Philosophy of Science and Social Philosophy

Author(s): H. G. Schrickel
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jul., 1943), pp. 208-212
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association
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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

H. G. SCHRICKEL

A problem of tremendous import confronts the social scientists of our day.

Having accumulated a vast amount of detailed data on human relations the
social scientists are now being asked about the significance of their data. Two
major aspects of this questioning are these: How can we synthesize all available
scientific data on human relations so that this knowledge can be successfully
applied to the solution of current social problems; and secondly, since some of
the data accumulated so far has been defined and organized in terms of concepts
imitative of older (Newtonian) physical (and sometimes biological) conceptsthe appropriateness of which to human relations as subject matter is questionable-should we not evaluate these basic concepts with a view to laying new
conceptual foundations for our knowledge of human relations? Thus we shall
open the way for new social research and at the same time develop a methodologically sounder basis for our knowledge of human relations. Briefly, our
knowledge of human relations at present is at loose ends, and in this condition is
not as applicable to the solution of pressing social problems as it would be if it
were unified into a comprehensive and more flexible science of human behavior.
Such a unification would demand not only a synthesis of the data of the social
sciences but also the critical evaluation of many of the basic concepts of these
sciences.

The social sciences have, on the whole, endeavored to follow the lead of the
natural sciences in the development of their concept of law. But the social
sciences have not achieved this goal they have set for themselves. Experimentation in the natural sciences has been found to be one of the most fruitful

methods for increasing both the scope and accuracy of our natural scientific
knowledge. The success of this method, however, is directly dependent upon
the extent to which the scientist is able to isolate and control the important
factors in the situation under study. The social scientist is limited in his use of
this method for he cannot isolate and control the important factors of human
behavior; for human beings do not consistently act in an exclusively economic,
religious, political, moral, or any other particular manner. Since the fundamental nature of his subject matter precludes the social scientist from using to
any great extent the most accurate method of science-the experimental method
-the laws worked out by the social scientist on the basis of his findings will only
approximate the accuracy and truth-value that can be attained through the use
of experimental method.
The present impasse in the social sciences can be indicated very briefly. The
modern social sciences have attempted, in general, to become as accurate as the
natural sciences and in the process have built up "pure" social sciences, each a
compact conceptual system, self-contained and not apparently related to each
other. The chief result of this development is that our present scientific knowledge of human relations, instead of being unified and comprehensive, is broken
208

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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

209

up into more or less isolated bodies of knowledge; and this inflexible compartmentalized social knowledge does not readily lend itself to application in any
endeavors to understand completely present social problems and their relations.
It is clear that both constructive and critical steps are very much in order in
our current knowledge of human relations if we are to put that knowledge on a
sounder basis and insure its progressive development. There is need for a new
discipline, a new conception of social philosophy which will take up the challenge.

Such a discipline can be based on some of the techniques and methods which
have been developed in contemporary philosophy of science. Also, the new
social philosophy will draw freely upon the synoptic methods and instruments
of analysis of the more general philosophical way of thought which has been and
remains the best source of systematic and critical thinking on human values.
I

Constructive philosophy of science, generally speaking, accepts scientific

method as the best method of obtaining the most reliable factual knowledge and
thus uses scientific method in many of its own speculations. More specifically,
constructive philosophy of science conceives its function to be the speculative
extension of the generalizing tendencies within science. This extension of the
generality of science is to take the form of attempts to work out the most inclusive

hypotheses possible; hypotheses of such generality that they will comprehend

eventually all the specific hypotheses of the various sciences. The ultimate goal
of the philosopher of science is a unified universal knowledge. In seeking this
goal, however, he is not committed to a complete unification of knowledge; it
may be that human knowledge will never be completely unified. Further, the
hypotheses which the philosopher of science develops are not regarded by him
as axiomatic or self-evident or lending certainty to the scientific hypotheses upon

