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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

Author(s): CLAUDIA CARD


Source: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March, 2007), pp. 1-29
Published by: Springer
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CLAUDIA CARD

RECOGNIZING TERRORISM
(Received and accepted 6 September 2006)

It has been claimed thatmost of theworld's preventable sufferingand


ABSTRACT.
death are caused not by terrorismbut by poverty.That claim, if true,could be hard
to substantiate. For most terrorismis not publicly recognized as such, and it is far
commoner than paradigms of the usual suspects suggest. Everyday lives under
oppressive

in racist

regimes,

environments,

and

of women,

and

children,

elders

everywherewho sufferviolence in their homes offer instances of terrorisms that


seldom capture public attention. Or so this essay argues, through exploring two
models of terrorismand the points of view highlighted by each.
KEY WORDS:

9/11, coercion model, criminal violence, domestic violence, group


targetmodel, just war theory, poverty, rape, John Rawls, reflectiveequilibrium,
stalking, terroristregimes,Michael Walzer, war, Carl Wellman

It has been observed that "most of the preventable sufferingand


death in theworld is not caused by terrorism"but "bymalnutrition,
and lack of education, and all the ills connected to poverty."1That
claim, if true,could be difficultto substantiate.For most terrorismis
as such, and

not documented
the usual
in racist

suspects

it is far commoner
lives under

suggest. Everyday
and of women,

children,

environments,

of

than paradigms

oppressive
regimes,
and elders every

where who sufferviolence in their homes seldom capture public


attention

lives. A
domestic

as high drama.

But

there is real terrorism

inmany

of these

genuine war on terrorismmight well begin with such


But

issues.

first it is necessary

to be

to recognize

able

terrorism.

To recognize terrorismin the everyday lives of people who may

never make

headlines,

and at the same

time deepen

our appreciation

of terrorisminmore high-profilecases, it is helpful to be able to


identify imaginativelywith not only potential targets but also

1
Martha

Nussbaum,

"Compassion

and

Terror,"

in James

P.

Sterba

(ed.),

Terrorism and InternationalJustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 248.


The Journal of Ethics
DOI

(2007)

11:1-29

? Springer2006

10.1007/S10892-006-9008-X

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CLAUDIA CARD

2
In

terrorists.

potential

an

early

essay

on method,

John Rawls

included inhis definitionof a "competentmoral judge" the capacity


to identifywith persons in a variety of positions.2 Identifyingwith

others
mean

does

being

not mean

favorably

endorsing
disposed

It does
their judgments.
them. It means
toward

not

even

entering

imaginativelyinto theirsituations,which can yield a livelierand truer


of their perceptions,

appreciation
motives.

feelings,

options,

reasoning,

and

My aim in adopting this strategyof identificationis to justifyan


expanded range of paradigms of terrorismthat isnot limitedto high
profile cases and to do thiswithout diluting themoral seriousness of
the concept. The importanceof thisproject is twofold.On one hand,
we gain greater insight intowhat is distinctive about terrorismand
what kind ofmoral significanceithas. On the other,we realize that
many

cases

seriously as

governments

of publicly

invisible

terrorism

deserve

to be

the widely recognized high-profile cases

and other public

taken

as

involving

policy-makers.

I neither begin nor conclude this project with a definition of


in the sense of a set of necessary

terrorism

and

sufficient conditions.

Nor do I take a finalposition on whether terrorismis ever justifiable.


The conception of terrorism that emerges from this investigation
suggests,

however,

that for the relatively

powerless

oppressed,

and

especially for thosewho are coerced into a relationship fromwhich


they cannot

extricate

themselves

by

ordinary

lawful means,

the

question of justification is a serious one, and its answer is not


obvious.

Terrorism's
resemblance

varied history and uses invite a Wittgensteinian


family
to itsmeaning,
developed with something like
approach

a Nietzschean perspectivism.3Accordingly, I begin with twomodels


of terrorismthatfithigh-profileparadigms. Let us call them the "the
coercion

appealed

the "group
Each model
has
target model."
to philosophers.
Each
emerges from important histories.

model"

and

John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (ed.), (Cambridge: Harvard


Press, 1999), pp. 2-3.
University
3
See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe
(trans.) (London: Blackwell, 1958), pp. 31-33 on "family resemblance;" see Friedrich
Nietzsche, On theGenealogy ofMorals, inWalter Kaufmann (trans.) Basic Writings
ofNietzsche, (New York: Modern Library, 1966), pp. 460-492, for illustrationof
Nietzsche's perspectivism in his speculations regarding thenoble and slavemodes of
valuation.

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recognizing

terrorism

Even if,ultimately,one model might absorb theother,both are useful


in that theyencourage identification
with differentparties.

of Terrorism

1. Two Models

One testof a satisfactoryconception of terrorismiswhether itmakes


sense of a wide range of paradigm instances.A paradigm is an
instance

that

informed and
relevantly
instance, a non-controversial

an

thinkers, indisputably
need be no consensus
whether

to

appears,

on what makes

it is. Like Rawls'

judgments
about which we are most

think we know

case.4 There

something an instance, only on


moral
these non
judgments,"

are firm but also

controversial
are cases

"considered

clear-headed

r?visable.5

confident

Our

now, based

paradigms
on what we

now.

Another testof a satisfactoryconception iswhether it enables us


to recognize instances we had failed to appreciate before ant?
understand why we should have. Something like Rawls' idea of
"reflectiveequilibrium,"which he applies tomoral theory,can apply
to more

and political
such as terrorism.6
concepts,
specific moral
a
we
to
at
arrive
Thus,
may go back and
satisfactory conception,
an
forth between
abstract
and paradigm
cases, now
conception

revisingtheconception, now rejectingormodifying old paradigms or


new ones. A

admitting

sense of a
conception will make
us
see
instances
that
cases, help

satisfactory
of uncontroversial

significant body
are not so widely recognized,
and provide
and borderline ones.
controversial

bases

for arguing

about

Think of a model as a blueprint for a definitionor conception, an


abstraction that highlights elements or relationships in what it
models. Different models suggest differentways to conceive of
terrorism by encouraging

us

to approach

it from different perspec

tives. The coercion model highlights elements that suggest the


who may not appreciate fully the impact on
projects of terrorists,
in contrast, highlights elements that
group target model,
the perceptions
of victims, who may not fully appreciate

victims. The
suggest
4

This is the sense of "paradigm" thatEric Reitan employs inhis insightfulpaper,


"Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept," Hypatia 16 (2001), pp. 43-66.
5

See Rawls,

Collected

Papers,

pp.

5-6

on

"considered

moral

judgments."

See Rawls' discussion of "reflective equilibrium" in John Rawls, A Theory of


Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 18-19
and

elsewhere.

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CLAUDIA CARD

4
intentions.

terrorists'

Each

model

is limited. Yet

each

also

points

beyond its limits.


The coercion model was persuasively developed by Carl Wellman
nearly threedecades ago.7 It focuses on the logic of terrorism,how
the terroristthinks,what the terroristhopes to achieve. Ultimately, it
encourages inquiry intowhy such drasticmeans would be chosen to
achieve those objectives. On thismodel, terrorismtypicallyhas two
targets. One

target is direct but secondary

in importance.

The

indirect

target is primary in that it is the intended recipient of a message


which

the terrorist's demands,

containing

are sent by way

of violence

(or the threatof violence) to the direct target.Direct targetscan be


people, property, or both. An example captured by thismodel is
bombing a public building (directbut secondary target) to pressure a
government (indirectbut primary target) to release prisoners or alter
The message,

policies.

often

is "accede

implicit,

to our demands,

or

therewill be furtherbombings." The building and any occupants may

be

as

Their
survival may
"throwaways."
the terrorist's objective,
whereas
target can be essential to that end.

treated

achievement
primary

of

not matter

survival

of

to

the

Other examples, arguably captured by thecoercionmodel, include


hostage-taking (Munich, 1972), kidnap for ransom (the Lindbergh
baby), airplane hijackings (or car-jackings), some forms of witness
intimidation,some forms of extortionpracticed by organized crime
(the Godfather's

"offers one cannot

refuse"

and

the horse-beheading

response to a man who thoughthe could),8 some drive-by shootings


by inner city gangs, and cross-burnings by the Ku Klux Klan.

Wellman

gives armed

hold-ups

as an example

of terrorist coercion.

But that example requires a littletamperingwith themodel, since the


same person

is ordinarily

both

the primary

and

secondary

target, a

matter towhich I return.Likewise, hijacking methods are typically


coercive

(armed hold-ups),
further coercion.

even

if the plane

or vehicle

is not used

for

A shortcomingof the coercion model is that it restrictsterrorist


objectives to coercion to comply with demands. But the same basic
pattern

characteristic

of

the coercion

(direct and indirect) and a message

model,

namely,

two

targets

(to the indirect but primary

Carl Wellman, "On Terrorism Itself," Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (1978),


pp. 250-258. This a model I have relied on and found useful in the past.
8
See Mario Puzo, The Godfather (New York: New American Library, 1978) or
The Godfather, 1973 Paramount, Frances Ford Coppola, (dir.), (Volume 1,DVD
2004).

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TERRORISM

RECOGNIZING

target), is compatible with objectives other than coercion and


messages other than demands. Other objectives might be, for
those of demonstration,

example,

protest*

revenge, or disruption.

Actions of partisans and of resistance fighters inWorld War II,


such as bombing trainsheaded forPoland, are often cited in raising
thequestion whether terrorismcan be justified.9Such actions appear
not to fit the coercionmodel in that theydo not present theprimary
targetwith a demand or offera choice. Still, they sendmessages: to
the Allies,

"watch

to Nazis,

these trains" and

"we will not just stand

by but will do all inour power to stop you," an urgentmessage in the


contextofwidespread acquiescence toNazi policies. The pattern of a
and indirect target and a message
remains, even if coercion
an
out.
not
Coercion
be
for
those extremely lacking
may
drops
option
in power. But some can still use terrorist means
to send messages.
direct

Not only iscoercive terrorismlimitedto thosewith enough power to

coerce,

but

also

it carries

certain

risks for the terrorist. As

with

interrogationaltorture, it is possible to go too far and defeat one's


purposes. The primary targetmay be too devastated by harm to the
direct target to care about themessage or may be unable to comply

a
may not get across successfully. When
to be none. But that
fails to get across,
there may appear
message
our
ahead
of
how targets may
gets
story, anticipating
conjecture
with demands.

Or

themessage

perceive matters.

In presenting the coercion model, Wellman did not defend


terrorism.Yet itmay be no accident that he found thatmodel apt
in the 1970s. Popular paradigms of terrorism in the U.S. then
included an array of morally and politically motivated non-lethal
violent crimes (mainlyproperty destruction) committedby otherwise
ordinary citizens, some fromwell-off and highly respected families.10
These crimes ranged from bombings by members of theWeather

to "monkey-wrenching"
Underground
as
(such
sabotage of off-road vehicles

natural habitats).11 Many


9
pp.

See,

for example,

R. M.

Hare,

activists
by environmental
used in projects destructive of

sent clear demands to stop specific

"Terrorism,"

Journal

of Value

Inquiry

13 (1978),

241-249.

10

Susan Braudy, Family Circle: The Boudins and theAristocracy of theLeft (New
York: Knopf, 2003) details the career and background ofKathy Braudy, member of
theWeather Underground, who eventually served twenty-twoand a half years in
for complicity in a bank hold-up.
prison
11
See Edward Abbey, The Monkey Wrench Gang (Philadelphia: Lippincott,
1975).

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CLAUDIA CARD

activities.Their objectives evoked some sympathyfrom social critics


on the left.12
If the coercion model gets us to focus on terroristreasoning, the
in contrast,

target model,

group

gets

us

to

focus

on

target

predicaments. The group targetmodel appears to be at work in


Michael Walzer's widely cited chapter on terrorism in Just and
Unjust WarsP Although Walzer describes terrorist violence as
targetingvictims randomly ("its method is the random murder of
innocent

within

people"),
group,

what
as

to have inmind
he appears
is randomness
as "the
he also
characterizes
terrorism

systematic terrorizingof whole populations"


of a nation

the morale

or a class."14

in order "to destroy


is a primary

there

Again

target,often less obvious than the immediate (direct) targets.The

primary target here is a group, a "class," which


be racial, ethnic, or religious, not only national.

presumably
Immediate

might
targets

appear (at least, tomembers of the target group) to be randomly


chosen members of the group, vulnerable not for theirconduct (in
that sense "innocent") but simply on account of their identityas

members

of the group.

Immediate

targets could

also

or

be persons

property presumed to be of value to the group, targeted for that


reason.

The

apparent

objective

is to hurt

the group

(demoraliza

tion, as Walzer puts it); harm to immediate targets is part of or a

means

so understood

to that end. Terrorism

fits what

come

have

to be (long sinceWalzer's book appeared) common definitions of


hate crime, according to which victims are selected at least partly
on the basis of theirmembership in an ethnic, racial, religious, or
national

model

In contrast,
terrorism
group.
a
need not be
hate crime.

understood

on

the coercion

The group targetmodel makes sense of some ethnic, racist, and


harassment

religious

that apparently

goes

of Christian

students

beyond

coercion.

An

example might be the physical beating of Jewish students on their


way

to school

by groups

on examination

days,

12

See documentary film The Weather Underground, Bill Seigel and Sam Green
(II), (dirs.), 2003 (DVD 2004) and Abbey, The Monkey Wrench Gang.
13
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 197-206.
A version of the coercion model is also currentlybeing developed persuasively by
Reitan in "Defining Terrorism," unpublished paper presented at thePacific Division
meetings of theAmerican Philosophical Society,March 2004; cited with permission.
14
Walzer,

Just

and Unjust

Wars,

p.

197.

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

as recounted by Simon Wiesenthal in his memoir The Sunflower}5


The immediate aim was to hinder Jewish students from passing
examinations.

Yet

there was

no evident demand

satisfaction

of which

would have ended theharassment.Were itnot exams, itwould likely


have been somethingelse. The aim seemed to be to harm the Jewish
coercion,
target model

community;
group

a means.
are

Other

vendettas

that seem to fit the


examples
indiscriminate
that sanction

targeting of members of an offending family and comparably


indiscriminatevigilante activities.
The coercion model might be made compatible with the group
targetmodel by the supposition that there is at least an implicit
demand

coercive

for the entire group

to get out. But

terrorists can be

expected to know that the demand is unrealistic when there is no


place for those expelled to go. Demoralization may be amore realistic
goal

of terrorism

that targets a group.

shortcoming of the group targetmodel is that it does not


encourage inquiry into why assailants wish to harm the group.
Perhaps theassumption is that itdoes notmatter: people should not
be harmed on thebasis of their identityas members of such groups,
A

whatever

the reason. But failure to look for a rationale

can mislead

us

about who the primary target is.When we discover animating


often
objectives,we sometimes identifytheprimary targetdifferently,
more (or less) specifically,as I argue below (Section 4) with respect to
rape

terrorism.

Even ifneithermodel entirelyabsorbs the other,many terrorist


deeds seem to fit both. On both, individualsmay be deliberately
harmed regardless of whether theyhave done anything to provoke
attack. Yet neithera lack of scruple regardingwho isharmed nor the
actual inflictionof harm is central to thecoercionmodel (threatsmay
suffice).On both, targetsmay be coerced into acceding to terrorists'
demands. Yet that aim is not central to the group targetmodel
are met). The
(terrorism may continue even though some demands
some of the same features. On both,
two models
also incorporate

there is an absence of procedural justice in targetselection.On both,

harm
there is, if not major
threat of major harm.

or an attempt

at

it, at

least a credible

15

Simon Wiesenthal, The Sunflower: On thePossibilities and Limits of Forgive


ness, Revised and Expanded Edition, H. A. Pichler (trans.) (New York: Schocken,
1997), pp. 18-20.

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card

claudia

Yet
model,

there are also important differences.On


terrorism

lies on a continuum

of hate

the group target

crime, at one

extreme

end ofwhich is genocide. The coercionmodel does not put terrorism

on

that continuum.

On

the contrary,

for relative optimism

grounds

the coercion

regarding

model

terrorists' potential

suggests
amena

bility to dialogue and argument. Coercive terroristsmay hope to


succeed

in relying on threats and avoid

ever having

to carry them out.

