedure by counsel.[17]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL JULIAN, represented by his

Attorney-in-Fact, ROBERTO DELA
CRUZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 174193

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PHILIPPINES and THE CITY
SHERIFF,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
December 7, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure
and should not be disregarded without the most compelling of reasons.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] of the Resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00240 dated April 12, 2005 which dismissed
petitioners appeal as follows:
Considering that per JRD Report dated March 30, 2005, the appellant
failed to pay the required docket and other lawful fees, the instant Appeal is
hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section [1](c) Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Also assailed is the CAs Resolution[4] dated July 27, 2006 which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioner seeks to reverse the aforesaid Resolutions of the CA and direct the latter to
admit the payment for the docket fees enclosed in his Motion for Reconsideration [5] so
that his appeal may be given due course, or, in the alternative, to remand the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings.
Factual Antecedents

This case stemmed from a Real Estate Mortgage[6] executed by Thelma Julian
(Thelma), mother of herein petitioner Samuel Julian, over a property situated in Fuentes
Subdivision, Roxas City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16705.[7]
On December 23, 1980,[8] Thelma obtained a housing loan from respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the amount of P99,400.00.[9] To secure
payment of the loan, she executed in favor of the respondent a Real Estate Mortgage on
the aforementioned parcel of land registered under her name. A Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) appointing the respondent and its personnel to sell the property in the
event of extrajudicial foreclosure was inserted and made an integral part of the mortgage
contract.[10]
Subsequently, Thelma died on January 8, 1982.[11]
Because of arrearages in the monthly amortizations, respondent foreclosed
the mortgaged property. Same was sold at public auction on September 15, 1983[12] with
respondent as the highest bidder.[13] No redemption having been made, title to the
property was consolidated in favor of the respondent on September 21, 1984[14] and TCT
No. T-19303[15] was thereafter issued in its name.
Thereafter, the actual occupants of the mortgaged property, spouses Ramon de la
Cruz and his wife, who is likewise petitioners sibling, Ruth Julian de la Cruz (spouses De
la Cruz), offered to purchase the property. Respondent accepted the offer and executed a
Deed of Conditional Sale[16] on October 31, 1985. However, spouses De la Cruz failed to
pay[17] 72 monthly amortizations resulting in the rescission of the said deed on February
28, 1992. Notwithstanding, spouses De la Cruz refused to vacate the premises
compelling respondent to file an Unlawful Detainer case against them on February 23,
1993. Judgment was rendered in favor of respondent on July 29, 1993.[18]
However, before the Writ of Execution could be carried out, [19] petitioner filed
Civil Case No. 6387[20] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City on October
27, 1993,[21] for the cancellation of respondents TCT No. T-19303.He contended that the
SPA which was used to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in 1983 was no
longer effective in view of Thelmas death in 1982. Consequently, the public auction, the
resulting Deed of Sale,[22] Affidavit of Consolidation and TCT No. T-19303 are null and
void.

During the course of the proceedings, a series of postponements[23] were

made at the instance of both parties due to an impending amicable settlement. Eventually,
the parties were able to reach a settlement. Thus, in an Order[24] dated October 28, 1998,
the RTC directed both parties to submit a joint motion to dismiss the case. However,
almost two years passed without the parties complying with the said Order.
Consequently, in an Order[25] dated October 11, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case
for failure of the parties to comply for an unreasonable length of time. The dismissal,
however, was set aside in an Order [26] dated February 12, 2003 in consideration of
petitioners payment of ten percent (10%) of respondents claim. The parties were then
given 15 days from notice within which to submit their compromise agreement, [27] which
was subsequently extended for 30 days from notice.[28] Despite the extensions, however,
no compromise agreement was filed in court. As a result, in an Order [29] dated July 24,
2003, the trial court directed the parties to show cause within 15 days from notice why
the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Meanwhile, with petitioners
conformity, his counsel withdrew her appearance on August 13, 2003.[30]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 28, 2004 or six months from the issuance of the show cause Order, the
trial court dismissed the case in an Order[31] which states:
For failure of the parties thru counsel to comply with the Order dated
July 24, 2003, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through his new counsel, timely filed a Notice of Appeal[32] on April 26,
2004 but failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

As earlier mentioned, the CA dismissed the appeal for non-payment of the

required docket and other lawful fees pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court.[33]
Seeking reconsideration,[34] petitioner attached to his motion Postal Money Order
Nos. A-0620000276, B-0610000283 and J-065000566 in the aggregate amount
of P3,020.00[35] as payment for the docket fees. He explained that his failure to pay the
required fees was due to oversight and non-cognizance of the necessity to pay the said
fees since his counsel did not inform him of such requirement to pay. Petitioner prayed
for liberal application of the Rules as according to him, a strict enforcement would be
tantamount to imposing a penalty not commensurate to his thoughtlessness or oversight
in not adhering to the procedural requisite.[36]
Petitioners submission did not move the CA, which disposed of his motion for
reconsideration through its second assailed Resolution[37] thus:
In the case of Meatmaster International Corporation vs. Lelis Integrated
Development Corporation, it was held that the payment of docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless
of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of the full amount
of the docket fee is sine qua non for the perfection of an appeal. The court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees.
Verily, the requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure but an essential requirement without which the decision appealed
from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. Thus,
if We allow belated payment as prayed for and reinstate the instant appeal, it
will have the effect of withholding the finality of the judgment or order
appealed from.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like
all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
proportionate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, appellant has not shown weighty and
persuasive reasons to compel Us to exercise Our discretion of suspending the
strict adherence to the Rules. Other than his flimsy excuse that the ground in
the Courts Resolution is merely technical, appellant has miserably failed to
proffer a convincing justification for [his] procedural error. Thus, appellant
failed to justify why the Rules should be relaxed and [why] the equitable
consideration of the Court should be exercised in his situation as an exception
to the strict implementation of the Rules.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED and
the Resolution dated April 12, 2005 MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.[38]

Issues
Petitioner comes before this Court by way of Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising the following issues:
A.
WHETHER X X X THE DISMISSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT [WAS]
PROPER.
B.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
STRICTLY THE RULES ON DOCKET FEES.[39]

The pivotal issue is whether the CA was correct in strictly applying the rules on
the payment of docket fees.
Petitioner acknowledges the mandatory nature of the rule that docket and other lawful
fees must be paid in full within the prescribed period for an appeal to be
perfected. However, he asserts that the broader interest of justice and the desired
objective of deciding the case on the merits call for leniency in the application of the
rules. Hence, he must be given an opportunity to air his cause without the constraints of
technicalities. Petitioner contends that the CA should apply the pronouncement of this
Court in Yambao v. Court of Appeals[40] relaxing the policy of strict adherence to the rule

regarding appeal fees if justifiable reason for the non-payment of the correct amount of
docket fees within the prescribed period is shown. He further contends that his act of
attaching the payment for the fees to his Motion for Reconsideration shows his intention
and willingness to comply with the rules.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Payment of full docket fees within the
prescribed period for taking an appeal is
mandatory.
It is well-established that [t]he right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[41] Thus,
one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements
of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[42]
The applicable rule for appeals from judgments issued by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction is Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, Section 4 of which provides:
Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the
period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or
the record on appeal.

The Rules also provide that failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other
lawful fees is a ground for dismissal of the appeal.[43]
The Court has consistently ruled in a number of cases that the payment of the full
amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
[44]
It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court
acquire jurisdiction over the case. [45] The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure and should not be undermined except for the most

persuasive of reasons. Non-observance would be tantamount to no appeal being filed

thereby rendering the challenged decision, resolution or order final and executory.
Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has
declared that in appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the
prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the
appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances.[46]
In the case at bench, the justifications presented by petitioner for the non-payment of the
docket fees are oversight and the lack of advice from his counsel. Unfortunately, the
reasons presented are neither convincing nor adequate to merit leniency.Petitioner
submits that he only found out about the requirement to pay the docket fees when he
received the CA Resolution denying his appeal on April 22, 2005 or three days short of
one year from filing of the said appeal. This Court finds this not to be logically true to
human experience. It is unusual for petitioners counsel not to advice him of the required
docket fees. More often than not, counsels are aware of the docket fees required to be
paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the said amount prior to filing pleadings in
court. This is so because counsels are not expected to shoulder or advance payment for
their clients. Assuming arguendo that petitioners counsel did not inform him of the
requirement to pay the docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find incredible is that
petitioner apparently failed to communicate with his counsel after the filing of said
appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that litigants, represented by counsel, should not
expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. [47] It
is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order
to be informed of the progress of his case. [48] Moreover, the counsels negligence binds
petitioner and, for that reason alone the loss of his remedy was caused by his own
negligence.[49] Consequently, a relaxation of the rule cannot be granted.[50] The bitter
consequence of such grave inadvertence is to render the trial courts order final and
executory.[51]
Further, the Court notes that petitioner only attempted to perfect his appeal on May 6,
2005 by appending the postal money orders to his Motion for Reconsideration, or one
year and nine days too late.[52] By that time, the challenged
Order has long become final and no longer open to an appeal.[53]

Petitioners reliance on the policy espoused in the case of Yambao[54] is likewise

unavailing. The pertinent portion relied on by petitioner reads:
Thus, the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket
fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for his failure
to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like
fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening
casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant. x x x [55] (Emphasis
supplied.)

Clearly, the case applies to a situation where payment of the docket fees was made albeit
incomplete. In the instant case, no payment was made by petitioner at all. Even
assuming arguendo that Yambao is applicable to petitioners case, still, the Court sees no
justifiable reason to allow this Court to relax the strict application of the Rules.
Likewise assuming for the sake of argument that consideration be given to petitioners
willingness to comply with the rules since he attached postal money orders to his motion
for reconsideration, the broader interest of justice will still not be served if petitioners
appeal is reinstated. On one hand, petitioner calls for leniency to enable him to establish
his case. On the other hand is respondent, which has been embroiled in a decades-long
waiting game. The long-running dispute could be recapped thus: (1) petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, Thelma, obtained a loan from respondent secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage on the subject property; (2) Thelma was unable to pay the loan thereby
causing foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage; (3) petitioner filed his civil action to
question the validity of the public auction sale only on October 27, 1993 or 10 years after
the sale was conducted; and, (4) from the time of the consolidation of title in the name of
respondent in 1984 until the present, spouses De la Cruz have been in possession of the
foreclosed property.
Petitioner and his sister Ruth Julian de la Cruz (Ruth) know that their mother Thelma has
already lost ownership rights to the property in question when the latter defaulted in her
payment to respondent and none of her successors-in-interest redeemed the property
within the prescribed period. This is the reason why Ruth and her husband offered to
purchase the property from respondent. However, when the said spouses De la Cruz
defaulted in their payment, they refused to surrender the property to respondent. For his

part, petitioner reinforces such refusal to surrender by questioning the validity of the
public auction sale.
Now petitioner comes before this Court praying for leniency in the interest of justice. It
must be stressed, however, that it is only when persuasive reasons exist that the Rules
may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure.[56] Here, the Court finds that petitioner is under no
threat of suffering an injustice. On the contrary, it will be the height of injustice if the
Court accords petitioner leniency and reinstates his appeal as this would mean further
waiting on the part of the respondent which has long been deprived of its right to possess
the property it owns.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00240 dated April 12, 2005 and July 27, 2006 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MILESTONE FARMS, INC.,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 182332

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,* JJ.
Promulgated:

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

Respondent.

