Thayer United States and Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia

Revitalizing U.S.
Engagement in Asia:
The Obama Administration and the Challenge of Non
Traditional Security Issues

Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper to KAMERA‐MAAS International Conference, ‘The United States and
the New Asia: Towards Partnership and Multilateral Engagement in the
21st Century’, sponsored by the Centre for American Studies (KAMERA),
Institute of Occidental Studies (IKON), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
and the Malaysian Association for American Studies (MAAS), Hotel Nikko,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 1‐2, 2010.
DRAFT NOT FOR CITATION 2
Revitalizing U.S. Engagement in Asia:
The Obama Administration and the Challenge of Non
Traditional Security Issues
Carlyle A. Thayer
Introduction
The United States has been engaged in forging cooperation to meet the challenges of
non‐traditional security issues since the end of the Second World War when all
present states, with the exception of Thailand, gained independence. U.S. policy
sought overcome underdevelopment by promoting economic growth and a system
of free trade.
The United States sought to address what is now termed ‘non‐traditional security
issues’ through policies aimed at modernization, economic development and
promotion of democratic institutions. Most non‐traditional security challenges were
addressed through bilateral programs. While there were precursors to regional
cooperation, the United States really began to fashion a multilateral approach to
non‐traditional security issues with the formation of the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, and more particularly, with the formal
establishment of dialogue relations with ASEAN in 1977.
In the 1970s and 1980s, political leaders in Southeast Asia began to re‐think the
concept of security based on reliance on the military instrument of national power.
In 1976, for example, the ASEAN appropriated Indonesia’s idea of ketahanan
nasional (national resilience) and developed it into the concept of regional
resilience. Indonesia’s original ketahanan nasional concept of was multidimensional
and included resilience in the ideological, political economic, social, cultural and
military fields. ASEAN dropped the emphasis on the military component.
The end of the Cold War changed the strategic context of what constituted a security
threat. A decade earlier notions of common security and comprehensive security
had already entered the lexicon of Southeast Asian political discourse and even
national policy, as was the case of Malaysia in 1984. In the 1990s ‘new thinking’ took
hold and led to the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum and what might be
termed the ‘creeping securitization’ of so‐called non‐traditional security issues.
Track 2 think tanks raised the question ‘what is the referent of security?’ The
answer went beyond the state and national security to embrace society and human
security.
The evolution of Southeast Asia thinking on non‐traditional security accompanied
the development of regionalism under the auspices of ASEAN. Increasingly ASEAN
set the agenda in its external relations. The U.S. responded by adjusting its
development programs to work with ASEAN to meet common objectives. This was
particularly the case after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997‐98 when U.S. policies
sought to assist ASEAN in meeting goals set out in the Hanoi Plan of Action and the
Vientiane Action Plan.
Once the Cold War ended, ASEAN became proactive in promoting comprehensive
security with an emphasis on non‐traditional security challenges. The ASEAN
Charter, for example, states that the principle of comprehensive security is the basis
of responding ‘to all forms of threat, transnational crimes and transboundary
challenges’.
There is no official agreement among ASEAN states about what security challenges
should be classified as non‐traditional security issues. To be sure there is a high
degree of consensus on many of the issues commonly included in the non‐
traditional category; but there is disagreement over which issues should be included
and disagreement over the priority to be assigned to one particular issue over
another.
To illustrate this point, consider the submissions from ASEAN member states to the
ARF’s 2009 Annual Security Outlook (ASO) Only five of ASEAN’s ten members
submitted security outlook statements – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam. The ASO process also illustrates that ARF members share widely
differing views on what matters and challenges should be considered security issues
and what priority should be assigned to them.
Five major security issues were listed as separate concerns by the five ASEAN states
that submitted security outlook assessments. These were: transnational or non‐
traditional; terrorism and extremism; natural disasters; territorial disputes;
maritime security; and piracy. Several of these issues could be collapsed under the
broad heading non‐traditional.
Transnational or non‐traditional challenges topped the list of security concerns.
Vietnam’s submission concluded, for example, that ‘non‐traditional security threats
are growing and become more complex’. When all the transnational security issues
identified in the security outlook assessments are collated, ten separate challenges
can be identified: transnational crime, small arms and light weapons smuggling,
money laundering, drug trafficking, people smuggling, illegal migration, illegal
logging, illegal fishing, avian influenza and swine flu and climate change. This list is
indicative as several of the issues could be clustered under transnational crime.
One final illustration of the difficulty of what should be included as a non‐traditional
security issue ‐ from a Southeast Asian perspective ‐ may be found in the Protocol to
the Concept Paper for the Establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
(ADMM). It notes: ‘the ADMM may discuss practical cooperation in traditional and
non‐traditional security concerns; transnational and transboundary security
challenges including maritime security; disaster relief and emergency response; and
peacekeeping, post‐conflict peace‐building and humanitarian assistance, among
other areas of cooperation’. This extends the notion of what constitutes a non‐
traditional security issue considerably.
Finally, although there was consensus among the five ASEAN states that
transnational security issues were the most serious security challenges faced by
Southeast Asia, there was no consensus on their priority. Indonesia, which suffered
greatly as a result of the 2004 tsunami, declared in its submission that ‘the utmost
challenge in the region security [sic] in the present time is on the effort to develop
disaster relief cooperation’.
This paper focuses on United States policy towards the challenges posed by non‐
traditional security in Southeast Asia. The main focus of the paper is on the
evolution of U.S. policy under the George W. Bush (2001‐2008) and Barrack Obama
Administrations (2009‐present). The paper notes the seminal impact of 9‐11 on the
first Bush Administration (2001‐04) and the priority emphasis on defeating
international terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. The Second Bush Administration
(2005‐08) placed a greater emphasis on regional cooperation to address non‐
traditional security issues, an emphasis underscored by the U.S. response to the
Indian Ocean or Boxing Day tsunami in 2004.
This paper concludes with a discussion of U.S. policy under the Obama
Administration. This section notes that there is a great deal of continuity in U.S.
policy in addressing non‐traditional security challenges. But the Obama
Administration has repackaged the delivery of U.S. support in acknowledgement of
the growth of regionalism and ASEAN’s central role. The new emphasis on ‘smart
diplomacy’ holds hope for a greater and more effective whole‐of‐government
approach to dealing with the challenges of both traditional and non‐traditional
security issues. The Obama Administration is more amenable to addressing non‐
traditional security issues through regular high‐level multilateral consultations.
Historical Overview
This section provides an overview of U.S. assistance to the newly independent states
of Southeast Asia following the Second World War to the start of the 21st century.
Initially the U.S. gave priority to the recovery of Europe through the Marshall Plan