It is the group targetmodel, however, thatmakes sense of much


popular thinkingabout terrorismin theUnited States today,which
not only withbut as potential direct targetswho
would have us identify
to
have done nothing provoke attack. It is no accident that thismodel
enjoyspopularitynow, followingthe 1993bombing of theWorld Trade
Center and themassively lethalattacks of theOklahoma City and 9/11
bombings. These deeds' objectives have not been made specificand
explicit.They appear somewhatmysterious, perpetrated by persons
unauthorized by any state. And they do not evoke widespread
sympathy in theU.S. from leftor right,although theyhave elicited
many questions.16 These deeds, along with recent bombings of
embassies and ships, are theparadigms that underlie and informthe
current G. W.

Bush

2. War
The

Bush

"war on terrorism."

administration's

administration's

on Terrorism

war

on

terrorism

appears

not

only

to

invoke the group targetmodel as applicable to the enemy, it also


appears to exemplifythatmodel in theway it treatsthose it regardsas
the enemy.

It views

terrorism as a special

form of combat

or violence,

distinguishable on one hand from conventional warfare (terrorists


need not be agents of states bound by treaties or international
conventions) and on the other from ordinary violent civilian crime
(terrorist harm

is often on a greater

scale and for larger purposes).

The

16
For details on some very disturbing questions, seeDavid Ray Griffin,The New
Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11
(Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2004); he summarizes the book's concerns in
fortyquestions, pp. 197-201. Furthermaterials (books, videos, websites) raising and
pursuing questions regardingwhat happened on 9/11 are listed in Global Outlook:
The Magazine of 9?11 Truth, Issue #10 (Spring/Summer2005), a periodical given to
me by an anonymous member of the audience at theUniversity of Victoria, where I
presented an earlier draft of the present essay. A more recent documentary DVD
"Loose Change 2," shown on my campus inMay 2006, raises still furtherquestions.

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

upshot is that restrictionsapplying to conventionalwarfare and to the


treatmentof civilian criminals are bypassed. As noted by David
Luban,

and

arrested

persons

situation

leaves

It can

as

detained

suspected

terrorists enjoy

(POW) protections nor civil rights.17This

neither Prisoner ofWar

to suffering many forms of terrorism.


to distinguish
terrorism from
right, however,
to
treat terrorists
crime
and
warfare and ordinary

them vulnerable

easily
both conventional

seem

differentlyfrom POWs and from civilian criminals. First, the


discrimination principle (from the "jus in bello" part of "just war
theory"), which

direct targeting of non-combatants,

prohibits

appears

to be increasinglya scruple that is not recognized by terrorists.18


Second, criminalviolence isusuallymotivated by personal, family,or
business

interests rather than by political

concerns,

whereas

terrorists

aremore often politicallymotivated. Third, criminal violence is also


commonly

clandestine,

terrorists are often politically

whereas

moti

vated and sometimes take responsibilitypublicly.


Yet these distinctions are not firm.On both models, terrorism
overlaps substantiallywith conventional warfare and with ordinary
in the 20th century,

crime. First,

conventional

warfare

also

increas

inglydeparted from thejus inbello discrimination principle until by


its end, over 80% of war casualties were civilians.19That statistic
makes dubious whether theold jus inbello discriminationprinciple is
any longer even governing

The World

such warfare.

War

II saturation

bombings of Dresden and Tokyo, for example, directly targeted


with

civilians

conventional

weapons,

aiming

to coerce German

and

Japanese capitulation, sending themessage thatotherwisemore cities

would

be destroyed.20
Second, domestic hate

terrorism

crimes do have

is often not political.

Hostages

political motives, whereas


are often taken for private

gain, for example, as in the Lindbergh kidnapping and the 1974


holdup of a Stockholm bank (whichbequeathed us theconcept of the
17
David

Luban, "The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights,"


and Public Policy Quarterly 22 (2002), pp. 9-14.
Philosophy
18
Reitan argues that terrorismis distinguished from conventional war in being
governed by a variant principle of target selection: targetdirectly only members of
the targetgroup ("Defining Terrorism"). A useful introduction to justwar theory is
William V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger,
1981).
19
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence ina Global Era, with an
January 2001 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, 2001), p. 100.
Afterward
20
There is inaddition theclaimmade by some criticsof thebombings ofHiroshima
and Nagasaki

that a deterrent

message

was

also

intended

for the Soviet

Union.

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CLAUDIA CARD

10

"Stockholm syndrome").21 Taking tellers as hostages is criminal


terrorism

to coerce

law enforcement

their loot.

into letting robbers

escape with

Finally, ordinary crime need not be clandestine. Some bank


robbers act in broad daylight, as the Stockholm robbers did. The
Tokyo and Dresden firebombings were not isolated incidents in the
Allied conduct of thewar. Less well known than itdeserves to be is
themassive area bombing by British forces throughoutGermany and
by U.S. forces in the Pacific,22 This is terrorism in modern
war. Closer

conventional

to the present,

the conduct

of U.S.

soldiers

in Iraq in rounding up detainees indiscriminatelyas "insurgents"


Truth:

routine military
terrorism. Mark
America, Abu Ghraib, and the War

Cross

report:

illustrates

Danner

on Terror

in Torture
quotes

and

a Red

Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors,
waking up residents roughly,yelling orders, forcing familymembers into one room
under military guard while searching the rest of the house and furtherbreaking
doors, cabinets, and other property. They arrested suspects, tying their hands in
the back with flexi-cuffs,hooding them, and taking them away. Sometimes they
arrested all adult males present in a house, including elderly, handicapped or sick
people...pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles, punching and
kicking and strikingwith rifles.23

He quotes further:
In almost all instances..., arresting authorities provided no informationabout who
theywere, where theirbase was located, nor did they explain the cause of arrest.
Similarly, they rarely informed the arrestee or his familywhere he was being taken
and for how long, resulting in the de facto 'disappearance' of the arrestee....Many
familieswere leftwithout news formonths, often fearing that their relativeswere
dead.24

The Red Cross thennotes thatmilitary intelligenceofficerssaid that


"in theirestimate between 70 percent and 90 percent of thepersons
21

See Irka Kulshnyk, "The Stockholm Syndrome: Toward an Understanding,"


Social Action and theLaw 10 (1984), pp. 37-42 and Thomas Strentz, "The Stockholm
Syndrome: Law Enforcement Policy and Hostage Behavior," inFrank M. Ochberg
and David A. Soskis (eds.), Victims of Terrorism (Boulder: West view, 1982),
pp.

149-161.

22

See A. C. Grayling, Among theDead Cities: The History andMoral Legacy of


theWWII Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan (New York: Walker and
Company, 2006).
23
Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and theWar on Terror
(New York: New York Review Books, 2004), p. 2.
24

Danner,

Torture

and Truth,

p. 2.

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

deprivedof theirlibertyinIraq had been arrestedbymistake [emphasis


added by Danner]."25
that occur

"Mistakes"

of the time are not mistakes.

90%

This

is

terrorism.The group targetmodel appears to fit. The ostensible


was

purpose

to coerce

information

from detainees.

were

But people

selected for round-up on thebasis of theiridentity,not on thebasis of

prior evidence
and a weapon.

that they had information. Terrorism was an expedient


It may not be clear whether
the message-to-others

aspect of the coercion model also fits. There could be an implied


- a
form of hostage-taking
possible
had
better come forward,
anything

in the disappearances
message
that anyone else who knows

or

their families would be subjected to similar treatment.But even


without thatmessage, this activityfits the group targetmodel.
Active opposition to terrorismas such would reject not only
saturation bombing of cities but tacticsdescribed in thisRed Cross
report. Such a campaign would also publicly expose and aggressively
as

oppose

terrorist many

disappearances

engineered

tion,

shootings,

drive-by

kinds

of

domestic

criminal

violence:

by oppressive
regimes, witness
even
and
rape, and
stalking,

intimida
intimate

relationship violence. I select for special attention (Sections 3 and 4


below) the cases of oppressive regimesand theoften doubly domestic
crimes of rape and relationship

which

violence,

have

in common

that

their targets tend to be relatively low-profile.