February 23, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Amended Decision[2] dated October 4, 2006 and its Resolution[3]dated March 27,
2008.
The Facts
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960.[4] Among its pertinent
secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other
livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this
purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed,
raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the
supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-products
of said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food
necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be
authorized by law.[5]
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took
effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage.
However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform [6] that agricultural lands devoted
to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422hectare property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T-410434) M15750, (T-486101) M-7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T-274129) M-15751, (T486103) M-7309, (T-486104) M-7310, (T-332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311,
(T-486106) M-7312, M-8791, (T-486107) M-7313, (T-486108) M-7314, M-8796,
(T-486109) M-7315, (T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and located in Pinugay,

Baras, Rizal, from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned
ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9),
setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands
used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on
January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O.
No. 9.[7]
Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption
Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners
property and arrived at the following findings:
[T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is 258.8422
hectares; the area which served as infrastructure is 42.0000 hectares; ten
(10) hectares are planted to corn and the remaining five (5) hectares are
devoted to fish culture; that the livestock population are 371 heads of
cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of swine and 788 heads of cocks;
that the area being applied for exclusion is far below the required or
ideal area which is 563 hectares for the total livestock population; that
the approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes with an
area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below the allowable
10% variance; and, though not directly used for livestock purposes, the
ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and the five (5) hectares devoted
to fishpond could be considered supportive to livestock production.

The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCECs findings and
recommendation, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug)
issued an Order dated June 27, 1994, exempting petitioners 316.0422-hectare
property from CARP.[8]

The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay

Farmers), represented by Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug
in his Order dated November 24, 1994.[9] Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed
a letter-appeal with the DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible
Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 781-T.[10]The MCTC
ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal. Ultimately, the case reached the CA,
which, in its Decision[11] dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling,
ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate portions of the property
covered by TCT Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its Resolution [12] dated
July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file a motion
for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record received its October
8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and executory.
In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881, [13] which
was approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. On October 22, 1996, the fact-finding team formed by the DAR
Undersecretary for Field Operations and Support Services conducted an actual
headcount of the livestock population on the property. The headcount showed that
there were 448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine.
The DAR Secretarys Ruling

On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary

Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the
316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring
75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.[14]

Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded

from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising
as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that the Certificates of
Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of
cattle were registered in the name of petitioners president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to
June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered
from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates rather
than to the headcount because the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle
owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988.
Applying the animal-land ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every head of
cattle/carabao/horse) and the infrastructure-animal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21
heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare for 21 heads of hogs) under DAR
A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao exempted 240.9776 hectares of the property, as
follows:
1. 86 hectares for the 86 heads of cattle existing as of 15 June
1988;
2. 8 hectares for infrastructure following the ratio of 1.7815
hectares for every 21 heads of cattle;
3. 8 hectares for the 8 horses;
4. 0.3809 square meters of infrastructure for the 8 horses; [and]
5. 138.5967 hectares for the 5,678 heads of swine. [15]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[16] submitting therewith copies

of Certificates of Transfer of Large Cattle and additional Certificates of Ownership
of Large Cattle issued to petitioner prior to June 15, 1988, as additional proof that
it had met the required animal-land ratio. Petitioner also submitted a copy of a
Disbursement Voucher dated December 17, 1986, showing the purchase of 100
heads of cattle by the Bureau of Animal Industry from petitioner, as further proof
that it had been actively operating a livestock farm even before June 15,

1988. However, in his Order dated April 15, 1997, Secretary Garilao denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[17]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal[18] before the Office
of the President (OP).
The OPs Ruling
On February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision [19] reinstating Director
Dalugdugs Order dated June 27, 1994 and declared the entire 316.0422-hectare
property exempt from the coverage of CARP.
However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
filed by farmer-groups Samahang Anak-Pawis ng Lagundi (SAPLAG) and Pinugay
Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a
resolution[20] dated September 16, 2002, setting aside its previous decision. The
dispositive portion of the OP resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision subject of the instant separate
motions for reconsideration is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao, as reiterated in another Order of 15 April 1997,
without prejudice to the outcome of the continuing review and
verification proceedings that DAR, thru the appropriate Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer, may undertake pursuant to Rule III (D) of
DAR Administrative Order No. 09, series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.[21]

The OP held that, when it comes to proof of ownership, the reference is the
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. Certificates of cattle ownership, which
are readily available being issued by the appropriate government office ought to
match the number of heads of cattle counted as existing during the actual
headcount. The presence of large cattle on the land, without sufficient proof of
ownership thereof, only proves such presence.

Taking note of Secretary Garilaos observations, the OP also held that, before
an ocular investigation is conducted on the property, the landowners are notified in
advance; hence, mere reliance on the physical headcount is dangerous because
there is a possibility that the landowners would increase the number of their cattle
for headcount purposes only. The OP observed that there was a big variance
between the actual headcount of 448 heads of cattle and only 86 certificates of
ownership of large cattle.
Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA.[22]
The Proceedings Before the CA and Its Rulings
On April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary evidence
presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion had more than
satisfied the animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9.
The CA also found that petitioner applied for exclusion long before the effectivity
of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that petitioner merely converted the
property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP
coverage. Petitioner was held to have actually engaged in the said business on the
property even before June 15, 1988. The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution of the Office of the President dated September 16,
2002 is hereby SET ASIDE, and its Decision dated February 4, 2000
declaring the entire 316.0422 hectares exempt from the coverage of the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Program
is
hereby REINSTATED without prejudice to the outcome of the
continuing review and verification proceedings which the Department of
Agrarian Reform, through the proper Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer, may undertake pursuant to Policy Statement (D) of DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.
SO ORDERED.[23]

Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without the

knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR
Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR Conversion Order No. CON0410-0016[24] (Conversion Order), granting petitioners application to convert
portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf
courses use. The portions converted with a total area of 153.3049 hectares were
covered by TCT Nos. M-15755 (T-332694), M-15751 (T-274129), and M-15750
(T-410434). With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the
controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
On the CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for Reconsideration were
filed by farmer-groups, namely: the farmers represented by Miguel
Espinas[25] (Espinas group), the Pinugay Farmers,[26] and the SAPLAG.[27] The
farmer-groups all claimed that the CA should have accorded respect to the factual
findings of the OP. Moreover, the farmer-groups unanimously intimated that
petitioner already converted and developed a portion of the property into a leisureresidential-commercial estate known as the Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex
(Palo Alto).
Subsequently, in a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration on Newly
Secured Evidence pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1993[28] (Supplement) dated June 15, 2005, the Espinas group submitted the
following as evidence:
1) Conversion Order[29] dated November 4, 2004, issued by Secretary Villa,
converting portions of the property from agricultural to residential and golf courses
use, with a total area of 153.3049 hectares; thus, the Espinas group prayed that the
remaining 162.7373 hectares (subject property) be covered by the CARP;
2) Letter[30] dated June 7, 2005 of both incoming Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) Bismark M. Elma (MARO Elma) and outgoing MARO Cesar C.
Celi (MARO Celi) of Baras, Rizal, addressed to Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) II of Rizal, Felixberto Q. Kagahastian, (MARO Report), informing
the latter, among others, that Palo Alto was already under development and the lots
therein were being offered for sale; that there were actual tillers on the subject
property; that there were agricultural improvements thereon, including an irrigation
system and road projects funded by the Government; that there was no existing

livestock farm on the subject property; and that the same was not in the possession
and/or control of petitioner; and
3) Certification[31] dated June 8, 2005, issued by both MARO Elma and
MARO Celi, manifesting that the subject property was in the possession and
cultivation of actual occupants and tillers, and that, upon inspection, petitioner
maintained no livestock farm thereon.
Four months later, the Espinas group and the DAR filed their respective
Manifestations.[32] In its Manifestation dated November 29, 2005, the DAR
confirmed that the subject property was no longer devoted to cattle raising. Hence,
in its Resolution[33] dated December 21, 2005, the CA directed petitioner to file its
comment on the Supplement and the aforementioned Manifestations. Employing
the services of a new counsel, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Rejoinder, [34] and
prayed that the MARO Report be disregarded and expunged from the records for
lack of factual and legal basis.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary
Villas Conversion Order of November 4, 2004, the appellate court had to
acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to
the remaining 162.7373 hectares. In the same token, the Espinas group prayed that
this remaining area be covered by the CARP.[35]
On October 4, 2006, the CA amended its earlier Decision. It held that its
April 29, 2005 Decision was theoretically not final because DAR A.O. No. 9
required the MARO to make a continuing review and verification of the subject
property. While the CA was cognizant of our ruling in Department of Agrarian
Reform v. Sutton,[36] wherein we declared DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional, it
still resolved to lift the exemption of the subject property from the CARP, not on
the basis of DAR A.O. No. 9, but on the strength of evidence such as the MARO
Report and Certification, and the Katunayan[37] issued by the Punong Barangay,
Alfredo Ruba (Chairman Ruba), of Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, showing that the subject
property was no longer operated as a livestock farm. Moreover, the CA held that
the lease agreements,[38] which petitioner submitted to prove that it was compelled
to lease a ranch as temporary shelter for its cattle, only reinforced the DARs
finding that there was indeed no existing livestock farm on the subject property.
While petitioner claimed that it was merely forced to do so to prevent further

slaughtering of its cattle allegedly committed by the occupants, the CA found the
claim unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the CA opined that petitioner should have
asserted its rights when the irrigation and road projects were introduced by the
Government within its property. Finally, the CA accorded the findings of MARO
Elma and MARO Celi the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions in the absence of evidence proving misconduct and/or dishonesty when
they inspected the subject property and rendered their report. Thus, the CA
disposed:
WHEREFORE, this Courts Decision dated April 29, 2005 is
hereby amended in that the exemption of the subject landholding from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby
lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby
declared covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
SO ORDERED.[39]

Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[40] On January 8,

2007, MARO Elma, in compliance with the Memorandum of DAR Regional
Director Dominador B. Andres, tendered another Report [41]reiterating that, upon
inspection of the subject property, together with petitioners counsel-turned witness,
Atty. Grace Eloisa J. Que (Atty. Que), PARO Danilo M. Obarse, Chairman Ruba,
and several occupants thereof, he, among others, found no livestock farm within
the subject property. About 43 heads of cattle were shown, but MARO Elma
observed that the same were inside an area adjacent to Palo Alto. Subsequently,
upon Atty. Ques request for reinvestigation, designated personnel of the DAR
Provincial and Regional Offices (Investigating Team) conducted another ocular
inspection on the subject property on February 20, 2007. The Investigating Team,
in its Report[42]dated February 21, 2007, found that, per testimony of petitioners
caretaker, Rogelio Ludivices (Roger),[43] petitioner has 43 heads of cattle taken care
of by the following individuals: i) Josefino Custodio (Josefino) 18 heads; ii) Andy
Amahit 15 heads; and iii) Bert Pangan 2 heads; that these individuals pastured the
herd of cattle outside the subject property, while Roger took care of 8 heads of
cattle inside the Palo Alto area; that 21 heads of cattle owned by petitioner were
seen in the area adjacent to Palo Alto; that Josefino confirmed to the Investigating
Team that he takes care of 18 heads of cattle owned by petitioner; that the said
Investigating Team saw 9 heads of cattle in the Palo Alto area, 2 of which bore

