SUCCESSION FULL TEXT CASES 4

Contents
Heirs of Uriarte v CA............................................................................................. 1
Vizconde v CA...................................................................................................... 6
Tison v CA.......................................................................................................... 11
Pavia v Ugarte.................................................................................................... 18
Salao v Salao...................................................................................................... 20
Diaz v Pamuti..................................................................................................... 32
Leonardo v CA.................................................................................................... 36
Rosales v Rosales............................................................................................... 41
Rodriguez v Ravilan............................................................................................ 44
Vda de la Rosa v Vda Damian............................................................................ 49
ADOPTION Santos Iniego v RP XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX................................60
Manuel v Ferrer XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX..................................................60
Acain v IAC......................................................................................................... 60
Suarez v CA XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.................................................65
Teotico v Del Val................................................................................................. 65

Heirs of Uriarte v CA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998]
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and
LOURDES URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF
PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented
herein
by
FELISA
ARNALDO
SULLANO
and
LUPECINO
ARNALDO,petitioners, vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
BENEDICTO
ESTRADA, respondents.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del
Sur, as well as the appellate courts resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of land in
Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on
March 31, 1989.
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents
were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married
Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. [2] Private
respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister
Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow
and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo
and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo
Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justas father, Juan Arnaldo,
were brothers.[3] Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth
degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio.
[4]
The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina,
Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of
Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitivas brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas,
Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives
within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and
Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court
for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7
hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her
parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase.[5] Private
respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the
latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed,
worked the land as Justas tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share
of the harvest.[6] He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa
but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from
her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. [7]
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. [8] In
their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa [9] but the latters heirs
entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by
Ambrocio Arnaldo,[10] their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to
Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocios nephews, in a holographic will executed by

Ambrocio in 1908.[11] Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, onethird.[12] The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and
that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only
received her share of the harvest from it.[13] They alleged that private respondent
did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio
Arnaldo, [14] the original owner of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioners contention. In its decision rendered on
November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews,
Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds
or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan.
The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares because the adjacent
lot of about two hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan
Arnaldo, after the latters death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax
declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter however died intestate
and without issue. Her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle
Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation
of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code).[15]
Accordingly, the court ordered:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the
intervenors [herein petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private respondent],
declaring the defendants and the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the
late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described in Tax
Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa
Arnaldo Sering. No cost.
SO ORDERED.[16]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial courts finding, the
appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justas parents,
Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her
half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the
estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court ordered:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is
hereby entered Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint
in the following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.
For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the partition in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte,
and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners allege:
I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO
SERING;
II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER
SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS
REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS;
IV AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED. [18]
After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already
stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7 hectares. Half of this land (0.5
hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was conjugal property of her
parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was
acquired by Justa after the death of her parents.Accordingly, the division of Justas
property should be as follows as private respondent contends:
A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo
which will accrue to petitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil,
which will accrue to private respondent.
B - As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already
stated was consolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private
respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and who is only three degrees from
Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and
Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo. [19]
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is
entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of
the Civil Code.
As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of Agatonica
Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue
only now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial of a
case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason,
therefore, should such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on
appeal to this Court.[20]

It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, [21] petitioners
admitted that private respondent is Justas nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being
Justas half-sister.Apparently they are now questioning private respondents
filiation because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private respondent is the
nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the
half hectare land as her fathers (Juan Arnaldos) share in the conjugal property, while
petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition, Justa inherited her
mothers (Ursula Tubils) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares
which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58
hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private
respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justas nearest surviving relative. As the Court of
Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest
in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions
of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles
963 - 966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
ART. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined
generations. Each generation forms a degree.

by

the

number

of

ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are
not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
ART. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or
persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one
degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the
great-grandparent.

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is
made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is
two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of
his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a
third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justas
cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the
lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no
moment.[22]
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an
Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro
Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of
Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As
already stated, private respondent is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. He is
therefore Justas nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may
inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.[23] That private
respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify
him from being his aunts heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, The
determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important
only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.[24]
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of
the petition for review must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Vizconde v CA
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998]
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS,respondents.

DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five
siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of
Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and
Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent.Antonio predeceased his parents and is now
survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of
10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property)
covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan
ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.[1] In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela
property was issued to Estrellita. [2] On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela
property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four
Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). [3] In June of the
same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with
improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque
property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the
balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and
her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident
popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation
conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.
[4]
Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with
the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of
his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares,[5] with
Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the
division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and
spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the
Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other
related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).[6] The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total
amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Saving
Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token
amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque
property and the car were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all
theirclaims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs [7] in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo
and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed
Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as

guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent

brother. Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition [9]dated March 24,
1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three
weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition [10] alleging, among others, that
Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not les
than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded
for courts intervention to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos
distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children, [11] Estrellita included. On May
12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled
InMatter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and
averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties
distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. [12] Ramon stated that herein
petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of
deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita. [13]
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the
Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the
slate of Rafaels heirs.[14] Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of
properties to be included in the estate. [15]Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated
January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his
wards property without the courts knowledge and permission. [16]
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10)
days x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the
pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any
pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and
Teresita de Leon. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19,
1994, stressing tha the was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael
and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said
Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994. [17] Despite the Manifestation,
Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in
the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as
the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated.[18] Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the
same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case
and considering the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. [19]
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon
opposed.[20] On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. It provides:
xxxxxxxxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were

then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable
consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael
Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said
spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro
Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for
sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths
of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to
buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have
been engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and
garment manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted to
indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property
from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her
father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased
out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas
in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. [21] (Underscoring
added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of
Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of
Appeals[22] denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the
question on the title of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate
court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule
90, Revised Rules of Court).[23] Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review oncertiorari. Finding prima facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent
Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from
Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the
Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other

gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the

legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common
mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made
according to law and the will of the testator. [24] Collation is only required of
compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or
rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.
[25]
The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in
interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him
something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the
predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to
the contrary.[26] Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property
donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated,
[27]
the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or
loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. [28]
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the probate
court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate
estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory
heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be
a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. [29] As such, petitioner
may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be

permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said

proceeding,[30] which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation. [31]
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings.[32] Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final
decision in a separate action to resolve title. [33] In the case at bench, however, we
note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it
proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between
Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the
concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent
of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are
matter outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in
an appropriate action. We reiterate:
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of
testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or
not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the
deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and
without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise
the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit. [34]
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its
initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of
Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling
in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the
provisions of article 1035[35] of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to
allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in
whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or hereditary portion to which they
are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is
untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate
court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is
the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using
the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable
simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory
basis.[36] The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was
gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the
Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration ofP900,000.00, [37] by
Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein,
and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property
is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against
petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the
heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels

estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat,

collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his
lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully
waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir [38] in the Paraaque
property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed,
died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount
more than the value of the Valenzuela property. [39] Hence, even assuming that the
Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of
the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore,
any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding
purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Tison v CA
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by
respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 1 which affirmed the Order of
December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil
Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein
petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a

parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene
Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and
was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit
from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin
Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012
was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for
resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the
late Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from
the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the
reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller
under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title
of the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus
attorney's fees for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the
participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and
knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as
conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone
witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners'
filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates
of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of
Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes

Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live

birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton
Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller;
joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of
marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage
certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case
and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by
herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the
ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased
Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further
averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her
relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and
incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article
172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof
of the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit
executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of birth
and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the
affiants were never presented for cross-examination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to
evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or
not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of
the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for
consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is
the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken
separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of
legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of
both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption
that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an
action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have
the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We
disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no

presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. 8 And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for
the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent
action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican
Code (Article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our
Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer
to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from
being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to
settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to
the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the
conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that
his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even
his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of
Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for
reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless
and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of
proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in
their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone

should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution
before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the
issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the
presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and
in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the
burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of legitimacy is
so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the
party claiming illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party
against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the
contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless
or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of
evidence and support a finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a presumption must be
followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus
established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must
stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence
to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she
in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or
disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and
admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged
and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy,
requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various
certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits
executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course
and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be
shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was
made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit

involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has
arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What
remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other
documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than
such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the
relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by
other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by
evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not
from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding
claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's
relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his
own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be precedent
proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a
member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that
declarant's relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the
party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the
declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable
are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in
controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible
without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is
then disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do
not derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if
not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The
distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations
are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of
necessity. 17(Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against
a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the requirement that there be
other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not
apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely
to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member
of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance
where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are
claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece,

is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding

the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being
such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such
evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More importantly, there is in the present
case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the
decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis
of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that
petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one
case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to
another person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the admission of the
declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same
result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly
conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered
opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in
evidence. 22 It
is
elementary
that
an
objection
shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since the right to
object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a
rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence
must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived.
The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the
answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the
evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the
statute is a waiver if the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a
witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to the
admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony
has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence
given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any
objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent
unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary
evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility
thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private
respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and
regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by
private respondent in her comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the
grounds therefor were already apparent at the time these documents were being
adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which

objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal
consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account
of herein private respondent's failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted
and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the
parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the
Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller
(Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and
Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries
wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together
with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to
prove that herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller these can
be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between the declarant
and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima
facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is
required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial
evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of
the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the
estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving
spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or theirs children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining
half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are
entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly
alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein
private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed coowners of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the
proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.

All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiff's
evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent
may no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under
Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are
declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and
three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Pavia v Ugarte
G.R. No. L-2599

October 27, 1905

CARMEN
LINART
Y
PAVIA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA JUANA UGARTE E ITURRALDE, defendant-appellant.
Pedro
Concepcion
Thos. D. Aitken for appellee.

for

appellant.

