Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SECOND DIVISION
Atlantic
Marine
Ltd.,
(Atlantic
JESUS E. VERGARA,
Petitioner,
versus -
Philippines
Promulgated:
(AMOSUP). AMOSUP
had
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Hammonia.
DECISION
The
BRION, J.:
petitioner
left
as
us
Review
loss.
C.A.-G.R.
SP
E.
Vergara
v.
Relations
through
on Certiorari
[1]
this
No.
Petition
85347
National
for
entitled Jesus
Labor
Commission, et al.
The
ships
August
medical
log
2000,
while
entered
his
its
foreign
petitioner
went
on
furlough
in
Port
(Hammonia)
pumpman. In
his condition.
The
Inc.
principal,
Differential
diagnosis
includes
precipitate
condition.
the
resurgence
of
his
former
20,
2001,
the
petitioner
Marine
of
the
partial disability.
Medical
Services
an
confirmed
ophthalmologist
at
the Chinese
31,
2001,
demanded
his
employer
to
the
Employment
Philippine
Overseas
AdministrationStandard
Employment
the
from
Contract
Governing
the
Ocean-going
complaint
allowance,
opinion
050809-00.
from
another
ophthalmologist,
Dr.
Vessels
for
(POEA
disability
damages
and
benefits,
Standard
sickness
attorneys
fees,
strictly
and
severally,
2,568.00
and
interpreting
the
POEA
Standard
sickness
allowance
of
US$
disability
benefits
of
US$
seafarers disability.
respondents
the
which
19,
rendered
appealed
decision
to
on March
weight
to
the
company-designated
The CA
[15]
dismissed
Decision
interpretation
promulgated
the
petition
on March
in
14,
2005,[11] and
the
POEA
Standard
these
documents
provide
that
it
is
the
THE PETITION
literal
interpretation,
to
the
petitioner,
is
Inc.
et
al., v. National
Labor
Relations
Commission.[16]
of
Dr.
Robert
Lim,
the
resume
sea
duties
as
of January
31,
the
correctness
of
Dr.
Lims
The
specialist
certification,
20/20;
hand
issued
issue
any
medical
findings
in
his
as
capacity
it
as
the
was
Medical
petitioner
it
petitioner
is
disputes
fallacious
posits
because
that
disability
specialist.
status
of
the
health
of
the
inability
views
the
in
it
compensation,
is
respondent
it
the
to
work
is
now
20/20
company-designated
as
alleged
physician,
by
he
the
can
work-related
the
Marine
as
petitioner
injury. In
this
regard,
cites
entreat
this
Court
to
dismiss
the
1. The
provisions
of
the
POEA
Standard
claim
of
total
and
permanent
petitioners
reliance
on
the Crystal
ophthalmologist
observation
who
and
scheduled
regular
him
for
monitoring
13,
2000,
the
petitioner
he
scheduled
deferred
tolerated
well. His
on November
because
he
22,
was
vitrectomy,
2000,
noted
was
to
have
x-ray,
and
mild
chronic
pulmonary
disease
as
pulmonary
function
test.
obstructive
revealed
He
by
was
his
given
both
eyes,
with
correction.
He
was
petitioner
was
cleared
for
surgery
underwent
laser
on November
29,
treatment
on December
7,
2000. He
of
his
2000. He
affected
eye
certification.
They
tolerated
the
petitioners
assessments
was
for
management
as
an
remained
constant
and
petitioners
private
should prevail.
markings.
the
the
by
dispute
believed
that
the
company-designated
of
the
company-designated
respondents
likewise
question
the
compensation
since
his
provides
as
doctors,
cited
the
Service
Insurance
advocated
medical
permanent disability.