MFI marks; and that the 9 heads of cattle appear to have matched the Certificates
of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner.
Because of the contentious factual issues and the conflicting averments of
the parties, the CA set the case for hearing and reception of evidence on April 24,
2007.[44] Thereafter, as narrated by the CA, the following events transpired:
On May 17, 2007, [petitioner] presented the Judicial Affidavits of
its witnesses, namely, [petitioners] counsel, [Atty. Que], and the alleged
caretaker of [petitioners] farm, [Roger], who were both cross-examined
by counsel for farmers-movants and SAPLAG. [Petitioner] and
SAPLAG then marked their documentary exhibits.
On May 24, 2007, [petitioners] security guard and third witness, Rodolfo
G. Febrada, submitted his Judicial Affidavit and was cross-examined by
counsel for fa[r]mers-movants and SAPLAG. Farmers-movants also
marked their documentary exhibits.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Formal Offers of
Evidence. Farmers-movants and SAPLAG filed their objections to
[petitioners] Formal Offer of Evidence. Later, [petitioner] and farmersmovants filed their respective Memoranda.
In December 2007, this Court issued a Resolution on the parties offer of
evidence
and
considered
[petitioners] Motion
for
Reconsideration submitted for resolution.[45]

Finally, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its

Resolution[46] dated March 27, 2008. The CA discarded petitioners reliance
on Sutton. It ratiocinated that the MARO Reports and the DARs Manifestation
could not be disregarded simply because DAR A.O. No. 9 was declared
unconstitutional. The Sutton ruling was premised on the fact that
the Sutton property continued to operate as a livestock farm. The CA also reasoned
that, in Sutton, this Court did not remove from the DAR the power to implement
the CARP, pursuant to the latters authority to oversee the implementation of
agrarian reform laws under Section 50[47] of the CARL. Moreover, the CA found:

Petitioner-appellant claimed that they had 43 heads of cattle which

are being cared for and pastured by 4 individuals. To prove its ownership
of the said cattle, petitioner-appellant offered in evidence 43 Certificates
of Ownership of Large Cattle. Significantly, however, the
said Certificates were all dated and issued on November 24, 2006, nearly
2 months after this Court rendered its Amended Decision lifting the
exemption of the 162-hectare portion of the subject landholding. The
acquisition of such cattle after the lifting of the exemption clearly reveals
that petitioner-appellant was no longer operating a livestock farm, and
suggests an effort to create a semblance of livestock-raising for the
purpose of its Motion for Reconsideration.[48]

On petitioners assertion that between MARO Elmas Report dated January 8,

2007 and the Investigating Teams Report, the latter should be given credence, the
CA held that there were no material inconsistencies between the two reports
because both showed that the 43 heads of cattle were found outside the subject
property.
Hence, this Petition assigning the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT HELD THAT LANDS DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK
FARMING WITHIN THE MEANING OF LUZ FARMS AND SUTTON,
AND WHICH ARE THEREBY EXEMPT FROM CARL COVERAGE,
ARE NEVERTHELESS SUBJECT TO DARS CONTINUING
VERIFICATION AS TO USE, AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH
VERIFICATION,
MAY BE
ORDERED
REVERTED TO
AGRICULTURAL
CLASSIFICATION
AND
COMPULSORY
ACQUISITION[;]
II.
GRANTING THAT THE EXEMPT LANDS AFORESAID MAY BE SO
REVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION, STILL THE
PROCEEDINGS FOR SUCH PURPOSE BELONGS TO THE
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE DAR, BEFORE
WHICH THE CONTENDING PARTIES MAY VENTILATE

FACTUAL ISSUES, AND AVAIL THEMSELVES OF USUAL

REVIEW PROCESSES, AND NOT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES
COMPLETELY UNRELATED TO REVERSION [; AND]
III.
IN ANY CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD
THAT THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE IS NO LONGER BEING USED
FOR LIVESTOCK FARMING.[49]

Petitioner asseverates that lands devoted to livestock farming as of June 15,

1988 are classified as industrial lands, hence, outside the ambit of the CARP;
that Luz Farms, Sutton, and R.A. No. 7881 clearly excluded such lands on
constitutional grounds; that petitioners lands were actually devoted to livestock
even before the enactment of the CARL; that livestock farms are exempt from the
CARL, not by reason of any act of the DAR, but because of their nature as
industrial lands; that petitioners property was admittedly devoted to livestock
farming as of June 1988 and the only issue before was whether or not petitioners
pieces of evidence comply with the ratios provided under DAR A.O. No. 9; and
that DAR A.O. No. 9 having been declared as unconstitutional, DAR had no more
legal basis to conduct a continuing review and verification proceedings over
livestock farms. Petitioner argues that, in cases where reversion of properties to
agricultural use is proper, only the DAR has the exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the same; hence, the CA, in this case, committed serious errors
when it ordered the reversion of the property and when it considered pieces of
evidence not existing as of June 15, 1988, despite its lack of jurisdiction; that the
CA should have remanded the case to the DAR due to conflicting factual claims;
that the CA cannot ventilate allegations of fact that were introduced for the first
time on appeal as a supplement to a motion for reconsideration of its first decision,
use the same to deviate from the issues pending review, and, on the basis thereof,
declare exempt lands reverted to agricultural use and compulsorily covered by the
CARP; that the newly discovered [pieces of] evidence were not introduced in the
proceedings before the DAR, hence, it was erroneous for the CA to consider them;
and that piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.

Finally, petitioner submits that, in any case, the CA gravely erred and committed
grave abuse of discretion when it held that the subject property was no longer used
for livestock farming as shown by the Report of the Investigating Team. Petitioner
relies on the 1997 LUCEC and DAR findings that the subject property was devoted
to livestock farming, and on the 1999 CA Decision which held that the occupants
of the property were squatters, bereft of any authority to stay and possess the
property.[50]
On one hand, the farmer-groups, represented by the Espinas group, contend
that they have been planting rice and fruit-bearing trees on the subject property,
and helped the National Irrigation Administration in setting up an irrigation system
therein in 1997, with a produce of 1,500 to 1,600 sacks of palay each year; that
petitioner came to court with unclean hands because, while it sought the exemption
and exclusion of the entire property, unknown to the CA, petitioner surreptitiously
filed for conversion of the property now known as Palo Alto, which was actually
granted by the DAR Secretary; that petitioners bad faith is more apparent since,
despite the conversion of the 153.3049-hectare portion of the property, it still seeks
to exempt the entire property in this case; and that the fact that petitioner applied
for conversion is an admission that indeed the property is agricultural. The farmergroups also contend that petitioners reliance on Luz Farms and Sutton is unavailing
because in these cases there was actually no cessation of the business of raising
cattle; that what is being exempted is the activity of raising cattle and not the
property itself; that exemptions due to cattle raising are not permanent; that the
declaration of DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional does not at all diminish the
mandated duty of the DAR, as the lead agency of the Government, to implement
the CARL; that the DAR, vested with the power to identify lands subject to CARP,
logically also has the power to identify lands which are excluded and/or exempted
therefrom; that to disregard DARs authority on the matter would open the
floodgates to abuse and fraud by unscrupulous landowners; that the factual finding
of the CA that the subject property is no longer a livestock farm may not be
disturbed on appeal, as enunciated by this Court; that DAR conducted a review and
monitoring of the subject property by virtue of its powers under the CARL; and
that the CA has sufficient discretion to admit evidence in order that it could arrive
at a fair, just, and equitable ruling in this case.[51]

On the other hand, respondent OP, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), claims that the CA correctly held that the subject property is not
exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that
the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry
raising; that the issues presented by petitioner are factual in nature and not proper
in this case; that under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questions of
fact may be raised by the parties and resolved by the CA; that due to the
divergence in the factual findings of the DAR and the OP, the CA was duty bound
to review and ascertain which of the said findings are duly supported by substantial
evidence; that the subject property was subject to continuing review and
verification proceedings due to the then prevailing DAR A.O. No. 9; that there is
no question that the power to determine if a property is subject to CARP coverage
lies with the DAR Secretary; that pursuant to such power, the MARO rendered the
assailed reports and certification, and the DAR itself manifested before the CA that
the subject property is no longer devoted to livestock farming; and that, while it is
true that this Courts ruling in Luz Farms declared that agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the CARP, the said
ruling is not without any qualification.[52]
In its Reply[53] to the farmer-groups and to the OSGs comment, petitioner
counters that the farmer-groups have no legal basis to their claims as they admitted
that they entered the subject property without the consent of petitioner; that the rice
plots actually found in the subject property, which were subsequently taken over by
squatters, were, in fact, planted by petitioner in compliance with the directive of
then President Ferdinand Marcos for the employer to provide rice to its employees;
that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not
agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that
land is entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction; and that, inasmuch as the
subject property was not agricultural from the very beginning, DAR has no power
to regulate the same. Petitioner also asserts that the CA cannot uncharacteristically
assume the role of trier of facts and resolve factual questions not previously
adjudicated by the lower tribunals; that MARO Elma rendered the assailed MARO
reports with bias against petitioner, and the same were contradicted by the
Investigating Teams Report, which confirmed that the subject property is still
devoted to livestock farming; and that there has been no change in petitioners
business interest as an entity engaged in livestock farming since its inception in

1960, though there was admittedly a decline in the scale of its operations due to the
illegal acts of the squatter-occupants.
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Let it be stressed that when the CA provided in its first Decision that
continuing review and verification may be conducted by the DAR pursuant to
DAR A.O. No. 9, the latter was not yet declared unconstitutional by this Court. The
first CA Decision was promulgated on April 29, 2005, while this Court struck
down as unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way of Sutton, on October 19, 2005.
Likewise, let it be emphasized that the Espinas group filed the Supplement and
submitted the assailed MARO reports and certification on June 15, 2005, which
proved to be adverse to petitioners case. Thus, it could not be said that the CA
erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No.
9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.
While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the complaint nor
raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process, [54]the same is not
without exception,[55] such as this case. The CA, under Section 3, [56] Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in the interest of justice, entertain and resolve
factual issues. After all, technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure,
and not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the
rules may thus be allowed to attain the prime objective of dispensing justice, for
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [57] Moreover,
petitioner cannot validly claim that it was deprived of due process because the CA
afforded it all the opportunity to be heard.[58] The CA even directed petitioner to file
its comment on the Supplement, and to prove and establish its claim that the
subject property was excluded from the coverage of the CARP. Petitioner actively
participated in the proceedings before the CA by submitting pleadings and pieces
of documentary evidence, such as the Investigating Teams Report and judicial
affidavits. The CA also went further by setting the case for hearing. In all these

proceedings, all the parties rights to due process were amply protected and
recognized.
With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioners arguments fail to
persuade. Its invocation of Sutton is unavailing. In Sutton, we held:
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock
farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent
to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine
and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that
livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not
fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of
the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets,
such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and
blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies,
anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by
lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms
which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. [59]

Indeed, as pointed out by the CA, the instant case does not rest on facts parallel to
those of Sutton because, in Sutton, the subject property remained a livestock farm.
We even highlighted therein the fact that there has been no change of business
interest in the case of respondents.[60] Similarly, in Department of Agrarian Reform
v. Uy,[61] we excluded a parcel of land from CARP coverage due to the factual
findings of the MARO, which were confirmed by the DAR, that the property was
entirely devoted to livestock farming. However, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc.,
represented by Carmen Z. Arnaiz v. Office of the President; Department of
Agrarian Reform; Regional Director, DAR Region V, Legaspi City; Provincial

Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR Provincial Office, Masbate, Masbate; and

Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR Municipal Office, Masbate, Masbate,
[62]
we denied a similar petition for exemption and/or exclusion, by according
respect to the CAs factual findings and its reliance on the findings of the DAR and
the OP that

the subject parcels of land were not directly, actually, and exclusively used for
pasture.[63]
Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own
livestock is fatal to its cause.[64] While petitioner advances a defense that it leased
this ranch because the occupants of the subject property harmed its cattle, like the
CA, we find it surprising that not even a single police and/or barangay report was
filed by petitioner to amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal acts.
Moreover, we accord respect to the CAs keen observation that the assailed MARO
reports and the Investigating Teams Report do not actually contradict one another,
finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside
the subject property.
`
Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are
characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within
the DAR Secretarys competence and jurisdiction. [65] Section 3, Rule II of the 2003
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure provides:
Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over
matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and
administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of
and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance
with his issuances, to wit:
xxxx
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for
livestock, swine, and poultry raising.

