4.

Saludaga vs FEU (Civil Law)

G.R. No. 179337

April 30, 2008

JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs. FEU and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS (President of FEU)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of (FEU) when he was shot
by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on
August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU Hospital due to the wound he
sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained
that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no
formal complaint was filed against him.

Saludaga thereafter filed with RTC Manila a complaint for damages against
respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students
with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.

Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Dvpt and Mgt
Corp. (Galaxy), the agency contracted by FEU to provide security services within its
premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to indemnify them
for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's
fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party
Complaint against AFP General Insurance.

On Nov.10, 2004, the trial court ruled in favor of Saludaga, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of FEU to pay jointly and
severally Joseph Saludaga the amount of P35,298.25 for actual damages with 12%
interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; moral damages
xxx, exemplary damages xx, attorney's fees xx and cost of the suit;
2. Galaxy Corp. and its president, Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and
severally 3rd party plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus in his capacity as President
of FEU) for the above-mentioned amounts;
3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed for lack of cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Respondents appealed to the CA which ruled in its favor, reversing the RTC decision,
dismissing the complaint, and also denying Saludagas subsequent MR. Hence, the
instant petition based on the following grounds:

THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED....IN RULING THAT:

5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A FORTUITOUS EVENT;
5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE INJURY RESULTING
FROM A GUNSHOT WOUND SUFFERED BY THE PETITIONER.....IN VIOLATION OF
THEIR....CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO PETITIONER.......TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A
SAFE AND SECURE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT;
5.3. ALEJANDRO ROSETE....IS NOT FEUS EMPLOYEE.....; and
5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN SELECTING GALAXY AS THE
AGENCY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN THE PREMISES OF
RESPONDENT FEU.

ISSUES:
WON Saludaga may claim damages from FEU for breach of student-school contract
for a safe learning environment
Whether FEUs liability is based on quasi-delict or on contract
From what source of obligation did the other claims arose?

HELD:
1) Yes.
2) FEUs liability is based on contract, not quasi-delict.
3) Quasi-delict vicarious liability between Galaxy Agency and security guard
Rosete
Quasi-delict but SC held that there is no vicarious liability between FEU and Rosete
Quasi-delict damage to FEU due to the negligence of Galaxy Agency in supplying
FEU with an unqualified guard (Imperial, the president of Galaxy is solidarily liable
with the agency)

It is undisputed that Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law student in FEU. As

such, there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On
Saludaga's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the
school. On the other hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart

knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take
adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract
and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
In the instant case when Saludaga was shot inside the campus by no less the
security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a
prima facie showing that FEU failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe
and secure environment to its students.

In order to avoid liability, however, FEU alleged that the shooting incident was a
fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the
accident caused by Rosete as he was not their employee; and that they complied
with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by
having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy.

After a thorough review of the records, the SC found that FEU failed to discharge the
burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning
environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the
guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security
Service Agreement. Certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial;
however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the
university was offered. FEU also failed to show that they undertook steps to
ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess
the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement.

Consequently, FEU's defense of force majeure must fail. In order for force
majeure to be considered, FEU must show that no negligence or misconduct was
committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person's participation - whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the
whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of
contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent
FEU is liable to petitioner for damages.

We note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable with
respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, we held that:
... Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not
necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he
assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest
resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) he
consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof,
does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3)
he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4)
he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate
action.
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case; hence,
respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with respondent FEU.

Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is the breach of
the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative, also holds respondents
vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. However, respondents cannot
be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents
are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The
instructions issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security
guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for
services entered into by a principal and a security agency.

As to the Third Party Claim against Galaxy, evidence duly supports that Galaxy is
negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their supervision.
Indeed, no administrative sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the
shooting incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which
led eventually to his disappearance. Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner's
condition or extend the necessary assistance. For these acts of negligence and for
having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified security guard, which resulted
to the latter's breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to
respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts
awarded to petitioner.

Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for
being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency. It was Imperial
who assured petitioner that his medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but
said representations were not fulfilled.

5.
G.R. No. 149338 July 28, 2008UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, UN
LADRURAL AN! O" NOVELETA, INC., UNLAD COMMODITIES, INC.,#ELENA $.
ENITE$, %&' CONRADO L. ENITE$ II,
Petitioners, vs.
RENATO P. DRAGON, TARCISIUS R. RODRIGUE$,
VICENTE D.CASAS, ROMULO M. VIRATA, "LAVIANO PERDITO, TEOTIMOENITE$,
ELENA ENITE$, %&' ROLANDO SUARE$,
Respondents.
The parties entered in a Memorandum of Agreement: respondents as controlling
stockholders of the Rural Bank shall allow Unlad Resources to subscribe to a
minimum of common or preferred non-voting shares of stock with a total par value
of P!."M and pa% up immediate P&.'M for said subscription that the respondents,
upon the signing of the said agreement shall transfer control and management over
the Rural Bank to Unlad Resources. The respondents complied with their
oligationut the petitioners did not, thus respondents complaint for rescission of
the agreement and the return of control and management of the Rural Bank
from petitioners to respondents, plus damages. Declared the rescinded ordered to
immediately return control and management over the Rural to respondents.
Petitioners appealed to the*A which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Petitioners contend that the issues court are intra Corporate in nature and are,
therefore, beyond the -jurisdiction of the trialcourt. The
point out that respondents complaint charged them with mismanagement and
alleged dissipation of the assets of the Rural Bank.
Issue
Rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement. This is to be distinguished from
respondents allegation of
thealleged mismanagement and dissipation of corporate assets % the petitioners,
which is based on the prayer for receivership over the Bank. The two issues,
albeit related, are obviously% separate, as the% pertain todi2erent acts of the

parties involved. The issue of receivership does not arise from the parties
obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement rather from special)c acts
attributed to petitioners as members of the Board of /directors of the Bank. the
rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement is a cause of action within the
-jurisdiction of the trial courts, notwithstanding the fact that the parties involved are
all directors of the same corporation.
Petitioners contend that the action for rescission has prescribed under Article &74"
of the *civil code, which provides: The action to claim rescission must
be commenced within This is an The prescriptive period applicable to rescission
under Articles 4 and 94 which provides that the action upon a written contract
should be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues

1. BPI v. CAG.R. No. 136202January 25, 2007Related topic: Sec. 49, NIL (Delivery
without endorsement of an order instrument)
FACTS:
Salazar had in her possession three crossed checks with an aggregate amount of
P267,692.50. These checks were payable to the order of JRT Construction and
Trading which was the name of Templonuevos business. Despite lack of knowledge
and endorsement of Templonuevo, Salazar was able to deposit the checks in her
personal savings account with BPI and en cash the same. The three checks were
deposited in three different occasions over the span of eight months. A year after
the last encashment, Templonuevo protested the purportedly unauthorized
encashments and demanded from BPI the aggregate amount of the checks. BPI
complied with Templonuevos demand. Since the money could no longer be debited
from the account of Salazar where she deposited the checks, they froze her other
account with them. Later on, BPI issued a cashiers check in favor of Templonuevo
for the aggregate amount and debited P267, 707.70 from Salazars account
representing the aggregate amount and the bank charges for the cashiers check.
Salazar filed a complaint against BPI. Trial court ruled in favor of her which was
affirmed by CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:

1.Did BPI have the authority to unilaterally withdraw from Salazars account the
amount it has previously paid upon certain unendorsed order instrument?
2.Did BPI act judiciously in debiting Salazars account?
HELD:
1.Yes.Records show that no prior arrangement existed between Salazar and
Templonuevo regarding the transfer of ownership of the checks. This fact is crucial
as Salazars entitlement to the value of the instruments is based on the assumption
that she is a transferee within the contemplation of Section 49 of the NIL. Section 49
of the NIL contemplates a situation where the payee or endorsee delivers an
negotiable instrument for value without endorsing it. The underlying premise of this
provision, however, is that a valid transfer of ownership of the negotiable
instrument in question has taken place. Transferees in this situation do not enjoy the
presumption of ownership in favour of holders since they are neither payees nor
endorsees of such instruments. Mere possession of an negotiable instrument does
not in itself conclusively establish either the right of the possessor to receive
payment, or of the right of one who has made payment to be discharged from
liability. Something more than mere possession is necessary to authorize payment
to such possessor.
Prepared by: Daniel John A. Fordan

1
https://www.scribd.com/doc/280020021/BPI-v-CA-digest-2007