Multilateralism The Anatomy of An Institution

Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution
Author(s): John Gerard Ruggie

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 561-598
Published by: The MIT Press
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Multilateralism:theanatomy
of an institution JohnGerardRuggie
In 1989,peacefulchange,whicha leadingrealisttheoristhad declared a very

event in internationalpolitics less than a decade before,1
low-probability
accommodatedthemostfundamentalgeopoliticalshiftof thepostwarera and
perhaps of the entire twentiethcentury:the collapse of the Soviet East
European empireand the attendantend of the cold war. Many factorswere
responsibleforthatshift.But thereseems littledoubt thatmultilateralnorms
and institutionshave helped stabilize theirinternationalconsequences. Inrole in the
appear to be playinga significant
deed, suchnormsand institutions
in
the world
and
changes
of
global
regional
of
a
broad
array
management
systemtoday.
multilateral
groupingsare involvedin
In Europe,byone countat leastfifteen
The
Community(EC) is
European
the
collective
destiny.2
shaping continent's
of a common
and
increasingly
relations
of
economic
anchor
the undisputed
want
countries
East
And
the
former
European
in
the
West.
vision
political
EC
a
that
the
to
the
fate
goal
EC,
their
economic
much
as
to
tie
so
nothing
This articlewas prepared as the backgrounddiscussionpaper forthe Ford FoundationWest
Several otherpapers preparedforthatworkshopare being
Coast Workshopon Multilateralism.
and theentiresetwillbe presented
publishedin thisand otherissuesofIntemationalOrganization,
Form
Matters.The Theoryand Praxisofan Institutional
in JohnGerard Ruggie,ed., Multilateralism
I thanktheFord Foundationformakingthe
Press,forthcoming).
(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
of CaliforniaInstituteon Global Conflictand Cooperationfor
projectpossibleand the University
it. I am also verygratefulto the otherparticipantsin the workshopforprovingthat
orchestrating
cooperationunderanarchyis notonlyfeasiblebut can also be mutuallyprofitableand
multilateral
fun;to Robert0. Keohane forhis extensiveand helpfulcritiquesof an earlierdraftof thisarticle,
whichforcedme to rethinkand clarifyseveralkey issues; to Ernst B. Haas forhis constructive
comments;and to David Auerswaldforresearchassistance.
Press,
1. See RobertGilpin,Warand Changein WorldPolitics(New York: CambridgeUniversity
1981), p. 15: "Although. .. peaceful adjustmentof the systemicdisequilibriumis possible, the
historyhas been war,or whatwe shall call hegemonic
principalmechanismof changethroughout
war (i.e., a warthatdetermineswhichstateor stateswillbe dominantand willgovernthesystem)."
2. See William M. Clarke, "The Midwivesof the New Europe," CentralBanker 1 (Summer
1990), pp. 49-51; and Bruce Stokes,"ContinentalShift,"NationalJoumal,nos. 33 and 34, August
1990,pp. 1996-2001.
46, 3, Summer1992
IntemationalOrganization
? 1992 bytheWorldPeace Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
562 InternationalOrganization
membershave facilitatedthroughthe creation of the European Bank for
Reconstructionand Developmentand, in some cases, throughthe prospectof
associationagreements.Yet the authorof anotherinfluentialrealisttreatise
publisheda decade ago gave the EC onlya fewfleetingreferences-and then
only to argue that it would never amount to much in the international
"structure"unlessittookon theformof a unifiedstate,whichitshowsno signs
of doingevennow.3
In the realm of European securityrelations,the centralpolicyissue of the
day concerns the adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to the new European geopolitical realities and the question of
whethersupplementary
indigenousWest European or all European multilateral securitymechanismsshouldbe fashioned.4The SovietUnion, contraryto
mostpredictions,posed no obstacles to German reunification,
bettingthata
united Germanyfirmly
embedded in a broader Westerninstitutional
matrix
would pose far less of a securitythreatthan a neutral Germanytuggedin
different
directionsin the center of Europe.5 But perhaps the most telling
indicatorof institutional
bitein Europe todayis theproverbialdog thathas not
barked:no one in anypositionof authority
anywhereis advocating,or quietly
preparingfor,a returnto a systemof competitivebilateralalliances-which
surelyis the firsttime that this has happened at any comparable historical
juncturesincetheCongressofVienna in 1815.6
3. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theoryof International
Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1979),especiallythereferencesto a unitedEurope on p. 180 and the discussionon pp. 201-2.
4. Moreover,Hungaryand Czechoslovakiahave alreadyjoined theCouncilofEurope, and both
have raisedthe issue of forgingsome typeof affiliation
withNATO. See "Prague CourtsNATO,"
LosAngelesTimes,19 March 1991,p. Ml.
5. Mearsheimerand otherswho discountthe efficacy
of institutions
have drawndire inferences
fromthe end of the cold war forthe futureof European stability.In contrast,Snyder,Van Evera,
and otherswho take institutions
seriouslyhave been muchmoreproneto see an adaptivepolitical
orderahead. See JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instability
in Europe Afterthe Cold
War," IntemationalSecurity15 (Summer1990), pp. 5-56; JackSnyder,"AvertingAnarchyin the
New Europe," IntemationalSecurity
14 (Spring1990), pp. 5-41; and StephenVan Evera, "Primed
forPeace: Europe AftertheCold War,"IntemationalSecurity
15 (Winter1990-91),pp. 7-57.
6. In 1989, accordingto Weber, "some foreignpolicythinkersin Paris revertedto old ideas,
suggestinga new alliance withPoland, the emergingEastern European states,and perhaps the
SovietUnion as well in oppositionto Germany.These flirtations
withbilateraltreatiesand a new
balance of power have been mostlyleftby the wayside."See Steve Weber,"SecurityAfter1989:
The FuturewithNuclear Weapons," in PatrickGarrity,
ed., TheFutureofNuclearWeapons(New
York: Plenum Press, forthcoming).
By comparablehistoricaljunctures,I mean 1848, 1919, and
1945.After1848,whatwas leftof the Concertof Europe systemrapidlydegeneratedintoa system
of competitivealliances; afterWorldWar I, France in particularsoughtthe protectionofbilateral
alliances against Germany;and afterWorld War II, several West European countriessought
bilateralallianceswiththe United States and withone another.Amongthe usefulsourcesforthe
twoearlierperiodsare the following:Rene Albrecht-Carrie,
A DiplomaticHistoryofEuropeSince
the Congressof Vienna (New York: Harper & Row, 1958); E. H. Carr, IntemationalRelations
BetweentheTwo WorldWars(New York: St. Martin'sPress,1961); HenryW. Degenhardt,Treaties
and Alliancesof the World,3d ed. (Essex: Longmans,1981); and A. J. P. Taylor,The Struggle
for
Mastery
ofEurope,1848-1918(New York: OxfordUniversity
Press,1971).
Multilateralism 563
Securityrelationsin the Asia-Pacificregionmake the same points in the
negative.In the immediatepostwarperiod, it was not possible to construct
in thisregion.Today,theabsence of such
frameworks
multilateralinstitutional
inhibitsprogressiveadaptationto fundamentalglobalshifts.The
arrangements
United States and Japan are loath to raise serious questions about their
anachronisticbilateraldefensetreaty,forexample,out of fearof unravelinga
arms races throughoutthe region.In
fragilestabilityand therebytriggering
the multitude
Asia-Pacific,thereis no EC and no NATO to have transformed
of regional securitydilemmas,as has been done in Europe with FrancoGermanrelations,forexample.Indeed no Helsinki-likeprocessthroughwhich
to begin the minimaltask of mutualconfidencebuildingexistsin the region.7
politicsin
Thus,whereastodaythepotentialto movebeyondbalance-of-power
itstraditionalformexistsin Europe, a reasonablystablebalance is thebestthat
one can hope to achievein theAsia-Pacificregion.8
At the level of the global economy,despite sometimesnear-hysterical
breakupand tradewars
monetary
yearsnowofimminent
predictionsfortwenty
thatcould become real wars, "just like in the 1930s,"9the rate of growthin
worldtrade continuesto exceed the rate of growthin worldoutput;international capital flows dwarf both; and the eighth periodic round of trade
pronounceddead, is movingtoward
whichhad been prematurely
negotiations,
issues
domesticand newtransnational
difficult
completion-thistimeinvolving
that the originatorsof the regimenever dreamed would become subject to
internationalrules. And despite considerable tension between them, the
United States and Japan continue,in Churchill'sphrase,to "jawjaw" rather
than"war-war"overtheirfundamentaltradedifferences.10
Limited multilateralsuccesses can be found even in the global security
Many responsible
realm. One is in the area of nuclear nonproliferation.
and policyanalystsin the 1960spredictedthatbythe 1980stherewould
officials
7. Some proposals along these lines are offeredby StuartHarrisin " 'Architecturefora New
Era' in Asia/Pacific,"PacificResearch3 (May 1990),pp. 8-9.
8. Latin America seems to fall somewherein between.Accordingto one recentassessment,
"While the United States was ignoringand underminingmultilateralismin the Western
hemisphere,theLatinAmericannationsthemselveswere movingtowardsgreaterco-operation,or
concertacion,
as theycall it,to some degree as a responseto United States policy."See RichardJ.
Bloomfieldand Abraham F. Lowenthal,"Inter-AmericanInstitutionsin a Time of Change,"
Joumal45 (Autumn1990),p. 868.
Intemational
9. This refrainwas begun by C. Fred Bergstenin "The New Economics and U. S. Foreign
50 (January1972), pp. 199-222. For a recentrendition,see "Echoes of the
Policy,"ForeignAffairs
1930s,"TheEconomist,5 January1991,pp. 15, 16,and 18.
10. On recent developmentsin the General Agreementon Tariffsand Trade (GATT), see
Gilbert R. Winham,"GATT and the InternationalTrade Regime," IntemationalJoumal 45
(Autumn1990), pp. 796-882. One real problemis thatthe varietyof extanttrade arrangements
and thatno new consensus
todayis well beyondthe scope of the traditionalGATT terminology
existsaboutwhattypesof unilateral,bilateral,and othermeasuresare compatibleor incompatible
withthe underlyingmultilateralcharacterof GATT. This gives added relevanceto the typeof
I am proposinghere.
conceptualclarification
existsome twodozen nuclearweapons states.1"As it has turnedout,however,
the total set of actual and potentialproblemstatestodayconsistsof onlyhalf
that number.Accordingto a formerofficialof the U.S. Arms Control and
DisarmamentAgency and an analystat the Lawrence LivermoreNational
treaty(NPT)
Laboratory,this is at least in part due to the nonproliferation
initiativehas turnedout to be much
regime:"Virtuallyeverynonproliferation
thanexpectedwhenitwas proposedor designed,and nonprolifmoreeffective
eration success has been cheaper than expected. The fact that the nuclear
proliferation
problemhas been 'bounded'bytheNPT regimemeansthatpolicy
can be focusedon a handfulof states.'"12
initiatives
Moreover,afteryearsof being rivetedby the cold war,the United Nations
(UN) has been rediscoveredto have utilityin internationalconflictmanagement: its figleafrole proved useful in Afghanistan,and its decolonization
functionaided Namibia. It servesas one means bywhichto tryto disentangle
regionalmorasses fromCambodia to the WesternSahara. And perhaps of
greatestimportanceforthenew,post-coldwar era, thepostureadoptedbythe
UN SecurityCouncilto sanctionIraq foritsinvasionand annexationof Kuwait
constitutedthe organization'smostcomprehensive,
firm,and unitedresponse
everto an act of international
aggression.13
Seen throughthe lenses of conventionaltheoriesof internationalrelations,
which attributeoutcomes to the underlyingdistributionof politicalor ecoin the
nomicpower,the rolesplayedbynormativeconstraintsand institutions
must seem paradoxical. Norms and
currentinternationaltransformation
institutions
do notmattermuchin thatliteratureto beginwith;theyare viewed
as by-products
of,ifnot epiphenomenaladjunctsto, the relationsof forceor
therelationsofproduction.Whatis more,insofaras theconventionalliterature
in the international
has anyexplanationat all of extensiveinstitutionalization
system,the so-called theoryof hegemonicstabilityis it. But in additionto all
the other historicaland logical problemsfromwhich that theorysuffers,14
11. Regardingthese predictions,see MitchellReiss, Without
theBomb: The PoliticsofNuclear
Nonproliferation
Press,1988),pp. 3-36.
and Nuclear
12. See Thomas W. Graham and A. F. Mullins,"ArmsControl,MilitaryStrategy,
Proliferation,"
paper presentedat a conferenceentitled"Nuclear Deterrenceand Global Security
in Transition,"Instituteon Global Conflictand Cooperation,Universityof California,La Jolla,
21-23 February1991,p. 3. As Graham and Mullinspointout, stateshave leftthe "problem"list
more rapidlythan theyhave joined it in recentyears. See also JosephF. Pilat and Robert E.
Pendley,eds.,Beyond1995: TheFutureoftheNPTRegime(New York: PlenumPress,1990).
13. As Heisbourghas suggested,it is also quite possible,thoughdifficult
to prove,that"without
the decisionsof the U. N. SecurityCouncil, therewould have been no [international]coalition
capable ofweatheringclose to seven monthsof crisisand war [and] the U. S. Congresswould not
have approvedoffensivemilitaryoperationsin the absence of the SecurityCouncil's Resolution
678,whichauthorizedthe use of force."See FrancoisHeisbourg,"An Eagle Amid Less Powerful
Fowl,"LosAngelesTimes,10 March 1991,p. M5.
14. See Robert0. Keohane, "The TheoryofHegemonicStabilityand Changesin International
Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson,and Alexander L.
George, eds., Change in the IntemationalSystem(Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1980), pp.
Multilateralism 565
merelyfindingthe hegemonyto whichthe currentarrayof regionaland global
institutionalroles could be ascribed is a daunting,if not insurmountable,
challenge.
mattercomes as no surpriseto the"new
The factthatnormsand institutions
in internationalrelations;afterall, thathas long been their
institutionalists"
message.15But, curiously,theyhave paid littleexplicitand detailed analytic
institutional
arrangements:
attentionto a core featureof currentinternational
theirmultilateralform.A literaturesearchkeyedon the conceptof multilaterfewentries,and onlya tinynumberoftheseare of any
alismturnsup relatively
relationstheorist.The focusofthenewinstitutioninterestto theinternational
alists has been on "cooperation" and "institutions"in a genericsense, with
internationalregimesand formalorganizationssometimesconceived as specificinstitutional
subsets.16For example,no scholarhas contributedmore to
in internationalrelationsthan RobertKeohane. Yet
the new institutionalism
in hiswork,even in a literature
is used sparingly
theconceptofmultilateralism
thathe employsis
of multilateralism
surveyon thatsubject.And the definition
purelynominal:"the practiceof co-ordinatingnationalpolicies in groupsof
threeor morestates."17
The nominaldefinition
of multilateralism
maybe usefulforsome purposes.
But it poses the problemof subsuminginstitutionalformsthat traditionally
have been viewed as being expressionsof bilateralism,not multilateralisminstancesof the Bismarckianalliance system,forexample,such as the League
131-62; ArthurA. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain,the United States,and the
38 (Spring1984),pp. 355-86; Duncan
InternationalEconomicOrder,"IntemationalOrganization
39 (Autumn1985),
Snidal,"The LimitsofHegemonicStabilityTheory,"IntemationalOrganization
pp. 579-614; and JohnA. C. Conybeare,Trade Wars: The Theoryand Practiceof Intemational
Press,1987).
CommercialRivalry(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
15. I mean to includeherebothstrandsof theorizingidentifiedbyKeohane: the rationalistand
the reflectivist.
See Robert 0. Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions:Two Approaches,"Intema32 (December 1988),pp. 379-96.