Thus, we cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR Secretary
of his legal mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over all ALI cases. To
succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is declared exempt from the
CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect,
the use and disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs
jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR
Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or
exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of
each case and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. In addition,
albeit parenthetically, Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into
residential and golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area originally
claimed as exempt from CARP coverage because it was allegedly devoted to
livestock production.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the assailed Amended Decision and
Resolution of the CA which would warrant the modification, much less the
reversal, thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals
Amended Decision dated October 4, 2006 and Resolution dated March 27, 2008
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN,

G.R. No. 182819

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

EMERSON B. AQUENDE,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 22, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 26 November 2007 Decision2 and 7 May 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91763. In its 26 November
2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent Emerson
B.Aquendes (Aquende) petition for annulment of judgment and declared the 26
November 1996 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City, Branch 6 (trial

court) void. In its 7 May 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner Maximina A. Bulawans5 (Bulawan) motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 1 March 1995, Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and
damages against Lourdes Yap (Yap) and the Register of Deeds before the trial court
docketed as Civil Case No. 9040.6 Bulawan claimed that she is the owner of Lot No.
1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13733
having bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos and
Francisco Yaptengco (Yaptengco brothers), who claimed to have inherited the
property from Yap Chin Cun.7 Bulawan alleged that Yap claimed ownership of the
same property and caused the issuance of TCT No. 40292 in Yaps name.

In her Answer,8 Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of Lot No. 1634-A of Psd187165, which she claimed is the controlling subdivision survey for Lot No. 1634.
Yap also mentioned that, in Civil Case No. 5064, the trial court already declared that
Psd-153847 was simulated by the Yaptengco brothers and that their claim on Lot No.
1634-B was void.9 The trial court likewise adjudged Yap Chin Cun as the rightful
owner of Lot No. 1634-B. Yap also stated that Lot No. 1634-B was sold by Yap
Chin Cun to the Aquende family.

On 26 November 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan. The trial courts 26
November 1996 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff (Bulawan) and against the defendant (Yap) declaring the plaintiff
as the lawful owner and possesor of the property in question, particularly
designated as Lot 1634-B of Plan Psd-153847. The defendant Lourdes Yap is
hereby ordered to respect the plaintiffs ownership and possession of said lot
and to desist from disturbing the plaintiff in her ownership and possession
of said lot.

Subdivision Plan Psd-187165 for Lot 1634 Albay Cadastre as well as TCT No.
40292 in the name of plaintiff10 over Lot 1634-A of Plan Psd-187165 are
hereby declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of Legazpi City is
hereby ordered to cancel as well as any other certificate of title issued pursuant
to said Plan Psd-187165.

Defendant Lourdes Yap is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as

reasonable attorneys fees, P5,000.00 as litigation and incidental expenses and
the costs.

SO ORDERED.11

Yap appealed. On 20 July 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed Yaps appeal.

On 7 February 2002, the trial courts 26 November 2006 Decision became final
and executory per entry of judgment dated 20 July 2001. On 19 July 2002, the trial
court issued a writ of execution.12

In a letter dated 24 July 2002,13 the Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the trial
courts writ of execution and required Aquende to produce TCT No. 40067 so that a
memorandum of the lien may be annotated on the title. On 25 July
2002,Aquende wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds questioning the trial courts writ
of execution against his property.14 Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any
litigation involving his property having received no summons or notice thereof, nor
was he aware of any adverse claim as no notice of lis pendens was inscribed on the
title.

On 2 August 2002, Aquende filed a Third Party Claim15 against the writ of execution
because it affected his property and, not being a party in Civil Case No. 9040, he

argued that he is not bound by the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision. In a letter
dated 5 August 2002,16 the Clerk of Court said that a Third Party Claim was not the
proper remedy because the sheriff did not levy upon or seize Aquendes property.
Moreover, the property was not in the sheriffs possession and it was not about to be
sold by virtue of the writ of execution.

Aquende then filed a Notice of Appearance with Third Party Motion 17 and prayed for
the partial annulment of the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision, specifically the
portion which ordered the cancellation of Psd-187165 as well as any other certificate
of title issued pursuant to Psd-187165. Aquende also filed a Supplemental
Motion18 where he reiterated that he was not a party in Civil Case No. 9040 and that
since the action was in personam or quasi in rem, only the parties in the case are
bound by the decision.

In its 19 February 2003 Order,19 the trial court denied Aquendes motions. According
to the trial court, it had lost jurisdiction to modify its 26 November 1996 Decision
when the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision.

Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 20 Aquende alleged
that he was deprived of his property without due process of law. Aquendeargued that
there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan conveniently failed to implead him despite
her knowledge of the existing title in his name and, thus, prevented him from
participating in the proceedings and protecting his title. Aquendealso alleged
that Bulawan was in collusion with Judge Vladimir B. Brusola who, despite
knowledge of the earlier decision in Civil Case No. 5064 on the ownership of Lot No.
1634-B and Aquendes interest over the property, ruled in favor
ofBulawan. Aquende added that he is an indispensable party and the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not impleaded as a party in the
case. Aquende also pointed out that the trial court went beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by the allegations on the complaint because Bulawan did not pray for the
cancellation of Psd-187165 and TCT No. 40067. Aquende likewise argued that a
certificate of title should not be subject to collateral attack and it cannot be altered,
modified or canceled except in direct proceedings in accordance with law.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Aquende. The 26 November 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November

26, 1996 in Civil Case No. 9040 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 40067 registered in the name of petitioner Emerson
B. Aquende and (LRC) Psd-187165 are hereby ordered REINSTATED. Entry
Nos. 3823 A, B and C annotated by the Register of Deeds of Legazpi City on
TCT No. 40067 are hereby ordered DELETED.

The parties are hereby DIRECTED to respect and abide by the Decision dated
October 31, 1990 in Civil Case No. 5064 quieting title over Lot No. 1634-B
(LRC) Psd-187165, now registered in the name of Emerson Aquende under
TCT No. 40067.

SO ORDERED.21

On 8 January 2008, Bulawan filed a motion for reconsideration.22 In its 7 May 2008
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Bulawans motion.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that it may still entertain the petition despite the fact that
another division of the Court of Appeals already affirmed the trial courts 26
November 1996 Decision. The other division of the Court of Appeals was not given
the opportunity to rule on the issue of Aquende being an indispensable party because
that issue was not raised during the proceedings before the trial court and on appeal.

The Court of Appeals declared that Aquende was an indispensable party who was
adversely affected by the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision. The Court of
Appeals said that the trial court should have impleaded Aquende under Section 11,
Rule 323 of the Rules of Court. Since jurisdiction was not properly acquired
over Aquende, the Court of Appeals declared the trial courts 26 November 1996
Decision void. According to the Court of Appeals, Aquende had no other recourse but
to seek the nullification of the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision that unduly
deprived him of his property.
The Court of Appeals added that the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision was void
because the trial court failed to note that the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and
Partition, from where the Yaptengco brothers derived their ownership over Lot No.
1634-B of Psd-153847 allegedly as heirs of Yap Chin Cun and now being claimed
by Bulawan, had already been declared void in Civil Case No. 5064. 24 The Court of
Appeals also said that a reading of Bulawans complaint showed that the trial court had
no jurisdiction to order the nullification of Psd-187165 and TCT No. 40067 because
this was not one of the reliefs that Bulawan prayed for.

The Issues

Bulawan raises the following issues:

I.
The Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals decided contrary to existing
laws and jurisprudence when it declared the Decision, dated 26 November
1996, in Civil Case No. 9040 null and void considering that a petition for

annulment [of judgment] under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is an equitable

remedy which is available only under extraordinary circumstances.

II.
The Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals decided contrary to law
when it considered Respondent Emerson B. Aquende as an indispensable party
in Civil Case No. 9040.

III.
The Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals sanctioned a departure from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it overturned a final
and executory decision of another Division thereof.25

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Petition for Annulment of Judgment

is the Proper Remedy

Bulawan argues that the Court of Appeals erred in granting Aquendes petition for
annulment of judgment in the absence of extrinsic fraud and the existence of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Bulawan adds that the Court of Appeals erred
because it annulled a decision which had already been considered and affirmed by

another division of the Court of Appeals. According to Bulawan, the trial courts 26
November 1996 Decision is already final and had been fully executed.

In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.26 Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured.27 The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.28 On the other hand, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either
case the judgment or final order and resolution are void. 29 Where the questioned
judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction,
the same shall be set aside and considered void. 30

In his petition for annulment of judgment, Aquende alleged that there was extrinsic
fraud because he was prevented from protecting his title when Bulawan and the trial
court failed to implead him as a party. Bulawan also maintained that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person and, therefore, its 26 November 1996 Decision
is not binding on him. In its 26 November 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals found
merit in Aquendes petition and declared that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over Aquende, who was adversely affected by its 26 November 1996 Decision. We
find no error in the findings of the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where

the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. 31 Consequently, an action for
annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had
already been fully executed or implemented. 32

Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it took cognizance
of Aquendes petition for annulment of judgment and overturned the trial courts 26
November 1996 Decision even if another division of the Court of Appeals had already
affirmed it and it had already been executed.

The Court also notes that when the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts 26
November 1996 Decision, it had not been given the occasion to rule on the issue
of Aquende being an indispensable party and, if in the affirmative, whether the trial
court properly acquired jurisdiction over his person. This question had not been raised
before the trial court and earlier proceedings before the Court of Appeals.