(1948‐51). In October 1951 Congress passed the Mutual Security Act setting up a
Mutual Security Agency to provide overseas assistance outside Europe.
First, U.S. assistance to Southeast Asia gave priority to postwar recovery in the
Philippines and Thailand.
Second, the United States extended its assistance to newly independent Indonesia in
1950. Priority was given to addressing Indonesia’s most urgent needs, including
food aid, infrastructure rehabilitation, health care, and human resources training.
U.S. assistance was cut during the Sukarno years. After the formation of the New
Order government under President Suharto, the United States resumed assistance
to restart and sustain economic growth. And the U.S. played a major role in helping
Indonesia achieve self‐sufficiency in rice production and reducing the birthrate in
the 1970s and 1980s.
In 1953 the U.S. established the Foreign Operations Administration as an
autonomous government agency to deliver economic and technical assistance on a
global scale. In 1954 the Foreign Operations Administration was folded into a new
organization, the International Cooperation Administration. The International
Cooperation Administration was charged with delivering aid to support economic
and social development and for specific political purposes. It was subordinate to the
Department of State.
In 1954, U.S. foreign assistance programs underwent a further evolution with the
Mutual Security Act. This legislation specified forms of development aid, security
assistance, discretionary contingency funding and guarantees for private
investment. At the same time the U.S. created the Food for Peace program to deliver
food aid.
Third, with the signing of the Southeast Asian Collective Security Treaty in 1954 and
the setting up of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955, U.S.
development assistance was channeled to SEATO members Thailand and the
Philippines and the protocol states of Indochina (South Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos). For example, between 1955 and 1963, the United States provided Cambodia
U.S. $409.6 million in economic grant aid and $83.7 million in military assistance.
This aid was used primarily to repair damage caused during the 1st Indochina War
(1946‐54) and to support the development of internal security forces. A major
showcase was the construction of an all‐weather road from Phnom Penh to the
seaport of Sihanoukville. For the first time the capital had direct access to the sea
and remote areas in the southwest.
It should be recalled that the Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty was
accompanied by a Pacific Charter encouraging signatories ‘to cooperate in the
economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards,
economic progress and social well‐being in this region’. The Pacific Charter also
affirmed the principles of ‘equality and self‐determination’ in relations among its
members (United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
the Philippines and Thailand). SEATO was wound up in 1977.
In 1957 the Mutual Security Act was revised. This led to the creation of the
Development Loan Fund as an arm of the International Cooperation Administration.
The purpose of this fund was to provide loans that the Export‐Import Bank would
not underwrite such as repayment in local currencies. The Development Loan Fund
became mainly involved in capital projects.
Fourth, under the Administration of John F. Kennedy, the United States undertook a
major reorganization of its development assistance program by delinking it from
political‐security/military assistance. In 1961, the United States Agency for
International Development (U.S. AID) was established. It was the first United States
government foreign assistance organization with responsibility for the delivery of
long‐range economic and social development assistance to the Third World. The
creation of the U.S. AID better enabled the United States to deliver assistance on a
regional basis.
Fifth, a major watershed in U.S. relations with Southeast Asia was reached in 1977
when the Administration of President Jimmy Carter agreed to open dialogue
relations with ASEAN. The U.S. was represented at the first dialogue meeting by
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Richard N. Cooper. ASEAN promptly
set up a special committee in Washington to facilitate dialogue.
In August 1978, ASEAN and the United States reached agreement on the broad areas
for U.S. assistance (commodities, market and capital access, technology transfer,
development of shipping, energy resources, and food security). U.S. funding
commenced in 1979 through the U.S. AID’s Regional Economic Development Office
in Bangkok. The regional approach to development assistance complimented
ASEAN’s approach.
The U.S.‐ASEAN dialogue took the form of annual discussions following the Annual
Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers and the Post‐Ministerial Conference (PMC)
between ASEAN and its dialogue partners. The Post‐Ministerial Conference became
an important venue for the U.S. Secretary of State to review development
cooperation issues with ASEAN counterparts (PMC + 1). Senior officials from both
sides met in advance to review economic and development cooperation and make
recommendations
An illustration of U.S. assistance to address what later became known as non‐
traditional security issues may be found in the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on ASEAN‐U.S. Project in Human Resources Development signed in 1987.
The agreement was executed by U.S. AID. Under the terms of the MOU, the United
States agreed to train 1,988 ASEAN participants in ‘plant protection and quarantine,
agricultural economics and planning, health, agricultural engineering, rural
development and other priority regional development areas’. Training included
provision for 360 students to pursue studies at Master’s Degree level in the region
(and a smaller number at universities in the United States). This cooperative
agreement was aimed an increasing human and institutional resource capacities in
Southeast Asia.
In the 1990s, the focus of U.S. development cooperation altered with greater
emphasis on trade and investment, technology transfer and human resource
development. But U.S. engagement with ASEAN also built on work of United States‐
Asia Environmental Partnership mentioned earlier. This was a presidential initiative
executed by U.S. AID.
In 1992, a Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN‐U.S. Project in Environmental
Improvement was signed. The MOU addressed one of the spin‐offs of economic
growth, the deterioration of the environment caused by migration into the cities and
urbanization. Most ASEAN members joined in a cooperative program to improve the
urban and industrial environments as part of environmentally acceptable economic
development. The MoU specifically focused on improving environmental quality in
industrial and urban sectors, environmental technology transfer, and investment in
urban environmental infrastructure. The U.S. promoted a model incorporating
partnerships with federal and state agencies, cities, corporations, and non‐
governmental organisations.
By the late 1990s non‐traditional security issues had become ‘securitised’ in the
discourses on security and development in Southeast Asia. The United States took
note of these developments and moved to adjust its policies to compliment ASEAN’s
efforts to address these and other emerging problems.
One seminal development in this respect was the ‘haze problem’ of 1997‐98 caused
by uncontrolled forest, peat and coal seam fires in Indonesia. Neighbouring states
were badly affected and ASEAN’s norm of non‐intervention was sorely tested. In the
aftermath of this disaster the U.S. provided U.S. $9 million in technical aid and
collaborated with ASEAN’s Haze Action Task Force. The U.S. then gave increased
attention to environmental issues.
U.S Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signaled this new direction in U.S. policy in
her remarks to the ASEAN Ten Plus One Meeting on 27th July 1999 in Singapore.
Secretary Albright stated that ASEAN and its partners must work together to
address transnational issues such as crime, illegal trafficking in women and the
environment. She drew particular attention to the history of close collaboration
between ASEAN, the United Nations and the United States to deal with illegal
narcotics trafficking as a model of cooperation.
Secretary Albright proposed two new environmental programs, one to address air

