Torts and An Damage Na

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO,
RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC;
and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years
of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by
petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of
the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on

the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the
then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties
to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was
filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc
was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority
had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners'
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14
December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15
January 1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to
comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties

concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said
motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of
hearing both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order
dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed
the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December
1987.
complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and

Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend
the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the
motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of
hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not
interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by
this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the
opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision
dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and
6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling
that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant.

Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the
Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical
rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of
appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and
the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend

that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to
the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child,
Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the
following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding
loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition;
conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the
case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time;
and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to
make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds

is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is
to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.
The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a
very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are
used only to help secure not override, substantial
justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of
shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of
action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the person herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis
supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not
only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and
for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities
of parents their parental authority which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for
the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court
in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising
from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our
Legislature has so elected to limit such liability
to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on
the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend
that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra-contractual liability with
certain well-defined exceptions to cases in
which moral culpability can be directly imputed to
the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and
control of one's agent or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to
the person made liable for their

conduct. 7(Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of
their minor children living with them, may be seen to be
based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil
Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to
supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying
such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an
air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's

allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after
considering the report of the Department of Social
Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency
and the evidence submitted before it, the court is
satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain,
care for, and educate the child, that the trial
custody period has been completed, and that the
best interests of the child will be promoted by the
adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered,
which shall be effective he date the original
petition was filed. The decree shall state the name
by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article
36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same
Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that

because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in
the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer
which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural

parents, except where the adopter is the spouse
of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have
been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil
Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is
the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with
the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly
insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living
in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect

may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of
the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since
they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent
with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption
shall be finally granted unless and until the
adopting parents are given by the courts a
supervised trial custody period of at least six
months to assess their adjustment and emotional
readiness for the legal union. During the period of
trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in
the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally

vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant
case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad
already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any
case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural
parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit
for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the
trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties
being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint
filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is
REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with
this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This
Decision is immediately executory.
Tamargo vs CA
Tamargo vs CA
GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners,
natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for
damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with
whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a
petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was
granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be
given retroactive effect so as to make adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against the adopted child where actual custody
was lodged with the biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of
duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental
authority which includes instructing, controlling and
disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the
shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto
was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows

that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for
the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be

given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
when they had no actual or physical custody over the
adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it
permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor
of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of
trial custody however in this case, trial custody period
either had not yet begin nor had been completed at
the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual
custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto
Petition for review was hereby granted.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and
SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL

LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or
control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the
former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with
regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall
be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,
without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents
and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For
civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same
rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is
sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the
instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their
years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While
we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families
through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at
least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial
contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof
were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us
seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated
on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following
decretal portion:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs

complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby
rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to
plaintiffs the following amounts:
chanroble s.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;

2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed." 1

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that
respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong
who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from
which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18
and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also
died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann
broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him
to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of
January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of
Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7
to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem
streets of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the
contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from
their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports,
documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter,
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed
over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended
that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells
death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby
avoid identification.
chanrobles.com :cralaw:re d
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No.
R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered

dismissing plaintiffs complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient
merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside
and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees
who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for
resolution the following issues in this case:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in

accordance with established decisional laws; and
Wendells hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.
cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on

the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to
be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record
of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes,
the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the
stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was
dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the
8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said
body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which
he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact,
on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the
wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the
head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair
or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are
general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct
examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly

interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious
liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police
Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on
some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound
was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue
emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder
or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It
should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance
to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide
or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of
contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance
wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of
deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor,
considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours
from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not
categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at
the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will
also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin
test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that
there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from
these guns because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless,

those indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the
gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a
smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that
you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the
trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact
that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim
himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above
the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on
your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the

trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the
manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7
WITNESS:
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at
the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie
Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared
by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9
shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the
right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr.
Cerna states:
ATTY. SENINING:
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion

collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward,
located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5
cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward,
upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a
punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial
cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues,
fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound,
irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0
cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus.
chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com :chanrobles.com.ph
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the

gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging,
singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound
of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are
absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was
made of record, thus:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the
wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to
the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi
to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by

extending his right arm almost straight towards his head." 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to
the testimonies of defendants witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique
Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from
the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the
Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person
at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where
she was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment;
that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs
and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas
station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to
the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone
lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told
him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of
the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone
regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house
with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiongs
house; and he further gave the following answers to these
questions:
chanroble s.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiongs in relation to your
house?
WITNESS:
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a

key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag,
all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their
son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on
that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16
We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a
family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have
gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of
his mother where the other key was.
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court

that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy
of the witnesses observations, since the visual perceptions of both
were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to
the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness
Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction
that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann
Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the
fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the
first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another
shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the
police station to report the incident. 15 Manolos direct and candid
testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia
Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate
of the Gotiong house.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent

and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son,
despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the
time of Wendells death that they allegedly discovered that he was a
CANU agent and that Cresencios gun was missing from the safety
deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as
being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what
clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession
of that firearm.
We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated

pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It
is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any
suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged
"John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial courts dubious theory that
Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming
evidence testimonial, documentary and pictorial the confluence of
which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being
revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding

petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion,
respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the
part of petitioners and had this to say:
A From upstairs in my living room.

ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:
chanrobles.com :cralaw:re d
Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a

good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the
crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence
on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children
who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace
of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising
the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his
reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which provides:
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in
their company.
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having

access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box,
defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural
consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has
been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of
which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961,
3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:
had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners
should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from
all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this
opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor
on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor

children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of
their minor children who acted with discernment is determined under
the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. (3
SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees,
Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said
gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that
said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when
Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said
gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong;
also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car,
in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ."
chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court

holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein
plaintiffs-appellants complaint because as preponderantly shown by
evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son
from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendantsappellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not
regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned
that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners,

respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly
holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by
their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same
case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary
liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted
passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring
for purposes of the discussion hereunder.
chanroble s law library
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the
parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look
considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which
warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings
that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their
minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor
be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the
other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct
and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their
minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said
code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and
the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not
subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that"
(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damages."
cralaw virtua1aw library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies
committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.

x
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil

liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or
by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their
legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under
the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes
committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and
also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part,
that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for
such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both
codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond
with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of
the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article
2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has
no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his
own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall
be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent
provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority,

legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . .
minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor

children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has,
aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number
of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22
Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al.
v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26

Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the
civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and
also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations are not
covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this
Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the
reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore
enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would
apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in
the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents
would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal
intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances
resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Courts determination of
whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or
quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double
homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action
arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and
severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good
father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary
liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the
parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated
homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code
providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for
damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but
less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time,
disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as
already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but
supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries
committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the
mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for
damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the
son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled
with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son,
"although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a
matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for
subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the
compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations
engaged in industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories
for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its
decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that
Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful
scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its
decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to
Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of
"subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not specifically
appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing
therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in
said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise:
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the
basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of
the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under
Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or
negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the
reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the
minors criminal responsibility is of no moment."
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the

parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it
is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on
the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and,
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who
acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age,
such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be

effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32
However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong
was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the
premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said
petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris
familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, Jr., JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Davide, Jr., J., took no part. I used to be counsel of one of the parties.
Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., took no part.
CASE DIGEST !
Libi vs IAC
FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart
until the former broke up with the latter after she
found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic.
Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by
Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day,
there were found dead from a single gunshot wound
each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie
herein private respondents filed a civil case against
the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such
damages.
HELD :The subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed under Art
2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal
Code covered obligations arising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the
civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their
minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that
responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove
that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. However, Wendells mother
testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in
a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.
Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise
admitted that during the incident, the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not
have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left
negligently lying around and that he has free access of
the mothers bag where the key was kept. The
spouses failed to observe and exercise the required
diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.
Torts And Damages Case Digest:

Valenzuela V. CA (1996)
G.R.No. 115024 February 7, 1996
Lessons Applicable:
Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)
Factors in Determining Amount (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant
at Araneta avenue towards the direction of Manila, Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so
she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away,
place her emergency lights and seeked help
She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
While she was pointing her tools to the man who will
help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by
another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who
was intoxicated and she slammed accross his
windshield and fell to the ground
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an

establishment located just across the scene of the
accident: Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very
near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast
speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days

and her leg was amputated and was replaced with an
artificial one.
ISSUE:
Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php

(confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory

negligence - NO
RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for

damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer,
jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to
Article 2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the
stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La
Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June
24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits
of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990
until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month,
for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in
moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary
damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorneys fees and
costs.
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer

should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked
at the side but absolved Li's employer
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the
wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting
the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his
brakes at the proper time and distance
it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to

the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the oncoming car since there is plenty of space for both cars,
since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane
going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also
on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection
emergency rule
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless
the emergency was brought by his own negligence
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or
alley where she would likely find no one to help her
She stopped at a lighted place where there were
people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to
solicit help if needed
she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away,
behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds
the master liable for acts of the servant (must be in
the course of business), but that of pater familias, in
which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer,
for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer
has exercised diligent supervision of its employee
during the performance of the latters assigned tasks
would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed
by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.
situation is of a different character, involving a
practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the
road on the night of the accident because he was
coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously selfserving. Assuming he really came from his
officemates place, the same could give rise to
speculation that he and his officemate had just been
from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to

our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li
4. YES.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this
Courts discretion, we are of the opinion that the
amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is
in greater accord with the extent and nature of the
injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by
Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent driving
of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of
the accident.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent
and lasting, it would also be permanently changing
and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her
body would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will require
corresponding adjustive physical and occupational
therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been
documented, are painful
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115024. February 7, 1996]
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS,
RICHARD
LI
and
ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 117944. February 7, 1996]
RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.

LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early
morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are
succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for

serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiffs version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in
the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from
her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza
Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora
Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the
direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire
and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people

present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach
her home in that cars condition, she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the
car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at
the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man
who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by
a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed,
and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of
her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of
the body. She was brought to
the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to
have a traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee). She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and
was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the
hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial
leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car
insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the
amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting
to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on
his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was
raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was
light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of
the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta
Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A.
Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite
direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright lights. Temporarily
blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding
with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiffs car, which he
did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no
parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly
lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of
plaintiffs car was protruding as it was then at a standstill
diagonally on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta
Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of
plaintiffs witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff
swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff
was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the
vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars
involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiffs car was near
the sidewalk; this witness did not remember whether the hazard
lights of plaintiffs car were on, and did not notice if there was an
early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of
Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
mostly dark, i.e. things can be seen (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after
plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk
compartment, defendants car came approaching very fast ten
meters from the scene; the car was zigzagging. The rear left side
of plaintiffs car was bumped by the front right portion of
defendants car; as a consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved to
the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
thrown to the windshield of defendants car, which was
destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that defendant
was under the influence of liquor as he could smell it very well

(pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs submissions and
found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise
held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally
liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants
to jointly and severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the

miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her severed
left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because
of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3)
weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a
month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La
Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this
judgment; and (c) P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in
plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of
this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorneys fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial courts decision, defendants filed an
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing
testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li),
tending to show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of
glass/debris from the parties cars, appeared to be at the center of the

right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants
forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a
Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that
there was ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial courts
finding that the plaintiffs car was properly parked at the right, beside
the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendants car.[1]Dismissing the
defendants argument that the plaintiffs car was improperly parked,
almost at the center of the road, the respondent court noted that
evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was at or near
center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.
[2]
The respondent court furthermore observed that:
Defendant Lis testimony that he was driving at a safe speed

of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was in
fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he
was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A.
Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his
attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the
plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk
compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li approaching very
fast ten (10) meters away from the scene; defendants car was
zigzagging, although there were no holes and hazards on the
street, and bumped the leg of the plaintiff who was thrown
against the windshield of defendants car, causing its destruction.
He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out from
under defendants car and was able to say hurting words to
Richard Li because he noticed that the latter was under the
influence of liquor, because he could smell it very well (p. 36, et.
seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a
beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970s, but did not know either
plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its
decision, however, absolved the Lis employer, Alexander Commercial,
Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and

reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding
justification for exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an
award of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorneys fees
and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the
defendants counterclaims.[3]
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent courts decision
by filing two separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R.
No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages
because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuelas own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event
that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to be
mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
assails the respondent courts decision insofar as it absolves Alexander
Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by
Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral
damages awarded by the trial court.[4]
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby
consolidated. It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R.
No. 117944 raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect,
attempts to have this Court review are factual findings of the trial court,
as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly
negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in
the early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a
general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such
factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is
based on a misapprehension of facts.[5]
In the first place, Valenzuelas version of the incident was fully
corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the
owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of
the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven
at a very fast speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta
Avenue.[6] Rodriguez further added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of the
accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the
windshield of the defendants Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she
eventually fell under the defendants car. Spontaneously reacting to the
incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking with the
smell of liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle in order to
survey the incident.[7] Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he
observed Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk,
[8]
contrary to Lis allegation that Valenzuelas car was close to the center
of the right lane. We agree that as between Lis self-serving
asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not even know
the accident victim personally and who immediately gave a statement
of the incident similar to his testimony to the investigator immediately
after the incident, the latters testimony deserves greater weight. As the
court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of

the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial courts
reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendants
assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez
drives only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not
necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination
and no attempt was made to question his competence or the
accuracy of his statement that defendant was driving very fast.
This was the same statement he gave to the police investigator
after the incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. P). We see
no compelling basis for disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez testimony are not
borne out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez
testified that the scene of the accident was across the street
where his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away
(pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the accident
transpired immediately in front of his establishment. The
ownership of the Lambingan sa Kambingan is not material; the
business is registered in the name of his mother, but he
explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn., June 20,

1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side of Aurora
Boulevard were on the night the accident transpired (p. 8) is not
necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was
a streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman
Street (p. 45, tsn., Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that

there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has
stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the
accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn., June 17, 1991). This was
consistent with plaintiffs testimony that it was no longer raining
when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn., April 29, 1991). It
was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an
attempt to explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p.
11, tsn., Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it
was raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to a
telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10,
tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies in
Rodriguezs testimony that would impair the essential integrity of
his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to
affirm the trial courts acceptance of the testimony of said
eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note
that Lis testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies leading
us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely adroitly
crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which would
exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against
Valenzuelas corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed
up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course of
trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when
out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him,
which was (the) plaintiffs car. He alleged that upon seeing this sudden
apparition he put on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery. [9]
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Lis
disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The
average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty
applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given
a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a
principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would
have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if
he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving
exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological fight or
flight[10] mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not
dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. [11] Lis failure to
react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could
therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1)
that he was driving at a very fast speed as testified by Rodriquez; and 2)
that he was under the influence of alcohol. [12] Either factor working
independently would have diminished his responsiveness to
road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to
reaching Valenzuelas car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with
approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan

Police immediately after the incident, he said that while driving
along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer
right in front of him, which was plaintiffs car, indicating, again,
thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of his
surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was not,
then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the
parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk
which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully
bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the left rear
edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police,

he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiffs car in front of
him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes
to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed,
running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have easily
completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the
plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery.
Verily, since, if, indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at
only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and
slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the plaintiff by the
mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and
distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his
testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police
immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more
believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes, but simply
swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with
glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid
it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the
car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside
the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve a
little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the oncoming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane
avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and
there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running
at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming car
was also on its right lane going to Cubao.
[13]
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his

company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to
determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of
contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard,

which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty
of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. [14] Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to
which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed
for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an
actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no
such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when
placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the
same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. [15] Under
the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court of Appeals,
[16]
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence.[17]
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a
vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two
children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc Kee vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[18] that the driver therein, Jose Koh,
adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting
the children. Using the emergency rule the court concluded that Koh,
in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with
an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence. [19]
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an

individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness
of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the overall nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at
a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a
hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous
for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the
entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the
hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion
of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire.
To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did what
was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court:
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify

whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having
been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat
and that she cannot reach her home she parked along the
sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car. In
fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator
on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuelas car was
parked very close to the sidewalk. The sketch which he
prepared after the incident showed Valenzuelas car partly
straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from
motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact
was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.
[20]
[21]
[22]
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the

standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities.
The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable
was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. Negligence, as it
is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others.[23] It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. [24] We stressed, in Corliss vs.
Manila Railroad Company,[25] that negligence is the want of care
required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the
court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving
his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast
speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a
drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial
evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor.
Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Prosser
and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an

automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at
intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be
required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his
failure to act properly when they appear may be found to
amount to negligence.
[26]
Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation

confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his own
making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Lis employer. In denying liability on the part of
Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Lis testimony, that the

visit was in connection with official matters. His functions as
assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work
outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company clients,
but he admitted that on the night of the accident he came from
BF Homes Paraaque he did not have business from the company
(pp. 25-26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). The use ofthe company car was
partly required by the nature of his work, but the privilege of
using it for non-official business is a benefit, apparently referring
to the fringe benefits attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis
of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the relationship
of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant
(Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred
while an employee was in the actual performance of his assigned
tasks or duties (Francis High School vs.Court of Appeals, 194
SCRA 341). In defining an employers liability for the acts done
within the scope of the employees assigned tasks, the Supreme
Court has held that this includes any act done by an employee,
in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account
of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon
its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and
beneficial to their employer (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial courts
finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the company
to use the company car either officially or socially or even bring

it home, he can be considered as using the company car in the
service of his employer or on the occasion of his functions.
Driving the company car was not among his functions as
assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes would
appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his
position. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a showing
that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of
the employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no
evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of the companys business or
its interests, or at least for its benefit. The imposition of solidary
liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation
must therefore fail.
[27]
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in

question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which
holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point,
however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing
the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code,[28] we are of the opinion that Lis employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused
by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of
Appeals upon which respondent court has placed undue reliance,
dealt with the subject of a school and its teachers supervision of
students during an extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under
the provision on special parental authority found in Art. 218 of the
Family Code which generally encompasses all authorized school
activities, whether inside or outside school premises.
[29]
Second, the employers primary liability under the concept of

pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the
Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His liability is
relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once
evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the
required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employers
burden
is
overcome.
The
question
of
diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of
employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has
exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance
of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the
liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either
the employees private activities or during the performance of tasks
either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employees tasks.
The case at bench presents a situation of a different character,
involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of
their employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either
wholly owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to
various plans through which employees eventually acquire their
vehicles after a given period of service, or after paying a token amount.
Many companies provide liberal car plans to enable their managerial or
other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of
vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to purchase on
their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and
maintains the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to the
employee; in the second example, the car is really owned and
maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such
employees, are companies totally absolved of responsibility when an
accident involving a company-issued car occurs during private use
after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars

under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their
agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company maintenance)
to their representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family,
they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the
employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company
car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to
himself, the company or to others. When a company gives full use and
enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that
it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the
privilege reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are
given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies
other than those cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the
privilege serves important business purposes either related to the
image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the
public in general, or for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its
managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach
clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car serves
both purposes. Since important business transactions and decisions
may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of
guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company
and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales
agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or
for the purpose of furthering the companys image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other
employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company
issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted
that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to
scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often
to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and
contacting and meeting with company clients. [30] These meetings,
clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a
managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company

with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as workrelated functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander
Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation
- to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latters
goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and
its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the
night of the accident because he was coming from a social visit with an
officemate in Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never
corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving.
Assuming he really came from his officemates place, the same could
give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a
work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other
work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our
satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made
as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to
whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. [31] Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company,
based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages
awarded by the respondent court, except as to the amount of moral
damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said damages are not
intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the
award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.
In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral
damages from an amount of P 1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the
Court of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the
resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a

traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh
just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be
deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even
with the use of state of the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the
period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be
required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and
months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy.
During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and
re-adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the
biological changes of middle-age, menopause and aging. Assuming she
reaches menopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to be
adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate
decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones of all postmenopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her would
not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body
wouldnormally undergo through the years. The replacements,
changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive
physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has
been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the
nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly speculative
to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which
goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A
prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a
reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of
the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant
anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain
are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts
discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00
granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature
of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a
result of Lis grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the

early morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the
court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vitug., J., see concurring opinion.
[1]
Rollo, p. 31.
[2]
Id.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 45-47.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 5-22.
[5]
De la Serna vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 325.
[6]
Rollo, p. 37.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[8]
Rollo, p. 31.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
The body releases catecholamines in response to alerting or threatening conditions

(called fight or flight conditions by physiologists) rendering the individual, through his
reflexes, senses and other alerting mechanisms responsive to these conditions. Alcohol,
drugs, illness, exhaustion and drowsiness dull these normal bodily responses. BEST
AND TAYLOR, PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, 81 (1993).
[10]
[11]
Id.,
There is no allegation on record that the blood alcohol levels of petitioner Li were
taken by the police. As this was a lapse on the part of the investigators, not petitioner
Valenzuela, Rodriguezs testimony as to the fact that Li was smelling of alcohol should
have been given greater weight by the courts below.
[12]
[13]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
KEETON AND DOBBS, ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS, 451, (1984) citing
SECOND RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Sec. 463.
[14]
[15]
Elmore v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 224 N.W. 28 (1929).
[16]
165 SCRA 378 (1988) cf. Siegl vs. Watson, 195 NW 867.
[17]
Id.
[18]
211 SCRA 517 (1992).
[19]
Id., at 540.
[20]
Rollo, p. 37.
[21]
Rollo, p. 31.
[22]
Id.
[23]
KEATON, supra, note 14.
[24]
McKee, supra, note 17, at 539, citing 3 COOLEY ON TORTS, 265 (Fourth Ed.)
[25]
27 SCRA 674 (1969).
KEATON supra. note 14, at 197, citing Stanek v. Sweizerk, 201 Neb., 357 (1981);
Lutz v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 70 Wis 2d 743 (1975); Potts v. Krey, 362 S.W. 2d 726
(1975); Ennis v. Dupree, 128 SE. 2d 231 (1962).
[26]
[27]
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[28]
The provision reads:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable, not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprises in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees and house helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task properly pertains, in
which case what is provided by Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, as long as they remain in their
custody.
The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
proved that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
[29]
194 SCRA 241 (1991).
[30]
Rollo, p. 36.
case making defendant therein, now appellant Agapito Fuellas,

liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for the following
damages:
For medicine, etc.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
P1,000.00
For moral damages
6,000.00
As exemplary damages
2,000.00
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14409
October 31, 1961
AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner,

vs.
ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Feliciano C. Tumale and Roberto R. Reverente
for petitioner.
Valerio V. Rovira for respondents.
As attorney's fees
Total
600.00
P9,600.00
PAREDES, J.:
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano, son of
plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, two separate actions were
instituted, Civil Case No. 583, filed on October 1, 1954, for
damages against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico
Fuellas, who caused the injuries, and Criminal Case No. 1765,
against Rico Fuellas, filed on November 11, 1954, for serious
physical injuries. They were tried jointly. On May 18, 1956, a
judgment of conviction in the criminal case was rendered, finding
Rico Fuellas guilty of the offense charged. No pronouncement as
to his civil liability was made, the trial judge having ruled that the
same "shall be determined in Civil Case No. 583 of this Court."
On May 25, 1956, the same court, rendered judgment in the civil
with 6% annual interest thereon until paid. The Court of Appeals