Aquende is a Proper Party to Sue

for the Annulment of the Judgment

Bulawan argues that Aquende was not an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 9040
because the lot Aquende claims ownership of is different from the subject matter of
the case. Bulawan clarifies that she claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd153847, while Aquende claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd187165. Bulawan argues that even if Aquende will be affected by the trial courts 26
November 1996 Decision, this will not make him an indispensable party.

Contrary to Bulawans argument, it appears that Aquendes Lot No. 1634-B of Psd187165 and Bulawans Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 actually refer to the same Lot
No. 1634-B originally owned by Yap Chin Cun. Both Aquende andBulawan trace
their ownership of the property to Yap Chin Cun. Aquende maintains that he
purchased the property from Yap Chin Cun, while Bulawan claims to have purchased
the property from the Yaptengco brothers, who alleged that they inherited the property
from Yap Chin Cun. However, as the Court of Appeals declared, the title of
the Yaptengco brothers over Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 had already been
cancelled and they were forever enjoined not to disturb the right of ownership and
possession of Yap Chin Cun.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in

interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. An
indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the

litigation.33 As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.

In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,34 we said:

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and
the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely
when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.35

During the proceedings before the trial court, the answers of Yap 36 and the Register of
Deeds37 should have prompted the trial court to inquire further whether there were
other indispensable parties who were not impleaded. The trial court should have taken
the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or to order Bulawan to do so as
mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 38 The burden to implead or
to order the impleading of indispensable parties is placed on Bulawan and on the trial
court, respectively.39

However, even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file a
petition for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person need not
be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. 40 What is essential is that he can
prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and that he would be adversely affected thereby.41

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable judgment from
the trial court by the use of fraud. Bulawan prevented Aquende from presenting his
case before the trial court and from protecting his title over his property. We also agree
with the Court of Appeals that the 26 November 1996 Decision adversely
affected Aquende as he was deprived of his property without due process.

Moreover, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the
decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is
a stranger.42 In National Housing Authority v. Evangelista,43 we said:

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by
judgment rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial courts
decision decreed that (A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever
nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by
defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the
pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with
any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered
to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs. Respondent is adversely
affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject
property from Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the
height of inequity to allow respondents title to be nullified without being
given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible
ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of
the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law. Clearly, the trial courts judgment is void insofar as
paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned. 44 (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Aquende was never made a party in Civil Case No. 9040. Yet, the trial court
ordered the cancellation of Psd-187165 and any other certificate of title issued
pursuant to Psd-187165, including Aquendes TCT No. 40067. Aquende was adversely
affected by such judgment as his title was cancelled without giving him the
opportunity to present his evidence to prove his ownership of the property.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 November 2007

Decision and 7 May 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
91763.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 173559

January 7, 2013

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A.
BALANGUE, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given not supported by the
evidence presented violates the opposing partys right to due process and may be declared void ab
initio in a proper proceeding.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) issued in G.R. SP No. 85541 which granted the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment3 filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that portion of the October 17, 2000
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5%
monthly interest rate for the principal amount of the loan respondent obtained from her.
This Petition likewise assails the CAs June 26, 2006 Resolution 5 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.
On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months
and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage6 over their 202-square meter property located in Marulas,
Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296. 7 When the debt became
due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on September 17, 1999, petitioner
filed with the RTC a Complaint8 praying that respondents be ordered:
(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum, from 02 March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.

(b) To pay petitioner actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no case
be less thanP10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fee, plus P2,000.00 per hearing as
appearance fee.
(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned
parcel of land, and for the disposition of the proceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon
failure of the respondents to fully pay petitioner within the period set by law the sums set
forth in this complaint.
(d) Costs of this suit.
Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.9 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On October
15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public Attorneys Office,
they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested extension, however,
respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC
declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. 10
Ruling of the RTC sought to be annulled.
In a Decision11 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioners Complaint. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, ordering the respondents to
pay the petitioner as follows:
a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid
principal loan obligation plus interest at 5% per month [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991,
until the same is fully paid;
b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees plus cost of suit;
c) in the event the [respondents] fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of
foreclosure shall be issued accordingly for the sale at public auction of the subject property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 and the improvements thereon for the
satisfaction of the petitioners claim.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution,13 alleging that respondents did not interpose a
timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTCs Decision on November 13, 2000.
Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 14 dated
January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According to the
other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not

inform them about it. They prayed that the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision be set aside and a new
trial be conducted.
But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered15 the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its
October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the
public auction of the mortgaged property,16 which the RTC granted.17 In an auction sale conducted on
November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420,000.00. Thus, a Certificate
of Sale18 was issued in her favor and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT No. V-12296.
Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution
Sale19 dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of
interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint.
Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full
payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to
May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.
In an Order20 dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents motion and accordingly modified the
interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Then on August 2, 2002, respondents
filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation21 in the total amount
of P126,650.00.22
Displeased with the RTCs May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari23 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a
Decision24 declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at
the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the
rate of interest to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated:
Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly
interest instead of the 12% per annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy is
not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
(Leonor vs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void
(Fortich vs. Corona, 312 SCRA 751).
From the foregoing, the remedy of the respondents is to have the Court declare the portion of the
judgment providing for a higher interest than that prayed for as null and void for want of or in excess
of jurisdiction. A void judgment never acquire[s] finality and any action to declare its nullity does not
prescribe (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 672).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having merit, is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE. Resultantly, the challenged May 7, 2002 and September 5, 2000 orders of Public
Respondent Court are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.25 (Emphases in the original; italics supplied.)

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Taking their cue from the Decision of the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents filed
with the same court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages. 26 They
contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in
gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process.
According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal agreement of the
parties that in lieu thereof petitioners family can continue occupying respondents residential building
located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully paid.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Initially, the CA denied due course to the Petition.27 Upon respondents motion, however, it reinstated
and granted the Petition. In setting aside portions of the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision, the CA
ruled that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5% was not
agreed upon by the parties and that petitioners Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12%
per annum. Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the CA concluded
that the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint. It
ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and our resolution dated
October 13, 2004 is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
ordering the ANNULMENT OF:
(a) public respondents impugned October 17, 2000 judgment, insofar as it awarded 5%
monthly interest in favor of petitioner; and
(b) all proceedings relative to the sale at public auction of the property titled in respondents
names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 of the Valenzuela registry.
The judgment debt adjudicated in public respondents impugned October 17, 2000 judgment is,
likewise, ordered RECOMPUTED at the rate of 12% per annum from March 2, 1991. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28 (Emphases in the original.)
Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution. 29
Issues
Hence, this Petition anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR
OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR
AND MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA, BRANCH 75 DATED OCTOBER 17,
2000 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 241-V-99, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS
BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF
IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT.30
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner claims that the CA erred in partially annulling the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision. She
contends that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be availed of only when the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the claimant. In the present case, however, respondents had all the opportunity to
question the October 17, 2000 Decision of the RTC, but because of their own inaction or negligence
they failed to avail of the remedies sanctioned by the rules. Instead, they contented themselves with
the filing of a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and then a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and to
Set Aside Execution Sale.
Petitioner likewise argues that for a Rule 47 petition to prosper, the same must either be based on
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. However, the allegations in respondents Rule 47 petition do not
constitute extrinsic fraud because they simply pass the blame to the negligence of their former
counsel. In addition, it is too late for respondents to pass the buck to their erstwhile counsel
considering that when they filed their Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside
Execution Sale they were already assisted by their new lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo A. Ruiz, who did not
also avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. As to the ground of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner
posits that there is no reason to doubt that the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case and over the persons of the respondents.
While conceding that the RTC patently made a mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest, petitioner
nonetheless invokes the doctrine of immutability of final judgment and contends that the RTC
Decision can no longer be corrected or modified since it had long become final and executory. She
likewise points out that respondents received a copy of said Decision on November 13, 2000 but did
nothing to correct the same. They did not even question the award of 5% monthly interest when they
filed their Motion to Set Aside Judgment which they anchored on the sole ground of the RTCs lack
of jurisdiction over the persons of some of the respondents.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents do not contest the existence of their obligation and the principal amount thereof. They
only seek quittance from the 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum imposed by the RTC.
Respondents contend that Section (3)d of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is clear that when the
defendant is declared in default, the court cannot grant a relief more than what is being prayed for in
the Complaint. A judgment which transgresses said rule, according to the respondents, is void for
having been issued without jurisdiction and for being violative of due process of law.

Respondents maintain that it was through no fault of their own, but through the gross negligence of
their former counsel, Atty. Coroza, that the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from
judgment were lost. They allege that after filing a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, Atty. Coroza
did not file any pleading resulting to their being declared in default. While the said lawyer filed on
their behalf a Motion to Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001, he however took no steps to
appeal from the Decision of the RTC, thereby allowing said judgment to lapse into finality. Citing
Legarda v. Court of Appeals,31 respondents aver that clients are not always bound by the actions of
their counsel, as in the present case where the clients are to lose their property due to the gross
negligence of their counsel.
With regard to petitioners invocation of immutability of judgment, respondents argue that said
doctrine applies only to valid and not to void judgments.
Our Ruling
The petition must fail.
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process
and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only
under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the
partys own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the
notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to
rest."32
While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of
due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. 34 In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof,
its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process
of law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint
and smacks of violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to

and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Teston,36 this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds
the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent
surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who
was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to
conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. 37 But the same
is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed
the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
The raison dtre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that
the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he known that
the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the
Complaint.38 No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard
defendants right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the
mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of fair
play"39 and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to
be heard thereon.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations
in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage40 executed by the parties
does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she
alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum"41 and sought payment thereof. She
did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor
testified thereon. Clearly, the RTCs award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and
disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not
informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe
that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.
Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioners general
prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x." 42 To repeat, the
courts grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto,
supported by evidence, and covered by the partys cause of action.43 Besides, even assuming that
the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial,

the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance with
applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,44 this Court held:
In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court
of Appeals, Spouses Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case of Spouses
Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3% interest per month or 36% interest per annum as
excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably reduced the rate of
interest to 1% interest per month or 12% interest per annum. (Citations omitted)
It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their
Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid
obligation."45 Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver to
contest patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as
applicable jurisprudence.
Respondents former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of his clients; respondents
did not lose ordinary remedies of new trial, petition for relief, etc. through their own fault.
Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. This is based
on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly
negligent in their duty to maintain their clients cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their
clients property without due process of law.46 In which case, the courts must step in and accord relief
to a client who suffered thereby.47
1wphi1

The manifest indifference of respondents former counsel in handling the cause of his client was
already present even from the beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients
a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without
filing an Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence was
aggravated by the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly interest despite receipt of
the RTC Decision on November 13, 2000.48 A simple reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision readily reveals that it awarded exorbitant and unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference
from what is being prayed for by the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very patent. It also
defies elementary jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the counsel carefully read the
judgment it would have caught his attention and compelled him to take the necessary steps to
protect the interest of his client. But he did not. Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to
Set Aside Judgment49 dated January 26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction,
oblivious to the fact that the erroneous award of 5% monthly interest would result to his clients
deprivation of property without due process of law. Worse, he even allowed the RTC Decision to
become final by not perfecting an appeal. Neither did he file a petition for relief therefrom. It was only
a year later that the patently erroneous award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the attention of
the RTC when respondents, thru their new counsel, filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and
To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC candidly admitted that it "made a glaring mistake in
directing the defendants to pay interest on the principal loan at 5% per month which is very different
from what was prayed for by the plaintiff."50

"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can
be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law."51 Judging from how
respondents former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly
negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due
process of law.
In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile
counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for
relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer
would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case.52 Here,
"respondents are plain and ordinary people x x x who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and
technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being so, they completely relied upon and trusted their
former counsel to appropriately act as their interest may lawfully warrant and require." 53
As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to
their former counsels gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTCs erroneous,
baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property and still
owe petitioner a large amount of money. As aptly observed by the CA:
x x x If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will not only end up
losing their property but will additionally owe private respondent the sum of P232,000.00 plus the
legal interest said balance had, in the meantime, earned. As a court of justice and equity, we cannot,
in good conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to prevail. 54
Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioners invocation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
Petitioner does not contest as she even admits that the RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding 5%
monthly interest.55Amazingly, she wants to benefit from such erroneous award. This Court cannot
allow this injustice to happen.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and
June 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MARICALUM
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

MINING

G.R. No. 157696-97

Present:

- versus PANGANIBAN, C.J.