conversion
condition
of
the
petitioners
from temporary
to
Entitlement
to
disability
benefits
by
Rule
2000
Finally, the respondents insist that neither
factual nor legal basis exists for petitioners
claim of Grade I total and permanent disability
of
of
the
the
Rules
and
Department
of
Regulations
Labor
and
to
work
by
the
company-designated
the
POEA
Standard
Employment
disability,
not
the
petitioners
claimed
has
the
determination
of
the
case
foreign
of
Filipino
ocean-going
seamen
working
vessels.[33] Every
to
execute
the
POEA
Standard
simplified
to
the
deployment
for
overseas
Contract. On
employer
the
is
matter
not
of
subject
disability,
to
the
Philippine
the
source
of
work-related
compensation
the
terms
and
conditions
of
presence
and
Philippine
waters. Thus,
that
hardly
with
the
see
POEA
upon,
intended
to
as
be
above
read
pointed
and
out,
understood
are
in
shall apply.
claim
or
grievance
arising
out
of
or
an
employer
operating
outside
and
treatment.[35] For
the
duration
of
the
Period of entitlement.
(a) The income benefit shall
be paid beginning on the first
day of such disability. If
caused by an injury or
sickness it shall not be paid
longer than 120 consecutive
days except where such injury
or
sickness
still
requires
medical attendance beyond
120 days but not to exceed
240 days from onset of
disability
in
which
case benefit for temporary
total disability shall be paid.
However, the System may
declare
the
total
and
permanent status at anytime
after 120 days of continuous
temporary total disability as
may be warranted by the
degree of actual loss or
impairment of physical or
mental
functions
as
determined by the System.
[Underscoring ours]
by
the
company
to
be
Contract
and
by
applicable
company
with
the
acted
terms
correctly
of
the
in
POEA
these
provisions
operate,
the
to
an
ophthalmologist
General Hospital. No
at
the
assessment/certification
that
the
existed
petitioner
by
on
the
point
dispute
the Chinese
executed
the
company-
designated physician.
resume
his
duties. In
the
absence
of
any
partial
and
total
distinctions
and
disability, their
consequences,
existence,
becomes
Grade
disability. Based
(20.15%)
on
partial
these
permanent
opinions,
the
case
is
the
issue
of
whose
medical
and
company
sickness
benefits;
when
the
The
POEA
Standard
Employment
but
to
declare
that
the
designated doctors
certification
determination
must
that
company-
is
the
final
prevail. We do
so
Moreover, as between
those
who
had
actually
attended to petitioner Vergara
throughout the duration of his
illness and those who had
merely examined him later
upon his recovery for the
purpose
of
determining
disability benefits, the former
must prevail.
of this
case,
it was
the
medical
results
are
not
essentially
during
its
progress;
and
who
issued
his
issue
of
the
contrary,
company-designated
the
petitioner
doctors
accepted
his
and
certification
to
this
effect. Under
these
subsequent
was
repeatedly
invoked
our
ruling
in Crystal
to
accordance
beyond
disability
the
fit
went
total
disability
temporary
resume
240
days
work. Under
the
above. Viewed
petitioner
more
than
120
days
which
constitutes
from
this
cannot
perspective,
cite
the
the Crystal
of
temporary
total
disability
cannot,
rules
that
affect
Injuries
implementing regulations.
Suffered
the
and
disability
Diseases
of
Filipino
Including
was
completely
unable
to
work
premises
considered,
January 30,
xxxx
I have admitted him for a course on intensive
conservative management in hospital. He has
been commenced on pelvic traction and been
given pain medication, which includes Narcotic
analgesia, muscle relaxants, and antiinflammatories. I have also commenced him on
a course of physiotherapy and hopefully with
this conservative mode of treatment he should
show sufficient improvement to obviate any
spinal surgery.5
On October 24, 2006, Dr. Govender issued
another medical report6 where he stated that
while Munars improved condition allowed him
to travel, he would require assistance in
carrying his things and should be lying down
for the entire duration of the trip. Munar should
undergo further treatment and management in
a spine rehabilitation facility but if he would
not register a positive response thereto, he
must undergo surgery. Specifically:
Mr. Munar is currently recovered from the
acute pain syndrome that he first presented
with. Although he has not recuperated
completely he has progressed to the state
were he will be able to travel back to the
Phillipines (sic) with assistance. He will require
assistance with regard to his baggage transfers
and he should also be accommodated on the
aircraft so that he can lie down, as this would
minimize the amount of pressure on his lumbar
inter-vertebral disc and minimize the nerve
root compression. It is reasonable to assume
that the heavy lifting that forms part of his
daily work duties has contributed significantly
to the abnormalities demonstrated on his
lumbar spine MRI scans. x x x.