pollution and the other to address climate change ‘without compromising economic
development’. The United States, she said, would continue to give priority support
to improved forestry management, coral reef preservation, biodiversity and
development of environmentally‐friendly technologies.
Secretary Albright also drew attention to international criminal activity. She pointed
out that criminals were combining the old tools of coercion and corruption with
cutting edge technology to evade national controls and undermine the sovereignty
of national borders. She called for greater regional cooperation. As a result the U.S.
and Thai agreed to co‐sponsor the International Law Enforcement Academy in
Bangkok. The United States also provided assistance and computing equipment to
the Philippine Center for Transnational Crime. In 2000, the U.S. co‐chaired with the
Philippines a regional workshop on illegal trafficking in women to underscore the
importance of this issue.
On 28th July 2000, Secretary of State Albright attended the next ASEAN Ten Plus One
Meeting. In her remarks she once again addressed a constant theme of U.S. policy:
trade not aid was the best way to advance economic development (and thus address
the underlying causes of non‐traditional security issues). The U.S. increased its
funding from U.S. $201 million (FY 1999) to U.S. $226 million (FY 2000) to promove
sustainable economic development in the ASEAN region.
To summarize, since the initiation of the first ASEAN‐U.S. dialogue in 1997, U.S.‐
ASEAN cooperation in addressing non‐traditional security issues expanded to
include environmental issues, public health, transnational crime, disaster relief and
other programs. These are summarized below.
Environment. The U.S.‐Asia Environmental Partnership program formed the basis

for initial U.S.‐ASEAN cooperation to address environmental issues that arose as a
by‐product of rapid industrial and urban growth. Under the U.S. East Asia and
Pacific Environmental Initiative the United States provided U.S. $8 million (1999‐
2000) to support sustainable development in the ASEAN region. Three areas were
given priority: forest management, forest fire and haze control, and coral reef
protection. In 2000, the Environmental Initiative allocated U.S. $3.5 million to fund
new projects including biodiversity in Laos, Vietnam and Thailand; preservation of
coral reefs in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia; and continuation of forest
management and forest fire/haze control in Indonesia.
Between 1979‐2002, the U.S. government provided U.S. $31.8 million for
environmental assistance programs – cleaner technologies, watershed and coastal
resources and energy efficient construction. A new Environmental Diplomacy Fund
was set up to address global needs including Southeast Asia.
Public health. During the Clinton Administration the United States launched a global
initiative to address he spread of HIV/AIDs and other infectious diseases such as
malaria. This initiative combined the resources of U.S. AID and Centers of Disease
Control (CDC), National Institute of Health and other U.S. agencies engaged in
research and treatment programs on these diseases.
The CDC and Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences cooperated with
Thailand to combat infectious diseases, including vaccines against Encephalitis and
Hepatitis and use of AZT in third trimester pregnancies to cut transmission of
HIV/AIDS to infants. The U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit in Jakarta worked with
local authorities to overcome the spread of HIV/AIDS. During this period the U.S.
exerted leadership to link programs across Southeast Asia to coordinate efforts.
Under the U.S.‐Japan Common Agenda, both countries combined to combat
infectious diseases in Southeast Asia. In June 2000, for example, a joint Japan‐U.S.
expert mission visited Cambodia to investigate cooperation in addressing HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, other infectious and parasitic diseases.
Between 1979‐2002, the U.S. government contributed U.S. $34.6 million to establish
regional education centres in health, agriculture planning and plant quarantine.
These funds also assisted in training, scholarships, and fellowships in economics,
engineering, agriculture and health.
Transnational crime. The United States has longed been involved in cooperating
with regional states to end the illegal trafficking in drugs and narcotics. The U.S.
conducts a number of bilateral counter narcotics programs in the ASEAN region and
through the UN Drug Control Program.
The United States has also supported ASEAN’s objective of creating a Drug Free
ASEAN by 2015 (brought forward from 2020). The U.S. has also endorsed the Hanoi
Plan of Action and its commitment to curb the production and trafficking in illegal
narcotics.
During the period under review, the U.S. gave its support to the Asian Regional
Initiative Against the Trafficking of Women and Children inaugurated in Manila. The
U.S. Department of Labor provided U.S. $1 million to the International Labor
Organisation’s Program on Elimination of Child Labor to develop projects in
Southeast Asia.
Disaster relief. In the period between 1999‐2000, the U.S. AID Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance provided U.S. $50 million for humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief.
Other programs. The U.S. AID Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia Program
provided U.S. $50 million in technical assistance to countries affected by the Asian
Financial Crisis.
Between 1979‐2002, the U.S. provided ASEAN states with U.S. $83 million in grants
for human resource development and institutional capacity building to promote
trade, investment and the role of small businesses.
Between 1979‐2002, U.S. AID provided U.S. $16.5 million in trade, investment and