HON. ARTURO D. BRION
in his official capacity as
Acting
Secretary
of
Labor and Employment
and the NATIONAL MINES
AND
ALLIED
WORKERSUNION (NAMA
WU Local 103),
Respondents.

Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 9, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeks to set aside the Decision [1] dated 24 January 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65351 and No. 65458
entitled, Carlos G. Nerja, Jr., et al. v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion, et
al. and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion, et
al., respectively, and the Resolution dated 18 March 2003 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC) is a domestic
corporation engaged in mining business and operation, while
private respondent National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local
103 (NAMAWU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and
file employees of petitioner.

On 29 January 1996, NAMAWU submitted its Collective Bargaining

Agreement (CBA) proposals to petitioner. Due to petitioners
inaction to the proposals submitted by NAMAWU, the latter filed
on 19 March 1996, its first Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Bacolod City, for refusal
to bargain and Unfair Labor Practice.

Eventually, petitioner presented its counter-proposals and started

the CBA negotiations. While the negotiations were going on,
petitioner dismissed some workers effective 06 May 1996.

On 23 August 1996, NAMAWU filed a second Notice of Strike for

Unfair Labor Practice against petitioner.

On 05 September 1996, while the NCMB Bacolod City was

conducting conciliation meetings, petitioner issued Notices of
Temporary Lay-off to its selected rank and file employees
effective 07 October 1996.

After the NCMB failed to conciliate the labor dispute between

NAMAWU and petitioner, then Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Secretary Leonardo Quisumbing,[2] on 03
October 1996, assumed jurisdiction over the case docketed as OSAJ-10-96-014 (NCMB-RB6-08-06-96).

Meanwhile, Pedro M. Abuana, Jr., an adversely affected employee

of petitioner during the retrenchment effected on 07 October
1996, filed, in his own behalf, an illegal dismissal case against the
petitioner before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as RAB Case No. 0612-10636-96 (Abuana case). The Labor Arbiter ruled that the
dismissal of Abuana was legal and valid.[3] On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, which decision became
final and executory.[4]

In an order dated 30 July 1997 (Quisumbing order),

Secretary Quisumbing resolved the labor dispute in favor of
NAMAWU: (1) directing the reinstatement with backwages of the
workers laid-off in May and October 1996; (2) finding petitioner
guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice; (3) directing
the parties to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
incorporating all the terms and conditions of the previous
bargaining agreement; and (4) providing for across-the-board
increase of all rank-and-file workers. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.

Declaring that lay-offs implemented

1996 and October 7, 1996 as illegal:

on May

7,

2.

Ordering that all workers, whether union members or

not, who were laid-off on May 7, 1996 and October 7,
1996 be immediately reinstated without gap in service,
loss of seniority, and that their full backwages and
benefits from the time of termination until actual
reinstatement be paid;

3.

Declaring the Company to have violated the Labor

Code provisions on Unfair Labor Practice for
negotiating in bad faith and later refusing to negotiate;
and

4.

Ordering the parties to enter into a new collective

bargaining agreement incorporating all the terms and
conditions of the previous collective bargaining
agreement between the Company and the NFL, except
the name of the exclusive bargaining agent, and
providing for an annual across-the-board increase in
the daily wage of all rank and file workers in the
amount of P60.00 per day from February, 1995 until
January, 1998 and another P50.00 increase annually
effective February 1, 1998 until January 31, 2000.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by

succeeding DOLE Secretary Cresenciano Trajano in an order
dated 17 April 1998 (Trajano order). The Trajano order modified
the Quisumbing order as follows: (1) setting aside the finding of
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice and remanding these
issues to the arbitration level of the NLRC for a hearing on the
merits; and (2) deleting the award of backwages for the workers
to be reinstated. The pertinent portions of the Trajano order state:

This Office finds that there are no new matters/evidence

in the Motion for Reconsideration which would warrant a
reversal of Our decision on wage issue.

We however find it necessary, in the interest of justice

and fairness, to reconsider Our finding of Unfair Labor
Practice which could ultimately subject the Company and
its officers to criminal prosecution.

xxxx

This being the case, it is a matter of necessity that a fullblown hearing be conducted on the issue of unfair labor
practice. Indeed, Art. 247 of the Labor Code, as amended,
mandates that a hearing should be conducted in the
resolution of an unfair labor practice.

Pending resolution of the issue of unfair labor practice

and illegal termination, the Company is directed to
physically reinstate all workers, whether union members
or not who were laid-off on May 7, 1996 and October 7,
1996.

WHEREFORE, except as above modified, Our Order

dated 30 July 1997 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Executive Labor Arbiter, Regional Arbitration Branch

No. VI, National Labor Relations Commission, is hereby
deputized as Hearing Officer and is directed to conduct

hearing/s and receive evidence as expeditiously as

possible on the issues of unfair labor practice and
terminations effected by the Company on May 7, 1996
and October 7, 1996, and to submit his Report and
Recommendation to this Office within ten (10) days from
termination of the hearing.

Meanwhile, as earlier mentioned, on 30 April 1998, the Labor

Arbiter handling RAB Case No. 06-12-10636-96 which was filed
by Abuana ruled that the retrenchment effected by MMC on 07
May 1996 and 07 October 1996 were valid and legal.[5]

Dissatisfied by the Quisumbing and Trajano orders, petitioner

MMC filed a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as
G.R. No. 133519 entitled, Maricalum Mining Corporation v.
Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, et al. In a resolution dated 06 July
1998 (Resolution), this Court dismissed the petition on the ground
that the then Secretary of DOLE Quisumbing did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing his order dated 30 July 1997.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Resolution.
On 11 September 1998, NAMAWU filed a Motion for Partial
Execution with the DOLE which was not acted upon due to
the pendency of petitioners motion for reconsideration.
During the pendency of petitioners motion for reconsideration,
the decision in St. Martins Funeral Homes v. National Labor
Relations Commission[6] was promulgated. Following the ruling in
said case, petitioners motion for reconsideration of our resolution
dated 06 July 1998 was remanded to the Court of Appeals for
proper disposition.

On 14 June 1999, the appellate court denied petitioners motion

for reconsideration.
Still undaunted, petitioner brought the case anew to this
Court via petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
138996
entitled, Maricalum Mining
Corporation
v.
Hon Cresenciano B. Trajano, in his capacity as the Secretary of
the DOLE and NAMAWU Local 103, which was, however, denied
with finality in a resolution dated 26 January 2000.

On 10 February 2000, NAMAWU filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation

and Second Motion for Execution with the Secretary of DOLE. The
motion also sought assistance from the Bureau of Working
Conditions (BWC) in the computation of the awards/benefits
due NAMAWUs members under the Quisumbing order.

On 25 July 2000, the BWC submitted to the DOLE its findings and
observation, coming up with a computation in the aggregate
amount of One Hundred Fifty-Nine Million, Fifty-Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Seventy-One and 30/100 (P159,054,971.30) Pesos
for loss of time, benefits, rice subsidy, health insurance bonus
and backwages of union members who were illegally dismissed.

Petitioner filed a comment to the BWC findings on 08 September

2000, stating that the BWC computation was erroneous for the
following reasons: (1) there is no legal basis for the computation
of backwages because the Trajanoorder deleted the award
of backwages made in the Quisumbing order; (2) the entitlement
to backwages of the employees retrenched in May and October
1996 would be dependent on the resolution of the cases for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice; and (3) the wage increase

awarded by the Secretary cannot be availed of by the other

employees who were not retrenched in May and October 1996.
On 18 November 2000, 149 employees of petitioner who claimed
were part of the 215 members of NAMAWU filed a Motion for
Intervention With Prior Leave before the Office of the Secretary of
DOLE.[7]

In an order[8] dated 09 May 2001, DOLE Acting Secretary Arturo

D. Brion granted NAMAWUs motion
for
execution,
approved BWCs computation of the benefits due to the laid-off
employees and denied the motion for intervention, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered:

1.

Ordering respondent MMC to immediately reinstate all

workers whether union member or not, who were laidoff on May 7, 1997 and October 7, 1996 without gap in
service,
loss
of
seniority,
and
that
their
full backwages and benefits from the time of
termination until actual reinstatement be paid;

2.

Approving the computation of BWC consisting of 23

pages based on the Order of July 30, 1997 submitted
on
this
office
on July
25,
2000 through
Director Danilo S. Lorredo and made integral part
thereof;

3.
4.

Denying intervenors motion for intervention; and

Ordering the Bureau of Working Condition to compute
the remaining amount of the award due to
complainants as per order of the Secretary of Labor

dated July
30,
1997 starting October
1999 until January 31, 2000.

1,

Let a partial writ of execution be issued directing the

Sheriff, Regional Office No. VI, Department of Labor and
Employment, Bacolod City to proceed to the premises
of Mariculum Mining Corporation to execute the Order
dated July 30, 1997 affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in the resolutions dated June 14, 1999
and July 6, 1998, respectively, and collect the aggregate
amount of P159,054,971.30 whose breakdown is specified
in the partial writ of execution.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On 11 May 2001,

then DOLE Acting Secretary Brion issued a Partial Writ of
Execution,[9] directing to proceed to the MMC premises for the
execution of the same. In an order dated o6 June 2001, Acting
Secretary Brion denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

With the denial of petitioners motion, Carlos G. Nerja, Jr.

and Eugenio D. Caras, who claimed to represent the 342
employees of petitioner at that time and who allegedly stand to
be adversely affected by the enforcement of the Partial Writ of
Execution, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65351.

Petitioner also filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of

Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65458.

NAMAWU filed a motion for consolidation of the two petitions

which was granted by the appellate court in its order dated 12
November 2001.

The Court of Appeals dispose of the two petitions by dismissing

them in a Decision dated 24 January 2002.

Motions for reconsiderations were filed, which the Court of

Appeals denied in an order dated 18 March 2003.

Carlos G. Nerja, Jr. and Eugenio D. Caras filed a petition for review
before this Court which was dismissed on 09 June 2003.

On 11 April 2003, petitioner filed the instant petition for review

on certiorari.