which they are built. Rather, he regards his synoptic (all-inclusive) hypotheses
as having only that degree of truth enjoyed by the scientific hypotheses upon
which he speculates. When the philosopher of science attempts to unify the
separate sciences into one universal body of knowledge he hopes that his synoptic

hypotheses may turn out to be suggestive for research in some of the specific
sciences. For example, in developing an hypothesis which draws upon theories
to be found in biology and in chemistry the philosopher of science might suggest

some new lines of research in bio-chemistry; in developing a cosmological hypothesis which draws upon several of the natural sciences he might suggest some
new lines of research in sub-atomic physics.

Correlative to the constructive function of philosophy of science is its critical

function. Referred to sometimes as "logic of science", the subject matter of
critical philosophy of science consists of the methods and concepts of all the
natural and humanistic sciences. Critical philosophy of science is engaged in
the logical evaluation of scientific methods and concepts. A typical problem for
critical philosophy of science is its consideration of the logical value of different

methods used by various scientists in approaching a common subject. The

philosopher's problem is to discover if possible, which of the various methods is

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210

H. G. SCHRICKEL

most appropriate to the problem being studied by the scientists, what logical
similarities and differences exist among these methods, and which method is
logically best; i.e., which method when applied (1) yields the most knowledge
and thereby expands human knowledge most; (2) introduces more logical coherence into our already existing knowledge; (3) offers the greatest predictive
possibilities and hence increases scientific control; and (4) stimulates further
research. When the philosopher of science investigates the basic concepts and
presuppositions of the various sciences he is concerning himself primarily with
problems of meaning. He might consider, for example, the meaning of evolution
as a concept that originally occurred in biology but which is now being used so
fluently by social scientists; do biologists and social scientists attach the same
meaning to this term, evolution? If not, in what ways do the meanings differ?
Just as in his examination of methods the philosopher was looking for the best
methods, here he is looking for the best conceptual structure for each science;
and ultimately, the best conceptual structure for the united knowledge of all
sciences.

A good phrase to express the aim of critical philosophy of science is testing for

fundamental adequacy. How does the test for fundamental adequacy differ from
the tests employed by a science in the establishment of one of its hypotheses as
a scientific law? The answer to this question would be that the former is more
far-reaching than the latter; that the first takes all of experience as its testing
ground while the second operates within the confines of the so-called "controlled
situation" (or an attempted approximation thereof); the former is synoptic
rather than limited to any one domain. Each science contains theories verified
by the defined and limited facts of that science; also, theories within a science
are tested for their mutual logical consistency. Testing for fundamental adequacy is a much broader and deeper process; it is, in a sense, an extension of
scientific verification. It demands verification of a theory, regardless of what
science it springs from, by relevant facts which exist outside the defined and
limited field treated by that science wherein the theory originated. It also
demands the logical consistency of a theory with the whole of human knowledge-

whatever that may be at the time. Critical and constructive philosophy of

science, in endeavoring to establish the fundamental adequacy of all our knowledge, attempts to coordinate the findings of all the sciences into an organized and

systematic body of knowledge. Since the aim is to systematize scientific knowledge-and since this knowledge has only a high degree of probability-the goal
in view is not a rigid and final systematization of knowledge but rather an
advance in knowledge itself. This goal of a better knowledge is sought in light
of the fact that adequate organization of our knowledge is a necessary condition
of its progressive development.
II

It is the specialization of the social sciences that poses one of the fundamental
problems of the new constructive social philosophy. The constructive social
philosopher realizes that if we are to construct successfully an adequate societal

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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