small business development involving the private sector.
Between 1979‐2002 the U.S. also provided substantial funding through bilateral as
well as regional programs for the development of the Mekong River basin.
In summary, during the period from 1977, with the establishment of the ASEAN‐
United States dialogue, to the end of the Clinton Administration, the U.S. addressed
non‐traditional security issues in Southeast Asian primarily through an economic
development framework rather than the framework of ‘securitisation’. The U.S.
continued to stress the role of trade, investment and market liberalization as a
catalyst for economic development. Increasingly the United States came to embrace
regional cooperation with ASEAN as a way to address non‐traditional security
issues; but the United States continued to place emphasis on bilateral programs as
well.
Bush Administration
The Bush Administration has been widely castigated for its unilateralism in foreign
policy and for initiating the war in Iraq. Southeast Asian leaders were largely
sympathetic to the United States in the wake of 9‐11, but key leaders in Indonesia,
Thailand and Malaysia initially tried to down play the threat of international
terrorism and/or disassociate themselves from what they perceived as an overly
military response to terrorism by the United States. Whereas the U.S. stressed
priority on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Southeast Asian leaders preferred
to link terrorism with non‐traditional security threats.
President George W. Bush served for two terms. His first Administration (2001‐04)
gave priority to the Global War on Terrorism as a result of the attacks on 9‐11.
Southeast Asia was characterized as the second front in the GWOT. Operation
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) was extended to cover U.S. counter terrorism
assistance to the government of the Philippines in dealing with the Abu Sayyaf
Group and its associates.
The United States and ASEAN initiated formal cooperation to deal with the threat of
international terrorism through a Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat
International Terrorism issued in Brunei on 1st August 2002. This Joint Declaration
noted the importance of developing a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt
and combat terrorism through exchange of information, intelligence and capacity
building. Further, the Joint Declaration specified that the United Nations should play
a major role in order to underpin the legitimacy of regional counter terrorism
efforts. The Joint Declaration was followed by a Work Plan to implement these
objectives.
The popular perception of the priority accorded by the Bush Administration to the
conduct the GWOT overlooks two major U.S. policy initiatives in 2002 in addition to
counter terrorism cooperation with ASEAN. Both initiatives focused on the new
challenges of globalisation, environment, infectious diseases, disaster management
and transnational crime.
In 2002, the United States announced the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative to
facilitate trade agreements between the U.S. and individual ASEAN member
countries. The objective of this initiative was to create a network of bilateral
agreements to compliment if not spur regional trade liberalization. In 2003 the
United States quickly signed an agreement with Singapore. Negotiations with
Thailand were derailed by the September 2006 military coup, while discussions
with Malaysia are still pending.
The second, and more significant initiative, the ASEAN Cooperation Plan, was
announced by Secretary of State Colin Powell in mid‐2002 in Brunei. The ASEAN
Cooperation Plan promoted cooperation in trade, disaster mitigation and counter
terrorism. It complimented key objectives of Vientiane Action Plan (ASEAN
integration by 2010). Under the ASEAN Cooperation Plan the United States provided
support to the ASEAN Secretariat to promote economic integration and
development and cooperation on transnational issues. A budget of U.S. $10 million
was allocated to support twenty projects.
The ASEAN Cooperation Plan facilitated U.S.‐ASEAN cooperation in dealing not only
with a wide range of transnational issues but cooperation between ASEAN and a
multiplicity of federal departments and agencies of the U.S. government including:
Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, ASEAN‐U.S. Business Council, U.S. Forest Service, U.S.
AID, and the U.S. Council of State Governments.
In 2003, the U.S. AID established its Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA)
in Bangkok to oversee a broad range of programs directed at meeting the challenge
of non‐traditional transnational security issues such as global climate change,
infectious disease, human and wildlife trafficking, and management of coastal and
marine resources. U.S. AID utilized the RDMA program as its prime vehicle for
strengthening regional institutions in Southeast Asia. In addition, the RDMA
program delivered bilateral assistance to those countries without a U.S. AID Mission,
such as Burma and Laos. The RDMA promoted five programs:
Environment. U.S. AID promoted regional cooperation to address the impact of
climate change, deforestation, and poor water supply. Specifically, U.S. AID assisted
in the development of innovative policies, practices and technologies designed to
address forest conservation, coral reef preservation, and illegal trade in timber and
wildlife. U.S. AID also increased funding to provide for potable water, improved
sanitation and clean energy.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service teamed up with the ASEAN
Secretariat and the International Union for Conservation of Nature‐World Wildlife
Fund’s Project Firefight Southeast Asia to develop an effective database and
clearinghouse on fire and haze activities in Southeast Asia
Public health. In order to meet the challenge of infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, avian
influenza, malaria and tuberculosis), U.S. AID developed programs to assist Burma,
Laos and Thailand to develop surveillance systems to track the spread of infectious
disease, monitor anti‐malarial drug resistance and improve border control.
Assistance was also provided to programs that catered for the prevention, care and
treatment programs for those infected with HIV/AIDS. Specifically, U.S. AID funded
the training costs of researchers and caregivers and the delivery of programs to the
population most at risk. Finally, U.S. AID assisted ASEAN to prepare for a possible
pandemic.
Economic growth. A long‐running staple of U.S. foreign assistance has been to
support economic growth and increased trade. This priority was also reflected in
the RMDA program that supported regional economic integration of states at
various stages of development. The RDMA placed emphasis on strengthening legal
reform, anti‐corruption programs, access to credit, and support for micro‐, small‐
and medium‐sized businesses.
Human trafficking. U.S. AID initiated a multi‐media based anti‐trafficking campaign
aimed at young adults most at risk in order to raise general awareness of the issue.
U.S. AID also supported programs than increased prevention of human trafficking.
Additionally, the United States provided funds to the International Organization for
Migration to improve data collection on global human trafficking including
Southeast Asia.
Assistance to marginalized communities. U.S. AID developed programs to address
marginalized communities, specifically migrants from Burma, survivors of Cyclone
Nargis and war victims in Laos.
In 2004, in a further U.S. commitment to address non‐traditional security issues as
part of the larger economic development process, the United States set up the
ASEAN‐U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility in the ASEAN Secretariat in
Jakarta. This was identified by U.S. officials as the flagship project of the ASEAN
Cooperation Plan and was funded at U.S. $6 million. The joint training facility
sponsored eight specific projects that were largely congruent with priorities set out
in the Vientiane Action Plan: economic sector integration; investment, trade and
customs facilitation; trade in services; trade negotiations; trade‐related
coordination and dialogue; natural resources management; public health; and
strengthening of the ASEAN Secretariat. Within three years the joint training facility
has sponsored 125 separate activities.
Just after President Bush was re‐elected for a second term in office (2005‐08), the
Indian Ocean region was struck by a massive tsunami generated by an earthquake
off the western coast of Sumatra. The earthquake was the second largest recorded,
measuring 9.1‐9.3 on the Richter scale. Over 230,000 persons perished in fourteen
countries and an estimated ten million were made homeless. Indonesia was the
worst hit with an estimated 130,000‐167,000 deaths and a half million displaced
persons. Thailand lost between 5,000 and 8,000.
The U.S. Government was one of the countries to respond to the disaster and the
United States played a major leadership role along with Japan, India and Australia in
providing immediate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The U.S.
humanitarian assistance effort included: C‐5 Galaxy and C‐17 Globemaster III
strategic airlifters, 10 C‐130 Hercules, 9 P‐3C Orions maritime patrol craft, 48 Navy
and Marine helicopters, the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group, an
Expeditionary Strike Group led by USS Bonhomme Richard and the UNSN Mercy
hospital ship. In all a total of 12,600 U.S. defence personnel were committed .
Remarkable teamwork developed between the Indonesian armed forces and U.S
military personnel to deliver vital relief supplies and aid workers to remote areas
affected by tsunami. After the disaster relief phase of operations ended, the U.S.
assisted in the construction of the Aceh west coast highway.
The U.S. also was one of the lead donors in the reconstruction efforts in the tsunami‐
hit area of Aceh. U.S. AID implemented three main programs. The first was to
provide assistance to local communities to help rebuild shelter and key
infrastructure. In addition, U.S. AID and the Indonesian government worked
together with the local community to ensure proper mapping and planning was
undertaken in recovery efforts.
The second U.S. AID program, the Community Based Recovery Initiative, was aimed
at restoring livelihoods to the people affected in 59 villages in Aceh. The third U.S.
AID program was aimed at strengthening capacity and governance by assisting local
government in restoring basic services and, over the longer term, supporting
initiatives to improve local government accountability and transparency, strengthen
the local legislative process, promote citizen engagement, and civil service reform.
In addition, U.S. AID provided numerous grants to UN agencies, international
organizations and NGOs to stave off a potential public health crisis, provide relief
services to survivors and generally stabilize the humanitarian situation in Aceh.
In May 2006, U.S. AID joined in partnership with ConocoPhillips, to assist in
repairing schools damaged by an earthquake that struck Yogyakarta as well as
Central Java.
In addition to disaster relief for Indonesia, U.S. AID has also played role in assisting
Indonesia combat trafficking in persons through its Trafficking in Persons program.
Under this scheme U.S. AID assists local civil society group to develop policies and
procedures to prevent human trafficking and provide protection to survivors of
trafficking.
During his second term, President Bush noticeably stepped up U.S.‐ASEAN
cooperation in managing non‐traditional security issues through the ASEAN‐U.S.
Enhanced Partnership program. This program was announced on 15th November
2005 in a Joint Vision Statement of the ASEAN‐U.S. Enhanced Partnership agreed
between ASEAN foreign ministers and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In
July 2006, the ASEAN‐U.S. Plan of Action for 2006‐2010 was adopted at PMC + 1
meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Once again, U.S. assistance priorities were brought into
broad alignment with ASEAN’s priorities as spelled out in the Vientiane Action Plan.
The adoption of the ASEAN‐U.S. Plan of Action was followed a month later by the
signing of the ASEAN‐U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement between
the U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and her ASEAN counterparts. This
agreement made provision for a regular dialogue on trade and investment matters.
It is implemented through a joint work plan.
In November 2006, U.S.‐ASEAN cooperation in managing non‐traditional security