Perhaps itwill be objected thatbecause domestic violence is small
scale compared withmass killings in thebombing of buildings or even
ships, calling them "terrorist" alters themeaning and dilutes the
seriousness

of the concept

of terrorism. Yet

the appearance

of a small

scale comes from looking only at individual episodes or at episodes


with a singlevictim.Victims of domestic violence aremore spread out
in time and space than victims in bombed buildings. Collectively,
domestic
of

violence

victims are not

them suffer equally

serious

less numerous.

harms

and

Individually,
fatalities. Because

many
those

who sufferviolence in thehome need not be prominent individuals,


officials, or
government
can
be expected
people
prominent
are better described as "low-profile"
such

as

Similar

points,

can

however,

even

individuals

about

to care particularly,
than as "small-scale."

be made

about

easily

whom

their cases
preventable

harms of poverty: collectively, poverty victims are hardly less


numerous
25

Danner,

than

Torture

bombing
and Truth,

victims,
p.

and

individually,

many

3.

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suffer

CLAUDIA CARD

12
harms

at least as serious. Yet


terrorism. To

become

sustain

poverty does not thereby


preventable
the case that real terrorism is present

not only in high-profilebombings but also inmuch rape, stalking,

domestic

violence,

and oppressive

government,

it is necessary

to show

relevant similaritiesto the high-profilecases and bring out relevant


of harm, such as poverty.
section below.

sources

from other

differences

to the concluding

reserved

That

task is

The group targetmodel appears inapt to make the case that


stalkingand intimaterelationshipviolence (relationshipviolence, for
short)can be terrorist,as theirprimary targetsare specificindividuals.
And for thecoercionmodel to fit,as in thecase of hold-ups, we need
to collapse the two targets.Yet stalking and relationship violence
bear relevant similarities to rape terrorism,
which fits both models.
The two models bring us closer to an intuitive recognition of
terrorism

during

in rape when
times of so-called

it becomes

peace.

Hence,

a practice, whether
in war or
I turn next to rape terrorism,

postponing stalkingand relationship violence to Section 4.

3. Rape

Terrorism

Mass rape of civilians by soldiers and militias during the 1990swars


in the formerYugoslavia and inRwanda has been publicly exposed
as a weapon

that was

used

in a deliberate

and calculated

manner.26

It

is now widely and officiallyacknowledged thatmilitary rape is not


simplya case of "a few bad apples" but has been a matter of policy.
War rape directly targetswomen and girls of all ages, even

disabled
women,
women,
pregnant women, menstruating
injured
even infants. The most salient feature of these
sick women,
women,

targets is theirgender, and so the crime initiallyappears misogynist


and in thatway tofit thegroup targetmodel. Were theprimary target
females, war would simply offer a context in which it is easy to

commit misogynist
crimes with impunity. That would not make
rape,
more
than looting, a weapon. When
it is not
any
rape is a weapon,

simply a gigantic hate crime against women that happens to be


26

DVD

The film,Hotel Rwanda (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Terry George, (dir.), 2004;


2005), excellent inmost respects, showed themachetes but failed to convey

that mass

rape was

also

a weapon

in the Rwandan

genocide.

For

an account

of the

mass rape inRwanda, including interviewswith survivors, seeHuman RightsWatch,


Rwanda: Shattered Lives - Sexual Violence during theRwandan Genocide and its
Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996).

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

13

perpetrated by soldiers, even ifmisogynist soldiers do the actual


raping most readily. A military objective of the toleration and

was
of war rape in the former Yugoslavia
to get
encouragement
a
Muslim
families to leave the territory. That made
coercive
rape
weapon.

As military policy, war rape appears to fitboth the coercion and


On thecoercionmodel, theprimary
group targetmodels of terrorism.
target isnot women and girls; theyare thedirect targets.The primary
target is an entirepeople. A coercive threat (message) is aimed at
thosewho resistor who might resist leaving,a slightlymore specific
target than the people as a whole.27 Insofar as the objective is not
simply to harm the group but to expel it,harm can seem secondary,
which makes the coercionmodel appear right.The basis for selecting
direct

victims

they are members

is that, because

of

the group,

publicized abuse of themcan intimidateothers into leaving.

as a weapon
of war is arguably not just coercive, however,
Rape
as
a reasonably
but genocidal,
insofar
foreseeable
if not
consequence,

a major purpose, is the irreversibledestruction of families and


cultural

that define a people.

practices

So

understood,

harm

is not

just instrumentalbut part of the end sought. Still,military rape can


appear more coercive than genocidal if individuals and familieswho
leave

can

relocate

successfully

without

being

pursued

and

hunted

down to be destroyed, as theNazis did with Jewswho fled to other


countries.

The

rape/death

camps

in the former Yugoslavia

impris

oned people who were captured right there,who were unable or


unwilling to flee.Genocide may have been a fallback, in the event
that coercion

to disperse was

unsuccessful.

It is less widely appreciated thatmuch civilian rape is also not


simplya matter of rottenapples but is part of a widespread coercive
practice or institution.28Feminist scholars have long argued that
and girls are targeted for rape not for the most

women

part because

theyare pretty,flirtatious,or teasingbut because theyhappen to be


27
On war rape in the formerYugoslavia,
Rape:

The

War

against

Women

see Alexandra Stiglmayr (ed.),Mass

in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Marion

Faber

(trans.)

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), and Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare:
The Hidden Genocide inBosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996).
28
Following Rawls, I use the terms"practice" and "institution" interchangeably,
understanding them to refer to forms of activity defined by rules that create and
distribute powers and opportunities, liabilities,responsibilities for consequences, and
so forth.

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CLAUDIA CARD

14
vulnerable

and female.29 The

group

target model

makes

sense of that

claim and of the idea that rape harms all women and girls, not just
those who are raped. But the group targetmodel also leaves us
mystified,as in Susan Griffin's reportof her childhood perception of
the threat of rape, in the observations
Crime:"
The All-American
"Rape:

opening

her

classic

essay

I have never been free of the fear of rape. From a very early age I, likemost
women, have thought of rape as part of my natural environment something to
be feared and prayed against likefire or lightning. I never asked why men raped; I
simply thought it one of themany mysteries of human nature.30

What Griffindescribes seems so far to fit thegroup targetmodel. Yet


a few pages

later, she proposes

an answer

to the question

of why men

rape, invoking the coercion model to dispel themystery.As in the

case of war

rape, the coercion model


the primary target and a new view
females who are not raped:

suggests a new identification of


of the harm rape does even to

In the system of chivalry,men protect women against men. This is not unlike the
protection relationship which [organized crime] established with small businesses
in the early part of this [20th]century. Indeed, chivalry is an age-old protection
racketwhich depends for its existence on rape.31

The idea is thatevenmen who profess to abhor rape but nevertheless


for domestic
trade "protection"
have an interest in the continued

(including sexual service) can


existence of the threat of rape, hence

services

innot having rapistsprosecuted zealously. Although individually less


29

Scholarship on rape in the "Second Wave" of feminismbegins with Barbara


Mehrhof and Pamela Kearon, "Rape: An Act of Terror," inAnne Koedt, Ellen
Levine, and Anita Rapone (eds.), Radical Feminism (New York: Quadrangle, 1973),
pp. 228-233; Andra Medea and Kathleen Thompson, Against Rape: A Survival
Manual (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1974); and Susan Brownmiller, Against
Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). Other
early philosophical classics include four essays (by Susan Griffin,Carolyn M. Shafer
and Marilyn Frye, Pamela Foa, and Susan Rae Peterson) inMary Vetterling
Braggin, Frederick Elliston, and Jane English (eds.), Feminism and Philosophy
(Totowa: Littlefield,Adams, 1977), pp. 313-371; Angela Davis, Women, Race, and
Class (New York: Vintage, 1981), pp. 172-201; Lorenne M. G. Clark and Debra
J.Lewis, Rape: The Price ofCoercive Sexuality (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1977).
Also influential is Menachem Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1971).
30
Griffin, "Rape: The All-American Crime," Ramparts (September, 1971), pp.
26-35, reprinted in Vetterling-Braggin et al. (eds.), Feminism and Philosophy, pp.
313-332.