Mr. Munar will require further treatment and
management in the Philippines. I would
recommend a further course of conservative
treatment for a few more weeks. If this does
not settle he may then require surgical
intervention with decompression of the areas
of stenosis (narrowing) and removal of the disc
fragments that are compressing the nerve
roots and a possible fusion of his lower back.
However, this will depend on the response to
Our Ruling
Issue
There is no dispute that Munars spine injury is
work-related and that he is entitled to disability
benefits. The bone of contention is how to
classify such injury in order to determine the
amount of benefits due to him. There is a
conflict between the disability ratings made by
the company-designated physician and Munars
doctor-of-choice and petitioners claim that
holding the latters determination to be more
credible is contrary to the provisions of the
POEA-SEC and prevailing jurisprudence. Absent
dated May 3, 2007 was issued within the 240day period. Moreover, Munar did not contest
Dr. Chuas findings using the procedure
outlined under Section 20-B(3) of the POEASEC. For being Munars attending physicians
from the time he was repatriated and given
their specialization in spine injuries, the
findings of Dr. Periquet and Dr. Lim constitute
sufficient bases for Dr. Chuas disability
grading. As Munar did not allege, much less,
prove the contrary, there exists no reason why
Dr. Chius assessment should be preferred over
that of Dr. Chua.
It must be noted, however, that when Munar
filed his complaint, Dr. Chua had not yet
determined the nature and extent of Munars
disability. Also, Munar was still undergoing
physical therapy and his spine injury had yet
been fully addressed. Furthermore, when
Munar filed a claim for total and permanent
disability benefits, more than 120 days had
gone by and the prevailing rule then was that
enunciated by this Court in Crystal Shipping,
Inc. v. Natividad35 that total and permanent
disability refers to the seafarers incapacity to
perform his customary sea duties for more
than 120 days. Particularly:
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker
to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use
of any part of his body. As gleaned from the
records, respondent was unable to work from
August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the
least, or more than 120 days, due to his
medical treatment. This clearly shows that his
disability was permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the
disablement of an employee to earn wages in
the same kind of work of similar nature that he
was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or
any kind of work which a person of his
mentality and attainments could do. It does
not mean absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is
compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to
work resulting in the impairment of ones
earning capacity.
xxxx
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings
by showing that respondent was able to work
again as a chief mate in March 2001.
Nonetheless, this information does not alter
the fact that as a result of his illness,
respondent was unable to work as a chief mate
for almost three years. It is of no consequence
that respondent was cured after a couple of
years. The law does not require that the illness
should be incurable. What is important is that
he was unable to perform his customary work
for more than 120 days which constitutes
permanent total disability. An award of a total
and permanent disability benefit would be
germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is
to help the employee in making ends meet at
the time when he is unable to
work.36 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
Consequently, that after the expiration of the
120-day period, Dr. Chua had not yet made
any declaration as to Munars fitness to work
and Munar had not yet fully recovered and was
still incapacitated to work sufficed to entitle the
latter to total and permanent disability
benefits.
In addition, that it was by operation of law that
brought forth the conclusive presumption that
Munar is totally and permanently disabled,
there is no legal compulsion for him to observe
the procedure prescribed under Section 20B(3) of the POEA-SEC. A seafarers compliance
with such procedure presupposes that the
company-designated physician came up with
an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to
work before the expiration of the 120-day or
240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a
certification from the company-designated
physician, the seafarer had nothing to contest
and the law steps in to conclusively
characterize his disability as total and
permanent.
This Courts pronouncements in Vergara
presented a restraint against the indiscriminate
reliance on Crystal Shipping such that a
seafarer is immediately catapulted into filing a
Complaint in NLRC OFW Case No. 06-0903109. Accordingly, the CA ordered DoehlePhilman Manning Agency, Inc. (DoehlePhilman), Dohle (IOM) Limited (Dohle Ltd.)
and Capt. Manolo T. Gacutan (petitioners) to
jointly and severally pay respondent Henry C.