challenges took another step forward at a meeting in Hanoi between President Bush
and his ASEAN counterparts. They agreed that the priorities for the ASEAN‐U.S.
Partnership Plan of Action would include cooperation in health (including avian
influenza), energy, natural disaster relief and environmental management. To
implement the Partnership Plan of Action the U.S. launched a new assistance
program called ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and
Economic Integration (ADVANCE) for the next five years.
Counter terrorism. In 2007‐08 the U.S. expanded its counter terrorism cooperation
with the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Cambodia. Since 2000, the U.S. has
provided nearly U.S. $400 million in military assistance to the Philippines. The U.S.
U.S. Special Forces have been posted to the southern Philippines to train the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). They also provide intelligence gathered from
satellite imagery, communications intercepts, global positioning information, and
aerial surveillance to assist the AFP in tracking members of the Abu Sayyaf Group.
U.S. Special Forces accompany the APF on patrol strictly for ‘observation’ only. U.S.
armed forces personnel also directly assist in disarming land mines.
In October 2007, the U.S. Congress authorized U.S. $60 million in combined military
and economic aid, portions of which were tied to addressing human rights abuses.
The lion’s share of assistance was allocated to support the modernization of AFP to
better carry out counter terrorism operations. Also in October 2007, the United
States opened a new front in assisting the Philippines. The U.S. Ambassador to the
Philippines announced a U.S. $100 million development campaign for Mindanao. In
June 2008, U.S. AID pledged U.S. $2.5 million for educational facilities in Mindanao.
The Sulawesi Sea, which borders the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, is an area
prone to piracy, armed robbery and a communications route for terrorists. In 2007,
the U.S. Department of Defense pledged U.S. $15.5 million to fund plans by the
Philippine Navy to install high‐frequency radio equipment along its southern
maritime borders on the Sulu and Sulawesi seas. This equipment would be used to
monitor the movement of armed gangs and terrorists in the shipping lanes and
fishing areas.
In FY 2007, the U.S. allocated U.S. $60 million to assist the Philippines, Indonesia and
Malaysia to improve border control measures to halt the smuggling of arms and
contraband and transit of terrorists. In 2008, the Pentagon funded the installation of
coastal surveillance radars, heat detecting cameras and computers in the
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia for use in monitoring the Sulawesi Sea.
Quite separately, in the third quarter of 2007, Congress voted to increase military
aid for Indonesia to U.S. $15.7 million in 2008. Some of the funding was contingent
on accounting for past human rights abuses. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is
currently running programs to enhance the monitoring capacity of the Indonesian
police in counter terrorism. Other U.S. specialists provide training to Indonesian
lawyers, prosecutors and judges to deal with trials of alleged terrorist.
In 2007 the United States resumed aid to Cambodia after a ten‐year suspension
following the Hun Sen ‘coup’ in 1997. U.S. aid was valued at U.S. $65 million. As part
of this package, the U.S. Marine Corps commenced a training program for
Cambodia’s National Counter‐Terrorism Task Force. In August 2007 the
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) offered anti‐terrorist training to
Cambodia, to include surveillance techniques, information sharing, and financial
monitoring.
In May 2008, Burma was struck by a major tropical storm, Cyclone Nargis that killed
tens of thousands of persons and left 1.5 million homeless. The United States offered
immediate large‐scale assistance and detached three amphibious ships from the
Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand to provide 90 tons of emergency supplies. Burmese
authorities refused to accept aid directly from U.S. naval ships, helicopters and
landing craft. Admiral Timothy Keating, U.S. PACOM commander later revealed that
he made fifteen separate requests to the Burmese government to provide disaster
relief via naval ships. He was refused on all occasions and the U.S. was restricted to
providing aid through C‐130 flights from Bangkok. The U.S. also unsuccessfully
offered to provide search‐and‐rescue and disaster relief experts, water making and
purification equipment.
ASEAN and the United Nations took the lead in providing humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief to Burma. Cyclone Nargis became a watershed for ASEAN in
raising the priority and urgency of developing a capability to deliver humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief in cooperation with its dialogue partners.
This section has documented that the Bush Administration’s priority attention to
the GWOT was not at the expense of major practical cooperation with ASEAN in
dealing with an array of non‐traditional security issues. The Bush Administration
initiated major multilateral programs to reinforce ASEAN’s long‐term objectives.
Despite this assistance, the Bush Administration is currently better known for its
unilateralism and initiation of the war in Iraq.
In the region, the Bush Administration left a legacy of disappointment that the
United States was not according Southeast Asia the attention it deserved. Secretary
of State Rice, it should be recalled, missed two ARF meetings. President Bush
cancelled out of a summit with ASEAN leaders to commemorate thirty years of U.S.‐
ASEAN dialogue relations. President Bush promised to make up by holding a
leaders’ meeting at his ranch in Crawford, Texas only to cancel again in response to
Burma’s crackdown on Buddhist monks. On a more positive note, in April 2008, the
United States became the first dialogue partner to appoint a non‐resident
Ambassador for ASEAN affairs.
Obama Administration
The Obama Administration has been in office for less than two years; but in his first
year as president Barrack Obama has overcome the perceived Bush legacy of neglect
towards Southeast Asia and ASEAN. In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
attended the ASEAN Post‐Ministerial Conference + US meeting in Phuket, Thailand.
On 22nd July she signed the ASEAN Treat of Amity and Cooperation and at a press
conference on the same day stressed that ‘we [the United States] are fully engaged
with our ASEAN partners on the wide range of challenges confronting us’. This was
reflected in the Revised Priorities for Cooperation under the ASEAN‐U.S. Enhanced
Partnership that was adopted at this time.
In a new initiative, Secretary Clinton met for the first time with her counterparts
from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to initiate cooperation to develop the
Lower Mekong River basin. Secretary Clinton pledged U.S. assistance in three areas:
environment, health and education. A working group on cooperation between the
