Ebarle v Sucaldito

156 SCRA 803

Facts:
Bienvenido Ebarle, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for
reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks to an injunctive relief from the cases filed against
him.
On September 26, 1970, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the
City Fiscal for violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. The City Fiscal awarded the simulated bidding in favor of Tabiliran
Trucking Company.
On the same date, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines commenced Criminal Case No. 2-71
of the City Fiscal, another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code. The bidding for the Capitol Building of Zamboanga del Sure was
maliciously manipulated to give preference in favor of Codeniera Construction.
On January 26, 1971, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the City
Fiscal, a prosecution for violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ebarle testifies falsely that he acquired said lot by purchase from a certain Brigido Sanchez and
that he is the owner, when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and is
owned by the provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71
of the respondent Fiscal, an action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and
213 of the Revised Penal Code. The City Fiscal awarded the simulated bidding in favor of
Tabiliran Trucking Company.
On April 26, 1971, Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed three complaints, subsequently
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XV1-8-ZDS of
the Circuit Criminal Court of Pagadian City, for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft
Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code. Bienvenido Ebarle appointed different
people related to him to different positions of the government.
Bienvenido Ebarle relies on the failure of the City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply
with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY
WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED,"
Issue: Whether or not Executive No. 264 applies to criminal action

Held:
No. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not
even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to
"irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had
it intended to make itself applicable thereto, as well as to such technical terms as accussed,
convicted or acquitted.
Santiago vs. Commission on Elections
Facts
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with Commission on Elections a Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative. He
based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right
of the people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution
The COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing the publication of the petition
of Delfin, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including
the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9
December 1996; and setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers; and representatives of, or counsel for, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK),
Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).12 Senator Roco, on
that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
On 18 December 1996, the Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising several arguments such as the
following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of
the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement
of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for
Intervention. They contends that the proposal does not involve an amendment but a revision
because, although, the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions,
such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.19 A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is
limited to amendments.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A.

No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional
amendments. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is
the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters
and COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the
sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right to peoples initiative
Held:
No. R.A. No. 6735 does not include peoples initiative to amend the Constitution simply because
it lacks a subtitle on the subject should be given the weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in
statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute may be
consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little
weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses.

People v Echaves
95 SCRA 663
The Presidential Decree No. 772 which took effect on August 20, 1975 provides:

Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the
latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an
imprisonment.
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court
separate informations against Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and
Modesto Suello charging them with squatting a portion of a grazing land physically occupied,
possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order
dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged
that the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy, whereas under the decree the
entry should be effected with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree
does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of stealth and
strategy the expression with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner
and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner. The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be
reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted. The lower court denied the motion.
The fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts,
applies to agricultural lands.
Held:
No. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing
lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for
any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands.
(The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not
apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to
urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a
tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain)
Paras vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996.*

Facts:
Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during
the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed
by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition.
To prevent the holding of the recall election, Paras filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining
order. The trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition.
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition.
Paras argument cites Section 74(b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date
of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday
of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.
Issue: Whether or not an SK election is a regular election.
No. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. When
construed, such elective local official may be subject of a recall election during the second year
of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to Paras interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
(Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74(b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997)

No. L-13160. January 30, 1960]

BIENVENIDO NERA, petitioner and appellee, vs. PAULINO GARCIA, Secretary of

Health, and TRANQUILINO ELICANO, Director of Hospitals, respondents and

appellants.
Facts
Bienvenido Nera a civil service eligible, serving as clerk in the Maternity and Children's
Hospital. He served as manager and cashier of the Maternity Employee's Cooperative
Association, Inc. As such, he was supposed to have under his control funds of the association. On
May 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with malversation,
for allegedly misappropriating the sum of P12,636.21 belonging to the association.
Antonio Rodriguez, acting for and in the absence of the Director of Hospitals, required Nera to
explain within seventy-two hours from, why he should not be dismissed from the service for acts
involving dishonesty. This period of seventy-two hours was extended to December 20, 1956.
Before the expiration of the period as extended, December 19, 1956, Nera received a
communication from Director of Hospital suspending him from office as clerk of the Maternity
and Children's Hospital, effective upon receipt thereof. This suspension carried the approval of
respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health.
Nera then filed the civil action to restrain Director of Hospitals from proceeding with the
administrative case against him until after the termination of the criminal case; to annul the order
of suspension dated December 19, 1956, and to compel Director of Hospitals to lift the
suspension.
The trial court held that Nera was illegally suspended, because the suspension came before he
was able to file his answer to the administrative complaint, thereby depriving him "of his right to
a fair hearing and an opportunity to present his defense, thus violating the due process clause";
also, that assuming for a moment that Nera were guilty of malversation or misappropriation of
the funds of the association, nevertheless, said irregularity had no connection with his duty as
clerk of the Maternity and Children's Hospital. The dishonesty or misconduct in office having
connection with one's duties and functions in order to warrant punishment, this involves an
interpretation of Section 694(2) of the Revised Administrative Code, which for purposes of
reference we reproduce below:
"if the charge against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty". Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Neri be given a preventive suspension.
Held:
Yes. It will be observed from the last line of the second paragraph of section 694 that there is a
comma after the words dishonesty and oppresion, thereby warranting the conclusion that only the
phrase "grave misconduct or neglect" is qualified by the words "in the performance of duty". In
other words, dishonesty and oppression to warrant punishment or dismissal, need not be

committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. Thereby making clear
the legislative intent that to justify suspension, when the person charged is guilty merely of
neglect, the same must be in the performance of his duty; but that when he is charged with
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct. these need have no relation to the performance of
duty.

StatCon maxim: The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last antecedent
if the latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents.