Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education

95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act
No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country.
It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private
school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards
that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of
Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by
the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before
such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a
practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such
power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power;
that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard
upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books
granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not
show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such
powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of
schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even
as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development
of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was
intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to
Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over
all schools.

Tan v. Macapagal
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people.
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional
Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution
and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to
revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government
other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention
being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution
without altering the general plan laid down therein."
Issues:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."
Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only
by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement.
Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.
Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,'
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
2. NO.
At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that
would radically alter the 1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The
case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the
court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.
Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The
Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their
duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfil its duties well. The court may not
interfere until the proper time comes ripeness

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a
motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The
SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of
Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for
hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed
by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided
for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether
the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards.
If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has
to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative
action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for

probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without
such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed
by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the
provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for
the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There
can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer
without the probation system.

Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others
are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail
sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality
of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.
HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on
the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183591
FACTS:

October 14 2008

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of
the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The
Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of
public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or
a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult
the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by
respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded
their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for
judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention
and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance
adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws
x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under
RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same selfexecutory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no
distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek
relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners
and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or
a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in
the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of

the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and
the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of
the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous
region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to
the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying
an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation,
in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes
and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her
mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed

standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional

amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required

amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a

plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations
either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the
time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes
not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous
peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of
choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists
in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro
homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that
ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clearcut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails,
among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not
grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment

and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated
by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process
by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is
on its way to independence.

Alunan vs Mirasol
GR No. 108399 July 31, 1997
Facts:
LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be composed of a
chairman, 7 members, a secretary and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK
elections were to be held 30 days after the next local elections. The Local
Government Code was enacted January 1, 1992.
The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992,
COMELEC provided guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK
on Sept. 30, 1992, which also placed the SK elections under the direct control
and supervision of DILG, with the technical assistance of COMELEC. After
postponements, they were held December 4, 1992.
Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21
registered, 15,749 of them filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council
passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.
September 18, 1992 The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolution
exempting Manila from holding SK elections because the elections previously
held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first SK elections under the new
LGC. DILG acted on a letter by Santiago, acting President of the KB (Kabataang
Barangay) City Federation of Manila and a member of the City Council of Manila,
which stated that elections for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26,
1990. In this resolution, DILG stated that the LGC intended to exempt those
barangay chapters which conducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to
January 1, 1992 from the forthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected
would be extended to coincide with the terms of those elected in the SK elections
Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had
no power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections
for SKs, and that DILG denied them equal protection of laws.
RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing
the order of the DILG Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified preelection activities in order to implement the general elections. The case was
reraffled to a different branch of the same court, and the new judge held that
DILG had no power to exempt Manila from holding SK elections, because that
power rests solely in COMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that
Manila has not previously held elections for KB by calling for a general election,
and that the exemption of Manila violated the equal protection clause because of
the 5,000 barangays that previously held elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay,
were there no elections.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and
supervision over the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELEC
Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK elections

Held:
Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold
SK elections.
o COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election
for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same
way that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the
jurisdiction of COMELEC.
o Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors, stated that
the provision in the Omnibus Election Code that states that COMELEC
shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contest involving elective
barangay officials only refer to elective barangay officials under the laws in
force at the time the Code was enacted, which was the old LGC.
o Moreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to the
framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution
of COMELEC. Although it is argued that no barangays were named in the
resolution, DILG was not given discretionary powers because they merely
used the time period set by COMELEC as a reference in designating
exempted barangays. Likewise, the LGC of 1991 was held to be curative,
and thus should be given retroactive effect, giving the mayor the authority
to call elections; thus, the 1990 KB elections were not null and void for
being conducted without authority.
o The contention of violation of the equal protection clause could not be
determined from the records of this case. The mere showing that there
were other barangays that held KB elections during the set period but
were not exempted from the 1992 SK elections is not sufficient to prove
that violation. An article in manila Bulletin stated that barangays in Bulacan
did not have elections in 1992 because they held elections on January 1,
1988.

CASE DIGEST - AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO

Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)
at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by
both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration,
setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for
both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for
opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and
restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the
WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted
by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee,
chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On
one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits
of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who
raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic
waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue
concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader
national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their
capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take
cognizance of the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA
exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that
the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.

Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of
Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516).
The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which
sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary
Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible
to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy
of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however,
the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on
petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of
the negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that
while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there
should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after
the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern
the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty
negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing
their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations
normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant
concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in

an area of greater national interest.

In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies
a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of
executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour
to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards
the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate
exercise thereof.

SECOND DIVISION

MANUEL H. NIETO, JR.,

G.R. No. 175263

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
-versus-

Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(SEC),
ATTY.
VERNETTE G. UMALI-PACO in her
capacity as General Counsel of the
SEC and in her personal capacity,
and JOHN/JANE DOES,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

March 14, 2012

x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 30
October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 94038, which annulled the
Orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) directing Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation (PHC) to convene its annual stockholders meeting.

The instant case is an offshoot of an intra-corporate dispute among contending

groups, i.e., Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. (Nieto) and Africa Groups (headed by Victor Africa), in
PHC.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

The voting shares of PHC were 80.5% owned by Philcomsat, which in turn, was
wholly owned by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC).

The PHC Board of Directors (Board) informed the SEC that they had decided not
to convene the stockholders meeting for 2005 pending results of the 2004 election,
which was then the subject of various court litigations. Jose Ozamiz (Ozamiz), a
minority stockholder of PHC, wrote to SEC and requested the issuance of a cease and
desist order from SEC against the group of Nieto, consisting of directors and officers of
PHC, in order to prevent the latter from allegedly dissipating the corporate assets; and
that a stockholders meeting be convened.

In response to Ozamizs letter, Nieto alleged that Ozamiz was attempting to preempt any judgment in cases pending before the various courts involving the
stockholders of Philcomsat, POTC and PHC.

Another letter was filed by Ozamiz to SEC urging the latter to order PHC to hold
a stockholders meeting to elect a new set of directors and officers and to form the
NOMELEC (A Nominations Committee).

On 26 February 2006, the SEC promulgated an Order in SEC Case No. 02-06113, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby resolves

to:

1.
Direct the directors and responsible officers of PHC and the
concerned parties to submit to the Commission, within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Order, the names of their nominees to the NOMELEC to be
composed of five (5) members, namely:

a)

One (1) from the Africa group;

b)

One (1) from Nieto group;

c)

d)
e)

A representative from the minority group, Mr. Jose Ozamiz,

who petitioned the calling of the annual stockholders meeting of
PHC;
A representative of the Republic of the Philippines; and
A common neutral party to be chosen by the other (4)
members of the NOMELEC.

2.
Direct the directors and responsible officers of PHC, within
the same period to submit the preferred date of annual meeting of PHC
which should be held not later than 17 April 2006; and

3.
Direct the directors and responsible officers of PHC to
comply with all the requirements for the conduct of meetings for publicly
listed companies including the posting of notices for two (2) consecutive
weeks prior to the date of meeting in strategic places within the premises
of PHC.

SEC issued another Order on 5 April 2006 reiterating the demand that PHC
convene its annual stockholders meeting. The third Order issued on even date denied
Nietos motion for reconsideration of the 26 February 2006 Order.

On 11 April 2006, Nieto filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
SEC from calling the PHCs annual stockholders meeting.

During the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals or on 1 July
2006, the majority stockholders of PHC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) agreeing to unite and form a common slate for the Board in POTC, Philcomsat
and PHC. They requested the SEC to set a date for the annual stockholders
meeting. The group of Nieto was a party to the MOU.
Four (4) days after the execution of the MOU, the Court of Appeals issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining SEC from implementing its orders.

On 7 August 2006, the SEC filed its Comment to the petition and defended the
order calling of the stockholders meeting of PHC as within its power and jurisdiction to
issue.

On 1 September 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition in view of

the MOU. This action notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals proceeded to render a
Decision annulling the assailed orders of the SEC and directing it to cease exercising its
regulatory powers. In other words, the Court of Appeals granted Nietos petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby

GRANTED. The February 26, 2006 and the two (2) April 4, 2006 Orders
of the SEC in SEC Case No. 02-06-133 are hereby ANNULLED. The
Securities and Exchange Commission is hereby DIRECTED to stay its
hand and cease in the exercise of its regulatory powers, as in this case,
when they interfere with or render moot the exercise of the adjudicative
powers already transferred from the SEC to the regular courts. [2]

In this petition with prayer for a TRO and preliminary injunction, petitioner
anchors its argument mainly on the view that the Court of Appeals should have granted
the withdrawal of the petition and should not have proceeded to decide the case. The
SEC agreed with petitioner that the Court of Appeals is duty bound to grant the
withdrawal of the petition.

The core issue is the authority of the SEC to call a stockholders meeting. The
MOU mooted that issue. It mooted the case before the Court of Appeals. It mooted
likewise the present petition questioning the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide
the case in spite of petitioners motion to withdraw petition.

By the explicit terms of the MOU, the parties to the MOU which include Pablo L.
Lobregat, representing the Nieto Family and Victor V. Africa, representing the Africa
Family, have decided to end their dispute. [3] Thus, the contending parties agreed on the
following terms and conditions:

1.

The parties warrant that they represent and/or have secured

authority to represent the interests of the private stockholder-families
and their successors and assigns in POTC, and shall do all acts that
may be necessary to enable them to continue representing such
interests;

2.

The parties have agreed in principle to unite and form a common

slate for the Boards of Directors in POTC, Philcomsat and PHC. The
names of the persons to be in the said common slate shall be indicated
in the Stockholders Agreement that the parties shall hereafter execute;

3.

The parties have agreed that each of the six stockholder-families

shall be appoint[ed] a representative who[m] the parties shall cause to
be elected as director of Philcomsat and PHC; while five of such
representatives shall be elected as directors of POTC, the sixth to be

elected immediately after the number of POTC directors as stated in

the Articles of Incorporation has been increased to nine (9);

4.

The parties have agreed that, with the execution of this

Memorandum of Understanding where the six stockholder-families are
represented, they shall hereafter be called the Owners Group and
henceforth no reference to the Nieto Group or the Africa Group shall be
made;

5.

The parties have agreed that Ambassador Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., as

one of the two (2) remaining living incorporators of POTC, will assume
the position of Chairman Emeritus of POTC, Philcomsat and PHC.

6.

The parties have agreed that they shall not, individually or

collectively, publish or cause to be published any press release against
any party to this Memorandum of Understanding, nor against any of
the stockholders the parties herein represent. The parties have
likewise agreed that they shall not do nor cause to be done any act
that will undermine the discussions of the parties, this Memorandum of
Understanding or the Stockholders Agreement or attack any of the
parties hereto or any of the stockholders they represent.

7.

The parties have agreed that, upon execution of the Stockholders

Agreement, all cases pending between the parties or the stockholders
they represent shall, insofar as practicable, be dropped and/or
withdrawn.

8.

The parties have agreed that this Memorandum of

Understanding as well as the discussions between them shall
lead to a Stockholders Agreement between them which shall
include, among others, the matters herein described, the calling
of stockholders meetings of POTC, Philcomsat and PHC and the
reorganization of the Boards of Directors of the said corporations.
[4]
[Emphasis Supplied]

The main point of Nietos petition before the Court of Appeals was to oppose the
calling of the annual stockholders meeting. By signing the MOU, Nieto agreed to the
convening of the annual stockholders meeting. As a consequence of the MOU, Nieto no
longer had any actual relief forthcoming from the case he filed with the Court of
Appeals.

The basic questions subject of the MOU and that of the case before the Court of
Appeals, overlap. The parties, specifically Nieto, effectively removed the issues from the
courts. While the courts can go ahead and render a decision, as did the Court of
Appeals, Nieto has divested himself of interest therein and as to him, mooted the
case. Nieto could not stop the Court of Appeals from proceeding until rendition of
judgment, and he cannot now question such judgment.

At any rate, whichever way the Court of Appeals decides the case would not
have any effect on Nieto. The nullification of the SECs decision to call for a stockholders
meeting is a decision on the SECs authority to call for a meeting. It was not about, and
would not result into, a prohibition against an agreement by the parties to, in fact and of
their own accord, call for a stockholders meeting.

A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of
the case.[5] In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would
be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. [6]

Parenthetically, almost a year from the filing of the parties respective Memorandum,
Roberto L. Abad (Abad), claiming to be an independent director of PHC, filed an urgent
motion for leave to intervene. Abad asserts that to allow Mr. Nieto to seek the reversal
of a Decision that is proper and in conformity with law and jurisprudence would
adversely affect herein movant-intervenors rights and interests as PHC director and
stockholder.[7]

Abads motion for leave to intervene, as an independent director of PHC, was

intended to sustain the Decision of the Court of Appeals in nullifying the SEC orders

calling for stockholders meeting. Abad is apparently opposed to the holding of the
stockholders meeting and the decision that favors his position may be reversed by this
Court. Abads position as an independent director contradicts that of Nieto and the
parties to the MOU, who all had agreed to call for a stockholders meeting.

The rendering of the instant petition as moot also forecloses any interest on the part of
Abad to intervene.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED FOR BEING MOOT AND

ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

MACASIANO VS NHA

Facts: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and
44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on
Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public
Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the
Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said
Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as
drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of
the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he
assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he
has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
disbursed." 2
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He
maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the
essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the
constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with
litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an
advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he
does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing
that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that
Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing
Held: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an
act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination
of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To
reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality
of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of

legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be
raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the
opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental
requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not
claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has
been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit
under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in
vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants."
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Kilosbayan v. Guingona
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also
know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of
serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated
Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the
executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal
policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute
actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of
various government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in
question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the
intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself.
Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby
declared contrary to law and invalid.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to

disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia, Jr.

243 SCRA 436 Business Organization Corporation Law Corporate Nationality
Public Utility Nationality Requirement in Nationalized Areas of Activity
In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding
was made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to
qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular
undertaking. An agreement was then made between the government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium.
The agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law
(RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall
build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is
completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the same
for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall have
fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the
facilities to the government for $1.00.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a
foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot
own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the
nationalized areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his
capacity as DOTC Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT
Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will not become the owner of a public
utility hence, the question of its nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign
corporation cannot own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will
be owning are the facilities that it will be building for the EDSA railway project. There is
no prohibition against a foreign corporation to own facilities used for a public utility.
Further, it cannot be said that EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one operating the
public utility for it will be DOTC that will operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one
exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway and from the proceeds, it shall
be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium. All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to
do is to build the facilities and receive rent from the use thereof by the government for
25 years it will not operate the railway transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a
corporation formed for the purpose of building a public utility it does not automatically
mean that it is operating a public utility. The moment for determining the requisite

Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form
of authorization for that purpose.

Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works and Communications

November 16, 2011
110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law.
He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the
terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said
Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate
that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented
in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be
unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld.
Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps
as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private
purpose. The subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the
property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed
when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance
with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money
raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage
of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were
to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Raoul Del Mar vs Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, et. Al.
G.R. No. 138298 June 19, 2001
FACTS
Raoul del Mar
ISSUE
PAGCOR filed a motion for reconsideration seeking to reverse the decision of the court
which enjoined (cease and desist order; prohibit) PAGCOR from managing, maintaining
and operating jai-alai games and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for
that purpose.
Whether or not PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-alai.

HELD
The SC denied the motions for reconsideration due to lack of required number of votes
because only 7 justices voted to grant the motions.

Opinions of Justices:
PUNO
Justice Puno denied the motion for reconsideration of PAGCOR. PD 1869 is an express
amendment of PDs 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1622. It is clear in the PAGCOR charter
that it does not include those games of chance covered by an existing franchise. Since Jai Alai
has an existing franchise to operate. It could not have been the intent of Congress to grant
franchises to operate jai-alai to 2 entities within the same jurisdiction. PD 1869 suffers from the
vice of vagueness since PAGCOR had to seek the legal opinions of not just 1 but several
government agencies. To begin with, PAGCOR was not authorized to centralize and integrate
all games of chance that have existing franchises. And the repeal of PD 810 did not have any

effect on the franchise of PAGCOR. In contending that jai-alai is impliedly included in Section
10 of PD 1869, PAGCOR is suggesting that an illegal act may be legalized by mere implication
of law.

MELO
Justice Melo granted the motion for reconsideration. PAGCORs charter states that it is allowed
to establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports,
gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc) and such other forms of amusement and
recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole;
construe the constituent parts together, ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act,
consider each and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute; and
endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and sensible.
Verga legis non est recendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Petitioners Raoul Del Mar contends that they have brought the present suit in their capacity as
taxpayers and legislators. For a taxpayers suit to prosper, the petitioners (del mar) must have
locus standi (legal standing). No public fund raised by taxation is involved in this case. No
spending powers of Congress are involved nor is there an allegation of illegal disbursement of
funds.
Taxpayers suit the act complained directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation.

VITUG
Justice Vitug grant the petition to enjoin PAGCOR from operating jai-alai through BELLE and
FILGAME or through any other agency and denies the petition to prohibit PAGCOR from itself
managing or operating those games. PAGCORs charter states to establish and operate clubs
and casinos for amusement and recreation, including games of chance is broad enough to
allow PAGCOR to operate all kinds of sports and gaming pools, inclusive of jai-alai BUT NOT in
joint ventre agreement with BELLE and FILGAME. The grant of a franchise is a purely
legislative act that cannot be delegated to PAGCOR without violating the Constitution.

DE LEON
Justice de Leon granted the petition filed by PAGCOR.

Section 10 of PD 1869
Section 10. Nature and term of franchise x x x authority to operate and maintain gambling
casinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball,
football, lotteries, etc. x x x
Gaming the act or practice of playing games for stakes
Et cetera (etc) depends largely on the context of the instrument, description and enumeration
of the matters preceeding the term and subject to which it is applied. When used in a statute,
the words should be given their usual and natural signication.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
-

when words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says.

Del Mar says that there is no specific mention of jai alai and there should have been an express
mention of jai alai. If that would be the case, it would render ineffective the use of the word etc
in the said law.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
-

a statute is to be favored and must be adopted if reasonably possibly, which will give
meaning to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and operation and effect
to every part and provision of it.

Del Mar says that the operations of jai alai was a legislative grant by Marcos to a corporation
controlled by his in-laws, the Philippine Jai Alai and Amusement Corporation (PJAC).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
-

it is improper to inquire into the motives that influenced the legislative body except
when those motives are disclosed (revealed) by the statute itself.\

Del Mar insist that PAGCOR was created to operate games of chance or gaming pools for
which no franchises have been granted.
The fact that there was an existing jai alai franchise of PJAC the time PD 1869 went into effect
does not mean that jai alai can never be the subject of PAGCORs franchise upon repeal of
PJACs franchise. PAGCOR was primarily created to maximize potential sources of
revenue.

Lorenzo Taada vs Mariano Cuenco

103 Phil. 1051 Political Law Constitutional Law Political Question Defined
Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada
who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from
the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed
this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if
the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista
Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the
issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and
Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before
the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable
question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being
asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised
by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid
which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from
the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the
minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of
the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats
(even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the
majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the
Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.

Daza v. Singson
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was
among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this
development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from
the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission
on Appointments
HELD:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as
follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented

therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of
a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant
to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Disclaimer: I just copy pasted this from the actual paragraph from the case in
toto, if youre going to make a case digest from this, please make the necessary
adjustments.