AFGHANISTAN

PUBLIC POLICY
POLICY
AFGHANISTAN
PUBLIC
RESEARCH
ORGANIZATION
RESEARCH
ORGANIZATION
www.appro.org.af

Position Paper
October 2016

About APPRO:
Afghanistan Public Policy Research
Organization (APPRO) is an independent social research organization with
a mandate to promote social and
policy learning to benefit development and reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan and other less developed countries through conducting
applied research, monitoring and
evaluation, and training and mentoring. APPRO is registered with the
Ministry of Economy in Afghanistan
as a non-profit, non-government organization. APPRO is headquartered
in Kabul, Afghanistan, with offices in
Mazar-e Shrif (north), Herat (west),
Kandahar (south), Jalalabad (east),
and Bamyan (center). APPRO is also
the founding organization of APPROEurope, registered in Belgium.

Contact us:
www.appro.org.af
Email: mail@appro.org.af
Tel: +93 700 053 081
www.appro-europe.net
Email: mail@appro-europe.net
Tel: +32 2 895 36 01
Fax: +32 2 895 36 02
This and other publications by APPRO
may be downloaded from:
http://appro.org.af/briefs/

www.appro.org.af

Development Programming:
Strategic Considerations
sustainability of development efforts:
the project are short in duration,
focused mostly on inputs and some
Significant efforts have been made to
support good governance and improve outputs but not outcomes, and rigid
the situation of women in Afghanistan. on deliverables and thus disallowing
learning by doing.1 At the same
Some of these have yielded notable
time, there is increasing recognition
results: legal dispositions to support
among the development community
human rights are in place, Afghan
that approaches to programming
citizens are increasingly demanding
and implementation need to become
accountability from governing institutions, the provision and quality of infor- more flexible and adaptive, particumation has expanded, important strides larly in fragile and conflict environhave been made in access to health and ments characterized by ever changing
operating conditions.2
education (including for women) and,
to some extent, women have managed
Drawing on work by APPRO and
to secure a presence in the public
others on governance and gender
space.
mainstreaming, this brief outlines
propositions for programming in good
However, Afghanistans entrance into
governance, gender mainstreaming,
the Decade of Transformation has
been marred by a heightening sense of and the broader approach to development in Afghanistan for the coming
uncertainty and significant increases
years.
in insecurity and instability. For future
programming in Afghanistan it will
be crucial to draw lessons from past
development performance and build on 1 See, among others, APPRO (2014), A Critical Assessexisting gains, while learning from the
ment of NAPWA, available from: http://appro.org.
past failures. This is particularly the case af/a-critical-assessment-of-napwa/, APPRO (2015),
Monitoring Womens Security in Transition Cycle 5,
for issues pertaining to good goveravailable from: http://appro.org.af/women-in-transinance and gender, both major areas of tion-cycle-5-findings-2/, and BAAG (2013), Getting it
Right: Examining Gender Programming in Afghanistan
development aid and both requiring
(London: BAAG), available from: http://appro.org.af/
generational change and prolonged,
examining-gender-programming-in-afghanistan-2/,
Abirafeh, L. (2005), Lessons From Gender-focused
sustained attention.

Background

Recent studies have shown time

and again that the current system
of programming, funding and
monitoring is inadequate to ensure the

International Aid in Post-Conflict Afghanistan

Learned? (NS: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung); and Kandiyoti,
D. (2005), The Politics of Gender Reconstruction in Afghanistan, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development).
2 DFID and the World Bank have been advocating for
such programming since 2012.

1. Good governance
There have been major accomplishments in
programming on governance, particularly
the establishment of sub-national structures and the creation of IDLG. There have
also been a number of legislative measures
to formalize arrangements for elections at
the national and sub-national levels, access
to information, and anti-corruption as key
elements of good governance. However, at
the less formal level and in practice, most of
the key elements of good governance such
as accountability, transparency, rule of law,
responsiveness, inclusivity, effectiveness,
efficiency, and participation have been weak
or missing.3 There is systemic corruption,
government officials have not yet acquired
a culture of serving the public, the public
does not know its rights to government
services or dares not to demand them, and
service delivery by governmental entities in
all sectors remains insufficient and largely
inadequate. In addition, sub-national government entities lack the necessary authority
and legitimacy to be responsive to the
publics needs while the rule of law remains
lacking in most of the country.

Increasing Government Revenues

through Combating Corruption: The
current APPRO project on anti-corruption
and good governance, funded by the
EU Delegation to Afghanistan, is aimed
at increasing the accountability of the
Revenue Department of the Ministry of
Finance through enhancing the technical
capacity of civil society and the private
sector to hold the government accountable and protect non-government actors
that wish to resist extortion from corrupt
government officials. APPROs anti-corruption should be viewed as only a first
step in this regard. Based on the findings
from this project, commencing from
around July 2016, future programming
possibilities need to be explored in close
consultation with stakeholders identified
through APPROs anti-corruption project.

Political Economy of Customs: An

estimated 50 percent of the potential revenue for the government from
customs operations is not being collected
due to an intricate system of bribe
payment by traders and bribe taking
by customs officials, despite the highly
modernized ASYCUDA system, one of the
most sophisticated in the region. A key
Proposed Areas of Intervention
challenge is to remove cash payments
from the system. This can be done
Anti-corruption
through conducting a political economy
assessment of the customs system,
To date, international donors and governresulting in such measures as digitization
ments have focused their efforts on curbing
of all customs transactions and in-depth
corruption within the Government of
understanding of the network of individAfghanistan and significant formal sectors
uals involved in maintaining bribe taking
such as banks. The main instruments in these
in order to manage and control them.
efforts have been legislation, regulatory
reform, removal of some of the most corrupt
Legal Literacy: Bribes are widely used to
individuals, and setting up anti-corruption
secure access to services in public health,
bodies such as GIAA and HOO. These intereducation, public utilities (electricity, land
ventions have largely failed due mainly to
titling, birth certificates/taskaras, and
neglecting the significant roles played by
passports), and formal justice. Possible
the general public, private sector, and interinterventions in this area include the
national donors in either failing to combat
utility of the recently passed Access to
corruption or perpetuating corruption by
Information Law obliging all government
corrupt or corruptive practices. Rather than
entities to provide details on their activfocusing exclusively on the most visible tip of
ities and services to the public. Each
the iceberg, effectiveness in anti-corruption
area of service provision needs to be
initiatives requires prolonged and concerted
mapped and analyzed prior to designing
interventions at all levels of society and
interventions to bring corruption in
government institutions. Specific areas of
service delivery under control. Additional
intervention on anti-corruption under the
capacity for civil society and private
theme of good governance include:
sector actors on legislative provisions,
3 See, for example, Good Governance Guide: Helping Local
through training and mentoring, will
Governments Govern Better, available from: http://www.
goodgovernance.org.au/about-good-governance/what-isenable these actors to counter corruption
good-governance/

and hold the government accountable

and thereby enforcing the rule of law.
Legitimacy of Sub-National Governance
Numerous efforts have been made by the
Afghan government, policy makers and
donors since the adoption of the new
Constitution in 2003 to expand and improve
sub-national governance structures and
processes. These include the relatively recent
Sub-National Governance Policy (SNGP) in
2010. Weak rule of law, increased tensions
due to diminishing security, and a lack of
coordination between and among funding
and administrative bodies have undermined
effectiveness in the functioning of governance at sub-national levels. The multitude
of local government formal structures were
put in place, mostly, in competition to pre-existing traditional structures.
With increases in insecurity and prevalent corruption among formal officials, the
pre-existing structures are increasing being
utilized by the general public in dispute
resolution and pursuit of justice. At the
district level in particular, there are wide
disparities in the presence and attributions
of governance bodies, none of which have
sufficient powers or independence to hold
the executive to account or to adequately
undertake their duties. Possible interventions include supporting decentralization
efforts by the government to provide provincial and district level authorities with the
necessary resources, technical capacity, and
thus increased legitimacy to respond more
effectively to the needs of citizens. The political impetus for such interventions is much
higher under the Unity Government than its
predecessor.
E-governance and Civic Technology

Fact checking platforms, for instance, have

received wide acclaim as successful means to
check the truthfulness of politicians claims
and performance through the involvement of
ordinary citizens, journalists, and academia.6
In Afghanistan, the persistent disconnection between legislative bodies and citizens
has adversely affected the legitimacy of
representative institutions. The public has
limited access to reliable information on
the workings of the institutions through
which it is governed. As a result, trust in
the democratic process and the purpose
of electoral voting has been damaged by
repeatedly broken promises. Representative
bodies are further perceived by the public as
riddled with corruption and aloof from their
constituencies. The unprecedented growth of
information and communication technology
in Afghanistan since 2001, particularly among
the youth, has resulted in the emergence of
a wide range of initiatives to build on this
momentum, though with mixed results.7
There is growing opportunity for technology
based initiatives and interventions to not
only monitor democratic processes, but also
to follow up on the commitments made by
elected representatives.

2. Gender
On June 30, 2015 Afghanistan adopted its
National Action Plan on Women, Peace
and Security (WPS) to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent
resolutions. This represents both a significant
opportunity, and a challenge, with the risk
of WPS becoming yet another box to tick to
meet donor requirements without effective changes in approach and end with the
same fate as the National Action Plan for the
Women and Afghanistan (NAPWA).

Though significant strides have been made by

E-governance can be used as an instrument
and for women in Afghanistan since 2001,
of administrative efficiency and accountthe implementation of gender mainstreaming
ability. Research on good governance has
strategies and policies by the international
demonstrated the effectiveness (and desirMonitor in Iran, Parliamentary Watch in Yemen, Vouli Watch
ability) of online and digital technologies in
in Greece, Questionnez Vos Elus in France, Marsad in Tunisia,
directly engaging citizens in parliamentary
Mein Parlament in Austria, Abgeordnetenwatch in Germany,
proceedings and increasing political perforamong others.
mance and accountability.4 The use of civic
6 Cf. https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/fact-checktechnology in good governance has expanded ing-project/dont-fade-away-fact-checking-continue-yearevery-year/; http://knightfoundation.org/press-room/
rapidly, generating a variety of innovations.5
press-release/fact-checking-medium-politifact-examine-polit4 See, for example: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
techtank/posts/2015/04/20-civic-technology
5 Some of these include They Work for You in the UK, Majlis

ical-/; http://www.poynter.org/2013/researchers-find-politicians-may-fear-fact-checkers/225330/
7 Such initiatives include www.baztabaf.com, http://sadroz.
af/, and http://govmeter.tolonews.com/

donors has consistently fallen short of

meeting their objectives.8 Several reports
have pointed to the lack of understanding of
the concept of gender and of the process of
gender mainstreaming in Afghanistan within
the donor community and among implementing organizations.9 As a result, many of
the myriad of gender policies of the international donors and their Afghan institutional
counterparts have remained superficial and
on-paper-only statements.
In many instances the inclusion of a gender
perspective in programming, a consistent
requirement by the donors, has not gone
beyond being a mere item to tick on the
checklist used for releasing development
funds. That said, despite the disconnect
between women-centred policy objectives at the formal level and programming outcomes at the practical level, by
all accounts the situation of women in
Afghanistan has improved significantly since
2001. There remain numerous opportunities for women to assume a more visible
and empowered presence in Afghan society
including in business, politics, and society at
large.

Proposed Areas of Intervention

Shift Focus from Gender Highlighting to
Gender Mainstreaming: A major concern
in several reports on women in Afghanistan
is the lingering misunderstanding of what
gender mainstreaming entails.10 Gender
mainstreaming has been consistently
equated with womens rights activism,
which, while an integral component of
gender mainstreaming in patriarchal
societies such as Afghanistan, is only one
of its key elements. This approach has
been described as women highlighting.11 Understanding and applying gender
mainstreaming at all levels is therefore
essential to sustain gain made in gender
8 For a critical self assessment confirming this, see, for example, Norad (2012), Evaluation of Norwegian Development
Cooperation with Afghanistan (2001 2011).
9 See, for example, AREU (2013), Womens Rights, Gender
Equality, and Transition : Security Gains, Moving Forward,
(Kabul: AREU); Wordsworth, A. (2008), Moving to the
Mainstream: Integrating Gender in Afghanistans National
Policy, (Kabul: AREU); Abirafeh, L. (2005), Lessons From
Gender-focused International Aid in Post-Conflict Afghanistan Learned?, (Firedrich Ebert Stiftung); and Kandiyoti,
D. (2005), The Politics of Gender Reconstruction in Afghanistan, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development).
10 See, for example, Wordsworth, A. (2008).
11 Abirafeh, L. (2005).

relations. The focus of this intervention

should be the recognition of gains made by
and for women in basic rights while actively
pursuing possibilities of building on these
gains, improving the quality of the conditions of women, and taking practical steps
to institutionalize womens place in Afghan
society through a mix of training/mentoring,
business opportunities, and involvement in
politics.
Include Men and Boys in Gender
Mainstreaming: Social rights violations are
experienced by men as well as women while
sexual abuse targets young boys as well as
young girls. The promotion of gender equality
through various interventions must be cognizant of these facts. To date, though acknowledged in general discussions, the inclusion
of men and boys in gender programming
remains minimal, symbolic, or poorly formulated. Integrated approaches to gender
mainstreaming must include a stock taking
of not only Afghan perceptions of gender
relations but also of the experts charged
with the delivery of donor-supported gender
program components.
Move From Flag-waving To Constructive
Advocacy: While rights activism is and should
be an integrated component of advocacy,
advocacy must also have elements of engagement and awareness changing through
dialogue, incentives, and education.12
More effort needs to be put into providing
technical assistance for the many Afghan
civil society organizations that advocate on
womens issues to ensure that their efforts
result in increased dialogue with governmental decision making bodies, rather than
simply widening the gap between civil society
and government on womens issues.
Learn from Other Contexts: Despite an
important body of work on gender programming and its shortcomings in Afghanistan,
little attention has been paid to gender
mainstreaming initiatives in other Islamic
societies. Lessons could be drawn from the
Tunisian experience, for example, or the
relatively long history of how Iranian women
have approached mainstreaming themselves
in all facets of Iranian society. Exchange visits
between Afghan and Iranian women (particularly with the recent thawing in relations
12 See, for example, APPRO (2013), Gender Screaming versus
Gender Mainstreaming in Afghanistan, available from: http://
appro.org.af/blog/gender-screaming-versus-gender-mainstreaming-in-afghanistan/ and BAAG (2014).

between Iran and the world) and between

Afghan women and Tunisian womens and
Tunisian civil society organizations are
likely to prove beneficial in legitimizing and
strengthening Afghan womens efforts to
overcome the many barriers to their rightful
place in society.

3. Redefine Approach to
Development in Afghanistan
To overcome challenges posed by the
volatility of the Afghan context, approaches
to development planning and implementation need to be rethought, incorporating
lessons learned from the past and from
other contexts.

Proposed Areas of Intervention

Ground Interventions in Applied,
Contextual Research: In fast changing
environments such as Afghanistan, no
assessment or study should be viewed as
the final, definitive take on the situation
being targeted for programming intervention. Also because of the rapid pace of
change, focus should be divided between
monitoring (based on carefully defined and
tested indicators) and in-depth research.
Monitoring findings should guide all
in-depth research to ensure that research
findings have practical implications for
development programming.
Monitor Outcomes: There is an urgent
need to develop robust monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms, incorporating both
quantitative and qualitative techniques, by
international donors to ensure the effectiveness of their interventions. The vast majority
of the relatively few evaluations of donor
programs in Afghanistan have been carried
out by professional international businesses
with little or no knowledge of the context of
Afghanistan or, perhaps, development aid
programming. Inevitably, these evaluations
have focused on inputs and outputs, since
the evaluators have had little or no access to
reliable outcome information. More systematic use should be made of working with
local partners with capacity to evaluate and
monitor.
Strengthen Local Implementing Partners:
The bulk of development aid funds are
channelled through large inter- and
multi-national development aid businesses.
5

Relatively very little of these funds are

granted directly to local partners because
local partners do not offer turn-key
solutions to the large, multi-faceted problems
international donors wish to address. There
is reasonably widespread awareness among
the donors that the large development
businesses have to rely on local partners
to implement the many large, multi-faceted programs the receive funding for.
Local partners receive a fraction of these
funds and little or no other support since
the large development businesses are fully
focused on the bottom line and minimization of costs. Granting larger funds to a large
number of suitably qualified local partners
does increase the workload of the donors
in terms of oversight, administration, and
management. However, if the intent is leave
something behind in terms of capacity and
increase longer term sustainability of interventions, ways must be found by the donors
to work directly with reliable and tested local
partners.
Conudct Full, Rather Than Symbolic,
Consultation with Relevant Local
Stakeholders: Carefully managed consultation to draw out intervention opportunities
would go a long way in ensuring practical
program designs and positive intervention
outcomes. Successful development interventions are often products of in-depth
contextual knowledge and close collaboration
with local civil society organizations, both of
which could be realized through co-thinking
development plans with local partners. This
approach is likely to result in better program
designs while increasing the technical
capacity and stake of local civil society
organizations.
Couple Training with Mentoring: One-time
training sessions, a popular form of input in
numerous funded proposals, yield little or
no result when delivered by context insensitive experts no matter how qualified and
not followed up with ongoing mentoring to
ensure that learning from training is being
applied by the trained. All future awareness
and technical capacity training interventions
should consider incorporating mentoring
as an integrated component of capacity
building.
Learn by Doing: In a context where political
realities and conflict dynamics are constantly
changing, programs need to be flexible

enough to allow for the incorporation of

new learning into planning for the implementation of the remainder of an ongoing
program.
Pilot First, Implement Later: To avoid
unforeseen risks, and ensure intervention
effectiveness, thought should be given
to piloting of project / program ideas as
standard practice.
Maximize Synergy: All efforts should be
made not to create silos among CSOs in
Afghanistan. Consultations on womens
issues should include other CSOs whose
primary focus is not womens issues. The
same argument applies to including health
or education or justice CSOs in discussions of
corruption.

Reduce Paperwork, Focus on Delivery

and Impact: Many international development businesses have dedicated specialists
6

for filling in complicated proposal forms.

Very few local civil society organizations
in Afghanistan have this skill and cannot
compete with a fully salaried professional
who has limitless time and resources to learn
about completing complicated
proposals. To remove this barrier to free and
fair competition, thought should be given to
simplifying formal procedures and reporting
requirements. Rigid, and badly designed,
funding application forms are excruciatingly
difficult to fill out for countless national
CSOs, sometimes resulting in a good proposal
not being considered on the account of
failing to follow through the myriad of procedures, sections and sub-sections that need to
be filled out.