Securing The Internet of Things: Mark Horowitz Stanford School of Engineering

Securing the Internet of
Things
Mark Horowitz
Stanford School of Engineering
It's Worse Than You Think
Secure Internet of Things
Our Goal
Embark on a 5-year research project to secure the
Internet of Things
Collaboration between Stanford, Berkeley, and Michigan
Rethink building IoT systems from the ground up
Systems, cryptography, applications, analytics, networks,

hardware, software, HCI
Data security: novel cryptography that enables
analytics on confidential data

System security: a software framework for safe
and secure IoT applications
Outline
What is the "Internet of Things"?

Why IoT security is so hard
What we plan to do about it
The Internet of Things
Internet(s) of Things
Industrial
Automation
Home Area
Networks
Personal Area
Networks
Networked
Devices
Thousands/person
Controlled Environment
High reliability
Control networks
Industrial requirements
Hundreds/person
Uncontrolled Environment
Unlicensed spectrum
Convenience
Consumer requirements
Tens/person
Personal environment
Unlicensed spectrum
Instrumentation
Fashion vs. function
Tens/person
Unlicensed spectrum
Convenience
Powered
WirelessHART, 802.15.4
6tsch, RPL
IEEE/IIC/IETF
ZigBee, Z-Wave
6lowpan, RPL
IETF/ZigBee/private
Bluetooth, BLE
3G/LTE
3GPP/IEEE
WiFi/802.11
TCP/IP
IEEE/IETF
Internet(s) of Things
Industrial
Automation
Home Area
Networks
Personal Area
Networks
Networked
Devices
Thousands/person
Controlled Environment
High reliability
Control networks
Industrial requirements
Hundreds/person
Unlicensed spectrum
Convenience
Consumer requirements
Tens/person
Personal environment
Unlicensed spectrum
Instrumentation
Fashion vs. function
Tens/person
Unlicensed spectrum
Convenience
Powered
WirelessHART, 802.15.4
6tsch, RPL
IEEE/IIC/IETF
ZigBee, Z-Wave
6lowpan, RPL
IETF/ZigBee/private
Bluetooth, BLE
3G/LTE
3GPP/IEEE
WiFi/802.11
TCP/IP
IEEE/IETF
IoT: MGC Architecture

eMbedded
devices
10

eMbedded
devices
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Gateways
11

eMbedded
devices
Cloud
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Gateways
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
12

eMbedded
devices
Cloud
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Gateways
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
User device
13

embedded C
(ARM, avr, msp430)
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
14

embedded C
(ARM, avr, msp430)
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
Obj-C/C++, Java,
Swift, Javascript/HTML 15

embedded C
(ARM, avr, msp430)
Ruby/Rails,
Python/Django,
J2EE, PHP, Node.js
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
Obj-C/C++, Java,
IoT Security is Hard

Complex, distributed systems
103-106 differences in resources across tiers

Many languages, OSes, and networks
Specialized hardware
embedded C
(ARM, avr, msp430)
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Just developing applications is hard

Securing them is even harder
Ruby/Rails,
Python/Django,
J2EE, PHP, Node.js
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
Enormous attack surface

Reasoning across hardware, software, languages, devices, etc.
What are the threats and attack models?
Obj-C/C++, Java,
Valuable data: personal, location, presence

Rush to development + hard avoid, deal later
17
What We're Going To

Do About it
18
Two Goals
1. Research and define new cryptographic
computational models for secure data analytics
and actuation on enormous streams of real-time
data from embedded systems.
2. Research and implement a secure, open source

hardware/software framework that makes it easy
to quickly build Internet of Things applications that
use these new computational models.
19
Two Kinds of Security

Data security: data collected and processed by
IoT applications remains safe
Home occupancy
Medical data
Presence/location
System security: elements of MGC architecture

are hard to compromise
eMbedded devices
Gateways
Cloud systems
End applications
20
Data Security
Security limits what you (or an attacker) can do
What do IoT applications need to do?
Generate data samples

Process/filter these samples
Analytics on streams of data, combined with historical data
Produce results for end applications to view
Goal: end-to-end security
Embedded devices generate encrypted data

Only end applications can fully decrypt and view data
Gateways and cloud operate on data without knowing what it is
21
End-to-End Security
Data
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
22
End-to-End Security
Data
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
23
End-to-End Security
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Data
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
23
End-to-End Security
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Data
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
23
End-to-End Security
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Data
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
23
End-to-End Security
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
Data
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
23
End-to-End Security
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
Data
23
End-to-End Security
ZigBee,
ZWave,
Bluetooth,
WiFi
3G/4G,
TCP/IP
Data
24
End-to-End Security
Sensing device samples data, encrypts it
Each processing stage can decrypt or operate on
encrypted data (increases storage requirements,

limits potential operations)
Possible that only end user can fully view data
data
Secure
Internet of Things
25
encrypted
encrypted
data
Homomorphic Encryption
(Gentry, 2009)
Take a sensor value S, encrypt it to be Se

It is possible to perform arbitrary computations on Se
But 1,000,000 slower than computations on S
So confidential analytics possible, but not yet practical
But can be fast for specific computations (e.g., addition)
26
New Computational Models

Is it possible for devices to compute aggregate
statistics without revealing their own data?
Youre in the 85th percentile for saving water today!

Your house consumed 120% of its average energy today
Is it possible to compute complex analytics?

Need new cryptographic computation models
Support computations that IoT applications need
)DFXOW\ZRUNLQJLQWKLVDUHD
Christopher R on analytics
Dan Boneh on cryptographic computational models
27
Two Goals
1. Research and define new cryptographic
computational models for secure data analytics
and actuation on enormous streams of real-time
data from embedded systems.
2. Research and implement a secure, open source

framework that makes it easy to quickly build
Internet of Things applications that use these new
computational models.
28
Building an Application
Write a data processing pipeline
Consists of a set of Models, describing data as it is stored

Transforms move data between Models
Instances of Models are bound to devices
Views can display Models
Controllers determine how data moves to Transforms
Sensor!
Gateway!
PC/Server!
App/Web!
Views!
Controllers!
Models and!
Transforms!
10Hz !
Sampling!
Recent!
History!
Recent!
History!
Long!
History!
Analytics,!
Suggestions!
Motion!
Activity!
Activity!
Behavior!
Health!
Alarm!
Schedule!
security and privacy !
29
Code Generation
Framework generates (working) skeleton code for
entire pipeline
All Models, Transforms, and Controllers are written in a

platform-independent language
Views are device specific (although many are HTML/JS)
Developer can modify this generated code
Framework detects if modifications violate pipeline description

E.g., data types, information leakage, encryption
Generated code compiles down to device OS/system
David Mazires: software abstractions for security
3KLO/HYLV: 5DYHO software V\VWHP
30
The Internet of Things

Networking is one of the hardest development
challenges in IoT applications
Ultra-low power protocols

Difficult link layers (4G, BLE)
Protocol stack mismatches
Data packing/unpacking
Framework handles this automatically
Novel network algorithms
Keith Winstein, reliability in challenged networks

Prabal Dutta, low power wireless
31
Software-defined Hardware
Hardware (boards, chips, power) is a daunting
challenge to software developers
It easier to modify something than create it from scratch
The data processing pipeline is sufficient
information to specify a basic embedded device
Sensors, networking, storage, processing needed
Mark Horowitz: DXWRPDWLQJFRQVWUDLQHGKDUGZDUHGHVLJQ

Prabal Dutta: embedded device design
Bjrn Hartmann: prototyping new applications
32
Making It Easy
If it's hard to use, people will work around it
Set password to "password"

Just store data in the clear
Must understand development model
Embrace modification, incorporation, low barrier to entry

Do so such that prototypes can transition to production
Bjrn Hartmann: prototyping new applications
33

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Securing the Internet of

It's Worse Than You Think

Secure Internet of Things

Collaboration between Stanford, Berkeley, and Michigan

Rethink building IoT systems from the ground up

Systems, cryptography, applications, analytics, networks,

Data security: novel cryptography that enables

analytics on confidential data

Secure Internet of Things

What is the "Internet of Things"?

Secure Internet of Things

The Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT: MGC Architecture

Secure Internet of Things

IoT Security is Hard

103-106 differences in resources across tiers

Just developing applications is hard

Enormous attack surface

Valuable data: personal, location, presence

What We're Going To

2. Research and implement a secure, open source

Secure Internet of Things

Two Kinds of Security

System security: elements of MGC architecture

Secure Internet of Things

Generate data samples

Goal: end-to-end security

Embedded devices generate encrypted data

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

Secure Internet of Things

encrypted data (increases storage requirements,

Take a sensor value S, encrypt it to be Se

But 1,000,000 slower than computations on S

So confidential analytics possible, but not yet practical

But can be fast for specific computations (e.g., addition)

Secure Internet of Things

New Computational Models

Youre in the 85th percentile for saving water today!

Is it possible to compute complex analytics?

Support computations that IoT applications need

Secure Internet of Things