tionalStudiesQuarterly
Press,
Regimes(Ithaca, N. Y.: CornellUniversity
16. See StephenD. Krasner,ed., Intemational
1983); KennethA. Oye, ed., CooperationUnderAnarchy(Princeton,N. J.: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1986); and Robert 0. Keohane, AfterHegemony(Princeton,N. J.: PrincetonUniversity
Press,1984).
Joumal
An Agenda forResearch,"Intemational
17. See Robert0. Keohane, "Multilateralism:
and definingit in this
the conceptof multilateralism
45 (Autumn1990), p. 731. Afterintroducing
in thegenericsense. See
institutions
manner,Keohane essentiallygoes on to discussinternational
also Keohane,AfterHegemony,in whichthereare but twofleetingreferencesto multilateralism,
and State Power
both to specificagreementsin trade; and Keohane, IntemationalInstitutions
in itsindex.
(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1989),whichcontainsno entryundermultilateralism
I mustadmitthatthese criticismsapplyas well to myown writingson the subjectof institutions.
Keohane has kindlyreferredto a 1975 paper of mine as having"foreshadowedmuch of the
conceptualwork of the next decade." Alas, it also foreshadowedthis blind spot, havingbeen
organizationfromthe studyof
withdifferentiating
the studyof international
concernedprimarily
formalinternationalorganizations-hence, the introductionof the concept of "regimes." See
Keohane, "Multilateralism,"p. 755, fn. 44, referringto Ruggie, "InternationalResponses to
29 (Summer1975),pp. 557-83.
Technology:Conceptsand Trends,"IntemationalOrganization
of the ThreeEmperors. In short,the nominal definitionof multilateralism
missesthequalitativedimensionofthephenomenonthatmakesit distinct.18
In a superb discussionof this issue, attemptingto sort out the enormous
varietyoftraderelationsin theworldtoday,WilliamDiebold insistsforstarters
on the need to distinguishbetween"formal"and "substantive"multilateralism,by whichhe means roughlywhat I mean by nominalversusqualitative.
"But thatis farfromtheend ofthematter.The bilateralagreementsofCordell
fromthoseof Hjalmar Schacht."19That is to say,
Hull were basicallydifferent
the issue is not the numberof partiesso much,Diebold suggests,as it is the
kind of relationsthat are institutedamong them. It is this substantiveor
that concernsme in the present
qualitativecharacteristicof multilateralism
dimensionofinternational
essay,notonlyfortradebutalso fortheinstitutional
relationsin general.
bytheconceptsof
Nor is themissingqualitativedimensioncapturedentirely
organizations.There are instances
regimesor intergovernmental
international
of internationalregimesthatwere not multilateralin form,such as the Nazi
As for
trade and monetaryregimes,to whichwe will returnmomentarily.
all
multilateralformalorganizations,althoughtheyentailno analyticmystery,
practitionersof the new institutionalismagree that these organizations
constituteonlyone small part of a broader universeof internationalinstitutionalformsthatinterestthem.
comesinto
immediately
The missingqualitativedimensionofmultilateralism
discourse,one informed
focus,however,ifwe returnto an olderinstitutionalist
order.
theinternational
bythepostwaraimsoftheUnitedStatesto restructure
When we speak here of multilateralismin internationaltrade, we know
thatit refersto tradeorganizedon thebasis of certainprinciples
immediately
Similarly,when we speak
of state conduct-above all, nondiscrimination.20
in securityrelations,we know that it refersto some
here of multilateralism
And when
expressionor otherof collectivesecurityor collectiveself-defense.21
PresidentGeorge Bush todayenunciatesa "new worldorder" forthe Middle
18. In the UN context,what Keohane defines as multilateralis called multinational-for
example,themultinational
(non-UN) observerteamin theSinai. In theUN, onlythatis considered
multilateralwhich is duly authorizedby a multilateralforum.But if Keohane's definitionis
as I discusslaterin myarticle.
too loose, theUN conceptionis too limiting,
analytically
19. See William Diebold, Jr.,"The Historyand the Issues," in William Diebold, Jr.,ed.,
and Canada in U. S. TradePolicy(Cambridge,Mass.: Ballinger,1988),
Bilateralism,
Multilateralism
whatkindof recenttrade
p. 1. Diebold seeks to formulatesome principledbasis fordistinguishing
measures-unilateral,bilateral,and whathe calls plurilateral-are consistentwith,and whatkind
on whichthe GATT regimeis based.
undermine,theprinciplesofmultilateralism
Perspective,
rev.ed. (New
in Current
20. See ibid.;RichardN. Gardner,Sterling-DollarDiplomacy
York: Columbia University
Press, 1980); JacobViner,"Conflictsof Principlein Draftinga Trade
Charter,"ForeignAffairs25 (July1947), pp. 612-28; Herbert Feis, "The Conflictover Trade
25 (January1947), pp. 217-28; and RobertPollard,EconomicSecurity
Ideologies,"ForeignAffairs
Press,1985).
and theOriginsoftheCold War(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
21. See Robert Dallek, FranklinD. Rooseveltand AmericanForeignPolicy(New York: Oxford
Press,
University
Press,1979); JohnLewis Gaddis, TheLong Peace (New York: OxfordUniversity
and theOriginsoftheCold War.
1987),pp. 3-47; and Pollard,EconomicSecurity
Multilateralism 567
East and elsewhere-universalaspirations,cooperativedeterrence,and joint
action against aggression22-whetherit constitutesvision or rhetoric,the
notionevokesand is entirelyconsistentwiththeAmericanpostwarmultilaterabout multilateralism
alistagenda,as I arguebelow. In sum,whatis distinctive
is not merelythatit coordinatesnationalpolicies in groupsof threeor more
states,whichis somethingthatotherorganizationalformsalso do, but thatit
does so on the basis of certainprinciplesof orderingrelationsamong those
states.
Thus, there exists a compound anomaly in the world of international
relationstheorytoday. An institutionalphenomenonof whichconventional
but at the same
theoriesbarelytake note is both widespreadand significant;
time,the particularfeaturesthatmake it so are glossedoverbymoststudents
institutions
themselves.This articleis intendedto help resolve
of international
bothpartsof theanomaly.
The premiseof the presentarticleis thatwe can betterunderstandthe role
in the currentinternationaltransformaof multilateralnormsand institutions
tion by recoveringthe principledmeaningsof multilateralismfromactual
historicalpractice;by showinghow and whythose principledmeaningshave
throughoutthe historyof the moderninterstate
come to be institutionalized
system;and by exploringhow and whytheymayperpetuatethemselvestoday,
even as theconditionsthatinitiallygave riseto themhave changed.
This "grounded" analysis of the concept suggests a series of working
whichrequiremore extensivetestingbeforestrongvalidityclaims
hypotheses,
can be made for them. Nevertheless,I and my fellow contributorsto this
symposiumon multilateralismbelieve that the hypothesesare sufficiently
plausible to
interestingand that the case we make for them is sufficiently
The
warrantsuch furtherstudy,and we presentthem here in that spirit.23
argument,in brief,goes somethinglike this: Multilateralismis a generic
life,and as suchit has been present
formof moderninternational
institutional
mustnot be
formof multilateralism
fromthe start.The genericinstitutional
confusedwithformalmultilateralorganizations,a relativelyrecentarrivaland
still of only relativelymodest importance.Historically,the generic formof
multilateralismcan be found in institutionalarrangementsto define and
stabilizethe internationalpropertyrightsof states,to manage coordination
problems,and to resolvecollaborationproblems.The last of theseuses of the
the least frequent.In the literature,thisfact
multilateralformis historically
has been explainedby the rise and fallof hegemoniesand, more
traditionally
recently,by various functionalconsiderations.Our analysissuggeststhat a
22. George Bush,citedin "PresidentBush's Addressto Congresson End of theGulfWar," The
New YorkTimes,7 March 1991,p. A8.
23. See the followingarticlesin thisissue of IO: JamesA. Caporaso, "InternationalRelations
Theoryand Multilateralism:The Search forFoundations"; Miles Kahler, "Multilateralismwith
Small and Large Numbers"; and Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power:
Matters.
to Ruggie,Multilateralism
in NATO." See also thecontributions
Multilateralism
in theleadingpowersof thedayis at least as
permissivedomesticenvironment
importantand, in some cases, more important.When we look morecloselyat
thepost-WorldWar II situation,forexample,we findthatitwas less thefactof
Americanhegemonythat accountsfor the explosionof multilateralarrangementsthan it was the fact of Americanhegemony.Finally,we suggestthat
institutionalarrangementsof the multilateralformhave adaptive and even
reproductivecapacities whichother institutionalformsmay lack and which,
therefore,may help explain the roles that multilateralarrangementsplay in
transformation.
stabilizingthecurrentinternational
The meaningsofmultilateralism
refersto coordinatingrelationsamong three or
At its core, multilateralism
morestatesin accordancewithcertainprinciples.Butwhat,precisely,are those
principles?And to what,precisely,do those principlespertain?To facilitate
the constructionof a more formaldefinition,let us begin by examiningan
is not:
historicalinstanceof somethingthat everyoneagrees multilateralism
bilateralism.
Nazi Germanysucceeded infinelyhoninga pureform
Earlierin thiscentury,
ofbilateralismintoa systemicorganizingprinciple.Now, as Diebold notes,the
everydayterm "bilateral" is entirelyneutralwith regard to the qualitative
So as to giveexpressionto its
relationshipthatis institutedamongcountries.24
has been referredto as
qualitativenature,the Nazi systemthereforetypically
as
bilateralism itsorganizingprinciple.
bilateralistin characteror as embodying
In any case, once the New Plan of the Nazi governmenttook effectin 1934,
HjalmarSchachtdeviseda schemeofbilateralisttradeagreementsand clearing
The essence of the German internationaltrade regimewas
arrangements.25
that the state negotiated "reciprocal" agreementswith its foreigntrading
partners.These negotiationsdeterminedwhichgoods and serviceswere to be
exchanged,their quantities,and their price. Often, Germanydeliberately
importedmorefromitspartnersthanit exportedto them.But it requiredthat
thereor
its tradingpartnersliquidatetheirclaimson Germanyby reinvesting
by purchasingdeliberatelyoverpricedGerman goods. Thus, its tradingpartnerswere doublydependenton Germany.
This trade regime in turn was linked to bilateralistmonetaryclearing
arrangements.Under these arrangements,a German importerwould, for
example,pay marksto the GermanReichsbankforits importsratherthanto
theforeignsourceofthegoods or services,whiletheforeigncounterpartofthe
24. Diebold, "The Historyand the Issues."
25. The classic and appropriatelytitled studyof the Nazi systemis Albert 0. Hirschman's
of California
Berkeley:University
ofForeignTrade(1945; reprint,
NationalPowerand theStructure
Press, 1980). See also Leland B. Yeager, IntemationalMonetaryRelations:Theory,History,and
Policy(New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 357-76.
Multilateralism 569
transactionwould receivepaymentin home countrycurrencyfromits central
bank-and vice versa for German exports.No foreignexchange changed
hands; the foreignexchangemarketswere bypassed; and artificialexchange
rates prevailed.The permissibletotal amountsto be cleared in thismanner
werenegotiatedbythetwostates.
German bilateralismtypicallybut not exclusivelyfocused on smallerand
weaker states in East Central Europe, the Balkans, and Latin America,
exchangingprimarycommodityimportsfor manufacturedexports.But the
universalized
schemehad no inherentlimit;it could have been geographically
to cover the entireglobe, withan enormousspiderwebof bilateralistagreementsradiatingout fromGermany.26
would not excludethe Schachtian
of multilateralism
The nominaldefinition
bilateralistdevice: it coordinatedeconomicrelationsamongmore than three
states.Nor is thefactdecisivethatnegotiationstookplace bilaterally:afterall,
many tariffreductionsin the General Agreementon Tariffsand Trade
is,ofcourse,thatwithin
(GATT) are also negotiatedbilaterally.The difference
GATT bilaterallynegotiatedtariff
reductionsare extendedto all otherparties
whereasthe Schachtian
on thebasis ofmost-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment,
so that bilateral
discriminatory,
scheme was inherentlyand fundamentally
basis, even if they
deals held onlyon a case-by-caseand product-by-product
coveredtheentireglobe in doingso.
Let us examinenextan institutional
arrangementthatis generallyacknowlprinciples:a collectivesecuritysystem.None
edged to embodymultilateralist
has ever existedin pure form,but in principlethe scheme is quite simple.It
restson thepremisethatpeace is indivisible,so thata war againstone stateis,
of statesthereforeis
ipso facto,considereda war againstall. The community
obliged to respond to threatenedor actual aggression,firstby diplomatic
means, then througheconomicsanctions,and finallyby the collectiveuse of
response,any
forceifnecessary.Facingtheprospectofsucha community-wide
rationalpotentialaggressorwould be deterredand would desist. Thus, the
incidenceofwargraduallywould decline.
A collectivesecurityschemecertainlycoordinatessecurityrelationsamong
threeor morestates.But so, too, as noted above, did the League of the Three
Emperors,whichwas nothingmorethana set of traditionalalliances.27Whatis
distinctabout a collectivesecurityscheme is thatit comprises,as Sir Arthur
Salter put it a half-century
ago, a permanentpotentialalliance "against the
unknownenemy"28-and,he should have added, in behalf of the unknown
betweenan allianceand a collectivesecurity
difference
victim.The institutional
26. Severalmajorstates,includingGreatBritainand theUnited States,had limitedagreements
with GermanyinvolvingSondermarks-markswhich foreignerscould earn throughthe sale of
specifiedproductsto GermanybutwhichGermanyin turnrestrictedto particularpurchasesfrom
Germany.
ofEurope,chap. 12.
forMastery
27. Taylor,TheStruggle
(London: Macmillan,1939),p. 155; emphasisin original.
28. ArthurSalter,Security
570 International
Organization
schemecanbe simply
stateA is pledgedtocometo the
put:inbothinstances,
aidofB ifB is attacked
byC. In a collective
A isalso
security
scheme,
however,
pledgedto cometo theaid ofC ifC is attackedbyB. Consequently,
as G. F.
Hudsonpointsout,"A cannotregarditselfas theallyof B morethanof C,
becausetheoretically
it is an open questionwhether,
ifan act ofwarshould
In thesamewayB has indeterminate
occur,B or C wouldbe theaggressor.
towardsA and C, and C towardsA and B, and so on witha vast
obligations
number
ofvariants
as thesystem
isextended
tomoreandmorestates."29
Itwas
precisely
thisdifference
betweena collective
security
system
and an alliance
thatultimately
doomedthefateoftheLeagueofNationsintheU. S. Senate.30
TheUnitedStatesfrequently
invoked
thecollective
security
modelinleading
theanti-Iraq
coalition
inthePersianGulfcrisisandtheninwar,though
whatif
anypermanent
institutional
willfollowfromthateffort
consequences
remains
a truncated
tobe seen.31
NATO reflects
version
ofthemodel,inwhicha subset
ofstatesorganizeda collective
self-defense
schemeofindefinite
de
duration,
de factoagainstone.Nevertheless,
jureagainstanypotential
aggressor
though
theschemewaspredicated
internally
ontwomultilateralist
principles.
Thefirst
was the indivisibility
of threatsto thecollectivity-that
is, it did notmatter
itwas Germany,
whether
GreatBritain,
theNetherlands,
or Norwaythatwas
norin theory
attacked,
bywhom-andthesecondwas therequirement
ofan
unconditional
collective
response.32
We are nowin a positionto be morepreciseaboutthecore meaningof
multilateralism.
Keohanehas definedinstitutions,
as "persistent
generically,
and connectedsetsofrules,formaland informal,
thatprescribe
behavioural
and shape expectations."33
roles,constrainactivity,
Verysimply,
the term
"multilateral"
is an adjectivethatmodifiesthe noun "institution."
Thus,
29. See G. F. Hudson, "CollectiveSecurityand MilitaryAlliances," in HerbertButterfield
and
MartinWight,eds.,DiplomaticInvestigations
(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,1968),
pp. 176-77. See also CharlesA. Kupchanand Clifford
A. Kupchan,"Concerts,CollectiveSecurity,
and the FutureofEurope," International
16 (Summer1991),pp. 114-61.
Security
30. Contraryto folklore,Woodrow Wilson was not prepared to committhe United States to
specificand automaticmilitaryobligationsunder the League of Nations; his collectivesecurity
scheme would have relied on public opinion, arms limitations,and arbitrationmore than on
enforcement
mechanisms.SenatorHenryCabot Lodge's fundamentalobjectionto the League of
Nations was that its permanenceand universalismwould entail limitlessentanglementsforthe
United States.Lodge in turnfavoredstrongerand morespecificsecurityguaranteesto France and
againstGermany.See LloydE. Ambrosius,WoodrowWilsonand theAmerican
DiplomaticTradition
(New York: CambridgeUniversity
Press,1987),pp. 51-106.
31. The keyshortcoming
of collectivesecurityUN styleis, of course,thatthe UN has no means
of its own to implementa militaryresponseto aggression,since no state has ever negotiatedan
Article43 agreementmakingstandbyforcesavailable.Afterthewar in the PersianGulf,theU. S.
ambassadorto theUN, Thomas Pickering,
proposedthereconsideration
ofArticle43 provisionsin
speeches beforethe Veterans of ForeignWars on 4 March 1991 and beforethe AmericanBar
Associationon 26 April1991 in Washington,D. C.
32. French absence from the unifiedcommand and U. S. control over nuclear weapons
complicatemattersfurther.
33. Keohane, "Multilateralism,"
p. 732.
Multilateralism 571
formin internationalrelations.
multilateralism
depicts a generic institutional
How does multilateralmodifyinstitution?Our illustrationssuggest that
multilateralismis an institutionalformwhich coordinatesrelations among
threeor morestateson thebasis of "generalized"principlesof conduct-that
is, principleswhichspecifyappropriateconductfora class of actions,without
interestsof the partiesor the strategicexigencies
regardto the particularistic
is a classicexamplein
thatmayexistin anyspecificoccurrence.MFN treatment
amongcountriesproducingthe
the economicrealm:it forbidsdiscrimination
same product.Its counterpartin securityrelationsis the requirementthat
statesrespondto aggressionwheneverand whereverit occurs-whetheror not
any specificinstancesuits theirindividuallikes and dislikes.In contrast,the
bilateralistform,such as the Schachtian device and traditionalalliances,
differentiates
relationscase-by-casebased preciselyon a prioriparticularistic
groundsor situationalexigencies.
repertoire
do not exhaustthe institutional
Bilateralismand multilateralism
of states. Imperialismcan be considered a thirdgeneric institutionalform.
Imperialismalso is an institutionthat coordinatesrelationsamong threeor
it does so by
more states though,unlike bilateralismand multilateralism,
ofthesubjectstates.34
denyingthesovereignty
First,generalof multilateralism.
Two corollariesfollowfromour definition
amongthe members
ized organizingprincipleslogicallyentailan indivisibility
ofa collectivity
withrespectto therangeofbehaviorin question.Dependingon
can take markedlydifferent
forms,ranging
circumstances,that indivisibility
chooses to standardfromthe physicaltiesof railwaylinesthatthe collectivity
all the way to the adoptionby statesof the premisethat
ize across frontiers,
nota
hereis a socialconstruction,
peace is indivisible.But notethatindivisibility
technicalcondition:in a collectivesecurityscheme,statesbehave as if peace
in the case of trade,it is the
were indivisibleand therebymake it so. Similarly,
GATT members'adherenceto theMFN normwhichmakesthesystemoftrade
an indivisiblewhole,not some inherentattributeof tradeitself.35
Bilateralism,
in contrast,segmentsrelationsintomultiplesof dyadsand compartmentalizes
them. Second, as discussed in furtherdetail below, successful cases of
in practice appear to generate among their memberswhat
multilateralism
That is to say,the
Keohane has called expectationsof "diffusereciprocity."36
arrangementis expected by its membersto yield a rough equivalence of
benefitsin the aggregateand over time.Bilateralism,in contrast,is premised
Press,1986),pp. 19-47. Some
34. See Michael Doyle,Empires(Ithaca, N. Y.: CornellUniversity
came veryclose to if theydid not
of the more predatoryexpressionsof the Nazi arrangements
actuallyconstitutetheimperialform.
or
35. Obviously,the existenceof nuclearweapons, economic interdependence,externalities,
thatstateschoose. I
othertechnicalfactorscan and probablydoes affectthe social constructions
a concept.
am notimputingcausalityhere,simplyclarifying
40
Organization
36. Robert0. Keohane, "Reciprocityin InternationalRelations,"International
(Winter1986),pp. 1-27.
the simultaneousbalancingof specificquids-pro-quos
on specificreciprocity,
byeach partywitheveryotherat all times.37
is a
It followsfromthis definitionand its corollariesthat multilateralism
is likely
form.Its historicalincidence,therefore,
highlydemandinginstitutional
to be less frequentthanthatof its alternatives;and ifits relativeincidenceat
any time were to be high,that factwould pose an interestingpuzzle to be
explained.
The obviousnextissue to addressis thefactthat,as Keohane pointsout,the
generic concept of internationalinstitutionapplies in practice to many
relationsamongstates.38So too, therefore,
different
typesof institutionalized
thatit
does the adjectivemultilateral:the genericattributeof multilateralism,
coordinatesrelationsamongthreeor more statesin accordancewithgeneralspecificexpressionsdependingon
ized principlesofconduct,willhave different
relationsto whichitpertains.Let us examinesome
thetypeofinstitutionalized
instances.Commonusage in the literaturedistinguishesamongthreeinstitutional domains of interstaterelations: internationalorders, international
regimes,and internationalorganizations.Each typecan be, but need not be,
in form.
multilateral
refersto internationaleconomicorders,internaThe literaturefrequently
maritimeorders,and so on. An "open" or
tionalsecurityorders,international
"liberal" internationaleconomicorderis multilateralin form,as is a maritime
orderbased on theprincipleofmareliberum.The New EconomicOrderof the
Nazis was not multilateralin form,for reasons that have already been
suggested,and neitherwas the European securityordercraftedby Bismarck.
rulesthatorder
here refersto the constitutive
The conceptof multilateralism
dimension,
life-their architectural
relationsin givendomainsof international
economicorder
so to speak. Thus,thequalityof"openness" in an international
as the prohibitionof exclusiveblocs, spheres,or
refersto such characteristics
similar barriers to the conduct of internationaleconomic relations. The
correspondingquality in an internationalsecurityorder-the quality that
would cause it to be describedas "collective"-is theconditionof equal access
condition
to a commonsecurityumbrella.To the extentthatthecharacteristic
or conditionsare met,the orderin questionmaybe said to be multilateralin
here depictsthecharacterof an overallorderof
form.In short,multilateralism
it says nothingabout how thatorder is
relationsamong states; definitionally
achieved.
theterm"regime"refers
A regimeis moreconcretethanan order.Typically,
to a functionalor sectoralcomponentof an order.Moreover,the conceptof
37. Bilateral balancing need not imply equality; it simplymeans establishinga mutually
acceptable balance betweenthe parties,howeverthatis determinedin practice.For an extended
discussionof this difference,see Karl Polanyi,"The Economy as InstitutedProcess," in Karl
Polanyi,Conrad M. Arensberg,and HarryW. Pearson,eds., Tradeand Marketin theEarlyEmpires
(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,1957),pp. 243-70.
38. Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions."
Multilateralism 573
regimeencompasses more of the "how" question than does the concept of
orderin that,broadlyspeaking,theterm"regime"is used to referto common,
means of conductinginterstate
deliberative,thoughoftenhighlyasymmetrical
relations.That much is clear fromcommon usage. But while there is a
widespread assumptionin the literaturethat all regimes are, ipso facto,
multilateralin character, this assumption is egregiouslyerroneous. For
example,thereis no reason not to call the Schachtianschemesfororganizing
monetaryand trade relations internationalregimes; they fullymeet the
standardcriteriaspecifiedbyStephenKrasnerand his colleagues.39Moreover,
it is entirelypossible to imagine the emergence of regimes between two
states-superpower securityregimes,for example, were a topic of some
discussion in the 1980s40-but such regimes by definitionwould not be
multilateraleither.In sum,whatmakesa regimea regimeis thatit satisfiesthe
definitionalcriteriaof encompassingprinciples,norms,rules, and decisionmakingproceduresaroundwhichactor expectationsconverge.But in and of
themselves,those terms are empty of substance. What makes a regime
multilateralin form,beyond involvingthree or more states, is that the
substantivemeaningsof those termsroughlyreflectthe appropriategeneralin the case of a multilateral
ized principlesof conduct.By way of illustration,
corresponding
traderegime,thesewould includethe normof MFN treatment,
reductionsand the applicationof safeguards,and
rulesabout reciprocaltariff
the rules.In the case of a
sanctionedproceduresforimplementing
collectively
collectivesecurityregime,theywould include the norm of nonaggression,
uniformrules foruse of sanctionsto deter or punishaggression,and, again,
them.
sanctionedproceduresforimplementing
collectively
Finally,formalinternationalorganizationsare palpable entitieswithheadquartersand letterheads,votingprocedures,and generouspensionplans.They
requireno conceptualelaboration.But,again,theirrelationshipto theconcept
than is sometimesassumed. Two issues
is less self-evident
of multilateralism
deservebriefmention.The firstissue,thoughitmaybe mootat themoment,is
thattherehave been internationalorganizationsthatwere not multilateralin
form.The Cominternand the Cominformcome to mind; theywere based
explicitlyon Leninistprinciplesof organization,whichwere quite different
fromtheir multilateralcounterparts.41 Along the same lines, the recently
frommultilatcollapsedSoviet-EastEuropean systemoforganizationsdiffered
eral formsin waysthatstudentsof international
organizationneverfullycame
Regimes.
39. Krasner,International
40. Steve Weber predicted the emergence of a superpowersecurityregime in "Realism,
44 (Winter1990), pp. 55-82. Robert
Organization
Detente, and Nuclear Weapons," International
Jervisdiscussedthe possibilityin two of his works:"SecurityRegimes,"in Krasner,International
Regimes,pp. 173-94; and "From Balance to Concert: A Study of InternationalSecurity
Cooperation,"WorldPolitics38 (October 1985),pp. 58-79.
withan
A Historyof theCommunist
International,
41. See Franz Borkenau,WorldCommunism:
ofMichiganPress,1962).
byRaymondAron (Ann Arbor:University
introduction
The second issue is more problematiceven today.There is a
to gripswith.42
common tendencyin the world of actual internationalorganizations,and
to equate the veryphenomenonof
sometimesin the academic community,
multilateralism
withthe universeof multilateralorganizationsor diplomacy.
The precedingdiscussionmakesit clearwhythatviewis in error.It maybe the
case empiricallythatdecisionsconcerningaspects of internationalordersor,
regimesin factare made in multilateralforums.The
morelikely,international
EC exhibitsthis empirical pattern most extensively;the failed quest by
developingcountriesfor a New InternationalEconomic Order in the 1970s
exhibitsthe desireto achieveit; and decisionson mostinternationaltradeand
"multilateral
monetarymattersfallsomewherein between.But definitionally,
organization"is a separate and distincttype of institutionalizedbehavior,
definedby such generalized decision-makingrules as votingor consensus
procedures.
In sum, the term "multilateral"is an adjective that modifiesthe noun
themultilateralformfromotherformsis thatit
What distinguishes
institution.
coordinatesbehavioramongthreeor more stateson the basis of generalized
that
institutions
anytheoryof international
principlesofconduct.Accordingly,
is bound to be a
does not includethisqualitativedimensionof multilateralism
withinthe
fairlyabstracttheoryand one thatis silentabout a crucialdistinction
forms.Moreover,foranalyticpurposes,
institutional
repertoireofinternational
withany
it is importantnot to (con)fuse the verymeaningof multilateralism
one particularinstitutionalexpressionof it, be it an internationalorder,
regime,or organization.Each can be, but need not be, multilateralin form.In
formshouldnotbe equated withuniversalgeographaddition,themultilateral
ical scope; the attributesof multilateralismcharacterize relations within
thatmayand oftendo fallshortof thewhole universeof
specificcollectivities
not
nations.Finally,it shouldbe keptin mindthattheseare formaldefinitions,
empiricaldescriptionsof actual cases, and we would not expectactual cases to
conformfullyto the formaldefinitions.But let us turnnow to some actual
themultilateralform.
historicalcases exhibiting
Multilateralismin history
has now been defined.What can we
The institutional
formof multilateralism
its
over
theirfrequencydistribution,
and
about
time,
specific
expressions
say
some possiblecorrelates?A briefhistoricalsurveywillsituatethephenomenon
betterand help us beginto answerthesequestions.To organizethe discussion,
42. See GerardHolden, "The End ofan Alliance: SovietPolicyand theWarsawPact, 1989-90,"
PRIF Reports(Peace ResearchInstitute,Frankfurt),
no. 16,December 1990.
Multilateralism 575
I adapt a standardtypologyof institutional
roles fromthe literature:defining
and stabilizinginternationalpropertyrights,solvingcoordinationproblems,
and resolvingcollaborationproblems.43
Propertyrights
Not surprisingly,
the earliest multilateralarrangementsinstitutedin the
modernera were designedto cope withthe internationalconsequencesof the
novel principle of state sovereignty.The newly emerged territorialstates
and the
conceivedtheiressence,theirverybeing,bythepossessionof territory
exclusionof othersfromit. But how does one possess somethingone does not
own?And, stillmoreproblematic,howdoes one excludeothersfromit?
The world's oceans posed this problem. Contiguouswaterwayscould be
shared,administeredjointly,or, more than likely,splitdown the middle; the
international
propertyrightsof statestherebywere establishedbilaterally.The
oceans were anothermatter.States attemptedto projectexclusiveunilateral
jurisdiction,but they failed. Spain and Portugal tried a bilateral solution,
wherebySpain claimeda monopolyof thewesterntraderoutesto theFar East
and Portugalclaimedthe easternroutes.But they,too, failed.All such efforts
ifnot impossiblein
failedforthe simplereason thatit is exceedinglydifficult
thelongruntovindicatea propertyrightthatis notrecognizedas beingvalidby
the relevantothers in a given community,especiallywhen exclusion is as
difficult
as itwas in theoceans. Attemptsto do so lead to permanentchallenge
and recurrent
conflict.A multilateralsolutionto thegovernanceoftheoceans,
therefore,
was inescapable.The principlewhichwas firstenunciatedbyHugo
Grotiusat the beginningof the seventeenthcenturyand whichstates slowly
came to adopt was one that definedan internationalmaritimeorder in two
sea under exclusivestate control,whichcustomeventually
parts:a territorial
set at threemilesbecause thatwas therangeofland-basedcannonsat thetime;
and the high seas beyond,available for commonuse but owned by none."
all stateswere freeto utilizethe highseas, provided
Under thisarrangement,
43. The distinctionbetweencoordinationand collaborationwas proposed by ArthurStein in

"Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in Krasner,International
Regimes,pp. 115-40. See also Duncan Snidal,"IGO's, Regimes,and Cooperation:Challengesfor
InternationalRelations Theory,"in MargaretP. Karns and Karen A. Mingst,eds., The United
(Boston: Unwin Hyman,1990), pp. 321-50; and Lisa Martin,
Institutions
Statesand Multilateral
The international
forthcoming.
Organization,
International
"Interests,Power,and Multilateralism,"
propertyrightsof states invariablyare taken for granted,however,even thoughtheir stable
definitionis logicallyand temporallypriorto the other two collectiveaction problems.I have
thereforeadded thisdimension.
discussionof how global warmingand
44. For a briefreviewof thissubjectand an interesting
risingsea levels may affectthese practices,see David D. Caron, "When Law Makes Climate
Change Worse: Rethinkingthe Law of Baselines in Lightof a Rising Sea Level," EcologyLaw
vol. 17,no. 4, 1990,pp. 621-53.
Quarterly,
And
onlythattheydid nottherebydamage the legitimateinterestsof others.45
each state had the same rules forall states,not one rule forsome and other
rulesforothers.
An even more profound instance of delimitingthe propertyrightsof
states-more profoundbecause it concernedinternal,as opposed to external,
as the basis for
space-was the inventionof the principleof extraterritoriality
As GarrettMattinglyput it
organizingpermanentdiplomaticrepresentation.
in his magisterialstudyof the subject:"By arrogatingto themselvessupreme
power over men's consciences,the new states had achieved absolute sovereignty.Having done so, theyfound theycould only communicatewith one
anotherby toleratingwithinthemselveslittleislands of alien sovereignty."46
Institutingthose little islands of alien sovereigntyin the end required a
based on the religious
arrangements
multilateralsolution,thoughdifferential
preferencesand social statusof rulerswere triedfirst.And theirmaintenance
came to be seen as being necessaryto the veryexistenceof a viable political
orderamongstates.47
As a result,gravebreachesof theprincipleof extraterriare, ipso facto,deemed to be a violationagainstthe entirecommunity
toriality
of states.48
Until quite recently,neither regimes nor formal organizationsplayed
roles in the definitionand stabilizationof internationalproperty
significant
rights.Conventionalpractice and episodic treatynegotiationssufficedto
ordersof relations.
establishmultilateral
Coordination problems
States have strongand conflicting
preferencesabout internationalproperty
rights.In the case of the oceans, forexample,coastal stateswere favoredover
coastal states
sea; different
landlockedstatesbytheallocationofanyterritorial
sized territorial
seas byvirtueofthelengthoftheir
ended up withdifferentially
wouldhavepreferredno limitat all to the
coastlines;coastalstatesnevertheless
territorial
sea; and so on. There also existsa class of problemsin international
in principleto the actual
relationswhereinstatesare more or less indifferent
came to
state-sponsored,
45. It tookuntilthe earlyeighteenthcenturybeforepiracy,frequently
damagingto the legitimateinterestsof states.See Robert
be generallydefinedas beinginherently
C. Ritchie,CaptainKidd and the WarAgainstthePirates(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,1986).
RenaissanceDiplomacy(Baltimore,Md.: PenguinBooks, 1964),p. 244.
46. GarrettMattingly,
playeda systemicrole,see Adda
47. On theemergenceoftheperceptionthatextraterritoriality
History(Princeton,N. J.: PrincetonUniversity
B. Bozeman, Politicsand Culturein International
Press,1960),especiallypp. 479-80.
condemns"Iraq
48. Note in thisconnectionthatUN SecurityCouncil Resolution667 "strongly
for"aggressive
actsperpetrated...againstdiplomaticpremisesand personnelin Kuwait,"whereas
Resolution660, passed in responseto Iraq's invasionof Kuwait,merely"condemns"the invasion,
withoutembellishment.The full textsare contained in UN SecurityCouncil, S/RES/667, 16
September1990,and S/RES/660,2 August1990; emphasisadded.
Multilateralism 577
outcome,providedonlythatall accept the same outcome.These are typically
referredto as coordinationproblems.49
A paradigmaticcase of a coordinationproblem in the mid-nineteenth
centurywas posed byelectronictelegraphyand concernedwhatwould happen
to a message as it came, forinstance,to the borderbetweenFrance and the
Grand Duchy of Baden. The followingprocedurewas instituted:"A common
stationwas establishedat Strasbourgwithtwoemployees,one fromtheFrench
Telegraph Administration,the other from Baden. The French employee
received,for example, a telegramfromParis, which the electricwires had
to himwiththe speed of light.This messagehe wroteout byhand
transmitted
ontoa special formand handed it acrossthetable to his Germancolleague.He
translatedit intoGerman,and thensentit again on itsway."50However,with
the intensification
of trade,the desire forthe lateststockmarketinformation
fromLondon, Paris, and Berlin, and importantdiplomaticmessages that
governmentswished to send to one another, this arrangementbecame
untenable.Its costs in profitslost,opportunitiesforegone,and administrative
resourcesexpended mountedrapidly.The initialresponsewas to negotiatea
series of bilateraltreaties.But in the dense communicationscomplexof the
European continent,bilateralsolutionssoon also provedinadequate. Several
were thereforeconstructedand were subsequently
multilateralarrangements
combinedin 1865,whenthe InternationalTelegraphUnionwas established.
The multilateralarrangementfortelegraphyconsistedof threeparts.First,
thepartiesdevisedrulesconcerningthenetworkoftelegraphlinesthatwereto
connectcountrieswithinEurope (and, later,in otherpartsof the world),the
thelanguagesthatwere
codes to be used, the agreedprioritiesoftransmission,
in whichproceeds
the
manner
to be levied,
permissible,the scheduleof tariffs
a
wouldbe divided,and so on. Second, theyestablished permanentsecretariat
of these rules and to coordinate
to administerthe day-to-day
implementation
the technicaloperationsof the system.And, third,theyconvened periodic
conferencesto make anysuchrevisionsin thebasic systemas became necessary
overtime.
Much the same kind of arrangementhad alreadybeen anticipatedin the
as on theRhine and theDanube, typically
domainofEuropean rivertransport,
consistingof commissions,secretariats,and judicial bodies-and, in some
similar
forofficials.51
Later in thenineteenthcentury,
instances,evenuniforms
in thefieldofpublichealth.52
were instituted
multilateralarrangements
In situationsexhibitingcoordinationproblems,the incentivesare highfor
49. Stein,"Coordinationand Collaboration."
Union (ITU), FromSemaphoretoSatellite(Geneva: ITU,
50. InternationalTelecommunications
1965),p. 45.
Rivers(New York: CarnegieEndowmentfor
51. J.P. Chamberlain,TheRegimeofInternational
InternationalPeace, 1923).
Press, 1964),
52. ErnstB. Haas, BeyondtheNationState (Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversity
pp. 14-17.
Organization
578 International
ofconduct.
principles
on thebasisofgeneralized
statestoordertheirrelations
coststends
thedesiretoreducetransaction
Atleastinthelongrun,therefore,
incidence
thehighest
historically
Notsurprisingly,
factor.
to becomea driving
is foundinthisdomain.
andorganizations
regimes
ofmultilateral
Collaborationproblems
ofatleastsomeinternational
property
andstabilization
Wherethedefinition
tomultilatinevitability
thereappearsto existan ultimate
is concerned,
rights
although"ultimate"maymeanafterall possiblealternatives,
eral solutions,
there
problems,
In casesofcoordination
war,havebeenexhausted.
including
is
as towhichoneofseveraloutcomes
indifference
appearstoexistan ultimate
as
sunk
heremaymasksuchconcreteproblems
"ultimate"
selected,although
that individualstatesmay have in the "equallyacceptable"
investments
outcomethatdidnotgetadopted.
liesthedomainof
andindifference
ofinevitability
Betweenthetwoextremes
however,
in
this
domain,
Even
of interest
situations.
conflict
mixed-motive,
a
Before
on
multilateral
basis.
it occurs
occurs.And sometimes
cooperation
itdidnotdo so veryoften.
1945,however,
case is theConcertofEurope,a
In thesecurity
realm,themostcelebrated
to
relations
havepaidfarmoreattention
international
of
caseinwhichstudents
fact
that
than
to
the
a
it
constituted
security
regime
ornot
theissueofwhether
Kupchan
form.Charlesand Clifford
elementsofthemultilateral
it exhibited
security
a
of
collective
with
useful
continuum
have recentlyprovidedus
at
the
other.
We
one
end
and
at
concerts
withthe"ideal"form
arrangements,
to
"ideal"
model.
According
of
the
theformal
attributes
havealreadyexamined
of
the
the
dominance
is
by
the
version
characterized
theKupchans, concert
andno
andconsensus,
negotiations
greatpowers,decisionstakenbyinformal
collective
action.
for
the
implementing
of
mechanisms
explicitspecification
mechanisms-a
security
But-and thisis whatputsitintheclassofcollective
on thenotionofall againstone."53Thatis,
is "predicated
concertnevertheless
andon
ontheindivisibility
ofpeace amongitsmembers
is predicated
a concert
torespondtoactsofaggression.
theirnondiscretionary
obligation
BetweentheNapoleonicandtheCrimeanwars,from1815to 1854,peace in
Europe was maintained,in HenryKissinger'swords,by an institutional
so that
as being"legitimate,"
"framework"
thatwas regardedbyparticipants
53. See Kupchan and Kupchan,"Concerts,CollectiveSecurity,and the Futureof Europe," p.

120. Note also the followinganalysisof the Treatyof Paris (1815) offeredby historianRichard
Langhornein "Reflectionson the Significanceof the CongressofVienna," ReviewofIntemational
Studies12 (October 1986),p. 317: "There appeared at clause 6, in whatwas certainlyCastlereagh's
drafting,[a shift in] emphasis from a specific guarantee to a scheme for the continuous
systembythegreatpowers."
managementof theinternational
Multilateralism 579
In doingso,
"theysoughtadjustmentwithin[it]ratherthanin itsoverthrow."54
accordingto RobertJervis,they"behaved in waysthatsharplydivergedfrom
normal'powerpolitics.'"55
As Jervisdescribes it, the five leading powers-Austria, Great Britain,
Prussia, Russia, and a French monarchyrestoredwiththe aid of the other
four-refrained from seeking to maximize their relative power positions
vis-'a-visone another,instead moderatingtheirdemands and behavior;they
weaknessesand vulnerabilirefrainedfromexploitingone another'stemporary
and used itrarelyas a meansto resolve
ties;and theythreatenedforcesparingly
differences
among them-except, Kal Holsti adds, thatthey"were clearlyof
the opinionthatforcecould be used individuallyor collectivelyforenforcing
certaindecisionsand forcoercingthosewho threatenedthe foundationsof the
orderor thesystemofgovernance."56
How were these featsachieved? The fivepowersconstitutedthemselvesas
"an executive body" of the European internationalsystem,57convening
extensivemultilateralconsultationsthroughwhichtheyacted on mattersthat
could have underminedthe peace. For example,theycollectivelycreated and
guaranteedthe neutralityof Belgium and Greece, therebyremovingthose
fromthe temptationsof bilateralpartitionor competition.As Rene
territories
Albrecht-Carriehas argued,the "Eastern question" in general-that is, the
problemof how to secure orderlychange and national independencein the
wake of the irreversibledecay of the Ottoman Empire-"provides many
illustrationsof an authenticcommon preferencefor orderlyand peaceful
implemented."58
procedure,morethanonce successfully
What could account for this unusual institutionaldevelopment?It seems
thatthethreatposed byNapoleon's imperialambitionsto theveryprincipleof
the balance of power provedweightierthan the usual risksand uncertainties
thatplague cooperationin the securityrealm.Moreover,the threatposed by
the Frenchrevolutionary
wars to the veryprincipleof dynasticrule seems to
such
in domesticsocial formations,
have provedweightierthanthe differences
as thoseexistingbetweenliberaland protestantEngland on the one hand and
the moreconservativeand catholicAustriaand orthodoxRussia on the other.
These two threats helped crystalizethe norm of systemicstability-the
54. See Henry A. Kissinger,A WorldRestored(New York: Universal Library,1964), p. 5.
Kissingerconcentrateson the Congresssystem,a subsetof the Concertof Europe, whichended by
holdsfortheentireconcertsystem.
about 1823,butmycommentary
55. See RobertJervis,"SecurityRegimes,"p. 178. See also Jervis,"From Balance to Concert";
and RichardB. Elrod, "The ConcertofEurope: A FreshLook at an InternationalSystem,"World
Politics28 (January1976),pp. 159-74.
56. Kal Holsti, "Governance WithoutGovernment:Modes of Coordinating,Managing and
ControllingInternationalPoliticsin NineteenthCenturyEurope," paper presentedat the annual
meetingoftheInternationalStudiesAssociation,Vancouver,Canada, March 1991.
(New
57. The termis used byGordonA. Craig and AlexanderL. George inForceand Statecraft
Press,1983),p. 31.
York: OxfordUniversity
The ConcertofEurope(New York: Walker,1968),p. 22.
58. Rene Albrecht-Carrie,
580 International
Organization
theconcertwas
"repose"of Europewas thetermthefivepreferred59-that
gearedto sustain.Theyemboldenedstatesto place a collectivebet on their
viatheconcert
limited
Andthemultilateral
consultations
instituted
the
future.
a forum
on thatbetbyproviding
within
whichintelligence
extentofcheating
foractions
could be shared,actorintentions
questioned,and justifications
proferred
andassessed.
erodednotonlybecausethememory
TheConcertofEuropegradually
ofthe
initialthreats
fadedbutalsobecauseovertimetheparameters
ofthesituation
Aboveall else,therevolutions
weretransformed.
of 1848seriously
shookthe
prevailing
conceptoflegitimate
politicalorderfromwithin,
and thesenseof
"I do not see Europe
international
cohesiondivergedsharplythereafter.
a Frenchforeign
minister
atthetime.60
In thesecondhalf
anymore,"
lamented
ofthenineteenth
century,
multilateral
consultation
and self-restraint
yielded
to thestriving
forunilateraladvantagecheckedonlybyexternal
constraints,
whilebilateralallianceformation
wasraisedtoa newlevelofsophistication
by
Bismarck.
In theeconomicrealm,thenineteenth
witnessed
whateconomists
century
ifnotparagons,
tobe paradigms,
consider
ofmultilateralism:
freetradeandthe
of barriers
goldstandard.By freetradeis meanttwothings:a minimum
to
andnontariff
tariff
trade,including
andnondiscriminatory
treatment
barriers;
intrade.An international
existswhentwosetsofconditions
are
goldstandard
approximated.
First,themajorcountries
mustmaintain
a linkbetweentheir
domesticmoneysupplyand gold at substantially
fixedratios.Second,in
ofgoldtoliquidatean adversebalanceof
principle
theymustallowtheoutflow
currentobligationsand mustaccept a corresponding
inflowin case of a
favorable
balance.Theseconditions
alsoestablish
theconvertibility
ofcurrenciesatrelatively
fixedrates,andtheyfacilitate
international
insofar
adjustment
as the initialimbalancein thecurrentaccountin principle
willbe rectified
inbothsurplusanddeficit
automatically
countries
bytheappropriate
domestic
measuresthatfollowfrom
theinflow
andoutflow
ofgold.
By the mid-nineteenth
Great Britain-thefront-runner
century,
in the
Industrial
Revolution,
theforemost
ofrawmaterials
importer
andexporter
of
manufactured
and theenthusiastic
products,
occupantofthedoctrinal
house
builtbyAdamSmithand DavidRicardo-waspreparedto movetowardfree
tradeon a unilateral
basis.PrimeMinister
RobertPeel declaredinParliament
that"ifothercountries
choosetobuyinthedearestmarket,
suchan optionon
theirpartconstitutes
no reasonwhywe shouldnotbe permitted
to buyinthe
cheapest."6'
Indeed,Britaindidliberalize
tradeunilaterally,
inthe
culminating
59. Holsti,"GovernanceWithoutGovernment,"p. 4.
60. The Frenchofficialis citedby F. H. Hinsleyin Powerand thePursuitofPeace (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity
Press,1963),p. 243.
61. RobertPeel, in Parliamentary
Debates,House of Commons,London, 29 June1846; citedby
JagdishN. Bhagwatiand Douglas A. Irwinin "The Returnof the Reciprocitarians,"The World
Economy10 (June1987),p. 114.
Multilateralism 581
abolitionof the Corn Laws in 1846. Others,however,did notfollowtheBritish
example as Britain had expected. Reluctantly,therefore,and in part also
inspiredby broader diplomaticconsiderations,Britain commencedwith a
series of bilateral tariffnegotiationswith other countries,and those other
countriesdid thesame withthirdparties,and thishad theeffectofsignificantly
barriers.The model was the Cobden-ChevalierTreatybetween
loweringtariff
Britainand France,concludedin 1860.62Althoughthiswas a bilateraltreaty,it
had multilateralconsequencesbecause it contained an unconditionalMFN
provision:it committedBritain and France to extend to each other any
subsequent concessions obtained from agreementswith any third party.
Bismarck,Louis Napoleon, and Cavourall viewedsuchtradetreatiesprimarily
as instrumentsof traditionalbilateral diplomacyand less as the means to
multilateralizetrade. But theynegotiatedthem,and theyincludedthe MFN
provision.The inclusionof thisprovisionin a series of trade treatieshad the
thetradingorder.63
effectofmultilateralizing
As it did in internationaltrade, Britain followed the rules of the gold
standardmorecloselythananyoneelse. It therebyprovidedtheworldeconomy
witha pillar of financialstabilityin the pound sterling,makingmultilateral
and adjustmentthatmuch easier to achieve.64Britain'spolicies
convertibility
in twootherwaysas well. As the
mayhave been conduciveto multilateralism
world's largest creditor country,Britain did not exploit its position to
accumulatelarge gold stocksbut instead made those surplusesavailable for
additionaloverseas investmentsand loans. The internationaleconomyas a
resultfunctionedmoresmoothlyand grewmoresteadilythanwould otherwise
have been the case. In addition, Britain always allowed debts to Britain
incurredby othercountriesto be cancelled by creditstheyearned elsewhere.
That in turnfacilitatedthemultilateralclearingofpaymentsbalances.65
The multilateralismof free trade and the internationalgold standard
appears to have been createdand sustainedbytwosets of factors.Althoughit
were not
may appear paradoxical, these paragon cases of multilateralism
achieved by multilateralmeans. The decisive factor seems to have been
62. For an excellentheterodoxtreatmentof these developments,see Stein, "The Hegemon's
Dilemma."
63. See Jacob Viner, "The Most-Favored-NationClause," in Jacob Viner, International
Economics(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951). The United States continuedto rejectunconditional
MFN provisionsin itstradetreatiesuntil1923.
64. BarryEichengreen,"Conductingthe InternationalOrchestra:Bank of EnglandLeadership
Moneyand Finance,vol. 6, no. 1, 1987,
Under theClassical Gold Standard,"JournalofIntemational
pp. 5-29.
were thatthe United Kingdom
65. Accordingto Briggs,"The keyequationsof multilateralism
producingcountries,and thattheysettled
itselfhad a creditbalance in itsdealingswiththeprimary
theirbalance of indebtednessbyan exportsurplusto the continentalcountriesand to the United
States. The continentalcountriesin their turn financed importsurpluses with the primary
producingcountriesand withthe United States byexportsurplusesto the United Kingdom."See
Modem
Asa Briggs,"The WorldEconomy:Interdependenceand Planning,"in TheNew Cambridge
Press,1968),vol. 12,p. 42.
History,
2d ed. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Britain's unilateralmove toward free trade and the gold standard and its
bilateraldealingsto achievebothgoals. Britaintherebysignaleditswillingness
to bear thecostsof an open tradingorderand a stablemonetaryorderand thus
for
and strategicuncertaintiesof these arrangements
reduced the distributive
others.66In that sense, freetrade and the gold standardcan be said to have
been less "regime-ish"thanwas theConcertof Europe. Anothercriticalfactor
As ArthurBloomfieldhas
was a permissivedomesticpolitical environment.
pointed out with regard to the monetaryrealm, "The view, so widely
recognizedand accepted in recent decades, of centralbankingpolicy as a
the achievementand maintenanceof reasonablestability
means of facilitating
in the level of [domestic]economic activityand prices was scarcelythought
about before 1914, and certainlynot accepted, as a formal objective of
capacityto
monetarypolicy."67Indeed,manycountrieslacked the institutional
pursue such a monetarypolicy,in some cases includingeven a centralbank
itself.The second oftheseconditionscollapsedwellbeforethefirst.68
centurysuggests
priorto thetwentieth
This briefoverviewofmultilateralism
severalbroad generalizationsthat shed furtherlighton the characterof the
multilateralinstitutionalform.First,the strategictask environmenthas an
theproperty
impacton theformthatagreementstake.Definingand delimiting
rightsof statesis as fundamentala collectivetask as any in the international
basis seems inevitablein
ofthistaskon a multilateral
system.The performance
the longrun,althoughin factstatesappear to tryeveryconceivablealternative
first.Moreover,in the past the multilateralarrangementsthatdid emergein
thisdomainwere monopolizedbystatesand essentiallycodifiedstatepractice
into prevailingordersof relations.At the otherextreme,limitingtransaction
neithercomplexnor
costs by solvingcoordinationproblemsis institutionally
in all
demanding,and it was the domainin whichmultilateralism
particularly
three institutionalexpressions-orders, regimes,and organizations-flourishedin thenineteenthcentury.Betweenthesetwolies theproblematicterrain
butprior
conflictof interestsituations,in whichstatessometimes,
of significant
even
to the twentiethcenturynot often,constructmultilateralarrangements
thoughalternativesare available and viable. The major powers could have
selected bilateral alliances in the early nineteenthcenturyand selected
in the mid-nineteenth
century,as they
economicarrangements
discriminatory
had done before and as they would do again subsequently.But at those
particularpointsin time,theydid not. Whynot? Presumably,multilateralism
was in theirinterest.But what,concretely,does thatmean? How and whydid
statescome to definetheirinterestsin a mannerthatyieldedsuch an unusual
institutional
outcome? As noted above, it seems thatthe Concertof Europe
66. Stein,"The Hegemon'sDilemma."
67. ArthurI. Bloomfield,MonetaryPolicy UndertheIntemationalGold Standard(New York:
Federal ReserveBank ofNew York, 1959), p. 23.
68. Peter Gourevitch,Politicsin Hard Times (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1986),
chap. 3.
Multilateralism 583
was due in partto exogenousshocksto both the internationalsystemand the
systemof domesticrule.Free tradeand thegold standardin partseem to have
been due to thewillingnessand thecapabilityof Great Britainto takethelead.
Both cases also were made possibleby the existenceof compatibleor at least
permissivedomesticsettings.
Second, as was alluded to earlier, it seems that successfulinstances of
For example,whatwas
multilateralism
come to exhibit"diffusereciprocity."69
crucialto the success of the Concertof Europe, accordingto Jervis,"is that
thanusual.... For
'self-interest'
was broaderthanusual [and] also longer-run
thissystemto work,each statehad to believethatitscurrentsacrificeswouldin
factyield a long-runreturn,that otherswould not renege on theirimplicit
whentheyfoundthemselvesin temptingpositions."70
commitments
Third, the record shows that prior to the twentiethcentury,very few
generatedformalorganizations.The Concertof
instancesof multilateralism
whilefreetradeand the
Europe neverwentbeyondgreatpowerconsultations,
gold standardwere institutedand sustainedbyeven moread hoc
international
bilateraland unilateralmeans. The multilateralorganizationsthat did exist
in the domainof coordinationproblems,wherethe task
functionedexclusively
at handwas to devisemutuallyacceptablerulesoftheroad and to changethem
as technologyand other such factors changed. And the role of these
organizationswas strictlycircumscribedby the overall normativestructure
withinwhichtheyexisted.
discontinuity
The twentieth-century
An important
breakin thisthirdpatternoccurredwiththetwentieth-century
''move to institutions,"as the critical legal theoristDavid Kennedy has
describedit-by whichhe means a moveto formalorganizations.71
repertoire
Above all, a completelynovelformwas added to the institutional
of states in 1919: the multipurpose,universal membershiporganization,
instantiatedfirstby the League of Nations and then by the UN. Prior
determinedbypower,
international
organizationshad butlimitedmembership,
function,or both, and theywere assigned specificand highlycircumscribed
tasks. In contrast,here were organizationsbased on littlemore than shared
aspirations,withbroad agendas in whichlargeand smallhad a constitutionally
organizations
mandatedvoice. Moreover,decisionmakingwithininternational
became subjectto the mechanismof voting,as opposed to treaty
increasingly
or customaryaccretion;and votingitselfsubsequentlyshiftedawayin
drafting
mostinstancesfromthe earlyunanimity
requirementthatwas consistentwith
the traditionalmode of conductinginternationalproceedings.Finally,the
69. Keohane, "Reciprocityin InternationalRelations."
70. Jervis,
"SecurityRegimes,"p. 180.
71. David Kennedy,"The Move to Institutions,"Cardozo Law Review 8 (April 1987), pp.
841-988.
move amplifieda trendthat had begun in the nineteenthcentury,a trend
towardmultilateralas opposed to merelybilateraldiplomacy,especiallyin the
formof "conferencediplomacy."72
producedseveralimportantconsequencesforthe
This move to institutions
First,it complicated,and in some instancesactually
statusof multilateralism.
ends-meansrelationthat previouslyprevailed
reversed,the straightforward
and whateverformal
betweenthegoals embodiedin multilateralarrangements
organizationalmechanismmay have existed to serve them. Or, to put it
it created principal-agentproblemsthat had not existedbefore.
differently,
Any formof organizationalmediationis capable of affectingoutcomes,of
introducingelementsinto the substanceor process of decision makingthat
universalmembershiporganizapreviouslywere not present.A multipurpose,
tion complicatesthat situationby involvingitselfeven in areas where no
normativeconsensusexists;aspectsofboththe League of Nationsand theUN
have
forumsincreasingly
illustratethatproblemin spades. Second,multilateral
come to share in the agenda-settingand conveningpower of states. For
example,such forumsincreasinglydrivethe internationalconferencediplomacygame. Third,and perhaps most important,multilateraldiplomacyhas
come to embodya proceduralnorm in its own right-thoughoftena hotly
withit an internationallegitimacy
contestedone-in some instancescarrying
notenjoyedbyothermeans.
move to institutions,a
In short, as a result of the twentieth-century
multilateralpoliticalorderthatis "capable of handlingat least some collective
tasks in an ex ante co-ordinatedmanner" has emerged.73I mightadd in
conclusionthat while numerousdescriptionsof this "move to institutions"
exist,I knowof no good explanationin theliteratureofwhystatesshouldhave
wanted to complicate their lives in this manner. And I would think it
explanationwithinthe
to formulateany straightforward
particularlydifficult
rationality.
ascendantlogicof instrumental
currently
The UnitedStatesand postwarmultilateralism

was
The precedingdiscussionmakes it abundantlyclear thatmultilateralism
not inventedin 1945. It is a generic institutionalformin the modernstate
system,and incipientexpressionsof it have been present fromthe start.
acrossa broad
ofmultilateral
arrangements
However,thebreadthand diversity
after1945. Quite naturally,therearrayof issue-areasincreasedsubstantially
fore,one associatesthe changewiththe postwarpositionof the UnitedStates.
"Global ConferenceDiplomacy
72. For a briefthoughexcellentreview,see VolkerRittberger,
EuropeanJoumalofPoliticalResearch,vol. 11, no. 2, 1983,pp.
and InternationalPolicy-Making,"
167-82.
73. Ibid.,pp. 167-68.
Multilateralism 585
hegemonicpowersare alike
Accordingto the theoryof hegemonicstability,
system.Hegemonicstabilitytheory
in theirquest to organizethe international
is rightonlyup to a point. To the extentthat it is possible to "know" these
things,historicalcounterfactualssuggestthat the likeness among hegemons
forn by which they choose to organize the
stops short of the institutional
For instance,had Nazi Germanyor the SovietUnion ended up as the
system.74
world'sleading power afterWorld War II, thereis no indicationwhatsoever
thatthe intentionsof eithercountryincludedcreatinganythingremotelylike
orderthatcame to prevail.Politically,Germany
the internationalinstitutional
pursued an imperialdesign in the European core, complete with tributary
Economically,theNazi schemeofbilateral,discriminastateson theperiphery.
no
tradepacts and monetaryclearingarrangements
tory,and state-controlled
doubt would have been extendedgeographicallyto complementGermany's
politicalobjectives.The SovietUnion presumablywould have soughtpolitical
controlthrougha restoredCominternwhilecausingthemodes ofproductionin
itssubjecteconomiesto be socializedand therelationsamongthoseeconomies
basis.
to be administeredon a plannedand discriminatory
In pointoffact,and thiswe can saywithgreaterassurance,thingswouldhave
in some respectseven ifBritainhad become hegemon.Colonialismas
differed
a political institutionwould have continued longer. And while monetary
relations probablywould have been organized similarly,merelybased on
sterlinginsteadof the U. S. dollar,75Britishimperialpreferenceswould have
remaineda centralfeatureof internationaltrade,possiblyforcingothersto
carveout regionaltradingblocs forthemselves.76
Finally,Europe certainlywould have been "integrated"by a German or a
fashionthan existsvia the EC
Soviethegemony-but in a markedlydifferent
system,Europe mostprobablywouldhave returned
today.And in a British-run
and the continued existence of separate national
to prewar multipolarity
economies.
Thus, all hegemoniesare not alike. The most that can be said about a
orderinsome
hegemonicpoweris thatitwillseek to constructan international
form,presumablyalong lines that are compatiblewithits own international
74. The counterto myargument,of course,would be that"systemicfactors"determineor at
As it
least shape thepreferencesand behaviorofhegemons.That,too, is plausibleas a hypothesis.
to theactualpostwarplansof
concernsthisparticularinstance,however,I attachgreatercredibility
the ThirdReich and to what,since 1917,we knewLeninistworldorderdesignsto be thanI do to
the explanatoryor predictivevalue of systemictheory.For generalmethodologicaldiscussionsof
counterfactuals,see Philip Nash, "The Use of Counterfactualsin History:A Look at the
of theSocietyforHistoriansofAmericanForeignRelations,no. 22, March
Literature,"Newsletter
1991; and JamesD. Fearon, "Counterfactualsand HypothesisTestingin PoliticalScience," World
Politics43 (January1991),pp. 169-95.
75. The consensuson thebasic contoursof a desirablepostwarmonetaryorderwas quite strong
and widespreadbeyondthe Axis powersand the Soviet Union. See League of Nations [Ragnar
Period (Geneva: League of
Experience:Lessons of theInter-War
Nurkse],IntemationalCurrency
Nations,1944),especiallypp. 66-112.
Perspective,
chaps. 5-8.
Diplomacyin Current
76. Gardner,Sterling-Dollar
Organization
586 International
But,in theend,thatreallyis notsaying
objectivesand domesticstructures.
much.
in itsgenericsenseserved
multilateralism
ForAmericanpostwarplanners,
on thebasisofwhichto reconstruct
architectural
principle
as a foundational
the postwarworld.Take firstthe economicrealm.Duringthe war,when
planningforthepostwarera began,theNazi economicorderwas thefocal
It had effectively
excludednonparticipants,
pointof Americanantipathy.77
American
tradeopportunities
toU. S. officials
notonlylimited
whichaccording
thatreadilyspilledoverintothesecurity
butalso triggered
economicconflicts
cannotlongbe
realm."Nationswhichact as enemiesin the market-place
of state for
friendsat the counciltable,"warnedthe assistantsecretary
WilliamClayton,echoinga favoriterefrainof his boss,
economicaffairs,
CordellHull.78
The defeatof Germanyand the allied occupationof its Westernsector
to helpimplant
thedomestic
social
theUnitedStatesan opportunity
afforded
form
offoreign
economic
different
policybythenewWest
basesfora markedly
Germanstate.Muchofthenegotiating
expendedbytheUnitedStates
energy
wasdirected
toward
on thecreation
ofthepostwar
economicorder,therefore,
undoingthe morebenignbut stillvexingBritishposition.It consistedof a
commitment
toimperial
on thepartoftheToriesandtoextensive
preferences
on international
economictransactions
controls
bytheLabourpartyas partof
nationaleconomicplanning.Bothwere
its objectiveto institute
systematic
intheirplace
The UnitedStatessoughttosubstitute
inherently
discriminatory.
tradebarriersand
a globalversionof the "open door."79Discriminatory
tariffs
weretobe dismantled,
reduced,anddecolonizacurrency
arrangements
Butnowhere
to
tionsupported.
woulddomestic
politicssustaina merereturn
laissez-faire
of unrestricted
tradeand thegoldstanthenineteenth-century
was governedbythe
dard,whereinthe levelof domesticeconomicactivity
balanceofpayments.
Evenfortherelatively
moreliberalUnitedStates,the
thedomestic
edificeof the "open door"had to accommodate
international
oftheNewDeal.80
interventionism
77. This is quiteclearfromtheprovisionsoftheAnglo-American
AtlanticCharter,promulgated
in August1941.
78. WilliamClayton,citedbyPollardinEconomicSecurity
and theOriginsoftheCold War,p. 2.
79. Gardner,Sterling-Dollar
Diplomacyin Current
Perspective,
part1.
80. For a depictionof the subsequenteconomic regimesalong these lines, see JohnGerard
Ruggie,"InternationalRegimes,Transactions,and Change: Embedded Liberalismin thePostwar
Economic Order," in Krasner,IntemationalRegimes,pp. 195-231. For additionaldocumentation,
see G. JohnIkenberry,
"A WorldEconomyRestored:ExpertConsensusand theAnglo-American
PostwarSettlement,"International
Organization46 (Winter1992), pp. 289-321. The historianof
the Marshall Plan, Michael Hogan, similarlyhas argued that U. S. postwarplanners"married
Hull's free-tradedictums to the new theories of economic regulation and countercyclical
stabilization."See Michael J.Hogan, "One WorldintoTwo: AmericanEconomicDiplomacyfrom
BrettonWoods to the MarshallPlan," unpublishedmanuscript,
Ohio State University,
Columbus,
n. d., p. 7.
Multilateralism 587
in
There is littledebate in the literatureabout the role of multilateralism
organizingthe postwareconomic order; the consensus is that its role was
substantial.There has been littledebate about its role in the securitydomain
reason that studentsof international
either-but here forthe verydifferent
relations have assumed that there was none. That interpretationis not
in its broad
supportedby the historicalrecordifwe thinkof multilateralism
organizations.
genericsense ratherthanmerelyin theformofmultilateral
As WorldWar II drewto a close, PresidentRooseveltfaced an institutional
problem.The United States mustnot retreatback into a "fortressAmerica,"
Rooseveltinsisted,or else itwouldonce againhavewonthewaronlyto lose the
subsequent peace. Winningthe peace, Roosevelt felt,would require active
U.S. internationalinvolvement.But at the same time,the Americanpublic
would not accept internationalinvolvementvia "entanglingalliances."'81
Hence, some other formwould have to be found. To complicate matters
further,
as JohnGaddis putsit,Rooseveltfavoreda policyof "containmentby
cooptation"towardthe Soviet Union and feltthat a stable postwarsecurity
orderrequired"offering
Moscow a prominentplace in it; by makingit,so to
speak, a memberof the club."82That in turnrequired a club to whichboth
belonged.
Giventhatcombinationof objectives,Roosevelthad littlealternativebut to
move towardsome formof collectivesecurityorganization.But it was to be a
modifiedformin the sense thatit strippedawaythe Wilsonianaspirationthat
collectivesecuritysomehowbe substituted
forbalance-of-powerpolitics.That
was too wild and woolya notionforthe depression-and war-hardenedU. S.
officialsin 1945. Instead,theysoughtto make the two compatible,so thatthe
collectivesecuritymechanismwould have a basis in the balance of powerbut
also mutethe more deleteriouseffectsof balance-of-power
politics.Thus was
mechanism"withteeth,"but subject
the UN born:at itscore, an enforcement
to greatpowerveto.83
81. See Dallek, FranklinD. RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy,pp. 406-41. WoodrowWilson
had confronteda similardilemmaat the end of WorldWar I-though, unlikeRoosevelt,Wilson
soughtto transcendwhat he termed"the evil machinations"of balance-of-powerpoliticsin the
process of resolvingit. "We still read Washington'simmortalwarningsagainst 'entangling
alliances' withfullcomprehensionand an answeringpurpose," he proclaimedin a 1918 speech.
"But onlyspecial and limitedalliancesentangle;and we recognizeand acceptthedutyofa newday
and clear
in whichwe are permittedto hope fora generalalliancewhichwillavoid entanglements
and themaintenanceofcommonrights."Wilsonis
theairoftheworldforcommonunderstandings
p. 46.
citedbyAmbrosiusin WoodrowWilsonand theAmericanDiplomaticTradition,
82. See JohnLewis Gaddis, Strategiesof Containment(New York: OxfordUniversityPress,
1982),p. 9. See also Dallak, FranklinD. RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy,p. 508. Accordingto
Dallek, forRoosevelt"a United Nationswould notonlyprovidea vehiclefordrawingRussia into
extended cooperation with the West, but would also assure initial American involvementin
postwarforeignaffairs."
83. For a good discussionof thiscompromise,see Dallek, FranklinD. Rooseveltand American
ForeignPolicy,pp. 442-82. On theKupchans'continuum(as outlinedin their"Concerts,Collective
Security,and theFutureofEurope"), theUN designmaybe describedas a concertplaced withina
collectivesecurityorganization.
Once the ironcurtainwentdown and Europe was split,containingMoscow
by exclusion became the dominant U.S. objective, and the UN became
But the Americanproblemof
marginalizedto core U.S. securityconcerns.84
avoidingboth a retreatintofortressAmerica and an entrance
simultaneously
intoentanglingalliances stillhad to be resolvedvis-a-visa threatenedEurope.
As SteveWeber remindsus, theUnitedStatesrepeatedlyturnedback requests
Instead,the
fromits European friendsto formbilateralallianceswiththem.85
United States initiallypursueda strategyof "economicsecurity,"of providing
the Europeans with the economic wherewithalto take care of their own
securityneeds.86By 1947,bilateraleconomicassistanceto Europe gave wayto
the more comprehensiveMarshall Plan, which required the Europeans to
develop a multilateralframeworkfor their own postwar reconstructionin
returnforreceivingaid. Moreover,theUnitedStateswas an earlyadvocateand
strong supporterof European effortsto achieve economic and political
integration.87
But European securitydemandedmore.Drivenby"la grandepeur"of 1948,
the Europeans came to feelthat"it was [also] necessaryto have some measure
Still,theUnitedStates
ofmilitary
'reassurance,'" as Michael Howard argues.88
continuedto resistbilateral deals and avoid militarycommitmentsof any
kind.89Eventually,the State Departmentrelented,but not untilsucceedingin
its insistencethat the United States would only aid a European-initiated
collectiveself-defenseeffort.The Belgians under Paul-HenriSpaak took the
lead. In March 1948, the Benelux countries,France, and Britain signed a
mutual assistance treaty.But how could theytie the United States to this
The Britishplayedthe criticalswingrole in definingan indivisible
framework?
securityperimeterfromScandinaviato theMediterraneanand,withCanadian
84. The UN withU. S. supportacquired a more modestcollectivesecurityrole in the formof
role via InternationalAtomic
peacekeepingin the 1950s and acquired a nuclearnonproliferation
treatyin the 1960s.
EnergyAgencysafeguardsand thenonproliferation
85. Weber,"ShapingthePostwarBalance of Power."
and theOriginsoftheCold War.
86. Pollard,EconomicSecurity
on a multilateralbasis
87. The requirementthat the Europeans cooperate in reconstruction
producedtheOrganizationforEuropean EconomicCooperationin 1948;it eventuallybecame the
chief mechanism
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-the
throughwhich economic bureaucratsof all the advanced capitalist countriescoordinate the
by 1947 the idea had gained strong
conductof day-to-daypolicies. As forEuropean integration,
supportin U. S. media and politicalcircles.SenatorFulbrightand RepresentativeBoggswentso
far as to introduceidenticalresolutionsinto the Congress thatyear, askingit to endorse "the
oftheUnitedNations."The billswere
creationof a UnitedStatesofEurope withintheframework
European integrationwas seen as a more promisingidea forEuropean
passed overwhelmingly.
economic recoverythan individualnational effortsalone, and it offeredsafeguardsfor the
of Germany,which in turn was increasinglyseen as being necessaryfor
reindustrialization
European recoveryand forthesuccessofthenewlyarticulatedU. S. policyofcontainingtheSoviet
ofEurope
Union. See Michael J.Hogan, TheMarshallPlan:America,Britain,and theReconstruction
Press,1987).
(New York: CambridgeUniversity
88. Michael Howard, "Introduction,"in Olav Riste, ed., WestemSecurity:The FormativeYears
1985),p. 14.
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,
89. Gaddis, TheLongPeace, pp. 48-71.
Multilateralism 589
The conceptofthe
help,gettingitto reachacrossto theWesternhemisphere.90
"NorthAtlantic"emergedas the spatial image that helped tie the knot.Its
formulation
and acceptance perhapswere facilitatedby the recentrevolution
wherebythe "airman's view," and thus the polar
in militarycartography,
proximityof the Soviet Union to the United States, came to shape U.S.
The NorthAtlanticTreatywas concluded in 1949. "The
strategicplanning.91
signingof the NATO Alliance," Howard has said, "provideda sense thatnow
at last all were forone and one was forall."92And this,of course,is whatthe
notionofcollectivesecurityhas alwaysmeant.
Indeed, NATO was conceivedand justifiedas an expressionofthecollective
self-defenseprovisionof the UN Charter.There is a directpath fromthe
negotiationsoverArticle51 of the UN Charter,endorsingan inherentrightof
individualand collectiveself-defense,to the draftingof the NorthAtlantic
The same cast of characterswho negotiatedthe UN provisionat San
Treaty.93
Francisco,GladwynJebbon the Britishside and SenatorArthurVandenberg
on the Americanside, also soughtto ensure that the NorthAtlanticTreaty
allowed the United States
would be compatiblewithit. That accomplishment
the
veto," as the Senator
the
but
outside
[Soviet]
to operate "within Charter,
a futureNATO in
not
drafted
with
Article
51
was
What
is
more,
likedto say.94
mind;it was instigatedby the Latin Americansto allow fora Latin American
regionalsecurityorganizationthatwas beyondthereachoftheU. S. vetoin the
UN SecurityCouncil.
To underscorethe obvious,the United States did not seek to endow formal
international
organizationswithextensiveindependentpowers;thatwas notits
agenda. The Americansinsistedon a veto in the UN Security
multilateralist
Council everybit as much as the Soviets did. Voting in the international
was and remainsweighted,the United States stillhaving
financialinstitutions
the largestsingleshare. GATT barelyexistsas a formalorganization(it was
supposed to have been foldedintothe InternationalTrade Organizationthat
never came into being), and until recentlyState Departmentfundingfor it
came out of an accountforad hoc internationalconferences.And the "O" in
90. MartinH. Folly,"BreakingtheVicious Circle:Britain,theUnitedStates,and theGenesis of
theNorthAtlanticTreaty,"DiplomaticHistory12 (Winter1988),pp. 59-77.
91. Alan K. Henrikson,"The Map as an 'Idea': The Role of CartographicImageryDuringthe
2 (April 1975),pp. 19-53 and 88.
Second WorldWar," TheAmericanCartographer
92. Howard,"Introduction,"p. 16.
93. On Article51, see J.Tillapaugh,"Closed Hemisphereand Open World?The Dispute over
Regional Securityat the U. N. Conference,1945,"DiplomaticHistory2 (Winter1978), pp. 25-42.
On the Vandenberg resolution,which paved the domestic political way for the eventual
negotiationsof the NorthAtlanticTreaty,and itsexplicitlinkto Article51, see Daryl J.Hudson,
"Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 239 and AmericanForeign Policy,"Diplomatic
History1 (Winter1977),pp. 46-63.
94. ArthurVandenberg,cited by Hudson in "VandenbergReconsidered."Those who assume
thatVandenberg'sexpressedconcernsamountedto nothingmorethanwindowdressinghave not
made a case for why a Republican senator, who had only recentlybeen convertedfrom
shouldhave thoughtitnecessaryto expendso muchenergyforso punya purpose.
isolationism,
NATO never has and does not now determinethe collectivesecurityof its
members.
agenda consistedabove all of a desire
The Americanpostwarmultilateralist
to restructure
the internationalorder along broadlymultilaterallines,at the
global level, and withinWesternEurope and across the NorthAtlantic.(In
East Asia, on the otherhand, the potentialwas lackingto constructanything
but the bilateralsecurityties on whichthe United States turnedits back in
Europe.95)Secondarily,the United States occasioned the creationof several
majormultilateralregimes,as in thefieldsofmoneyand trade,and also helped
establishnumerousformalinternationalorganizationsto providetechnically
competentor politicallyconvenientservicesin supportof thoseobjectives.96
But the
To be sure,the United States hardlyacted againstits self-interests.
factthatU. S. behaviorwas consistentwithits interestsdoes not explainthe
whatsomewouldcall "a consumptiongood"
behavior.Nor was multilateralism
fortheUnitedStates,an end in itself.So how do we explainU. S. actions?One
agenda is the
possible source of explanationforthe Americanmultilateralist
internationalsystemitself.System-leveltheories of internationalrelations,
muchfavoredin the disciplineat themoment,essentiallyare of twosorts.One
is structural,
the otherfunctional.Both offerparsimoniousand oftenpowerful
posfirst-cut
explanations.Structuralaccountsof the postwarmultilateralist
tureof the United Stateswould focuseitheron U. S. hegemonyor on strategic
bipolarityas the independentvariable.97The problemwithusinghegemonytoutcourt-as an explanationhas already been addressed: other hegemons
and so subsequenthistorywould have been
would have done it differently,
different.
Hence, we stillrequireinsightintowhythisparticularhegemondid
thingsin thisparticularway.
Invoking bipolarityas an explanation is much more promising-once
But it is notwithoutproblemsfortheearliestpostwaryears,
bipolarityexists.98
when bipolaritywas just in the process of becoming,even as some of the
multilateraldevelopmentsdescribedabove were takingplace. Indeed, it took
policymakersand analystsquite some time to grasp the fact of bipolarity.
Serious postwarplanningby the United States began in 1942. WilliamFox's
book, The Super-Powers,
publishedin 1944,stillassumed thattherewould be
95. See Marc S. Gallicchio,The Cold WarBeginsinAsia (New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press,
and theOriginsof the
1988); Gaddis, The Long Peace, pp. 72-103; and Pollard,EconomicSecurity
Cold War,chap. 8.
96. For example,TheNew YorkTimesdescribedtheApril 1943Hot Springsconferenceon food
and agriculture,a conferencethat led eventuallyto the creationof the Food and Agriculture
Organizationof the UN, as "a prologue-a kind of dress rehearsal-preparatoryto the world
organization[Washington]hoped to set up after the war." Cited by Craig Alan Wilson in
"Rehearsal fora United Nations: The Hot SpringsConference,"DiplomaticHistory4 (Summer
1980),p. 264.
thatofKennethWaltz exemplifies
the
97. Whiletheworkof RobertGilpinexemplifies
thefirst,
second.
98. Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity,Multipolarity,and Free Trade," AmericanPolitical Science
Review83 (December 1989),pp. 1245-56.
Multilateralism 591
threeof them.99The BrettonWoods conferencewas held thatyear,withthe
Sovietsin attendance.Moreover,the option of dividingthe world into three
spheresof influenceforthepurposesof conflictmanagementhad notyetbeen
entirelydiscardedin 1944. By 1945,it had been discarded,but in favorof the
universalUN.100In his 1946 "long telegram"and again in his 1947 "Mr. X"
article,George Kennanwarnedabout theemergingSovietsphereof influence,
to reemergefromthedevastationofthe
expectedmultipolarity
buthe explicitly
in orderto
strategy
warbeforelong,and he designedhisproposedcontainment
to
Moreover,as late as 1947,tradenegotiatorsweretrying
achievethatgoal.101
square circlesto devise a multilateraltrade regimethat could accommodate
Even more important,also in 1947,Lucius
socialiststate tradingcountries.102
governorin Germany,initiallyblamed the French,not
Clay,the U. S. military
the Soviets,for impedingquadripartitegovernmentthere when it was still
doable; the failureto achieve it resultedultimatelyin the bizonal divisionof
Germanythatbecame emblematicof thecold war.103
Admittedly,actor perceptionsdo not mattermuch in structuraltheories.
Nevertheless,itdoes seem morethana littleawkwardto retrojectas incentives
conditionswhichhad notyetclearlyemergedand
foractorbehaviorstructural
were notyetfullyunderstoodand whichin some measureonlythe subsequent
behaviorof actorshelped to produce.104
as we noted at the outset,
Functionaltheoriesof internationalinstitutions,
thus far have focused largely on undifferentiated"cooperation" and
Their limitedutilityon
not the specificformof multilateralism.
"institutions,"
thiscounthas alreadybeen commentedon. Moreover,functionaltheorieshave
been concernedlargelywithsuchfactorsas the desireto minimizetransaction
This rationale,
inefficiencies.
costs,and similarinstitutional
costs,information
too,has limits.First,althoughour historicalcases are too fewto make a strong
of this
inefficiencies
case, theydo suggestthatthe driveto limitinstitutional
The UnitedStates,Britain,and theSovietUnion(New
99. WilliamT. R. Fox, The Super-Powers:
York: Harcourt,Brace, 1944).
100. Dallek, FranklinD. RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy,chaps. 14-15.
pp. 25-53.
ofContainment,
see Gaddis,Strategies
101. For a discussionofKennan's strategy,
102. See Viner,"Conflictsof Principlein Draftinga Trade Charter";and Feis, "The Conflict
Over Trade Ideologies."
103. See JeanEdward Smith,Lucius D. Clay:An AmericanLife (New York: HenryHolt, 1990),
especiallypp. 423-49. Smith'soverallassessmentofU. S.-Sovietrelationsas seen on thegroundin
Germanyis this:"The questionoferectinga counterpoiseto theSovietUnion did notenterClay's
thinkinguntillate 1947, and untilthen his relationswiththe Russians were warmand cordial"
(p.7).
the peculiarformof bipolarity
104. Jervishas pointedout thatthe decisiveeventin instituting
knownas the cold war was the Korean War. High U. S. defensebudgets,a large U. S. armed
presence in Europe to back the NorthAtlanticTreatysecurityguarantees,and anticommunist
all acrosstheglobe tookhold onlyafterthatwar.What is more,Jervisargues,"there
commitments
were no eventson the horizonwhichcould have been functionalsubstitutesforthe war"-and
security
wouldhavebeen capable ofproducingthosefeaturesoftheinternational
which,therefore,
See Robert Jervis,"The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Joumalof
environment.
Resolution24 (December 1980),p. 563.
Conflict
kindis mostdecisivein the realmof coordinationproblems.When it comes to
hopes for lastingpeace, the calculus of
sheddingblood or institutionalizing
universeof discourse.Second, it also
countriesappears to drawon a different
inefficiencies
or costs is not entirely
seems thatwhat constitutesinstitutional
independent of the attributesof the states making the calculation. For
example,it is difficult
to imaginean institutionalarrangementthat imposed
highertransactioncosts on all concernedthan the Nazi trade and monetary
regimes.But giventhe overallstrategicobjectivesof the German state at the
was seen as an investment,
thosearrangements
time,thepriceof administering
not an expenditureto be minimized.The domesticmechanismsthatshape the
Japanese foreigntrade posture today, with all their reputed institutional
"inefficiencies,"
maypose an analogousconceptualproblem.105
agenda was pursued,it
In short,to determinewhythisparticularinstitutional
is inescapable at some pointto look more closelyat thisparticularhegemon.
situation
That in turnrequiresnotonlyexaminingthehegemon'sinternational
but also delvingintoitsdomesticrealm.
It seems clear thatacross a broad arrayof social and economicsectors,the
United States afterWorldWar II soughtto projectthe experienceof the New
arena.106
Deal regulatory
stateintotheinternational
Accordingto Anne-Marie
The firstwas a belief
Burley,thisendeavorentailedtwodistinctdimensions.107
that the long-termmaintenanceand success of domestic reformprograms
at
requireda compatibleinternationalorder.The second was a commitment
the internationallevel to institutionalmeans which had alreadybeen tried
revolutionthat
domesticallyand whichgrewout ofthelegal and administrative
accompaniedthe New Deal. The combinationof the two translatedinto an
a multilateralinternationaleconomicand
activeU. S. effort
to institutionalize
social order.
In the securityrealm,a countof the domesticpoliticalnoses led President
Roosevelt to believe that isolationisttendenciescould not be neutralizedby
having the United States formbilateral alliances with or against the very
European statesthatkept draggingit intowar-which is how the isolationists
the notionwas foremostin Roosevelt's mind
viewed the world.Accordingly,
that onlyby "binding"the United States to a more permanentmultilateral
traditionalinternational
institutional
whichpromisedto transform
framework,
Karel van Wolferen,and
105. The so-calledGang ofFour (ChalmersJohnson,ClydePrestowitz,
in thisregard;see "BeyondJapan-Bashing:
The
JamesFallows) has insistedthatJapanis different
'Gang of Four' Defends the RevisionistLine," BusinessWeek,7 May 1990. For a dispassionate
conclusions,see Edward J. Lincoln,
empiricalanalysis,whichdoes not reach radicallydifferent
1990).
Japan'sUnequalTrade(Washington,D. C.: BrookingsInstitution,
Search fora
106. See Michael J. Hogan, "Revival and Reform:America'sTwentieth-Century
New Economic Order Abroad," DiplomaticHistory8 (Fall 1984), pp. 287-310; and Anne-Marie
InternationalLaw, and theProjectionof theNew
Burley,"RegulatingtheWorld:Multilateralism,
Matters.While Hogan stressesthe economic
Deal RegulatoryState," in Ruggie,Multilateralism
and legal dimensions.
interestgroupdimension,Burleyfocuseson the administrative
107. Burley,"RegulatingtheWorld."
Multilateralism 593
By 1947,the Truman
politics,could a relapse into isolationismbe avoided.108
rhetoricto be a usefultool toward
discoveredanticommunist
administration
thatsame end.109
More generally,Peter Cowheyhas advanced the provocativethesisthatthe
ofAmerica'spostwar
of theU. S. polityenhancedthecredibility
verystructure
The problemof "defection"thatis explored
to multilateralism.110
commitment
at lengthin the literaturefocusesnoton thehegemonbut,rather,on theother
is an extremely
states,potentialfree ridersone and all. But multilateralism
form,and the factis thatthe hegemonhas farmore
demandinginstitutional
unilateraland bilateraloptionsavailableto itthananyotherstate.So howdoes
credible?How can
to multilateralism
the hegemonmake itsown commitment
theotherstatesbe assuredthatthehegemonwillnotdefectifit shouldchange
interests,leaving them in the lurch?
its mind or recalculate its short-term
to
of the Americancommitment
Ironically,Cowheyattributesthe credibility
multilateralism
to the veryfeaturesof the U.S. politythat are oftensaid to
conductof foreignpolicy.These includethe institutional
hamperits effective
consequencesof an electoralsystemgeared to the medianvoter;a divisionof
and greater
powersmakingreversalsof fundamentalpolicyposturesdifficult;
of and access to the domesticpoliticalarena even on the partof
transparency
foreigninterests.No potentialPax Nipponicatoday,Cowheyconcludes,would
level of confidence;it lacks the appropriatedomesticbase.
instilla sufficient
Cowhey'sthesisand thecomparisondeservemoreextensivestudy.
in the postwarera
In sum,in one crucialsense the originsof multilateralism
reiteratethe recordof priorperiods. Between the deep level of definingand
stabilizingthe internationalpropertyrightsof states and the relatively
superficiallevel of solvingcoordinationproblems,a pronouncedshifttoward
in economicand securityaffairsrequiresa combinationoffairly
multilateralism
Ifthatis so,
forcesand compatibledomesticenvironments.
stronginternational
then it was the factof an Americanhegemonythatwas decisiveafterWorld
And this in turnmakes the role of
War II, not merelyAmericanhegemony.
of even greater
in the currentinternationaltransformation
multilateralism
interest.
Multilateralismand transformation
The issue ofwhethertheUnitedStatesis in relativedeclineand, ifso, whether
it is takingthe internationalorder along with it has been debated in the
108. See Dallek, FranklinD. RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy.

109. See Thomas G. Paterson,MeetingtheCommunistThreat:Trumanto Reagan (New York:
Press,1988),pp. 3-158.
OxfordUniversity
110. Peter F. Cowhey, "Elect Locally, Order Globally: Domestic Politics and Multilateral
Matters.
Cooperation,"in Ruggie,Multilateralism
literaturefornearlytwo decades.1"' More recently,the end of bipolarityhas
werethe
The newinstitutionalists
been adduced as a cause forsimilaralarm.112
powershiftsand
firstto questionanydirectrelationshipbetweeninternational
unraveling.They providedseveral functionalreasons whystates
institutional
would, under some circumstances,remaincommittedto existinginstitutions
inertia,sunk
even"beyondhegemony,"focusingon suchfactorsas institutional
costs, the services that institutionscontinue to provide, and the common
objectivesthattheymaycontinueto pursue.113
But as we saw at the outsetof our discussion,the situationtoday,especially
but not exclusivelyin Europe, is not simplyone of past multilateralarrangements hangingon for dear life. There are numerous instances of active
institutionaladaptation and even creation.Again, there is not much in the
theoreticalliteraturethat providesready explanations.The definitionaland
presentedhere, however,does suggest
historicalanalysisof multilateralism
severalfactorsthatmaybe at work.
itself.
ofmultilateralism
One suchfactoris logicallyimpliedbythedefinition
to establish
Ironically,the veryfeaturesthat make it strategicallydifficult
multilateralarrangementsin the firstplace may enhance the durabilityand
once theyare in place. I pointedout earlier
adaptabilityof thesearrangements
that successfulmultilateralarrangementsin the past have come to exhibit
It seems plausible to hypothesizethat as
expectationsof diffusereciprocity.
longas thatexpectationcontinuesto hold,as longas each partydoes notinsist
of the arrangeon being equally rewardedon everyround,the sustainability
and intertempomentshouldbe enhancedbecause itmakesbothcross-sectoral
ral trade-offsand bargains feasible. Cooperation with the EC seems most
clearlyto exhibitthis pattern.It may have benefitedfromor perhaps even
requiredactiveU. S. encouragementat thestart,butobviouslyithas longsince
institutional
takenoffon a self-sustaining
path.114
all otherthingsbeingequal, an arrangement
based on generalized
Similarly,
organizingprinciplesshouldbe more elasticthanone based on particularistic
interestsand situationalexigencies.It should,therefore,also exhibitgreater
power
in theface ofchangingcircumstances,
includinginternational
continuity
shifts.A collectivesecurityarrangementmore readilyabsorbs such shifts,as
111. The debate was triggeredby Charles Kindleberger'sbook, The Worldin Depression,
of CaliforniaPress, 1973),whichalso made popular the analogy
1929-1939 (Berkeley:University
betweenthe 1930sand subsequentdecades-first the 1970s,thenthe 1980s,and nowthe 1990s?
112. See, forexample,Mearsheimer,"Back to theFuture."
Regimes;and Keohane,AfterHegemony.
113. See Krasner,Intemational
114. In his contributionto our project,Garrettanalyzes the most far-reachinginstance of
of the SingleEuropean Act.
multilateralism
ever:the EC members'adoptionand implementation
If he is
He describeshis storyas beingentirelyconsistentwitha "rationalist"viewof institutions.
correct,it would suggestthat,givena certainset of incentivesto collaborateand givena certain
institutional
framework
forcollaboration,beyondsome pointno extrapushfromany"extraneous"
forces,symbols,or aspirationsmay be necessaryto achieve integrativesolutions.See Geoffrey
Garrett,"International Cooperation and InstitutionalChoice: The European Community's
46 (Spring1992),pp. 533-60.
InternalMarket,"IntemationalOrganization
Multilateralism 595
does a trade regime based on MFN treatment.It is hard to imagine the
the hegemonyof the ThirdReich,
orderof the Nazis surviving
discriminatory
however.And even in the case of traditionalalliances, the major means of
adjustmentis simplyto abandon the prevailingdyadicties.Althoughthecases
the ready adaptation of NATO at least as a
no doubt are overdetermined,
versusthetotalcollapse oftheWarsawPact neverthearrangement
transitional
less mayhelp illustratethispoint.
The durabilityof multilateralarrangements,the analysispresentedhere
For example,therewas
suggests,is also a functionof domesticenvironments.
centurythat could have
around the mid-nineteenth
no shiftin multipolarity
accountedforthefinalcollapse of the ConcertofEurope and thereemergence
did divergesharplyafter
of competitivealliances,but domesticenvironments
the revolutionsof 1848. The erosion of the gold standardand free trade to
in thatboth sets of factorschanged;but
some extentmaybe overdetermined
were
even beforeBritaindeclinedappreciablyas a worldpower,governments
politicallycompelled to intervenein theirdomesticeconomies in ways that
were incompatiblewith the two multilateralarrangements.In fact, even
CharlesKindleberger'sclimactericcase ofthe 1933London EconomicConference-when "the Britishcouldn'tand the United Stateswouldn't"-does not
systemicaccount. What the United States
lend itselfto a straightforward
the
formof economicmultilateralism:
"wouldn't"was to supporttheprevailing
laissez-fairekind, the London and New York bankers' kind, and Herbert
Hoover'skind.But no one, includingPresidentRoosevelt,had yetfiguredout a
viable and mutuallyacceptable alternative.15As ArthurSchlesingernotes in
his classic account,"This difference[betweenthe United States and Britain]
was too great to be bridgedby any formof economicor diplomaticlegerdemain. The London Conferencedid not create the difference.It simplycame
along too late-or too early-to do anythingabout it."116 No domestic
divergencethatstarkexistsamongthemajorpowerstoday.The collapse ofthe
SovietUnion and thedomesticchangesin EasternEurope have eliminatedthe
internationalsignificanceof the socialist economic model. The domestic
ofJapanmaypose a remotelycomparableproblem,butitis
economicstructure
hardlyof thesame magnitude."7
in Crisis(Boston: Little,Brown,1966).
115. See HerbertFeis, 1933: Characters
116. See ArthurM. Schlesinger,The Comingof theNew Deal, vol. 2 of TheAge of Roosevelt
renderingof thiscase, whichnot
1958), p. 229. For a game-theoretic
(Boston: HoughtonMifflin,
onlysupportsSchlesinger'sconclusionbut also shedsconsiderablelighton thebroaderdebate,see
Triangle:MonetaryDiplothe followingworksof KennethA. Oye: "The Sterling-Dollar-Franc
macy, 1929-1937," WorldPolitics 38 (October 1985), pp. 173-99; and "On the Benefitsof
Bilateralism:Lessons fromthe 1930s," paper prepared for the Workshopon Change in the
of SouthernCalifornia,Los Angeles,5-6 May 1989.
InternationalSystem,University
117. Gilpin raises this,correctlyin myjudgment,as one potentialfactorthatcould undermine
the embedded liberalismcompromiseon whichthe postwareconomic regimeshave rested.See
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of IntemationalRelations (Princeton,N. J.: Princeton
Press,1987).
University
Furthermore,by and large actual multilateralarrangementswith welldefinedtaskssimplyhave notlivedup to thebad billingtheyget in some of the
literatureas unwieldyexpressionsof the law of large numbers.This is so for
in practice
severalreasons. Firstof all, mostmajormultilateralarrangements
Snidal,
that
Duncan
"k-groups"
are governed by subsets of states-the
collective
many
international
followingRussell Hardin, suggestsattenuate
action problems.18Miles Kahler shows empiricallywhat Snidal postulates
theoretically:
themajorpostwarglobalregimeshave been governedbywhathe
Thus, the regimeswere not
terms"minilateralist"groupingswithinthem.1"9
mere expressionsof hegemony,and theytherebyavoided obvious legitimacy
problems.Nor did theyoperate purelyon the basis of egalitariandecisionmakingrules, however.Decolonization began to strainthis "minilateralist"
solutionin the 1960s and 1970s.Nevertheless,whetherin the subsequentLaw
of the Sea negotiations,GATT rounds,or draftingof global environmental
Kahler findslittleevidencethatstateshave encounteredinsuperconventions,
in devisinginstitutionalmechanismswhich,at one and the
able difficulties
same time,accommodatelargernumbersof participantswhileretainingtheir
complex and more
capacityto reach decisions. Even in the extraordinarily
"democratic"contextof the UN Conferenceon the Law of the Sea, as Barry
Buzan has shown in great detail, the institutionalinventivenessof states to
and thefailureto obtaina ratified
accommodatelargenumberswas impressive,
ofinterest,notfromanymechanical
treatyresultedfromfundamentalconflicts
problemofsize.120
A final factorto be considered in explanationsfor the adaptabilityof
multilateralarrangementsis that in some instances the twentieth-century
"move to institutions"
clearlyhas kickedin. Indeed, muchof the institutional
inventivenesswithin multilateralarrangementstoday is coming from the
or at leastspeakfor
represent
thatarguably
fromplatforms
themselves,
institutions
at hand. Again,the EC offersthe most dramaticillustration,
the collectivities
EC relationswiththeEuropeanFree
whetherit concernsplansfororchestrating
itself.'21
Trade Area, the East Europeanstates,or the futureof the Community
PatrickMorgangoesso faras toarguethatWestEuropeanactorstodayareexplicitly
lessonsthattheyderived
applyingto EasternEurope some of the institutional
fromtheirown earlierpostwarexperiencewiththe United States,not onlyin
the economic realm but also in the securityrealm.122Beyond Europe, the
118. See Snidal, "The Limitsof Hegemonic StabilityTheory"; and Russell Hardin, Collective
Press,1982).
Action(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkinsUniversity
withSmall and Large Numbers."
119. Kahler,"Multilateralism
120. Barry Buzan, "Negotiatingby Consensus: Developments in Technique at the U. N.
Conferenceon the Law of the Sea," AmericanJoumalof IntemationalLaw 75 (April 1981), pp.
324-48.
121. See "Western Europe Moves to Expand Free-Trade Links," The New York Times,8
December 1989,pp. 1 and D5; "All Europe's a Stage," TheEconomist,16 March 1991,p. 48; and
"InnerSpace," TheEconomist,18 May 1991,pp. 53-54.
122. See PatrickM. Morgan,"Multilateralismand SecurityProspectsin Europe," in Ruggie,
Matters.See also Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts,CollectiveSecurity,and the
Multilateralism
FutureofEurope."
Multilateralism 597
convening-and agenda-setting
power of multilateralorganizationsis perhaps
best illustratedin the area of the commons.There would be no plan to tryto
salvage the Mediterraneanwere it not formultilateralplayers,as Peter Haas
has shown.123
Similarly,
multilateralplayerskeptfirstthe ozone issue and now
globalwarmingon thenegotiating
table evenwhenmajorpowers,includingthe
UnitedStates,were reluctantparticipantsat best.124
In sum, parts of the internationalinstitutionalorder today appear quite
robust and adaptive. The above discussionsuggeststhat the reason is not
are "in demand." The
and thatinstitutions
simplythatthese are institutions
reasonis also thattheseinstitutions
are multilateralin formand thatthisform,
under certain circumstances,has characteristicswhich may enhance its
and abilityto adapt to change.This,at anyrate,is thecentralnotion
durability
thatthe explorationof theconceptofmultilateralism
presentedhere advances
forfurtherscrutiny.Discoveringpreciselywhat those circumstancesare and
why the picture is far frombeing uniformacross issue-areas is clearly a
necessarynextstep in thisline of inquiry.
Conclusion
This articlewas writtenwithtwo sets of protagonistsin mind. The firstare
matterlittle.It
thosetheoristsof internationalrelationsforwhominstitutions
theorists
that
do
not
be
as
these
may
true,
insist,
they
purportto explain
It does notfollowfrom
butthatwhattheydo explainis important.125
everything
that truth,however,that what theyleave unexplainedis unimportant.And
institutions,
clearly,are notunimportant.
The second set of protagonistsare those of my fellowinstitutionalists
for
whom the formthat institutionstake is left unexplored.Their focus is on
in a genericsense or on cooperationeven more generally.Much
institutions
can be learned about internationalrelationsfromthatperspective.But at the
same time,too much is leftunsaid. And what is leftunsaid-the formthat
institutions
assume-affectsvitallythe role thatinstitutions
play on theworld
stagetoday.Above all else, policymakers
gropingforalternativesamidstrapid
change, hoping to grasp the flow of events and channel it in desirable
directions,do notdeal in genericchoices;theirchoicesare palpablyconcrete.
Press,1990).
123. PeterM. Haas, SavingtheMediterranean
Epistemic CommunityEffortsto
124. See Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons:
46 (Winter1992),pp. 187-223;JamesK.
ProtectStratosphericOzone," IntemationalOrganization
Sebenius,"Craftinga WinningCoalition:Negotiatinga Regime to ControlGlobal Warming,"in
a Global Regime(Washington,D.
Negotiating
RichardElliot Benedicket al., GreenhouseWarming:
C.: World Resources Institute,1991); and Mark W. Zacher, "MultilateralOrganizationsand the
Spaces," in
The Developmentof Regimes forthe Non-Terrestrial
Institutionof Multilateralism:
Matters.
Ruggie,Multilateralism
125. This has been Waltz'sstandardresponse;see, forexample,KennethWaltz,"Reflectionson
Politics:A Response to My Critics,"in Robert0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism
TheoryofIntemational
Press,1986),pp. 322-45.
and Its Critics(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
arrangeA core and concretefeatureof currentinternationalinstitutional
ments is their multilateralform.Why both the conventionalliteratureon
should remainrelainternationalrelationsand the literatureon institutions
tivelysilenton it maywell have somethingto do withthe atomisticontologyof
epistemologyof the other,as James
the one and the instrumental-rationalist
Be thatas it
ways,suggest.'26
Caporaso and FriedrichKratochwil,in different
may,I hope that the presentarticlehas established,at minimum,that it is
seriouslytheissue thatformmatters.
worthinvestigating
No theoryhas been advancedin thepresentarticle;no theorywas vindicated
or even tested. We cannot explain what we have not firstdescribed.And
conceptual explicationis a requisite for theoreticallyinformeddescription,
to theorybuildingitself.Mymainobjectivehere has been to
leadingultimately
and
and historically,
bothanalytically
explicatethe conceptof multilateralism,
to offersome preliminary
guidinghypothesesabout what may and may not
explainitsincidenceand correlatesand about how and whyitmatters.
126. See Caporaso, "InternationalRelations Theory and Multilateralism";and FriedrichV.

Divide: A Unilateral Plea for
Kratochwil,"Multilateralismand the Rationalist/Reflectivist
CommunicativeRationality,"in Ruggie,Multilateralism
Matters.

Multilateralism The Anatomy of An Institution

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Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution

Author(s): John Gerard Ruggie

In 1989,peacefulchange,whicha leadingrealisttheoristhad declared a very

43. The distinctionbetweencoordinationand collaborationwas proposed by ArthurStein in

53. See Kupchan and Kupchan,"Concerts,CollectiveSecurity,and the Futureof Europe," p.

The UnitedStatesand postwarmultilateralism

108. See Dallek, FranklinD. RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy.

126. See Caporaso, "InternationalRelations Theory and Multilateralism";and FriedrichV.

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