Haro permanent and total disability benefits
amounting to US$60,000.00 and attorneys
fees of 10% of the total monetary award. Also
assailed is the March 27, 2013 CA
Resolution7 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of
its foreign principal, Dohle Ltd., hired
respondent as oiler aboard the vessel MV CMA
CGM Providencia8 for a period of nine months
with basic monthly salary of US$547.00 and
other benefits.9 Before deployment, respondent
underwent pre-employment medical
examination (PEME) and was declared fit for
sea duty.10
respected.24
Finally, petitioners argued that since
respondents illness is not an occupational
disapproved.26
Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally
losing their benefits, respondents executed
handwritten resignation letters. In Montassah's
and Rouen Ruth's cases, their resignations
were executed on Saudia's blank letterheads
that Saudia had provided. These letterheads
already had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on
the subject portions of their headings when
these were handed to respondents.27
On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a
Complaint against Saudia and its officers for
illegal dismissal and for underpayment of
salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday,
rest day, premium, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, separation pay, night shift
differentials, medical expense reimbursements,
retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over
expense and allowances, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.28 The case was
initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Hermino V.
Suelo and docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 0011-12342-07.
Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.29 It claimed that all the determining
points of contact referred to foreign law and
insisted that the Complaint ought to be
dismissed on the ground offorum non
conveniens.30 It added that respondents had no
cause of action as they resigned voluntarily.31
On December 12, 2008, Executive Labor
Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco rendered the
Decision32dismissing respondents' Complaint.
The dispositive portion of this Decision
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises' considered, judgment
is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant
complaint for lack of
jurisdiction/merit.33cralawlawlibrary
On respondents' appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission's Sixth Division reversed
the ruling of Executive Labor Arbiter JambaroFranco. It explained that "[considering that
complainants-appellants are OFWs, the Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC has [sic] jurisdiction to
hear and decide their complaint for illegal
termination."34 On the matter of forum non
conveniens, it noted that there were no special
circumstances that warranted its abstention
from exercising jurisdiction.35 On the issue of
whether respondents were validly dismissed, it
held that there was nothing on record to
support Saudia's claim that respondents
resigned voluntarily.
October 10,
The Petition
The petitioners are now before this Court
praying for a reversal of the CA judgment on
the following grounds:
1. The CA committed a reversible error in
disregarding the Omnibus Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,12 as
amended by R.A. No. 10022,13 mandating that
"For OFWs with collective bargaining
agreements, the caseshall be submitted for
voluntary arbitration in accordance with
Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code."14
The petitioners bewail the CAs rejection of the
above argument for the reason that the
remedy they pursued was inconsistent with the
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
Citing Municipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of
Aritao,15 they argue that the "dismissal of a
case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings."
In any event, they posit that the IRR of R.A.
No. 10022 is in the nature of an adjective or
procedural law which must be given retroactive
effect and which should have been applied by
the CA in resolving the present case.
2. The CA committed a reversible error in
ruling that the AMOSUP-VELA CBA does not
contain unequivocal wordings for the
mandatory referral of Fernandezs claim to
voluntary arbitration.
The petitioners assail the CAs failure to explain
the basis "for ruling that no explicit or
unequivocal wordings appeared on said CBA
for the mandatory referral of the disability
claim to arbitration."16They surmise that the CA
construed the phrase "either party may refer
the case to a MANDATORY ARBITRATION
COMMITTEE" under Section 14.7(a) of the CBA
as merely permissive and not mandatory
because of the use of the word "may." They
contend that notwithstanding the use of the
word "may," the parties unequivocally and
unmistakably agreed to refer the present
disability claim to mandatory arbitration.
3. The CA committed a reversible error in
disregarding the NLRC memorandum
prescribing the appropriate action for
complaints and/or proceedings which were
initially processed in the grievance machinery
Petitioner,
Pres
- versus
PER
ABA
VILL
MEN
ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL
CHARTERERS, INC.,
Respondents.
Pro
June 1
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
PERALTA, J.:
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] dated
July
11,
PER
action
the
CA
However,
as
petitioners
stressed, the same was
already discharged.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of private respondent.
