Centeno To Leynes

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113092. September 1, 1994.]

MARTIN CENTENO, Petitioner, v. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Santiago V . Marcos, Jr. for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS; CONSTRUED. it is an

elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
2. ID.; "CHARITABLE" ; RELIGIOUS; DISTINCTLY USED IN SEVERAL STATUTES. It will be observed that the 1987
Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and
independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28
(3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and parsonages . . ., and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two terms are
likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income
tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes
for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real
property tax) of the Local Government Code. That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable"
and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
3. ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1564; RELIGIOUS PURPOSE; CONSTRUED. All contributions designed to
promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support on
voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable
purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse
is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term.
Although the term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters
which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious
purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done
away with by statute. The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable of different significations.
For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very wide meaning, but under
Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it would be
prejudicial to petitioners. To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the
taxpayer. However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been
liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the term
"charitable purposes," within the meaning of a statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or
for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is deemed to
include religious purposes. A gift for "religious purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as
regards exemption from inheritance tax. On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation
within the concept of "charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree No. 1564 requires a prior permit from
the Department of Social Services and Development, under pain of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be
prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations
for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations
that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.
4. ID.; "PENAL LAWS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED" ; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by
implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to
spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal
statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions,
that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in
and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal
expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal
statute should be regarded as without its intendment. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. The word
"charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of
that which is charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. The law does not operate in
vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract. Furthermore, in the provisions of
the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given which include the words
"charitable" and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a
disjunctive article in indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice
of either. When "or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. Accordingly,
"charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or" should be given
different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage
of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; FREEDOM TO ACT; MAY BE SUBJECTED TO
RESTRICTION; CONSTRUED IN CASE AT BAR. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion
has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve
the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Whence, even the exercise of religion may be
regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt,
a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before
permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the
cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. It does not follow, therefore, from the
constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It
has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering
with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of
one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any
religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional
objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited
previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOLICITATION FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSE; MAY BE SUBJECTED TO PROPER REGULATIONS
THROUGH POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to
determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes
or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes
is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for
worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable
limits the worthy from the unworthy. The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy
and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money
for charity is lessened or destroyed. Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. To
conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally
liable therefor.
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1564; PURPOSE. The purpose of the Decree is to protect
the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the
other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need
for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for
protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.
2. ID.; ID.; SOLICITATION FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES; DISTINGUISHED FROM CHARITABLE OR PUBLIC WELFARE
PURPOSES. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public
welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public
welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy
families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription
to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon
the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as
the solicitor. Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who
is solicited for contribution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR GOVERNMENT PERMIT; RESTRAINT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. To require a
government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free
exercise of religion. Such restraint, if allowed, may well justify requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday
collections or enforce tithing. But in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, we precisely held that an ordinance
requiring payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellants sale
of bibles because that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason
that religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of
public parks and streets. To read the Decree, therefor, as including within its reach solicitations for religious
purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is not fairly
possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire to devote their remaining
years to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization for that purpose, should find
themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a community member allegedly without the
required permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
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The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known
as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of
Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It
is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against petitioner Martin
Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the
Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged therein do
not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable
or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This
was denied 3 by the trial court, and petitioners motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the
merits ensued.
chanroble s.com:cralaw:red
On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner
Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial
court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the
fact that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally liable were it not for the existence of
Presidential Decree No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10.
However, Accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded only with respect to petitioner
Centeno. On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but
modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed which caused damage and prejudice
to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months
and a fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of
the decision was denied by the court. 6
Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy eventually
reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for religious purposes are within
the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a
question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a
final adjudication.
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Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for
religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes; (2) penal laws are to be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations
made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under
the Constitution.
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law),
provides as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of
Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a written
application for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent
or temporary permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or
revoke any permit issued under Act 4075."
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The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned. 7
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and
"religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive
words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions, churches
and parsonages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in
statutes wherein these two terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26
(e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal
Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.
chanroble s.com : virtual law library
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities
depend for their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the
expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable
purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the
legal sense of the term. 9 Although the term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader
term and includes matters which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable
purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the
distinction has been done away with by statute. 10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is
capable of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very
wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad
application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.
To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer. However, there
are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been liberally construed as covered
in the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within the
meaning of a statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or for the use of any institution for
purposes only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes. 11 A
gift for "religious purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from
inheritance tax. 12
On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of "charitable" purpose
which under Presidential Decree No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and
Development, under pain of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the
term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we
adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be
adopted as would favor the accused.
chanroble s law library
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and
to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits
of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its
provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to
be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such.
Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment. 13
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but
to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than of
precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own
particular facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined
by circumstances in the abstract.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein
given which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense,
"or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article in indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be
taken separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the
disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration
why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1564.
cralawnad
II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for, otherwise, it
will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently,
solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the
regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering,
however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion
guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the
power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be
imposed thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it
forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus,
the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the
power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom. 17
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may
protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish
his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to
regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or
convenience. 18
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything
which may be so called can be tolerated.19 It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental
interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also
incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in
the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or
delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a
religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of
religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 21
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on by persons
and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and
defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to
people who manipulate them. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether
or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent
purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused
is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes
should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy
from the unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper
charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity
is lessened or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. 24
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree no. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally
liable therefor.
chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty imposed by the trial
court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioners act which thereby caused damage to the complainant. it
must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even recommended
executive clemency in favor of petitioner and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in good faith in
making the solicitation from the complainant, an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a
doubtful and difficult question of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise, that
petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. this could be reflective upon her objectivity,
considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears
stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence,
and must resist any pressure from whatever source.26
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., and Puno, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered
by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare
purposes." My reasons are three-fold.
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare
purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare
purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy families or
victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious
magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of
faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund
campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted
among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not
exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so
as to justify state regulation.
chanrobles law library
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior
restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if allowed, may well justify requiring a permit before a
church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we
precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be
applied to the appellants sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional
right. It is for the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public
assemblies and other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefor, as including within its reach
solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.
chanroble s virtual lawlibrary
For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.
Padilla, J., concurs.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias "WARPAN",Appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of A firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed "no other crime" Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of
direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were
about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms.
Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four charges
lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations, 2 all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G.
Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information 3 was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated
drugs It reads as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located
at Rio Hondo, 4 this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting . . . his co-accused
wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form." 5
The second Information 6 charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it
below:
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and Confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting
with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have id their possession and under their custody and control,
the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live
ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty [-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1)
homemade caliber .38 revolvers with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five
(5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell
of [a] cal. 38 . . . Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one
defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor
from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law." 7
The third Information, 8 for multiples attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and
other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting . . .
one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill
SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J.
LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16
Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of
the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police,
Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were
engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the
Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus commencing
the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their
unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary
desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during
the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police
officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a.Warpan and
Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2
Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large." 9
In the fourth Information appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs. 10
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon
motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the
lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.

The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a plea
of not guilty. 11
After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a.WARPAN

1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article 111, of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said
accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00)
and to pay the costs;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 1463, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article
IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS
him of said crime with costs de officio;
"3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and
SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay
the costs;
"4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of direct Assault with Multiple
Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correctional as maximum and to pay a fine
of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs." (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal. 12
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief, 13 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
"At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search
warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30
p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga
City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe
Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as
presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the
search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
"After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to
the house of appellant and his wife at Folio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1948, p. 32;
April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran
towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When
the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of
gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5,
1998, pp. 14-16).
"SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of policemen
saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group,
together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to
observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March
4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
"In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73- 76).
Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting
opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and
Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the saga of the ground floor while other
policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the saga together with a young girl and three (3)
children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the
corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
"Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at
them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the
bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring
house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest
appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction
of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of
his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
"At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the
second floor (Ibid., P. 2-7). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the
bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two
(2) more M14 rifle magazines on that sofa, one with twenty (20) five ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with
twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner
at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
"After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut followed and
entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to
the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground
floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). on top of a table was a pencil
case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
"Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April
28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1)
M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell
of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
"Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning
of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson
knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants house about fifteen
(15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of
shabu from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to
go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted
kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson
obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
"While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all stood and entered
appellants compound, but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his
house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are already here. They scampered and ran away because
there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near
the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
"The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating
what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.
"After the search and before returning to the police station, PO3 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property Seized
(Exh. P & 3) listing the properties Seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure
officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the
receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 1112)
"An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates
(Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998,
p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms
were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber
revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225
(Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
"With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab,
likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded
aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50)
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the
examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
"The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that
appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or . . . been given
authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)" 14
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower Court. 15 Hence, we quote the pertinent
parts of the assailed Decision:
"Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a.Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as smuggling (tsn,
p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying
taxes (tsn, pp. 4041, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan
Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather
than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was
alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos
daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio
Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested.
He said he was arrested." . . [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping . .
. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him considering that the one who
arrested me does not have nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him
testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According
to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were]
the one[s] who fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause
the door is very near . . . the vicinity of my house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh.B-3) which according to
policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15,
id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the
M79 rifle (Exh.B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh.G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines
with live ammunition (Exh.G-3; G-4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs.B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum
foils each containing shabu (Exhs.J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh.J, the assorted coins placed inside
a blue bag (Exh.W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh.K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen
just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the
policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I
think this (is) theirs, . . . they just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
"Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he owns
that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose
name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the police raided
the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although
Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p. 11, id). He did
not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are
plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of
them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp. 11-14, id).
"After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one night
before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes
two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his
younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match From the police station, he was brought to the PNP
Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
"During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the
younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot
them[,] only I do not know his name." They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed
against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33. May 4, 1998).
"Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji
Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo
Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the house.(W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing
(their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They
searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam.
They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed
the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi
was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just
before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they
left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by . . . Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp. 6-8,
May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id).
Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money , she had not seen anything else
that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
"Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of September
24, 1997, he was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was
about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00
placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a
policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times
and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he
was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five days after which
he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5,1998).
"Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,1997, she was in the house
of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her parents house
and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife.
When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her
husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then
the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he
was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp. 2-7, May 5,1998).
"Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,1997, she was sitting at
the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcycle, driven by a person, stopped near her
house The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and
poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to enter
the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three
persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
"Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24,1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because
of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already
inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but,
the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside
the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and
the shabu (tsn, p. 17, May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things
recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table.Upon seeing
the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. "P." ; "P-1") of the things . . .
taken during the search" (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he
went to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p.
18, id)." 16
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant
No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for
more than one specific offense, 17 in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 18 The court a quo
ruled:
"It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it was issued for
more than one specific offense . . . contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in Connection with one specific offense . . .. in Tambasan v.
People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a
scatter shot warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void." 19
(emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers who
were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of several police officers,
20 who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the
firearms and appellant. 21 Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his
Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire
during the raid. 22 the trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants
narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
"Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and Confiscate the
firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the
firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace Officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer,
within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although
at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the
policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended
to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and
arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant."
23
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a
magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) 24 used by appellant against the police elements, two M14
magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines. 25 The trial court observed that these items were in "plain view"
of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were "evidence [of] the commission of a
crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure" 26 since appellant "had not applied for a license to
possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence." 27
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were seized by the police
officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant
evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest.
To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the
barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying
that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense. 28
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
"The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol,
Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house where
shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought
and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with
the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in
any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by
proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general
reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a.Warpan that
he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or
smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted
that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that
extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain
Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to
when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document
showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam
a.k.a.Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence." 29
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:
". . . . The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a
search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicides not multiple attempted
murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no
circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.

"The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a.Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section 16,
Article 111, in relation to Sections 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams
all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence
against g him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20
which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the
police officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live
ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively
considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court.
The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a.Warpan
because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said
assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury" 30
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:
"The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the police
officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between
Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
"The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the scene of
the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
III
"The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties [excluded]
the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the
police." 31
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular inspection,
(b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame up. In addition, we shall also discuss the
proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on Appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.

First Issue:
Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam
residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court "a better perspective and an
idea with respect to the scene of the crime." 32 We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. 33 We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to
sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house. 34
Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings 35 Moreover, the question Whether to view
the setting of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge. 36 Here,
there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion. 37
Second Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. 38 Suffice it to state that the trial
courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality. 39 After carefully examining the
records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the
general rule. 40 Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired
upon the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr.
41 testified thus:
"PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? . . . You said you were fired
upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
x
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe
Gaganting . . . I will reform that question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at
the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?

A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was
concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with Ricardo
Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately
went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the window of his
house . . . leading to the roof of the neighbors house.
x
COURT:
Reform. That is leading

Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the raiding
team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?

A; Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the investigator of
the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam." 42
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos, 43 as follows:
"Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?

A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the
second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over to
the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put . . . markings.
x
COURT
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?

A: Found with [ammunition].
x
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?

A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL." 44
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized during
the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for
gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open court:
"Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder
nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would be]
positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
x
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and
traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness . . .?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue; it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident . . ..
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?

A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.

COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor." 45 (Emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements 46 of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly
showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element
was the prosecutions Certification 47 stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm,
and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence. 48 Further, it should be pointed out
that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be
licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual. 49
Third Issue:
Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is frameup. He claims that he items seized from his house were "planted," and that the entire Zamboanga police force was
out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but
terribly difficult to disproved. 50 Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police officers, 51
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much
credence. 52 Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate
his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the
trial. 53 He testified thus:
"Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December 1997[;]
tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?

(Showing)
A Yes, Sir This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I was
resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our house.. and
I inspected and . . . we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked . . .
our house; [the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what]
you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September 24,
1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the
two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo.
Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighbors house at that time
when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house at
Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is . . . not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct." 54
Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with
attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was
correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions,
including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who
testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the
prosecutions story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault 55 with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. It found that" [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to
enter his house to serve a search warrant . . ." constituted such complex crime. 56
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional. 57 Hence, for the present
complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the "most serious crime," should be imposed and
applied in its maximum period. 58
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him
also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and
sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied the
new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded
prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the
changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the
new law, which provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than
.30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of
any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor."
Citing People v. Jayson, 59 the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this
case. Since another crime - direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide was committed, appellant cannot be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited provision.
Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance
under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is
not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even
if another crime is committed at the same time. 60

Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however,
Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso 61 in the second paragraph, it seemed to have
construed "no other crime" as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms
is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person
may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple
reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no
separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 62 In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s
simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of
the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. 63 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted
of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover,
since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be
deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in
this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already
been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. 64 In other words, no longer in existence
was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from
any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific
proviso that "no other crime was committed."
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson 65 is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of
appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained however, that
"the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration."
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the
second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of
the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it
did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense
which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor,
for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of
firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, 66 like alarm and scandal 67 or slight
physical injuries, 68 both of which are punishable by arresto menor. 69 This consequence, however, necessarily
arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the
result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give
statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence 70 to the proven facts. and we have done so in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only
of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is
sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he
was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against Appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound
discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 69344. April 26, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES
ANTONIO and CLARA PASTOR, Respondents.
Roberto L. Bautista for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. TAXATION; TAX AMNESTY; GOVERNMENT ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEFICIENCY
TAX ASSESSMENT AND PAYMENT OF AMNESTY TAX. Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment of
P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were correct, since the latter have already paid almost the equivalent
amount to the Government by way of amnesty taxes under P.D. No. 213, and were granted not merely an
exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax failings, the Government is estopped from collecting the difference
between the deficiency tax assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. "A tax amnesty,
being a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons
otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by
the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, prejudicial thereto,
particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so and thereby become
a part of the new society with a clean slate." (Commission of Internal Revenue v. Botelho Corp. and Shipping Co.,
Inc., 20 SCRA 487).
2. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF APPELLATE COURT THAT DEFICIENCY INCOME TAXES WERE PAID ENTITLED TO HIGHEST
RESPECT; EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE FINDINGS MAY BE DISTURBED. The finding of the appellate court that
the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting
amnesty to persons who are required by law to file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the
highest respect and may not be disturbed except under exceptional circumstances which have already become
familiar (Rule 45, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; e.g., where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence in which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents and (9) when the finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Thelma Fernan v. CA, Et Al., 181 SCRA 546, citing Tolentino v. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; People v. Traya, 147 SCRA
381), none of which is present in this case.
3. ID.; TAX STATUTES ARE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. The rule is that in case of doubt,
tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes
being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in the case P.D. 231) expressly and
clearly declares (Commission of Internal Revenue v. La Tondea, Inc. and CTA, 5 SCRA 665, citing Manila Railroad
Company v. Collector of Customs, 52 Phil. 950).
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The legal issue presented in this petition for review is whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the
private respondents on October 23, 1973 bar an action for recovery of deficiency income taxes under P.D.s Nos.
23, 213 and 370.
On April 15, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action
in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, Branch XVI, to collect from the spouses Antonio
Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 in the amount of P17,117.08
with a 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, and costs.
The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied. On August 2, 1975, they filed an
answer admitting there was an assessment against them of P17,117.08 for income tax deficiency but denying
liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty under P.D.s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and
had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting to P10,400 or 10% of their reported untaxed income under
P.D . 23, P2,951.20 or 20% of the reported untaxed income under P.D. 213, and a final payment on October 26,
1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Governments Official Receipt No. 1052388. Consequently, the Government
is in estopped to demand and compel further payment of income taxes by them.
The parties agreed that there were no issues of fact to be litigated, hence, the case was submitted for decision
upon the pleadings and memoranda on the lone legal question of: whether or not the payment of deficiency income
tax under the tax amnesty, P.D. 23, and its acceptance by the Government operated to divest the Government of
the right to further recover from the taxpayer, even if there was an existing assessment against the latter at the
time he paid the amnesty tax.
It is not disputed that as a result of an investigation made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1963, it was found
that the private respondents owed the Government P1,283,621.63 as income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959,
inclusive of the 50% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. The defendants protested against the assessment. A
reinvestigation was conducted resulting in the drastic reduction of the assessment to only P17,117.08.
chanrobles law library : red
It appears that on April 27, 1978, the private respondents offered to pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue the sum
of P5,000 by way of compromise settlement of their income tax deficiency for the questioned years, but Assistant
Commissioner Bernardo Carpio, in a letter addressed to the Pastor spouses, rejected the offer stating that there
was no legal or factual justification for accepting it. The Government filed the action against the spouses in 1980,
ten (10) years after the assessment of the income tax deficiency was made.
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Government, which the spouses did not oppose, the trial
court rendered a decision on February 28, 1980, holding that the defendants spouses had settled their income tax
deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213, as shown in the Amnesty
Income Tax Returns Summary Statement and the tax Payment Acceptance Order for P2,951.20 with its
corresponding official receipt, which returns also contain the very assessment for the questioned years. By
accepting the payment of the amnesty income taxes, the Government, therefore, waived its right to further recover
deficiency incomes taxes from the defendants under the existing assessment against them because:
1. the defendants amnesty income tax returns Summary Statement included therein the deficiency assessment for
the years 1955 to 1959;
2. tax amnesty payment was made by the defendants under Presidential Decree No. 213, hence, it had the effect
of remission of the income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959;
3. P.D. No. 23 as well as P.D. No. 213 do not make any exceptions nor impose any conditions for their application,
hence, Revenue Regulation No. 7-73 which excludes certain taxpayers from the coverage of P.D. No. 213 is null and
void, and
4. the acceptance of tax amnesty payment by the plaintiff-appellant bars the recovery of deficiency taxes. (pp. 3-4,
IAC Decision, pp. 031-032, Rollo.)
The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (AC-G.R. CV No. 68371 entitled, "Republic of the
Philippines v. Antonio Pastor, Et. Al."), alleging that the private respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax
amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available only to persons who had no pending
assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact
have a pending assessment against them, they were precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.s Nos.
23 and 213. The Government further argued that "tax exemptions should be interpreted strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer."
The respondent spouses, on the other hand, alleged that P.D. 213 contains no exemptions from its coverage and
that, under Letter of Instruction (LOI) 129 dated September 18, 1973, the immunities granted by P.D. 213
include:
chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanroble s.com :chanrobles.com .ph
"II Immunities Granted.

Upon payment of the amounts specified in the Decree, the following shall be observed:
"1. . . .
"2. The taxpayer shall not be subject to any investigation, whether civil, criminal or administrative, insofar as his
declarations in the income tax returns are concerned nor shall the same be used as evidence against, or to the
prejudice of the declarant in any proceeding before any court of law or body, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative, in which he is a defendant or respondent, and he shall be exempt from any liability arising from or
incident to his failure to file his income tax return and to pay the tax due thereon, as well as to any liability for any
other tax that may be due as a result of business transactions from which such income, now voluntarily declared
may have been derived." (Emphasis supplied; p. 040, Rollo.)
There is nothing in the LOI which can be construed as authority for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to introduce
exceptions and/or conditions to the coverage of the law.
On November 23, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing
the Governments appeal and holding that the payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No.
213, and the acceptance thereof by the Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover
deficiency income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment against
them. The appellate court held that if Revenue Regulation No. 7-73 did provide an exception to the coverage of P.D.
213, such provision was null and void for being contrary to, or restrictive of, the clear mandate of P.D. No. 213
which the regulation should implement. Said revenue regulation may not prevail over the provisions of the decree,
for it would then be an act of administrative legislation, not mere implementation, by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
On February 4, 1985, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed this petition for review of
the decision dated November 23, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the dismissal, by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, of the Governments complaint against the respondent spouses.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment of P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were correct, since
the latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount to the Government by way of amnesty taxes under P.D.
No. 213, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax failings, the Government is
estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax assessment and the amount already paid by
them as amnesty tax.
A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties
on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or
waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, prejudicial
thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so and thereby
become a part of the new society with a clean slate (Commission of Internal Revenue v. Botelho Corp. and Shipping
Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).
The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the
Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by law to file income tax returns but
who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be disturbed except under exceptional
circumstances which have already become familiar (Rule 45, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; e.g., where: (1) the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (6) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(7) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence in which they are based; (8) the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by
the evidence on record (Thelma Fernan v. CA, Et Al., 181 SCRA 546, citing Tolentino v. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67;
People v. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), none of which is present in this case.
The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this
case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares (Commission of Internal Revenue v. La Tondea, Inc. and CTA, 5
SCRA 665, citing Manila Railroad Company v. Collector of Customs, 52 Phil. 950).
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108524. November 10, 1994.]
MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS, INC., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
SECRETARY, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), AND REVENUE DISTRICT
OFFICER, BIR MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS BY GOVERNMENT AGENCY CHARGED

WITH ITS ENFORCEMENT, ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT. Under S 103(a) of the NIRC, the sale of agricultural
non-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or
owner of the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a trader or
dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under S 103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in their
original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller is. We agree
with respondents. In interpreting S 103(a) and (b) of the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a
strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the state. Indeed, even Dr. Kintanar said that his classification of copra food was based on "the
broader definition of food which includes agricultural commodities and other components used in the
manufacture/processing of food." Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law,
the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is
entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of
his power under S 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the
provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar
purposes."
2. ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE RULES AND INTERPRETATIVE RULES. There is a distinction in
administrative law between legislative rules and interpretative rules. There would be force in petitioners argument
if the circular in question were in the nature of a legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere interpretative rule. In
addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to
the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a
court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative
agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is
not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its
delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to
judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness
or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give
the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some
intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
3. ID.; ID.; REASON. The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws
must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must
be hearing.
4. TAXATION; NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE; COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE; NOT BOUND BY
THE RULING OF HIS PREDECESSOR; MAY CONSIDER COPRA AS A NON-FOOD PRODUCT; CASE AT BAR. In the
case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an
"agricultural food product" within the meaning of S 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra
per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food."
That previous Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the contrary, the
overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COCONUT FARMER
AND COPRA PRODUCERS, REASONABLE BASIS FOR DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION FOR PURPOSES OF TAXATION;
CASE AT BAR. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and
dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit
out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers. The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial
difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the
other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the
differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. It is not true
that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to S 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of
services. Under S 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and
dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In
the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by other
traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by the producer.
6. TAXATION; NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE; VAT; ALLEGATION OF COUNTER PRODUCTIVITY OF
CLASSIFICATION OF COPRAS AS AN AGRICULTURAL NON-FOOD, A QUESTION OF WISDOM OR POLICY. The sale
of agricultural non-food products is exempt from VAT only when made by the primary producer or owner of the
land from which the same is produced, but in the case of agricultural food products their sale in their original state
is exempt at all stages of production or distribution. At any rate, the argument that the classification of copra as
agricultural non-food product is counterproductive is a question of wisdom or policy which should be addressed to
respondent officials and to Congress.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and
enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members
of petitioner organization. 1
Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually
or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior
to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90,
copra was classified as agricultural food product under $103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and,
therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution.
Respondents represent departments of the executive branch of government charged with the generation of funds
and the assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.
The pertinent provision of the NIRC states:
Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
(a) Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest products in their original state by the primary producer or the
owner of the land where the same are produced;
(b) Sale or importation in their original state of agricultural and marine food products, livestock and poultry of a
kind generally used as, or yielding or producing foods for human consumption, and breeding stock and genetic
material therefor;
Under 103(a), as above quoted, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is exempt from
VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same are produced. The
sale made by any other person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand,
under 103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of
production or distribution regardless of who the seller is.
The question is whether copra is an agricultural food or non-food product for purposes of this provision of the NIRC.
On June 11, 1991, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the circular in question, classifying copra
as an agricultural non-food product and declaring it "exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary
producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code, as amended." 2
The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was
classified as an agricultural food product under 103(b) of the NIRC. Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on
various grounds, which will be presently discussed although not in the order raised in the petition for prohibition.
First. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of Health and not the BIR is the
competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food products. Petitioner cites the opinion
of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because
it is produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the
implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect.
We agree with respondents. In interpreting 103(a) and (b) of the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
gave it a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. Indeed, even Dr. Kintanar said that his classification of copra as food
was based on "the broader definition of food which includes agricultural commodities and other components used in
the manufacture/processing of food." The full text of his letter reads:
10 April 1991
Mr. VICTOR A. DEOFERIO, JR.
Chairman VAT Review Committee
Bureau of Internal Revenue
Diliman, Quezon City
Dear Mr. Deoferio:
This is to clarify a previous communication made by this Office about copra in a letter dated 05 December 1990
stating that copra is not classified as food. The statement was made in the context of BFADs regulatory
responsibilities which focus mainly on foods that are processed and packaged, and thereby copra is not covered.
However, in the broader definition of food which include agricultural commodities and other components used in the
manufacture/processing of food, it is our opinion that copra should be classified as an agricultural food product
since copra is produced from coconut meat which is food and based on available information, more than 80% of
products derived from copra are edible products.
Very truly yours,
QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, M.D., Ph.D.
Director
Assistant Secretary of Health
for Standards and Regulations
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the
ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his power under $ 245 of the NIRC to
"make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws,
including rulings on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."
Second. Petitioner complains that it was denied due process because it was not heard before the ruling was made.
There is a distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and interpretative rules. 3 There would be force
in petitioners argument if the circular in question were in the nature of a legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere
interpretative rule.
The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit
of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this
connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Public Participation. If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in
a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. 4
In addition such rule must be published. 5 On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within
the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued
pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of
the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those questions to
administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into
the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its
judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. 6
In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as
an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends,
"copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for
food." That previous Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is
wrong. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. 7 To the contrary, the
overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.
Third. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not,
although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT
payment of traders and dealers.
The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra
producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the
latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a
reasonable basis for classifying them differently. 8
It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on
the sale of services. Under 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by
traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT
exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by
other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by the producer.
Fourth. It is finally argued that RMC No. 47-91 is counterproductive because traders and dealers would be forced to
buy copra from coconut farmers who are exempt from the VAT and that to the extent that prices are reduced the
government would lose revenues as the 10% tax base is correspondingly diminished.
cralawnad
This is not so. The sale of agricultural non-food products is exempt from VAT only when made by the primary
producer or owner of the land from which the same is produced, but in the case of agricultural food products their
sale in their original state is exempt at all stages of production or distribution. At any rate, the argument that the
classification of copra as agricultural non-food product is counterproductive is a question of wisdom or policy which
should be addressed to respondent officials and to Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86020. August 5, 1994.]
RAMON CORPORAL, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION LAW; REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMPENSABILITY OF SICKNESS OR DEATH; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for
sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (a) that it is a
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with the
conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contacting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Clearly, then, the principle of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old Workmens
Compensation Act no longer applies. Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as
compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk
of contracting Normas illness was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge
the onus imposed by law. The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter
distance of more than one kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such
condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the
veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum.
2. ID.; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION THEREOF IN FAVOR OF LABOR; RULE AND EXCEPTION. With the evidence
presented in support of the claim, petitioners prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor and social welfare
legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, there is also the rule that such liberal construction
and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No.
626, as amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation.
DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission which denied
petitioners claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
I
Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On
November 28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial Hospital for acute coronary
insufficiency and premature ventricular contractions.
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On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three
kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was available to ferry her and other teachers from the
national highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion and was
hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital. After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work.
In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September of the same year, she was transferred to the Kilicao
Elementary School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of rough road. On December 2, 1984, she gave
birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Concepcion Hospital
due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day due
to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a "prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when
she died.
Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioners claim thus:
"Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the cause of death
of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational disease
as contemplated under the above-mentioned law (P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing that her position
as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of contracting her ailment" (Rollo, p. 23).
Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation
of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter
its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is non-work-connected as
contemplated under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher increase the risk of contracting her ailment
(Rollo, p. 25).
Petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to reevaluate petitioners claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction that in case the claim is denied
once more by the System, the entire record of the case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial of
petitioners claim.
On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying petitioners claim. It said:
"Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in infants and nulliparous women as well as multiparas.
Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first
two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The cervix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal
tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak cardinal ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree
or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of the uterus have passed through the introitus and entire
vaginal canal is inverted. (Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585).
On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a syndrome characterized by
prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe
inadequacy of coronary circulation. The symptoms in this condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina
pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings associated with myocardial infarction are absent. The
syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of ones coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the
heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy, pp. 100-101).
Based on the above medical discussion of the subject ailments, we believe that the development of the fatal illness
has no relation whatsoever with the duties and working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing that the
nature of her duties caused the development of prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a complication of childbirth
causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late stage. We also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as non-workconnected illness for the reason that it is caused by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply
oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we have no recourse
but to sustain respondents denial of the instant claim" (Rollo, pp. 29-31).
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, asserting compensability of the death of his wife.
II
Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim
should prosper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that as early as January 1984 or
before Normas fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared like a tomato protruding out of
Normas vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition was attributable to Normas long walks to and from her
place of teaching Banadero Elementary Volcano. Moreover, the roads leading to the school are full of ruts and
rocks, and, during the rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner asserts that inspite of these, Norma
continued to discharge her duties as a public servant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus.
Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents contravene the constitutional provision on social
justice. He alleges that since the workmens compensation law is a social legislation, its provisions should be
interpreted liberally in favor of the employees whose rights it intends to protect.
Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the
claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions (Santos v. Employees Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182
[1993]; Quizon v. Employees Compensation Commission, 203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of
aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old Workmens Compensation Act no longer applies
(Latagan v. Employees Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]).
Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the ECC and he
merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of contracting Normas illness
was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law.
The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one
kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such condition caused her to develop
prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma had
a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum.
Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and
quite beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child she was already forty years old.
Novaks Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus uteri) as follows:
"An extremely common condition, being far more frequent in elderly than in young patients. This is explained by
the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures in later life. The effects of childbirth
structures in late life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus make themselves evident, in the form of uterine
prolapse, may years after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous
complications, as noted by Piver and Spezia.
The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic floor,
and especially of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this
there is usually extensive injury to the perineal structures, producing marked vaginal relaxation and also frequent
injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually,
various combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated
with the prolapse. Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in women who have never borne children, and in
these the prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor"
(Emphasis supplied).
The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes the condition as follows:
"Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth injury to the pelvic floor (particularly the
transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and
perineal body augment the weakness. Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging and congenital weakness can
accelerate the development of prolapse."
The determination of whether the prolapse of Normas uterus developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is
therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and changes in the body on
pregnancy and childbirth.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary
With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioners prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor
and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, (Tria v. Employees
Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule that such liberal construction and
interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor code and P.D. No. 626,
as amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the
importance of the services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meager salaries which are
not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the values and character of the youth in this country
(De Vera v. Employees Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]).
But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some
form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioners wife.
chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanroble s.com :chanrobles.com .ph
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-44899. April 22, 1981.]
MARIA E. MANAHAN, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GSIS (LAS PIAS
MUNICIPAL HIGH SCHOOL), Respondents.
Romualdo M. Jubay and Romeo R. Lobregat for Petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Jose F. Racela, Jr. and Solicitor
Josefina Z. Domingo-David for respondent Commission.
Manuel M. Lazaro for respondent G.S.I.S.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits of her husband, a public school teacher who succumbed to "Enteric Fever"
(typhoid fever) on May 8, 1975. The medical records of the deceased show that he was in perfect health when he
entered the government service on July 20, 1969, and that in the course of his employment on December 10,
1974, he was treated for epigastric pain which is a symptom of ulcer, a common complication of typhoid fever. The
Government Service Insurance System, later affirmed by the Employees Compensation Commission, denied the
claim on the ground that typhoid fever was not induced by or aggravated by the nature of the duties of the
deceased as a teacher.
On review, the Supreme Court held that since under the circumstances in the case at bar, the illness that claimed
the life of the deceased could have had its onset months before December 10, 1974, the law applicable should be
the Workmens Compensation Act pursuant to which law the presumption of compensability subsisted in favor of
the claimant.
Decision reversed.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR CODE; CLAIM FOR WORKMENS COMPENSATION; WORKMENS
COMPENSATION ACT APPLICABLE WHERE CLAIM ACCRUES PRIOR TO EFFECTIVITY OF LABOR CODE; CASE AT BAR.
Article 294, Title III (Transitory and Final Provisions) of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims
accruing prior to the effectivity of said Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of
their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses and Claims), workmens
compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of the Code and during the period from November 1, 1974 up
to December 31, 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their
causes of action accrued. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmens
Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
2. ID.; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF LABOR; RATIONALE. In case of doubt, claims for Workmens
Compensation should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations like the Workmens
Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e. to give
relief to the Workman and/or les dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GUARANTEE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PROTECTION TO LABOR; BASIS FOR GRANT OF
CLAIM IN CASE AT BAR. The constitutional guarantee of social justice and protection to labor made the Court
take a second look at the evidence presented by the claimant. As a teacher of the Las Pias, Municipal High School
at Las Pias, Rizal, the deceased used to eat his meals at the school canteen. He also used the toilet and other
facilities of the school. Said the respondent Commission,." . . it is not improbable that the deceased might have
contracted the illness during those rare moments that he was away from his family, since it is medically accepted
that enteric fever is caused by salmonella organisms which are acquired by ingestion of contaminated food or
drinks. Contamination of food or water may come from the excretion of animals such as rodents, flies. or human
beings who are sick or who are carriers, or infection in meat or animals as food. Meat, milk and eggs are the foods
most frequently involved in the transmission of this type of species since the organism may multiply even before
ingestion . . . ." These findings of the respondent Commission lead to the conclusion that the risk of contracting the
fatal illness was increased by the decedents working condition.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0070
(Nazario Manahan, Jr., deceased), entitled "Maria Manahan, Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance
System, (Las Pias Municipal High School), Respondent" affirming the decision of the Government Service
Insurance System which denied the claim for death benefit 1
The claimant, petitioner herein, Maria E. Manahan, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric
Fever" while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias Municipal High School, Las Pias, Rizal, on May 8, 1975.
The petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System for death benefit under Presidential
Decree 626. In a letter dated June 19, 1975, the Government Service Insurance System denied the claim on a
finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in
perfect health when admitted to the service and that the ailment of said deceased was attributable to his
employment.
The Government Service Insurance System affirmed the denial of the claim on the ground that enteric fever or
paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced
by or aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. 2
To support her theory that the disease of Nazario Manahan, Jr., enteric fever, resulted from his employment as
classroom teacher of the Las Pias Municipal High School, the petitioner cites the following authority:
"EPIDEMOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF

ENTERIC FEVER
"THE SOURCE OF INFECTION is feces or urine from patients and carriers. Family contacts may be transient carriers
and 2 to 5% of patients become chronic carriers. In poorly sanitized communities, water is the most frequent
vehicle of transmission; food, especially milk, is the next most important. In modern urban areas, food,
contaminated by healthy carriers who are food handlers, is the principal vehicle. Flies may spread the organism
from feces to food. Direct contact infection is infrequent.
"The organism enters the body through the gastrointestinal tract, invading the bloodstream by way of the
lymphatic channels. There is hyperplasia and often ulceration of Pyeris patches, especially in the ileum and cecum.
When the ulcers heals, no scar results. The kidneys and liver usually show cloudly swelling and the latter may
reveal a patchy necrosis. The spleen is enlarged and soft. Rarely the lungs show pneumonic changes. (Merck
Manuel, 10th Edit., p. 842)" 3
The factual findings of the respondent Commission indicate that the deceased was in perfect health when he
entered government service on July 20, 1969, and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated
for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975.
Enteric fever is referred to in medical books as typhoid fever (Dorlands Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th Ed., p.
548) or paratyphoid fever (Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, 6th Ed., p. 817). Its symptoms include
abdominal pain (id., p. 810). In discussing the clinical manifestations of the disease, Mr. Harrison states that
recovery (from enteric or paratyphoid fever) may be followed by continued excretion of the causative organism in
the stools for several months (id., p. 817). This lingering nature of the species producing enteric fever points out
the possibility that the illness which afflicted the deceased in 1974 was the same as, or at least, related to, his
1975 illness.
The medical record of the deceased shows that he had a history of ulcer-like symptoms (p. 3, ECC rec.). This
buttresses the claimants claim that her husband had been suffering from ulcer several months before his death on
May 8, 1975. This is likewise sustained by the medical certificate (p. 12, ECC rec.) issued by Dr. Aquilles Bernabe to
the effect that "Nazario Manahan was treated for epigastric pain probably due to hyperacidity on December 10,
1974. "Epigastric pain is a symptom of ulcer, and ulcer is a common complication of typhoid fever. There is even
such a thing as "typhoidal ulcer" (p. 812, supra).
Because of these circumstances, the illness that claimed the life of the deceased could have had its onset months
before December 10, 1974. Such being the case, his cause of action accrued before December 10, 1974.
In the case of Corales v. ECC (L-44063, Feb. 27, 1979), We ruled that:
". . . Article 294, Title III (Transitory and Final Provisions) of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and
claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the
time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses and Claims),
workmens compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from November
1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the
time their causes of action accrued Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, as
amended, on passing upon petitioners claim."
Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act in this case, the
presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
In any case, We have always maintained that in case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker,
and that social legislations like the Workmens Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally
construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event
that the former should die or sustain an injury.

Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of social justice and protection to labor make Us take a second look at the
evidence presented by the claimant.
As a teacher of the Las Pias Municipal High School at Las Pias, Rizal, the deceased used to eat his meals at the
school canteen. He also used the toilet and other facilities of the school. Said the respondent Commission,." . . it is
not improbable that the deceased might have contracted the illness during those rare moments that he was away
from his family, since it is medically accepted that enteric fever is caused by salmonella organisms which are
acquired by ingestion of contaminated food or drinks. Contamination of food or water may come from the excretion
of animals such as rodents, flies, or human beings who are sick or who are carriers, or infection in meat of animals
as food. Meat, milk and eggs are the foods most frequently involved in the transmission of this type of species,
since the organism may multiply even before ingestion . . . ." These findings of the respondent Commission lead to
the conclusion that the risk of contracting the fatal illness was increased by the decedents working condition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside
and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered:
1. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as death compensation benefit;
2. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorneys fees;
3. To reimburse the petitioner expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the
deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts; and
4. To pay administrative fees.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Although enteric fever is not an occupational disease, considering the cause of said illness, the risk of contracting it
could have been increased by the working conditions of the deceased, a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the
school canteen and used the comfort room and other facilities of the school.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 110170. February 21, 1994.]
ROLETO A. PAHILAN, Petitioner, v. RUDY A. TABALBA, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE
JUDGE SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., BRANCH 28, MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN,Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This original action for certiorari impugns the Order 1 of respondent Commission on Elections, dated January 19,
1993, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Roleto A. Pahilan for the latters failure to file a notice of appeal with
the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and, necessarily on the same rationale, the Resolution 2
promulgated by said respondent on May 6, 1993 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Pahilan and private respondent Tabalba were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin during the
local elections held on May 11, 1992. On May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Tabalba as
the duly elected Mayor of Guinsiliban, the latter having garnered 1,087 votes as against 806 votes for Pahilan.
Thereafter, Pahilan filed an election protest 3 which he sent by registered mail on May 23, 1992, addressed to the
clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, attaching thereto P200.00 in cash as payment for
docket fees. In a letter 4 dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin Branch 28, informed Pahilan that the correct fees that where supposed to be paid amounted to P620.00,
and that, accordingly, the petition would not be entered in the court docket and summons would not be issued
pending payment of the balance of P420.00.
On June 16, 1992, upon receipt of the letter, Pahilan paid the required balance in the total amount P470.00. 5
Subsequently, on June 22, 1992, Tabalba filed his Answer with Counterclaim, 6 alleging as one of his affirmative
defenses lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to entertain the election protest for having been filed
beyond the ten-day period provided by law.
On August 17, 1992, Pahilan filed a Motion for Inhibition, dated August 14, 1992, because of alleged serious and
grave doubts that the presiding judge could impartially hear and decide his election protest with the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge, as the latter allegedly belongs to and had supported a political group adverse to the
candidacy of petitioner.
On August 18, 1992, the trial court proceeded with the pre-trial conference, heard the defense on the allegation of
lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of docket fees, and thereafter ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
Tabalba filed his Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defense of Lack of Jurisdiction, 7 dated September 4,
1992. Under date of September 22, 1992, Pahilan filed a Memorandum 8 as well as a Motion to Resolve Motion for
Inhibition Prior to Resolution of Affirmative Defenses. 9
On October 2, 1992, the trial court issued an Order 10 denying the motion for inhibition and dismissing the election
protest for "non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading." Pahilans counsel received a
copy of said order on October 12, 1992 in Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 17, 1992 and within the 5-day period to appeal, Pahilan filed a verified appeal brief 11 in respondent
Commission on Elections, with copies duly served on the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin and the
counsel for herein private Respondent.
On December 12, 1992, the Comelec Contests Adjudication Department directed the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Camiguin, Branch 28, to immediately transmit the complete records of EP Case No. 3(92) which was being
appealed by herein petitioner. 12 Thereafter, in a letter 13 dated January 7, 1993, the said Clerk of Court informed
respondent Commission that "to this very late date, this office has not received any notice of appeal from the
aggrieved party." As a consequence, respondent Commission, in an Order dated January 19, 1993, dismissed
Pahilans verified appeal for failure to appeal within the prescribed period.
Pahilan filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the order dismissing his appeal. Both parties were required by
respondent Commission to file their respective memoranda. Finally, on May 6, 1993, respondent Commission issued
its aforestated resolution denying Pahilans motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition on the bases of the following assigned errors:
1. Whether or not respondent Commission validly dismissed the verified "Appeal" of petitioner which contains all
the elements of a "notice of appeal" and more expressive of the intent to elevate the case for review by said
appellate body, and furnishing copies thereof to the respondent trial judge and counsel for the adverse party, aside
from the incomplete payment of the appeal fee; and
2. Whether or not the respondent trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of petitioner for non-payment
on time of the required fees.
We find cogency and merit in the petition.
The bone of contention in this petition is the alleged erroneous dismissal of petitioners appeal by respondent
Commission because of the failure of petitioner to file a notice of appeal before the Regional Trial Court of
Mambajao, Camiguin which, in turn, dismissed the election protest of petitioner for non-payment of docket fees.
The COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE provide for the manner in which appeals from decisions of courts in election
contests shall be made, to wit:
RULE 22 Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases

SECTION 1. Caption and title of appealed cases. In all election contests involving the elections, returns, and
qualifications of municipal or barangay officials, the party interposing the appeal shall be called the "Appellant" and
the adverse party the "Appellee", but the title of the case shall remain as it was in the court of origin.
x
SEC. 3 Notice of Appeal. Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the court, the aggrieved party
may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse
party.
SEC. 4. Immediate transmittal of records of the case. The Clerk of the court concerned shall, within fifteen (15)
days from the filing of the notice of appeal, transmit to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department the
complete records of the case, together with all the evidence, including the original and three (3) copies of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings.
SEC. 5. Filing of briefs. The Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt of the complete records of the case, shall
notify the appellant or his counsel to file with the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department within thirty (30)
days from receipt of such notice, ten (10) legible copies of his brief with proof of service thereof upon
the Appellant.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the brief of the appellant, the appellee shall file ten (10) legible copies of his
brief with proof of service thereof upon the Appellant.
x
SEC. 9. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the
instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee;

(b) Failure of the appellant to file copies of his brief within the time provided by these rules;
(c) Want of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief; and
(d) Failure to file notice of appeal within the prescribed period.
In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the trial courts order dismissing his election protest on October 12,
1992. As earlier stated, herein petitioner, instead of filing a notice of appeal as required by the rules, filed with
respondent Commission a verified appeal brief within the five-day reglementary period by registered mail under
Registry Receipt No. 43093, dated October 17, 1992. It will be noted, however, that on even date, petitioner
likewise sent by registered mail copies of his appeal brief to the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, under
Registry Receipt No. 43091, and to the counsel of herein private respondent, under Registry Receipt No. 43092. 15
The question now posed by the foregoing factual situation is whether the notice of appeal can be validly substituted
by an appeal brief. We firmly believe and so hold, under the considerations hereinunder discussed, that the same
may be allowed.
First, in cases where a record on appeal is required under the Rules of Court, it has been consistently held that the
filing or presentation and approval of the record on appeal on time necessarily implies or involves the filing of the
notice of appeal, 16 because the act of taking or perfecting an appeal is more expressive of the intention to appeal
than the filing of a mere notice to do so. 17
If the courts can deign to be indulgent and lenient in the interpretation of the rules respecting ordinary civil actions
involving private parties representing private interests, with more reason should the rules involving election cases,
which are undoubtedly impressed with public interest, be construed with the same or even greater forbearance and
liberality.
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes
providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is
imbued with public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect
to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in
office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by
brushing aside technicalities of procedure with protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. 18 For this reason,
broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their
command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by
technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated. 19
It is true that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating
the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. 20
Nevertheless, in some instances, this Court has disregarded such unintended lapses so as to give due course to
appeals on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave
miscarriage thereof in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. 21
It is our considered opinion that public interest is of far greater importance than the justifications of substantial
justice and equity in seeking an exception to the general rule. Hence, election cases, by their very nature, should
and ought to merit a similar exemption from a strict application of technical rules of procedure.
Second, it has been shown and it is not even denied that the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin, as well as the
counsel for private respondent, was furnished copies of the appeal brief which were sent by registered mail on
October 17, 1992, within the reglementary period to appeal. This fact was never refuted by the Solicitor General in
his Comment. Concomitantly, although the Clerk of Court claimed that he had not received any notice of appeal
from herein petitioner, it would be safe to assume, under the circumstances, that the appeal brief duly directed and
mailed was received in the regular course of the mail 22 and was, therefore, deemed filed with the trial court as of
the date of mailing.
Third, applying suppletorily the provisions of the Rules of Court, 23 particularly Section 4, Rule 41 thereof, the
requirement is that a notice of appeal shall specify the parties to the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order,
or part thereof, appealed from; and shall specify the court to which the appeal is taken. A perusal of herein
petitioners appeal brief will disclose the following information; that the parties to the case are Roleto A. Pahilan as
protestant-appellant and Rudy A Tabalba as protestee-appellee; that appellant therein is appealing from the order
of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, dismissing the petition for election contest in Election Case No.
3(92); and that the appeal is being made pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7166, that is, before the
Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, there is no gainsaying the fact that the particulars which ought to be reflected in the notice of appeal
have been specifically and categorically spelled out in the appeal brief of petitioner. Perforce, and in light of the
foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
We now proceed to resolve the issue anent the dismissal of petitioners election protest by the Regional Trial Court
for non-payment, or more accurately the incomplete payment of docket fees. Ordinarily, with the reversal of the
respondent Commissions questioned order, this case should be remanded to said court for adjudication on the
merits. Considering, however, the exigencies of time appurtenant to the disposition of election cases, and
considering further that the issue has at any rate been squarely raised in this petition, it is now incumbent upon
this Court to act on the propriety of the trial courts order dismissing the election protest for failure of petitioner to
pay the correct amount of docket fees.
In dismissing petitioners action, the trial court relied on the rulings enunciated in the cases of Malimit v. Degamo
24 (an action for quo warranto) Magaspi, Et. Al. v. Ramolete, Et. Al. 25 (a suit for recovery of possession and
ownership of land). Lee v. Republic 26 (a petition for declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen).
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. 27 (an action for a sum of money and damages).
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) Et. Al. v. Asuncion, 28 (a suit for a sum of money and damages), and Tacay, Et.
Al. v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, etc., Et. Al. 29 (an action for damages). It bears emphasis
that the foregoing cases, except for Malimit v. Degamo, are ordinary civil actions. This fact alone would have
sufficed for a declaration that there was no basis for the dismissal of petitioners protest for the simple reason that
an election contest is not an ordinary civil action. Consequently the rules governing ordinary civil actions are not
necessarily binding on special actions like an election contest wherein public interest will be adversely affected.
The case of Malimit v. Degamo, on its part, is not on all fours with the present case. In that case, the petition for
quo warranto was mailed to the clerk of Court on December 14, 1959 and was received by the latter on December
17, 1959. The docket fee was deemed paid only on January 5, 1960, because the petitioner therein failed to prove
his allegation that a postal money order for the docket fee was attached to his petition. Hence, the petition for quo
warranto was correctly dismissed.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the sum of P200.00 was attached to the petition mailed to the
Regional Trial Court of Camiguin and this fact was even acknowledged by the Clerk of Court thereof when he
requested herein petitioner to pay the balance of the correct docket fee. In Malimit, there was no docket fee paid at
all at the time of mailing; in the present case, the docket fee was paid except that the amount given was not
correct. Considering the fact that there was an honest effort on the part of herein petitioner to pay the full amount
of docket fees, we are not inclined to insist on a stringent application of the rules.
Furthermore, there are strong and compelling reasons to rule that the doctrine we have established in Manchester
and cases subsequent thereto cannot be made to apply to election cases.
As we have earlier stated, the cases cited are ordinary civil actions whereas election cases are not. The rules which
apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose of election cases, especially if we consider the
fact that election laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and application, bearing in mind
always that the will of the people must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would generally involve private interests
while all elections cases are, at all times, invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere
procedural or technical infirmities.
Again, the Court in Manchester made its ruling in view of its finding that there existed the unethical practice of
lawyers and parties of filing an original complaint without specifying in the prayer the amount of damages which,
however, is stated in the body of the complaint. This stratagem is clearly intended for no other purpose than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees by misleading the docket clerk in the assessment thereof. Thus, the
court therein held that jurisdiction shall be acquired only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
That ruling was later relaxed in the case of Sun Insurance which allowed the subsequent payment of the correct
docket fees provided it is made within the reglementary period or before prescription has set in. The reason given
was that there was no intent on the part of the petitioners therein to defraud the government, unlike the plaintiff in
the case of Manchester.
In Tacay, Et. Al. v. Tagum, Et Al., it was stated that this Court, inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester,
issued Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988, which was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the
prayer of their complaints any specification of the amount of damages, the omission being clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees by deluding the docket clerk in his assessment
of the same. In all these cases, the rule was applied for failure of the plaintiff to include in the prayer of the
complaint the total amount of damages sought against the defendant. The reason for this, according to the Tacay
case, is because the amount of damages will help determine two things: first, the jurisdiction of the court; and,
second, the amount of docket fees to be paid.
In the case now before us, and in election cases in general, it is not the amount of damages, if any, that is sought
to be recovered which vests in the courts the jurisdiction to try the same. Rather, it is the nature of the action
which is determinative of jurisdiction. Thus, regardless of the amount of damages claimed, the action will still have
to be filed with the Regional Trial Court. In such a case, the evil sought to be avoided in Manchester and like cases
will never arise. Peremptorily, there will be no occasion to apply the rulings in the cases mentioned. In addition, the
filing fee to be paid in an election case is a fixed amount of P300.00. There will consequently be no opportunity for
a situation to arise wherein an election contest will have to be dismissed for failure to state the exact amount of
damages and thus evince an intent to deprive the Government of the docket fees due.
Finally, in Manchester, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the plaintiffs therein to evade payment of the
correct docket fees. In the case of petitioner, he already explained, and this we find acceptable and justified, that
"since the schedule of the new rates of court fees was not then available and the filing of the petition for election
contests was done thru the mails, the old rates readily came to mind, and this was the reason why only two
hundred pesos was remitted at the same time with the petition." 30
To summarize, the evil sought to be avoided in Manchester and similar cases can never obtain in election cases
since (1) the filing fee in an election cases is fixed and not dependent on the amount of damages sought to be
recovered, if any; and (2) a claim for damages in an election case is merely ancillary to the main cause of action
and is not even determinative of the courts jurisdiction which is governed by the nature of the action filed.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Commission on Elections dated January 19, 1993, as well as its Resolution
promulgated on May 6, 1993, both in EAC No. 24-92; and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin, dated October 2, 1992, in Election Case No. 3(92) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
records of this case are hereby ordered REMANDED to the court a quo for the expeditious continuation of the
proceedings in and the adjudication of the election protest pending therein as early as practicable.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 36378. January 27, 1992.]
PIO BALATBAT, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO PASION, Respondents.
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for Petitioner.
Roberto Y. Miranda for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; AGRARIAN REFORM CODE (R.A. NO. 6389); RULE ON THE DISPOSSESSION
OF AGRICULTURAL LESSEE ON THE GROUND OF PERSONAL CULTIVATION BY THE AGRICULTURAL LESSOR-OWNER;
CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT. Since under the original provision of Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844,
the dispossession of the agricultural lessee on the ground of personal cultivation by the agricultural lessor-owner
can only take place when "authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory," it follows then that
since the repeal of the provision took effect before the judgment in this case became final and executory, private
respondent may no longer dispossess petitioner on that ground because it had been removed from the statute
books. Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Greta-Diosa Quitorio, Trial Attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance,
made a thorough study of the history of R.A. No. 6389 and came up with the conclusion that, as gathered from the
questions and answers of Senators Diokno and Laurel, the legislative intent to give retroactive effect to said law or
to make it applicable to pending cases of ejectment on ground of personal cultivation, appeared clear. She further
summoned to the aid of petitioner an arsenal of impressive doctrines in statutory construction to protect the cause
and strengthen the case of the petitioner. All of her efforts, which are undoubtedly commendable, are futile. As
early as 1984, in Nilo v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., and Castro v. Castro, this Court, per Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
ruled that Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect because, while during the debates on the
bill which was eventually enacted into Republic Act No. 6389, there were statements made on the floor that "the
owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this measure" even in cases where the owner has not really
succeeded in ejecting the tenants, Congress failed to express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389
retroactive and to cover ejectment cases on the ground of personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the
courts.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by an agricultural lessee who was
ordered ejected in an action for ejectment filed by the new owner of the landholding on the basis of the latters
claim that he will personally cultivate the land pursuant to Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844.
The antecedent facts, as gathered from the pleadings, are not controverted.
Petitioner is the agricultural lessee of a parcel of land located at Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing an area
of 18,490 square meters, more or less, which is owned by Daniel Garcia. The latter sold the land to private
respondent Domingo Pasion and had it declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 126. Sometime
after the sale, Domingo Pasion, on a claim that he will personally cultivate the land, filed on 15 June 1970 with the
Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch II at San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint to eject
petitioner alleging therein that he had notified petitioner of his intention to personally cultivate the landholding, but
despite the lapse of one (1) agricultural year from receipt of the notice thereof, petitioner refused to vacate the
land.
In his amended answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied having received any notice from the private
respondent and by way of special and affirmative defenses, he alleged that: (a) the jurisdictional requirements of
the law have not been complied with by private respondent; (b) the latter has another palay landholding situated at
Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga with an area of 2 1/2 hectares which is being worked by a hired helper; (c) private
respondent is physically unfit to perform the different phases of farm work; and (d) that private respondent filed
the case merely to harass petitioner because of the latters adoption of the agricultural leasehold system and
refusal to shift back to the 50-50 sharing arrangement with the former. In his counterclaim, petitioner sought to
exercise his right of redemption over the subject landholding pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 3844 in view of
the failure of the former owner, Daniel Garcia, to notify him beforehand of the intended sale of the landholding.
Private respondent filed his Answer to the Counterclaim.
At the pre-trial conference of the case, the parties could only stipulate on their being of legal age, their residences
and on the fact that private respondent is the owner of the landholding in question, which is cultivated by petitioner
under the leasehold system.
After trial on the merits, the agrarian court rendered a decision against petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered granting authority to plaintiff Domingo Pasion to
eject defendant Pio Balatbat from the landholding in question described in the complaint and to personally cultivate
his landholding, and ordering said defendant to vacate the said premises and to deliver the possession thereof to
the said plaintiff, subject, however, to the second proviso contained in Section 36(1) and to the provisions of
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844.
The claim for damages of plaintiff is DENIED for lack of basis.
The counterclaim of the defendants is hereby DISMISSED 6r lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 1
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as C.A.-G.R. No. 00479-R; he urged said
court to reverse it because the agrarian court gravely erred in: (a) ordering his ejectment, completely denying the
fact that private respondent, due to his sickness, is physically incapable of personally cultivating the subject
landholding and that private respondent filed the complaint out of vindictiveness, and (b) in dismissing the
counterclaim for redemption, contrary to the facts and law. 2
On 16 December 1972, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 3 in C.A.-G.R. No. 00479-R affirming the
decision of the agrarian court. In disposing of the assigned errors, said Court ruled that private respondent
complied with the requirement of notice of at least one (1) agricultural year. And although private respondent was
already 69 years old at the time he testified, there is nothing on record to indicate that he is suffering from any
physical ailment; besides, in this age of advanced technology, most of the back-breaking processes of farming have
been lightened by machinery. As regards the asserted right of redemption pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No. 3844,
the Court held that the petitioner "failed to comply with the requirements" and took note of petitioners petition
before the lower court to litigate as pauper as "a circumstance that is highly indicative of lack of funds on his part."
4 His motion to reconsider 5 the decision having been denied in the resolution of 25 January 1973, 6 petitioner
took the instant recourse to present the following legal issues for this Courts resolution:
"1. What in the effect of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389, abolishing personal cultivation by landowners as a ground for
dispossession of tenants from their landholdings, on pending appealed cases?
2. Should pending appealed cases on personal cultivation be decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389?"
Expectedly, petitioner maintains that this case should have been decided in the light of Section 7 of R.A No. 6389
since, in view of the appeal, the private respondent did not yet acquire a vested right to personally cultivate the
landholding. In short, the application of the repealing law warrants the dismissal of the action for ejectment.
Republic Act No. 6389 took effect on 10 September 1971, during the pendency of this case before the Court of
Appeals.
After private respondent filed this Comment 7 in compliance with the resolution of 13 March 1973, this Court
resolved to give due course to the petition 8 and thereafter required the petitioner to file his Brief, 9 which he
complied with on 22 June 1973; 10 he makes the following assignment of errors:
"I
The Court a quo gravely erred in ordering the ejectment of herein petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing private respondents complaint for cultivation in view of the
repeal of Section 36(1) Rep. Act 3844 by Section 7 of Rep. Act 6389."
Private respondent filed his Brief on 25 September 1973.

In support of the first assigned error, petitioner asserts that during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6389, Section 7 of which amended Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844. As
amended, personal cultivation is no longer a ground to dispossess an agricultural lessee of his landholding. Section
36(1) of R.A. No. 3844 originally read as follows:
"SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or
will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful nonagricultural purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case
instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one agricultural
year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate
the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to
demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession."
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Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 reads as follows:
"SECTION 7. Section 36(1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross
harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;"
Since under the original provision of Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, the dispossession of the agricultural lessee on
the ground of personal cultivation by the agricultural lessor-owner can only take place when "authorized by the
Court in a judgment that is final and executory," it follows then that since the repeal of the provision took effect
before the judgment in this case became final and executory, private respondent may no longer dispossess
petitioner on that ground because it had been removed from the statute books. Counsel for petitioner, Atty. GretaDiosa Quitorio, Trial Attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, made a thorough study of the history of
R.A. No. 6389 and came up with the conclusion that, as gathered from the questions and answers of Senators
Diokno and Laurel, the legislative intent to give retroactive effect to said law or to make it applicable to pending
cases of ejectment on ground of personal cultivation, appeared clear. She further summoned to the aid of petitioner
an arsenal of impressive doctrines in statutory construction to protect the cause and strengthen the case of the
petitioner. All of her efforts, which are undoubtedly commendable, are futile. As early as 1984, in Nilo v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., and Castro v. Castro, 11 this Court, per Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., ruled that Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect because, while during the debates on the bill which was eventually
enacted into Republic Act No. 6389, there were statements made on the floor that "the owner will lose the right to
eject after the enactment of this measure" even in cases where the owner has not really succeeded in ejecting the
tenants, 12 Congress failed to express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive and to cover
ejectment cases on the ground of personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the courts. This Court thus
stated:
"Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: Laws shall not have a
retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided. According to this provision of law, in order that a law may
have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing
should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule
established to guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past
times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive
effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow,
40 Phil. 997).
As early as 1913, this Court with Justice More land as ponente announced:
The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is there anything
found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an effect. Its effect is, rather, by clear intendment,
prospective.
It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation
unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the
retrospective effect. The cases supporting this rule are almost without number. . .
x
The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543.). Thus
A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively,
unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by
necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a
statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong,
and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature car not be
otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so . . . (Farrel v.
Pingree (1888), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer v. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306)
x
Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision game added strength from later developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is impressed with a social
function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his property not only to benefit himself but society as
well. Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of social justice, the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits. The Constitution also ensures that the worker shall have a just and living wage
which should assure for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for
a better life (Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta v. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).
In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, which
decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferred to them the ownership of the
land they till, in Gonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA 294). We noted the imperative need for such a decree in Chavez v.
Zobel (55 SCRA 26). We held in the latter case that on this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the
need for what for some is a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent.
Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived . . . There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the
goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the
present Constitution.
Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of the tenant from the bondage of the soil, transfers to
him the ownership of the land he tills, and provides instruments and mechanisms therefor has (sic) recognized
personal cultivation as a ground for retention and, therefore, exemption from the land transfer decree. Personal
cultivation cannot be effected unless the tenant gives up the land to the owner.
Presidential Decree No. 27 provides:
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating
such area or will now cultivate it.
The redistribution of land, restructuring of property ownership, democratization of political power, and
implementation of social justice do not require that a landowner should be deprived of everything he owns and that
even small parcels as in these two cases now before us may not be worked by the owner himself. The evil sought
to be remedied by agrarian reform is the ancient anachronism where one person owns the land while another
works on it. The evil is not present in cases of personal cultivation by the owner.
Taking over by the landowner is subject to strict requirements. In addition to proof of ownership and the required
notices to the tenant the bona-fide intention to cultivate must be proved to the satisfaction of the court. And as
earlier stated, the tenant is protected in case the owner fails to cultivate the land within one year or to work the
land himself for three years.
The seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable only to landowners who do not own other agricultural
lands containing an aggregate of more than seven hectares or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or
other urban purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. (Letter of
Instruction No. 472 dated October 21, 1976)."
The subsequent cases of Diga v. Adriano, Et. Al. 13 and Gallardo v. Borromeo 14 reiterated the rule We laid in the
Nilo and Castro cases.
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WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104215. May 8, 1996.]
ERECTORS, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JULIO ANDRES, JR.
and FLORENCIO BURGOS, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DETERMINED BY LAW IN FORCE
AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS OF OVERSEAS
WORKER FILED ON MARCH 31, 1982. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent
filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential
Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out
of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the
complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 797 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA); WITHOUT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION; LABOR ARBITER NOT DIVESTED
OF JURISDICTION BY EFFECTIVITY OF E.O. 797. E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiters authority to hear
and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively
unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used. We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. The law
at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the
POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board and
the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out
of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." The
rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed
prior to its effectivity.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CURATIVE STATUTE; DEFINED. A curative statute is enacted to cure
defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and
decide the complaint 1 for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay filed by private respondent
Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker.
The facts are undisputed:
In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent to work as service contract driver in Saudi Arabia for a
period of twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00 and an allowance of US$165.00 per month. They further
agreed that private respondent shall be entitled to a bonus of US$1,000.00 if after the 12- month period, he
renews or extends his employment contract without availing of his vacation or home leave. Their contract dated
September 20, 1979, was duly approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
The aforesaid contract was not implemented. In December, 1979, petitioner notified private respondent that the
position of service driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract which
changed the position of private respondent into that of helper/laborer with a salary of US$105.00 and an allowance
of US$105.00 per month. The second contract was not submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for
approval.
On December 18, 1979, private respondent left the country and worked at petitioners Buraidah Sports Complex
project in Saudi Arabia, performing the job of a helper/laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of
US$210.00, in accordance with the second contract. Private respondent renewed his contract of employment after
one year. His salary and allowance were increased to US$231.00.
Private respondent returned to the Philippines on August 24, 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract.
He demanded from the petitioner the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract,
and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual bonus which should have been awarded to him for not
availing of his vacation or home leave credits. Petitioner denied private respondents claim.
On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and contractual bonus.
On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation stage, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 797 creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) took effect. Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA
with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." 2
Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case on the merits. On September 23, 1983,
he rendered a Decision 3 in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent to pay the complainant as follows:
1. The sum of US$2,496.00 in its peso equivalent on August 25, 1981 as difference between his allowance as
Service Driver as against his position as Helper/Laborer;
2. The sum of US$1,000.00 in its peso equivalent as of the same date, as his contractual bonus.
The complaints for non-payment/underpayment of overtime pay and unpaid wages or commission are DISMISSED
for lack of merit." 4
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It questioned the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the enactment of E.O. No. 797.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1991, 5 respondent NLRC dismissed the petitioners appeal and upheld the Labor
Arbiters jurisdiction. It ruled:
"To begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to decide this case. On May 29, 1978, the Labor Arbiters were
integrated into the Regional Offices under P.D. 1391. On May 1, 1980, P.D. 1691 was promulgated giving the
Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and Employment the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. There is no
dispute that the Labor Arbiter had the legal authority over the case on hand, which accrued and was filed when the
two above mentioned Presidential Decrees were in force." 6
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari reiterating the argument that:
"The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Labor Arbiters
void judgment in the case a quo." 7
It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of his authority to try and resolve cases arising from
overseas employment contract. Invoking this Courts ruling in Briad Agro Development Corp. v. Dela Cerna, 8
petitioner argues that E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by
private Respondent.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. 9 On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the
petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 10 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 11 which
vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." 12 At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter
had clear jurisdiction over the same.
E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiters authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent
prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them
retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. 13 We fail to perceive in
the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.
The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. v. Dela Cerna 14 cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at
bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development
Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of
Labor and Employment over cases involving workers money claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in
force at the time of the filing of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989. 15 It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No.
111, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Directors lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor
Arbiter and the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims. However, on
November 9, 1989, the Court, in a Resolution, 16 reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and referred the
case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which
divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears emphasis that the Court accorded E.O.
No. 111 and R.A. 6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the
rule on prospectivity of laws.
E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the workers access to the government for redress
of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving
money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and
the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective
jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money
claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service,
or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3)
the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases are within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative
statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or
acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal
requirements.
The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It
created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen
Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the
POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,
including seamen." 17 The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect
jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its effectivity.
Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. v. NLRC 18 is more apt to the case at bar. In this case, PSPC hired
Jardin to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a complaint against PSPC for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages
on January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter. PSPC questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because at that
time, the power to hear and decide cases involving overseas workers was vested in the Bureau of Employment
Services. We held:
"When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5) of the Labor Code provided
that Labor Arbiters and the NLRC shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all cases arising from
employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code. At that time Art. 15 of the same Code had
been amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on June 9, 1978. The pertinent provision of the said presidential
decree states:
ARTICLE 15. Bureau of Employment Services.

(a) . . .
(b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employeremployee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment, except seamen. The decisions of the Bureau shall be final and executory subject
to appeal to the Secretary of Labor whose decision shall be final and inappealable.
Considering that private respondent Jardins claims undeniably arose out of an employer-employee relationship with
petitioner PSPC and that private respondent worked overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Employment
Services and not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. . . .
Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1990. Such amendment qualifies the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as follows:
(b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or
cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment except seamen: Provided that the Bureau of
Employment Services may, in the case of the National Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever the Minister
of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the regional offices or the Bureau of Employment Services if so
authorized by the Minister of Labor as provided in this Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations
Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article 223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations
Commission shall be final and inappealable.
Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the regional offices of the then
Ministry of Labor and Bureau of Employment Services in the National Capital Region. It is noteworthy that P.D. No.
1691, while likewise amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code, did not alter the provision that Labor Arbiters shall have
jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code.
The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were subsequently assumed by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including
seamen. (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA], 200 SCRA
663 [1991]). This development showed the legislative authoritys continuing intent to exclude from the Labor
Arbiters jurisdiction claims arising from overseas employment.
These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint for illegal dismissal was filed on January 31, 1979, under
Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the Bureau of Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the
case and not the Labor Arbiters. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637 [1991]). P.D. 1691 which
gave the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment Services,
was promulgated more than a year after the complaint was filed.(Emphasis supplied)
In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of
respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private respondent against the petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 100776. October 28, 1993.]
ALBINO S. CO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983, in the
sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the terselystated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
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A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino
Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Cos conviction of the crime charged, and his
being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the
sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for
the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September
21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee
the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the
issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was
not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That
Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
"2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether
pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s.
1981, Virginia Montano v. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon v. Lydia Calingo,
October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido v. Miguel A. Mateo, Et Al., November 17, 1981; Res. No.
589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro v. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981)."
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No.
12) almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1,
1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have
been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on
the original bill, i.e., that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the
payment of an obligation," decreed as follows: 4
"Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its
administration interpretation of a statute, but that its new interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury
Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or
part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection will no longer be considered as a valid
defense."
Cos theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima,
101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was
merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor
General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits
of Albino Cos theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this
comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties arguments and
contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Cos appeal and adjudicate the same
on its merits.
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code: "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal . . ." 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of
payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, Et Al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that
RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases,
could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the
effect that Sections. 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive
application; Peo. v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20
of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar
v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings,
pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA
519, adjudging that RA 6389 which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant
cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA
319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect;
Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also
Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v.
COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the
holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled
that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent
appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system . . ."
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
"It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down
by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7 reversing
the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the
basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . . The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes,
in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Courts construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled
rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet
the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in
Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the
doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society."
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (G.R. No.
97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205
SCRA 515, 527-528: 8
"We sustain the petitioners position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24,
1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the
petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in
Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these
decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. But while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the
law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application
of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines.
Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and
a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof."
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative
fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity."
Thus, in this Courts decision in Taada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 which declared "that
presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect," and as
regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect . . . (the) decision might have no acts done in reliance on the validity of those presidential decrees . . ."
the Court said:
". . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
"The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have
to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No.
342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea,
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and
which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 unreasonable, and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court made substantially the same
observations, to wit: 11
". . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal
rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once
judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper . . . It is understandable
why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its
terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic.
It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must
have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has
been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say
on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US
371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002
[1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is
the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21
SCRA 1095)."
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v Military Commission No 34, 12
declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted
in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons this Court, in Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700,
ruled as follows:
"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only
to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be
no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts
against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by
the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of
constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based
on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer
possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
x
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the tenyear period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987
of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to
the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question
arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local
government abolished." 13
It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Courts decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to
the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister
of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. V. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the
familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only
relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in
the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other Government officer
construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an
honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the
present case, on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but
upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose
opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals as
reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of
penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in his office as regards prosecutions for
their violation. 17 Senarillos v. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals is crucially
different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary
construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in
favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as hereinabove set out and
discussed, negativing criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set
aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 79060. December 8, 1989.]
ANICETO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(University of the Philippines), Respondents.
Pedro F. Martinez for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PRES. DECREE NO. 772 (ANTI-SQUATTING LAW); ELEMENTS. The law involved in this case is
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, which embraces three (3)
elements, namely: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) that he succeeded in occupying or possessing the
property through force, intimidation, or threat or by taxing advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner;
and (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner.
2. REMEDIAL; LAWS OF PROCEDURE; APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS PENDING AND UNDETERMINED AT THE TIME OF
THEIR PASSAGES. The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect
only on October 1, 1988, but the same was given retroactive effect in the case of Bonalos v. People, in its
resolution dated, September 19, 1988. Well-settled is the rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retrospective in that sense and to that extent" (People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 784; Alday v. Canilon, 120 SCRA
522). The amendment would therefore apply in this case.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DEMURRER EVIDENCE; RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE DEEMED WAIVED IF FILED
WITHOUT EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT. Nowhere does the record show that accused-petitioners demurrer to
evidence was filed with prior leave of court, the retroactive effect of the amendment aforestated would therefore
work against herein petitioner. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, Accused-petitioner
waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This is exactly what petitioner did, and he cannot now claim denial of his
right to adduce his own evidence. As the Solicitor General aptly opined, "petitioner gambled on securing an
acquittal, a gamble which he lost."
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to reverse or set aside the judgment of public respondent Court of Appeals
dated May 8, 1987 which affirmed the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty of violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for one (1) year, with the
accessories provided by law and to remove the house constructed on the land in question within thirty (30) days
from the finality of judgment, otherwise, private respondent University of the Philippines was authorized to
demolish or dismantle the house at the expense of the petitioner.
cralawnad
The facts are not disputed.

"At about 10:00 oclock in the morning of August 15, 1984, the desk officer of the U.P. Police Force received a
telephone call; the caller reported that somebody was constructing a house at the U.P. Arboretum. Villanueva,
Ladip and Ernesto were directed to investigate (pp. 4-5, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 4, TSN, July 22, 1985).
Villanueva and Ladip are members of the U.P. Police Force connected or assigned with the U.P. Squatters Relocation
Team.
The U.P. Arboretum is located at the back of the U.P. Petron, beside the U.P. Hydraulic Research Center (p.5, TSN,
June 21, 1985).
They proceeded to said place and there they saw some people constructing a house. They asked the carpenters
who owned the house and were told that the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is the owner. Aniceto Ocampo who was
present at the time, was asked whether he had a building permit. The accused admitted that he had no building
permit, although he claimed that he bought the parcel of land on which his house was being constructed from a
certain Roberto Pael (p. 5, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 6, TSN, June 21, 1985).
The accused was informed that the land belongs to the University of the Philippines and that he should stop the
construction of his house. The accused complied (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 21, 1985; p. 6, TSN, July 22, 1985).
However, on August 24, 1984, the accused resumed the construction of his aforesaid house. The aforenamed
prosecution witnesses reminded the accused that he was violating Presidential Decree No. 772 (pp. 7-8, TSN, June
21, 1985; pp. 6-7, TSN, July 22, 1985).
The accused was again told to stop the construction of his house. The accused ignored the U.P. Police Squatters
Team, and insisted that he bought the land from Mr. Pael (p.9, TSN, July 22, 1985; p.10, TSN, June 21, 1985).
The team reported the matter to their Chief, Captain Madrigal, and executed an affidavit (Exh. "A") which they
submitted to the U.P. Legal Department (p. 9, TSN, July 22, 1985; p. 10, tsn, June 21, 1985).
A picture of the house constructed by the accused was also taken" (Exhibit "B"). (pp. 2-3, Comment; pp. 22-23,
Rollo).
After the preliminary investigation had been conducted, an information dated March 25, 1985, was filed against
Aniceto Ocampo charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q38997.
Upon arraignment, Accused-appellant (now petitioner) pleaded "not guilty"
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner waived the presentation of his evidence and instead filed a motion
to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on the ground that the prosecution did not present Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 192689 to prove ownership of the land in question and that it failed to prove that the land on which the
petitioner constructed his house belongs to the University of the Philippines.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, arriving at the following conclusion:
"The prosecution did not present in evidence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689 to prove that the land in
question, indeed, belongs to the University of the Philippines. The absence of this piece of evidence, in the
considered view of this Court, did not cripple the fact that the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is not the owner of said
property. And since there is no showing that the accused occupied the lot in question and constructed his
residential house thereat with the knowledge and/or consent of the owner thereof, the accused is a squatter within
the contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 772.
"Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772 reads:
Any person, who with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a
fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency."
(p. 5, Comment; p. 25, Rollo)
On October 7, 1985, the trial court found Aniceto Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Accused then appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court erred in: (a) applying Section 15, Rule
119 of the 1985 Rule of Criminal Procedure; (b) convicting appellant on the basis of evidence which does not
measure to the degree of proof as required by law; and (c) not applying the principle of presumption of innocence
in favor of Appellant.
Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding said appealed decision to be in
accordance with law and supported by evidence as well.
Hence, Accused-appellant filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
In this petition, two issues are presented involving purely questions of law:
"1. Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present evidence of ownership is not a fatal defect in finding the
accused-petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of squatting; and
2. Is the Motion to Dismiss filed by accused-petitioner a bar for him to present evidence?
For failure of the petitioner to file his reply within the period which expired on December 20, 1987, this Court, in a
resolution dated February 3, 1988, resolved to dispense with the aforesaid reply and considered the case submitted
for deliberation.
Petitioner alleges that the very essence of the case is the proof of ownership of the land involved herein. We do not
agree.
The law involved in this case is Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting
Law, which embraces three (3) elements, namely: (a) accused is not the owner of the land; (b) that he succeeded
in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or threat or by taxing advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the owner; and (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the
will of the owner. In the case at bar, all three (3) elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence presented by the prosecution manifested that Aniceto Ocampo was not the owner of the land on
which he constructed his house and that he did so against the owners will or without its consent. Prosecution
witnesses testified that as early as May, 1983, petitioner was told that the area is U.P. property; that he began
constructing his house without a permit from the owner; that petitioner had no building permit and that he had
been informed that he was violating the Anti-Squatting Law. Besides, it was also confirmed that petitioner had
never shown title to the land he claims to have purchased from one Roberto Pael. Yet, he failed to present any deed
of sale or any title in his name. This alleged sale is a defense which the petitioner could have successfully utilized to
his advantage but failed to substantiate it with evidence at the trial. When petitioner moved for dismissal of the
case, he forfeited his chance to prove his claim. It must be noted also that this Roberto Pael was shown by
testimonial evidence to be not the owner of the land and that said land is the subject of a criminal case against Pael
for squatting.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Neither did the petitioner exhibit any building or sanitary permit to the U.P. Security Force or in court, such being
attached only to his motion for reconsideration. Worthy of note is the fact that such permits are both dated June
26, 1985, which is more than ten (10) months after the illegal construction took place and three (3) months after
the case had been filed against petitioner. (p. 29, Rollo)
We concur with the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial courts decision which maintained that the failure of the
prosecution to present title to prove ownership by the University of the Philippines of the land in question is not
material in proving the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The ownership of U.P. is not in issue in this
case. Withal, the property has been widely and publicly known to be part of the U.P. grounds. The crucial issue is
the act of squatting of the petitioner and his non-ownership of the property, both of which have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
As regard the second issue presented, the answer is in the affirmative. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
"Section 15. Demurrer to Evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be
heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
"If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused
files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution." (Emphasis supplied).
The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect only on October 1,
1988, but the same was given retroactive effect in the case of Bonalos v. People, in its resolution dated, September
19, 1988. Well-settled is the rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent" (People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 784; Alday v. Canilon, 120 SCRA 522). The amendment would
therefore apply in this case.
In the case at bar, nowhere does the record show that accused-petitioners demurrer to evidence was filed with
prior leave of court, the retroactive effect of the amendment aforestated would therefore work against herein
petitioner.
By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, Accused-petitioner waives his right to present
evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for
the prosecution. This is exactly what petitioner did, and he cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his own
evidence. As the Solicitor General aptly opined, "petitioner gambled on securing an acquittal, a gamble which he
lost." (pp. 31-32, Rollo)
More than that, petitioner raises as issue whether his motion to dismiss bars him from presenting his evidence, but
nowhere in his petition does he endeavor to argue in his favor. Such a question should have been raised by the
petitioner in the court a quo and on appeal yet he failed to do the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmieto and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 82805 & 83225. June 29, 1989.]
BRIAD AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE DIONISIO DELA SERNA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, TRADE UNIONS
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)-WFTU LOCAL CHAPTER NO. RO1-005, ALFRED
DELA CRUZ, ET AL., * respondents.
[G.R. No. 83225. June 29, 1989.]
L.M. CAMUS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, The HON.
UNDERSECRETARY DIONISIO C. DELA SERNA, VICTORIANO ATIENZA, JR., JOSNERI DIOCARES,
REYNALDO PAREO, WINNIE ORTOSIT, NELEN SEVERINO, MARLON RESONABLE, ROLANDO ALDANESE,
ALICIO SEBIAO, CARLINTO PAQUERO, JULIAN GOSONA, ROLANDO CASIMERO, ALFREDO DE LEON,
VICTORIANO MACHANG, ARMANDO SALAZAR, ANITO DE JESUS, FRANCISCO DELGADO, PAQUITO
PITULAN, DANILO CENTINO, ROMEO DELOS SANTOS, RUBEN LARA, ROGELIO MAGHUYOR, BEN ABDANI,
RUDY PALASUGLO, WILLIAM BALDADO, ROMEO LABIGAN, TANNY JANOLO and EDGAR A.
OREZ, Respondents.
Corazon R. Paulino for petitioner in G.R. No. 82805.
Raoul B. Agrava & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 83225.
Lar, Comia, Manala & Associates for respondents in G.R. No. 82805.
Jesus Balicanta for respondents in G.R. No. 83225.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS; SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND REGIONAL DIRECTORS BESTOWED JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 111. The Court
rules that, in view of the promulgation of Executive Order No. 111, Zambales Base Metals v. Minister of Labor is no
longer good law. Executive Order No. 111 is in the character of a curative law, that is to say, it was intended to
remedy a defect that, in the opinion of the legislature (the incumbent Chief Executive in this case, in the exercise of
her lawmaking powers under the Freedom Constitution) had attached to the provision subject of the amendment.
This is clear from the proviso: "The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding . . ."
Plainly, the amendment was meant to make both the Secretary of Labor (or the various Regional Directors) and the
Labor Arbiters share jurisdiction.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; CURATIVE STATUTES, PURPOSES AND CONDITIONS FOR
VALIDITY. Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this jurisdiction. Their purpose is to give validity
to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. They
are, however, subject to exceptions. For one, they must not be against the Constitution and for another, they
cannot impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts.
3. ID.; RULE THAT A STATUTE IS TO BE READ IN A MANNER THAT WOULD BREATHE LIFE INTO IT, RATHER THAN
DEFEAT IT, APPLIED TO EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 111; CASE AT BAR. Executive Order vests in Regional Directors
jurisdiction," [t]he provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding", it would have rendered
such a proviso and the amendment itself useless to say that they (Regional Directors) retained the self-same
restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that
would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. At any rate, and as we have observed, the language of Executive
Order No. 111 is comprehensive enough to extend to the resolution of employer-employee controversies covered
by Article 217.
4. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 111, WITH RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. The
Executive Order in question being a curative statute has retrospective effect.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ESTOPPEL; A PARTY MAY NOT ATTACK A TRIBUNALS JURISDICTION AND AT THE SAME TIME
ASK FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF; CASE AT BAR. With respect moreover to Camus Engineerings petition (G.R. No.
83225), it is the Courts considered opinion that the petitioner is estopped from assailing Director Kongs
jurisdiction. The rule is that a party may not attack a tribunals jurisdiction and at the same time ask for affirmative
relief. The records disclose that the petitioner had entered into an amicable settlement with a total of forty-seven
employees and had it approved by Director Kong. The petitioner must, therefore, be said to have accepted Director
Kongs jurisdiction. It cannot now assail it.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
Submitted for decision are these two consolidated cases, both in the nature of challenges to the jurisdiction of the
various Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment to act on money claims. 1
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
I. G.R. No. 82805
This case originated from a complaint filed on February 21, 1987 to recover unpaid wages and wage supplements
filed with Regional Director Filomeno Balbin of the Labor Departments Regional Office No. I sitting in San Fernando,
La Union. The facts appear in his order:
cralawnad
This case arose out of a complaint filed by TRADE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)
WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI-005, against respondent agricultural firm, for alleged underpayment/non-payment of
minimum wage, ECOLA, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay.
Acting on this complaint and pursuant to a corresponding authority issued, a routine inspection was conducted on
subject establishment by Labor Standards and Welfare Officer Danilo T. Basa on May 20, 1987, but the same did
not materialize since no records were presented for examination, as the same are allegedly all being kept at the
firms Manila Office. Nevertheless, LSWO Basa advised the firms Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Virgilio Villa-Real to present
the said records for verification at our Dagupan Labor Office. However, to date and despite the fact that respondent
has been duly notified to present the same, no records were presented for verification.
x
Respondents repeated failure to appear during the scheduled conferences despite due notices, is construed as a
waiver of its right to adduce evidence to controvert the above-noted claims. Likewise, its failure to present the
required employment records is presumed to mean that the presentation of the same will be against the interest of
the respondent and said records will prove the claims of herein complainants.
Based on the records on hand, the workers/members of the complaining Union have been found to be underpaid of
their wages and unpaid of their ECOLA, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from January
1984 to April 1987. The claims for non-payment of overtime pay and night shift differential pay have not been
clearly shown and proven, hence, are not included in the computed deficiencies. 2
Director Balbin then held against Briad Agro Development Corporation, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, and considering further that said deficiencies form part of the legal
remuneration of herein employees, respondent is hereby ordered to satisfy the same and pay the total amount of
FIVE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE PESOS and 30/ 100
(P5,369,909.30) in the manner above-stated, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, and to submit proof of
payment within the same period. Otherwise, a Writ of Execution will be issued to the proper sheriffs to enforce this
Order. The claims for non-payment of overtime pay and night shift differential pay, are hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
Let the parties be notified accordingly.
SO ORDERED. 3
In its appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, Briad Agro Development contended that the Regional
Director has no authority to entertain pecuniary claims of workers, following this Courts ruling in Zambales Base
Metals, Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 4 in which we held that money claims are the exclusive domain of the labor
arbiters. The National Labor Relations Commission dismissed the appeal on the strength of Executive Order No.
111, 5 amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, in which jurisdiction to so act on monetary claims was
supposedly granted to regional directors. In its petition to this Court, Briad Agro Development reiterates its
jurisdictional challenge.
II. G.R. No. 83225.

The money award in this case, as and for unpaid emergency cost of living allowances, and thirteenth-month and
holiday pays, was granted originally in favor of seventy-four employees of L.M. Camus Engineering following an
inspection by Regional Director David Kong of the Department of Labors Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City.
In his order, issued on May 16, 1983, Director Kong condemned the corporation to pay a total of P146,181.20.
Forty-seven employees were, however, later dropped from the case following an amicable settlement with the
petitioner. The facts are as follows:
Records disclosed that on the basis of the complaint filed by the herein complainants, an inspection was conducted
in respondents premises but both the project manager and the project engineer were out of town, except the
internal auditor who informed the Labor Regulations Officer (now known as Labor Standards and Welfare Officer)
that he had no authority to produce the employment records needed; that the internal auditor promised to inform
the project manager and the project engineer about the required employment records but no information was
received since then. Consequently, a subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Regional Director on August 20,
1982, addressed to the Manager of respondent company ordering the latter to submit the pertinent employment
records before the Field Service Division, Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City on August 25, 1982 at 9:30 a.m.
Notwithstanding receipt of such subpoena duces tecum and the follow-up letter to the said Manager of respondent,
plus another subpoena addressed to respondents project manager, respondent failed to submit the required
pertinent records. Consequently, on October 25, 1982 the Regional Director issued the Order in dispute, copy of
which was received by respondent on November 1982.
On November 18, 1982, counsel for respondent, Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos, filed a motion for extension of time to file
his motion to set aside and/or reconsider Order dated 25 October 1982.
On November 24, 1982, respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside and/or Reconsider the Order dated 25 October 1982
on the following grounds namely:
1. That the Order dated 25 October 1982 was issued without notice and hearing.
2. That the questioned Order is not supported by the facts and the law of the case.
Respondent argues that the awards are void because the composition of each award was not indicated; that
complainants were either its employees or that of its subcontractor Carlos Balinagay; that of the 74 complainants
only three, namely: Julian Gajana, Jose Casimora and Jose Roxas failed to execute quitclaims; and that for these
reasons the disputed Order may be validly set aside and/or reconsidered.
Complainants, thru counsel, filed their opposition to the aforesaid Motion to Set Aside Order dated 25 October
1982. They maintain that the Order in question was issued in the valid exercise of the visitorial and enforcement
power of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment, thru the Regional Director as his duly authorized
representative; that before the said Order was issued, respondent or its representative was directed time and again
by the Regional Director to submit the pertinent employment records of complainants but respondent chose to
ignore the said directives; that during the hearing of respondents motion on November 25, 1982 each complainant
testified that no quitclaim was ever executed by them, although they remembered having signed a certain
document which respondent thru its representative made them believe to be simply an evidence of payment of
salary and not a quitclaim.
On May 16, 1983, the Regional Director issued an Order denying respondents motion.
On May 27, 1983, a Motion to Dismiss was filed alleging that "the parties have agreed to settle amicably the
individual claims of the various complainants who are listed in the order of 25 October 1982."
Respondent likewise moved for the reconsideration of the May 16, 1983-Order on the ground that the Regional
Office never had any jurisdiction over the nature of the dispute. 6
The petitioner then appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor, an appeal that did not prosper. On behalf of
the Secretary, Undersecretary Dionisio de la Serna affirmed Director Kongs award, as modified.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, impugning the authority of the Regional Director. Undersecretary Dionisio
dela Serna denied reconsideration and sustained the Regional Directors jurisdiction.
The petitioner, in this petition, primarily questions Regional Directors jurisdiction to pass upon money claims.
III. The cases before the Court; the question of jurisdiction.
The petitioners in these two consolidated cases submit that the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive on the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission, by force of Article 217 of the Labor Code:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties
for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms an conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. 7
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, relies on the provisions of Executive Order No. 111, amending, among
other things, Article 128, paragraph (b), of the Labor Code:
(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial
safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their orders except in case where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation
officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in
the normal course of inspection. 8
He further submits that, as a consequence, Zambales Base Metals, Inc. v. Minister of Labor is no longer controlling
(although in his comment in G.R. No. 83225, he maintains that it is still in force and effect.) 9
IV. The Courts decision.
The Court rules that, in view of the promulgation of Executive Order No. 111, Zambales Base Metals v. Minister of
Labor is no longer good law. Executive Order No. 111 is in the character of a curative law, that is to say, it was
intended to remedy a defect that, in the opinion of the legislature (the incumbent Chief Executive in this case, in
the exercise of her lawmaking powers under the Freedom Constitution) had attached to the provision subject of the
amendment. This is clear from the proviso: "The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding . . ." Plainly, the amendment was meant to make both the Secretary of Labor (or the various
Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiters share jurisdiction.
Curative statutes have long been considered valid in this jurisdiction. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done
that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. They are, however,
subject to exceptions. For one, they must not be against the Constitution and for another, they cannot impair
vested rights or the obligation of contracts. 10 It has not been shown in this case that these exceptions apply.
That Executive Order No. 111 intended to make the jurisdiction to pass upon money claims, among the other cases
mentioned by Article 217 of the Labor Code, concurrent between the Secretary of Labor (or Regional Directors) and
the Labor Arbiters is clear from its perambulatory clauses, to wit:
WHEREAS, the welfare of the workers is a primary concern of the government.

WHEREAS, it is necessary to amend or repeal provisions of laws that repress the rights of workers and of their
trade unions. 11
Executive Order No. 111, it is obvious, was enacted to widen workers access to the Government for redress of
grievances.
The language of the provision is indeed broad enough to encompass cases over which Labor Arbiters had hitherto
exercised exclusive jurisdiction. We quote, in part:
. . . the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and
administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code and other
labor legislation . . . 12
We can no longer accept the contention that the Regional Directors singular concern, under the said provision, is to
ensure compliance with labor standards, such as industrial safety and similar concerns. In Zambales Base Metals, it
was our reading of Section 128(b) of the Code that the aforesaid labor officials authority stopped there, 13 but we
have, in view of the amendment under Executive Order No. 111, since taken a second look. As we said, the
Executive Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction," [t]he provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding", it would have rendered such a proviso and the amendment itself useless to say that they
(Regional Directors) retained the self-same restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental that a
statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. At any rate, and as we have
observed, the language of Executive Order No. 111 is comprehensive enough to extend to the resolution of
employer-employee controversies covered by Article 217.
It is interesting to note that the Government itself (through the Solicitor General) considers Zambales Base Metals
v. Minister of Labor as Executive Order No. 111s very raison detre. 14 If this is so, the intent of the legislator to
grant Regional Directors the jurisdiction now impugned cannot any more be clearer.
Being a curative statute, the Executive Order in question has retrospective effect. In Garcia v. Martinez, 15 we held
that legislation "which is in the nature of a curative statute" 16 has "retrospective application to a pending
proceeding." 17 Hence, these cases should be decided in the light of the presidential issuance in question, although
they might have come pending further proceedings. Be that as it may, the records show that G.R. No. 82805 had
come about during the effectivity of Executive Order No. 111. (In G.R. No. 82805, the complaint was filed on
February 21, 1987; in G.R. No. 83225, the material dates do not appear in the records but the order decreeing the
money award was issued on October 25, 1982 and a subponena duces tecum appears to have been issued, in
connection with the inspections that prefaced the complaint, on August 20, 1982. 18) With respect to G.R. No.
82805, therefore, the Executive Order squarely applies, while insofar as G.R. No. 83225 is concerned, we give it a
retroactive operation.
With respect moreover to Camus Engineerings petition (G.R. No. 83225), it is the Courts considered opinion that
the petitioner is estopped from assailing Director Kongs jurisdiction. The rule is that a party may not attack a
tribunals jurisdiction and at the same time ask for affirmative relief. 19 The records disclose that the petitioner had
entered into an amicable settlement with a total of forty-seven employees and had it approved by Director Kong.
The petitioner must, therefore, be said to have accepted Director Kongs jurisdiction. It cannot now assail it.
chanrobles law library : red
Accordingly, we sustain the jurisdiction of the respondents Regional Directors.

WHEREFORE, these petitions are DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
While, for the reasons hereinafter stated, I concur in the result reached in the main opinion, I cannot quite bring
myself to agree with its express or clearly implied postulate that Executive Order No. 111 worked any substantive
change in the law previous thereto as far as concerns the extent and character of the authority vested in the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his representatives in labor standards disputes. A survey of the state of the
law prior to and after the issuance of said Executive Order will, I hope, make the point clearer.
1. The Law Prior to EO 111. 1
a. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Prior to the effectivity of EO 111, the Labor Arbiters had
"original and exclusive jurisdiction (inter alia) to hear and decide" (1) "cases . . . that workers may file involving
wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment . . .," and (2) "all money claims of workers
involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation, maternity or service
incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from employer-employee relations, except claims
for employees compensation, social security and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 127 of (the
Labor) Code . . ." 2
b. Power Granted to Secretary of Labor or Representative. Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters above mentioned was pronounced to be original and exclusive, some power over the same subject matter
(over wages [e.g., non-payment or under-payment], hours of work [e.g., overtime or premium compensation], and
other terms and conditions of employment [e.g., separation pay, maternity and other leave benefits]) was in
measure also vested in the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative, i.e., the Regional Director.
(1) Article 128 of the Labor Code. Article 128 of the Labor Code, 3 as amended by P.D. No. 850, 4 conferred on
the "Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives . . . the power to order and administer, after due
notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of . . . (the) Code based on the findings of labor
regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to
the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order."
(2) Labor Standards Provisions. The "labor standards provisions" referred to are, of course, those concerning
wages, hours of work, separation pay, maternity and other leaves, industrial or occupational safety, medical and
dental treatment, etc. 5
(3) Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. The Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor
Code promulgated on February 16, 1976 provided, among other things, 6 that the Regional Director had power to
cause investigation of complaints filed by aggrieved parties if employer-employee relationship still existed between
the parties, and take such other action as may be necessary in accordance with Article 128 of the Code; but if the
employment relation no longer existed, the case would be assigned to a Conciliator for determination of the issues
and effecting of an amicable settlement, and if no settlement was reached, the case would be certified to the
Appropriate Labor Arbiter. However, the Regional Director could deny certification of the case to the Labor Arbiter if:
(a) the complaint patently lacked cause of action; (b) the causes of action had already prescribed; (c) the
complaint patently partook (of) the nature of harassment; and (d) the complaint was barred by prior judgment.
The denial of the certification could however be subject of appeal by the Bureau of Labor Standards.
(4) Policy Instructions No. 14. Policy Instructions No. 14, on the subject, "Termination Cases," effective April 23,
1976, recognized the jurisdiction of the Regional Director to conduct a summary investigation of applications for
clearance to dismiss employees and decide whether or not to deny the application; but "if he does not deny the
application, he shall immediately certify the case to the Executive Arbiter for hearing and decision on the merits."
7
c. Allocation of Jurisdiction. Considering that apart from the Regional Director (in representation of the Secretary
of Labor) and the Labor Arbiter, there were other officers, i.e., the Conciliators in the Bureau of Labor Relations,
who also had some power relative to "labor standards cases," it was thought necessary to define more precisely the
competence of the different officials on the matter. This was done in Policy Instructions No. 6 issued by the Ministry
of Labor and Employment on April 23, 1976, dealing explicitly with the subject, "Distribution of Jurisdiction over
Labor Cases."
(1) The Regional Director. Placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the REGIONAL DIRECTOR were labor
standards cases "arising from violations of labor standard laws discovered in the course of inspection or complaints
where employer-employee relations still exist." 8
(2) The Conciliation Section. Placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the CONCILIATION SECTION were
labor standards cases "where employer-employee relations no longer exist." 9
(3) The Labor Arbiters. Declared as "CERTIFIABLE" to the Labor Arbiters were cases which were "not settled by
the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office" "where employer-employee relations no longer exist" or those
concerning (a) "questions of law," or (b) "claims involving an amount exceeding P100,000 or 40% of the paid-up
capital of the employer, whichever is lower, or (c) evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course
of inspection." 10
d. Additional Prescriptions. Further refinement of the power of the Regional Directors over Labor Standards
Cases was effected by Policy Instructions No. 7. Policy Instructions No. 7 declared that a Regional Director could
exercise jurisdiction over labor standards controversies except in those cases
(1) where questions of law are involved as determined by the Regional Director; 11
(2) where the amount involved exceeds P100,000 or over 40% of the equity of the employer, whichever is lower;
(3) where evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection are required; or
(4) where there is no more employer-employee relationship. 12
e. Later Rules.
(1) PD 1367. Presidential Decree No. 1367 confirmed the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over "cases arising from
employer-employee relations duly indorsed (or "certified") by the Regional Directors." 13
(2) Policy Instructions No. 37. Policy Instructions No. 37, issued on October 7, 1978 in connection with PD 1391,
provided that "cases, involving violation of labor standards laws where employer-employee relationship still exists
shall be assigned to the Labor Arbiters where: (a) intricate questions of law are involved; or (b) evidentiary matters
not disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection by labor regulations officers are required for their proper
disposition." 14 It declared, too, that the so-called "conciliable cases" theretofore under the jurisdiction of the
defunct Conciliation Section for purposes of conciliation or amicable settlement, became immediately assignable to
the Arbitration Branch for joint conciliation and compulsory arbitration. 15
(3) PD 1691. PD 1691 further amended Article 127 (re-numbered 128) by the addition of a proviso relative to
the situation referred to in Policy Instructions Numbered 7 and 37, supra, i.e., where the employer contests the
findings of labor regulations officers, viz.: 16
"x
"(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to order and administer, after
due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this code based on the findings of labor
regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to
the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the
findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary
matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection."
f. Restatement of Power of Secretary of Labor or Representative Prior to EO 111. In light of the laws and rules
just cited, and the pronouncement in Policy Instructions No. 7 that labor standards cases had been taken from the
arbitration system and placed under the enforcement system to the end that "the worker need not litigate to get
what legally belongs to him," the fact of the matter is that the power of Regional Directors over labor standards
cases prior to EO 111 consisted merely of the enforcement of UNCONTESTED MONEY CLAIMS OF PERSONS STILL
EMPLOYED, i.e., money claims of persons arising from violations of labor standards provisions of the Labor Code (or
other statute) discovered by labor regulations officers in the course of normal inspection, where the employment
relationship still existed, or the employer did not contest or otherwise raise any issue respecting the findings of said
labor regulations officers.
(1) No adjudicatory power. Indeed, no adjudicative power as that possessed by Labor Arbiters was ever reposed
in the Regional Director, in the sense of trying and deciding (or hearing and determining) legal controversies or
justiciable causes involving labor standards laws. The Regional Director actually did not have the power or faculty
known as "jurisdiction," vested in a judge, for instance, or a labor arbiter, i.e., to receive evidence adduced by
parties involved in a labor standards controversy, determine on the basis thereof the factual issues, and apply the
law to the facts thus deemed established, in order that the controversy or litigation might be authoritatively
resolved. He did not have the power to resolve controversies (understood in the popular sense, as clashes of
opposing views). He merely had functions that can only be described as ministerial. He had visitorial power, as
representative of the Minister or Secretary of Labor, to cause inspection of establishments to ascertain observance
of labor standards provisions, and in the event of discovered violations thereof, to require compliance therewith if
the employer admitted the infractions; but if it should appear, at the hearing required to be held after discovery of
the infractions, that a controversy existed, i.e., the employer was not accepting but was on the contrary contesting
said officers findings, or that no employment relationship existed any longer, the Regional Director himself could
not try and decide the case but had to refer or certify it to the appropriate Labor Arbiter for hearing and judgment.
There was, in fine, no sharing by the Regional Director of the original and exclusive jurisdiction reposed by law in
Labor Arbiters even with respect to money claims arising from alleged breach of labor standards provisions of the
Labor Code.
3. Relevant Jurisprudence. It was in this sense of the Regional Directors lack of adjudicatory authority, or the
power of compulsory arbitration that the law was applied in Zambales Base Metals v. Minister of Labor, 146 SCRA
50 (Nov. 26, 1986), concerning money claims 17 arising from alleged violations of labor standards provisions not
discovered in the course of normal inspection, Oreshoot Mining Co. v. Arellano, 156 SCRA 500 (Dec. 14, 1987),
involving, among others, employees whose employment had been terminated, 18 and Ong v. Parel, 156 SCRA 768
(Dec. 21, 1987), in which the employer inter alia disputed the adequacy of the evidentiary foundation (employees
affidavits) of the findings of the labor standards inspectors. Noteworthy is that, as observed in Ong v. Parel, the
Solicitor General had taken the position (as late as January, 1987) that the respondent Regional Director was "not
empowered to adjudicate money claims because such authority is reposed in the Labor Arbiter and the National
Labor Relations Commission as provided under Art. 127 of the same Code, as amended . . . (and) that the visitorial
and enforcement powers of the public respondent under Art. 128 of the Labor Code are limited to awards not
exceeding P100,000.00 pursuant to MOLE Policy Instruction No. 7." 19
4. Amendments Under EO 111. Another amendment of paragraph (b) of Article 128 of the Labor Code was made
by Executive Order No. 111 which took effect, as aforestated, on March 3, 1987. The amendment consisted merely
in the intercalation of two (2) clauses, to wit: (a) "The provisions of Article 217 of this code to the contrary
notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists," and (b) "and other labor
legislation." As thus amended, 20 paragraph (b) Article 128 now reads:
"(b) The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship
of employer-employee still exists, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor regulations officers or industrial
safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations
officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in
the normal course of inspection."
5. Actual Effect of EO 111. According to the Solicitor General, Executive Order No. 111 was promulgated
precisely to revise the law as pronounced and applied in the Zambales Base Metals decision. 21 If this be so, the
formulation of the executive order falls short of the purpose, and is, in light of the prior state of the law,
inefficacious to bring about the intended revision.
The insertion of the clause, "where the relationship of employer-employee still exists," to qualify the power of the
Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives the necessary
implication being that where the employment relation no longer existed, said Minister (Secretary) or his
representatives had no such power was quite unnecessary for in Policy Instructions Numbered 6, 7 and 37,
supra, it was explicitly acknowledged that these officials really had no jurisdiction over cases where the relationship
of employer and employee no longer existed.
The inclusion of the phrase, "and other labor legislation," was also unnecessary for it is obvious that labor
standards provisions may be found in the Labor Code as well as in other statutes. In any event, the phrase did not
affect the subject of jurisdiction of Regional Directors.
Neither does the intercalation of the phrase, "the provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding," work a change in the existing law. For even before the effectivity of EO 111 and
notwithstanding that under said Article 217 Labor Arbiters had exclusive original jurisdiction over cases . . . (and
all) money claims of workers involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime or premium
compensation, maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from employeremployee relations, except claims for employees compensation, social security and medicare benefits" the
Minister (Secretary) of Labor or his duly authorized representatives already had the power (albeit not truly
adjudicative) where the employer-employee relationship still existed
". . . to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this
code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in
cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues which cannot be
resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection."
In other words, even without the qualifying phrase, "the provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding," the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives already "shared" in some measure
the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters to order observance of labor laws denominated exclusive and original in said
Article 217 in that in UNCONTESTED MONEY CLAIMS OF PERSONS STILL EMPLOYED, Regional Directors had
power to "order and administer . . . compliance with the labor standards provisions . . . and to issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order." The principle has not been changed.
Even under EO 111 no other aspect of the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction may be deemed to be shared by the
Secretary or his representatives, in view of the retention of the provisos requiring (1) the existence of the
employment relationship and (2) the absence of a contest or issue raised by the employer anent the findings of the
labor regulations officers. Whether under EO 111 or the prior law, therefore, the Secretary of Labor or his
representatives could, notwithstanding the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred on Labor Arbiters, order
compliance with the legal provisions governing wages, hours of employment and other terms of employment, found
to have been violated in the normal course of inspection, provided that (1) the employment relationship still existed
and (2) the case was uncontested, i.e., the employer did not contest or raise any issue relative to the findings of
the labor standards officers.
To recapitulate, under EO 111, the Regional Directors, in representation of the Secretary of Labor and
notwithstanding the grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters by Article 217 of the Labor Code, as
amended have power to hear cases involving violations of labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other
legislation discovered in the course of normal inspection, and order compliance therewith, provided that:
1) the alleged violations of the employer involve persons who are still his employees, i.e., not dismissed: and
2) the employer does not contest the findings of the labor regulations officer or raise issues which cannot be
resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.
These propositions relative to uncontested cases are reflected in Rule III of the Rules Implementing Executive
Order 111 governing the "Endorsement of Cases to the National Labor Relations Commission," viz.:
"Section 1. Contested Cases.
a) In cases where the employer contests the findings of the Labor Standards and Welfare Officers and the issues
cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection, the Regional Director shall endorse such case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
b) The employer shall raise such objections during the hearing of the case or at any time after receipt of the notice
of inspection results. The issue of whether or not the case shall be endorsed to the NLRC shall be resolved by the
Regional Director in the final disposition of the case.
Section 2. Labor Standards and Welfare Officers (LSWOs) as witnesses In cases that have been endorsed to the
NLRC, the LSWOs who participated in the investigation shall make themselves available as witnesses in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter concerned."
It may finally be observed that the hearing to be conducted by the Regional Director is limited to a determination of
whether or not (1) the employment relationship still exists, and/or (2) the employer accepts the findings of the
LSWOs and raises no issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not
verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In the affirmative case, the Regional Director may properly order
compliance with the legal provisions violated and issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of this order; otherwise, the Regional Director ceases to have competence to take cognizance of and
decide the case but must refer or certify it to the Labor Arbiter for hearing and judgment.
6. Application of the Law to Cases at Bar. In G.R. No. 82805 (Briad Agro Development Corporation v. de la
Serna), the employer refused to present its records for inspection by the Regional Office. This may be deemed a
waiver of the right to contest the conclusions of the Labor Inspectors drawn from the evidence and records at hand.
Under Executive Order 111, which is applicable since the violations of labor standards took place after its
effectivity, it was within the authority of the Regional Director to order compliance with the labor standards
statutes, and to issue a writ of execution to the appropriate authority to enforce his order.
In G.R. No. 83255 (L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation v. Secretary of Labor), the employer similarly refused to
produce its relevant records, despite several requests therefor by the Regional Office. Its refusal may be regarded
as a waiver of the right to contest the Directors findings made on the basis of the records and evidence available,
including the fact that the employer had impliedly acknowledged the imputed infractions of labor standards when it
made payments on account thereof to several of its employees by way of amicable settlement. Under the law prior
to Executive Order 111, the Regional Director had the power, in cases where the employment relationship still
existed, to order compliance with labor standards and issue a writ of execution to the appropriate authorities for
the enforcement of his awards. In any event, said Executive Order, as a "curative statute . . . has retrospective
application to a pending proceeding." 22
I suggest that in both cases, even without the sanction of Executive Order 111, which neither enlarged nor
otherwise altered the authority of the Secretary of Labor and the Regional Directors as regards labor standards
cases, the assailed actions of said officials may be sustained as properly within the powers vested in them by the
law in force before the effectivity of said enactment. Upon this proposition, the dismissal of both petitions is entirely
in order.
7. Republic Act No. 6715. What in fact conferred upon Regional Directors adjudicative power in the true sense of
the term, i.e., the power take cognizance of, receive evidence on and determine legal controversies brought before
them, is Republic Act No. 6715, signed into law on March 2, 1988 and effective "fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, whichever comes
earlier."
a. Amendment of Article 129. RA 6715 amended Article 129 of the Labor Code to read as follows:
ART. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. Upon complaint of any interested party,
the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of
the Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter
involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an
employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this code, arising from
employer-employee relations; Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided,
further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30)
calendar days from the date of the filing of the same . . .
Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on
the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt of a copy of said
decision or resolution, to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10)
calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules.
x
b. Amendment of Article 217. Amended by RA 6715, too, was Article 217 of the same Code, to read as follows:
chanrob1es virtual
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ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Except as otherwise provided under this code, the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
(2) Termination disputes;

(3) If accompanied with a claim of reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relation;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims
arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving
an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
x
c. Requisites for Exercise of Jurisdiction by Regional Director, etc. Quite clearly, under the provisions of said Act,
Regional Directors and other hearing officers of the Department of Labor (aside from the Labor Arbiters) have real
jurisdiction i.e., they may try and decide, or hear and determine any claim brought before them for recovery
of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, if the following requisites concur, to wit:
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1) the claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper
under the Code;
2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and
3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
d. When Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Where these three (3) requisites do not co-exist, the Labor
Arbiters have exclusive original jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations, other than
those for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.
Fernan, C.J., Cruz and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80593. December 18, 1989.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. TERESITA CRUZ, JOSE AGRIPINO, BERNARDO BAUZON,
LUCRECIA BILBAO, MA. LUISA CABRERA, FRANCIS BAACLO, GUADALUPE CAMACHO, LUZ DE LEON, MIKE
VILLAVERDE, NEPOMUCENO MEDINA, EDGARDO MENDOZA, JENNIFER VELEZ, AMELIA MEDINA,
EDUARDO ESPEJO and RICARDO BATTO, Respondents.
The Chief Legal Officer for Petitioner.
Romualdo C. Delos Santos for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; PROVISIONS IN THE LABOR CODE AS TO WORKERS PREFERENCE AS REGARDS MONETARY CLAIMS
MUST PREVAIL OVER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE; REASON. This Court must uphold the preference
accorded to the private respondents in view of the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code which are clear and
which admit of no other interpretation. The phrase "any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding" indicates
that such preference shall prevail despite the order set forth in Articles 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. No
exceptions were provided under the said article, henceforth, none shall be considered. Furthermore, the Labor Code
was signed into Law decades after the Civil Code took effect. In Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, this
Court declared that whenever two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of legislative will.
Applying the aforecited case in the instant petition, the Civil Code provisions cited by the petitioner must yield to
Article 110 of the Labor Code.
2. ID.; WORKERS PREFERENCE IN CASE OF BANKRUPTCY; APPLIES EVEN IF THE EMPLOYERS PROPERTIES ARE
ENCUMBERED BY A MORTGAGE CONTRACT. Our pronouncement in A.C. Ransom labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, (150
SCRA 498) reinforces the abovementioned interpretation where this Court, explicitly stated that" (t)he worker
preference applies even if the employers properties are encumbered by means of a mortgage contract . . . . So
that, when (the) machinery and equipment of RANSOM were sold to Revelations Manufacturing Corporation for P2
M in 1975, the right of the 22 laborers to be paid from the proceeds should have been recognized . . . ."
3. ID.; ID.; EXTENDS TO TAX CLAIMS. Under Article 110 of the Labor Code as amended, the unpaid wages and
other monetary claims of workers should be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors.
Thus not even tax claims could have preference over the workers claim.
4. ID.; ID.; INTENDED FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE WORKING CLASS. Consistent with the ruling of this Court
in Volkschel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, this court adopts the doctrine that" (i)n the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration." Bearing this in mind, this Court must reiterate the dictum
laid down in A.C. Ransom that the conflict between Article 110 of the Labor Code and Article 2241 to 2245 of the
Civil Code must be resolved in favor of the former. A contrary ruling would defeat the purpose for which Article 110
was intended; that is, for the protection of the working class, pursuant to the never-ending quest for social justice.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The focus of the instant petition for certiorari is the application of Article 110 of the Labor Code. The said article
provides that workers shall enjoy first preference with regard to wages due them in cases of bankruptcy or
liquidation of an employers business.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1980 Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) laid-off about seventy percent (70%) of its employees
because it was experiencing business reverses. The retained employees constituting thirty percent (30%) of the
work force however, were not paid their wages. This non-payment of salaries went on until July 1982 when AMEX
completely ceased operations and instead entered into an operating agreement with T.M. San Andres Development
Corporation whereby the latter would be leasing the equipment and machineries of AMEX.
The unpaid employees sought redress from the Labor Arbiter 1 who, on August 27, 1986 rendered a decision
finding their claim valid and meritorious. The dispositive part of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the claims of complainants for payment of unpaid wages and separation pay to be valid and
meritorious, respondents Aggregate Mining Exponent and its president Luis Tirso Revilla should, as they are hereby
ordered to pay the same to said complainants in the following amounts:
Yrs. of Separation
Employees Service Rate Pay Backwages
1. Jose Agripino 8 P1,300.00 P5,200.00 P6,174.96
2. Bernardo Bauzon 9 1,900.00 8,550.00 11,712.85
3. Lucresia Bilbao 7 2,300.00 8,050.00 19,247.00
4. Teresita S. Cruz 12 2,700.00 16,200.00 23,485.70
5. Ma. Luisa Cabrera 3 1,800.00 2,700.00 5,004.35
6. Francis Baaclo 7 3,500.00 12,550.00 32,986.90
7. Guadalupe Camacho 6 1,300.00 3,900.00 3,227.15
8. Luz de Leon 5 1,300.00 3,250.00 3,110.85
9. Mike Villaverde 6 1,500.00 4,500.00 4,793.80
10. Nepomuceno Medina 5 1,200.00 3,000.00 4,287.10
11. Edgardo Mendoza 4 920.00 1,840.00 832.10
12. Jenifer Velez 2 740.00 740.00 4,287.66
13. Amelia Medina 2 740.00 740.00 6,822.81
14. Eduardo Espejo 4 970.00 1,940.00 234.10
15. Ricardo Batto 7 3,000.00 10,500.00 9,874.70

TOTAL P83,360.00 P136,092.03
========= =========
in the total amount of P219,452.03. To properly effectuate the payment of the same, the necessary arrangement
should be made between respondents Annex and T.M. San Andres Development Corp. and Philippine National Bank
(PNB) on their respective role and participation herein. For should the principal respondent be unable to satisfy
these Awards, the same can be satisfied from the proceeds or fruits of its machineries and equipment being
operated by respondent T .M . San Andres Dev. Corp. either by operating agreement with respondent Amex or thru
lease of the same from PNB.
To obviate any further differences between complainants and their counsel to the latters attorneys fees which
seems to be the cause of their earlier misunderstanding, as can be gleaned from the Charging Lien filed by said
counsel, respondents are, moreover, ordered to segregate and pay the same directly to said counsel, the amount of
which is to be computed pursuant to their agreement on July 14, 1983 (Annex A of Position to Enter Attorneys
Charging Lien in the Record of the Case)." 2
AMEX and its President, Tirso Revilla did not appeal from this decision. But PNB, in its capacity as mortgageecreditor of AMEX interposed an appeal with the respondent Commission, not being satisfied with the outcome of the
case. The appeal was primarily based or the allegation that the workers lien covers unpaid wages only and not the
termination or severance pay which the workers likewise claimed they were entitled to.
In a resolution 3 dated October 27, 1987, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the decision appealed
from. Hence the instant petition filed by the petitioner bank based on the following grounds:
"I. ARTICLE 110 OF THE LABOR CODE MUST BE READ IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244 AND
2245 OF THE CIVIL CODE CONCERNING THE CLASSIFICATION, CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF CREDITS.
"II. ARTICLE 110 OF THE LABOR CODE DOES NOT PURPORT TO CREATE A LIEN IN FAVOR OF WORKERS OR
EMPLOYEES FOR UNPAID WAGES EITHER UPON ALL OF THE PROPERTIES OR UPON ANY PARTICULAR PROPERTY
OWNED BY THEIR EMPLOYER." 4
At the outset, petitioner PNB did not question the validity of the workers claim for unpaid wages with respect to the
mortgaged properties of AMEX, provided that the same be limited to the unpaid wages, and to the exclusion of
termination pay. In the instant petition however, PNB starts off with the question of whether or not the workers
lien take precedence over any other claim considering that this Court has ruled otherwise in Republic v. Peralta. 5
This Court cannot allow the petitioner to alter its stance at this stage inasmuch as it is deemed to have acquiesced
in the decision of the labor arbiter concerning payment of unpaid wages. The records reveal that the petitioner
failed to question the same on appeal. Hence, it is now barred from claiming that the workers lien applies only to
the products of their labor and not to other properties of the employer which are encumbered by mortgage
contracts or otherwise.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attempt on the part of the petitioner to seek relief from that portion of the
decision would still be in vain.
Article 110 of the Labor Code provides that:
"Art. 110. Worker preference in case of bankcruptcy. In the event of bankcruptcy or liquidation of an employers
business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regarding their unpaid wages and other monetary claims,
any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages and monetary claims, shall be paid in full
before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid." 6
This Court must uphold the preference accorded to the private respondents in view of the provisions of Article 110
of the Labor Code which are clear and which admit of no other interpretation. The phrase "any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding" indicates that such preference shall prevail despite the order set forth in Articles
2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. 6a No exceptions were provided under the said article, henceforth, none shall be
considered. Furthermore, the Labor Code was signed into Law decades after the Civil Code took effect.
In Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 7 this Court declared that whenever two statutes of different
dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date must
prevail being a later expression of legislative will. Applying the aforecited case in the instant petition, the Civil Code
provisions cited by the petitioner must yield to Article 110 of the Labor Code.
Moreover, Our pronouncement in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, 8 reinforces the above-mentioned
interpretation where this Court, speaking through Associate Justice Melencio-Herrera, explicitly stated that" (t)he
worker preference applies even if the employers properties are encumbered by means of a mortgage contract . . . .
So that, when (the) machinery and equipment of RANSOM were sold to Revelations Manufacturing Corporation for
P2 M in 1975, the right of the 22 laborers to be paid from the proceeds should have been recognized . . .." 9
Reliance by the petitioners on Republic v. Peralta is without basis. The said case involved a question of workers
preference as against the tax claims of the State. In the said case the Court held that the State must prevail in that
instance since "it has been frequently said that taxes are the very lifeblood of government. The effective collection
of taxes is a task of highest importance for the sovereign. It is critical indeed for its own survival." 10
Nevertheless, under Article 110 of the Labor Code as amended, the unpaid wages and other monetary claims of
workers should be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors. Thus not even tax claims
could have preference over the workers claim.
chanroble s lawlibrary : rednad
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in Volkschel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 11 this court adopts
the doctrine that" (i)n the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration." 12
Bearing this in mind, this Court must reiterate the dictum laid down in A.C . Ransom that the conflict between
Article 110 of the Labor Code and Article 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code must be resolved in favor of the former. A
contrary ruling would defeat the purpose for which Article 110 was intended; that is, for the protection of the
working class, pursuant to the never-ending quest for social justice.
Petitioner next advances the theory that "even if the workers lien applies in the instant case, the same should
cover only unpaid wages excluding termination or severance pay." 13 To support this contention, petitioner cites
Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code which provides that:
"The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided under Article 283 of the Code.
The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to termination pay provided in the
Code, . . .." (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on that premise, petitioner contends that the claim for termination pay should not be enforced against AMEX
properties mortgaged to petitioner PNB because Article 110 of the Labor Code refers only to "wages due them for
services rendered during the period prior to bankcruptcy or liquidation." 14 Citing serious financial losses as the
basis for the termination of the private respondents, petitioner alleges that the employees are not entitled to the
termination pay which they claim.
This contention is, again, bereft of merit.
The respondent Commission noted that "AMEX failed to adduce convincing evidence to prove that the financial
reverses were indeed serious." 15 After a careful study of the records of the case, this Court finds no reason to
alter the findings of the respondent Commission.
In Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission, 16 it was held that "it is essentially required that the alleged
losses in business operations must be proved." 17 This policy was adopted to obviate the possibility of an employer
fabricating business reverses in order to ease out employees for no apparent reason. Hence, no departure shall be
made by this Court from the ruling in Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. National Mines and Allied
Workers Union (NAMAWU-MIF) 18 where it was categorically stated that the term "wages" includes not only
remunerations or earnings payable by an employer for services rendered or to be rendered, but also covers all
benefits of the employees under a Collective Bargaining Agreement like severance pay, educational allowance,
accrued vacation leave earned but not enjoyed, as well as workmens compensation awards and unpaid salaries for
services rendered. All of these benefits fall under the term "wages" which enjoy first preference over all other
claims against the employer. 19
Furthermore, in Peralta, this Court held that for purposes of the application of Article 110, "termination pay is
reasonably regarded as forming part of the remuneration or other money benefits accruing to employees or
workers by reason of their having previously rendered services . . .." 20 Hence, separation pay must be considered
as part of remuneration for services rendered or to be rendered.
Indeed Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended, aforecited, now provides that the workers preference covers
not only unpaid wages but also other monetary claims.
The respondent Commission was, therefore, not in error when it awarded the termination pay claimed by the
private respondents. As far as the latter are concerned, the termination pay which they so rightfully claim is an
additional remuneration for having rendered services to their employer for a certain period of time. Noteworthy also
is the relationship between termination pay and services rendered by an employee, that in computing the amount
to be given to an employee as termination pay, the length of service of such employee is taken into consideration
such that the former must be considered as part and parcel of wages. Under these circumstances then, this Court
holds that the termination or severance pay awarded by the respondent Commission to the private respondents is
proper and should be sustained.
Lastly, it must be noted that the amount claimed by petitioner PNB for the satisfaction of the obligations of AMEX is
relatively insubstantial and is not significant enough as to drain its coffers. By contrast, that same amount could
mean subsistence or starvation for the workingman. Quoting further from Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank, this Court supports the equitable principle that "it is but humane and partakes of the divine that labor, as
human beings, must be treated over and above chattels, machineries and other kinds of properties and the
interests of the employer who can afford and survive the hardships of life better than their workers. Universal
sense of human justice, not to speak of our specific social justice and protection to labor constitutional injunctions
dictate the preferential lien that the above provision accord to labor." 21 In line with this policy, measures must be
undertaken to ensure that such constitutional mandate on protection to labor is not rendered meaningless by an
erroneous interpretation of the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I can perhaps be allowed a little immodesty in taking this occasion to point out that in Republic of the Philippines v.
Peralta, cited in the ponencia, I was the only one who held the view that the claims of the laborers should take
precedence over those of even the Government under Article 110 of the Labor Code.
Interpreting the said provision, I submitted that it should be read according to its literal import and obvious
philosophy, to favor and protect the laborer pursuant to the social justice policy. None of my thirteen colleagues
then agreed with me.
With the amendment of the article, evidently to correct the meaning given to it in Peralta, all doubt has been
removed as to its original intention (which I feel was quite clear even before). There is no question now that under
Article 110 of the Labor Code as reworded the claims of the laborer prevail over those of all others, including the
Government itself, in the interest of social justice. It is for me a cause for deep elation.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 87119. April 16, 1991.]
HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Manila, Petitioner, v. THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. LACUNA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of
the City Council of Manila, and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA,Respondents.
The City Legal Officer for Petitioner.
Lacuna, Bello & Associates Law Offices for Danilo B. Lacuna.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JUDGMENTS THEREOF UNAPPEALABLE AND SUBJECT
ONLY TO THIS COURTS CERTIORARI JURISDICTION. As we held, the Civil Service Commission, under the
Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service and as such, its judgments are
unappealable and subject only to this Courts certiorari jurisdiction.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL LAW REGARDLESS OF THEIR DATES OF
PASSAGE AND THE SPECIAL IS CONSIDERED AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL. There is no doubt that Republic
Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila, is a special
law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal governments in general, are
general laws. As the Solicitor General points out, and we agree with him, it is a canon of statutory construction that
a special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passage and the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general.
3. ID.; CONFLICT BETWEEN STATUTES MUST BE AVOIDED. So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a
conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.
4. ID.; REPEALS OF LAWS BY IMPLICATION, NOT FAVORED; WHEN THERE IS A MERE REPUGNANCY BETWEEN TWO
STATUTES, THE ONE LATER IN TIME REPEALS THE OTHER. Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not
favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the court in holding that
the later in time repeals the other.
5. ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5185 (DECENTRALIZATION LAW) AND BATAS BLG. 337 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE),
NOT MEANT TO DEPRIVE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA OF ITS APPOINTING POWER GRANTED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO.
409 (CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA). We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the provisions of
Republic Act No. 5185, giving mayors the power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city funds" and those of
Batas Blg. 337, empowering local executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and employees of the city,"
were meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to underscore the transfer of
the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments and to
highlight the autonomy of local governments. They were not meant, however, to deprive the City Council of Manila
for instance, its appointing power granted by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement is sufficient to
accomplish the objectives of both the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth
to local autonomy.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The only question in this petition, denominated as a "direct appeal under Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e), of the
Constitution and Section 9(3), of Batas Blg. 129," is whether the City Council of Manila still has the power to
appoint Council officers and employees under Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of
Manila, or whether the power is now vested with the City Mayor pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, the
Decentralization Law, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code. The facts are as follows:
On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the Hon.
Danilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through the Regional Director of the National Capital
Region, the appointments of nineteen officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding
Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the provisions of Section 15, of said Republic Act No. 409, as amended,
which reads:
SEC. 15. . . .
. . . The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees of the Board. 1
The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau of the Mayors office "comment and/or
recommendation" on whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the City Council may be paid on the
basis of appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor. 2 The Personnel Bureau then forwarded the query to the City
Legal Officer who, in a 3rd endorsement dated September 19, 1988, 3 rendered an opinion that the proper
appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. This opinion was transmitted by the Secretary to the
City Mayor to the Commission.
On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-075, and held that contrary to the opinion of
the City Legal Officer, it is the City Council to which the appointing power is vested. The dispositive portion thereof
is as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to rule, as it hereby rules that the proper
appointing authority of the officers and employees of the City Council of Manila is the City Council and the signatory
of individual appointments thus issued is the City Vice-Mayor of Manila. 4
As we stated at the outset, the issue is whether or not Section 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of Manila has
been repealed, and as a result, the City Council can no longer tender appointments to Council positions.
As we also mentioned at the outset, this petition has been brought by way of a "direct appeal" from the resolution
of the Civil Service Commission pursuant supposedly to the Constitution and Batas Blg. 129. In this connection, we
have held that no appeal lies from the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, and that parties aggrieved
thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to Section 7, Article IX, of the Constitution. We quote:
SEC. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. 5
As we held, the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the
civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Courtscertiorari jurisdiction. 6
The petitioners omission notwithstanding, we are nevertheless accepting the petition and because of the important
public interest it involves, we are considering it as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, considering further that it
was filed within the thirty-day period. 7
As the petitioner contends, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409 as amended has supposedly been repealed by
Republic Act No. 5185, specifically, Section 4 thereof, which we quote, in part:
The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police and City Chief of Fire Department and other heads of
offices entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants or deputies shall, subject to civil service law,
rules and regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to
Judges, Auditors, Fiscals, City Superintendents of Schools, Supervisors, Principals, City Treasurers, City Health
Officers and City Engineers.
x
All other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds, road and bridge funds,
school funds, and other local funds, shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the
Provincial Governor, City or Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned . . . 8
and by Batas Blg. 337, we likewise quote:
SEC. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers, and Duties.
(2) The city mayor shall:
(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and employees of the city, whose
appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code; 9
There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the Government of
the City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to
municipal governments in general, are general laws. As the Solicitor General points out, and we agree with him, it
is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of
passage and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general. 10
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible,
the laws must be reconciled in that manner.
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be
very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other. 11
Why a special law prevails over a general law has been put by the Court as follows:
x
. . . The Legislature consider and make provision for all the circumstances of the particular case. The Legislature
having specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting a special charter, it
will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to the
provisions of the charter, and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended
to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis v. Cook County, 74 I11. App., 151; Philippine Railway Co. v.
Nolting, 34 Phil., 401.) 12
In one case, we held that Republic Act No. 5185 did not divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the Charter
of the City of Manila to approve the city budget. 13
We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving mayors the
power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city funds" 14 and those of Batas Blg. 337, empowering local
executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and employees of the city, "15 were meant not to vest the city
mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over
local officials and employees from the President to the local governments and to highlight the autonomy of local
governments. They were not meant, however, to deprive the City Council of Manila for instance, its appointing
power granted by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both
the Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.
In the light of all the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-55230. November 8, 1988.]
HON. RICHARD J. GORDON, in his capacity as City Mayor of Olongapo, Petitioner, v. JUDGE REGINO T.
VERIDIANO II and Spouses EDUARDO and ROSALINDA YAMBAO, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; VESTED WITH ALL DRUG INSPECTION FUNCTIONS
AND APPROVAL OF APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO OPERATE OR ESTABLISH A DRUG ESTABLISHMENT. The
authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a condition precedent to the grant of a mayors permit to the drug
store seeking to operate within the limits of the city. This requirement is imperative. The power to determine if the
opening of the drug store is conformable to the national policy and the laws on the regulation of drug sales belongs
to the FDA. Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to a drug store not previously cleared with and licensed by the
said agency will be a nullity.
2. ID.; CHARTER OF OLONGAPO CITY; EMPOWERS CITY MAYOR TO GRANT OR REFUSE MUNICIPAL LICENSES TO
OPERATE OR PERMITS OF ALL CLASSES AND TO REVOKE THE SAME. The petitioner traces his authority to the
charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter alia empowers the city mayor under Section 10 thereof to
grant or refuse municipal licenses to operate or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the
conditions upon which they were granted.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO APPROVE A LICENSE INCLUDE BY IMPLICATION, THE POWER TO REVOKE. The
power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By
extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first
place. Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the
requirements of the general laws and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their
violation that the FDA may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his
ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is
only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.
4. ID.; FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; ORDER OF CLOSURE OF A DRUG STORE FOR VIOLATION OF ITS
CONDITIONS; GROUND NOT AVAILABLE AS A GROUND FOR REVOCATION OF THE MAYORS PERMIT OF THE SAME
STORE. In the present case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of
its own conditions, which it certainly had the primary power to enforce. By revoking the mayors permit on the
same ground for which the San Sebastian Drug Store had already been penalized by the FDA, the mayor was in
effect reversing the decision of the latter on a matter that came under its jurisdiction. As the infraction involved the
pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute, the mayor had no authority to
interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute them for the decision already made by the FDA.
5. ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES, ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT. The indefinite
suspension of the mayors permit for Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the transfer thereof to the site of the
San Sebastian Drug Store as approved by the FDA but without permission from the petitioner. On this matter, the
Court believes that the final decision rested with the mayor. The condition violated related more to the location in
Olongapo City of business establishments in general than to the regulation of drug stores in particular. It therefore
came under the petitioners jurisdiction.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is the conflict between the Food and Drug Administration and the mayor of Olongapo
City over the power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drug stores in the said city. While conceding
that the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claims he may nevertheless, in the exercise of his own power,
prevent the operation of drug stores previously permitted by the former.
There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, to wit, the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City
Drug Store, both owned by private respondent Rosalinda Yambao. 1 They are located a few meters from each other
in the same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo City. 2 They were covered by Mayors Permits Nos. 1954 and
1955, respectively, issued for the year 1980, 3 and licenses to operate issued by the FDA for the same year. 4
This case arose when on March 21, 1980, at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, a joint team composed of agents
from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug
Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium, 10 mg. worth P410.00 without a doctors prescription. 5
A report on the operation was submitted to the petitioner, as mayor of Olongapo City, on April 9, 1980. 6 On April
17, 1980, he issued a letter summarily revoking Mayors Permit No. 1954, effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant
violation of R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
7 Later, when the petitioner went to Singapore, Vice-Mayor Alfredo T. de Perio, Jr. caused the posting of a signboard
at the San Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure. 8
Acting on the same investigation report of the "test-buy," and after hearing, FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala, on
April 25, 1980, directed the closure of the drug store for three days and its payment of a P100.00 fine for violation
of R.A. No. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambao against a repetition of the infraction. 9 On April 29,
1980, the FDA lifted its closure order after noting that the penalties imposed had already been discharged and
allowed the drug store to resume operations. 10
On April 30, 1980, Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the
revocation of Mayors Permit No. 1954. 11 On May 7, 1980, having received on reply, she and her husband filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, against the petitioner and Vice-Mayor de Perio. 12
On the same date, Yambao requested permission from the FDA to exchange the locations of the San Sebastian
Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store for reasons of "business preference." 13
The request was granted. 14 But when informed to this action, the petitioner, in a letter to the private respondent
dated May 13, 1980, disapproved the transfers and suspended Mayors Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City Drug
Store. 15
The Yambaos then filed on May 15, 1980, a supplemental complaint questioning the said suspension and praying
for the issuance of a preliminary writ of prohibitory injunction. 16 On the same day, the respondent judge issued an
order directing the maintenance of the status quo with respect to the Olongapo City Drug Store pending resolution
of the issues. 17
On May 21, 1980, the petitioner wrote the FDA requesting reconsideration of its order of April 29, 1980, allowing
resumption of the operation of the San Sebastian Drug Store. 18 The request was denied by the FDA in its reply
dated May 27, 1980. 19
A motion for reconsideration of the status quo order had earlier been filed on May 1, 1980 by the petitioner. After a
joint hearing and an exchange of memoranda thereon, the respondent judge issued an order on July 16, 1980, 20
the dispositive portion of which read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the defendants motion for reconsideration of the status quo order dated May 15, 1980, is hereby
DENIED and the letter of the defendant city mayor dated April 17, 1980, for the revocation of Mayors Permit No.
1954 for the San Sebastian Drug Store is declared null and void.
"Accordingly, a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction is heretofore issued enjoining defendants from doing acts
directed towards the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the suspension of the Olongapo City Drug Store
both situated at Hospital Road, Olongapo City. Further, the signboard posted at San Sebastian Drug Store by the
defendants is ordered removed in order that the said drug store will resume its normal business operation.
"The hearing of the main petition for damages is set on August 14, 1980, at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon."
The petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-stated order was denied in an order dated September 4,
1980. 21 The petitioner thereupon came to this Court in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, to challenge the aforesaid orders.
We issued a temporary restraining order against the respondent judge on October 27, 1980, 22 but lifted it on
December 10, 1980, for failure of the petitioner to file his comment on the private respondents motion to lift the
said order and/or for issuance of a counter restraining order. 23
First, let us compare the bases of the powers and functions respectively claimed by the FDA and the petitioner as
mayor of Olongapo City.
The task of drug inspection was originally lodged with the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners pursuant to Act
2762, as amended by Act 4162. By virtue of Executive Order No. 392 dated January 1, 1951 (mandating
reorganization of various departments and agencies), this was assumed by the Department of Health and exercised
through an office in the Bureau of Health known as the Drug Inspection Section. This section was empowered "to
authorize the opening of pharmacies, drug stores and dispensaries, and similar establishments after inspection by
persons authorized by law."
The Food and Drug Administration was created under R.A. No. 3720 (otherwise known as the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act), approved on June 22, 1963, and vested with all drug inspection functions in line with "the policy of
the State to insure safe and good quality supply of food, drug and cosmetics, and to regulate the production, sale
and traffic of the same to protect the health of the people." Section 5 of this Act specifically empowers it:
"(e) to issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of license and
spotcheck for compliance with regulations regarding operation of food, drug and cosmetic manufacturers and
establishments."
For a more effective exercise of this function, the Department of Health issued on March 5, 1968, Administrative
Order No. 60, series of 1968, laying down the requirements for the application to be filed with the FDA for
authorization to operate or establish a drug establishment. The order provides that upon approval of the
application, the FDA shall issue to the owner or administrator of the drug store or similar establishment a "License
to Operate" which "shall be renewed within the first 3 months of each year upon payment of the required fees."
This license contains the following reservation:
"However, should during the period of issue, a violation of any provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
and/or the regulations issued thereunder be committed, this License shall be subject to suspension or revocation."
cralaw
virtua1aw library
When the drug addiction problem continued to aggravate, P.D. No. 280 was promulgated on August 27, 1973, to
give more teeth to the powers of the FDA, thus:
"Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Food and Drug Administrator is hereby
authorized to order the closure, or suspend or revoke the license of any drug establishment which after
administrative investigation is found guilty of selling or dispensing drugs, medicines and other similar substances in
violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, or other laws regulating the sale
or dispensation of drugs, or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
"Sec. 2. The administrative investigation shall be summary in character. The owner of the drug store shall be given
an Opportunity to be heard." (P.D. 280, Emphasis supplied.)
For his part, the petitioner, traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter alia
empowers the city mayor under Section 10 thereof:
"k. to grant or refuse municipal licenses to operate or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of
the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or city ordinances are being committed
under protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is
carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest."
The charter also provides, in connection with the powers of the city health officer, that:
"Sec. 6(k). He and his representatives shall have the power to arrest violators of health laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations and to recommend the revocation or suspension of the permits of the different establishments to the
City Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances, rules and regulations." (Emphasis supplied.)
An application to establish a drug store in Olongapo City must be filed with the Office of the Mayor and must show
that the applicant has complied with the existing ordinances on health and sanitation, location or zoning, fire or
building, and other local requirements. If the application is approved, the applicant is granted what is denominated
a "Mayors Permit" providing inter alia that it "is valid only at the place stated above and until (date), unless sooner
revoked for cause." 24
Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same
instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise
policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of
the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate
department of the government. It is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws
above-cited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.
A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a condition precedent to
the grant of a mayors permit to the drug store seeking to operate within the limits of the city. This requirement is
imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the drug store is conformable to the national policy and the
laws on the regulation of drug sales belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit issued by the mayor to a drug store not
previously cleared with and licensed by the said agency will be a nullity.
This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the mayors permit is mandatory once it is shown that the FDA has
licensed the operation of the applicant drug store. This is not a necessary consequence. For while it may appear
that the applicant has complied with the pertinent national laws and policies, this fact alone will not signify
compliance with the particular conditions laid down by the local authorities like zoning, building, health, sanitation,
and safety regulations, and other municipal ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause. This compliance
still has to be ascertained by the mayor if the permit is to be issued by his office. Should he find that the local
requirements have not been observed, the mayor must then, in the exercise of his own authority under the charter,
refuse to grant the permit sought.
The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By
extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first
place. Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the
requirements of the general laws and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their
violation that the FDA may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his
ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is
only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.
Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own permit on the ground that the compliance with the conditions laid
down and found satisfactory by the FDA when it issued its license is in his own view not acceptable. This very same
principle also operates on the FDA. The FDA may not revoke its license on the ground that the conditions laid down
in the mayors permit have been violated notwithstanding that no such finding has been made by the mayor.
In the present case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of its own
conditions, which it certainly had the primary power to enforce. By revoking the mayors permit on the same
ground for which the San Sebastian Drug Store had already been penalized by the FDA, the mayor was in effect
reversing the decision of the latter on a matter that came under its jurisdiction. As the infraction involved the
pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute, the mayor had no authority to
interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute them for the decision already made by the FDA.
It would have been different if the offense condoned by the FDA was a violation of, say, a city ordinance requiring
buildings to be provided with safety devices or equipment, like fire extinguishers. The city executive may ignore
such condonation and revoke the mayors permit just the same. In this situation, he would be acting properly
because the enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In the present case, however, the condition
allegedly violated related to a national law, not to a matter of merely local concern, and so came under the
jurisdiction of the FDA.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of administrative authorities are accorded great respect because of their
acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. 25 Even the courts of justice,
including this Court, are concluded by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion, which is not present in the case at bar. For all his experience in the enforcement of city ordinances, the
petitioner cannot claim the superior aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement of the pharmacy and drug addiction
laws. He should therefore also be prepared, like the courts of justice themselves, to accept its decisions on this
matter.
The petitioner magnifies the infraction committed by the San Sebastian Drug Store but the FDA minimizes it.
According to the FDA Administrator, Valium is not even a prohibited drug, which is why the penalty imposed was
only a 3-day closure of the drug store and a fine of P100.00. 26 Notably, the criminal charges filed against the
private respondent for the questioned transaction were dismissed by the fiscals office. 27
It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug Store was penalized by the FDA only after a hearing held on
April 25, 1980, at which private respondent Yambao, assisted by her lawyer-husband, appeared and testified. 28 By
contrast, the revocation of the mayors permit was communicated to her in a letter 29 reading simply as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
April 17, 1980

Rosalinda Yambao
c/o San Sebastian Drug Store
Hospital Road, Olongapo City
Madame:
Based on a report submitted by PC Major Virtus V. Gil, Chief 3 RFO, Dis. B, Task Force `Bagong Buhay, you are
rampantly violating the provisions of Republic Act 5921 otherwise known as the `Pharmacy Law.
Aside from this, there is evidence that you are dispensing regulated drugs contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
In view of the above, Mayors Permit No. 1954 heretofore issued in your name for the operation of a drug store
(San Sebastian) at the Annex Building of the Fil-Am (IYC),along Hospital Road, this City, is REVOKED effective April
18, 1980.
PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) RICHARD J. GORDON
City Mayor
If only for the violation of due process which is manifest from this letter, the mayors arbitrary action can be
annulled.
The indefinite suspension of the mayors permit for Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the transfer thereof to
the site of the San Sebastian Drug Store as approved by the FDA but without permission from the petitioner. On
this matter, the Court believes that the final decision rested with the mayor. The condition violated related more to
the location in Olongapo City of business establishments in general than to the regulation of drug stores in
particular. It therefore came under the petitioners jurisdiction.
The FDA would have the right to disapprove the site of the drug store only if it would impair the health or other
interests of the customers in contravention of the national laws or policies, as where the drug store is located in an
unsanitary site. But the local executive would have reason to object to the location, even if approved by the FDA,
where it does not conform to, say, a zoning ordinance intended to promote the comfort and convenience of the city
residents.
The reason given by the petitioner in disapproving the transfer was violation of Mayors Permit No. 1955, which by
its terms was valid only at the place stated therein. In the letter of May 13, 1980, 30 the private respondent was
clearly informed that for violation of the condition of Mayors Permit No. 1955 granting her the privilege of
operating the Olongapo City Drug Store at No. 1-B Fil-Am Bldg., Hospital Road, the said permit was "hereby
suspended." We find that reason was valid enough. The permit clearly allowed the drug store to operate in the
address given and not elsewhere. No hearing was necessary because the transfer without the mayors permission is
not disputed and was in fact impliedly admitted by the private Respondent.
If the private respondent wanted to transfer her drug store, what she should have done was to secure the approval
not only of the FDA but also, and especially, of the mayor. Merely notifying the petitioner of the change in the
location of her drug stores as allowed by the FDA was not enough. The FDA had no authority to revoke that
particular condition of the mayors permits indicating the sites of the two drug stores as approved by the mayor in
the light of the needs of the city. Only the mayor could.
We assume that Mayors Permit No. 1954 could also have been validly suspended for the same reason (as the sites
of the two drug stores were exchanged without amendment of their respective permits) were it not for the fact that
such permit was revoked by the petitioner on the more serious ground of violation of the Pharmacy Law and the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
It is understood, however, that the suspension should be deemed valid only as the two drug stores have not
returned to their original sites as specified in their respective permits. Indefinite suspension will amount to a
permanent revocation, which will not be a commensurate penalty with the degree of the violation being penalized.
The Court adds that denial of the request for transfer, if properly made by the private respondents, may not be
validly denied by the judge in the absence of a clear showing that the transfer sought will prejudice the residents of
the city. As the two drug stores are only a few meters from each other, and in the same building, there would seem
to be no reason why the mere exchange of their locations should not be permitted. Notably, the location of the two
drug stores had previously been approved in Mayors Permit Nos. 1954 and 1955.
Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayors Permit No. 1954 after the FDA had authorized
the resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store following the enforcement of the penalties imposed
upon it. However, it was competent for the petitioner to suspend Mayors Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the
Olongapo City Drug Store in violation of the permit. Such suspension should nevertheless be effective only pending
the return of the drug store to its authorized original site or the eventual approval by the mayor of the requested
transfer if found to be warranted.
The petitioner is to be commended for his zeal in the promotion of the campaign against drug addiction, which has
sapped the vigor and blighted the future of many of our people, especially the youth. The legal presumption is that
he acted in good faith and was motivated only by his concern for the residents of Olongapo City when he directed
the closure of the first drug store and the suspension of the permit of the other drug store. It appears, though, that
he may have overreacted and was for this reason properly restrained by the respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders of July 6, 1980 and September 4, 1980, ate MODIFIED in the sense that the
suspension of Mayors Permit No. 1955 shall be considered valid but only until the San Sebastian Drug Store and
the Olongapo City Drug Store return to their original sites as specified in the FDA licenses and the mayors permits
or until the request for transfer, if made by the private respondents, is approved but the petitioner. The rest of the
said Orders are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23052. January 29, 1968.]
CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner, v. GENERO M. TEOTICO and THE COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for Petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza & Associates for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF CIVIL CODE, THOUGH A GENERAL LAW, PREVAIL OVER
MANILA CHARTER, SPECIAL LAW. Insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act 409 is a special
law and the Civil Code is a general legislation; but as regards the subject-matter of the provisions of sec. 4, Rep.
Act 409 and Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the former establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City
of Manila for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to enforce the
provisions of said Act; while article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces,
cities and municipalities liable for damages for the death or injury suffered by any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets and other public works under the control or supervision of said municipal
governments. In other words, sec. 4 of Rep. Act 409 refers to liability arising from negligence in general regardless
of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 of the Civil Code, governs liability due to defective streets in particular.
The Civil Code is decisive herein because the present action is based on the alleged defective condition of a road.
2. PLEADINGS; ANSWER; ALLEGATIONS NOT SET FORTH IN ANSWER, CANNOT BE RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL. The assertion that P. Burgos Avenue is a national highway for which the City of Manila is not liable, was
made for the first time in the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. It was
not alleged in the answer. Such assertion raised a question of fact which had not been put in issue in the trial court
and cannot, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal much less after the rendition of the decision of the
appellate court.
3. ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF COURT OF APPEALS, CONCLUSIVE. The determination of whether or not P. Burgos
Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence in
connection with the maintenance of said road is a question of fact a question already decided by the Court of
Appeals and the factual findings of said Court are not subject to a review by the Supreme Court.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting
for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb
to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken
pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his
assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital,
where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper
eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip, apart from
an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who
charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint
which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city
health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval
by the Court of Appeals,
"At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the
University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co.,
the A. U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was
also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines, Ys Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from
engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his
incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates
and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his
minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay
his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
"On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section,
Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P.
Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit
4); that again the iron cover of the same catchbasin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover
was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect
that the catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1958; that it has always been a policy
of the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of
Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is
immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel
matting; that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was
rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers;
that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of catch basins in the
City by constructing them under the sidewalk with concrete cement covers and openings on the sides of the gutter;
and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available."
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining
the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila
is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the
City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
"The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions."
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision."
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation;
but, as regards the subject- matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a
general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from
the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by
reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence,
in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets, "in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving
him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection
therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City.
Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the
defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept
in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered, by the defendant
City and its officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective
functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of
fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and can not be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much
less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said
street or road. Even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section
18(x) thereof provides:
"SEC. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
x
"(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and to
regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places;
to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix
the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the
building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of
poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and regulate cross-walks, curbs, and gutters therein; . . . to
regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the
same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the
use, of bridges, viaducts, and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kiteflying, hoop rolling, and other
amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to
regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of
the city; to regulate the lights used on all such vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the
location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to
such provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to
provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains,
sewers, and culverts along and under their tracts, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property
shall not be obstructed."
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113,
dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway
funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets
within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic
Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the
construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and
city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the
supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be
authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of
Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were
decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court, thereon are not
subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It
is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando,JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-34024. April 5, 1978.]
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, Petitioner, v. CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS
CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO, CATALINA B.
CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO LAPEA,
LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City Mayor, City Vice
Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, Respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for Petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner, a city judge receiving an actual salary of P12,000 sought by mandamus to compel respondents to enact
the necessary budget and to provide for and pay him an annual salary of P18,000 as fixed by Republic Act 5967,
which requires the city government to pay the difference between the salary being received by a city judge and the
basic salary established in said act. Respondents contented that may not be compelled to pay the salary difference,
because Republic Act 5967 further provides "that the salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per
month less than that of the city mayor, and petitioners annual salary of P12,000 is 100 per month less than the
annual salary being received by the city mayor which is P13,200.
The trial court dismissed the petition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts decision, and held that the clear intention of Congress in enacting
Republic Act 5967 was that the salary of the city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor, and
inasmuch as the mayors salary is P13,200, respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual salary of
P18,000 for the petitioner as city judge.
SYLLABUS
1. MANDAMUS; CITY JUDGES MAY NOT COMPEL CITY GOVERNMENTS TO PAY THEM SALARIES HIGHER THAN THAT
PROVIDED FOR THE CITY MAYORS. It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the intention of Congress
in enacting Republic Act 5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city
mayor. The saving clause "Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least 10000 per month less
than that of the city mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary of city judges for second and third
class cities at 18,000 per annual. Inasmuch as the city mayor was receiving an annual salary of 13,200,
respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual salary of 18,000 for the petitioner as city judge.
2. STATUTE; THE PURPOSE OF PROVISO IS TO LIMIT THE GENERAL LANGUAGE OF STATUTE. The primary
purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between
the proviso and the body of the statute, the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the
latest expression of the intent of the legislature.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City,
Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), instituted against the City of San
Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer
of San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the incumbent City Judge of San Carlos City
(Pangasinan, that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its creation in 1966 up to the present, has
been classified as a third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became effective on June 21, 1969 provides
that the basic salary of city judges of second and third class cities shall be P18,000.00 per annum; that the
petitioner was then actually receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which P350.00 was the share of the national
government and P650.000 is the share of the city government, which salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly
salary of a City Judge of a third class city; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference between the salary
actually being received by a City Judge and the basic salary established in said act shall be paid by the city
government; that from June 21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition on January 21, 1971, the petitioner was
entitled to a salary differential of P9,500.00 with the respondent City of San Carlos (Pangasinan); that the
petitioner had repeatedly requested the respondents to enact the necessary budget and to pay him the said
differential but the respondents, without any justification. whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the same; that
it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact the necessary budget providing for the payment of the salary of the
petitioner as provided for in Republic Act No. 5967; that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy
remedy except the present action for mandamus; and that because of the refusal of the respondent to comply with
their obligation as provided in Republic Act No. 5967, the petitioner was forced to engage the services of a lawyer
to file this action for which he was to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as attorneys fees. 2
In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents admitted and denied the allegations in the petition and
alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides, among other things, that the salary of the city judge shall at
least be one hundred pesos per month less than that of a city mayor; that the city judge receives an annual salary
of P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month less than the salary being received by the city mayor which is
P13,200.00 yearly; that assuming the existence of a salary difference, in view of the provision of Republic Act No.
5967, that the payment of the salary difference shall be subject to the implementation of the respective city
government, which is discretionary on the part of the city government as to whether it would or would not
implement the payment of the salary difference, and in view of the financial difficulties of the city which has a big
overdraft, the payment of the salary difference of the city judge cannot be made; and that the petitioner should
pay his lawyer and should not charge the attorneys fees to the respondents who have not violated any rights of the
petitioner. 3
The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), Branch X, rendered its decision dated May 31, 1971
dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as to costs.
The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967 reads:
"Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law provides higher salary, the city judge in chartered cities shall
receive a basic salary which shall not be lower than the sums as provided thereinbelow:
(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos per annum;
x
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos
less than that fixed for the district judge, and for second and third class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand five hundred pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for other cities, the city judge shall
receive two thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the salary of a city
judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per month less than that of the city mayor."
The petitioner contends that." . . if the last proviso of said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 would be interpreted
as the controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city judges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing
the salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that of a City Mayor (particularly in the case of second
and third class cities) would be rendered totally useless." The petitioner submitted "that since the principal
intention of the legislature in enacting Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is to increase the salary of the city judges,
then the last proviso of said Section 7 should give way to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was
a third class city; that the petitioner as city judge received an annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor
of San Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00 which was exactly P100.00 a month more than the
salary of the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046, which became Republic Act No. 5967, the following
discussion took place:
"SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I recall that there will be some cities where the city judges
will receive salaries higher than those of the mayors. And in all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a
department head theoretically, at least, under the mayor. It would not be fair for the purposes of public
administration that a city department head should receive a salary higher than that of the chief executive of the
city.
"SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I would like to congratulate Your Honor.
"SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the concern of the distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in
this particular amendment prepared by the distinguished lady from La Union, this will not require the council to pay
it at P100.00 exactly lees than the salary of the mayor. It is just the limit the maximum but they may fix it at
much less than that. That is why the words at least were suggested by the Committee. It need not be exactly just
P100.00 less. It may be P500.00 less.
"SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod or Manila for that matter.
The Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a month. Now, under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva
Ecija and Davao which has already been accepted by the sponsor does it mean that if the salary of the city
mayor is P1,500, the city judges will receive P1,400?
x
"SENATOR ANTONINO I would like to call his attention to lines 13 to 20. We presented this amendment because
it says here: For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge. So it will happen, and my attention was called by the
gentlemen from Iloilo that the city judge will be receiving more salary than the city mayor. Hence the
amendment, Mr. President.
x
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas, and this was their objection. We have proposed this
amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no city judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they
will be receiving less than what is proposed in this Bill." (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records, pages
2773-2787. (Emphasis supplied.) 4
It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 5967 was
that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. The saving clause "Provided,
however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least P100.00 per month less than that of the city mayor"
qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary of city judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00
per annum.
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable
repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is given precedence over the latter on the
ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an annual salary of P13,200.00, the
respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual salary of P18,000.00 for the petitioner as city judge of
the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman) Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120865-71. December 7, 1995.]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO
TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET
DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR
ISIDRO B. PACIS, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 120866. December 7, 1995.]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C.
TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE
BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF
TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR.,Respondents.
[G.R. No. 120867. December 7, 1995.]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO
A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL;
GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 120868. December 7, 1995.]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S.
PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA;
IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION
and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 120869. December 7, 1995.]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A.
MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON
FISHlNG CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 120870. December 7, 1995.]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A.
MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH
VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or
MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 120871. December 7, 1995.]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S.
LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA
MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY
OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, Respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption and
extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing
in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.
chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal
interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No.
4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and
effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the
national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No.
4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns
of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: the
environment impact of development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river Systems; the
inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since
any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, likewise gave impetus
to the creation of the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns
hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social
and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution." 1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:
"SEC. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be
known as paragraphs (j), (k), (1), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:
(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other aquaculture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to
conduct studies and make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that
until modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the following sub-paragraph, the present laws,
rules and permits or authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting
the said lake including navigation. construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like,
and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect necessary fees for said
activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and
other government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be determined by the President of
the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authoritys Board: Provided, further, That the Authoritys Board may
determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay
and related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of
the Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna
de Bay which shall take into consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide
resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a
master plan for fishpen construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town residents, and
preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborers for fishery projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and
other regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same with the
assistance of the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters
within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the Authoritys projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing water quality standards for industrial,
agricultural and municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the
government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions
as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate
water quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board;" 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree
No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the
Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to
insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and
conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the
Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged
the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region" .
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in
particular the sharing of fees:
"SEC 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate
and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit
for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term Laguna de Bay Region shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and
Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas
and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in
Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.
SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and
its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial,
agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected,
and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authoritys Board, except fishpen fee,
which will be shared in the following manner: 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5
percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75
percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the
Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the
fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the
remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its
corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1234." (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:
"SECTION 41. Definition of Terms.

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act Laguna de Bay which is that a water
when it is at the average level of elevation 12.50 meters, 10.00 meters below mean lower low Lands located at and
below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake."
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
"Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges. (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of
this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas within a
definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish
from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee,
charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
x
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . .,

(1) . . .
(2) . . .
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or
fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the
municipal waters.
x
x"
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority.
Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third the entire lake water surface area,
increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayors
permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority
on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of
fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of
fishpens permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current
environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:
"In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila,
Laguna, pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of
1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal
Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered
or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as
of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition
which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to
demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as
amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of
not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the
foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their
said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled."
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days
from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional
trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch
70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp.,
MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil
Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by
AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-,
forCertiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial
Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were
invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in
Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures
in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority
with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties,
and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the
construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:
"(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in civil Cases Nos. 64125,
759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the
Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, after or modify the
provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive
authority to issue said permits."
By this Courts resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authoritys consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of
Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authoritys consolidated petitions, the Court
of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to the
Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are
concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had
been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant
permits devolved to respective local government units concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision to this Court charging the following errors:
"1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA
LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS
AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID
RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO
ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS."
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only use posed is: Which agency of the
Government - the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the
Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or
other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating
the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the
lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal
the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law.
Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a
special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class
of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent
to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law." 3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of
1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the
Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay,
like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km2 lake surface water, the
eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or
watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural
ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining
sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious
management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection,
conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational
use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this
need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay
lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore
local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or
sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain
area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km2 of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive
and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and
sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This
is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to
issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section
2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the
power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna
de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,
considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306,
which we quote:
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAR),
except in cases where the special law provides for another forum It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.
x
. . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a cease and desist order is, perforce, implied Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a toothless
paper agency."
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary:red
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to
pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authoritys pretense, however, that it
is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of
Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the
Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the
authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render
useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the
authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal;
Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig,
Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and
operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous
issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of
Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de Ia Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala,
specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by
Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito
Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield
Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading
Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon
Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President
Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation,
are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what the
decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from
imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units. In other
words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake area should be
allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a
permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the
local government units concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as
amended, with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and municipalities in
the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003.]
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), HON. GREGORIA S. ONG,
DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. SALVACION DALISAY, PROVINCIAL
AUDITOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision 1 dated September 14, 1999 of the Commission on Audit (COA), affirming the
resolution of COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong dated March 29, 1994 which in turn affirmed the opinion dated
October 19, 1993 of the Provincial Auditor of Oriental Mindoro, Salvacion M. Dalisay. All three denied the grant of
P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As such, his salary and representation and transportation
allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, petitioner received a monthly
allowance of P944 from the local funds 2 of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984. 3
On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the
Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly
allowance by the municipality to petitioner judge. On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved
Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656)
starting May 1993. 4 By virtue of said resolution, the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and the
Sangguniang Bayan) approved a supplemental budget which was likewise approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro. In 1994, the Municipal
Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner judges P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget which
was again approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of
Oriental Mindoro. 5
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to
petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She opined that
the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already
receiving from the Supreme Court. Her directive was based on the following:
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993

Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be
determined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) while in the actual performance of their
respective functions are hereby granted monthly commutable representation and transportation allowances payable
from the programmed appropriations provided for their respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below .
..
National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, of the Department of Budget and Management
Subject: Representation and Transportation Allowances of National Government Officials and Employees
x
4. Funding Source: In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount appropriated
for the purpose and other personal services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and
employees covered under this Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial
Auditor Dalisay and who added that Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed
to comply with Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated September 1, 1993 outlining the conditions for the
grant of allowances to judges and other national officials or employees by the local government units (LGUs).
Section 3 of the said budget circular provides that:
Sec. 3. Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the national government
officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates authorized by law, rules and regulations and subject to the
following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as certified by the Accountant concerned
will allow the grant of the allowances/additional compensation without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full requirement of RA 6758 have
been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the LGU
concerned;
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in accordance with the provisions of
RA 7160;
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160; and
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the
officials/employees assigned to the LGU. 7
Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the Commission on Audit. In the
meantime, a disallowance of the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner was issued. Thus he
received his P1,600 monthly allowance from the Municipality of Naujan only for the period May 1993 to January
1994.
On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision affirming the resolution of Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong:
chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
The main issue . . . is whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its
Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.
Generally, the grant of (RATA) [sic] to qualified national government officials and employees pursuant to Section 36
of R.A. 7645 [General Appropriations Act of 1993] and NCC No. 67 dated 01 January 1992 is subject to the
following conditions to wit:
1. Payable from the programmed/appropriated amount and others from personal services savings of the respective
offices where the officials or employees draw their salaries;
2. Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual General Appropriations Act;
3. Officials/employees on detail with other offices or assigned to serve other offices or agencies shall be paid from
their parent agencies;
4. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.
On the other hand, the municipal government may provide additional allowances and other benefits to judges and
other national government officials or employees assigned or stationed in the municipality, provided, that the
finances of the municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to Section 447, Par. 1(xi), R.A. 7160, and provided
further, that similar allowance/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the
official/employee assigned to the local government unit as provided under Section 3(e) of Local Budget Circular No.
53, dated 01 September 1993.
The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 36 of the
General Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645] have been harmonized by the Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated 01
September 1993, issued by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to its powers under Section 25
and Section 327 of the Local Government Code. The said circular must be adhered to by the local government units
particularly Section 3 thereof which provides the implementing guidelines of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in the grant of allowances to national government officials/employees assigned or
stationed in their respective local government units.
Consequently, the subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro, having failed to comply with the inherent precondition as defined in Section 3 (e) . . . is null and void.
Furthermore, the Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government official is prohibited to receive
additional RATA from the local government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act (R.A.
7645 for 1993) and National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated 1 January 1992. 8 (Emphasis ours)
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied by the Commission in a
resolution dated May 30, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following assignments of
error for our consideration:
WHETHER OR NOT RESOLUTION NO. 101, SERIES OF 1993 OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO, WHICH GRANTED
ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE TO THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL JUDGE OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO AND INCREASING
HIS CURRENT REPRESENTATION AND TRAVELLING ALLOWANCE (RATA) TO AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO THAT
RECEIVED MONTHLY BY SANGGUNIANG MEMBERS IN PESOS: ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P1,600.00)
EFFECTIVE 1993, IS VALID.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO GRANT ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER
BENEFITS TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES STATIONED IN THEIR MUNICIPALITY IS VERY EXPLICIT AND
UNEQUIVOCAL UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 IN RELATION TO
SECTIONS 17 AND 22 THEREOF.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM) CAN, BY THE ISSUANCE OF BUDGET
CIRCULARS, RESTRICT A MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FROM EXERCISING ITS GIVEN LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
PROVIDING ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO NATIONAL EMPLOYEES STATIONED OR
ASSIGNED TO THEIR MUNICIPALITY FOR AS LONG AS THEIR FINANCES SO ALLOW.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447(a)(1)(xi) WAS
EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY REPEALED OR MODIFIED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7645 AND THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
ACT OF 1993.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES GRANTED TO HIM BY
THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO BY VIRTUE OF ITS RESOLUTION NO. 101, SERIES OF 1993.
POSITION OF COA
Respondent Commission on Audit opposes the grant by the Municipality of Naujan of the P1,600 monthly allowance
to petitioner Judge Leynes for the reason that the municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the
RATA already received from the Supreme Court. 9 Respondent bases its contention on the following:
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67 (hereafter NCC No. 67) dated January 1, 1992 of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) which provides that (a) the RATA of national officials and employees shall be
payable from the programmed appropriations or personal services savings of the agency where such officials or
employees draw their salary and (b) no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source;
2. the General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645) which provided that the RATA of national officials shall be
payable from the programmed appropriations of their respective offices and
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53 (hereafter LBC No. 53) dated September 1, 1993 of the DBM which prohibits local
government units from granting allowances to national government officials or employees stationed in their
localities when such allowances are also granted by the national government or are similar to the allowances
granted by the national government to such officials or employees. 10
POSITION OF PETITIONER
Petitioner judge, on the other hand, asserts that the municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by RA
7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other
benefits to judges stationed in its territory. Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 imposes
only one condition, that is, "when the finances of the municipal government allow." The Code does not impose any
other restrictions in the exercise of such power by the municipality. Petitioner also asserts that the DBM cannot
amend or modify a substantive law like the Local Government Code of 1991 through mere budget circulars.
Petitioner emphasizes that budget circulars must conform to, not modify or amend, the provisions of the law it
seeks to implement. 11
HISTORY OF GRANT OF ALLOWANCES TO JUDGES
The power of local government units (LGUs) to grant allowances to judges stationed in their respective territories
was originally provided by Letter of Instruction No. 1418 dated July 18, 1984 (hereafter LOI No. 1418):
WHEREAS, the State is cognizant of the need to maintain the independence of the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, the budgetary allotment of the Judiciary constitutes only a small percentage of the national budget;
WHEREAS, present economic conditions adversely affected the livelihood of the members of the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, some local government units are ready, willing and able to pay additional allowances to Judges of
various courts within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby direct:
1. Section 3 of Letter of Implementation No. 96 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"3. The allowances provided in this letter shall be borne exclusively by the National Government. However,
provincial, city and municipal governments may pay additional allowances to the members and personnel of the
Judiciary assigned in their respective areas out of available local funds but not to exceed P1,500.00; Provided, that
in Metropolitan Manila, the city and municipal governments therein may pay additional allowances not exceeding
P3,000.00. (Emphasis ours)" 12
On June 25, 1991, the DBM issued Circular No. 91-7 outlining the guidelines for the continued receipt of allowances
by judges from LGUs:
Consistent with the constitutional provision on the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary and the policy of the National
Government of allowing greater autonomy to local government units, judges of the Judiciary are hereby allowed to
continue to receive allowances at the same rates which they have been receiving from the Local Government Units
as of June 30, 1989, subject to the following guidelines:
1. That the continuance of payment of subject allowance to the recipient judge shall be entirely voluntary and noncompulsory on the part of the Local Government Units;
2. That payment of the above shall always be subject to the availability of local funds;
3. That it shall be made only in compliance with the policy of non-diminution of compensation received by the
recipient judge before the implementation of the salary standardization;
4. That the subject allowance shall be given only to judges who were receiving the same as of June 30, 1989 and
shall be co-terminous with the incumbent judges; and
5. That the subject allowance shall automatically terminate upon transfer of a judge from one local government
unit to another local government unit. (Emphasis ours)
On October 10, 1991, Congress enacted RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 13 The
power of the LGUs to grant allowances and other benefits to judges and other national officials stationed in their
respective territories was expressly provided in Sections 447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)(1)(xi) of the
Code.
On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (hereafter LBC No. 55) setting out the maximum
amount of allowances that LGUs may grant to judges. For provinces and cities, the amount should not exceed
P1,000 and for municipalities, P700.
On December 3, 2002, we struck down the above circular in Dadole, Et. Al. v. COA. 14 We ruled there that the
Local Government Code of 1991 clearly provided that LGUs could grant allowances to judges, subject only to the
condition that the finances of the LGUs allowed it. We held that "setting a uniform amount for the grant of
allowances (was) an inappropriate way of enforcing said criterion." Accordingly, we declared that the DBM exceeded
its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did not jibe with the Local Government Code of
1991. 15
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
From the foregoing history of the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges, the following principles should be
noted:
1. the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges has long been recognized (since 1984 by virtue of LOI No.
1418) and, at present, it is expressly and unequivocally provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local
Government Code of 1991;
2. the issuance of DBM Circular No. 91-7 dated June 25, 1991 and LBC No. 55 dated March 15, 1994 indicates that
the national government recognizes the power of LGUs to grant such allowances to judges;
3. in Circular No. 91-7, the national government merely provides the guidelines for the continued receipt of
allowances by judges from LGUs while in LBC No. 55, the national government merely tries to limit the amount of
allowances LGUs may grant to judges and
4. in the recent case of Dadole, Et. Al. v. COA, the Court upheld the constitutionally enshrined autonomy of LGUs to
grant allowances to judges in any amount deemed appropriate, depending on availability of funds, in accordance
with the Local Government Code of 1991.
OUR RULING
We rule in favor of petitioner judge. Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the P1,600 monthly allowance
by the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes.
DISCUSSION OF OUR RULING
Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides:
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants . . ., and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective municipal government, and in
this connection shall:
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to
judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed
in or assigned to the municipality; (Emphasis ours)
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section has been repealed, modified or amended by NCC No.
67 dated January 1, 1992, RA 7645 (the General Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53 dated September 1,
1993. 16
It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or
nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it. 17 In
the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.
It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction that repeal of statutes by implication is not favored,
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. The legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and cannot be presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 18 Respondent COA alleges
that Section 36 of RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) repealed Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991). A
review of the two laws, however, shows that this was not so. Section 36 of RA 7645 merely provided for the
different rates of RATA payable to national government officials or employees, depending on their position, and
stated that these amounts were payable from the programmed appropriations of the parent agencies to which the
concerned national officials or employees belonged. Furthermore, there was no other provision in RA 7645 from
which a repeal of Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied. In the absence, therefore, of any clear repeal
of Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, we cannot presume such intention on the part of the legislature.
Moreover, the presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when, as in this case, one law is special and
the other is general. 19 The principle is expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, a general law
does not nullify a specific or special law. The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special
character, considers and makes special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by the special law.
This being so, the legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to those of the special law
and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify such special law, cannot be deemed to have
intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the latter. 20
In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law 21 which exclusively deals with local government units
(LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local
autonomy. RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993), on the other hand, was a general law 22 which outlined the share in the
national fund of all branches of the national government. RA 7645 therefore, being a general law, could not have,
by mere implication, repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160 should be taken as the exception to RA 7645 in the
absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion. 23
The controversy actually centers on the seemingly sweeping provision in NCC No. 67 which states that "no one
shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source." Does this mean that judges cannot receive allowances
from LGUs in addition to the RATA from the Supreme Court? For reasons that will hereinafter be discussed, we
answer in the negative.
The pertinent provisions of NCC No. 67 read:
3. Rules and Regulations:
3.1.1 Payment of RATA, whether commutable or reimbursable, shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed for
each of the following officials and employees and those of equivalent ranks, and the conditions enumerated under
the pertinent sections of the General Provisions of the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA):
4. Funding Source:
In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount appropriated for the purpose and
other personal services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and employees covered under this
Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source. (Emphasis ours)
In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in statutory construction that force and effect should not be
narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together
in one rational view. 24 Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in parts or sections, that is, one part is as
important as the others, the statute should be construed and given effect as a whole. A provision or section which
is unclear by itself may be clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute.25
cralaw:re d
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of RATA by a national official
from the budgets of "more than one national agency." We emphasize that the other source referred to in the
prohibition is another national agency. This can be gleaned from the fact that the sentence "no one shall be allowed
to collect RATA from more than one source" (the controversial prohibition) immediately follows the sentence that
RATA shall be paid from the budget of the national agency where the concerned national officials and employees
draw their salaries. The fact that the other source is another national agency is supported by RA 7645 (the GAA of
1993) invoked by respondent COA itself and, in fact, by all subsequent GAAs for that matter, because the GAAs all
essentially provide that (1) the RATA of national officials shall be payable from the budgets of their respective
national agencies and (2) those officials on detail with other national agencies shall be paid their RATA only from
the budget of their parent national agency:
Section 36, RA 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993:
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be
determined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) while in the actual performance of their
respective functions are hereby granted monthly commutable representation and transportation allowances payable
from the programmed appropriations provided for their respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below,
which shall apply to each type of allowance:
Officials on detail with other offices, including officials of the Commission of Audit assigned to serve other offices or
agencies, shall be paid the allowance herein authorized from the appropriations of their parent agencies. (Emphasis
ours)
Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only against the dual or multiple collection of RATA by a national
official from the budgets of two or more national agencies. Stated otherwise, when a national official is on detail
with another national agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent national agency and not from the other
national agency he is detailed to.
Since the other source referred in the controversial prohibition is another national agency, said prohibition clearly
does not apply to LGUs like the Municipality of Naujan. National agency of course refers to the different offices,
bureaus and departments comprising the national government. The budgets of these departments or offices are
fixed annually by Congress in the General Appropriations Act. 26 An LGU is obviously not a national agency. Its
annual budget is fixed by its own legislative council (Sangguniang Bayan, Panlungsod or Panlalawigan), not by
Congress. Without doubt, NCC No. 67 does not apply to LGUs.
The prohibition in NCC No. 67 is in fact an administrative tool of the DBM to prevent the much-abused practice of
multiple allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA by national agencies. Thus, the purpose clause of NCC
No. 67 reads:
This Circular is being issued to ensure uniformity and consistency of actions on claims for representation and
transportation allowance (RATA) which is primarily granted by law to national government officials and employees
to cover expenses incurred in the discharge or performance of their duties and responsibilities.
By no stretch of the imagination can NCC No. 67 be construed as nullifying the power of LGUs to grant allowances
to judges under the Local Government Code of 1991. It was issued primarily to make the grant of RATA to national
officials under the national budget uniform. In other words, it applies only to the national funds administered by the
DBM, not the local funds of LGUs.
To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges as what respondent COA would like us to do will
subvert the principle of local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the Constitution. 27 The Local Government Code of
1991 was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the
Constitution. By upholding, in the present case, the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to
their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, we
ensure the genuine and meaningful local autonomy of LGUs.
We now discuss the next contention of respondent COA: that the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan
granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge was null and void because it failed to comply with LBC
No. 53 dated September 1, 1993:
Sec. 3. Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the national government
officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates authorized by law, rules and regulations and subject to the
following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as certified by the Accountant concerned
will allow the grant of the allowances/additional compensation without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full requirement of RA 6758 have
been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the LGU
concerned;
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in accordance with the provisions of
RA 7160;
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160.
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the
officials/employees assigned to the LGU.
Though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within the ambit of the Presidents power of general supervision
over LGUs, 28 we rule that Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, clearly provides that provincial, city and municipal governments may grant allowances to judges as long as
their finances allow. Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting
allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by the national government or (2) similar to
the allowances granted by the national government, violates Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code
of 1991. 29 As already stated, a circular must conform to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or
amend it. 30
Moreover, by prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted by the national
government, Section 3(e) of LBC No. 53 practically prohibits LGUs from granting allowances to judges and, in
effect, totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory power of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges and being violative of their autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section
3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared null and void.
Paragraphs (a) to (d) of said circular, however, are valid as they are in accordance with Sections 324 31 and 325 32
of the Local Government Code of 1991; these respectively provide for the budgetary requirements and general
limitations on the use of provincial, city and municipal funds. Paragraphs (a) to (d) are proper guidelines for the
condition provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that LGUs may grant
allowances to judges if their funds allow. 33
Respondent COA also argues that Resolution No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
paragraphs (a) to (d) of LBC No. 53, thus it was null and void.
The argument is misplaced.
Guidelines (a) to (d) were met when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro approved Resolution No.
101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge as well as the
corresponding budgets of the municipality providing for the said monthly allowance to petitioner judge. Under
Section 327 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was specifically tasked to
review the appropriation ordinances of its component municipalities to ensure compliance with Sections 324 and
325 of the Code. Considering said duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, we will assume, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro performed what the law required it to do,
that is, review the resolution and the corresponding budgets of the Municipality of Naujan to make sure that they
complied with Sections 324 and 325 of the Code. 34 We presume the regularity of the Sangguniang Panlalawigans
official act.
Moreover, it is well-settled that an ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is
not in accordance with the law. 35 Respondent COA had the burden of proving that Resolution No. 101 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan did not comply with the condition provided in Section 447 of the Code, the
budgetary requirements and general limitations on the use of municipal funds provided in Sections 324 and 325 of
the Code and the implementing guidelines issued by the DBM, i.e., paragraphs (a) to (d), Section 3 of LBC No. 53.
Respondent COA also had the burden of showing that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro
erroneously approved said resolution despite its non-compliance with the requirements of the law. It failed to
discharge such burden. On the contrary, we find that the resolution of the Municipality of Naujan granting the
P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge fully complied with the law. Thus, we uphold its validity.
In sum, we hereby affirm the power of the Municipality of Naujan to grant the questioned allowance to petitioner
Judge Leynes in accordance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy and the provisions of the
Local Government Code of 1991. We also sustain the validity of Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993, of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan for being in accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September 14, 1999 of the Commission
of Audit is hereby SET ASIDE and Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113092. September 1, 1994.]

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS; CONSTRUED. it is an

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MENDOZA, J., concurring:

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lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a.WARPAN

circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:

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The appeal has no merit.

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Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

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Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

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Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?

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Reform. That is leading

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Q: Were you able to go down?

"Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?

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Q: How about the M14?

Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?

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Q: There is also black residue?

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May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.

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Q . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?

Crime and Punishment

Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

if another crime is committed at the same time. 60

"II Immunities Granted.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS BY GOVERNMENT AGENCY CHARGED

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Dear Mr. Deoferio:

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

"EPIDEMOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF

that the former should die or sustain an injury.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is meritorious.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

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RULE 22 Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases

(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee;