Personality and Individual Differences 45 (2008) 591596

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Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Predicting the acceptability and likelihood of lying: The interaction

of personality with type of lie
Beverly A. McLeod *, Randy L. Genereux
Department of Psychology, Mount Royal College, 4825 Mount Royal Gate SW, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T3E 6K6

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 31 October 2007
Received in revised form 6 June 2008
Accepted 16 June 2008
Available online 8 August 2008
Keywords:
Deceptive communication
Lies
Lying
Personality
Individual differences
Attitudes

a b s t r a c t
The present study investigated the role of individual differences in the perceived acceptability and likelihood of different types of lies. Two-hundred and eighty seven college students completed scales assessing six personality variables (honesty, kindness, assertiveness, approval motivation, self-monitoring, and
Machiavellianism) and rated 16 scenarios involving lies told for four different motives (altruistic, conict
avoidance, social acceptance, and self-gain lies). Our central hypothesis that the perceived acceptability
and likelihood of lying would be predicted by interactions between personality characteristics of the rater
and the type of lie being considered was supported. For each type of lie, a unique set of personality variables signicantly predicted lying acceptability and likelihood.
2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Which types of individuals are the most accepting of interpersonal deception and which types are the most likely to lie? In this
study, we tested the proposition that the answers to these questions depend on the type of lie being considered.
Although a number of studies have examined individual differences in deception, most have focused on the ability to detect lies
or to lie successfully (e.g., Aamod & Custer, 2006; Bond, Malloy, &
Arias, 2005; Ekman, 2001; Johnson et al., 2004; Porter, Campbell,
Stapleton, & Birt, 2002; Riggio & Friedman, 1984; Vrij, 2000; Watson & Sinha, 1993). The few studies that have examined the role of
personality in the perceived acceptability or likelihood of lying
have typically attempted to identify personality traits that have a
broad overall effect on judgements or likelihood of interpersonal
deception. These studies have yielded limited and inconsistent results. For example, Gozna, Vrij, and Bull (2001) found that none of
the ve personality constructs they studied (acting, manipulativeness, impression management, sociability, and anxiety) predicted
self-reported frequency of everyday lying. They did nd however
that high manipulativeness predicted low guilt when lying,
whereas high anxiety and high sociability predicted high guilt
when lying, suggesting that these traits might be related to the
perceived acceptability of lying. Eswara and Suryarekha (1974) reported that high lie scores were associated with low anxiety scores
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 403 440 6426.
E-mail address: bmcleod@mtroyal.ca (B.A. McLeod).
0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2008.06.015

on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. In a study of prison inmates,

Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (2004) found signicant positive correlations between deception scores and both neuroticism and
psychoticism. In a study of undergraduates, Weaver III (2005)
found a signicant positive correlation between neuroticism and
deceptive communicative style, but not between psychoticism
and deceptive communicative style.
One key to furthering our understanding of the role of individual differences in the acceptability and likelihood of lying is to recognize that whereas some personality characteristics may exert a
broad-brush inuence across a behavioural domain, others may
exert a signicant yet much more delimited inuence over a subset
of behaviour. This suggests, for example, that while some personality traits may inuence the acceptability or likelihood of lying
across a wide range of types of lies, others may do so only for certain types of lies. The methodological implication is that to further
our understanding of the acceptability and likelihood of lying, we
should devise studies that seek to uncover interactions between
personality characteristics on the one hand and different types of
lies on the other hand.
One study that did explore possible interactions between personality and type of lie is Kashy and DePaulos (1996) diary study
on the frequency of everyday lying. In this study, they examined
the relationships between several personality characteristics and
the frequency of two types of lies: self-centred versus otheroriented lies. Kashy and DePaulo (1996) hypothesized that personality would predict not only the overall frequency of lying but also
the kind of lies that people tell. They found limited support for

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B.A. McLeod, R.L. Genereux / Personality and Individual Differences 45 (2008) 591596

their hypotheses. Regarding overall frequency of lying, they found

signicant positive correlations with manipulativeness, concern
with impression management, and extraversion, but no signicant
relationships with social self-condence, socialization, and social
participation. Regarding the two types of lies, they found that more
manipulative and less socialized individuals reported telling proportionally more self-centred lies than their less manipulative
and more socialized counterparts.
Our goal in the present study was to further investigate potential interactions between personality and type of lie in predicting
the acceptability and the likelihood of lying. We rst identied four
types of lies reecting four different motives for lying: to help or
protect others (altruistic lies), to avoid conict with others (conict
avoidance lies), to t in with or be liked by others (social acceptance lies), and to materially benet oneself (self-gain lies). Perceived motive has been found to inuence the acceptability of
lying. For example, altruistic lies have been rated as considerably
more acceptable than selsh or exploitative lies (Lindskold & Walters, 1983). The four types investigated in the present study were
selected in part to reect a range of acceptability, with altruistic
lies representing one of the most acceptable types of lies, self-gain
lies representing one of the least acceptable types of lies, and conict avoidance and social acceptance lies expected to fall in between. As Seiter, Bruschke, and Bai (2002) have noted, there are
many and varied typologies of motives for lying, with no one typology being universally accepted. As such, the specic types chosen
for the present study, although drawn from the array of types identied in previous studies, were not intended to comprise an
exhaustive list of types of lies. Instead, we selected a manageable
sample of lying types that might reasonably be expected to differentially correlate with personality, as described below.
The six personality variables we selected were honesty, kindness, assertiveness, approval motivation, self-monitoring, and
Machiavellianism. Our central hypothesis was that perceived
acceptability and likelihood of lying would be predicted by interactions between particular personality characteristics of the rater
and the type of lie being considered. Our specic hypotheses
regarding the relationships between the particular personality
characteristics and four types of lie are detailed below.
2. Hypothesized Predictors
2.1. Honesty
Honesty as a personal value is the one personality variable we
did not expect to interact with type of lie we included honesty
in this study to contrast its expected uniform signicant relationship with all types of lies to the hypothesized more limited relationship of other personality variables with particular types of
lies. We predicted that individuals who highly value honesty
would rate all forms of deceptive communication regardless of
motive as less acceptable than those who place a lower value
on honesty. We also expected those who highly value honesty to
report being less likely to lie themselves, irrespective of the type
of lie being considered.

ported likelihood of telling self-gain lies. We expected to nd no

signicant relationship between kindness and conict avoidance
or social acceptance lies.
2.3. Assertiveness
The construct of assertiveness includes the free expression of
emotion (positive and negative), standing up for ones rights, and
a positive or non-anxious reaction to acting assertively (Hertzberger, Chan, & Katz, 1984). Given assertive individuals apparent willingness to state their feelings or position even if that may cause
social ripples, we hypothesized that highly assertive individuals
would rate the use of deception to avoid conict as less acceptable
than would less assertive individuals. We also hypothesized that
highly assertive individuals would report being less likely to tell
lies to avoid conict than would those low in assertiveness.
2.4. Approval motivation
People high in approval motivation need to receive positive
evaluations and social approval from others and to avoid negative
evaluations and social criticism or rejection from others (Martin,
1984). One way of gaining social approval in interpersonal interactions is to present ones self, honestly or dishonestly, in a way that
is designed to curry favour and elicit liking from others (e.g., agreeing with a partners attitudes and/or personal values, highlighting
similarities with others, avoiding conicts/disagreements). As
such, we hypothesized that individuals high in approval motivation would rate lies told to gain social acceptance and lies told to
avoid conict as more acceptable than would individuals low in
approval motivation. We also expected those high in approval
motivation to rate their likelihood of engaging in these two kinds
of lies as higher than those low on this construct.
2.5. Self-monitoring
Self-monitoring reects the extent to which individuals can and
do control their expressive behaviours so as to behave in an appropriate or socially sanctioned manner in public situations (Snyder &
Gangestad, 1986). High self-monitors regulate their expressive
self-presentations to achieve desired public appearances, whereas
low self-monitors tend to express their inner attitudes, traits, and
feelings rather than those demanded by the social situation. We
predicted that high self-monitors would rate lies to gain social
acceptance as more acceptable and more likely than would low
self-monitors.
2.6. Machiavellianism
People high in Machiavellianism place little value on conventional morality, are motivated primarily by their own needs, and
freely admit to lying, cheating and deceiving others as a means
of achieving their own ends (Christie & Geis, 1970). Given their
propensity to seek self-gain even at the expense of others, we predicted that high Machiavellianism would be most strongly correlated with high acceptability and likelihood of self-gain lies.

2.2. Kindness
3. Method
We hypothesized that the personal value of kindness would be
a signicant positive predictor of the rated acceptability of altruistic lies (i.e., lies to help or protect others) and a signicant negative
predictor of the rated acceptability of self-gain lies (i.e., lies told to
benet the liar at some cost to the lie recipient). Similarly, we
hypothesized that kindness would positively predict the reported
likelihood of telling altruistic lies and negatively predict the re-

3.1. Participants
Participants were 287 college students (26% male; 74% female)
enrolled in Introductory Psychology classes. They each received 2%
course credit for participating in the study. The median age was
20 years, with a range of 1752 years.

B.A. McLeod, R.L. Genereux / Personality and Individual Differences 45 (2008) 591596

3.2. Procedure
Participants volunteered to complete an online questionnaire
on attitudes regarding various aspects of interpersonal behaviour.
In the rst part of the questionnaire, participants rated the acceptability and likelihood of four types of lying as depicted in 16 deception scenarios. In the remainder of the questionnaire, participants
completed six personality scales. The questionnaire took approximately 50 minutes to complete.
3.3. Measures of the acceptability and likelihood of lying
Each of the 16 deception scenarios depicted one person lying to
another person for a clearly specied motive. Four scenarios1 assessed each of the following four types of lies: lying to help or protect others (altruistic lies), lying to avoid conict with others
(conict avoidance lies), lying to t in with or be liked by others (social acceptance lies), and lying to materially benet oneself (self-gain
lies). Altruistic lies involved lying for someone elses benet with
some cost to the liar, social acceptance lies and conict avoidance
lies involved lies told primarily for the benet of the liar, and selfgain lies involved lies that were told to benet the liar at some cost
to the lie recipient. The 16 scenarios were presented in randomized
order. An example of each type of lie is shown below.
3.3.1. Altruistic
Brads friend asks if he will help her move the next day. In order
to be helpful, Brad lies and tells her that he has nothing planned
and will help her move, even though he had booked in to work that
day.
3.3.2. Conict avoidance
Bobs neighbour asks if he will vote for him in the upcoming
election. In order to avoid conict, Bob lies and says he will, even
though he intends to vote for another candidate.
3.3.3. Social acceptance
Kates fellow students are complaining about an instructor they
do not like. In order to t in, Kate lies and says she dislikes the
instructor as well, even though she really likes the instructor.
3.3.4. Self-gain
Sean accidentally backs into a parked car. As he is driving away,
the owner arrives and asks Sean if he saw who damaged his car. In
order to avoid paying for the damage, Sean lies and says he has no
idea who did it.
The complete set of scenarios is available from the authors upon
request.
After reading each scenario, each participant rated (a) how
acceptable it was for the person in the scenario to have lied, and
(b) how likely it is the participant himself/herself would have lied
as described in the scenario if he/she was the main character. Ratings were made using nine-point Likert scales ranging from extremely unacceptable to extremely acceptable and extremely unlikely
to extremely likely.
For each participant, one acceptability score for each type of lie
was obtained by calculating his/her average score across the four
relevant scenarios. The same was done for likelihood scores. As
well, an overall acceptability and an overall likelihood score for

1
To avoid a case-category confound (Seiter et al., 2002) and to increase the
generalizability of the results beyond the supercial details of a single scenario, we
used four scenarios for each stated motive. Cronbachs alphas for the scenarios types
were 0.41 (altruistic), 0.58 (avoid conict), 0.74 (social acceptance) and 0.64 (selfgain) for the acceptability ratings and 0.40 (altruistic), 0.51 (avoid conict), 0.75
(social acceptance) and 0.59 (self-gain) for the likelihood ratings.

593

each participant was obtained by calculating his/her average score

across all 16 scenarios. This resulted in ve acceptability and ve
likelihood scores per participant. These are the scores that were
used in subsequent statistical analyses.
3.4. Personality measures
All six personality measures used in this study are well-established measures with acceptable psychometric properties (for reliability and validity of these scales refer to Corcoran & Fischer,
1987; Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991; and Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).
3.4.1. Honesty (PVSH)
The 20-item Honesty scale from the Personal Values Scale
(Scott, 1965) was used to assess honesty as a personal value. This
scale measures the extent to which respondents value absolute
honesty. Scores can range from 0 to 20.
3.4.2. Kindness (PVSK)
The 20-item Kindness scale from the Personal Values Scale
(Scott, 1965) was used to assess kindness as a personal value.
Scores can range from 0 to 20.
3.4.3. Assertiveness (ASRI)
The Assertiveness Self-Report Inventory was used to assess
assertiveness (Hertzberger et al., 1984). This is a T/F 25-item scale
with scores ranging from 0 to 25.
3.4.4. Approval motivation (RMLAM)
The 20-item Revised MartinLarsen Approval Motivation Scale
was used to assess need for others approval (Martin, 1984). Scores
can range from 1 to 100.
3.4.5. Self-monitoring (SM)
Snyder and Gangestad (1986) revised self-monitoring scale was
used to measure self-monitoring. This is an 18-item T/F scale with
scores ranging from 0 to 18.
3.4.6. Machiavellianism (Mach IV)
The 20-item Mach IV scale was used to assess Machiavellianism
(Christie & Geis, 1970). Scores can range from 40 to 160.
4. Results
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations (Pearsons r) for the six personality scales are shown in Table 1. There
were signicant small to moderate-sized correlations for several
pairs of personality measures, ranging from an r of 0.14 between
kindness and assertiveness to an r of 0.51 between approval
motivation and assertiveness.
Means and standard deviations for the ratings of acceptability
and likelihood of lying and the bivariate correlations between these
two measures are presented in Table 2.2 Consistent with previous
research (e.g., Backbier, Hoogstraten, & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven,
1997; Boon & McLeod, 2001; Lindskold & Walters, 1983), altruistic
lies were rated as the most acceptable and likely overall, while selfgain lies were rated as the least acceptable and likely overall.
Using the six personality measures as predictor variables, standard
multiple regression analyses were conducted to predict the rated
acceptability and likelihood of each of the four types of lies separately.

2
Missing data points appeared random and were therefore replaced with the mean
for each item. This resulted in the same pattern of signicance for all analyses as with
the missing data points left out.

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B.A. McLeod, R.L. Genereux / Personality and Individual Differences 45 (2008) 591596

Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the personality measures

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
*
**

Honesty
Kindness
Assertiveness
Approval motivation
Self-monitoring
Machiavellianism

SD

8.85
12.57
14.21
54.34
9.25
89.09

3.85
3.74
4.14
9.41
3.31
13.61

2
0.43***
0.09
0.18**
0.32***
0.40***

0.14*
0.03
0.18**
0.49***

0.51***
0.10
0.01

0.03
0.22***

0.23***

p < 0.05.
p < 0.01.
p < 0.001.

***

Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the acceptability and likelihood of different types of lies
Type of lie

Altruistic
Conict avoidance
Social acceptance
Self-gain
All

Acceptability of lying

Likelihood of lying

SD

SD

4.84
4.30
3.59
2.35
3.77

1.17
1.22
1.29
1.16
0.87

5.00
4.33
2.91
2.79
3.76

1.46
1.48
1.55
1.55
1.04

0.47
0.46
0.54
0.59
0.55

Results of these eight regression analyses are summarized in Tables 3

and 4. All eight regression analyses were signicant at p < 0.001, and
in each case a unique combination of personality characteristics signicantly predicted the acceptability or likelihood of lying.
5. Discussion
Can personality characteristics be used to predict the acceptability and likelihood of lying? The results of this study indicate

that they can. All the regression equations for predicting the
acceptability and likelihood of lying using our six selected personality characteristics were signicant at p < 0.001. The multiple correlations for predicting acceptability ranged from R = 0.31 (for
altruistic lying) to 0.52 (for lying for self-gain), with the proportion
of variability in acceptability ratings accounted for by personality
ranging from 10% (8% adjusted) to 27% (25% adjusted). The multiple correlations for predicting the likelihood of lying ranged from
R = 0.34 (for altruistic lying) to 0.57 (for lying to avoid conict),
with the proportion of variability in likelihood ratings accounted
for ranging from 12% (12% adjusted) to 32% (30% adjusted).
Which types of individuals are the most accepting of interpersonal deception and the most likely to lie? The results of this study
strongly support our central hypothesis that it depends on the type
of lie being considered. For each of the four different types of lies
examined in this investigation, a unique set of personality characteristics signicantly predicted both the acceptability of lying (see
Table 3) and the likelihood of lying (see Table 4). For example, the
signicant predictors of the acceptability of social acceptance lies

Table 3
Standard multiple regression analyses for the acceptability of lying
Type of lie and predictors

R2

Adj.R2

Altruistic
HonestyKindness+
Assertiveness
Approval motivation
Self-monitoring
Machiavellianism
Conict avoidance
HonestyKindness
AssertivenessApproval motivation+
Self-monitoring
Machiavellianism
Social acceptance
HonestyKindness
Assertiveness
Approval motivation+
Self-monitoring+
Machiavellianism
Self-gain
HonestyKindnessAssertiveness
Approval motivation
Self-monitoring
Machiavellianism+

0.31

0.10

0.08

0.39

0.42

0.52

Note: For each F-test, df = 6280.

Hypothesized to be a signicant negative predictor.
+
Hypothesized to be a signicant positive predictor.
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.

0.15

0.17

0.27

0.13

0.16

0.25

sr2

5.06***
0.07
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.04
0.01

0.23***
0.12
0.08
0.01
0.11
0.10

0.04
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01

0.07
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.05
0.01

0.21**
0.05
0.01
0.17*
0.14*
0.09

0.03
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.01

0.05
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.01

0.14*
0.07
0.07
0.32***
0.09
0.12

0.01
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.01
0.01

0.05
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.04
0.02

0.16*
0.13*
0.08
0.00
0.11*
0.28***

0.02
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.05

8.19***

9.89***

16.85***

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B.A. McLeod, R.L. Genereux / Personality and Individual Differences 45 (2008) 591596
Table 4
Standard multiple regression analyses for the likelihood of lying
Type of lie and predictors
Altruistic
HonestyKindness+
Assertiveness
Approval motivation
Self-monitoring
Machiavellianism
Conict avoidance
HonestyKindness
AssertivenessApproval motivation+
Self-monitoring
Machiavellianism
Social acceptance
HonestyKindness
Assertiveness
Approval motivation+
Self-monitoring+
Machiavellianism
Self-gain
HonestyKindnessAssertiveness
Approval motivation
Self-monitoring
Machiavellianism+

R
0.34

0.57

0.47

0.47

R2
0.12

0.32

0.22

0.22

Adj.R2
0.10

0.30

0.20

0.20

sr2

***

6.23

0.06
0.05
0.08
0.01
0.03
0.01

0.16*
0.13
0.23***
0.05
0.07
0.04

0.02
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.07
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.02
0.02

0.18**
0.19**
0.17**
0.32***
0.05
0.17**

0.02
0.02
0.02
0.07
0.00
0.02

0.04
0.04
0.01
0.06
0.03
0.01

0.10
0.11
0.03
0.38***
0.07
0.09

0.01
0.01
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.01

0.01
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.06
0.03

0.03
0.15*
0.06
0.01
0.13*
0.30***

0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.06

21.83***

13.15***

13.04***

Note: For each F-test, df = 6280.

Hypothesized to be a signicant negative predictor.
+
Hypothesized to be a signicant positive predictor.
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.

were approval motivation (positive correlation) and honesty (negative correlation), whereas for self-gain lies, the signicant predictors were Machiavellianism and self-monitoring (positive
correlations), and honesty and kindness (negative correlations).
As another example regarding the likelihood of lying, the two signicant predictors of telling altruistic lies were assertiveness and
honesty (negative correlations), whereas for telling lies to achieve
social acceptance, the one signicant predictor was approval motivation (positive correlation).
In total, eight of our 11 hypothesized predictors of lie acceptability across the four types of lies turned out to be signicant predictors in the expected direction, three of the 11 did not reach
signicance in the regression analyses (although assertiveness
did have a signicant bivariate correlation in the predicted direction with acceptability of conict avoidance lies), and one signicant predictor of self-gain lies emerged that we did not expect
(see Table 3). In terms of likelihood ratings, seven of our 11
hypothesized predictors across the four types of lies turned out
to be signicant predictors in the expected direction in the regression analyses, four of the 11 did not reach signicance in the
regression analyses (although two of the four, honesty for self-gain
and for social acceptance lies, did have signicant bivariate correlations with likelihood in the predicted direction), and four unhypothesized signicant predictors emerged (see Table 4).
An interesting aspect of these ndings is that seemingly conicting traits (e.g., kindness and Machiavellianism) can show opposite
effects on the propensity of some types of lies (i.e., self-gain lies)
but similar effects on the propensity of other types of lies (i.e., conict avoidance lies). This highlights the rich complexity of interrelationship that can exist between personality and types of lies.
Another interesting pattern that emerged in this study is that
some types of lies were signicantly predicted by a combination

of several personality characteristics, while others had only one

or two signicant predictors. For example, the regression equation
for the acceptability of lying for self-gain has four signicant predictors, whereas the equation for the acceptability of altruistic lying has just one. It may be that some types of lies are inuenced by
a wide range of personality characteristics, perhaps because there
exist a variety of possible reasons for engaging in that type of lie or
a range of possible subjective interpretations of that type of lie.
Other types of lies may be much more trait-specic in nature, perhaps due to fewer alternative reasons for, or interpretations of, that
kind of lie.
The ip side of this pattern is that while some personality variables had wide predictive utility across the four types of lies, others
had a much more limited scope, predicting only one or two types of
lies. Perhaps a fruitful way of conceptualizing the relationship between personality and lying may be in terms of a hierarchy of traits
ranging in breadth of inuence from widely applicable core
deception traits to those with a much more delimited, yet important, sphere of inuence.
In addition to providing strong support for our major hypothesis and considerable support for our specic hypotheses, the
present results suggest a number of implications regarding future
work on personality and deceptive communication. Our key nding that the personality characteristics that signicantly predict
the acceptability and likelihood of lying depend on the type of
lie involved suggests that a more rened, interactional approach
to conceptualizing the relationship between personality and
deception may prove to be a more fruitful one than the broadbrush approach typical of previous research in this area. To better
understand how people perceive lies and the kind of lies they are
likely to tell, researchers need to assess more than just general
attitudes towards deception; they need to identify and explore

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B.A. McLeod, R.L. Genereux / Personality and Individual Differences 45 (2008) 591596

the role of specic personality characteristics in judging different

types of lies.
Another implication relates to the differences in ndings for the
two criterion variables, rated acceptability of lies and the likelihood of lying oneself. The correlations between the acceptability
and likelihood ratings were from 0.46 to 0.59 (see Table 2), indicating some distinction between the two measures. Although these
two variables shared seven signicant predictors across the four
types of lying, some interesting differences emerged as well. For
example, assertiveness failed to predict the acceptability of any
type of lying, but it did signicantly predict the likelihood of both
altruistic lies and lying to avoid conict. The personal value of honesty signicantly predicted acceptability ratings for all four types
of lying, but likelihood for only two types of lies. The nding that
likelihood ratings differ to some extent from acceptability ratings
is consistent with perspectives such as the Theory of Planned
Behaviour (e.g., Ajzen, 1985), which identies an individuals perception of the acceptability of a behaviour as only one of several
key factors that contribute to the likelihood of engaging in a behaviour. The implication for future research is that we should distinguish between the acceptability of lying and the likelihood of
lying when investigating possible personality differences in
deception.
A promising line of future research would be to extend the paradigm used in the present study to other personality traits and to
additional types and aspects of lying. For example, are there particular personality characteristics that best predict other types of lies
such as lying to protect ones privacy or to deliberately hurt another? Does personality interact with type of lie in terms of the
ability to detect lies, such that some types of individuals are better
able than others to detect particular types of lies, but not others?
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