It took cognizance of the
case by virtue of Article 217
(a), paragraph 6 of the Labor
Code and the existence of a
reasonable causal connection
between
the
employeremployee relationship and
the
claim
asserted.
It
ordered the petitioner to
pay P4,621,300.00,
the
equivalent of US$90,000.00
less P20,000.00, at the time
of judgment x x x
xxxx
The Labor Arbiter also ruled
that the proximate cause of
Nelsons death was not workrelated.
On
appeal,
[the
NLRC]
affirmed the Labor Arbiters
decision as to the grant of
death benefits under the CBA
but reversed the latters
ruling as to the proximate
cause of Nelsons death.[3]
considering
the
P20,000.00
already
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the petition is
hereby GRANTED and the case
is REFERRED to the National
Conciliation
and
Mediation
Board for the designation of
the Voluntary Arbitrator or the
constitution of a panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators for the
appropriate resolution of the
issue on the matter of the
applicable CBA provision.
SO ORDERED.[4]
involves
the
interpretation
and
Petitioner
filed
Motion
for
xxxx
confers
jurisdiction
upon
voluntary
or
bargaining
arbitrators
implementation
over
of
interpretation
collective
unresolved
The pertinent provisions of Section 10
of R.A. 8042 provide as follows:
grievances
arising
from
the
SEC.
10. Money
Claims. - Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary,
the Labor Arbiters of the
National
Labor
Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have
arbitrators.
Collective
Agreement.
ARTICLE 261. Jurisdiction of
Voluntary Arbitrators or panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators. The
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall have
original
and
exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide
all
unresolved
grievances
arising from the interpretation
or
implementation
of
the
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement and those arising
from the interpretation or
enforcement
of
company
personnel policies referred to in
the
immediately
preceding
article. Accordingly, violations
of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement, except those which
are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair
labor practice and shall be
resolved as grievances under
the
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of
this article, gross violations of
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement shall mean flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional
Offices
and
the
Regional
Directors of the Department of
Labor and Employment shall
not
entertain
disputes,
grievances or matters under the
exclusive
and
original
jurisdiction of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators
and
shall
immediately dispose and refer
the same to the Grievance
Machinery
or
Voluntary
Arbitration provided in the
Bargaining
interpretation
or
implementation
of
out
of
an
employer-employee
Filipino
workers
for
overseas
arising
implementation
from
of
the
interpretation
collective
or
bargaining
present
Implementing
Omnibus
Rules
the
and
Migrant
Regulations
Workers
and
Affairs
and
that
these
Senate
Committee
on
Labor
and
In the same
prevailing
manner, Section 29
Standard
Governing
the
Terms
and
Employment
of the
Conditions
of
Filipino
(DFA)
by
the
Philippine
Overseas
parties
covered
by
a
collective
bargaining
agreement shall submit the
claim or dispute to the
original
and
exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator
or
panel
of
arbitrators. If the parties are
not covered by a collective
bargaining
agreement,
the
parties may at their option
submit the claim or dispute to
either
the
original
and
exclusive jurisdiction of the
National
Labor
Relations
Commission (NLRC), pursuant
to Republic Act (RA) 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 or to the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators. If there is no
provision as to the voluntary
arbitrators to be appointed by
the parties, the same shall be
appointed from the accredited
voluntary arbitrators of the
National
Conciliation
and
Mediation
Board
of
the
Department of Labor and
Employment.
It
is
clear
from
the
above
that
the
the
Senate
and
the
House
of
covered
by
collective
bargaining
absence
of
collective
bargaining
The
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration
(POEA) shall exercise original
and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide disciplinary
action on cases, which are
administrative
in
character,
involving or arising out of
violations of recruitment laws,
rules and regulations involving
employers,
principals,
contracting
partners
and
Filipino seafarers. (Emphasis
supplied)
No
less
than
the
Philippine
Constitution
workers
and
employers
and
the
including
conciliation,
and
shall
emphasize
collective
including
the
primacy
bargaining
and
voluntary
arbitration,
of
free
negotiations,
mediation
and
areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.