31
Griffin, "Rape: The All-American Crime," p. 320.

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

15

powerful, theycan play a role, as can otherswho judge thata woman


was "asking for it," analogous to thatofmilitary officerswho make it
evident that rapistswill not be prosecuted or will not receive very
harsh treatmentif theyare. It is the intentionsofmen in these roles,
rather than the intentions of individual

rapists,

that reveal

the nature

listen with
of rape as a coercive practice. How many ordinary men
no
to
to be vicarious pleasure,
what must appear
raising
objection,
reason
men
One
tales of rape by friends, relatives, acquaintances?

rape is they can. They usually get away with it.That could change

with

less peer

tolerance.

Any woman or girl can become a direct targetof civilian rape, if

she can be made

to appear

to have

afterward

prosecute

successfully

rape, who

blame

"simple

rape"

for it," not a

"asked

it nearly impossible to

difficult task. Rules of the practice make

(not aggravated

for example,

by threatswith a weapon).32 Again, the group targetmodel appears


to fit.But Griffin's analogy with organized crime invokes the context
of a practice of extortion, defined by rules that include those of
chivalry. Insofar as themessage is "good girls don't get raped (they
get put on pedestals)," itappears to be directed to femaleswho may
be insufficiently
attached to, deferential to, or supportive of male
"protectors." Again, this is themessage apt to be sentby thosewho
could but do not take serious steps to prosecute rapistsor discourage
the victim, and

so on. These

are

the parties whose

roles are analogous to those of military officers and others who

choose

not

to discourage

or investigate war

rape or treat it seriously.

Individual rapists,however, often target specific individuals,not

- or
formany, under some
(not to deny that for some
just "a woman"
conditions
rape as a practice ismore
any woman will do). Although

about violence than about sex, the individual rapist engages in a


sexual performance and may be able to do that only to certain

women.

Hence,

victims need not appear

from the rapist's perspective

to be randomly selected (although theremay be no way for thevictim


to have predicted the choice, and so, the selectionmay well appear
random fromher perspective).Nor need the rapist have any interest
a protection
he may).
For
these
racket (although
in supporting
as
a
one
of
that
crime
is
form
the
idea
civilian
reasons,
rape
may resist
terrorism.

32
On the rules of rape, see Claudia Card, The Unnatural Lottery: Character and
Moral Luck (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), pp. 97-117. See, also,
Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

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CLAUDIA CARD

16

The claim I wish to defend,however, ismore specific: thatcivilian

rape, when

by a protection

racket,

than in war. What

matters

supported

is a form of terrorism. It

does not matter what the individual rapist's intentionsare, in civil


society any more

is how he

It is

is used.

only at the level of rules mandating female attachment to male


that it becomes

protectors
an

creating

atmosphere

to see rape as a coercive


possible
of terror for women who would,

practice
or who

might, violate the rules. Allowing rape, both preemptively and


punitively, is the sanction of the rules.And thosewho back the rules
not just men.

include women,

are

and

punished
continue.
On

the coercion

The

very few rapists who


that allow
the protection

scapegoats
model,

civilian

are caught
racket to

terrorism makes

rape

extremely

ineligiblefemale independence,assertiveness,or a lifestyleinwhich a


most

woman's

intimate

and

enduring

primary

are

attachments

to

other women. Who, then, is really theprimary target?The message


now appears directed to lesbians and any women who might prefer
defer to, and serve men.33

not to embrace,

Perhaps

the primary

target

really is females in general, conceived as potential lesbians or


resisters and other potential

marriage

trouble-makers

for patriarchal

politics.

It is an empirical question whether a rape protection racket exists


in a particular locale, just as it is an empirical question whether rape

is a weapon

as
recognized
also.
nized,

in a particular

war.

terrorist; protection

as a war weapon
is now
Rape
racket rape should be so recog

The coercion and the group targetmodels bringwar and civilian


rape policies intuitivelycloser tomore widely recognized paradigms

of terrorism,

such as extortionist

practices

in organized

crime

and

mass destruction in war. They highlight comparable harms and


injustices.

They

reveal

coercion

and

lack of due process.

Neither

model yetmakes explicitwhat is specificallyterroristin thesepolicies

(for that, see Section 5). But rape terrorism shares with the terrorism
of oppressive
structure involving many agents in
regimes a complex
a
different roles, and it shares with terrorism in intimate relationships
complex

pattern,

including many

kinds of acts, not all violent. These

complications and the lack of publicity surrounding them can


33

For development of the idea that heterosexual!ty ismade compulsory by social


practices, seeAdrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,"
Signs 5 (1980), pp. 631-660.

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recognizing
obscure

terrorism

17

of terrorism for anyone

the perception

whose

paradigms

of

terrorismare simpler,publicly conspicuous, typicallyone-off events,


such as bombings.

the Two Models

4. Beyond

seems
at groups
violence with a coercive

to political
violence
as
to
it
does
arbitrary,
restricting
political
aim. Emma Goldman
and Michael Walzer

aimed

terrorism

Restricting

have

discussed

instances

of political violence, includingassassinations, thatwere not aimed at


Many 19thand early 20thCentury
groups.34Were theynot terrorist?
at specific individuals who
their
violence
activists
aimed
political
occupied positions of public trust and could affectpublic policy.
Walzer notes that some assassins who killed inpublic apparentlyhad
scruples against allowing children to be killed, even as "collateral
The

damage."

lack of randomness

violence

to distinguish

leads Walzer

such

from terrorism.

political
And yet, assassinations

very significant features with

share morally

less focused terroristviolence. Bystanders predictably get caught in


are

assassinations

the crossfire when

out

carried

in public

places.

the killings are preceded by no public and fair trials


justifyingthe selection of one target rather than another, therealso

Because
may

be

nothing

to restrain

even

assassins

who

are protective

of

children from continuallymoving on to additional adult targets. It


may also be impossible to preventothers fromusing theassassination
as a cover for theirown killings, done for theirown less principled
reasons.

Thus,

in practice,

assassination

is apt to be less focused

in its

impact and more arbitrary than one might have thought.


Like many

rapists,

and

stalkers

in intimate

abusers

relationships

target specific individuals. Still, itmight seem that the group target

it appears
these cases. For
captures
case
can
be made for the view
female. A good

model

that most

victims

that women

who

are

suffer

domestic abuse are targetednot forwho theyare or forwhat theyare


like as individuals

but because

they are female, because

they are easily

34
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 197-206; Emma Goldman, Anarchism and
Other Essays (New York: Dover, 1969), pp. 79-108. See, also, Goldman's autobi
ography, LivingMy Life, 2 volumes (New York: Knopf, 1931).Goldman was vilified
as a terrorist

McKinley)

on

the basis

of her alleged

connections

with

an assassination

and an attempted assassination (Henry Clay Frick).

(President

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CLAUDIA CARD

18

accessible by theirpartners,and because any penalty for theabuse is


likelynot to be high.

is problematic.
Crime
Statistics
reporting in this area, however,
same-sex relationships
and probably
tend to overlook
underestimate
women's
violence
effective abuse of men. Relationship
"family
in sociologists' parlance
violence"
includes, in addition, child abuse,
sibling violence, violence against elders, and violence against parents

by teenaged children.Victims includeboth genders. Stalking, defined


as a crime in the early 1990s throughout the U.S., has much in
common

Stalkers

with relationship
violence
and can be an element of it.
can easily be female.35 Further, targets are not always known

personally, let alone intimately, to stalkers (celebrity stalkers, for


at any rate, those commonly
the stalkers
example),
although
as
to
such
have a passionate
identified
attachment
characteristically
or emotional
involvement with their targets, even if the passion
is

never

reciprocated.36

Although thegroup targetmodel is not clearly apt,many cases of


relationshipviolence and stalkingdo appear tofit thecoercionmodel,
at least somewhat.As Wellman noted long ago in the case of armed
hold-ups by robbers,we have to tamperwith themodel a little to
make itfit.First, both thedirect and the indirect targetsare usually
to call "the target." In
it is more natural
the same person, whom
as in punishment by the state, themessage
intimate relationships,
"do

thisor else" is usually sent to the same person who will sufferthe "or

else"

if the demand

is not met.

Second, what is coercive ismore thewhole relationship than a


series of specificdemands, and even the demands are often implicit

and vague or general rather than explicit and clear or specific.37 There
batterers escalate violence when a
are, of course, coercive episodes:
partner

attempts

to leave, or to get a restraining

order,

or to report

35

Between 1990 and 1993,most states in the U.S. passed anti-stalking laws.
Similar lawswere soon passed in the rest and in theDistrict of Columbia. Discus
sions appeared in popular magazines, such as Newsweek (13 July 1992) and Good
(August, 1993).
Housekeeping
36
Are police detectives stalkers?They do many of the same thingsas stalkerswith
many

of the same

consequences

in emotional

stress

to their

targets.

But

given what

they are legally authorized to do, their trailing does not count as the crime of
stalking. I imagine that private detectives walk a thin line.When they become
stalkers, theyneed, of course, have no emotional engagementwith or attachment to
their targets.

37

I have discussed this issue at greater length inClaudia Card, Lesbian Choices
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 110-115.

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

19

to friends, doctors, or police. But not every threat, act


prior violence
or
to a coercive pattern need
of violence,
other deed that contributes
come with its own demand. Some threats and violent episodes display
the futility of resistance
dominance
show who is boss or demonstrate
rather than manipulate
particular choices.38 Yet they are part of a
pattern

that manipulates

a partner's

attitudes

toward

the batterer

and

toward possibilities of resistance.Many episodes that pretend to be


punishments (coercive) are better construed as dominance displays,
since the "offense"

that ostensibly

provoked

them could

not reason

ably have been predicted in advance to be an offense and will not


necessarily

provoke

"punishment"

next

time. Abused

partners

are

often forced to use imagination and ingenuityto anticipatewhat will


displease or provoke and what will please or pacify.
If assassinations,
stalkings, and relationship violence have primary
targets that are more focused than groups, terrorist regimes can be

less discriminating than even the group targetmodel ordinarily


allows. In oppressive regimes,harm is aimed by a rulingbody, or its
representatives,

against

its own people,

or rather against

a subset of

them that defies definition.39Oppressive regimes are notorious for

cannibalizing

themselves. The French Revolution

and ensuing Terror

of 1793-1794 (which bequeathed us the concept of terrorism)


ostensibly targeted the privileged
royalty, nobility, and clergy

who

supported

them.

In practice,

however,

it targeted

anyone

who

was perceived as insufficiently


supportive of the revolution,which
included former leaders of the revolution. Likewise, Joseph Stalin
and Pol Pot (and closer to home, formerU.S. Senator Joseph
McCarthy and former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover) targeted
anyone who fell intopolitical disfavor.
For terroristregimes, the group targetmodel is both unhelpful
and misleading. The regime's alleged principles do not really explain
why many individuals are targeted.They do not yield a group the
members of which could have been identified in advance. It may
appear

homosexuals,
targets are certain groups
are like
those
In
however,
groups
practice,
Capitalists.

that primary

Communists,
38

For an excellent discussion thatmakes this point, using Amnesty Interna


tional's Chart of Coercion, see Ann Jones,Next Time She'll Be Dead: Battering and
How to Stop It (Boston: Beacon, 1994), pp. 90-91.
39
For accounts of the French Revolution and theTerror of 1793-1794, I have
relied on Will and Ariel Durant, The Age of Napoleon (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1975), pp. 13-87, and Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution, Volume 3
(London: J. Fraser, 1837).

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claudia

20

card

the targets of the French Terror: anyone who falls into political
Victims

disfavor.

come

may

to be branded

"queer,"

"Communists,"

or "Capitalists" after the fact (after theyhave been targeted).People


who never identifiedthemselvesas members of such groupsmay be so
others, for any
the terror.
Hence,

"identified"

by

accordingly.

number

of

reasons,

and

treated

The message not to do anything that would bring one into


political disfavor is unhelpful, as there is no reliableway to predict
what would stave off political disfavor. Regime violence is often
better understood

as a dominance

of the same ways as relationship


"do not even attempt to leave,"

display
violence.

and

as coercive

in many

Some

demands,
Citizens
who
specific.

are

such as
tried to

escape the Soviet Union by going over theBerlinWall were shot, as

are many

battered

women

who

try to leave

a partner.

But

targets

must often use imagination and ingenuity to avoid being harmed.


What theyare coerced into is, basically, maintaining a relationship,
just as abused intimatepartners are, although the relationship is a
different one.

Neither model
oppressive

regimes

is an entirely satisfactoryfit for the cases of


and

relationship

violence.

But

the coercion

and

group targetmodels are best treatednot as definitiveof terrorismbut


as invitations to understand terrorismby identifying
with different
a
one
at
least
of them perceives as
parties to
relationship that
terrorist.That thoughtexperiment is theproject of thefinal section.
Applied to low-profile violence, such as intimate relationship
that experiment
violence,
many of those cases.

should

5. How

enable

Terrorism

us to recognize

terrorism

in

Works

Following the lead of the coercionmodel, which takes us inside the


terrorist's

head,

suppose

we

consider

what

circumstances

and

objectives might drive one to use terroristmethods, make


appear

attractive

or

tempting. What

advantage

might

them

terrorist

methods offer, as compared with alternatives? Similarly, following


the lead of thegroup targetmodel, which invitesus to identify
with a
we
consider
if
is
distinctive
what, anything,
potential target,suppose
reason
to fear, under what
targets have
potential
one
circumstances
becomes
liable to such fears, and what
the fears
can do to those who have them, what is so terrifying.
about

what

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

21

Let us begin with the perspective of targets.Not all terror is a

product of terrorism. Nor does terrorism always succeed in arousing


terror. But terrorism creates an atmosphere
of grave uncertainty,

often in the face of what could be imminentdanger, which makes


fears reasonable

and

can

sometimes make

terror a natural

response.

People who belong to an ethnic group,members of which appear to


have been targetedjust because of theirgroup identity,have reason to
fear for theirown safety.For all theyknow, theycould be next.And
nextmight be any time.There may be nothing theycan effectively
do
to avoid

that danger.40

Knowing thatone is a member of a deliberately targetedgroup is


not the only kind of basis for grave uncertainty. Terrorists'

to do "collateral
also creates reason for many
damage"
willingness
of a targeted group to fear being next
who are not members
caught
sources of equally grave uncertainty
in the crossfire. Other potential

can be created by terrorists. We have reason to fear being next when


we cannot predict what instruments are apt to be used as weapons,
or
we
or
cannot detect instruments
when
carriers of danger
(an issue

with chemical and biological weapons), when we cannot predict


where the sources of danger may be located (what streets,cities, or
airlines to avoid), or ifwe do not know when or for how long to be
alert. For theremay then appear nothing we can do effectivelyto
escape,

protect

or defend

ourselves,

or even get braced

to withstand

assault. Our sense of helplessness is aggravated by the thought that


are deliberately created by malevolent
these uncertainties
parties who
are monitoring
us while we are unable to monitor
that
them,
they are
in control and we are not.

Grave uncertaintyabout whether one might be next is brought


to prominence in the group targetmodel. On thatmodel, all that
keeps uncertainty alive is the hope that not all members of the
group will eventually become direct targets.Without that hope,
resignation

can

take

over.

The

term

"terrorism"

suggests

the

perspective of a targetwho is not resignedbut is stillvulnerable to


fear and

hope.
coercion

a different strategy to keep


incorporates
stave
to
off
uncertainty alive,
resignation (which can defeat terrorists'
If demands are met, the threat
ends) and also keep fear manageable.
or so terrorists would
of harm may
be withdrawn,
have
targets
The

believe.
40

model

In reality, as the target should

know,

demands

may

escalate

This point ismade verywell by Reitan ("Defining Terrorism").

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CLAUDIA CARD

22
as a result of success.

Hence,

uncertainty,

and

of a

the instability

fear that is indanger of passing over into resignation- which presents


a challenge for the terrorist.But, again, that is getting ahead of the
story.The point to note here is that thereappears to be somethinga

potential

target of coercive

direct

terrorism can do, namely,

pressure

a primary target to accede to demands, a task that keeps hope, and


thereby uncertainty,
Such atmospheres

alive.

of uncertainty

are

common

predicaments

of

unarmed potential targets of bombings, targets of stalking and


intimate relationship violence, and targets of oppressive
aside for the moment
(but will return to) wartime

regimes. I set
uncertainties.