ARELLANO, C.J.:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900,
Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate
heir of the deceased.
There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or
descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral
descendant that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. Her mother,
Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, as well as the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y
Gonzalez, were children of Manual Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez.
The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate,
having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
in force at the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she was declared, in
an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be
the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian,
Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde
y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who
had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased a fact which this new relative
did
not
deny be required to render an account of the property of the estate.
The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria
Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. Pablo Linart, the father of Carmen Linart, was the
legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon
Iturralde y Gonzalez. They, and Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez are the common
trunk from which the three branches issue.
Carmen Linart does not claim that her father, Pablo, who was of the same degree as
Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, should have succeeded Ramon, for the reason that
the latter died first. This, however, was not alleged, mush less proved. What she
claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her
aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of
the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation that is to say,
that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the estate as
the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.lawphil.net
The court below on the 24th of February, 1905, entered judgment declaring that the
petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate,
enjoining her, at the same time, from disposing of any part thereof until such
accounting had been made and the estate distributed. Maria Juana Ugarte excepted
to the judgment and has brought the case to this court.
After a consideration of the case, this court finds: (1) That the relative nearest in
degree excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of
representation in proper cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the Civil Code); and (2) that the
right of representation in the collateral line shall take place only in favor of children
of brothers or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).
In the light of the foregoing, the error which the appellant claims was committed in
the court below is very clearly shown. The court below held that the grandniece was
entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a
matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this
case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the
appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been
quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the
deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,
Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have
inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to
consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include
"grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a
conclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31,
1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in
cases relating to testate and not to intestate successions. In both cases, and in
many others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the
Civil Code, where a testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing,
that the property should pass to their children, it was held that "Grandchildren"
were necessarily included in the word "children," and that in such a case the
grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit by representation, "for the reason
that he must in any event succeed the child in the natural and regular order," and
pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first
decision, "the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of
the complaint that the action was based upon the right of representation, is not
sufficient to deny to the appellant a right which he had under the terms of the will."
The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take
into consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes
the children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily
considered as included in the term "children," unless they are expressly excluded,
whereas in intestate successions, reference should only be had to the provisions of
the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral
line do not obtain beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.
We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased
can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a
nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the
right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers
and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the
plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
For the reasons above stated, we hereby reverse the judgment of the court below,
and declare that Carmen Linart has no right to succeed the deceased with said
Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who was once declared to be the lawful heir, and
who is now in possession of the estate, as to whom we hereby dissolve the
injunction issued from the Court of First Instance.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith,
without special provisions as to the costs of this instance, and let the record be
remanded to the court of First Instance from whence it came for execution of the
said judgment. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Salao v Salao
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976
BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO
ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the
latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO
ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the
Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P.
SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO
DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest of the late
JUAN S. SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendantsappellants.
Eusebio V. Navarro for plaintiffs-appellants.
Nicolas Belmonte & Benjamin T. de Peralta for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:
This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran,
Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription. The facts are as
follows:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel
Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child.
Valentin Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel
Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate
was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized
on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her
three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in
representation of his deceased father, Patricio.
The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit were as follows:
Nature of Land
Area in
square meters
(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents,
Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of which was owned by
her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,700

(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418

(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989
(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469
(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares purchased from
Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on November 9, 1895 with a
bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11,205
(6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000
(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square meters, the
other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,217
(8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454
(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January 27,
1890 with a house and two camarins thereon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,065
(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao, with an area of 11,678 square meters,
of which 2,173 square meters were sold to Justa Yongco . . . . . . . . . .9,505
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179,022 square
meters
To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share
valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao (who
was then already forty-eight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area
of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters
and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had
an aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive
share. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of
P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was obviously intended to avoid the
fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.
In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina
Ignacio y Mendoza, ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao"
"cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por
designacion los mismos". It was expressly stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not
obligated to render any accounting of her administration "en consideracion al
resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagodas por ella las
contribusiones (pages 2 and 11, Exh. 21).
By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueos absolutos de sus respectivas
propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes, en la forma
como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina
Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens

title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a fortyseven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is
also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later
became a part of Bataan.
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.
Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the
fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any
documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao
were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the
properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were
used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary
evidence to support that theory.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted
of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and
1908 as, shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the
plaintiffs.
However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they
exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.
Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the
Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In
the deed of sale (Exh19) Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were
the dueos proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the
vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for
an anual canon of P128 (Exh. 19-a).
After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and
Juan sold it under pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of
redemption was also one year (Exh. 20). The fishpond was later redeemed and
Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document dated October 5, 1916
(Exh. 20-a).
The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals
that the Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was
claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond
(subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square
meters (Exh. 22).
Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia
Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of
swampland planted to bacawan and nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and
73 centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinanganacan, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17d).

The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No.
12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan
Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names on January
15, 1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho terreno por partes
iguales y por la compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17a).
At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified
for the applicants. On that same day Judge Moir rendered a decision, stating, inter
alia, that the heirs of Engracio Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and
Juan Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del terreno solicitado a
nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de su esposa Diega
Santiago y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones
iguales" (Exh. 17-e).
On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said
land. The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original
Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the
names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.
That Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the
Hermosa cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His
nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years
according to the death certificate (Exh. A. However, if according to Exhibit 21, he
was forty-eight years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years old in 1933).
The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December
28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina SalaoAlcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited
in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.
If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds
with a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his
aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that
no mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial partition of his estate in
1934.
It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her
grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with a total
area of 5,832 square meters (Exit. L). As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of
donation.
On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the
children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was
held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.
But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death
that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond

which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan
Salao y Santiago (Juani).
On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before
Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly
eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso share in
the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time
she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the other half of
the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The
deed of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She
reserved for herself the usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2
or M).
The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39,
Defendants' Record on Appeal).
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated
January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in
the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused
to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which
allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that
Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole
owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles
issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half
share (Exh. K-1).
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan
S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36).
They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment
of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the
Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145
hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia
Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens
title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds,
prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting
to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and
reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the
lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one.
He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the
administrator of his estate.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in
question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition
that the properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this
case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

After trial the trial court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages
dismissed the amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed
pages it made a laborious recital of the testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses,
Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo Mangali Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio
Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies Basilio Atienza, Benita
Salao, Emilio Cagui Damaso de la Pea, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco Buensuceso,
and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia,
Tiburcio Lingad, Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao.
(Plaintiffs presented Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).
The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao,
Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan
(Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of
Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirr after her death in 1914; that the coownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918
when her estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson,
Valentin Salao.
The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918
misled the plaintiffs and their witnesses and caused them to believe erroneously
that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or thereabouts. The trial court speculated
that if valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds of the Calunuran and
Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or profit- sharing basis. It conjectured
that Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion
of the earnings of the fishponds as a reward for his services or because of
Ambrosia's affection for her grandnieces.
The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the
Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the
fishponds. It did not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses
because their memories could not be trusted and because no strong documentary
evidence supported the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged
trust were already dead.
It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan
S. Salao, Jr., the donee, would nevertheless be the sole legal heir of the donor,
Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the properties donated to him.
Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for
reconveyance was dismissed. The defendants appealed because their counterclaim
for damages was dismissed.
The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of
Appeals. However, as the amounts involved exceed two hundred thousand pesos,
the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of Octoter 3,
1966 (CA-G.R. No. 30014-R).
Plaintiffs' appeal. An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index index of the
matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page references" to the

contents of the brief (Sec. 16 [a], Rule 46, 1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48,
1940 Rules of Court).
The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with
that requirement. Their statements of the case and the facts do not contain "page
references to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly
section 17, Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and reread section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements
prescribed in section 16, they might make a competent and luminous presentation
of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court.
What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this
Court is so great that we cannot, in justice to other litigants, undertake to make an
examination of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1,553 pages in this case,
twenty-one witnesses having testified), unless the attorneys who desire us to make
such examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief it
in accordance with our rules" (Palara vs. Baguisi 38 Phil. 177, 181). As noted in an
old case, this Court decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in
minute orders an exceptionally considerable number of petitions, motions and
interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 395; See In re
Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573).
Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14
of their first cause of action they made certain averments to establish their theory
that Valentin Salao had a one-third interest in the two fishponds which were
registrered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied each and all the
allegations" in paragraphs I to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with the
qualification that Original certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472 were issued "more
than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the
circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s "positive defenses" and "not under the
circumstances stated in the in the amended complaint".
The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect tin admission
of the allegations in their first cause of action that there was a co-ownership among
Ambrosia, Juan, AIejandra and Valentin, all surnamed Salao, regarding the Dampalit
property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the common funds were invested the
acquisition of the two fishponds; that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was
verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the l919 partition and that there was a
verbal stipulation to to register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Salao".
That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 of Rules of Court
the answer should "contain either a specific dinial a statement of matters in
accordance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of
the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specificaly with each material
allegation of fact the truth of wihich he does not admit and, whenever practicable

shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his
denial". "Material averments in the complaint, other than those as to the amount
damage, shall be deemed admitted when specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The
defendant may set forth set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he
may have. All grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the
preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).
What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive
defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action which which
supported his denials of paragraphs 4 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action.
Obviously, he did so because he found it impracticable to state pierceneal his own
version as to the acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and
repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting allegations of the first cause of
action.
We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of
Court. It may be noted that under the present Rules of Court a "negative defense is
the specific denial of t the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to
plaintiff's cause of causes of action". On the other hand, "an affirmative defense is
an allegation of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the
complaint, expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by
the plaintiff." Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by of confession and
avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6, Rules of Court).
The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and similar cases
are distinguishable from the instant case. In the El Hogar case the defendant filed a
laconic answer containing the statement that it denied "generally ans specifically
each and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint".
It did not set forth in its answer any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It
did not interpose any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not
interpose any affirmative defenses.
Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a
general denial which was tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the
complaint and which justified judgment on the pleadings. That is not the situation in
this case.
The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive
issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan
Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue is tied up with the question of whether
plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan
S. Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in
plaintiffs' complaint. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their
appelants' brief.
To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it
is necessary to maek some exegesis on the nature of trusts (fideicomosis). Trusts in

Anglo-American jurisprudence were derived from thefideicommissa of the Roman

law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642, 646).
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in
equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another, but the word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and
responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89 C.J.S. 712).
A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is
reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the
trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to
as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary relation between the
trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money
or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of
the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law"
(Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest
therein may be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral
evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs.
Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543,
546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 72).
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction asmatters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matter of equity,independently of the particular
intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting
and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust. is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act
or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised
by implication of law and presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not
expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of
resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs.
Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs.
Grao 42 Phil. 35).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is -a trust "raised by construction of law, or
arising by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as contra-distinguished
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words,
either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intension to create a trust, but by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice." It does not arise
"by agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).

Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code).
Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of
equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the
defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense.
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P. I., 49 Phil. 244).
Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove
that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin
Salao. Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their
claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond
was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable.
It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already
in force when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable:
parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.
Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or
constructive, regarding the two fishponds?
Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust.
The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no community of property during the
lifetime of Valentina; Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants'
documentary evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands
supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention
that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao.
But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite
improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not
satisfactorily proven. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was
a co-ownership over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In their amended
complaint, they alleged that the co-ownership was over seven hectares of fishponds
located in Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the
fishponds, ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area
of twenty-eight hectares, of which sixteen hectares pertained to Valentina Ignacio
and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate.
They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay
the very root, of the property now in litigation (page 6, plaintiffs-appellants' brief).
But the eleven hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. Benita
Salao's testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra and Valentin
partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible.
As noted by the defendants, Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs'
complaints.
The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares
of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the time that partition was made there
were eleven hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who

died in 1885, those eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the
case of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.
It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be
adjudicated to Valentin Salao mere by by word of mouth. Incredible because for the
partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate
"Escritura de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed by the
four Salao heirs. Surely, for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of
fishponds among three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have
sufficed.
The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is
borne in mind that the two fishponds were registered land and "the act of
registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act
No. 496). That means that any transaction affecting the registered land should be
evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successorsin-interest, the plaintiffs, never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure
any documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest ox participation in the
two fishponds is very suggestive of the absence of such interest.
The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of
partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate wag notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21). The
plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and
that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share.
Now in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate, Valentin was obligated to pay
P3,355.25 to Ambrosia Salao. If, according to the plaintiffs, Ambrosia administered
the two fishponds and was the custodian of its earnings, then it could have been
easily stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount
due from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the
earnings of the two fishponds. There was no such stipulation. Not a shred of
documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation in the two fishponds.
The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be
proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and
uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs.
Molo-Peckson, 116 Phil. 1267, 1273).
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof.
Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be
sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much
certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot be
established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive
proof. (Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303).
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to
establish a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully
convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an
authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting

in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana
vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil. 110).
The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as
already noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy
oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be
easily fabricated.
On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the
land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens
titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for
reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and
convincing (Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. "Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of
losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).
There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on
the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust.
There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the
names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case
where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran
fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of
Valentin Salao.
And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly
barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61
SCRA 284; Quiniano vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221;
Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, 9, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs.
Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377).
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied
trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year
(Sec. 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand
for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in
1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The
plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if
they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is
watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).
"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit
in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly
when they are threatened or invaded". "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of
a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but
may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
(Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-441).

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the
reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity
of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in
the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any
successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her
nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if
living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together
with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could
not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral
line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters
whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew
excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs
Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).
The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.
Defendants' appeal. The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the
plaintiffs filed their action in good faith. The defendants contend that they are
entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing
them. They ask for P25,000 attorneys fees and litigation expenses and, in addition,
moral damages.
We hold that defemdamts' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the
plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of this case which
lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought tenaciously. They obviously incurred
considerable expenses in prosecuting their case. Although their causes of action
turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed
their claim indicate their sincerity and good faith.
There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common
ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio, and that plaintiffs'
action was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition
of the lands in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly inherited from
Manuel Salao.
Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that
plaintiffs' action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the
defendants. An award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just
and proper.
The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously
instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs.
Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra). The
instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the
Civil Code wherein moral damages may be recovered. Nor can it be regarded as
analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles.

The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject
the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. (Barreto vs.
Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771. 779).
The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that
attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in
any other case where the court deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees
should he awarded.
But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action
there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorney's
fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).
It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse
decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party
(Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O.
G. 6959).
The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando (Chairman, Second Division), J., took no part.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Diaz v Pamuti
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL,
all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of
FEDERICO
SANTERO,
et
al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

PARAS, J.:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate
of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the
corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be
appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children
of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon
Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in
1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate
Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an
Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was
allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero
by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and
Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking
part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude
Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin
"from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual
Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated
November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate
Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the
dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law
applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the
Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in
the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein)
was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984
hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of
petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or
natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral
relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural
grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to
the intestate estate of their grandmotherSimona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision
erred in mistaking the intestate estate
of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or
relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren
Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a
niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes
the
natural children of
her
son
Pablo
Santero,
who
are
her
direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the
applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9,
1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the legal heirs
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate
child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their
pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They
contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941
(Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil
Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and
inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed
and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate
children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of
their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother
of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code
which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand,
the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of
the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona

Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the
New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish
Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing
herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also
finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed
that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998.
The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis
illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp.
40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken
of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties
who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in
ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9,
1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose
Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners
herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the
proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated
December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir
of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion
for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became

final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower
court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment
has become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did
not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980
excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and
executory, hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., took no part.

Leonardo v CA
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
CRESENCIANO
LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK
OF PARAAQUE, INC.,respondents.
Porfirio C. David for petitioner.
Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner:
(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of
deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said
deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the
deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James
Bracewen
(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in
so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;

(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the
properties subject of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the
finality of this decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and
30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share
thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;
(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim.

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942
was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson,
Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her.
Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the
late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money
and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be
declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to onehalf share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent
herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes,
described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles,
and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from
the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been
made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive
ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate
child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other
defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are
now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence
of the private respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.
From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as
already stated, reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing
petitioner's complaint, reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court,
this petition for review was filed of the following assignment of errors:
I

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE

EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
HIS FILIATION.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT
GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY
REPRESENTATION.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive
properties of the private respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each
has its own distinct factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles
under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y
linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la
izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea
delRailroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918
up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija,
Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land. However,
for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because
of this, plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the
great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under
a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as follows:
. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con
la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y
Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste
con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una extension superficial de 1229.00
metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and
continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso
Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes administered
the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own
name. Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed
the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents
the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally
because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which

they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the
plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the
evidence as to the identification of the lands in question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to
Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by
adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of
the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description
fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is also located in
Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property
described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades
have already passed between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period,
many changes of abode would likely have occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and
they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28,
1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is the same, if not
Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the
plaintiff.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo
in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however
undeniable that after declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty
taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact,
forgetting that since the present petition is one for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court
in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final
and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above
exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following
findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo,
the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges

that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who
subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently
succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate
showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged
mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital
evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link
connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this
piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of
the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938
to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did
not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in
the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and
space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove
his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be
an heir in the inheritance in question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for
review in the absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by
substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the court making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child
of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the
estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the
Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not
yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.
At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this
petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.

Rosales v Rosales
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can
inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June
16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4,
1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together
with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The
trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a
widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the
Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the
estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit
by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated,
an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code
are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right
of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse)
is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision
which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by
the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude
the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir
of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply
to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of
the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v.
Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No.
3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the
estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which
is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the
deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate
of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by
the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970
and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by
law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio
Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales,

but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the
same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by
his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father,
Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary
to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is
not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.

Rodriguez v Ravilan
G.R. No. 5343

September 16, 1910

CELESTINO RODRIGUEZ, administrator, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
LUISA RAVILAN, defendant-appellant.

Martin M. Levering, for appellant.

Rodriguez and Del Rosario, for appellees.

TORRES, J.:

On November 29, 1904, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their
son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amended complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of their daughters Maximina,
Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among
other things, that many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo
of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana,
Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, surnamed Barte, and that, although
five of them divided among themselves the said property, consisting of lands
situated in the said pueblo and several carabaos, the legal portions which pertained
to four of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained undivided, and these
latter continued to possess, in common, the property that fell to their shares, and
were also associated in business separately from their other coheirs.

The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of one
parcel of agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as is usually
sown with a ganta of seed corn, bounded on the north by property of Damasa
Manlili, on the south by that of Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria
Mendoza, and on the west by that of Feliciana Barte; another parcel of agricultural
land in the barrio of Banilad of the same pueblo, of an area usually covered in
sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street that
leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio Cortes, and on the east and
west by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio Ceniza, respectively; another parcel of
land, situated in the same barrio and of and an area required for the sowing of 2
gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street leading to Talamban, on the
south by the land Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley, and on the west by the
property of Marcelo Oano.

That said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these
lands, other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo,
of an area usually sown with 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south,
east and west by property of Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo
Nuez, and Feliciano Cortes, respectively; another parcel in the same barrio, of an
area sufficient for 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the property of
Benito Cabajug, on the south by the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on the east by those
of Amadeo Elorde, and on the west by that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in
the same barrio, of sufficient area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north,
south, east and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano
Cortes, and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area
ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and
west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Mariano Cabajug, and Mariano
Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the north,
south, east, and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another
parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east,
and west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and

Anacleto Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho of

the aforesaid pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the
north, south, east and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa,
Vicente Odian, and Meliton Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of
the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of
Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose Arfon and Santiago Ortelano,
respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of Dughoy, Tabugon, of an area sown
with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by property of
Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago Ortelan, and Donato Mendoza; eleven plow
carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four head of cattle, acquired by
the community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against Laureano Soliano, secured
by a mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the pueblo of Bogo, and three
carabaos.

That the business of the said four brothers and sisters was, by common accord,
administered by one of them Espiridion Barte, and, when he died, the three
survivors remained united in their interest and the undivided property was
administered, until December, 1901, by Pedro Barte, who at his death four heirs, the
said Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, represented by their mother, Luisa
Ravilan, the wife and widow of Pedro Barte and the defendant in this suit; that the
said property, as aforesaid, was administered by Espiridion Barte, in common
accord with the others, and, he having died without leaving heirs, by force of law
the part that pertained to him passed to his brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and
Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and, by common
agreement, the said brother and sisters continued their partnership organization
and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator; that during the latter's
administration, Matea Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza,
represented by his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro
Barte, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas decided
upon the distribution of the property mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to
Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not
agree to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratix of that property, she
had to pay debts of the deceased.

That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts
having been settled, as admitted by the defendant herself, the latter was requested
to present the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do, and that she continued
in the possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without the consent
or intervention of the plaintiffs; that Jorgia Barte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of Matea
Barte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima
Barte, were then entitled to the property in question, which should be divided
among them in three equal parts, one to be allotted to Jorgia Barte, another to
Nicolas Mendoza, and the other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.

The demand further recites that the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and
therefore pray that a partition of the property, both real and personal, be decreed
and also of the profits that may have accrued thereto during the time that it was in
the possession of and usufruct enjoyed by the defendant, in accordance with the
respective rights of the parties, and that, in case that the distribution can not be
made without detriment to such rights, the property be ordered sold and the
proceeds divided among the parties. The plaintiff requested also that the costs of
the suit be assessed against the defendant.

A demurrer to the complaint was interposed, although the record does not show
how it was decided. The defendants in their answer denied all the allegations of the
amended complaint.

