Yvo de

Boer I{]N~CCC
To

cc

Subject
CoP15

Dear colleagues,
Attached are some reflections on what I think happend.
Yvo

(See attached file: looking back aCCoP1S.doc)

Dear colleagues dear friends.

At the beginning ofthe CoP I called for a three-layered cake. What we ended-up with
was a muffin of questionable parentage. That was the result of a multitude of factors
mainly beyond our control. I will try to unravel some of what happened in this
message but getting the full picture will probably take more time more insights from
you and more reflection.

What is important to recognise is that we you delivered an incredible e ent. ay

what you will about the outcome but the fact remains that we managed to support a
huge event. Un-precedented attendance un-precedented comple ity and un-
precedented pressure. Certainly there are lessons to learn and we must take the time to
learn them. The main point though is that we you did everything humanly possible -
and more - to deliver what was in our power. Of this you can be very very proud.

The result, or I should say the Copenhagen Accord is being portrayed by different
people in different ways for different reasons. There is of course a lot more than the
Accord. We went through a diplomatic time warp by making it from the mess we left
Barcelona with to draft l/CoP15 and l/CMP5 decisions. Although the underlying
decisions are not finalised as a package many of them are close to ready and some
could have been adopted. The CGE was reborn we ha e made huge advances on
REDD there is willingness to reform the CDM and a host of other issues ha e been
resolved. Most of this happened in what was probably less than a week. I have to add
that in that week and in the one that followed, many of you worked through several
nights and I saw something emerge that was close to a shift system.

ay of the Accord what you will it has given the process an important sense of
direction. It has captured important advances on commitments actions reporting and
finance. Thanks to Lumumba, a backroom deal decried by many turned into a letter
of intent rejected by few. The challenge now is to build on this in a careful and
thoughtful way_

We ha e a very unusual e ent behind us I will be unusually frank in describing it and

I count on your usual discretion in keeping this message to yourself.

-------- 0 ---------

o what happened to the cake?

Everyone recognised that CoPt5 would be significant. This led to a heightened sense
of nervousness among Parties throughout the year. A few unfortunate rno es aside
n
The Danish Presidency (layer managed to build quit a lot of trust in spite of this.
The Greenland Dialogues focussed the attention of a core group of Ministers and
managed to build a con ergence of thinking on a number of key issues especially
how to deal with measuring reporting and verification. At the pre-CoP there was I
think broad support for a package of decisions that would lay the foundation for the
subsequent adoption of a new legal instrument under the Convention and something
close to consensus on a second Kyoto period.
 le Danish paper pr sented at an informal meeting a eek before the CoP destroyed
10 years of effort in one fell s oop. All our attempts to pre ent this paper happening
liled. The meeting at which it was presented as unannounced and the paper
nbalanced. It also r ealed that there were two school of thought within the Dani h
'residency. Earlier references to a politically binding agreement (an oxymoron if e er
. saw one) had already heightened nervousness. ow it became clear that a
omprehensive package as perhaps not e eryone s iew of a desirable outcom .
ubsequent announcements of papers that never came but still some aw had two
significant impacts. First delegates were ready to embrace enthusiastically what they
had thus far resisted: text from Michael and John. Thi attempt by Parties to get things
back under their control had two important con equences. First it gave us two
documents or sets of documents that we can continue to work with. econdly
suspicion that something else was being cooked behind the cene the early arrival of
Ministers and the launch of a process among a small number of HoS paralys d the
ability of Parties to make ad ances on the key political issues in the informal plenary
and some of the contact groups. maller group meetings did not enjo consensu.
Ministers had turned heir attention to their Ho . The focus of the process hifted. The
first layer broke down.

The s cond layer was mi ed with the first. It centr d around a vie from within th
PM s office that the outcome of the CoP should b a declaration rather than a package
of decisions. Although a second Danish paper never formally saw the light of day at
the b ginning of the second week consolations ere taking place. The announcement
of the Prime Minister taking-o er shifted attention a ay from the formal proce s. 24
hours were lost in trying to e tablish some kind of small group process. When Connie
finally managed to arrange a meeting with the G77 on how to proceed the process
under the PM had taken 0 er. After another 12 hours had passed the PM finally
managed to bring a small group together. This group was built around the
Copenhagen Commitment ircle a small number of Ho that had been regularly
di cussing progress in the run-up to the CoP. eeing that further ork in this group
would undermine trust and transparency e en more the P backed a ay from taking
further initiative.

The third layer consisted of a small number of countries trying to rescue the CoP and
still achie e a result. Bilateral and trilateral consultations among Parties did not lead
to a coherent way forward and the PM was asked to take control again. This he did by
bringing together the 30 or so countries that brokered the Accord. Our attempts to
create a basis for discussion that would ad ance agreement on lICoP15 and 1/CMP5
failed. The text was silent on the future of the KP and an reference to a future legally
binding instrument. Through a disorganised and ill-directed sherpa process a
document emerged that became the Accord. Frantic behind the scenes diplomacy b
major countries led to it s ultimate adoption in the small circle.

By then e had the Frida informal High Le el E ent behind us. A small group of
countries reflecting a much broader discontent with the process made it clear that
they would not accept a backroom deal brokered by the sup r powers. ot enough
was done to sell the Accord especial 1 within the 077. Wh n it reached the plenary
attempts to get r gional groups to discuss it fail d. Complete chao resulted. EU and
Umbrella call d for the Accord to b hammered-through as a decision.
Here we reached the very edge of the abyss. Although here was by then almost
uni ersal support to adopt the Accord hammering it though against consensus would
have created mass protest. Attempts to 0 errule his ould have destroyed the
credibility of the process. Consensus may be difficult to achieve but if it is what you
have it must be respected.

The Lumumba effect then kicked-in. The outrageous statements made prompted
many Parties to take the floor and say they were in fact willing to accept the Accord
as an outcome. I think it took about five hours to get through the worst plenary I can
remember and finally a decision was taken to note the Accord. In the fmal part of the
plenary it became ery clear that we need to be very careful in how we take it forward
and how we position the ecretariat in relation to it. Handled carefully it can b an
important statement of intent in moving forward. Attempts to use it to forge a
consensus outside the FCCC will have the opposite effect.

Do s this spell the end of he UNFCC process? That is what many were saying.
Parties that participate in the most un-transparent backroom dealing I have ever se n
are certainly expression frustration at their failure to force a stronger result. 0 er time
I hope they will see this failure as a blessing. Democracy is time consuming and can
be frustrating but it builds a stronger future. We have an incredible architecture under
the CC and attempts to reconstruct it among a smaller circle could take a
decade. Investing in managing our process properly is a better way to go.

In iting Ho seemed like a good idea, but it seriously backfired. Their early arrival as
well as that of Ministers did not have the catalytic effect hoped-for. The process
became paralysed. Rumour and intrigue took over.

At the final press conference a journalist asked if I will now leave. My answer was
that if I felt responsible I would have. We did everything in our power to discourage
bad moves and work the best we could to limit damage once and make the best of it
once they were made. The level of engagement took things out of our hands.

What I ha e written is only the tip of the iceberg. Much more went on. As said we
need to think this though more deeply and learn from it. But let s do that after a good
rest!

I thank. you for a tremendous effort.

I wish you all a happy holiday and year-end.