211

design for living in the modern world, we must construct that design on a comprehensive scientific knowledge of human relations. Since that unified scientific
knowledge of the facts of human relations is not at hand it is necessary that we
work for its realization. According to this view, the most immediate problem
of constructive social philosophy is the unification of the social sciences. The
constructive social philosopher will examine the data, methods, and hypotheses
of the social sciences for presumptive all-inclusive hypotheses in these sciences.
From these all-inclusive hypotheses he will attempt to give broad explanations
that will include the more limited explanations embodied in the more particular
hypotheses that are to be found in the more specific social sciences. Admittedly
speculative, these all-inclusive hypotheses will carry no more probability or
truth-value than that which can be established by application of the particular
hypotheses which they unify. But this limitation on the social philosopher's
synoptic hypotheses is more than made up for by their focusing value and their
ability to bring to bear on specific social problems all available scientific knowledge of human relations.
Another task of constructive social philosophy is its attempt to state the
necessary and sufficient conditions of an ideal society. In his second task the
social philosopher combines a unified scientific knowledge of human relations
with a knowledge of human values to construct a societal plan of living that will
make possible the good life. This ideal he regards as tentative, for he knows
that it will change as knowledge of human relations and human values change.
Critical social philosophy is limited primarily to an evaluation of the concepts
and methods employed by the social sciences and psychology. The critical
social philosopher is concerned with the validity and scope of the basic concepts
of economics, political science, sociology, and the other social sciences. This
would include an evaluation of the meanings which social scientists attach to
their basic concepts, of the use of these concepts, of possible relations obtaining
between these concepts, and in general, of the logical and methodological structure of each of the social sciences taken singly and taken together.
Typical problems for the critical social philosopher are the following, all of
which have to do with the fundamental adequacy of the social sciences: What
is the political scientist's empirical referent for his concept, "government?"
How abstractive is this empirical referent and how much does it overlap the
empirical referent of the economist's concept of the "economic system" or the
sociologist's concept of "culture?" What is the empirical referent of the psychologist's concept of "personality?" In explaining what he means by "free
enterprise" to what extent does the abstraction of the economist in making his
definition invalidate his concept of free enterprise? What logical relations maintain between the economist's concept of free enterprise and that "law" of human
behavior which he refers to as the "law of diminishing returns?" What degree
of validity attaches to the sociologist's use of various psychological and biological
concepts? To what extent do the various methods of the social sciences transform the subject matters they investigate, and more generally, what degree of
transformation in subject matter can be practiced by the social scientists without

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H. G. SCHRICKEL

invalidating their results? Are the presuppositions involved in the use of scientific method in the natural sciences identical with the basic assumptions involved in the methods used by the social sciences?
Social philosophizing is evaluative and factual thinking about human relations
which utilizes scientific and other logical methods in its search for knowledge of
social facts and values and an adequate societal design for living. As conceived
here, social philosophizing is scientific in at least two senses. Constructively,
the social philosopher utilizes the findings of the modern social sciences in laying

the factual and valuational foundations of what he regards as a more adequate

societal design for living. Methodologically, the social philosopher employs
scientific method in his consideration of social problems and in his social planning. In this same sense the social philosopher seeks to be as objective as the
scientist; both try to rid themselves of personal biases and prejudices, of interests

which they share as members of particular social groups and classes, and of
prejudices which they share with great numbers of their contemporaries.

By being critical of modern scientific knowledge of human relations the social

philosopher hopes to make that knowledge better. With a better knowledge of
human relations he hopes to construct some societal plan of living that will make

possible the greater and more widespread enjoyment of human values. The
social philosopher seeks a better knowledge of real social values, and this knowledge is to form a standard for the evaluation of proposed social reforms. In his
speculative hypotheses he hopes to discover suggestions for further research in
the social sciences themselves. Furthermore, he aims to make it convincingly
clear, through his work, that no comprehensive theory of society or social philosophy can be satisfactorily worked out within the confines of the concepts, hypoth-

eses, and methods of any one particular social science. In these tasks he has
set for himself he solicits the cooperation of philosophers and scientists alike,
feeling that they will recognize the necessarily cooperative nature of a progressive

knowledge of social values and facts.

Carnegie Institute of Technology.

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