modified the judgment by reducing the moral damages to
P3,000.00. An appeal was taken to this tribunal solely on
questions of law.
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant
Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954.
They were classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City.
In the afternoon of September 16, 1954, while Pepito was
studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one
Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of
Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was
Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who
held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a
teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home.
Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just
gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an
angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake
hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the
proffer to shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his
leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground.
Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body,
whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such
position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is broken." Rico then
got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to go home.
That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General
Hospital for treatment (Exh. 4). An X-Ray taken showed that there
was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right
forearm which necessitated plaster casting (Exhs. A, B and D).
On November 20, 1954, more than a month after Pepito's release
from the hospital, the plaster cast was removed. And up to the
last day of hearing of the case, the right forearm of Pepito was
seen to be shorter than the left forearm, still in bandage and could
not be fully used.
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the
deliberate injury caused by his son; that the said court held the
petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in
connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according to the
last article, the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or
negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or negligence
on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate
intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the
existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act
negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission.
Appellant, therefore, submits that the appellate Court erred in
holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of
his minor son.
The above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code states:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter. (Article 2176)
The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
xxx
xxx
xxx (Article 2180).
In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado, G.R. No. L-11394, prom.

September 9, 1958, Benjamin Araneta was talking with other
students of the Ateneo de Manila, seated atop a low ruined wall.
Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass
by. The boys twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling
in the De la Salle College. Arreglado, resenting the banter, pulled
a Japanese luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan
Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw.
Dario was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty. But
in view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the Court
suspended the proceedings (Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code).
Thereafter, action was instituted by Araneta and his father against
Juan Arreglado, his wife and their son Dario to recover material,
moral and exemplary damages. The Court of First Instance
sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as damages and
attorney's fees. The Aranetas appealed in view of the meager
amount of indemnity awarded. This tribunal affirmed the decision
but increased the indemnity to P18,000.00. This decision was
predicated upon the fact that Arreglado's father had acted

negligently in allowing his son to have access to the pistol used to
injure Benjamin. And this was the logical consequence of the
case, considering the fact that the civil law liability under Article
2180 is not respondeat superior but the relationship of pater
familias which bases the liability of the father ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his minor son (Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison, 55 Phil. 23), and that if an injury is caused by
the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law presumes that
there was negligence on the part of his father (Bahia vs. Litonjua
y Leynes, 30 Phil., 625).
In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., G.R. No. L-10132,
prom. June 29, 1957), holding the defendants jointly and
severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages, arising
from the criminal act committed by the latter, this tribunal gave the
following reasons for the rule:
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who
live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them in proportion to their means", while on the
other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil
Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code). This, defendants failed to prove.
And a noted Spanish commentator said:
Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to
govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents
and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance

over the acts of their children and wards in order that
damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of
foresight or discernment of such children and wards may
be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply
with this duty, they should suffer the consequences of
their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage
caused" (12 Manresa, 649-650). (See also Arts. 311 and
316, Civil Code).
It is further argued that the only way by which a father can be
made responsible for the criminal act of his son committed with
deliberate intent and with discernment, is an action based on the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of the
parents; that the minor Fuellas having been convicted of serious
physical injuries at the age of 13, the provisions of par. 3 of Art.
12, Revised Penal Code, could have been applied, but having
acted with discernment, Art. 101 of the same Code can not
include him. And as par. 2, of Art. 101, states that "the exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6
of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Art. 11 of this Code does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
subject to the following rules: First, in cases of subdivisions 1, 2
and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an
imbecile or insane person and by a person under nine years of
age or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part," the appellant
concluded that this provision covers only a situation where a
minor under 15 but over 9 years old commits a criminal act
"without discernment."
In the recent case of Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, G.R.
No. L-14414, April 27, 1960; 57 Off. Gaz. No. 37, p. 6603,
September 11, 1961, the defendant Balce was the father of a
minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who was living
with him. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having
killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court

rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating that the civil
liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal
liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In
reversing the decision, this tribunal held:
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a
father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his
son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9
years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is
no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son
who commits the act under any of those conditions is by
law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions
1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave
the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil
liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under
his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability,
for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that
case, resort should be had to the general law which is our
Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180,
the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company." To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with
criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular

provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some
recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or
identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals
on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties,
independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or
negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the
present case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal
Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law
as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor's criminal
responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on

Court that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties

complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

the person made liable for their

therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural

shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally

was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be

1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs

1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;

However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed." 1

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered

1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on

2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless,

A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by

"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14

box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent

We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A From upstairs in my living room.

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a

"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having

had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners,

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil

"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority,

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor

v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be

Torts And Damages Case Digest:

She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon

Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated