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be more stable: exuberance in one issue area may be offset by more sober or
realistic assessments and every day interactions in another issue area.
Of course, exuberance, disappointment, and shattered expectations are
characteristics of the psychology of people and small groups, not nations or
states. So to test more observable implications, the research needs to go
more micro. The body of theory could be adapted to interstate relationships
to generate additional observable implications. What would we expect to see
in foreign policy discourses, in the arguments made or not made in the policy
process, in the actors involved in policy, and in actions taken unilaterally,
bilaterally, or multilaterally if a theory of disappointment were correct? Can
different leaders be classified according to their predispositions towards
exuberance and thus disappointment?
Yan does use events data to examine overall patterns of conflict and
cooperation in the USChina relationship as evidence for superficial
friendship-generated instability. But, as I will note later, these data are only
one place to look for confirmation (or disconfirmation) of the argument. And
these events data do not necessarily capture what is going on at the
individual and small group level where, after all, the effects of psychological
factors are most observable.
Security dilemma theory is a better explanation for instability in
relations
Johnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda
Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government,
Harvard University (Stability and Instability in SinoUS Relations: A Response
to Yan Xuetongs Superficial Friendship Theory Chinese Journal of
International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.
doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003
Still, I think Yan might consider additional explanations other than the two he
dismisses in this article. An obvious alternative would come from security
dilemma theory.31 A security dilemma has the following features. Two or
more essentially status-quo-oriented states with more or less benign
intentions begin to doubt the other is similarly oriented. Each side takes
politico-military steps to enhance its security in the face of this uncertainty.
These steps are seen by Self as defensive and non-threatening to the other
sides core interests. Others, however, sees them as offensive and
threatening. The result is a spiral of insecurity and the mutual construction of
an adversary.
Security dilemmas are endogenous social processes. As they intensify, the
meaning of cooperative moves is discounted and the meaning of conflictual
moves is amplified. Each side comes to believe that it is more or less the
status quo state, but increasingly doubts that the other side is. At first, Selfs
response is framed in terms of maintaining its prior strategy, perhaps in
hopes that the other side is misperceiving the relationship. But Self then
begins to shift to a view that the other side is more revisionist than previously
thought, e.g. a shift towards a dispositional conclusion about Other. This leads
to a reassessment of the wisdom or appropriateness of Self's old strategy,
and the rise of voices in support of a more basic shift towards a more
coercive strategy. So a security dilemma can start out as a cycle of insecurity
between two essentially status quo states but end up changing preferences in
less status quo directions. In this regard, security dilemmas are socialization
experiences.32 This process also suggests that, contrary to Yans logic,
relations of enmity are not necessarily more stable than so-called superficial
friendship33enmity breeds security dilemma dynamics which are likely to
amplify and accentuate malign signalling and malign reactions. Although
relations will not zigzag between amity and enmity, the probability of conflict
increases exponentially or at least non-linearly.
To check whether security dilemma dynamics are increasingly characteristic
of the USChina relationship, we need to look for three basic pieces of
evidence. First, we need to look for evidence that Self discounts Others
cooperative behaviour and amplifies Others non-cooperative behaviour, such
that these behaviours are now interpreted differently from in the past. In
contrast, superficial friendship theory might suggest an equal exaggeration of
positive (exuberance) and negative (disappointment) information.
in the past, in the 1960s, when Chinas leaders advocated nuclear multipolarity, presumably because this would help balance against and constrain
US power. Chinas assessment of the non-proliferation problem has changed,
however.
In the category of complementary interests, one could argue that bilateral
trade is a USChina interest because of the victory of free trade ideology in
both countries, indeed globally. There was a time, however, when a new
international economic order was the intellectually dominant argument
among many developing states. Now market ideology is deeply ingrained,
despite the fact that there are clearly absolute and relative losers from free
market economics.
As for conflicting interests, one could argue that the main reason arms sales
to Taiwan are on this list is because the Chinese Communist Party decided in
the early1940s to change its position on the status and importance of
Taiwan.22 Or because the USA believes (with less evidence than one might
think) that the credibility of its commitments are at stake in its relationship
with Taiwan.
Regarding confrontational interests, maritime control of the South China Sea
is on this list only because of a deeply ingrained linkage between territoriality
and sovereignty in Chinese concepts of interests. This linkage is a product of
a particular nationalist interpretation of Chinese history. It is not fixed, nor is
its intensity necessarily shared across all states. Nothing about geography,
material power distributions, or anarchy predicts to these definitions of
interests.
In short, because of problems in the coding of interests, Yans analysis may
be exaggerating the degree of instability in the relationship after the end of
the Cold War. And therefore Yan may be exaggerating the degree of
disappointment and shattered expectations on both sides.
Yans assessment of Chinese motives doesnt reflect official policy
Johnston, 11 - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda
Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government,
Harvard University (Stability and Instability in SinoUS Relations: A Response
to Yan Xuetongs Superficial Friendship Theory Chinese Journal of
International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29.
doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003
Yans ledger of shared and not shared interests is a mix of interests that
include officially announced ones, and those that he infers. An important
source of instability, he notes, is essentially a zero-sum relationship between
US desire to maintain global leadership and Chinas desire to regain its place
as world leading power.18 This is quite an admission about China's interests.
Since it is not official policy to challenge or replace the USA as the dominant
state in the system, and since there is no obvious evidence for or against this
being a deeply held interest among the top leadership, it is hard to know how
to assess this claim. The USA certainly openly refuses to relinquish its
leadership role. But does this therefore mean there is a conflict of interest
over hegemony? Not according to the Peoples Republic of China government.
Moreover, the USA officially supports Chinas rise, and thus does not see US
leadership and Chinas rise as necessarily zero-sum. So how are we to judge
where US and Chinese interests lie on this question? For those officially
articulated interests, how do we know they are authoritative expressions of
true intentions? And for those that are not officially stated but inferred by Yan
himself, how do we know these even exist as interests?
In short, I think that there is certain arbitrariness to the list of interests in
Table 1. If one plausibly recodes many of the interests in Yans list, or adds
missing interests not on the current Table 1, then the balance of common,
complementary, conflictual, and confrontational interests may change. This
affects the overall assessment of the degree of stability and instability in the
relationship. In essence, the operationalization and measurement of the
dependent variable becomes problematic. This, in turn, raises doubts about
the reliability and validity of tests of the superficial friendship thesis. One
suggestion would be that Yan develops explicit criteria for putting certain
issues on this list, for coding them in particular ways, and for keeping other
issues off the list.
corruption allowed to run rampant. Chinas domestic policy needs are now
integrally bound up with the countrys foreign policy direction. In Xis
worldview, an increasingly rich and powerful China must now start playing
a much bigger role in the world. No longer will China hide its strength, bide its
time, and never take the lead (taoguang yanghui, juebu dangtou
), Deng Xiaopings foreign policy mantra for decades. China must now
pursue an activist (fenfa youwei ) foreign policy that maximizes
Chinas economic and security interests, and one that begins to engage in
the longer term reform of the global order. Xi speaks for the first time of
Chinas grand strategy needing to embrace a new great power diplomacy
with Chinese characteristics (you zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao
), in order to craft a new type of great power relations
(xinxing daguo guanxi ) with the United States. Xi, in short, is not
a status quo politician. He is the exact reverse. And in pursuing his sense of
national mission and personal destiny, he is prepared to take calculated risks
in a traditionally risk-averse Communist Party culture.
Xi Jinpings sense of personal and national urgency is animated by a
formidable, Confucian work ethic, which he also expects of his Party
colleagues and policy advisors. He is results-driven. He is frustrated by the
interminable processes of the Chinese bureaucracy, and its predisposition for
formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is very much a man in a
hurry.
For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal
authority and policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with
the United States, albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision
for Chinas future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing
role of Chinas one-party state. When, therefore, Xi uses the term win-win
(shuangying ) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it should
not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential
value in strategic and political collaboration with the United States.
In short, there is still reasonable foreign and security policy space for the U.S.
administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping, although it is an
open question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and
the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of bold
policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on intractable
questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful re-unification of the Korean
Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it can while it
still lasts.
Beijing has taken two measures that demonstrate a growing intention to play
offense, not just defense. China now plans for the first time to deploy ballistic
missile submarines in the Pacific. That is a major change in Beijings
deployment of forces. Until now, Chinese leaders have been content with a
land-based, purely second-strike nuclear deterrent. Putting part of its
strategic arsenal aboard submarines both increases deterrent survivability
and creates the specter (however remote) of a first-strike capability.
The other component of an offensive rather than purely defensive Chinese
strategy is its growing diplomatic and economic (and possibly strategic)
penetration of Latin America. Premier Li Keqiangs high-profile visit to several
major South American countries in the spring of 2015 was a potent symbol of
that intention. But more important has been the deployment of Chinese
economic assets. China has now displaced the United States as Brazils
largest trading partner, and Beijing has been making multi-billion dollar loans
to various Latin American governments.
Washington is clearly worried about the influence that might accompany such
economic maneuvers. In March 2015, President Obama made an
announcement that surprised most observers, declaring Venezuelas leftist
regime to be a national security threat to the United States. What puzzled
experts is that this move came on the heels of Obamas policy of
rapprochement with Cuba and the previous willingness of his administration
(and its predecessors) to regard the behavior of Caracas as an annoyance
rather than a threat. What had changed?
One major development took place in January when the Chinese government
agreed to a multi-billion-dollar investment in Venezuela to help offset the
impact of the global oil price slump on that country. In addition, there were
reports in March of an impending $5 billion loan to Caracas from China, which
would have brought the cumulative total to $45 billion. Perhaps Obamas
announcement was just coincidental timing, but it seems more likely that it
was a recognition of, and a firm response to, a perceived Chinese geopolitical
foray into Washingtons traditional sphere of influence in the Western
Hemisphere.
All of this suggests that China does not intend to be a passive victim of U.S.
primacy. Beijing may operate at a disadvantage with respect to a geopolitical
power struggle against the United States, but it does have some assets to
deploy. And it fully intends to do so. Washington may find that its effort to
maintain a position of primacy in East Asia is more challenging than it ever
anticipated.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/americas-doomed-china-strategy16365?page=2)//SL
Two developments in the past month indicate that Washingtons mixed policy
of engagement and containment (or congagement) toward China has
begun to tilt more toward containment. The first development was the visit of
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to India in mid-April and the signing of a
bilateral cooperation agreement on military logistics. The other episode is
President Obamas just-completed trip to Vietnam and the announced lifting
of the long-standing arms embargo on that country. As usual, American
officials insist that the marked change in U.S. policy toward Hanoi is not in
any way directed against China. But such statements strain credulity,
especially when viewed in the larger context of U.S. warships conducting
freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea and bluntly reminding
Beijing of Americas security obligations to the Philippines under a bilateral
defense treaty.
