SAFETY DISCIPLINE FEED-BACK REPORT

AMP2 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY

Prepared by:

Sbastien Chdeville (Feb. 2005)

Contract n

8524R AKOGEP Phase 2 (AMP2)

Client/COMPANY:

EPNL (TOTAL)

Safety leader:

B. Teigner

The purpose of this feed-back is to present the approach applied for the determination of PFP
extent that has been adopted on the AKOGEP Project (TOTAL Nigeria). This approach is based
on risk / consequence assessments.
This feedback expand the feedback Passive Fire Protection AMP2 offshore platform dated Feb.
2003 and therefore supersedes it.
1.
METHODOLOGY APPLIED FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE PFP EXTENT ON
AMP2 PLATFORM
The methodology applied for the determination of the PFP extent on AMP2 platform can be
divided into the following steps:
1. Accident scenarios identification and definition
2. Safety Critical Elements identification
3. Definition of survival criteria for the Safety Critical Elements
4. Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) and mapping of FERA scenarios
consequences upon the Safety Critical Elements
5. Structural redundancy study
6. 3D-model reviews
7. Definition of the PFP extent
1.1

Accident scenarios identification and definition

The first step applied for the determination of the PFP extent is the identification of main accidental
scenarios that could occur at various process sections on AMP2 platform. The selection of these
main scenarios has been based upon criteria such as high pressures, large inventories, location of
the source / equipment etc. Thus, 26 scenarios were identified (mainly jet fires and 1 pool fire).
Refer to the Minutes of Meeting of the kick-off meeting for the FERA study: Safety Meeting for
the definition of the scenario for the Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment FERA (MM-8502SP316-CT/AKPRS/012 dated the 23/05/02002).

1.2

Safety Critical Elements identification

The second step is the identification of the Safety Critical Elements (SCE) to be protected. The
protection of these Safety Critical Elements has been found mandatory in order to meet the
COMPANY requirements in term of level of protection. Indeed, the COMPANY GS-SAF-337
requires that the integrity of Safety Critical Elements has to be maintained to allow the following
objectives being achieved:

5 min. for escape of personnel from a fire zone

120 min. for Evacuation and Rescue

60 min. for Emergency Response (ER) duties in non-hazardous area

120 min. for ER duties in hazardous area

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AMP2 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY

60 min. for mitigation (Emergency Depressurisation)

The Safety Critical Elements thus identified jointly with the TFE representative are:

The Escape, Evacuation and Rescue facilities (EER)

Risers / pipelines

ESDV / SDVs which have an ESDV funtction

Emergency response facilities:

-

Flare system (piping header, drum)

Firewater system (firewater pumps, firewater piping)

Buildings protecting Safety Critical Elements

Structures supporting Safety Critical Elements (bridge structure supporting flare piping and
EER facilities, main structure, pipe rack with flare piping and ESDV/BDV cables)

In addition, other Safety Critical Elements have been added and are also protected as their failure
may lead to a serious escalation of the hazard and/or damage the SCEs. They are:

1.3

Supports of equipment containing large inventories of Hydrocarbon

Secondary structural members supporting critical equipment (i.e. instrument air drums,
metering unit, gas inlet separator, TEG inlet scrubber, gas compressor, Turbo-generators)

Crane pedestal

Definition of survival criteria for the Safety Critical Elements

The next step of the process is the definition of acceptable survival criteria for each aforementioned
Safety Critical Elements. The protection criteria (radiation limit maximum acceptable exposure
time) considered are presented in the table hereafter. They are based on data from CMPT (Centre of
marine and Petroleum Technologies): A guide for QRA for offshore installations 1999.

Safety Critical
Elements

Survival
criteria
(BTU/h/ft)

Exposure
duration
(sec.)

EER

1000

N/A

Jet fire / Pool fire leak size 7mm

ESDV

5000

N/A

Jet fire / Pool fire leak size 20mm

Flare drum

2000

300

Jet fire leak size 20mm

Flare piping

3000

300

Jet fire leak size 20mm

600

Pool fire leak size 20mm

N/A

Flame impingement

300

Jet fire leak size 20mm

600

Pool fire leak size 20mm

600

Jet fire leak size 20mm

Beams structure,
Bridge, buildings
Firewater pumps

5000
5000

Corresponding scenarios

N/A means that no associated duration is considered: protection means have to be considered
regardless of exposure duration.
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1.4

Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) and mapping of FERA scenarios consequences
upon the Safety Critical Elements
The FERA study has then been performed in order to calculate and to assess the consequences of
each scenario upon each Safety Critical Element. The calculations have been performed taking into
account detection / isolation time (60 sec.) and Emergency Depressurisation of the process section
where applicable. The results are presented in the Additional Study of FERA scenarios
This has lead to a mapping exercise of the consequences for the entire platform. The FERA
calculations have been transposed and plotted on schemes for each deck, taking into account
obstruction by firewalls / building. Obstructions by equipment / structures were further considered
during specific 3D-model reviews (refer to section 1.6). Refer to AMP2 Passive Fire Protection
(PFP) Philosophy and Requirements for further details.

1.5

Structural redundancy study

In addition to the study of FERA scenarios and their consequences, a structural redundancy
analysis has been performed by the Structural Department. The aim of such study is to investigate
the redundancy of the primary structural members of the AMP2 Topsides.
The basis of this study is the following principle: should a structural member be impacted by a jet
fire, the latter will lose its mechanical properties, eventually collapse whereas the surrounding
structural members will be affected and weakened by the resulting thermal radiation. A redundant
member, by definition, can be exposed to jet fires and collapse without jeopardising the overall
structure integrity.
The relation between redundant members and PFP requirements is that all structural members
found redundant further to the structural analysis do not need to be coated with Passive Fire
Protection. On the other hand, all main structural members which are non-redundant and may be
exposed to a jet fire, require PFP coating.
Thus, a significant saving on the PFP extent has been reached through such study (about 50% of
primary structures were found not to be protected).
Refer to AMP2 topsides redundancy analysis for further details.

1.6

3D-model reviews
Where necessary, 3D-model reviews were performed in order to achieve PFP optimisations.
The scenarios were reviewed taking into consideration view factors and masking effects coming
from various obstacles such as equipment, piping and structural members, etc. The 3D-model has
been used to identify / visualize these obstacles and to figure out what would be their effect on jet
fire impingement on structural members.
This has allowed to assess that some areas, despite being in the initial jet flame range or in the zone
likely to be exposed above the maximum criteria, are in fact unexposed due to large enough
obstacles located between the targeted areas and the sources.

2.

LEVEL OF PROTECTION TO MEET SAFETY OBJECTIVES

Protection of EER facilities are ensured at the outset of the accidental event in order to meet the
design objectives regarding the escape of personnel from a fire zone (5 minutes). Practically, H0 or
J0 ratings are required to offer protection as soon as the fire begins. Thus, it is anticipated that
personnel would be sufficiently protected to escape from the protected zone and then to safely
escape and/or evacuate. For some essential EER facilities the level of protection may be higher to
indeed give protection during at least 5 minutes (i.e. firewalls protecting the bridge access).
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AMP2 being a gas platform, the main risk is associated to jet fires. Additional Study of FERA
scenarios has shown that, for credible leaks, the extent of associated jet fires drops (due to
depressurisation) within a few minutes. After 30 minutes, the extent of jet fire associated to
credible leaks has dropped to a few centimetres. Therefore a maximum of 30 minutes jet fire
exposure has been considered. The Safety Critical Elements associated to the Emergency Response
have thus been protected up to these 30 minutes. The ER facilities integrity are maintained during
the maximum duration of exposure. Afterwards, the consequences of the event are drastically
lowered due to this Emergency Response and the protection is not required anymore. The design
objectives for the ER duties in hazardous and in non-hazardous area are met.
For similar reasons, the objectives for mitigation (60 minutes) are met providing that the SCEs
assuring this mitigation are adequately protected for the maximum jet fire duration (30 minutes
considered here).
For some essential Critical Elements of the Mitigation / Emergency Response, the level of
protection has been extended up to the protection duration of the related objective. On AMP2, this
has been the case for the exposed structural members of the bridge and the platform (primary and
secondary) whose failure would lead to catastrophic collapse of the structure and whose integrity
shall be maintained in order to keep the overall platform integrity and/or not to jeopardize the
objectives. For these elements, the fire protection required is J60.
It is also the case for the gas export riser and associated ESDV where protection is J30-H120.
3.

PFP EXTENT ON AMP2

Safety Critical
Element

PFP extent

A firewall rated J0 on the northern side of the HVAC room (south of Platform+15100)
protects the escape from the buildings.

PFP (rated J30) is applied on the underside of the HVAC room, on the underside of the
storage sample room and on the underside of the main deck area located to the East of the
HVAC room. The PFP extent on the underside of the main deck area is on the cantilever area
of the row B and extends from the emergency assembly area to the leg B1.

A firewall rated J30-H60 is installed on the northern side of the ESDV area on the
Mezzanine deck to protect the escape ways to the bridge.

EER facilities

Note: EER facilities are also Protected by physical barriers or other protective measures
(radiation shields, water curtains)

ESDV / risers

ESDVs handling flammable fluids (on AMP2 and the new one on AMP1) are Fire and blast
protected J30.

Gas Riser is protected by intumescent PFP or GRP rated (J30 H120) between LAT (as far
as practicable) and associated ESDV.

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Safety Critical
Element

PFP extent

The flare drums (HP & LP) skirt, saddle supports and supporting structures are protected by
PFP for a fire rating J30.
Note: The drums themselves are not PFP protected as covered by deluge. The flare pipes are
not PFP coated as the EDP will cool down the pipes and the welded pipes might eventually
be deformed but would not fail.

A firewall rated J30-H60 between process equipment and firewater pump 46 GY 921A acts
as a protection against radiation and against blast and missiles. The diesel engine of the FW
pump is within an A0 enclosure, which is mainly present to allow the extinguishing of an
engine fire by the CO2 system.

Where exposed to fire, supports (rating J30) and flanges (by casings) of the wet section of
the firewater network are fire protected.
Note: wet pipes are not protected as water flowing within the pipes will cool the pipes (GRE
pipe can resist to 30 minutes jet fire if water is flowing, as per Vendor info).

Emergency
Response
facilities

Note: All cables used for safety system that need to be energised to operate are fire resistant.
All other cables are flame retardant. Fail safe circuits have no fire resistant cables.

Electrical Switchroom: Northern / Eastern external walls shall be rated J30-H120

ITTR/HVAC rooms: the associated building protects Evacuation / Emergency Response

facilities. The external walls potentially exposed to fire (Northern/eastern walls; underside of
HVAC room; roof of ITTR room) are rated J30-H120.

H60 fire walls are required between transformers and the associated part of the supporting
roof (Electrical Switchroom)

Vessel skirts, saddle supports and structural element supporting vessels or exchangers
containing hydrocarbons are protected with PFP rated J30.
Note: Process vessels themselves are provided with deluge and therefore are not PFP
protected.

The pipe racks and pipes supports are protected by a fireproof coating (J30) if pipe is a flare
header line and/or pipes carries firewater which would reduce the fire-fighting capability in
case of loss of pipe support.
Note: As deluge is provided over the main pipe racks, PFP on the pipes is not required.

The bridge structure (J60) and flare headers supports (J30) distance of 25 metres on each
side AMP1 and AMP2 are be protected by fireproof coating

Exposed primary and secondary structural members of the platform are protected by PFP
rated J60 if they are non-redundant and/or if they support Safety Critical Elements and
critical equipment.

buildings

Piping /
Equipment /
Structure

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4.

REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
Title
Passive Fire Protection
Safety Meeting for the definition of the scenario for the Fire
and Explosion Risk Assessment FERA
Additional Study of FERA Scenarios
AMP2 Passive Fire Protection (PFP) Philosophy and
Requirements
AMP2 Topsides Redundancy Analysis
CMPT (Centre of marine and Petroleum Technologies): A
guide for QRA for offshore installations

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Document Number
TOTAL GS-SAF-337
MM-8502S-P316-CT/AKPRS/012

Rev.
0
-

8502S-001-RT-1900-07

01

8502S-001-RT-1900-08

02

8502S-300-CN-3632-095

00
1999