Unlike most members of hated groups and citizens of oppressive


regimes,

targets

of

become

weapons

many

stalkers

and

violent

partners

know

the next

assault

specificallythat theyare direct targets.They do not have towonder


whowill be next. But theyoften cannot predictwhen an assault will be
triggered,what will triggerit,what places, topics of conversation, or
potentially offendingbehaviors to avoid, and so on. If they can
predict timing and triggers, they often remain uncertain what
instruments will

will inflict.

or what

torture

tofear" understates a terrorist target's predicament.


"Reason
Fear
need not amount to terror. Fear can be advantageous
for mobilizing
Terror

self-protection.

makes

us

less able

to resist.

It focuses

our

with our ability to think and


energies non-productively, interferes
plan,

undermines

competence.

It is a panic

response.

in

Uncertainty

confronting imminent danger does not always actually produce

to panic, irrationality, imprudence.


panic. But itmakes us vulnerable
Former U.S. President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's
pronouncement,

"The only thingwe have to fear is fear itself,"was a warning about


panic. People in theU.S. had learned to fear panic in surviving the
crash of 1929 and itsaftermath.
The crash of 1929 can take us back to thequestion of how poverty
differs

from

uncertainties.

terrorism.

When

Poverty
gives rise
harmful (as it commonly

it can be as serious

chosen),
about
others'

impoverishment

poverty
is not

can

to grave dangers
and
iswhen not voluntarily

as terrorism; those who neglect or bring


as terrorists. But
be as reprehensible

terrorism.

Sudden

impoverishment

41

can

Alan Dershowitz argues that terrorism continues because it succeeds. See


Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the
Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

23

produce panic and become fatal, as itdid formany in 1929. But the
onset ofmost poverty isnot sudden; people are oftenerborn to it. Its
are often not imminent, anticipated,

dangers

or even perceived. When

theyare anticipated or perceived, poverty givesmore play to fortune,

hope. People have time to think, plan, experiment, take


encouraging
chances. Often they feel less helpless than they are. More
importantly,

although some can be deeply culpably responsible for others'

to
intended
need not be
the relevant deeds
poverty,
or use others' vulnerability
to panic
in the face of grave
produce
If they were, one might make a case for regarding those
uncertainties.
unchosen

Had someone deliberately produced the crash of


deeds as terrorist.
1929 to harm investorsas a group (as the Unabomber apparently
wished to harm proponents of high technology in theU.S.), or to
bring about widespread povertyas a warning to theU.S. to change its
that deed would

policies,

have

been

an act of terrorism.

Justas evils aremost likelyto be so called by victims and seldom


by perpetrators, terrorismis apt to be called somethingelse by those
fighting," "enforcing
identify as terrorists: "freedom
even
"romantic
traitors,"
"war,"
pursuit,"
"eliminating
discipline,"
"war on terrorism."42 Public perception
tends to be controlled more

whom

others

by regimesand dominant partners in intimaterelationships,which is


surelya factor inwhy deeds of regimesand of dominant partners in
intimaterelationshipsare lesswidely recognized as terroristthan are
deeds

that target states or prominent

men.

But thosewho think theyare targetsare not always right.Victims


of deliberate and unpredictable property violence may perceive as
terrorist deeds

that are basically

intended

as rescues,

such as break

ins by theAnimal Liberation Front to save animals frombeing used

in painful, disabling, and often fatal laboratory experiments, or deeds


like
such as tree-spiking, by those who,
of "monkey-wrenching,"
Because
Dave
describe
themselves as eco-warriors.43
Foreman,
they

act with the scruple of not injuringlivingbeings (warningworkers in


advance of the presence of spikes in trees, for example), animal
liberators

and eco-warriors

tend not to apply

the term "terrorist"

to

42

See Robert E. Goodin, What's Wrong with Terrorism? (Cambridge: Polity


Press, 2006) fordevelopment of the idea thatgovernmentswho cultivate a climate of
terror
citizens

43

as

to terror may
part of their response
as
whom
call
"terrorists."
those
they
just

be

undermining

the autonomy

of

See IngridNewkirk, Free theAnimals! The Untold Story of the U.S. Animal
Liberation Front & Its Founder, "Valerie" (Chicago: Noble Press, 1992) and Dave
Foreman, Confessions of an Eco-Warrior (New York: Harmony Books, 1991).

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CLAUDIA CARD

24
themselves.

They

compare

themselves

not to the Resistance

inWorld

War II but to theUnderground Railroad during slavery in theU.S.,


most members of which (the exception of John Brown duly noted)
did not have terroristintentions; theywere primarily interested in
rescues,

effecting

certainly

less interested

in causing

to some

harm

than inbringinghelp to others.44Yet theirmethods of rescue can put


at risk. They can create some of the same uncertainties
as do
intentions are less benign. Insofar as they are willing,
terrorists whose

others

in order to achieve theirends, to break laws to which theydo not


it is unclear

object,
unclear

to others what

to themselves.

in efforts to avoid

Law-breaking
detection. Further,

environmental activists may

their scruples are. It may be


can escalate
in unforeseen ways
as with

the scrupulous

assassin,

unwittingly (although predictably)

a cover for others


to engage
in far less
provide
or
be
deeds.
Justifiable
borderline
not,
may
scrupulous
eco-sabotage
as terrorism. But we begin to see what there is to argue about.
encourage

or

Consider more fully theposition of the terrorist.Like interroga

tional

torture,

terrorism can be an expedient.

But

torture assaults

victimwho has already been rendereddefenseless (tied up naked on a


table

or

rack,

for example).45

Terrorists,

in contrast,

often

attack

targetswho are anything but defenseless in terms of theirpower

to which
and the resources
they have access. Terrorism
positions
over
more
conventional modes of attack that it is
offers the advantage
use
to make
of
the element of surprise, or at least
able
strategic

unpredictability,tomake up for eitheror both of two serious sources


of disadvantage

in a struggle. One

source

of disadvantage

is that of

being on the short end of a gross power disparity,as is ordinarily the


case with individual citizens in relation to theirgovernment. The
other source of disadvantage is that of being unable to justify one's
demands to those ofwhom theyaremade, as is typicallythecase with
an

a
intimate abuser and with oppressive
governments.
Although
one
terrorist can be at both disadvantages
often
it
is
simultaneously,
or the other. Intimate abusers,
like governments,
for example, often
44

Although JohnBrown is remembered forhis terrorism,he was also a conductor


on theUnderground Railroad and helped many slaves to escape. For discussion of
those activities as well as of Brown's differenceswith many abolitionists over the use
of violence, see themagnificent biography by David S. Reynolds, John Brown,
Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked theCivil War, and Seeded Civil
(New York: Knopf, 2005).
Rights
45
See Henry Shue, "Torture," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1978),
pp.

124-143.

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

25

do have power but are unable to justifytheirdemands and secure the


of those

voluntary

cooperation

overcome

a severe power

they terrorize.

If terrorism

is ever

justifiable, it seemsmost likely in the case of those who use it to


disadvantage

and

least likely in the case of

those who use it because they are simply unable to justify their
demands.
For

are

terrorists who

relatively

poor

in resources

or who

are

relativelypowerless politically, the surprise element has the advan


tage of giving victims no chance tomobilize theirgreater resources

the terrorist,
and defense. To
for protection
feel terror or even
whether
targets actually

surprised, as long as they are placed

that renders them unable


uncertainty
against threatened harm. Panic does

it may

not matter

whether

they

are

in a situation of grave

or protect themselves
tend to increase defenselessness.
to defend

But it can also make a target less prudent, which would be a


for many coercive terrorists.
disadvantage
The surprise of terrorism is created in various

ways. One,

captured

by the group targetmodel, is arbitrary selection of members of an

or religious group. The


ethnic, racial, national,
surprise in rape
terrorism is often of this sort: one is not surprised to learn that a
woman was raped, but one is often surprised to learn who itwas and

who did it.Other ways of creating surprise,which produce a sense of


betrayal, include turningagainst people instrumentstheyhave come
to depend on in daily lifeand regard as benign (box cutters,kitchen
knives) or attacking when it is least expected or in circumstances
under which people are likely to have let down theirguard (in the
middle of the night when they are sleeping, for example, which is
when
Iraq

terrorist regimes
arrested detainees,

tend to arrest people, when U.S.


raided
when the Chicago
police

soldiers

in

the apart

ment of Fred Hampton).46 Surprise in rape terrorismcan include


unexpected

betrayal

as well,

as

in some

cases

of marital

rape, war

rape by neighbors, and the rape of children by guardians.