The case came to trial and, the testimony having been adduced by both parties, the
exhibits being attached to the record, the judge, in view of the conclusions reached
therefrom and on the date of November 4, 1907, rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, by ordering the partition of the property mentioned, in the manner and
portions expressed in the judgment, and decreeing that such partition must be
made in accordance with section 185 to 195 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with
respect to the real property, and that the five carabaos should be distributed in
three equal allotments in the manner determined for the real property. The costs
were charged to the plaintiffs and assessed against the divisible property.

Counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment and prayed for its annulment
and a new trial. The motions was overruled, to which exception was taken, and the
appellant duly presented his bill of exceptions, which was approved and forwarded
to this court.

A demand is made in the complaint for the partition of the common property held
undividedly by four brothers and sisters who formed a partnership for the use and
enjoyment of the same.

In relating the origin of a part of the property of the four brothers and sisters joined
in partnership, the plaintiffs stated that their deceased parents, Javier Barte and
Eulalia Seno, left at their death nine children, above mentioned, and property
consisting of carabaos, a credit, and lands situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and
that, their property having been divided among their nine children, that portion
thereof which corresponded to the brothers and sisters Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and
Pedro remained undivided and its owners, associated together, continued to enjoy it
and manage it in common, separately from their other brothers and sisters.

Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers
and sisters were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and
Eulalia, and are therefore their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a
lawful partition was made among their nine children, of the property left by both
spouses at their death, and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of
Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated
together, were awarded to the same. Such a partition, were it made, should appear
in an authentic document, which was not exhibited with the complaint, since article
1068 of the Civil Code provides "A division legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property which may have been awarded to him."

Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had
been shown that the Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to the four
brothers and sisters aforementioned, there would have been prima facie proof that
they were and certainly are the owners thereof.

Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding real
estate with others, in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may compel
partition thereof in the manner hereinafter prescribed."

Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for
partition shall set forth the nature and extent of the plaintiff's title and contain an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and name
each tenant in common, coparcener, or other person interested therein, as
defendants."

So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status
of a coproprietor or coowner of the property the partition of which is asked for; and
notwithstanding the fact that Jorgia Barte and the son of Matea Barte, through his
representative, aver that they are the coowners of the said Mandaue lands of others
situated in the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved their
averment by titles which establish the common ownership alleged. A mere
affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant party, representing the
four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of
the complaint.

It is true that the defendant Luisa Ravilan stated in her sworn testimony that, as the
guardian of her children, she had an interest in the lands situated in Mandaue and
that the parcels of land situated in Tabogon did not belong to her, nor to her

deceased husband, Pedro Barte; but she positively affirmed that the seven parcels
of land situated in Bogo were acquired by her said husband during his lifetime and
during his marriage with her, and she exhibited five documents, one of them the
original of a possessory information, as titles proving the ownership of her said
husband.

Against the averment of the plaintiffs appear that of the defendant, in the name of
her four daughters, the heirs of Pedro Barte, and while the plaintiff party exhibited
no title of ownership whatever, not even of the lands situated in the pueblo of Bogo
and which the defendant affirmed were acquired by her deceased husband, Pedro
Barte, during his lifetime, it is an indisputable fact that the latter's widow, who in
her own behalf and in the name of her four daughters claims the exclusive
ownership of the lands in Bogo, is at the present time in possession thereof, and
moreover showed documents which prove the acquisition of some of them. The
testimony of the defendant to the effect that she only had a share in the lands of
Mandaue, but not in those situated in Tabogon, is worthy of serious consideration,
although she positively affirmed that those situated in Bogo belonged to her
husband and to herself. As she is in possession of these lands, and as the record of
the trial shows no proof that they belonged to the joint association or partnership
existing between the said four brothers and sisters, there are no legal provisions
that would support the issuance of an order for the partition of the said lands in
Bogo, of which the widow of their alleged former owner is now in possession.

In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties
are all coowners or coproprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The
question of common ownership need not be gone into at the time of the trial, but
only how, in what manner, and in what proportion the said property of common
ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of court.

Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that
the hereditary succession of the deceased Espiridion Barte, who it is said left no
legitimate descendants at his death, should be divided among his eight brothers
and sisters who may have survived him, and in case any of these have died, the
children of his deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per
stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to the provisions of
articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which prescribes:
"Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the whole blood, the
former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes," representing their
respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the deceased.

The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir at her death,
and if she did not, her collateral relatives succeed her in the manner provided by
law.

It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the four brothers and
sisters can not affect the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the
deceased predecessor in interest successions. (Arts. 744, 763, 806, 808, 913, 946,
Civil Code.)

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the
judgment appealed from, to declare and we do hereby declare, that the partition
prayed for be denied, and to absolve, as we do hereby absolve, the defendant Luisa
Ravilan from the complaint, without special finding as to costs.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

Vda de la Rosa v Vda Damian

G.R. No. 155733

January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA.
DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA
DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO,
GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO,
CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO
CAMPO-ENCINAS
and
MELINDA
DELGADO
CAMPOMADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA
CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR.,
namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIAMIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; 1 and GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION

CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in SP Case No.
97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between
petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is
attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and
full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and
nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of
the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by one Lucio
Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado
was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all
natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life.
Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But,
unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the
benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is
in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is
crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If Ramon Osorio and
Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a
legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if
the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In
support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not
even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is

clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son
with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that
the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no
marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several
months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but
whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two
eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove
their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado
as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919
and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on
September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they
were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To
support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United
States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4,
004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States
of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore]
to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was
married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of
their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and

Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was
known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter,
his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that
status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados
obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent
as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas
identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. 20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no
interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the
authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code. 21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo
Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia.
He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children or natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition was overtaken by
his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his
sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the
children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia
Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and
Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed
the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the
"spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch
55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs
of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law
from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the
motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to
state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely
lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The
motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other
claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission
of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister,
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.27The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere
in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa
Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled
to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred
to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate
of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the
late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no
force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their
settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a
single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner
Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in
relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the
petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered
to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and
income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of
this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her

actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that
the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on
motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court
of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest
of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court
of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within
the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On
October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent
portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to
certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the
decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to
be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on
appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is
apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE,
in
view
of
the
foregoing
considerations,
the
Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial courts
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court of Appeals amended its
earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With
the
further
modification,
our
assailed
decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this
decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion
referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to
inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in
relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the
oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in
the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the
appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the
assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice
of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of
her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and
posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr.
Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and
the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which

courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified
into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn,
either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation
of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original
petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of
the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a
witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40 Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the declaration under oath of no less
than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado 43 and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 44 No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein
was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they
primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had
proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived
together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption
of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein, 46 such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if
the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of
the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be
addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. 48 On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied
on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname
Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of
Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio
and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her natural
children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X
and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they
succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood
between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab

intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that
of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are
only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the
children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different
persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding
succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full
blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of halfblood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood,
they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate,
they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new
Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor
of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court
to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not
have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves

as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of
Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 59 She, however, claimed the status
of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the
latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was
in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however,
later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition is
compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. 63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this
did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action
for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and
the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for
compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor Guillermas

right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo

Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail.
An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This
includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under
the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did
not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the
authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an
authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of
Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who
was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was
filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the
latters death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It
is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence. 68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new
Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate

estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order
of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out
the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,72a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of
Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias
hereby ANNULLED.

June

15,

1973

affidavit

of

self-adjudication

is

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of
Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados fullor half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her
estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the
identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz

(whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman
Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia
Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon
their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be
determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOPTION
Santos Iniego v RP XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Manuel v Ferrer XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Acain v IAC
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO
C.
ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108)
ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents'
(petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of
the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the

petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as

to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain
and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain
died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and
his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will
allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya
(Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner
without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G.
Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's
property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and
money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to
my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at
357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain predeceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in
Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely:
Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who
are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings
No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of
tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by
the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate
Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo,
p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157);
the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic
validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate.
The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition
of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents
who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that
mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a
share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the
case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in
violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been
pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall
he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though

mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may
not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not
in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of
the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator
has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9).
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of
the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least
their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions
which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for
they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway
for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises
having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left
by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling
the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as
already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the
will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as
an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a
devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any
gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive
(Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as
an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the
succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However,

intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has
no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and
Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v.
Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982];
Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador
Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper
remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a
case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of
Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the
Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966];
Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982];
Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals,
139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense,
plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief
that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the
will in question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by
the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute

the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing
held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of
dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge
allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared
to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its
probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will
is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January
21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters
properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the
merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the
case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as
petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled
with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or
could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before
the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v.
Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of
by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy
of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a
petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not
afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30,
1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Suarez v CA XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Teotico v Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753

March 26, 1965

VICENTE
B.
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.

TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

Antonio
Gonzales
for
petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of
Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which
she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page
thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who
in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix
and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was
possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal
pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and
that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could
freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to
Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said
spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the
naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the
legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as
her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before
the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3,
1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to
the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed
as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to
execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under
duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due
hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging,
the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico
because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last
illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its
decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the
disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the
portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way
of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion
for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the
estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as
passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration
of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr.
Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration
with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his
favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both
petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion
which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated
portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that
portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and
oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled
down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in
this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3)
Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be
vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in
a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo
The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested

party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand,
in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has
been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate
Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that
in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a
person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect
or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa
vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions
of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the
event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have
any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein
any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the
estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a coowner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building
located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the
will.1wph1.t
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such
right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil
Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose
Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of
Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her
any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to
the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And
this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our
Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy
behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called
relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the
law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts
and upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in
turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the

former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish
upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p.
110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child
of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption
is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives
of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided
for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting
parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by
law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants
and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they
may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered
as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the
adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to
other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the
children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by
Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa,
Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary
or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly
admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted
not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured
thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake
believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence
of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the
instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she
executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the
testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every
page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and

the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign
and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the
testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the
first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards
she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the
testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the
witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he
signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog.
He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at
the same time and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the
will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also
belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following
observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr.
Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was
improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the
testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see
personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to
exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951.
Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor,
yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented
the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it
did not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as
testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the
Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In
fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the
foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her
husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply
because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and
that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated
from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what
the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and
with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under
consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be
supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and
subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her
express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The

burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the
time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented
not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions
among which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine
if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."
(Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions
relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after
the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein
contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to
produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by
anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the
testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually
complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals.
(Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a
condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code
for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines
and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the
validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426,
428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a
quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must
be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why
said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene
in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the
disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be
set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that
the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the
rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.