The containment side of U.S. policy has gone from merely assembling some
of the necessary components, to be activated at a later date if necessary
(first gear), to the initial phase of activation (second gear). More emphasis is
likely to be placed on China as a serious strategic competitor, if not an
outright adversary. But developing any kind of a containment policy against
China is almost certain to prove hopelessly difficult. Despite the sometimes
inflammatory rhetoric coming from Donald Trump and some other China
bashers, the bilateral economic relationship remains quite extensive and
crucial. China is Americas second largest trading partner. In 2015, the United
States exported $116 billion in goods to China while importing $482 billion.
Disrupting that relationship would be extremely costly and painful for both
countries.
That point underscores one key reason why reviving anything even faintly
resembling the Cold Warera containment policy that worked against the Soviet Union
is a hopeless quest. Americas economic relations with the USSR were
minuscule, so there was little sacrifice on that front in taking a hardline
stance against Moscow. That is clearly not the case today regarding
Americas economic connections to China.
There is also the matter of assembling a reliable alliance against Beijing.
Conducting a containment policy against the Soviet Union during the Cold
War was feasible because (at least during the crucial formative stages)
neither the United States nor its key allies had much of a political or
economic relationship to lose with Moscow. The costs, therefore, of shunning
Moscow were minimal. That is clearly not the case with China. Most of the
East Asian countries, including close U.S. allies Japan and South Korea,
already have extensive economic links with Beijing. Indeed, China is Japans
largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of that countrys total trade.
It would not be easy for those countries to jeopardize such stakes to support
a confrontational, U.S.-led containment policy aimed at Beijing. Tokyo
undoubtedly has concerns about Chinas behavior in the East China Sea (and
about overall Chinese ambitions), but it would still be a reluctant recruit in a
hostile containment strategy.
Indeed, as time passed during the Cold War, even the containment strategy
directed against the Soviet Union proved increasingly difficult for U.S. leaders.
That was especially true after the early 1970s, when West Germanys policy
of Ostpolitik sought better relations with communist East Germany, and
indirectly with Moscow and the rest of the Soviet bloc. As connections
deepened between democratic Europe and the USSR, support for hard-line
U.S. policies began to fade. That point became evident in the 1980s, when
U.S. leaders attempted to persuade their European allies to reject the
proposal for a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe,
fearing that it would give Moscow an unhealthy degree of policy leverage.
Much to Washingtons frustration, key European allies rejected the advice.
If the United States attempts to mobilize regional support for a containment
policy against China, it will start out operating in an environment even less
conducive than the policy environment regarding the Soviet Union in the
1980s. Washingtons courtship might be welcomed by very small countries,
such as the Philippines, that are already on extremely bad terms with Beijing.
Larger powers, though, are more likely to see what benefits they can entice
and extract from Washington, without making firm commitments that would
antagonize China and jeopardize their own important ties to that county.
There is a final reason why an overt containment policy against China would
be a poor option for the United States. Several troublesome global or regional
issues will be difficult to address without substantial input and cooperation
from China. It is nearly impossible, for example, to imagine progress being
made on the difficult and complex issue of North Koreas nuclear and ballistic
missile programs without Chinas extensive involvement.
The United States needs to lower, not increase, its level of confrontation
toward China. That also means restoring respect for the concept of spheres of
influence. In attempting to preserve U.S. primacy in East Asia and the
western Pacific, U.S. leaders are intruding into the South China Sea and other
areas that logically matter far more to China than to America. Such a strategy
is likely to result either in a humiliating U.S. retreat under pressure or a
disastrous military collision. A containment strategy is a feeble attempt to evade that
reality.
Containment fails it doesnt assume the current international
power structure or lack of necessary support from East Asian allies
Kai 14 doctor of International Relations from the Graduate School of
International Studies, Yonsei University, South Korea, and is a lecturer there
(Jin, The US, China, and the Containment Trap, The Diplomat, April 30th,
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-us-china-and-the-containmenttrap/) // EDP
Regarding the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute in the East China Sea, U.S.
President Barack Obamas recent position was loud and clear: And let me
reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japans security is absolute, and
Article 5 covers all territories under Japans administration, including the
Senkaku Islands. This confirmation of Washingtons military commitment to
Tokyo in a possible clash between China and Japan was called myopic by
the Chinese state news agency.
Given the current situation, even the slightest possibility of U.S. military
involvement may push Beijing to alter its expectations and act more
decisively and consistently regarding the enduring dispute, all while still
trying to prevent the situation from getting worse. After all, recent joint U.S.Japan military exercises demonstrated to China that the U.S. has already
prepared several operation plans for possible military assistance. In fact,
China is concerned not only about the probability of U.S. military intervention,
but also about the long-term impact of this reassurance toward Japan and the
complexity it may add to the current Sino-Japanese standoff.
Despite U.S. assurances, in Beijings view, a number of signs indicate that the
U.S. policy toward China intends to contain rather than engage. The
U.S. supports the Philippines on the South China Sea dispute, reiterates
Washingtons security commitment to Japan on the East China Sea dispute,
and has also agreed to sell more advanced arms to Taiwan. In almost every
dispute that involves China, the U.S. seems to automatically support any
party that has trouble with China, either directly or indirectly. Meanwhile, the
U.S. labels Chinas overseas economic activities as neo-colonialism and calls
Chinas territorial disputes with its neighbors evidence of expansionism. The
U.S. has also called China one of the biggest sources for cyber espionage
activities (although Mr. Edward Snowden told the world another story).
For the U.S., the rise of China just seems to be an uncomfortable fit with the
dominant, U.S.-led system. So the U.S. may rely on its still-dominant power
and its alliance relations (especially with its key partners) to sustain its
supremacy in and beyond the Asia-Pacific region particularly without
making substantial compromises to accommodate Chinas core
interests. By containing China with regard to Beijings core interests, the
U.S. is trying to gain strategic advantages.
Such measures and policies may put real pressure on China in the near
future, but they are risky. The fact is that the U.S. might have already been
hijacked by its military alliances in East Asia and thus finds it increasingly
difficult to handle its relations with both its traditional allies and a rapidly
emerging China. The U.S. faces a difficult situation: if it fails to subdue a
powerful China, it loses respect and trust from its allies. Hence, at least for
the time being, the U.S. is more willing to hold its ground, especially with
support and assistance from its traditional allies.
But this expedient makeshift can hardly solve the fundamental problem. A
rising China, like other great powers, needs strategic room for its survival and
further development. China surely needs to adapt to regional and global
arrangements, while the international community also needs to
accommodate or constructively engage this newly emerged great power.
In the 1970s and 1980s, improvements in China-U.S. relations contributed to
Washingtons strong and successful containment of the former Soviet Union
in Europe the traditional region of concern for the U.S. But the Cold War has
been over for decades. The same policy and approach will not necessarily
work for an emerged China under completely different international
conditions. And thats not even mentioning the challenge of confronting two
great powers (China and Russia) simultaneously. However, the current
situation suggests that the U.S. is in danger of falling into the containment
trap the more it loses its global supremacy and the more it expects support
and assistance from its traditional allies, the more obligated the U.S. will feel
to push forward hard-line policies toward China. Such containment might
work, given comprehensive and unconditional support from U.S. allies, but
reality is rarely that simple. Meanwhile, the U.S. should not underestimate
Chinas strategic determination and counter-measures to containment.
That being said, the rise of China and its disputes with neighboring countries
inevitably pose challenges for the long-established regional and global
arrangements. Hence Chinas rise may cause concerns. In view of this, China
needs to handle and adjust its diplomacy very cautiously to avoid
unnecessary misunderstandings and misperceptions. On the other hand,
particularly in East Asia, the current power structure and regional
arrangements were built either during the Cold War era, when there was
confrontation between two super powers, or after the Cold War, when U.S.
unilateral supremacy prevailed. During these two periods, China did not need
and could not afford sizable strategic room. Thats no longer the case today,
when China has already become a sizable great power and is still rising.
In the long run, the U.S. cannot contain China. Accordingly, rather than
relying on excessive containment or a check-and-balance approach, the world
and especially the U.S. might find more opportunities from deeper and more
constructive policies of engagement with China. Hopefully this engagement
can truly be a win-win game.
Containment ruins US soft power and increases Chinese influence
Kurlantzick 16 senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign
Relations (Joshua, Let China Win. Its Good for America, Washington Times,
January 14th 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/let-china-winits-good-for-america/2016/01/14/bfec4732-b9b6-11e5-829c26ffb874a18d_story.html) //EDP
Still, Obama administration officials see a battle for supremacy. As Clinton
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2011: Lets put aside the
moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in, and lets just talk
straight realpolitik. We are in a competition with China in the Pacific islands.
So the White House has increased U.S. diplomatic representation in the
region, boosted aid dramatically and rhetorically pointed to a competition
between Beijing and Washington. It has done so even though most Pacific
nations are tiny economies and the U.S. Navy retains a
massive advantage over Chinas in speed, technology and basing throughout
the Pacific. The White House strategy inevitably diverts scarce U.S. diplomatic
resources from other parts of the globe while leaving island nations feeling
compelled to choose between closer ties with China or with the United States.
The result might embarrass Washington: Many of these nations might prefer
China for its lavish aid and possible investment.
Despite Chinas growing global influence, its image in many regions, including
in Asia, is still weak. In the past decade, its relations with many of its
neighbors have soured, largely because of its aggressive claims in disputed
coastal waters. The same Pew surveys that found favorable views of China in
Africa also showed that negative opinions were much higher in Asian nations
such as India, the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam, where 74 percent of people
had an unfavorable view of China. In Europe, Australia and parts of Latin
America, initial excitement in the 2000s about the impact of new Chinese
investment and aid has given way to decidedly mixed views among citizens
and governments about Beijing, including fears that China will not play by
trade rules, will steal technology and will make investments that offer little
benefit to local economies.
U.S. popularity, by contrast, has recovered from the lows of the Bush
administration, particularly across the Pacific. A 2014 poll of people in 11
Asia-Pacific countries, conducted for the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, found that nearly 80 percent of respondents, including those in many
countries that viewed China unfavorably in the Pew study, supported a more
robust U.S. economic and security presence in Asia a percentage that
would have surely been lower during the 2000s. But the exercise of soft
power rests on lasting positive perceptions, and it does not help for
Washington to cultivate strongmen such as Malaysias Najib or Kazakhstans
Nursultan Nazarbayev while promoting democracy elsewhere. It leads people
in these countries to see little difference between U.S. and Chinese foreign
policy.
Containment fails it provokes a nationalist backlash
Swaine, 15- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The
Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyondamerican-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-chinabalance-of-power)//JS
The Unsustainability of American Predominance and the Chinese Response
While continued American predominance cannot, at present, be justified on
the basis of a Chinese drive for predominance, what of the widespread
argument in U.S. policy circles that such predominance is necessary
regardless of Chinese intentions, as the best possible means of ensuring
regional (and global) order? While deeply rooted in both American
exceptionalism and beliefs about the benefits of hegemonic power in the
international order, the notion that unequivocal U.S. predominance in the
Western Pacific constitutes the only basis for long-term stability and
prosperity across the Asia-Pacific is a dangerous, increasingly obsolete
concept, for several reasons.
First, it is inconceivable that Beijing would accept the unambiguously superior
level of American predominance that the many proponents of this course of
action believe is required to ensure long-term regional stability in the face of
a rising China, involving total U.S. freedom of action and a clear ability to
prevail militarily without excessive costs in any conceivable contingency
occurring up to Chinas mainland borders. The United States would never
tolerate such predominance by any power along its borders, and why should
an increasingly strong China? Given Chinas expanding interests and
capabilities, any effort to sustain an unambiguous, absolute level of American
military superiority along Beijings maritime periphery will virtually guarantee
an increasingly destabilizing and economically draining arms race, much
greater levels of regional polarization and friction than at present, and
reduced incentives on the part of both Washington and Beijing to work
together to address a growing array of common global challenges.
U.S. efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in Chinas backyard
will further stoke Beijings worst fears and beliefs about American
containment, sentiments inevitably reinforced by domestic nationalist
pressures, ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist
motives, and Chinas general commitment to the enhancement of a
multipolar order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of long-term vulnerability
and weakness for Beijing that prevents any assured defense of Chinese
territory or any effective wielding of influence over regional-security-related
issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the fate of the Korean
Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce
and sustained domestic criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it.
This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power
continues to grow, bolstering Chinese self-confidence. Under such conditions,
effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain predominance along Chinas
maritime periphery would become a matter of political survival for future
Chinese leaders.
eight million college graduates Chinas universities produce each year. Bluecollar wages that had risen for a decade have been stagnant for well over a
year as layoffs continue in coastal factories, with labor disputes doubling in
2014 and again in 2015.25
Iraq, and has now fallen back to close to three percent. Washington has been
able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in
part to the bases its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop.
Chinas only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than it
is worth.
Mutual interests, interdependence, and the power gap dissuades
China
Rudd 15- Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 (Kevin, How to
Break the Mutually Assured Misperception Between the U.S. and China, The
World Post, 4-20-2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-chinarelations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html)//SL
5. Armed conflict between the U.S. and China is highly unlikely in the coming decade.
Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and Chinas neighbors
have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard
security interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of
any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S.
over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for
any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention
for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no
Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact,
there is a high level of economic interdependency in the relationship, which
some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the
possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the U.S. is no
longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.
However, armed conflict could feasibly arise through one of two scenarios:
Either an accidental collision between U.S. and Chinese aircraft or naval
vessels followed by a badly managed crisis; or
Through a collision (accidental or deliberate) between Chinese military assets
and those of a regional U.S. ally, most obviously Japan or the Philippines.
In the case of Japan, the report argues that, after bilateral tensions reached
unprecedented heights during 2013-14, Beijing and Tokyo took steps in late
2014 to de-escalate their standoff over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Hotlines
between the two militaries are now being established, reducing the possibility
of accidental conflict escalation. However, the same cannot be said of the
South China Sea, where China continues its large-scale land reclamation
efforts, where tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines remain high, and
where mil-to-mil protocols are undeveloped. Xi Jinping has neither the
interest, room for maneuver or personal predisposition to refrain from an
assertive defense of these territorial claims, or to submit them to any form of
external arbitration.
Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S.,
a nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine Chinas economic
rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the
immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct
conflict with the U.S. This explains Xis determination to oversee the
U.S. power. Until recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based deterrent
force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft carrier, and many of
its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power.
When these less-than-imposing features of the Chinese military posture are
combined with widely reported deficiencies in airlift, reconnaissance,
logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous.
China is an emerging regional power that is unlikely to ever match America in
the main measures of military power unless dysfunctional political processes
in Washington impair our nations economy and defenses. In fact, secular
trends are already at work within the Chinese economy, society and political
culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less threatening
tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of America.
Chinas rise will be peaceful cultural norms, focus on domestic
development, and reliance on current global order
Li and Worm 10 professors at the Asian Research Centre of Copenhagen
Business Schools Department of International Economics and Management
(Xin and Verner, Building China Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise, Journal of
Chinese Political Science, November 24th, 2010,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226526970_Building_China's_Soft_P
ower_for_a_Peaceful_Rise) // EDP
We argue China has a genuine desire for peace in her rise for several
reasons. Firstly, Chinese culture advocates moral strength instead of military
power, worships kingly rule instead of hegemonic rule, and emphasizes
persuasion by virtue and returning good to evil. Therefore, at the individual
level, even if there has been a victim mentality and retaliation sentiment in
populace, when promoted to a top leadership position, Chinese will tend to
behave like a benevolent sage, partly because of the cultural norm and partly
he/she may feel good by doing so. On 10 April 1974, Deng Xiaoping delivered
a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in which he declared if one
day China should...play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject
others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world
should...expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to
overthrow it. 3 Secondly, at the state level, Chinas priority in the important
strategic opportunity period is still domestic development so that China
would try her best to avoid conflict and seek peace. Thirdly, at the
international level, todays international system is characterized by economic
interdependence and nuclear weaponry. This reality makes a military or
confrontational power-shift/rise less likely or too costly for China to even
consider [4]. Ikenberry [5] argues that China not only needs continued access
to the current global capitalist system but also wants to protect the systems
rules and institutions because China has thrived in such system. We argue
even if China desires to reform the current world order which China perceives
imbalanced and unreasonable, China can be patient enough and adopt a
gradualist approach toward that end, just like what China did in its gradual
economic reform and opening up. Last but not least, Chinese history does not
support that kind of prediction that Chine will use non-peaceful means to rise
as well. By reexamining the evidences of diplomacy of the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC), Johnston makes a convincing case that China has become
more integrated into and more cooperative within international institutions
than ever before and behaviorally it does not appear at the moment that
China is balancing very vigorously against American military power or U.S.
interests as its leaders have defined them [6]. We also disagree with those
arguments based on power transition theory, according to which, the rise of
China will ultimately lead to Chinese power parity with the US [7], which may
cause structure-changing wars under certain circumstances. Theoretically,
the power transition theory posits that a rising power is likely turn into a
revisionist with two conditions: its capability and willingness (or
dissatisfaction with the status quo). Empirically, history has shown that an
international system with shifting power structure is fueled with conflicts and
militarized disputes [810]. Based on this logic, a rising China will change the
international power structure and eventually lead to conflicts. We argue there
is a missing point in such argument, namely, there should be another
condition: whether the rising power is willing to take unilateral and radical
action to reduce its dissatisfaction. Clearly, China appears to be a pragmatic
power which prefers modest actions
China is not aggressive government wants collaboration with
surrounding countries, routinely makes concessions for the greater
good, and is open to foreign policy reform
Li and Worm 10 professors at the Asian Research Centre of Copenhagen
Business Schools Department of International Economics and Management
(Xin and Verner, Building China Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise, Journal of
Chinese Political Science, November 24th, 2010,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226526970_Building_China's_Soft_P
ower_for_a_Peaceful_Rise) // EDP
On the other hand, we notice that Chinese government is not changeresistant and actually China has a plan to gradually reform its political
system. Ramo [28, p. 13] points out that the CCP is the source of most of the
change in China in the last 20 years. Yu [29] points out Chinese know how
demagogues can destroy countries in the name of democracy...China has its
own reform agenda based on Chinas painful historic experience. We support
Colleys viewpoint [30] that many people (especially in the West) tend to see
Chinas development as a glass half empty or largely focus on the negative
aspects of Chinas development. What those people neglected is the fact that
16 Starting since the end of Cultural Revolution before which the main
political ideology was class struggle, CCP has been continuously reforming its
political system and improving its domestic political values. Many new ideas
have been officially adopted by the CCP government, such as hearing system
in 1996, rule of law in 1997, civil society in 1998, developing political
civilization in 2001, human-oriented in 2003, protection of human rights and
protection of private property written in the national Constitution in 2004,
and building a socialist harmonious society in 2004. Colley [30] argues when
Chinese leaders like Wen Jiabao talk of putting people first and developing
a harmonious society, they tend to mean it. We argue China needs and can
have more and substantial improvement in domestic governance because
even within the current political system a one party democracy can still be
developed; and in the meantime, China needs to better communicate with
outside world what progress China has made and what the political reform it
plans to proceed. Internationally, China has consistently followed the
principles of peaceful coexistence and no-interference of other nations
domestic affairs which reward China a friendly and peaceful image in many
countries. China advocates that all nations regardless of size and wealth
should be treated as equal and their ways of life should be respected. China
maintains that peace and development should be the two major themes of
contemporary world and development should be the priority of developing
nations. China encourages SouthSouth cooperation to promote economic
development of developing world. China claims that all countries should
shoulder common but differentiated obligations to solving global issues such
as climate change and the developed nations should attend to the needs of
development of developing countries when it comes to international
obligations like reducing CO2. China pursues common security through
dialogue and cooperation17 and insists the UN Security Council should be the
core mechanism of international security. China proposes that political and
diplomatic solutions should be the primary means to international disputes.
China is devoted to improving the current unbalanced and unjust
international order in pursuit of a harmonious world. According to Wang and
Lu [16], in the reform era, China has adopted an independent foreign policy,
i.e., resistant to outside pressure, free from alignment, non-ideological, and
non-confrontational, which together with its good neighbor policy have made
China appealing. China has been sensitive to being seen as a responsible
stakeholder and behaving accordingly. For instance, in 1997 Asian financial
crisis, Chinese government resisted the pressure for RMB devaluation which
helped East Asia recover at Chinas own expense of detrimental economic
consequences in short run. In dealing with North Korean nuclear crisis, China
abandoned the ideological approach it had used in Maos time and played an
active mediating role in the Six-Party Talk. In order to promote peace, China
has also made unprecedented concessions in solving the territorial disputes
with its neighboring countries [32]. We see Chinas foreign policies and
principles of international relations as a strong source of Chinas soft power.
Although some scholars argue Chinas practice of non-interference might
jeopardize some western countries efforts to pressure some dictatorship
regimes to democratize their domestic governances, we argue China should
not compromise on this non-interference principle. The normal practices of
Western powers is to use economic sanction and arms embargo to force
changes in domestic governance, which can be argued to have little and even
negative impact on solving the very problems. Simply, many sanctioned
countries are those in urgent need of economic development and economic
sanction may bring humanitarian disasters to those countries. Having said
this, we nevertheless suggest China to be more flexible to work more closely
with international organizations and relevant western powers to find
alternative ways to solve those problems.
bonds for the intended purpose of hurting the U.S. economy, one of its
largest markets for exports? China would likely lose a huge amount of money
in the first round, when its remaining bonds dropped precipitously in value.
But more important, by damaging the U.S. economy and basically
threatening economic warfare, China would almost certainly have done
severe damage to a major export market and a source of foreign direct
investment. Reducing the overall purchasing power of the United States and
upsetting it politically would also risk reciprocal economic punishment.
one could describe the U.S. relationship with South Korea and Australia
(alliances) or Singapore and Taiwan (security partnerships). These alliances
and security relationships give the United States more than just additive
power in a conflict; they provide permanent basing rights in many cases and,
in others, the right to use ports and airstrips for exercises and in certain
emergencies. In addition, they provide intelligence sharing and local
awareness regarding geography, weather, and the like that serve as a major
force multiplier for American power. While, for reasons offered in chapter 4,
this does not necessarily mean that the United States should cut its defense
budget or become complacent about the security challenges posed by a
rising China, it seriously undercuts arguments that China is quickly closing
the gap with U.S. military power or on course to dominate the international
system.
economic interests in the region, let alone to create leverage to harm U.S.
national security interests in the Western Hemisphere.
Impact answers
Second, and equally important, it is far from clear that American military
predominance in the Asia-Pacific region can be sustained on a consistent
basis, just as it is virtually impossible that China could establish its own
predominance in the region. Two Carnegie reports on the long-term security
environment in Asia, Chinas Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 and
Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,2 concluded that, while
the United States will remain the strongest military power on a global level
indefinitely, Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe,
economically induced defense spending limitations that will constrain efforts
to decisively keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary
presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline,
that is, the area covered by the so-called first and second island chains. This
will occur despite Washingtons repeated assertion that the rebalance to Asia
will sustain Americas predominant position in the region. Moreover, such
largely economic constraints will almost certainly be magnified by the
persistence of tensions and conflicts in other parts of the world, such as the
Middle East and Central Europe. These events are likely to complicate any
U.S. effort to shift forces (and resources) to the Asia-Pacific.
America will lose a war with china
Majumdar 16-Defense editor for the National Interest (Dave, A Readiness
Crises :Would America Lose a War to Russia or China, June 22, 2016, The
National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/readiness-crisiswould-america-lose-war-russia-or-china-16676?page=2)//SL
The United States military is at a crisis point in terms of readiness against high-end
threats such as Russia or Chinaat least thats the view of the House and Senate
Armed Services Committee majority staffs. While part of the cause stems
from the counter-insurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of the blame
can be attributed to a moribund acquisition system that chokes the life out of
innovation.
Were in a dramatic crisis now. There is no question that were capable
against the threats on the counter-terrorism side, but weve reached a point
where were in factnot heading towardsbut were already hollow against a
high-end threat, said House Armed Services Committee majority staff
director Bob Simmons speaking before an audience at the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI) on June 21. We lack the capacity and capability that
we need to effectively deter on the high-end.
The problem manifests itself in many waysand it spans across the
Pentagons entire range of capabilities in the air, on land, at sea and in space.
One immediate example is U.S. Marine Corps aviationwhere the service
does not have enough trained maintainers to fix their aircraft. Out of a total
of 271 Marine Corps strike aircraft, only about 64 are flyable at any given
time, Simmons noted. The Air Forcemeanwhileis not doing much better
with only 43 percent of its aircraft being full mission capable.
Because of the aircraft shortage, the Marine Corps naval aviators who fly
those warplanes are getting far fewer hours in the air than their Russian and
Chinese counterparts. These days, Marine pilots are flying only four to six
hours per month instead of the twenty to thirty per month they once used to
that creates permanent experience gaps. To put it bluntly, we fly about as
much as the North Korean pilots do and about three times less than Chinese
pilots do today, Simmons said.
Meanwhile, the aircraft themselvesexcept for the handful of Lockheed
Martin F-22 Raptors, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and Northrop Grumman B-2
Spiritsare not able to penetrate into the teeth of enemy air defenses. Be it
the Fairchild Republic A-10, Boeing F-15, Lockheed Martin F-16 or the Boeing
F/A-18 Hornet, none of those warplanes can survive against the current
generation of Russian and Chinese high-end air defense systems. Even the
latest Russian fourth generation fighter aircraft cant survive against
Moscows own formidable integrated air defense products. Could the Russian
fly their aircraft over Ukraine? Simmons asked. Nope. If youre flying fourthgeneration aircraft in the current environment, youre in trouble.
The Pentagons lack of readiness to fight a high-end war can in many ways be
attributed to the Defense Departments byzantine, risk-averse bureaucracy
that does everything it can to crush innovation. Indeed, the current debacle is
a direct result of the Pentagons pursuit of so-called transformational
capabilities such the F-22, F-35 and the now defunct Future Combat Systems
rather than a more incremental approach. During the Cold War, the United
States would evolve systems incrementally over time. We continued that
through the Cold War, we continued that steady incremental improvement to
all our weapons systems forcing them to chase us, then the Berlin Wall came
down and we adopted their acquisition system, Simmons said sarcastically.
Were trying to get back to incrementalism.
Fundamentally, the House and the Senate are trying to reform the Pentagons
procurement system so that new technologies are developed and fielded
faster in an incremental fashion. The country can simply no longer afford to
invest tens of billions of dollars into programs that might only bear fruit two
to three decades laterif at all. Enemies will catch up in the meantime,
Simmons said. Indeed, in some caseslike the Armys Future Combat
Systemsbillions were squandered with no appreciable result. Chris Brose,
Senate Armed Services Committee majority staff directorwho was also
speaking at the AEI eventsaid he agreed with Simmons assessmentthe
current situation is not acceptable. Were seeing the exact same problem,
Brose said.
The House and the Senate must act now because of the shifts in geopolitics.
After the post-Soviet lull, the high-end anti-access threat has reemerged but
the low-end counter-terrorism threat will persist into the foreseeable future.
Moreover, the current threat does not clearly fit into the Defense
Departments traditional organizational boxesand addressing those
challenges all at the same time is the fundamental problem the Pentagon
faces. The challenge that we have is the need to move faster, the need to
not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, Brose said.
As a solution, both Simmons and Brose advocated for an incremental,
decentralized approach to acquisitions. Instead of building an all-powerful
AT: Containment CP
Links to politics
Containment links to politics
Lumbers 15-Program Director, Emerging Security NATO Association of
Canada (Michael, Wither the Pivot? Alternative U.S. Strategies for
Responding to Chinas Rise, 10 Jul 2015, Comparative Strategy, Vol.34, Is
4)//SL
Perhaps the biggest problem with a strategy of confrontation is its lack of
viability. China literally could not be contained even if it were decided that
this was a wise course of action, David Shambaugh notes, precisely
because of China's existing integration in the global system. The genie
cannot be put back into the bottle. Any effort to weaken China's economy
by, say, blocking its access to the global trading system would harm the U.S.
as much as China, not to mention ignite a firestorm of protest from politically
powerful domestic constituencies with vested interests in sustaining
economic links to the mainland. Beijing, unlike Moscow during the Cold War,
would have formidable tools at its disposal for retaliating against any act of
economic warfare. The extent of China's ties to both the American and global
economy have created a degree of interdependence that considerably
narrows the scope of threatening actions that a rational, economically selfinterested actor such as the United States can adopt toward the PRC.
Permutation solves
High level diplomacy is vital to reducing the impact to balancing
China
Tellis and Blackwill 15 (Ashley** and David*, senior fellow for U.S. foreign
policy at the Council on Foreign Relations*, senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security,
defense, and Asian strategic issues**, U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,
Council on Foreign Relations,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf, April 13, 2015, NRG)
The United States should energize high-level diplomacy with China to attempt
to mitigate the inherently profound tensions as the two nations pursue
mutually incompatible grand strategies, and to reassure U.S. allies and
friends in Asia and beyond that Washington is doing everything it can to
avoid a confrontation with Beijing.
Despite the destabilizing objectives of Chinas grand strategy in Asia and in
the context of implementing the many policy recommendations in this report
to systemically strengthen the American response to the rise of Chinese
power, the United States bears major responsibilities to promote international
stability, prosperity, and peacein Asia and across the globe.
In this context, take into account the negative consequences for each
countrys formidable domestic challenges if the United States and China
seriously mismanage their relationship. Imagine the tumultuous effects on
the global economy. Consider the dramatic increase in tension throughout
Asia and the fact that no country in this vast region wants to have to choose
between China and the United States. Envision the corrosive impact on U.S.China collaboration on climate change. Picture the fallout over attempts to
deal with the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and Iran.
With this in mind, the U.S.-China discourse should be more candid, high level,
and private than current practiceno rows of officials principally trading
sermons across the table in Washington or Beijing. Bureaucracies wish to do
today what they did yesterday, and wish to do tomorrow what they did today.
It is, therefore, inevitable that representatives from Washington and Beijing
routinely mount bills of indictment regarding the other side. All are familiar
with these calcified and endlessly repeated talking points. As the Chinese
proverb puts it, To talk much and arrive nowhere is the same as climbing a
tree to catch a fish.
For such an intensified high-level bilateral dialogue between Washington and
Beijing to be fruitful, it should avoid concentrating primarily on the alleged
perfidious behavior of the other side. For instance, no amount of American
condemnation of Chinas human rights practicesprivate or by megaphone
will consequentially affect Beijings policies, including toward Hong Kong, and
no degree of Chinese complaints will lead the United States to weaken its
alliance systems that are indispensable to the protection of its vital national
interests. Nor is it likely that either side will admit to its actual grand strategy
toward the other. In any case, endemic contention will over time contribute to
a systemic worsening of U.S.-China bilateral relations that results in all the
destructive consequences enumerated earlier.
Instead, after thorough consultations with its Asian allies, the United States
should commit to working with China on two or three issues that would make
a positive contribution to bilateral ties and to international peace and
security. After the November 2014 U.S.-China summit in Beijing, Asian
security would be good subject with which to begin. For example, subjects for
joint exploration could include the possibility of creating a version of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for Asia, expanding the
talks on North Korea to include broader Asian security issues, or agreeing on
enhanced security confidence-building measures between the two sides. To
inspire fresh thinking and creative policy initiatives, it might be best if the
senior individuals to take the lead in these talks were not in the direct
national security chain of command.
The plan doesnt prevent a shift to containment
Mattis, 15 - Peter Mattis is a Fellow in the China Program at The Jamestown
Foundation (U.S. Policy Towards China: Imposing Costs Doesn't Mean Ending
Engagement 9/10, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-policy-towardschina-imposing-costs-doesnt-mean-ending-13810?page=show
The idea of imposing costs or forcing China to face consequences for its
actions is easily misunderstood as abandoning the carrot for the stick as a matter of
U.S. policy toward China. On some issues and for some analysts, moving from
a cordial to an adversarial approach may well be the case in areas such as
South China Sea or cyber. Even these, however, are selective, based on
Chinese actions in particular areas, and focused on continuing the basic U.S.
policy of shaping the choices Beijing can make while encouraging a positive
course. Shaping Chinese choices necessarily requires a mix of incentives and
disincentives, but the latter can only be as strong as the will to act upon
them.
It is worth noting that even Michael Pillsbury in his harshly critical book on
U.S.-China relations, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to
Replace America as the Global Superpower, does not advocate replacing the
carrot with the stick. His policy proposals deal most strongly with better
assessing China, dealing with Beijing as it is run under the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), and avoiding being duped. They boil down to how
President Barack Obama characterized the way to run foreign policy: Dont
do stupid stuff.
The idea that imposing costs and consequences on China for actions inimical
to U.S. interests means abandoning incentives to browbeat Beijing seems
premised on the assumption that such consequences mean the beginning of
a containment strategy and the end of engagement.
Engagement is not going away. Suggestions of its demise are premature. If you
want to persuade or dissuade someone, the only way to ensure your signal