Yet, itmay be objected, surprise need not be a problematic

to
for contestants
strategy. In many contests, it is perfectly acceptable
a
to
in order
win. Surprise is
aim to surprise opponents
strategy that
then, is
opponents
expect others will try to use against them. What,
distinctive about the use of surprise in terrorism?
46

On FBI involvement in theChicago police raid ofHampton's apartment, fatal


toHampton, who died in his bed, see Curt Gentry* J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and
theSecrets (New York: Plume, 1992), pp. 620-622.

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CLAUDIA CARD

26

The answer, I think,is that terroristsstrike (or threaten to strike)


not just to win but in such a manner that the target cannot even
a defense.

mount

"Beating"

is not really the right concept here.


"Winning"
closer. It is tempting to say that terrorism is not so

comes

a mode of fighting as a response that makes fighting


unnecessary,which can explain why it is resorted to by thosewho
lack the resources to fightor who are incapable of justifying their

much

aims. Terrorism

allows

its targets no opportunity

to mobilize

what

forces or resources theyhave to put up a fight, tryto hide, or tryto


escape. Yet a general presumption exists, not only inmorality but
even in law and politics, that everyone should be allowed a decent
opportunity

for self-defense. When

assailants

appear

to violate

that

presumption, theiractivitymay be perceived as, at best, extremely


on the level and seriousness
of the
or, depending
"unsporting,"47
as
terrorist.
violation,
Traditions
of just war theory and rules of International Human
itarian Law
between
and
attempt to define distinctions
acceptable
unacceptable

ways

to take advantage

of an enemy's

vulnerabilities.

They rule out, as "hittingbelow the belt," thekinds of surpriseon

which

terrorists rely to gain advantage

over adversaries.

It should

be

as difficultto justifyterrorism,ifterrorismis ever justifiable,as it is to


justifyhittingbelow thebelt. Perhaps thebest case ismade for those
who confrontgenuine evils against which theycan defend themselves
no other way.

It is true that modern

warfare

has been unclear

about

where the belt lies.The old jus in bello discrimination principle no


longer appears to help verymuch to pick it out. Nevertheless, it is
widely agreed thatbiological and chemical weapons strikebelow. In
civil

a
terrorist when
likewise, criminal offenses become
takes unthinkable
of others' vulnera
perpetrator
advantage

society,

violent

bilities, as in the case of theWashington D. C. snipers,Lee Boyd


Malvo and JohnAllen Muhammad, in 2002.48 Law-breakers who
take hostages

also

cross

that line.

The 9/11 bombers exploited the element of surprise,attacking in

we are
daylight,
literally out of the blue, using as weapons,
told, civilian transport planes and box cutters. The planners of these
its own resources
attacks, whoever
they were, turned against the U.S.

broad

and technology. IfThe 9/11CommissionReport's identificationof the


47

I owe to Alison

Jaggar, in correspondence, the observation about being

"unsporting."

48

See Sari Horwitz and Michael E. Ruane, Sniper: Inside theHunt for theKillers
Who Terrorized theNation (New York: Random House, 2003).

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

27

its history of trust


agents is accurate,
they also turned against the U.S.
and goodwill
toward immigrants who came to pursue an education or
inmany parts of the world
occupational
training.49 Suicide bombers
themselves

disguise

as ordinary

pedestrians,

customers,

clients,

or

passengers, exploiting the trustof everyday life that is somuch of the


What make theirdeeds terroristare
glue thatholds a society together.
as much these elements as theirprinciples of target selection or the
use

some

of

to coerce

targets

All

others.

contribute

to creating

atmospheres of grave uncertainty, inability to protect or defend,


vulnerability to panic, and the sense that basic trust has been
betrayed.
World

Trade

Center

Twin

Towers

were

citizens of many
of many
nations, members
racial, ethnic, and religious groups. The
Towers may have been targeted in part because
of this diversity.
workers

Compatibly with theaccount of The 9/11Commission Report on who

the perpetrators were, the message may not have been just "Amer
icans, take note!" but more generally, "anyone who benefits from,
or endanger
Islamic
those who kill Muslims
supports, or condones
a "group"
take note!"
communities,
apt to be constituted more like

the targets of Stalin or the French Terror than like the targetsof

racist or homophobic
hate
manner
such terrorism in a

crimes. There
that would

is no need

put

to understand

it on a continuum

with

genocide.

9/11 bombers left no explicit message with demands.


Subsequent videos of Osama bin Laden aired on network television
The

in the U.S.

suggest

that the intent was

to pressure

the U.S.

to stay

away fromArab nations and stop supporting Israel,which would fit


the coercion

bombers

model.

acted

not yet appear,


that the
however,
was
bin Laden.
If Al-Qaeda
from Osama

It does

on orders

behind the bombings, the intentmight have been punitive, perhaps

an
for perceived
economic
payback
oppression,
sense of the choice of theWorld Trade
also makes

that
interpretation
Center as a target.

Alternatively (or in addition), the intentof theperpetrators,whoever


they were, might have
to massive
invulnerable

to prove
lethal attack.

been

that the mainland

U.S.

49

is not

There has, of course, been nothing like a trial to confirm the identitiesof those
said to be agents of the 9/11 bombings. For sketches of some of those named as
agents, see The 9jll Commission Report: Final Report of theNational Commission on
TerroristAttacks Upon theUnited States, Authorized edition (New York: Norton,
n.d.),

pp.

145-173.

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CLAUDIA CARD

28

For terroristswho occupy positions of political power, and for


dominant

in abusive

has
relationships,
surprise violence
cannot
one's
ratio
special advantages.
justify
objectives
nally to others or secure voluntary cooperation,
surprise violence has
partners

one

When

the advantage of removing any need to argue or justify. But in


allowing targetsno time to think,plan, or respond, it also removes
decent opportunities for them to defend themselves. It intimidates
potential questioners and keeps themoccupied with urgencies. Like
terrorists in intimate

terrorist governments,

use unpre

relationships

dictability to keep targetswalking on eggshells, ready to defer.


Terrorists in thehome can be as creative as the 9/11 bombers in the
use

of

and

betrayal

uncertainty,

taking

to

surprise

advantage

of

create

targets'

of grave
atmospheres
vulnerabilities.50
special

They strike below the belt, not just figuratively. Surprise is an


advantage

also for governments

who must

deceive

a public,

as it gives

victims no time to let others know what is being done to them or

where

they are being

taken.

The currentU.S. war on terrorismis philosophically misleading


with respect to the project of arriving at an adequate, realistic
to
of terrorism because
that war was never meant
understanding
It ignores the terrorism of rape, of
target terrorists in general.
in intimate relationships,
violence
and of terrorist regimes and

military policies, such as thosedescribed by theRed Cross regarding


treatment

the U.S.

of Arab

detainees.

of

conception

terrorism

guided solely by theobjective ofmaking sense of the usual suspects,

or of the war

on

terrorism, risks

out

leaving

the commonest,

most

pervasive forms of terrorismin theworld, perpetuating theirpublic


invisibility.Even if it remains true thatmost preventable suffering
and death are caused not by terrorismbut "by malnutrition, lack of
education,

and

all

the

ills connected

to poverty,"

an

enormous

amount of preventable sufferingand death, globally, is caused by


terrorism against

targets who

have

lacked

a public

voice.

50

For examples of intimate terroristcreativity,see thefilmWhat Ever Happened


toBaby Jane? Robert Aldrich (dir.), 1962.The filmSleeping with theEnemy, Joseph
Ruben (dir.), 1991, portrays theuse of surprisebut fails to capture the inventiveness
of abusers in creating it.

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RECOGNIZING TERRORISM

And
positions

how much
of power

public voice?51

29

suicidal terrorismdirected against those in

is a desperate,

last-ditch

attempt

also

to gain

UniversityofWisconsin
Madison, WI, 53706, USA
E-mail:

cfcard@wisc.edu

51

Thanks toAlison Jaggar, Paula Gottlieb, Mohammed Abed, Vivi Atkin, Sara
Gavrell, Fred Harrington, Alan Rubel, and to audiences at the Rocky Mountain
Philosophy Conference in Boulder (2006) and at the University of Victoria
Lansdowne lecture (2006) for helpful comments, reflections,and suggestions.

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