DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City.
Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship
between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J.,
was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa
Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his
legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher
J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner
Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher J.
T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case
contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the
Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of
separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in
an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental
authority of the mother by express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support should be
brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant
and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitionerappellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and
her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under
the custody of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper
case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus in Special Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.

Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children
is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each
other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaa v.
Gaela, 1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were
compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art.
176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of
her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is
entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to
the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,
especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is
a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She
augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of
P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works
up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and
sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for
every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it
what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with
him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to
her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of
P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any
support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them
on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale because
of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the
respondent." He prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and
education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is
justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for
payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the
Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the
court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter
case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the
time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over
seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any

way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant
of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to deliver
the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary
support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the
Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted
him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same
gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil
Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary
and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage. However, Wendells mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted
that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the
gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mothers bag where the key
was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such
damage.

G.R. No. 70890 September 18 1992

FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the
parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.

RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is imposed by Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents' liability
as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the
diligence of a good father to prevent damage.
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their son. It was only at the
time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in

the shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell
from having access to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said
minor who was living in their company.

G.R. No. 70890

September 18, 1992

CRESENCIO LIBI* and AMELIA YAP LIBI, petitioners, vs. HON. INTEMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE
GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondents.
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration
is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those
whose lives they have touched. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through
seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended
judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the parties,
petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2,
1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs complaint is hereby reversed; and instead,
judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed. 1
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of
Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January
14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners
are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and
who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic
and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her.
In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina
and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm,
a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene
of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets
of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting
her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand,
petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann
to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint for
insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit. 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffsappellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the
present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this case:
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws;
and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners
liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his
findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell
Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder
or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the
only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in
the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have
been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the
occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left
untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was
negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on
Wendells hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours
after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that when he
arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the
stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he
admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or
washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In
fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the
bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that he found no burning
or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of
contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:
Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black residue or tattooing that
could result from these guns because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule
out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the
trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have
been fired by the person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the
right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?

A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the
angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim. 7

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime, each of which were
the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at
the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges
inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right
external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a
punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the
brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges
(e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder
tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or
separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are absent. 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record, thus:
Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the
bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court
how would i have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.
ATTY. SENINING:
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost straight towards
his head. 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants witnesses
Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and
the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a shadow of a
person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas station; that it is
the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall
between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop
of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique
Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a shadow on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having
talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it;
that his house is next to Felipe Gotiongs house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions:
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiongs in relation to your house?
WITNESS:
A It is about 8 feet.

ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)

Q And where were you looking from?

WITNESS:
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high. 14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire credence as to the
reliability and accuracy of the witnesses observations, since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high
walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness
Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were
waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was
going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard
another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15
Manolos direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James
Enrique Tan saw as the shadow of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot
Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor
did they file any case against any alleged John Doe. Nor can we sustain the trial courts dubious theory that Wendell
Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence testimonial, documentary and pictorial the
confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his
persistent pleas for a reconciliation.
Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not be
civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept
in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit
box and Amelitas key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son
Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety
deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have
gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free
access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent,
of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not
diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the
time of Wendells death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencios gun was
missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being
drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with
a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and
on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this
opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:
. . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity
involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son,

Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:

The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children who live in their company.
Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in
a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of
said minor who was living in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated
by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas vs. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31,
1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with discernment is
determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to
hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage
is caused with criminal intent. (3 SCRA 361-362).
. . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the
drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing
from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and
dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said
gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court was not correct in
dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendantsappellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from
committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for
they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed. (Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on
what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to
digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et
al 20 which supposedly holds that (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children
imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses, followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused
by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for
purposes of the discussion hereunder.
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of their
liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of
this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability
of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor
be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence
would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary

liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and,
in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and
not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that (t) he responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damages.
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise
primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 101.
xxx

Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.

xxx

xxx

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under
nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault
or negligence on their part. ( Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the
parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of
lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the
corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own
property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors,
Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . .
shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. For
civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person
be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with civil law.
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of
Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., 22
Araneta vs. Arreglado, 23 Salen, et al. vs. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al., 25 and Elcano, et al, vs.
Hill, et al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes
committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors
15 years of age or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances,
this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article
2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated
that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses
would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the
damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a
regrettable inconsistency in the Courts determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence, in a
separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of
the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary
liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found
guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility
of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of his son, who
was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the
Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in
line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical
injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were

adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the
son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to lack of intent, coupled with mistake, it was ruled that while under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence, but is now of age, as a matter
of equity the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for persons causing
damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers,
tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in
industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other
classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not exactly
accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what
respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas,
was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of subsidiary liability. However, such categorization
does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of
Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise:
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both
parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the
present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence
under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any
discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is of no moment.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under
15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall
devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity,
upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability
arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182
of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict
committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom.
Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED

Espiritu vs. CA
GR 115640, March 15, 1995

FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US.
Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a
temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a
brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they
decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and
the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his
sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and
that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The
presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive.
At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to
whom she preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay
with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers infidelity. Furthermore,
there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the
mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and
personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

Leouel Santos vs. CA

GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal
trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will
quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure,
she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never
did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate
or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that
failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her
being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his
petition was denied.

G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996

NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ, respondents.
Parties herein would have this Court duplicate the feat of King Solomon who was hailed in Biblical times for his
sagacious, if, at times unorthodox, manner of resolving conflicts, the most celebrated case being that when his
authority was invoked to determine the identity of the real mother as between two women claiming the same infant.
Since there could only be one mother, the daunting task that confronted the king/judge was to choose the true one.
In the instant case, we are faced with the challenge of deciding, as between father and mother, who should have
rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both their genes.
While there is a provision of law squarely in point, the two courts whose authority have been invoked to render a
decision have arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions.
It has fallen upon us now to likewise act as judge between the trial court, on the one hand, and the appellate, on the
other.
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the boy's father
Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial court's decision to grant custody to Nerissa Z. Perez, the child's mother.
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner
herein, is a registered nurse. They were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two
operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a modest
house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. She
became a resident alien in February 1992.
Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife,
however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S.
She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her
husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray,
they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind
and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days, before Ray II's first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. That
their love for each other was fading became apparent from their serious quarrels. Petitioner did not want to live near
her in-laws and rely solely on her husband's meager income of P5,000.00. 1 She longed to be with her only child but
he was being kept away from her by her husband. Thus, she did not want to leave RJ (Ray Junior) with her husband
and in-laws. She wished for her son to grow up with his mother.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He
maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. They could live
comfortably on his P15,000.00 monthly income 2 as they were not burdened with having to pay any debts.
Petitioner was forced to move to her parents' home on Guizo Street in Mandaue. Despite mediation by the priest who
solemnized their marriage, the couple failed to reconcile.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus 3 asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender
the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her.
On August 27, 1993, the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother,
Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued ordering the respondent to turn over the
custody of their child Ray Cortes Perez II, his passport and round trip ticket to herein petitioner with a warning that if
he will escape together with the child for the purpose of hiding the minor child instead of complying with this Order,
that warrant for his arrest will be issued.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals, on September 27, 1994, reversed the trial court's order and
awarded custody of the boy to his father. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 she filed the instant petition for review where the sole
issue is the custody of Ray Perez II, now three years old.
Respondent court differed in opinion from the trial court and ruled that there were enough reasons to deny Nerissa
Perez custody over Ray II even if the child is under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy's father
would be for the child's best interest and welfare. 7
Before us is the unedifying situation of a husband and wife in marital discord, struggling for custody of their only child.
It is sad that petitioner and private respondent have not found it in their hearts to understand each other and live
together once again as a family. Separated in fact, they now seek the Court's assistance in the matter of custody or
parental authority over the child.
The wisdom and necessity for the exercise of joint parental authority need not be belabored. The father and the
mother complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the
physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. By precept and example, they mold
his character during his crucial formative years.
However, the Court's intervention is sought in order that a decision may be made as to which parent shall be given
custody over the young boy. The Court's duty is to determine whether Ray Perez II will be better off with petitioner or
with private respondent. We are not called upon to declare which party committed the greater fault in their domestic
quarrel
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. It provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the Code does not qualify the word "separation" to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are
separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms. 8
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors)
provides:
Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. When husband and wife are divorced or living
separately, and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of
their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the
court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child
as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of
age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty. . . . No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court
finds there are compelling reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated
from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article
213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. In the
case of Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, 9 the Court declared:

The use of the word shall in article 363 10 of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations made by the Code
Commission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in no uncertain
terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court. 11
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of age to their mother was explained by
the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception
allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if
the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and
the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will
not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. (Report of the Code Commission,
p. 12) 12
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old should not be
separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which reduced the child's age to five years. 13
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison d'tre in
the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. 14 Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, 15 unemployment and immorality, 16 habitual drunkenness,
17 drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. 18
It has long been settled that in custody cases, 19 the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of
the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: "In all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." 20
Courts invariably look into all relevant factors presented by the contending parents, such as their material resources,
social and moral situations. 21
In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that
they have ample means.
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of work in the U.S.A. and has taken this point against
her. The records, however, show that she is employed in a New York hospital 22 and was, at the time the petition was
filed, still abroad. 23 She testified that she intends to apply for a job elsewhere, presumably to improve her work
environment and augment her income, as well as for convenience. 24 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that a
registered nurse, such as petitioner, is still very much in demand in the United States. Unlike private respondent, a
doctor who by his own admission could not find employment there, petitioner immediately got a job in New York.
Considering her skill and experience petitioner should find no difficulty in obtaining work elsewhere, should she desire
to do so.
The decision under review casts doubt on petitioner's capability to take care of the child, particularly since she works
on twelve-hour shifts thrice weekly, at times, even at night. There being no one to help her look after the child, it is
alleged that she cannot properly attend to him. This conclusion is as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her
present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a number of working
mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time
management principles judiciously. Second, many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has invited her own
mother or relative to join her abroad, providing the latter with plane tickets and liberal allowances, to look after the
child until he is able to take care of himself. Others go on leave from work until such time as the child can be
entrusted to day-care centers. Delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does
not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are
often brought up by housemaids or "yayas" under the eagle eyes of the mother. Third, private respondent's work
schedule was not presented in evidence at the trial. Although he is a general practitioner, the records merely show
that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. 25 Hence,

respondent court's conclusion that "his work schedule is flexible (and h)e can always find time for his son" 26 is not
well-founded. Fourth, the fact that private respondent lives near his parents and sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth,
petitioner's work schedule cited in the respondent court's decision is not necessarily permanent. Hospitals work in
shifts and, given a mother's instinctive desire to lavish upon her child the utmost care, petitioner may be expected to
arrange her schedule in such a way as to allocate time for him. Finally, it does not follow that petitioner values her
career more than her family simply because she wants to work in the United States. There are any number of
reasons for a person's seeking a job outside the country, e.g. to augment her income for the family's benefit and
welfare, and for psychological fulfillment, to name a few. In the instant case, it has been shown that petitioner earned
enough from her job to be able to construct a house for the family in Mandaue City. The record describes sketchily
the relations between Ray and Nerissa Perez. The transcripts of the three hearings are inadequate to show that
petitioner did not exert earnest efforts and make sacrifices to save her marriage.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a baby were frustrated
several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her before he has
even reached his first year. The mother's role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose
and poetry, the depth of a mother's love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its
justification, not in fantasy but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 27, 1994
as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court
dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother,
herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132223, June 19 2001 [Guardianship]

VANCIL VS BELMES

FACTS:
The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate
of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor
children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural
mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected Belmes'petition.
The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC,
the Court resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.

RULING:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states:
"The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case
of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over
Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons
as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

Facts:
Petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said
country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his
common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Petitioner commences before the RTC a guardianship proceeding over the
persons and properties of minors Valerie, 6 years old and Vincent, 2 years old. She was appointed legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of said children. The natural mother of the minors, herein respondent,
submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship. The trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia
as guardian. The subsequent attempt for reconsideration was likewise dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

Ruling:
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding
natural and legal right to his custody. The ruling in Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals is reiterated in this case that of
considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor

children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the
parental relationship.
Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority
pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code which states that in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The ruling in Santos, Sr. vs. Court of
Appeals is reiterated herein that the law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Hence, actual custody of and exercising parental authority over minor Vincent is vested on the natural mother.

St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos

GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in
a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed
that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the
jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate
cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show
such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical
defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting
from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public
or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner
of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial
court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.