Mekong River Commission and the Mississippi River Commission was set up to map
out technical cooperation in the sustainability of hydropower development, water
and food security, flood and drought mitigation, improved navigation and trade on
inland water ways, and climate change adaptation.
On 15th November 2009, President Barrack Obama cashed in the ‘rain check’ of the
previous Administration and attended the 1st ASEAN‐United States Leaders’ Meeting
in Singapore. President Obama won plaudits when he praised ASEAN for its key role
in regional affairs. The ASEAN‐U.S. Joint Statement adopted at this meeting
reaffirmed the commitment of all parties to work together to promote development
cooperation, counter‐terrorism cooperation, achievement of Millennium
Development Goals,i narrowing the development gap, research on climate impacts
and the development of appropriate mitigation policies. In addition, the ASEAN‐U.S.
Joint Statement pledged cooperation ‘to prevent and combat other transnational
crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, money laundering, arms
smuggling, sea piracy, international economic crime and cyber crime…’
In January 2010, President Obama established a U.S. Permanent Mission to ASEAN
and appointed a representative pending the appointment of resident ambassador.
In a modification of U.S. policy, the Obama Administration signaled a shift from
priority on negotiating bilateral free trade agreements to a regional approach. As
early as September 2008 the United States sought membership in the Trans Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership (widely known as the Trans Pacific Trade
Partnership).ii The Obama Administration has renewed the U.S. bid for membership
as part of a broader strategy to encourage a regional free trade regime.
On 12th January 2010, Secretary of State Clinton delivered the most authoritative
exposition of U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia in a speech delivered at the East‐
West Center in Hawaii. She underscored the centrality of ASEAN in regional affairs
but tempered her praise with a call for ASEAN to ‘work better’ to deliver practical
results. In particular, she urged the ASEAN Regional Forum to continue its practical
efforts to address humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Clinton stated, ‘the
ASEAN Regional Forum should make good on the vision laid out at our meeting in
Thailand last July for it to assume greater responsibilities for disaster relief and
humanitarian operations. And the United States stands ready to assist in facilitating
that.’
As noted above, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was a seminal event that prompted
the United States to push for greater regional cooperation to address humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. As a result of a U.S. initiative, the ASEAN Regional
Forum held its first Joint Voluntary Exercise on Disaster Relief in the Philippines in
May 2009. This was also the first time that the assets of ARF members were actually
committed to a field exercise. The ARF subsequently took note of and praised this
exercise but failed to commit itself to any specific follow up action.
The United States provided immediate humanitarian assistance to the victims of
typhoons Ketsana and Parma that struck the Philippines in the space of two weeks
in September 2009. The value of U.S. assistance for disaster relief and early recovery
was valued at U.S. $19.8 million and included; U.S. AID U.S. $5.3 million for disaster
assistance; U.S. Department of Agriculture U.S. $8.5 million in food aid; U.S.
Department of Defense U.S. $800,000 for emergency relief supplies, logistics and
transportation; and an additional U.S. $5.2 million announced by Secretary of State
for flood and storm victims.
The Obama Administration has also promoted continuity in addressing non‐
traditional security issues bilaterally through treaty allies (the Philippines and
Thailand) and prospective strategic partners, such as Indonesia.
The Philippines. As a treaty ally, the Philippines enjoys high‐level access to the
Obama Administration. In July 2009, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo visited
Washington and met with President Obama. In September 2009, Defense Secretary
Gilbert Teodoro, Jr. visited the Pentagon and met with Secretary of Defense Bill
Gates. They discussed continued U.S. assistance in counter terrorism training and
civic action. And they also discussed U.S. cooperation in assisting the Philippines to
address such non‐traditional security issues as humanitarian assistance, disaster
response, climate change, drug trafficking and maritime security. Secretary of State
Clinton visited the Philippines in November 2009 and announced new relief funds to
assist in recovery from recent typhoons.
With respect to maritime security, on 13th August 2009 the U.S. and the Philippines
reached a new counter terrorism agreement. Under this agreement the U.S. agreed
to provide funding for the installation of radars in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi Tawi to
assist the Philippines Coast Watch South Program to monitor the movements of
terrorists, pirates and smugglers.
As noted above, U.S. defence cooperation with the Philippines includes both training
in counter insurgency/counter terrorism and civic action. These military‐civil
components are routinely incorporated into annual bilateral military exercises and
involve humanitarian projects. U.S. officials estimate that U.S. Special Forces devote
80 percent of their time to community development including and construction of
school, roads, bridges, and other development assistance.
In FY 2009, the U.S. Government working in cooperation with the government of the
Philippines, the private sector civil society groups and other donors provided U.S.
$138 million in grant funds to promote ‘peace and security’. About 55% of economic
assistance was channeled to Mindanao to support programs that promoted
economic growth and conflict mitigation.
Thailand. The Obama Administration has continued funding for the wide range of
programs that assist Thailand in meeting the challenge of non‐traditional security
issues, especially in the fields of public health, counter narcotics and capacity
building. The U.S. also assists in rural development, family planning, education, and
science and technology.
U.S. AID, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Armed Forces
Research Institute of Medial Sciences cooperate closely on a range of public health
initiatives, including efforts to fight malaria, tuberculosis, dengue, HIV/AIDS, and
avian/pandemic influenza.
The United States and Thailand work closely together and with the United Nations
on a range of programs to halt illicit drug trafficking and trafficking in persons. The
U.S. supports the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, which
provides counter‐narcotics and anti‐crime capacity‐building programs to law
enforcement and judicial officials from a number of regional countries.
Currently, U.S. AID is providing U.S. $15.5 million annually to assist in the creation of