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING

THAT THE TRAJANO ORDER MODIFIED THE QUISUMBING
ORDER AND THUS, PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN ORDERING AND ISSUING A
WRIT OF EXECUTION BASED ON THE QUISUMBING
ORDER.

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING

THAT
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
ACTED
WHIMSICALLY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN APPROVING THE COMPUTATION OF
THE BUREAU OF WORKING CONDITIONS (BWC) WITHOUT
GIVING ANY CONSIDERATION TO THE SUPERVENING
EVENTS THAT RENDER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BWC
COMPUTATION UNREASONABLE AND UNJUST.

III

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING

THAT NAMAWU HAD NO LEGAL STANDING TO SEEK THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS GIVEN THAT
MAJORITY OF ITS TOTAL MEMBERSHIP HAS CHOSEN TO
DISAFFILIATE.

The petition has no merit.

On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals

erred in affirming the assailed orders issued by DOLE Acting
Secretary Brion finding that it was the Quisumbing order that this
Court upheld in G.R. No. 133519 and that the said order should be
the basis for the enforcement of the writ of execution.

Petitioner stresses that the Trajano order superseded and

modified the Quisumbing order, hence, the basis for the issuance
and enforcement of the writ of execution must be the former
order. To support its stance, petitioner argues that when it filed
the petition in G.R. No. 133519, it merely questioned
the Trajano order inasmuch as the said order affirmed
the Quisumbing order directing the reinstatement of the laid-off
workers and the award of wage increase.Petitioner points out that
since the only issues raised by it in G.R. No. 133519 were the
reinstatement and award of wage increase, it follows that the
other issues such as unfair labor practice and the award
of backwages are excluded.Thus, the effect of the dismissal of the
petition in G.R. No. 133519 was the reinstatement of
the Trajano order.

Petitioner also asserts that even assuming that the Resolution

affirmed the Quisumbing order in its entirety without a similar
pronouncement that the Trajano order was a nullity, would only
mean that there were two valid and subsisting orders. Since
the Trajano order is the later issuance, ergo, it supersedes and
modifies the Quisumbing order.

Petitioner further claims that NAMAWU admitted the validity,

finality and enforceability of the Trajano order in its Motion for
Partial Execution dated 11 September 1998.

In the petition filed by petitioner in G.R. No. 133519, the following

averments appear:[10]

Now, not only was the assumption improperly made, but

worse, its implementation was also gravely abused by the

then Secretary of Labor. It may be well to note that in the

first assailed Order dated 30 July 1997, the Petitioner was
found guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal,
a
finding
that
was
arrived
at
by
then Secretary Quisumbing without
observing
the
measure of due process demanded by the gravity of the
charges made against MMC x x x.

For all its efforts, the Petitioner should have, at the very
least, been spared of these whimsical and arbitrary
impositions of the Public Respondent and his predecessor
in office (referring to Secretary Quisumbing) x x x.

The foregoing portion of the petition amply suggests that

petitioner was assailing the Quisumbing order, not only on the
issues of reinstatement and the award of wage increase, but also
on the matter of unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and the
award of backwages as well. Assuming arguendo that indeed the
issues on unfair labor practice and award of backwages were not
raised by petitioner, there is nothing to prevent this Court from
reviewing matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by
the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
resolution of the controversy, as in the instant case. Thus we held:

x x x It is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted

by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and
that this Court has the authority to review matters not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
resolution of the case.[11]

In upholding the Quisumbing order over the Trajano order, we

resolved:[12]

Indeed, the timing of the retrenchment of workers tends

to confirm the finding of the Secretary of Labor that the
cessation of operations on October 7, 1996 was an illegal
lock-out. It is noteworthy that Petitioner claimed business
losses to justify the retrenchment of workers at the time
when the parties were negotiating a new CBA.

Considering that he found Petitioner to be guilty of unfair

labor practice in bargaining in bad faith, the
reinstatement of the dismissed workers and the grant of
wage increase were proper.

It must be noted that the Trajano order omitted the findings of

unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal and the award
of backwages which
were
embodied
in
the Quisumbing order. Since we upheld entirely the findings in
theQuisumbing order, i.e., illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
award of backwages, reinstatement and wage increase in our
Resolution, as a result the Trajano order is necessarily vacated.

Furthermore, the dispositive portion could not have been clearer

as
it
categorically
declares
that
the
Secretary
of
Labor, i.e., Leonardo Quisumbing, did not commit grave abuse in
his order dated 30 July 1997, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for

lack of showing that the Secretary of Labor and
Employment committed grave abuse of discretion in his
order of July 30, 1997.

The order that we sustained in the foregoing fallo is

the Quisumbing order which is dated 30 July 1997, and definitely
not the Trajano order which is dated 17 April 1998. Even if we did
not explicitly annul the Trajano order, nevertheless the tenor of
the Resolutions dispositive portion indubitably decreed that we
sustained
the
order
dated 30
July
1997 or
the Quisumbing order. Indeed, it is the dispositive part of the
judgment that actually settles and declares the rights and
obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, authoritatively,
notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent statements in the
body that may tend to confuse. [13] It is the dispositive part that
controls, for purposes of execution. [14] Hence, there is no doubt
that it was the Quisumbing order, not the Trajano order, that we
upheld in our Resolution and which should be the basis of the writ
of execution.
As to petitioners contention that NAMAWU allegedly admitted in
its Motion for Partial Execution dated 11 September 1998 the
validity
and
finality
the Trajano order,
the
same
is
unsubstantiated. It does not appear from the said motion that
NAMAWU made such categorical admission.

Besides, even if there was such an admission, the same does not
bind this Court. It is not the interpretation of NAMAWU that makes
the Trajano order or the Quisumbing order controlling, rather, it is
the Courts declaration that settles such issue.

Anent the second issue, petitioner questions the BWC

computation. It accentuates that the same is flawed as it included
the award of backwages which was already deleted in
the Trajano order.

Petitioner also insists that the Abuana case where the dismissal
of Abuana was declared valid, and therefore the award
of backwages was deleted by the labor arbiter and later affirmed
by the NLRC - should have a bearing in the instant case
considering that the circumstances surrounding the dismissal
of Abuana are the same circumstances that resulted in the
retrenchments of NAMAWUs members in May and October
1996. As Abuana was
not
awardedbackwages, NAMAWUs members should not have been
awarded backwages as well.

Petitioner likewise avers that the employees who were not

retrenched in May and October 1996 should not be awarded the
wage increase because of subsequent and supervening events
such as the fact that these employees had entered into separate
agreements with petitioner for the adoption of a new progressive
wage system and that they executed quitclaims releasing
petitioner from any liabilities.
According to petitioner, another reason why the wage increase
cannot be availed of by the employees not retrenched in May and
October 1996, is because the NAMAWU and petitioner have yet to
enter
into
a
collective
bargaining
as
required
by
the Quisumbing order. It is petitioners interpretation of the said
order that prior to the implementation of the wage increase, a
CBA must first be constituted.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals opined that

the Quisumbing order, and not the Trajano order, is controlling
and should be the basis of the issuance of the writ of execution.
As to the Abuana case, the appellate court ruled that the same
cannot prevail over the Quisumbing order, the latter having been
affirmed both by the Court of Appeals and this Court. The Court of
Appeals added that the decision inAbuana cannot bind the parties
in the instant case since they are not involved in the
said Abuana case.

Addressing the matter on the execution of quitclaims, the Court of

Appeals discredited the same on the grounds that the copies of
the same were not presented, and that granting that they were
indeed executed, the same cannot bar the execution of
the Quisumbing order in the absence of any showing that the
entire amount due the employees was fully satisfied with the
execution of the quitclaims.
It ruled that the wage increase embodied in the BWC computation
does not refer to the agreed wage increase that can only be
implemented after a CBA is reached by the parties, rather, it
refers
to
the
across-the-board
increase
granted
in
the Quisumbing order as a result of a finding of unfair labor
practice on the part of petitioner due to its failure to observe its
duty to bargain. Thus, the wage increase as computed by the
BWC, is legally in order even in the absence of a new CBA.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners assertion that there is no basis for the computation

of backwages,
because
the backwages awarded
in
the Quisumbing order was deleted in the Trajano order flounders
in view of our declaration that the Quisumbing order sets aside
the Trajano order.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that the pronouncement

in the Abuana case is not binding on the parties in this case. We
further state that the Abuana case does not affect NAMAWU no
matter the similarity in situation is on the ground that NAMAWU
was not impleaded as a party in the Abuana case. It is a basic
postulate in this jurisdiction that no man shall be affected [in] any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are
not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. [15] Due process
requires that a court decision can only bind a party therein and
not against one who did not have his day in court.
As to petitioners argument on the new progressive wage, suffice it
to state that the same issue had already been passed upon
in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Trajano[16] where we affirmed
the finding of the Court of Appeals,viz:[17]

The alleged acceptance of the workers of the new wage

structure is likewise unreliable. If the alternative is
dismissal, who would not sign an acceptance of such new
wage structure? Besides, as pointed out by the private
respondent, even granting that the workers freely agreed
to such wage structures, the company could not have
validly negotiated with them without violating the Labor
Code, considering that the private respondent was still
then the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees.

Petitioners contention that the workers whose services were

terminated subsequent in May and October 1996 executed
quitclaims does not merit our attention because petitioner failed
to prove such execution.

Quitclaims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public

policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the
workers legal rights especially if the following are present: (a)
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the settlement
are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims
must be struck down as invalid or illegal. [18] In the instant case,
the execution of the alleged quitclaims appears to be suspect
because of the illegal dismissal of the workers and the unfair labor
practice committed by petitioner. For fear of getting nothing from
petitioner, it may be readily concluded that employees were
compelled to sign the quitclaims. Also, petitioner failed to present
evidence to show that payments to the workers were made.
Equally unavailing is petitioners assertion that the wage increase
or adjustment adopted under the BWC computation is premature
since no CBA had been entered into.
As accurately explained by the appellate court: [19]
Neither can We subscribe to petitioners contention that
the wage adjustment or increase adopted in the BWC
computation cannot be implemented in the absence of a
new CBA. It is undisputed that the increase adverted to in
the BWC computation does not refer to the agreed wage
increase that could only be implemented based on a new
CBA. Rather, it refers to the across-the-board increase
granted in the Quisumbing order as a consequence of a
finding of unfair labor practice on the part of MMC due to
its failure to observe its duty to bargain.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that NAMAWU had no

legal standing to seek the implementation of the assailed orders
of DOLE Acting Secretary Brion because of the disaffiliation of the

majority of its members which deprived NAMAWUs authority to

represent its members.
Article 256 of the Labor Code partly provides:

REPRESENTATION
ISSUE
IN
ORGANIZED
ESTABLISHMENTS. In organized establishments, when a
verified petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the sixtyday period before the expiration of the collective
bargaining
agreement,
the
Med-Arbiter
shall
automatically order an election by secret ballot when the
verified petition is supported by the written consent of at
least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit.

xxxx

At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer

shall continue to recognize the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for
certification election is filed.

According to the foregoing provision, for a union to become an

exclusive bargaining representative of a particular establishment,
it must emerge as winner in a certification election. In the case at
bar, there was no certification election held challenging the
majority status of NAMAWU as the exclusive bargaining
representative of petitioners employees. NAMAWU, therefore,

remains the exclusive bargaining representative of petitioners

employees and possesses legal standing to represent them.

One final point. NAMAWU accuses petitioner of forum

shopping. NAMAWU alleges that the instant petition is filed for the
purpose of preventing the execution of the Quisumbing order as
affirmed by this Court on 06 July 1998 in G.R. No. 133519 and
on 26 January 2000 in G.R. No. 138996.

Petitioner counters that it did not commit forum shopping

because the relief prayed for in the previous case was the
reversal of the Trajano order while the relief prayed for in this
petition is the reversal of the orders enforcing and executing the
terms of the Quisumbing order.

Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails of several

judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely, by some other court. [20] It has been
characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and
condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. The test in determining whether a party violates the
rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or
where the elements oflitis pendentia are present. In turn, the
elements of res judicata as enumerated in Sy Kao v. Court of
Appeals[21] are as follows: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
(c) identity in the two preceding particulars should be such that
any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will,

regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in

the action under consideration.
In this case, the parties are the same, petitioner and
NAMAWU. The reliefs prayed for are substantially identical which
is
ultimately
the
nullification
of
[22]
the Quisumbing order. Likewise, res judicata
exists because a
ruling of this Court on the issues raised by petitioner would
amount to revisiting and re-ventilating the essentially same
issue, i.e., whether or not the Quisumbing order is controlling,
which were already passed upon and definitely resolved by this
Court in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Trajano.[23] Even on this
ground alone, for being violative of the rule against forum
shopping, the instant petition for review should be denied.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 24 January 2002 and its Resolution
dated 18 March 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.

SO ORDERED.

GANIE P. OLAMA, DATU MAKAY G.R. No. 169213

S. BANTO, DARIMBANG ANTAL
SULTAN, CAMAD SANGCOPAN,
JAMIL ABIDEN TAMPUGAO, and
ABDULGAFOR ANGINDARAT,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
represented by its Branch Manager
at Marawi City, MADAME BAI
SANDORIE TAMPI DISOMANGCOP
and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its Branch Manager,
MACLARING LUCMAN,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------- x

ABOL M. SALIM, MUSTAPHA

BUAT, ELIAS R. DITUCALAN,
JALIL ABIDEN, JAMALODEN G.
DIATOR AND BATO ADAM,
Intervenors-respondents.

- versus - Promulgated:

TAHA C. ALI

Third-party defendant. June 22, 2006

x
x

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The petition for review assails the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated June
22, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84112, which reversed the Decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Marawi City, Branch 10, in Spl. Civil Action
No. 985-03, as well as the Resolution[3] dated August 15, 2005 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners Ganie P. Olama, Datu Makay Banto, Darimbang Antal Sultan,

Camad Sangcopan, Jamil Abiden Tampugao, and Abdulgafor Angindarat, alleged

that they were the duly elected Punong Barangay in Barangays Alog, Bita, Campo,
Madaya, Mindamudag and Riantaran, respectively, all of the Municipality of
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, during the special barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
elections held on August 13, 2002. Petitioners further claimed that notwithstanding
their election and despite repeated demands, they were denied by the respondent
Philippine National Bank (PNB) of their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
months of October, November and December 2002 and January 2003. PNBs
refusal to release their IRA was allegedly anchored on the refusal of Local
Government Operations Officer (LGOO) Hadji Hussein Tugaya Tabua (LGOO
Tabua) to issue the certifications requested of him by the petitioners.[4]

Thus, petitioners filed a petition[5] for mandamus and injunction with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the RTC of
Marawi City which was docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 985-03 and raffled to
Branch 10. It seeks the issuance of a judgment requiring PNB to release the IRA to
the petitioners and their respective appointed Barangay Treasurers.[6]

Instead of an answer, PNB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of cause of action which was denied by the trial court in its Order dated March 31,
2003.[7] The RTC also ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directing PNBs Marawi Branch to cease, desist and refrain from releasing the
subject IRAs for barangays Alog, Madaya, Mindamudag and Campo, Riantaran
and Bita, except to petitioners Gani Olama, Datu Makay Banto, Darimbang Antal
Sultan, Camad Sangcopan, Jamil Abiden Tampugao, and Abdulgafor Angindarat.[8]

Subsequently, several motions for leave of court to intervene were filed by

herein intervenors Abol M. Salim,[9] Elias R. Ditucalan, Jalil Abiden, Mustapha
Buat,[10] Jamaloden Diator and Bato Adam.[11] They alleged that each one is the
incumbent punong barangay of the same barangays that herein petitioners are
claiming to be, to wit: Bato Adam for Brgy. Riantaran; Abol M. Salim for Brgy.
Alog; Elias R. Ditucalan for Brgy. Campo; Jalil Abiden for Brgy. Madaya; and
Macay Buat for Brgy. Bita, that they will be adversely affected if the petition is
granted because they will be unlawfully and unwarrantedly ousted from their
position as Punong Barangay.

According to the intervenors, there was a failure of election held on August

13, 2002 in barangays Alog, Bita, Campo, Madaya, Mindamudag and Riantaran
based on the report of the election officer assigned in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, to
supervise the conduct of special barangay and SK elections on August 13, 2002.
[12]
Thus, they claimed that they are still the incumbent punong barangays of their
respective barangays based on the hold over provision of Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9164[13] which provides that:

Section 5. Hold Over. All incumbent barangay officials and sangguniang

kabataan officials shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for
cause until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code relative to the failure of elections and special
elections are hereby reiterated in this Act.

The court a quo granted the motions for intervention and thereafter issued an
order[14] requiring all the parties to submit their respective memoranda pursuant to
Section 8[15] of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On November 21, 2003, the trial

court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of

which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of petitioners and against respondent and intervenors:

a. Recognizing petitioners legal rights to continue assuming the position as

Punong Barangay in six (6) subject barangay without prejudice to the outcome or
resolution of the COMELEC EN BANC of the pending (sic) between the parties;

b. Commanding and ordering respondent Philippines National Bank of the

Philippines, Marawi City Branch, represented by Bai Sandorie T. Disomangcop
both in her official capacity as Branch Manager or whoever is the Acting
Head/Executive officer or manager of the bank to release to petitioners the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the month of February 2003 and
succeeding or subsequent months corresponding to the six (6) barangay units
opposite their names as follows:

Gani P. Olama --------- Brgy. alog, Tubaran, Lanao Del Sur

Datu Makay S. Banto Brgy. Bita, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
Darimbang Antal ------ Brgy. Campo, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
Sultan Camad Sangcopan Brgy. Madaya, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
Jamil Abiden Tampogao ---- Brgy. Mindamudag, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur.
Abdulgafor Angindarat ------ Brgy. Riantaran, Tubaran, Lanao Del Sur.

c. Ordering intervenors to desist, refrain, and cease from exercising the

powers and functions of petitioners as Punong barangays of in (sic) their
respective barangay aforestated.

SO ORDERED.[16]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court for
want of factual and legal basis.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

The petitioners argue that the findings of facts made by the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court. Verily, the issue raised by the petitioners
invite us to rule on questions of fact, contrary to the settled rule that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review. However, while it is an established
dictum that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh
evidence anew, the circumstances obtaining in the present case require us to
disregard the general rule and to apply one of the recognized exceptions, i.e., when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.
[17]

Petitioners contend that the pieces of documentary evidence they presented

before the trial court clearly established their right to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus.

We are not persuaded.

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy granted by courts of

appellate jurisdiction, directed to some corporation, officer, or inferior court,
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed from operation of
some law.[18] Under the Rules of Court, the writ of mandamus is available as a
remedy only under these circumstances:

When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there in no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.

x x x x.[19]

Thus, as an extraordinary remedy, mandamus may be availed of only if the

legal right to be enforced is well defined, clear and certain. It lies only to compel
an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.[20]

Further, it is settled that in order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it
is essential that, on the one hand, the person petitioning for it has a clear legal right
to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, the respondent has an
imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not
issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable
or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of
mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it
is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement
that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.[21]

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and we find that the
arguments raised by the petitioners clearly fall below the yardstick of the clear
legal right required to be possessed by someone petitioning for the issuance of the
writ of mandamus.

Contrary to the contention of the petitioners that they have established their
legal right to the relief that they are seeking, their claim rests on very doubtful
grounds. Petitioners allege that they were the duly elected heads of their respective
barangays based on the Certificates of Canvass of Votes and Proclamations of

Winning Candidates for Punong Barangay and Kagawad ng Sangguniang

Barangay by the Barangay Board of Canvassers[22] which showed that they
garnered the highest number of votes for punong barangay in their respective
areas. However, petitioners failed to explain why each of the said certificates bore
identical serial numbers.

As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:

Appellees (herein petitioners) failed to establish that they have been

elected and proclaimed as punong barangays. What they submitted were xerox
copies of supposedly certified copies of Certificates of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation (hereafter Certificates) which curiously enough bear the same serial
number. No evidence has been adduced to explain these patent irregularities and
the non-production in the trial court of the original Certificates. EO ALI who
purportedly certified as true and correct the Certificates in question does not
appear to have any right to the custody of the records nor does he appear to have
authority to furnish authenticated copies thereof. Worse, EO ALI was not even
presented in court to attest to the said Certificates and the statements he made in
his letter to LGOO which Appellees claimed will prove that they were elected and
proclaimed as punong barangays. All these cast serious doubts on the authenticity
and admissibility of the said documents.

The authenticity of the Certificates was not established in accordance with

the Rules of Evidence. Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that an official record or entries therein may be proved by an official
publication or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record
or by his deputy. Section 25 of the same Rule further states that whenever a copy
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any.[23]

To our mind, the attitude manifested by the petitioners towards establishing the
veracity of their respective Certificates of Canvass, a piece of evidence upon which
they greatly anchor their petition before us, is contrary to the behavior of one who
is convinced that his claim is valid. Petitioners failed to offer any satisfactory
explanation on the patent irregularity that attended their Certificates of
Canvass. Worse, a perusal of the respective certificates of assumption of
office[24] of each petitioner will show that these documents were executed and
certified by the petitioners themselves. We agree with the Court of Appeals that no
probative value can thus be accorded to these certificates, they being
uncorroborated and evidently, self serving.

From the foregoing, it is not correct to say, as petitioners claimed, that the refusal
of the respondent PNB to release the IRA is unjustified. PNB has the right to
require petitioners to present the proper certification as duly elected punong
barangays from the Local Government Operations Officer of Tubaran, Lanao del
Sur. Since the latter did not issue the certifications to the petitioners, there must be
compelling reasons for such refusal as shown in the foregoing discussion.

To be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted
by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or
person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal
right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party in the sense
that he possesses a clear right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act
to be performed. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the
case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. Legal standing means a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the government act that is being challenged. [25] Clearly, not only did the

petitioners fail to establish a clear legal right to the relief they are seeking, they
also failed to make a case of locus standi for themselves in this case. The principle
echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if
those rights are well defined, clear and certain. Mandamus never issues in doubtful
cases.[26]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June

22, 2005 and Resolution dated August 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 84112 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.