networks between the Thai National Human Rights Commission, Election
Commission,, National Corruption Commission and civil society leaders, academics
and other civic leaders to advance democratic reform and conflict mitigation with a
focus on southern Thailand.
Indonesia. Just after taking office in early 2009, Secretary of State Clinton visited
Indonesia where she and her counterpart, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, announced
that the U.S. and Indonesia would begin discussions on developing a comprehensive
partnership between the two countries. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review also
identified Indonesia (along with Malaysia and Vietnam) as a potential strategic
partner. Secretary of State Clinton singled out Indonesia again in an address to the
Council on Foreign Relations prior to attending the annual ARF ministerial meeting
in July 2009.
The Obama Administration has continued to fund U.S. AID assistance programs in
Indonesia in the fields of basic and higher education, democratic and decentralized
governance, economic growth, health, water, sanitation, and the environment.
Future programs will place a greater emphasis on energy. Currently the U.S.
provides major assistance in five areas.
The U.S. provides extensive assistance in the public health sector. U.S. AID works
with the Indonesia government, NGOs, and other partners, to address HIV/AIDS,
avian influenza, tuberculosis, and malaria. The U.S AID’s avian influenza program,
for example, funds an integrated public and private sector avian influenza
surveillance and response program.
The United States continues to assist Indonesia in addressing problems associated
with human trafficking. In 2008‐09, for example the U.S. Department of State and
Department of Labor provided more than U.S. $6 million to fund projects to prevent
trafficking in persons, protection for victims of trafficking and prosecution of
traffickers.
Under its Global Train and Equip Program, the United States provided Indonesia
with U.S. $47 million between 2006‐09 to combat smuggling, piracy and trafficking.
In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense sponsored the installation of seven
radar systems to improve maritime security throughout Indonesia including the
Malacca and Makassar Straits.
In 2009, U.S. and Indonesian armed forces co‐hosted the Garuda Shield multilateral
military exercise in Bandung. This is a training exercise focused on peace support
operations and included more than 1,000 soldiers and marines from nine countries.
The United States was one of the first responders when Indonesia was struck by an
earthquake on 30th September 2009. The U.S military was quick to provide disaster
relief and humanitarian assistance. U.S military survey teams worked closely to
coordinate with U.S. AID, the Indonesian government and local NGOs to provide
medical support, civil engineering and emergency supplies. U.S. assistance totaled
U.S. $11.4 million and included: U.S. AID U.S. $7.1 for emergency relief shelter and
settlement, water sanitation and hygiene, economic recovery and health assistance
and U.S. Department of Defense U.S. $4.3 million in medical relief and
transportation.
Finally, President Barrack Obama is scheduled to visit Indonesia after an earlier
cancellation to deal with urgent health legislation before the U.S. Congress.
Laos. The United States also assists other states in Southeast Asia to address the
challenges of non‐traditional security challenges. In 2009, for example, U.S. AID
provided U.S. $62 million for programs in health, education, governance, and
economic growth. U.S assistance to Laos includes funding for unexploded ordnance
clearance and removal, counternarcotics, health and avian influenza, education,
economic development, and governance. In FY 2008 U.S. assistance in all areas
totaled more than U.S. $18 million.
As a result of U.S. counter narcotics efforts opium production has dropped
considerably. Nevertheless, due to a marginal increase in poppy cultivation, Laos
remains on the U.S. list of major opium producers. The U.S. provides law
enforcement assistance to help Laos combat methamphetamine trafficking and
criminal activities associated with the chemical drug trade. Additional U.S.
assistance is provided to build capacity in the treatment of opium and amphetamine
addiction.
In summary, the Obama Administration has elevated the importance of U.S.
engagement with ASEAN to address non‐traditional security issues. Under President
Obama’s leadership the United States has taken part in its first meeting with ASEAN
leaders and this high‐level summit holds out the promise for a more concerted effort
to address non‐traditional security issues on a multilateral basis. Nevertheless there
has been a continuity in U.S. bilateral assistance programs with priority attention
devoted to treaty allies the Philippines and Thailand and prospective strategic
partner Indonesia.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a broad over of U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia with a
focus on non‐traditional security issues from the 1950s to the present. In the period
from 1950‐77, the U.S. addressed non‐traditional security issues through the
framework of economic development, modernization and democracy promotion.
There was a marked stress on trade and investment as the key to economic
development. The United States gave primary emphasis to bilateral assistance
programs.
In 1997 the United States and ASEAN entered into a formal dialogue relationship. In
the period from 1997‐2000, there was a marked increase in U.S. efforts to align its
assistance program with ASEAN objectives. But the U.S. resisted ‘securitizing’ non‐
traditional security issues preferring instead to address these concerns as part of
the development process. There continued to be continuity in the U.S. emphasis on
the role of trade, investment and market liberalization as a catalyst for economic
development. Finally, the U.S. continued to place primary emphasis on bilateral
assistance programs.
The first Bush Administration gave priority to the Global War on Terrorism and
designated Southeast Asia as the second front. Contrary to popular perceptions that
the Bush Administration’s war on terrorism skewed its relations with Southeast
Asia, this paper argued that both Bush Administrations initiated major multilateral
programs in cooperation with ASEAN to address non‐traditional security issues. In
particular, the U.S. aligned its assistance to accord with ASEAN’s objectives as set
out in the Vientiane Action Plan.
Finally, this paper examined U.S. policy under the Obama Administration. This
analysis noted there was a great deal of continuity in the delivery of programs
designed to address non‐traditional security challenges. At the same time, the
Obama Administration elevated U.S. engagement with ASEAN to head of state level
and repackaged its assistance programs in acknowledgement of the growth of
regionalism and ASEAN’s centrality in this process.
Bibliography
Primary.
ASEAN Regional Forum, Annual Security Outlook 2009, Jakarta.
ASEAN‐US Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism,

Brunei: August 1, 2002.
Concept Paper for the Establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
(ADMM).
Kurt M. Campbell, ‘Principles of U.S. Engagement in the Asia‐Pacific,’ Remarks before
the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2010.
Hillary Rodman Clinton, ‘Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,’
Remarks at the East‐West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 12, 2010;
Joint Statement Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity, 1st
ASEAN‐U.S. Leaders’ Meeting, Singapore, November 15, 2009.
Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN‐US Enhanced Partnership, September 12,
2005.
Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN‐U.S. Project in Human Resources

Development, 1987.
Memorandum of Understanding ASEAN‐U.S. Project in Environmental

Improvement, 1992.
United States Agency for International Development and the United States
Department of State, United States Engagement with ASEAN, 19772007: Thirty Years
of Friendship and Cooperation. 30th Anniversary ASEAN‐US Dialogue 2007.
United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington:

February 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Brunei Country Profile, December 31, 2009.
U.S. Department of State, Burma Country Profile, January 31, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Cambodia Country Profile, January 12, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Indonesia Country Profile, January 21, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Laos Country Profile, May 6, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Malaysia Country Profile, January 28, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, The Philippines Country Profile, April 19, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Singapore Country Profile, April 1, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Thailand Country Profile, January 31, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, TimorLeste Country Profile, February 12, 2010.
U.S. Department of State, Vietnam Country Profile, October 30, 2010.
Other sources.
Alice Ba ‘Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US‐Southeast Asia Policy,’

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(3), December 2009, 369‐398.
Renato Cruz de Castro, ‘The US‐Philippines Alliance: An Evolving Hedge against an
Emerging China Challenge,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(3), December 2009,
399‐423.
Ralph Emmers, ‘ASEAN and the securitization of transnational crime in Southeast
Asia,’ The Pacific Review, 16(3), September 2003, 419‐438.
Evelyn Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security
Order’, International Relations of the AsiaPacific, 8(3), 2008, 353‐377.
Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘Pax Asia‐Pacifica? East Asian Integration and Its Implications
for the United States’, The Washington Quarterly, 30 (3), 2007, 67‐77.
Kishore Mahbubani, ‘America’s Place in the Asian Century’, Current History,
107(709), 2008, 195‐200.
Derek J. Mitchell, ed., The United States and Southeast Asia: Toward a Strategy for
Enhanced Engagement. A Conference Report of the CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative.
Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2008.
Sheldon Simon, ‘U.S. Southeast Asia Relations: Burma Heats up and the U.S. Blows
Hot and Cold,’ Comparative Connections: A Quarterly EJournal on East Asian Bilateral
Relations, October 2007.
_____, ‘U.S. Southeast Asia Relations: The New ASEAN Charter Bedeviled by Burma’s
Impunity,’ Comparative Connections: A Quarterly EJournal on East Asian Bilateral
Relations, January 2008.
_____, ‘U.S. Southeast Asia Relations: U.S. Frustrated as Burma Obstructs Cyclone
Relief,’ Comparative Connections: A Quarterly EJournal on East Asian Bilateral
Relations, July 2008.
_____, ‘U.S. Southeast Asia Relations: The United States Is Back!,’ Comparative
Connections: A Quarterly EJournal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, October 2009.
_____, ‘U.S. Southeast Asia Relations: Engagement with Burma Ramps Up,’
Comparative Connections: A Quarterly EJournal on East Asian Bilateral Relations,
January 2010.
Robert G. Sutter, ‘The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia,’ Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 31(2), August 2009, 189‐216.
_____, The United States in Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,

2009.
Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘US Rapprochement with Laos and Cambodia,’ Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 32(3), forthcoming, December 2010.

i Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education;
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve
maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure
environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development.
ii The Trans Pacific Strategic and Economic Partnership is a multilateral agreement
among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Chile signed in 2005.

Thayer United States and Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Thayer United States and Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Revitalizing U.S.

Secretary Albright proposed two new environmental programs, one to address air

Environment. The U.S.‐Asia Environmental Partnership program formed the basis

Between 1979‐2002, U.S. AID provided U.S. $16.5 million in trade, investment and

In November 2006, U.S.‐ASEAN cooperation in managing non‐traditional security

ASEAN‐US Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism,

Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN‐U.S. Project in Human Resources

Memorandum of Understanding ASEAN‐U.S. Project in Environmental

United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington:

Alice Ba ‘Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US‐Southeast Asia Policy,’

_____, The United States in Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,

You might also like