Contents

1.

Golaknath v. State of Punjab, Natural justice, Arbitrariness, Separation of powers.............................4

2.

In re: Beru Bari (Exchange of Exclaves).............................................................................................4

3.

Samata v. State of UP, Rights of Forest dwellers.................................................................................4

4.

Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal, duties of the administration...............5

5.

Kharak Singh v. State of UP, Right to privacy, scope of surveillance by the executive.......................5

6.

Munn v. Illinois, regulation of business...............................................................................................5

7.

Entick v. Carrington, rule of law..........................................................................................................6

8.

Wilkes v. Woods, rule of law...............................................................................................................7

9.

Nandini Sundar v. State of Chattisgarh, control over administrative powers, delegated legislation,

constitutionality of extra constitutional bodies............................................................................................7

10.

State of Madras v. VG Row, Magnum Opus on freedom to form associations................................8

11.

Jamat-e-Islam v. Union of India, freedom to form associations.......................................................8

12.

USA v. Schenk, Clear and Present Danger test................................................................................8

13.

Union Carbide v. Union of India, administrative powers and principles........................................10

14.

Charanlal Sahoo v. Union of India, powers of the administration, related to the union carbide case.
...........................................................................................................................................................
11

15.

Himmat Lal Shah v. Police Commmissioner, freedom to form association, form assemblies........11

16.

Sarala Mudgal, formation of a unified civil code...........................................................................12

17.

Lily Thomas v. Union of India, judicial review of action of members of the administration or

executive...................................................................................................................................................12
18.

Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, Uniform civil code............................................12

19.

Balakottaiya v. Union of India, freedom to form association.........................................................13

20.

Devendra Appa v. Karnataka Small Scare Industries, freedom to form associations.....................13

21.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (referred to USA v. Schenk and Whitley v. California), Principle

of Reasonableness.....................................................................................................................................13

22.

Whitney v. California, freedom of speech and expression, also see US v. Schenk.........................14

23.

Air India v. Nargis Meerza, De-juridicalization, Public morality...................................................14

24.

MP Mathur v. Delhi Transport Corporation, dis-investment, de-juridicalization...........................14

25.

Vayudoot Case- Indian Airlines Officers Association v. Indian Airlines Ltd, dis-investment, de-

juridicalization...........................................................................................................................................15
26.

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, De-reservation..........................................................................15

27.

AK Thakur v. Union of India, De-reservation................................................................................15

28.

TMA Pai Foundationv. Union of India, De-reservation.................................................................15

29.

Narmada Bachao Andolan, de-politicalization, Defintion of public purpose.................................15

30.

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, right to remain silent= right to freedom of free speech and

expression..................................................................................................................................................15
31.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, natural justice, separation of powers.......................................16

32.

AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, administrative action, fairness....................................................16

33.

Liversidge v. Anderson, arbitrariness, red light theory, arbitrariness, natural justice.....................16

34.

Ridge v. Baldwin, arbitrariness, natural justice, red-light theory...................................................18

35.

Nakud Ali v. Jayaratne, natural justice...........................................................................................19

36.

Bina Pani Devi v. State of Orissa, natural justice...........................................................................19

37.

Sarjoo Prasad v. General Manager, natural justice.........................................................................19

38.

AK Kraipak v. Union of India, Natural justice...............................................................................19

39.

Hiranath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Natural justice......................................20

40.

Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhut v. Police Commissioner, right to religion and its myriad forms.
...........................................................................................................................................................
20

41.

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, right to life, natural justice, rule of law................................20

42.

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, Separation of Powers.............................................................21

43.

P. Sambamurthy v. State of AP, rule of law....................................................................................21

44.

Somraj v State of Haryana, rule of law..........................................................................................22

45.

Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, rule of law, arbtrariness......................................................22

46.

State of MP v. Ramshanker Raghuvanshi, rule of law, arbitrariness..............................................22

47.

Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, Separation of Powers........................................................22

48.

In re: Delhi Laws Act, Delegated legislation, separation of powers , administrative action...........22

49.

Jayantilal v. FN Rana, delegated legislation...................................................................................24

50.

2G Scam- PUCL v. Union of India................................................................................................24

51.

Francis Coralie v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi............................................................24

52.

Minerva Mills v. Union of India, administrative action, green light theory...................................24

53.

R v. Lemon, freedom of speech and expression.............................................................................24

54.

Minerva Talkies v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1988 SC 54, administrative action............................25

55.

Jammu and Kashmir State Board of Education v. Feyaz Aramod Malik, AIR 2000 SC 1038,

administrative action.................................................................................................................................25
56.

Superintendent of Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohiya, freedome of speech and expression,

also see case of auto shanker.....................................................................................................................25

57.

Bharat Aluminum Limited Co. (BALCO) v. Workers Union (Disinvestment)...............................26

58.

MP Mathur v. DTC (Disinvestment/Dejuridicalization)................................................................26

59.

Vayudoot Case- Indian Airlines Officers Association v. Indian Airlines Ltd, (2007) 10 SCC 684

(Disinvestment/Dejuridicalization)............................................................................................................26
60.

Chitralekha Case (Dereservation)..................................................................................................26

61.

EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, doctrine of arbtrariness.........................................................26

62.

Mohendra Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (Watershed- Election).........................................27

63.

Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, 1950, freedom of free speech and expression........................27

64.

Secretary of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of West Bengal, SC

1995, public property, administrative action..............................................................................................27

65.

R v. Lancashire country council, ex p Huddleston (Amber Light Theory).....................................27

1.

Golaknath v. State of Punjab, Natural justice, Arbitrariness, Separation of powers.

The Parliament cannot use Art.368 to destroy the Constitution.

The 17th Constitutional Amendment was challenged. 11 judge bench. 6:5 majority. The majority held, overruling Shankari
Prasad and SajjanSingh, that the FRs were not amendable through the constitutional amending process set out in Article
368.
The Court held that law opposed arbitrariness. Administrative law believes in fairness in action. Law is there to protect the
interest of the country and preserve the past.
With respect to Separation of Powers
The Constitution brings into existence different constitutional entities, namely, the Union, the State, and the Union
Territories. It creates three major instruments of powers, namely, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. It
demarcates their jurisdiction minutely and expects them to exercise their respective powers without overstepping their
limits. They should function within the spheres allotted to them.
2.

In re: Beru Bari (Exchange of Exclaves)

Cessation of land from West Bengal to East Pakistan.

The powers of given to Parliament to reorganize States cannot be availed by it to cede any Indian territory to a foreign
country. The Supreme Court held that Article 3, broadly stated, deals with the internal adjustment inter se of the
territories of the constituent States of the Indian Union. The authority of the Parliament to diminish the area of any
State envisages taking out a part of the area of a State and adding it to another State; the area diminished continues to be
part of the Indian Territory and it does not contemplate cession of national territory in favor of a foreign country. Thus,
Indian Territory can be ceded to a foreign country only by enacting a formal amendment of the Constitution under Article
368 to modify the 1st Schedule of the Constitution.
3.

Samata v. State of UP, Rights of Forest dwellers

An NGO from Hyderabad filed a PIL to protect tribal land and natural resources and people also protected by various Acts
(See Article 244A). It dealt with Schedule 5 of the Constitution- protecting the tribal people of the 7 north-eastern states.
District council and state council would be constituted by the Governor to look after the language, culture, transcripts of
these tribal people.
The SC has observed as regards the basic tenor of the Indian Constitution- The Constitution envisions to establish an
egalitarian social order rendering to every citizen, social, economic, and political justice in a social and economic
democracy.(talks about distributive justice).

4.

PaschimBangaKhetMazdoorSamiti v. State of West Bengal, duties of the administration

A mazdoor while working fell down and was seriously injured. He was transferred from one government hospital to
another till he was admitted to a private hospital where he was charged 7,000. Aggrieved, the mazdoor association filed a
petition to provide facilities in government hospitals,
The SC again observed- The Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare State at the federal level as well as
the State level. In a welfare State, the primary duty of the Government is to secure the welfare of the people. Citing
financial incapacity is not an excuse to escape the duty the state is bound to abide by.
Right to health and preserve ones life is a fundamental right. Failure to provide medical assistance to the needy that
approaches them is a violation of article 21. Thus, the State is responsible to pay compensation for not providing medical
assistance. The court also directed the State to take steps to provide medical facilities in government hospitals.
The case stated the egalitarian nature of the state.
5.

Kharak Singh v. State of UP, Right to privacy, scope of surveillance by the executive

In this case, the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the ambit and scope of this right when the power of
surveillance conferred on the police by the provisions of the U.P. Police Regulations came to be challenged as being
violative of Articles 19(1)(d) and Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court repelled the argument of infringement of
freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution, and the attempt to ascertain the movements of an
individual was held not to be an infringement of any fundamental right. The minority judgment, however, emphasized the
need for recognition of such a right as it was an essential ingredient of personal liberty.The dissenting opinion of Justice
Subba Rao was in favour of deriving a right to privacy from the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21.
6.

Munn v. Illinois, regulation of business

It was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with corporate rates and agriculture. The Munn case opened the door
for states to regulate certain businesses within their borders, including railroads, and was an important case in the struggle
for public regulation of private enterprise in post-Civil War America. Chief Justice Waite argued that the states may
regulate the use of private property "when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Waite resurrected a
Latin legal doctrine to support his view: "When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only." Munn was one of six cases, the so-called Granger cases, all decided in the United States Supreme Court
during the same term, all bearing on the same point, and all decided on the same principles. Later court decisions,
however, sharply curtailed the governments power to regulate business.
The court further explained the meaning of life; not mere animal existence. He is not a vegetable. He has a mind, body
and soul, he should be given space for enhancement of his personality.

7.

Entick v. Carrington, rule of law

Every mans house is his own castle. It has deleterious effect if it hampers a persons physical happiness and comfort
which is a violation of the right to privacy. (this was followed in a case related to Priyanka Gandhi and her house in
Haryana).
It is a leading case in English law establishing the civil liberties of individuals and limiting the scope of executive power.
The case has also been influential in other common law jurisdictions and was an important motivation for the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is famous for the dictum of Lord Camden: "If it is law, it will be found in
our books. If it not to be found there, it is not law."
Facts
On 11 November 1762, the King's Chief Messenger, Nathan Carrington, and three other King's messengers, James
Watson, Thomas Ardran, and Robert Blackmore, broke into the home of the Grub-street writer, John Entick (1703?-1773)
in the parish of St Dunstan, Stepney "with force and arms". Over the course of four hours, they broke open locks and
doors and searched all of the rooms before taking away 100 charts and 100 pamphlets, causing 2000 of damage. The
King's messengers were acting on the orders of Lord Halifax, newly appointed Secretary of State for the Northern
Department, "to make strict and diligent search for . . . the author, or one concerned in the writing of several weekly very
seditious papers intitled, The Monitor, or British Freeholder".
Entick sued the messengers for trespassing on his land.
Judgement
The trial took place in Westminster Hall presided over by Lord Camden, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.
Carrington and his colleagues claimed that they acted on Halifax's warrant, which gave them legal authority to search
Entick's home; they therefore could not be liable for the tort. However, Camden held that Halifax had no right
under statute or under precedent to issue such a warrant and therefore found in Entick's favour. In the most famous
passage Camden stated:
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property.[2] That right is preserved

nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon to answer fo
Hence Lord Camden ruled, as later became viewed as a general principle, that the state may do nothing but that which is
expressly authorised by law, while the individual may do anything but that which is forbidden by law.
Significance
The judgment established the limits of executive power in English law: the state can only act lawfully in a manner
prescribed by statute or common law.

It was also part of the background to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and was described by
the Supreme Court of the United States as a "great judgment, one of the landmarks of English liberty, one of the
permanent monuments of the British Constitution, "and a guide to an understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
8.

Wilkes v. Woods, rule of law

Wilkes v. Wood was a search and seizure case from the English Court of Common Pleas, 2 Wilson 203; 95 E.R. 766. Lofft
1; 98 E.R. 489, that was decided on December 6, 1763. It provided much of the conceptual background for what became
the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Wilkes v. Wood was a suit for trespass that John Wilkes brought against
Robert Wood, the British undersecretary of state, who had assisted in the execution of a search warrant at Wilkes's home
in London. The warrant was written in very general in nature.
9.

NandiniSundar v. State of Chattisgarh, control over administrative powers, delegated legislation,

constitutionality of extra constitutional bodies

State has become a pillar of power. The Chattisgarh government enacted a law in 2007 the chattisgarh police act with a
view to tackle the naxalite movement that authorized the government to create the SalwaJudum by empowering youths
under 18 years of age to fight the naxalites that create a threat to the capitalist forces of Chattisgarh. The P and 2 others
filed a PIL challenging the constitutionality of the SalwaJudum because unemployed underage youths from villages were
being recruited.
The court held that it is a violation of Article 21, the appointment of SalwaJudum as unconstitutional and it was to be
disbanded immediately.
Two important cases:
a. Kharak Singh v. State of UP (the IPC case)- held that the police regulations were unconstitutional and the
act of police disturbing the petitioner at odd times in the night and surveillance all his movements was
against the constitution.
b. Francis Coralie v. UT of Delhi- Right to life doesnt mean minimal animal existence.
10.

State of Madras v. VG Row, Magnum Opus on freedom to form associations.

Section 15(2)(b), Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 as amended by the Madras Act, 1950 gave wide discretionary
powers to the Stat government to declare any association as unlawful. The Court struck down this as unconstitutional
because it allows the administrative authority to exercise this discretion on subjective satisfaction without permitting the
grounds to be judicially tested.
Reasonable restriction on any given organization will have to be clearly defined in the order that didnt allow forming an
association for proscribing to continue any activity. The State will have to specify the grounds on which it issues a
notification banning any form of association related activities.

11.

Jamat-e-Islam v. Union of India, freedom to form associations

Natural justice contents yield to change with exigencies of different situations and, therefore, do not apply in the same
manner to situations which are not alike. They are neither case in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal
straightjacket. They are not immutable and can be adapted, modified, and excluded by statute, rules of the Constitution;
except where such exclusion is not charged with the vice of unreasonableness and consequential voidness.
The SC held that the requirement of natural justice in a case of this kind (organization has been declared as illegal) had to
be tailored to safeguard public interest which must always weigh over every lesser interest.
The rights to from an association are a fundamental right and the freedom of speech and expression is the mother of all
rights.
12.

USA v. Schenk, Clear and Present Danger test

It is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. A
unanimous Supreme Court, in a famous opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., concluded that defendants who
distributed leaflets to draft-age men, urging resistance to induction, could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft,
a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not alter the well-established law in cases where the attempt was made
through expressions that would be protected in other circumstances. In this opinion, Holmes said that expressions which
in the circumstances were intended to result in a crime, and posed a "clear and present danger" of succeeding, could be
punished.
The Court continued to follow this reasoning to uphold a series of convictions arising out of prosecutions during war time,
but Holmes began to dissent in the case of Abrams v. United States, insisting that the Court had departed from the
standard he had crafted for them, and had begun to allow punishment for ideas. The "clear and present danger" standard
remains the test of criminal prosecutions, but the Court has set another line of precedents to govern cases in which the
constitutionality of a statute is challenged on its face.
Background of the case
Schenck v. United States is the first in a line of Supreme Court Cases defining the modern understanding of the First
Amendment. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote the often-cited opinion in the case, because of
events that were not publicly known at the time. The United States' entry into the First World War had caused deep
divisions in society, and was vigorously opposed, especially by those on the radical left and by those who had ties to
Ireland or Germany. The Woodrow Wilson Administration launched a broad campaign of criminal enforcement that
resulted in thousands of prosecutions. Many of these were for trivial acts of dissent. In the first case arising from this
campaign to come to the Court, Baltzer v. United States, the defendants had signed a petition criticizing their governor's
administration of the draft, threatening him with defeat at the polls. They were charged with obstructing the recruitment

and enlistment service, and convicted. When a majority of the Court voted during their conference to affirm the
conviction, Holmes quickly drafted and circulated a strongly worded dissenting opinion:
Real obstructions of the law, giving real aid and comfort to the enemy, I should have been glad to see punished more
summarily and severely than they sometimes were. But I think that our intention to put out all our powers in aid of success
in war should not hurry us into intolerance of opinions and speech that could not be imagined to do harm, although
opposed to our own. It is better for those who have unquestioned and almost unlimited power in their hands to err on the
side of freedom.[1]
Rather than proceed in the face of Holmes's biting dissent, Chief Justice Edward Douglass White set the case aside and
word of the situation evidently reached the Administration, because the prosecution was abandoned. White then asked
Holmes to write the opinion for a unanimous Court in the next case, one in which they could agree, Schenck v. United
States. Holmes wrote that opinion, and wrote again for a unanimous court upholding convictions in two more cases that
spring, Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States, establishing what remains the standard for deciding the
constitutionality of criminal convictions based on expressive behavior. Holmes disliked legislative-style formulas, and did
not repeat the language of "clear and present danger" in any subsequent opinion, however. The Schenck opinion alone
accordingly is often cited as the source of this legal standard, and some scholars have suggested that Holmes changed his
mind and offered a different view in his equally famous dissent in Abrams v. United States. The events leading to the
assignment of theSchenck opinion to Holmes were discovered when Holmes's biographer Sheldon Novick unearthed the
unpublished Baltzer opinion among Holmes's papers at Harvard Law School.
The facts of the Schenck Case were as follows. Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer were members of the Executive
Committee of the Socialist Party in Philadelphia, of which Schenck was General Secretary. The executive committee
authorized, and Schenck oversaw, printing and mailing more than 15,000 leaflets to men slated for conscription during
World War I. The leaflets urged men not to submit to the draft, saying "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your
rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn
duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain," and urged men not to comply with the draft on the
grounds that military conscription constituted involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment
After jury trials Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating Section 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917.[4] Both defendants
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that their conviction, and the statute which purported to authorize it,
were contrary to the First Amendment. They relied heavily on the text of the First Amendment, and their claim that the
Espionage Act of 1917 had what today one would call a "chilling effect" on free discussion of the war effort. [5]
The Court's decision
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., held that Schenck's criminal conviction
was constitutional. The statute only applied to successful obstructions of the draft, but common-law precedents allowed

prosecution for attempts that were dangerously close to success. Attempts made by speech or writing could be punished
like other attempted crimes; the First Amendment did not protect speech encouraging men to resist induction, because,
"when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right."[6] In other words, the court held, the circumstances of wartime allow greater restrictions on free speech than would
be allowed during peacetime, if only because new and greater dangers are present.
The opinion's most famous and most often quoted passage was this:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstance-s and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.[7]
The phrase "shouting fire in a crowded theater" has since become a popular metaphor for dangers or limitations of free
speech.
13.

Union Carbide v. Union of India, administrative powers and principles

The Bhopal Gas tragedy case. In this, the whole event of the gas leak and its subsequent developments were a complete
breach of the principles as per the Indian Administrative Law.
In this, the SC quoted Macbeth to the Bhopal Victims who urged that a settlement, which denies even a modicum of
hearing to them, is legally flawed by the very jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court. Their Lordships said, to do
a great right after all, it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong.
14.

CharanlalSahoov. Union of India, powers of the administration, related to the union carbide case

So on the materials available, the victims would have to express their views. The victims have not been able to show at all
any other point or material which would go to impeach the validity of the settlement. Therefore, in our opinion, though
settlement without notice is not quite proper, on the materials so far available, we are of the opinion that justice has been
done to the victims but justice has not appeared to have been done. In view of the magnitude of the misery involved and
the problems in this case, we are also of the opinion that the setting aside of the settlement on this ground in view of the
facts and the circumstances of this case keeping the settlement in abeyance and giving notice to the victims for a postdecisional hearing would not be in the ultimate interest of justice. It is true that not giving notice was not proper because
principles of natural justice are fundamental in the constitutional set up of this country. No man or no man's right should
be affected without an opportunity to ventilate his views. We are also conscious that justice is a psychological yearning, in
which men seek acceptance of their view point by having an opportunity of vindication of their view point before the
forum or the authority enjoined or obliged to take a decision affecting their right. Yet, in the particular situations, one has

to bear in mind how an infraction of that should be sought to be removed is accordance with justice. In the facts and the
circumstances of this case where sufficient opportunity is available when review application is heard on notice, as directed
by Court, no further opportunity is necessary and it cannot be said that injustice has been done. "To do a great right" after
all, it is permissible sometimes "to do a little wrong". In the facts and circumstances of the case, this is one of those rare
occasions. Though entering into a settlement without the required notice is wrong, in the facts and the circumstances of
this case, therefore, we are of the opinion, to direct that notice should be given now, would not result in drainage justice in
the situation. In the premises, no further consequential order is necessary by this Court. Had it been necessary for this
Bench to have passed such a consequential order, we would not have passed any such consequential order in respect of the
same.
15.

Himmat Lal Shah v. Police Commissioner, freedom to form association, form assemblies

The Bombay Police Act conferred powers on the Commissioner of Police for regulating assemblies and processions on
public places and empowered him to refuse permission to hold any meeting.
Whether giving such powers to the Commissioner to refuse giving permission to hold public meetings curbs fundamental
rights under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution?
The Court held that such a power conferred was actually ultra vires the parent act and did violate the right of people under
Article 19(1)(c).
Rule 7 under Section 44 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 gave unguided discretionary power to the Police Commissioner
to grant or refuse to grant permission for any public meeting to be held on a public street. The SC struck down the rule as
being an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right.
16.

Sarala Mudgal, formation of a unified civil code

This case was discussed because a Hindu man, when he is already married cannot remarry and in this case there were
several instances of Hindu men converting to Islam and marrying again in spite of being already married to a Hindu. In
India, a Uniform Civil Code is not a possibility. And hence, a Hindu man cannot remarry when he is already married to a
Hindu woman. This will make the administration process all the more difficult.
17.

Lily Thomas v. Union of India, judicial review of action of members of the administration or executive

The SC of India, in its judgment of the Lily Thomas v. Union of India case ruled that any Member of
Parliament (MP), Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) or Member of a Legislative Council (MLC) who
is convicted of a crime and awarded a minimum of two year imprisonment, loses membership of the House with
immediate effect. This is in contrast to the earlier position, wherein convicted members held on to their seats until they
exhausted all judicial remedy in lower, state and SC of India. Further, Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People
Act, which allowed elected representatives three months to appeal their conviction,was declared unconstitutional by the

bench of Justice A. K. Patnaik and Justice S. J. Mukhopadhaya. The judgment is largely seen to cleanse politics from
criminalization.
18.

Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, Uniform civil code

Facts of the Case

Shah Bano married Ahmad Khan (advocate) 1932

Children- 3 sons & 2 daughters

After 14 years he married a younger woman

In 1975 Ahmad khan drove out of her matrimonial home in 1975. Her age was 62 years

She filed a petition for maintenance in April 1978 under section 125 CrPC because he had stopped giving
her maintenance of Rs 200 which he had promised.

Maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. - law for women . Basically u/s 125 CrPC a wife who is without
any income, has no source of income and is neglected by her husband is entitled to maintenance, which
includes a divorced wife who is not remarried.

On November 1978 her husband gave an irrevocable talaq (divorce) to her and took up the defence that
since Bano had ceased to be his wife so he was under no obligation to provide maintenance for her.

The Magistrate court directed Khan to pay Rs 25 per month to Shah Bano.

This amount was enhanced by the revisional application to High Court in Madhya Pradesh for Rs 179

Ahmed Khan however approached against the judgment to Supreme Court.

Judgement
On 3 February 1981, the two judge bench first heard the matter, in light of the earlier decisions of the court which had
held that section 125 of the Code applies to Muslims also, referred Khan's appeal to a larger Bench. Muslim bodies All
India Muslim Personal Law Board and JamiatUlema-e-Hindjoined the case as intervenor.
On 23 April 1985, Supreme Court in a unanimous decision, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the High
Court.
19.

Balakottaiya v. Union of India, freedom to form association

Certain railway employees belonging to the workers association wanted to paralyze the communication system because
the government was not saying a yes to their demands, especially a raise in their pay. A chargesheet was filed against
them. They were also members of the communist party and were terminated from their services.
The SC rejected the argument of the petitioners, stating that they had a fundamental right to form an association but not a
right to be in government service when they are involved in acts mentioned in the Unlawful Activities Act.
However, this was overruled in the case of DevendraAppa v. Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation.

20.

DevendraAppa v. Karnataka Small Scare Industries, freedom to form associations

The Court held that procedure must necessarily be followed. Law must not be arbitrary. The procedure followed to
implement laws must be fair and not arbitrary.
Laws mean just not lex. Laws means what the law is and what the law ought to be and this shall be decided by the Courts.
A person who legitimately seeks to exercise his rights cannot be told to not exercise his rights but then one should also be
ready to face its consequences. But he cannot be kept away from his fundamental rights on the cost of his employment or
government service.
Government servants have the right to form associations in order to show their grievances against their employees even
though they are members of a political party. His service cannot be terminated on the ground that he was related to one or
more other organizations.
21.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (referred to USA v. Schenk and Whitley v. California), Principle of

Reasonableness
The petitioner is a DU student who challenged the constitutionality and validity of Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 after
the arrest of two young girls on the basis on their post on fb regarding the death of Shiv Sena leader, Bal Thackrey. This
section gives wide powers to the government to arrest anyone who sends offensive, false, derogatory or defamatory
messages through any communication service. This also includes messages which incite violence and injury, ill will,
hatred etc.
The petitioner questioned whether this section curbed the liberty of people. The SC discussed various cases and finally
came to the conclusion that 66A does take away the liberty of people and is therefore unconstitutional. It violates articles
14 and 21 and curbs the right of speech and expression of the people. It robs the liberty of people. The court held that it is
a curtail on the freedom of people to post any message through e-mails and hence is unconstitutional.
22.

Whitney v. California, freedom of speech and expression, also see US v. Schenk

It was a United States Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction of an individual who had engaged in speech that
raised a threat to society.
Anita Whitney, a member of a distinguished California family, was convicted under the state's 1919 Criminal Syndicalism
Act for allegedly helping to establish the Communist Labor Party of America, a group the state charged was devoted to
teaching the violent overthrow of government. Whitney claimed that it had not been her intention, nor that of other
organizers, that the parties become an instrument of violence.
The question before the court was whether the 1919 Criminal Syndicalism Act of California violated the Fourteenth
Amendments due process and equal protection clauses. The Court, by a 9-0 vote, held that it did not and upheld
Whitney's conviction. Justice Sanford wrote for the seven-justice majority opinion, and invoked the Holmes test of "clear

and present danger" but went further. The Court held that the state in exercise of its police power has the power to punish
those who abuse their rights to freedom of speech "by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime,
disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow." In other
words, if words have a "bad tendency" they can be punished.
23.

Air India v. NargisMeerza, De-juridicalization, Public morality

The SC held that certain regulations pertaining to the conditions of service of air hostesses in Air India, an undertaking of
the Central Government, as discriminatory under Art.14 of the Constitution.
The regulations made by Air India provided for termination of service of an air hostess on her first pregnancy was held to
be the most unreasonable and arbitrary provision which is abhorrent to the notions of a civilized society. The Court is
empowered to enforce morality.
24.

MP Mathur v. Delhi Transport Corporation, dis-investment, de-juridicalization

The Court stated that once public interest is accepted as a superior equity, it can override individual equity and if
aggrieved individuals could be said to have anticipated revision or change in policy, they may not crowd the courts with a
complaint either that their legitimate expectations stand violated nor may they claim any promissory estoppels (both
judicially crafted IAL doctrines). Aggrieved individuals cannot challenge government policies meant for economic
developments.
The facts of the case further suggest that the creditor (Government of India) constrained in part the debtor (Delhi
Transport Corporation) to resile from an earlier beneficial policy and concurred further with the DTC policy change.
25.

Vayudoot Case- Indian Airlines Officers Association v. Indian Airlines Ltd, dis-investment, de-juridicalization

The Court held that the employees of the Indian Airlines were held not denied of natural justice because of nonconsultation with them. The SC candidly stated- the employees of Indian Airlines did not and could not have any say in
policy-making. Even their rights and interest may be adversely affected, they did not have any natural justice right to be
heard prior to policy enunciation and even subsequent to it.
26.

IndraSawhney v. Union of India, De-reservation

Challenge to the Mandal Committee report and the subsequent amendments which allowed for reservation of the SCs, STs
and OBCs. The Court stated that the reservation however should not be above 50%.
27.

AK Thakur v. Union of India, De-reservation

The SC has held that private educational institutions may not as yet, indeed if ever, attract the discipline of the newly
announced regime of OBC reservations. That is, non-governmental educational institutions may not implement the
reservation policy incorporated under Articles 15 and 16.

The Court further held that the same shall also apply to MNCs.
28.

TMA Pai Foundationv. Union of India, De-reservation

Private educational institutions, not receiving grant or aid from the government need not follow reservation. This means
that again a gap is created between the rich and the poor.
29.

Narmada BachaoAndolan, de-politicalization, Defintion of public purpose

NGO and activists filed a PIL stating that the dam will increase the water levels and will lead to the displacement of a lot
of people and will also damage the ecology. Court stated that it is not the correct forum to decide policy matters in respect
of economic developments. Principle of natural justice need not be followed. However, the persons displaced must be
rehabilitated or paid adequate compensation.
30.

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, right to remain silent= right to freedom of free speech and expression

The National Anthem case.

The SC invalidated the expulsion order passed against 3 children belonging to the sect of Jehovahs Witness for not
joining in the singing of the National Anthem. The children had shown respect to the Anthem by standing while it was
being played.
The freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom to remain silent.
31.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, natural justice, separation of powers

This case touched new heights in observing principles of NJ by administrative authorities. The Central government, under
Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1961 impounded the passport of the P on the ground of interest and security of the
nation.
She was not given any opportunity to be charged/heard and the FIR against her was vague and general in nature, citing
general public interest. She challenged the arbitrary action of the government.
Every citizen has the right to a passport. The action of the government is a violation of Article 14, 19 and 21.
Section 10 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 states that no persons passport can be impounded without
following the principles of NJ.
J. Krishna Iyer: Life doesnt mean mere animal existence. Whenever there is conflict between international and national
law, then to fill the gap, international laws can be used to decide the case according to the rules followed under
international laws.
The court stated that administrative authorities should refrain from acting judicially and should act fairly, following the
principles of NJ.

32.

AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, administrative action, fairness

The petitioner who was detained under the Preventive Detention Act (Act IV of 1950) applied under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and for his release from detention, on the ground that the said Act contravened the
provisions of Arts. 13, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and was consequently ultra vires and that his detention was
therefore illegal.
33.

Liversidge v. Anderson, arbitrariness, red light theory, arbitrariness, natural justice

It is a landmark United Kingdom administrative law case which concerned the relationship between the courts and the
state, and in particular the assistance that the judiciary should give to the executive in times of national emergency. It
concerns civil liberties and the separation of powers. Both the majority and dissenting judgments in the case have been
cited as persuasive precedent by various countries of the Commonwealth of Nations. However, in England itself, the
courts have gradually retreated from the decision in Liversidge. It has been described as "an example of extreme judicial
deference to executive decision-making, best explained by the context of wartime, and it has no authority today." It is
therefore mainly notable for the dissent of Lord Atkin.
Emergency powers in Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 permitted the Home Secretary to intern
people if he had "reasonable cause" to believe that they had "hostile associations". Sir John Anderson exercised this power
in respect of a man called Jack Perlzweig,who used the name Robert Liversidge, committing him to prison but giving no
reason.[2] On appeal, the case, joined with that of Ben Greene, reached the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords,
the highest court of appeal.[3] They had to decide whether the court could investigate the objective basis for the
reasonable cause; in other words, could they evaluate the Home Secretary's actions on an objective standard, comparing
them to that which might be taken by a reasonable man, or were they to measure them against the personal standard of the
Secretary
Judgment
The majority of the Law Lords held that the legislation should be interpreted so as to make effect what Parliament
intended, even if that meant adding to the words to give that effect. Although Parliament had made the power subject to a
reasonable belief they accepted the Home Secretary's statement that he held such a belief; in otherwise that he believed he
had reasonable cause. Viscount Maugham said that the court should "prefer a construction which will carry into effect the
plain intention of those responsible" and Lord Macmillan that "it is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to
promote rather than to defeat its efficacy". According to him, if the Secretary had acted in good faith, he need not disclose
the basis for his decision, nor were his actions justiciable in a court of law.

The majority of the Lords appear to have been greatly concerned with the fact that they were dealing with a matter of
national security. In their view, it was not appropriate for a court to deal with matters of national security, especially as
they were not privy to classified information that only the executive had.
Dissent
In a dissenting speech Lord Atkin stated his view the majority had abdicated their responsibility to investigate and control
the executive, and were being "more executive-minded than the executive". Atkin protested that theirs was "a strained
construction put on words with the effect of giving an uncontrolled power of imprisonment to the minister," and went on
to say:

In England, amidst the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the sam

I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction. "When I use a wo
Lord Atkin's view was that the phrase "reasonable cause" in the statute at hand indicated that the actions of the Secretary
of State were meant to be evaluated by an objective standard. As a result it would be within the court's purview to
determine the reasonableness of those actions.
The potential power of this dissenting judgment was clearly recognised even before it was published. The Lord
Chancellor, Viscount Simon, wrote to Lord Atkin asking him to amend the proposed terms of the speech. He did not.
In India, the Liversidge decision was cited in Gopalan v. State of Madras, where the court held that the subjective test was
to be applied. However, subsequent decisions such asFazalGhosi v. State of Uttar Pradesh have allowed some measure of
judicial intervention by holding that the executive's decisions must be based on "pertinent material"; if it is found that
there is no such material justifying the decision, the courts may act. In some other Commonwealth countries such as
Malaysia, it has been attempted to overrule the precedent of Liversidge by citing Indian cases as persuasive precedent; in
the case of Karam Singh, the Indian case of JagannathMisra v. State of Orissa, where the facts were similar, was cited.
Legal commentators have noted, however, that the Malaysian judiciary has been reluctant to accept Indian authorities,
seeking to distinguish them whenever possible. One Malaysian judge has suggested that "English courts take a more
realistic view of things while Indian judges ... impress me as indefatigable, idealists seeking valiantly to reconcile the
irreconcilable".
34.

Ridge v. Baldwin, arbitrariness, natural justice, red-light theory

The Brighton police authority dismissed its Chief Constable (Charles Ridge) without offering him an opportunity to
defend his actions. The Chief Constable appealed, arguing that the Brighton Watch Committee (headed by George
Baldwin) had acted unlawfully (ultra vires) in terminating his appointment in 1958 following criminal proceedings against
him.

Ridge also sought financial reparation from the police authority; having declined to seek reappointment, he sought a
reinstatement of his pension, to which he would have been entitled with effect from 1960 had he not been dismissed, plus
damages, or salary backdated to his dismissal.
The House of Lords held that Baldwin's committee had violated the doctrine of natural justice, overturning the principle
outlined by the Donoughmore Committee thirty years before that the doctrine of natural justice could not be applied to
administrative decisions.
"Natural justice" is a legal doctrine which requires an absence of bias (nemo iudex in causa sua) and the right to a fair
hearing (audialterampartem). Ridge was the first time that the doctrine had been used to overturn a non-judicial (or quasijudicial) decision
35.

Nakud Ali v. Jayaratne, natural justice

The textile commissioner of Ceylon was given executive powers to cancel, revoke or suspend any license on his
subjective satisfaction.
Lord Radcliff: Subjective satisfaction exercised by Court for license based on national security is not subject to judicial
control.
The PC held that in the absence of any express statutory requirement for hearing, the rules of natural justice are not
attracted, even when the power to cancel a license is coupled with the fact that reasonable grounds must exist for the
exercise of the power.
36.

Bina Pani Devi v. State of Orissa, natural justice

Termination of service without prior notice and chance of being heard goes against the principles of natural justice. If
order is administrative in character leading to civil consequences, then principle of natural justice must be followed.
Bina Pani Devi was a doctor in government employment. She had stated that her date of birth was 10 th April 1910 at the
time of joining service. The government however, later came to know that she has misrepresented her Date of Birth and it
was actually 10th April 1907. Acting on this information, without any notice or hearing, terminated her from service for
misrepresentation. She filed a case in the Orissa HC against her termination. However, the court, following Liversidge v.
Anderson, held that administrative orders are not subjected to judicial review. She then went on appeal to the SC.
37.

Sarjoo Prasad v. General Manager, natural justice

The short point in this appeal is whether it was open to the respondent to change or alter the birth date of the appellant,
being 25th July, 1927, once accepted by the respondent in 1951, without giving an opportunity to him to sustain the same.
It is admitted that the alteration in the accepted birth-date of appellant has been made without giving an opportunity of
hearing to the appellant. Appellant claimed that his date of birth is July 25th, 1927 and this birth date is entered in his
High School Certificate and this birth date was accepted by the respondent in 1951. The appellant under the orders of this

Court continues to be in service and will continue to be in service. It will however be open to the respondent if it so
desires and considers it necessary to hold the enquiry about the correct birth date afresh after giving notice and
opportunity of hearing and producing evidence on either side in this case.
38.

AK Kraipak v. Union of India, Natural justice

In this case, the SC held that though the action of making selection for government services is administrative, yet the
selection committee is under a duty to act judicially. The dividing line between an administrative power and quasi-judicial
power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated.
In order to determine whether the action of the administrative authority is quasi-judicial or administrative, one has to see
the nature of power conferred, to whom the power is given, the framework within which power is conferred and the
consequences.
39.

Hiranath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Natural justice

Some students of a medical college climbed the girls hostel using pipes and behaved indecently with many girls. A
complaint was lodged and enquiry was made and the girls were called one by one and their statements were recorded. The
boys were then expelled for a period of one year.
A WP was filed by the boys to the SC on two basic grounds:
a. Charge made/ recorded statements were not made known to them
b. The statements made by the girls were not recorded in the presence of the boys.
The concept of principles of NJ is not inflexible and in disciplinary matters, it shouldnt be followed. The court said
however unsavory the procedure may look to a judicial mind, the girls may not have recorded their statements in the
presence of the boys.
Thus, procedure has to be followed and there is no need to strictly comply with the principles of NJ because the
contention of the boys that the statements were not recorded in front of them is not effective because otherwise the girls
would not have come up boldly and recorded their statements.
40.

Acharya JagdishwaranandAvadhut v. Police Commissioner, right to religion and its myriad forms

The petitioner filed writ petition under Art.32 of the Constitution for a direction to the respondent No.1 and the State to
allow procession to be carried in thepublic streets and meetings to be held in public places by the followers of the
AnandaMargaaccompanied by the performance of Tandava dance within the State of WestBengal. The petitioner
submitted that Ananda Marga was asocio-spiritual organisation dedicated to the service ofhumanity in different
spheres of life such as physical, mental and spiritual, irrespective of caste, creed orcolour; one of the prescriptions of
the religious rites tobe performed. Held that Ananda Marg is not a separate religion by itself and hence provisions u/A 25
and 26 are not attracted.

41.

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, right to life, natural justice, rule of law

The basic concept of rule of law is not a well-defined legal concept. The courts generally would not invalidate any
positive law on the ground that it violates the contents of rule of law. However, in this case, an attempt was made to
challenge the detention orders during Emergency on the grounds that it violates the principles of rules of law as the
obligation to act in accordance with rule of lawis a central feature of our constitutional system and a basic feature of
our Constitution.
Illegal acts of the government could not be challenged in a court because it was found that the source of personal liberty in
India was Art.21 which had been suspended by the Presidential Proclamation, and not any common law of the people
42.

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, Separation of Powers

See page 26 of IP Massey for the crux of the judgments by the judges.
In the Indian Constitution, the separation of powers is only in a broad sense only. A rigid separation of powers like in USA
or Australia does not apply to India.
Adjudication of a specific dispute is a judicial function which the Parliament, even acting under a Constitutional
amending power cannot exercise.
Just as courts ought not to enter into problems entwined in the political thicket, Parliament must also respect the preserve
of the courts. The principle of separation of powers is a principle of restraint which has in it the precept nature in the
prudence of self-preservation that, discretion is the better part of valor.
The Supreme Court in this case invalidated Article 329A(4) which was inserted by the 39 th Amendment to the Constitution
in 1975 to immunize the election dispute to the office of the Prime Minister and Speaker from any kind of judicial review.
Justice Chandrachud has held- political usefulness of the doctrine of separation of powers is now widely recognized. No
Constitution can survive without a conscious adherence to its fine checks and balances. Just as courts ought not to enter
into problems entwined in the political thicket, Parliament must also respect the preserve of the courts. The principle of
separation of powers is a principle of restraint which has in it the precept innate in the prudence of self-preservation, that
discretion is the better part of valor.
Our constitution is a bag of borrowed provisions from other constitutions. The constituent powers of the Parliament is
subject to the basic structure of the constitution.
43.

P. Sambamurthy v. State of AP, rule of law

It categorically stated that Article 371D (5) proviso of the Constitution clearly violated the rule of law which is a basic
structure and essential feature of the Constitution. This provision had authorized the Andhra Pradesh State Government to

nullify any decision of the administrative service tribunal. Declaring the provision unconstitutional, the court maintained
that it is a basic principle of the rule of law that the exercise of power by the executive or by any other authority must not
only be conditioned by the Constitution but must also be in accordance with law and the power of judicial review that the
rule of law is maintained and every organ is kept within the limits of the law.
44.

Somraj v State of Haryana, rule of law

The SC observed that the absence of arbitrary power in the first postulate of the rule of law upon which the whole
constitutional edifice is based. If the discretion is exercised without any principle or without any rule, it is a situation
amounting to the antithesis of the rule of law.
45.

Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, rule of law, arbtrariness

The court insisted on fairness to women in police lock-up and drafted a code of guidelines for the protection of prisoners
in police custody, especially female prisoners.
46.

State of MP v. RamshankerRaghuvanshi, rule of law, arbitrariness

The Court secured fairness in public employment by holding that reliance on police report is entirely misplaced in a
democratic republic.
47.

Ram JawayaKapur v. State of Punjab, Separation of Powers

The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognized the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity but the
functions of the different parts or branches of the government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can
very well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of functions
that essentially belong to another.
48.

In re: Delhi Laws Act, Delegated legislation, separation of powers, administrative action

There were a few states which were under the direct administration of the Central Government and were classified as Part
C States. These States did not have a legislature of their own and the Parliament had to legislate for these States. As it was
very difficult for the Parliament to find time to legislate for them, it passed the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950.
The Act authorized the Central Government to extend to any Part C State, with such restrictions and modifications as it
thought fit, any enactment in force in a Part A State. While doing so, the Government could repeal or amend any
corresponding law (other than a Central Law) which might be operative at the time in the Part C State concerned. The
powers of delegations were hence of sweeping nature.
The SC was called upon to adjudge the validity of this law. Seven judges participated in the decision and seven opinions
were delivered exhibiting a cleavage of judicial views on the question of limits subject to which the legislature in India
should be permitted to delegate legislative power. Yet, on 2 points, there was a unity of outlook amongst all the opinions.

First, keeping the exigencies of the modern Government in view, Parliament as well as State legislatures in India need to
delegate legislative power if they are to be able to face the multitudinous problems facing the country, for it is neither
practical nor feasible to expect that each legislative body could turn out a complete and comprehensive legislation on all
subjects sought to be legislated upon.
Two, since the Legislatures derives their power from the written constitution which creates them, they could not be
allowed the same freedom as the British Parliament in the matter of delegation, and that some limits should be set on their
capacity to delegate.
The judges however differed on the question as to what were to be the permissible limits within which the Indian
Legislature could delegate its legislative power?
One view propounded was that the Indian Legislature could delegate its power to any extent subject to the limit that it did
not efface itself, or abdicate its powers, which meant that the Legislature should never give up its control over the
delegate; that it must destroy its own legislative power; that it must retain its hands the ultimate control over the authority
so as to be able to withdraw the delegation whenever the delegate did something wrong or foolish.
The other view which approximated to the American approach, and which in theory at least is somewhat more restrictive
than the first, was that the Legislature should not delegate its essential legislative function which comprised the
formulation of policy and enacting it into a binding rule of conduct. That means the legislative should lay down standards
or policy in the delegating Act and the delegate may be left with the power to execute the policy.
By a majority, the Court laid down that the legislature should not delegate its essential legislative function which
comprises the formulation of policy and enacting it into a binding rule of conduct. The SC propounded the thesis that the
Legislature is the creature of the Constitution, the constitution-makers have placed their confidence in the collective
wisdom of the legislature, and the constitution has chosen to vest legislative power in the elected representatives of the
people. It is inevitable that the Legislature should itself discharge the essential legislative function, viz., the legislature
should itself lay down standards or policy in the delegating Act leaving the delegate with the power to make rules to
execute the policy laid down by the Legislature.
The specific provision involved was held valid by a majority, subject to two riders:
a. That part of it was bad which authorized the Government to repeal a law already in force
b. The power to effect modification in a State law in its application to a Part C State envisaged only such
modifications as did not change the underlying policy of the law sought to be extended.
The case achieved two ends:
a. It legitimized delegation of legislative power by the legislature to administrative organs

b. It imposed an outer limit on delegation by the legislature. No Indian Legislature can delegate unlimited
legislative powers to the administration. If the delegation is too broad, the courts can declare the same as
excessive and hence invalid.
The Court further held that incidental legislative functions can be delegated.
It was the first case in which separation of powers discussed. SC stated that our constitution doesnt vest executive powers
with the legislature, applying the doctrine of constitutional limitations and trust.
49.

Jayantilal v. FN Rana, delegated legislation

Essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. Conditional legislation and confinement of subordinate legislation
short of delegation of incidental legislative functions are valid.
50.

2G Scam- PUCL v. Union of India

51.

Francis Coralie v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi

The right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more
than just physical survival.
52.

Minerva Mills v. Union of India, administrative action, green light theory

The question before the Court was whether the DPSPs are subordinate to Fundamental rights?
The Court held that they are supplementary and complementary to each other.
The scope and extent of the doctrine of basic structure was considered.
A petition was filed challenging the taking over of the management of the mill under the Sick Textile Undertaking
(Nationalization) Act, 1974 and an order made under Section 18A of the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951. The petition also challenged the constitutional validity of clause (4) and (5) of Article 368 introduced by the 42 nd
Amendment.
Court- the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance of Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to
one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance is an essential feature of the
basic structure of the Constitution.
53.

R v. Lemon, freedom of speech and expression

James Kirkup's poem The Love that Dares to Speak its Name was published in the 3 June 1976 issue of Gay News. The
poem, written from the viewpoint of a Roman centurion, graphically describes him having sex with Jesus after his
crucifixion, and also claims that Jesus had had sex with numerous disciples, guards, and even Pontius Pilate.

In early November 1976, Mary Whitehouse obtained a copy of the poem and announced her intention to bring a private
prosecution against the magazine. Leave to bring this prosecution was granted on 9 December 1976. The charges named
Gay News Ltd and Denis Lemon as the publishers. A charge against Moore Harness Ltd for distributing was subsequently
dropped. The indictment described the offending publication as "a blasphemous libel concerning the Christian religion,
namely an obscene poem and illustration vilifying Christ in his life and in his crucifixion".
The Gay News Fighting Fund was set up in December 1976. Judge Alan King-Hamilton QC heard the trial at the Old
Bailey on 4 July 1977, with John Mortimer QC and Geoffrey Robertson representing the accused and John
Smyth representing Mary Whitehouse. On Monday 11 July, the jury found both defendants guilty. Gay News Ltd was
fined 1,000. Denis Lemon was fined 500 and sentenced to nine months imprisonment suspended. It had been "touch
and go", said the judge, whether he would actually send Denis Lemon to jail.
Mary Whitehouse's costs of 7,763 were ordered to be paid four fifths by Gay News Ltd and one fifth by Lemon. Gay
News Ltd and Denis Lemon appealed against conviction and sentence. On 17 March 1978, the Court of Appeal quashed
Denis Lemon's suspended prison sentence but upheld the convictions on the basis that the law of blasphemy had been
developed before mens rea, literally, a "guilty mind", became an essential element of a crime. Gay News readers voted by
a majority of 20 to 1 in favour of appealing to theHouse of Lords. The Law Lords heard the appeal against conviction and
delivered their judgment on 21 February 1979.
At issue was whether or not the offence of blasphemous libel required specific intent of committing such a blasphemy. By
a majority of 3 to 2, the Lords concluded that intention was not required. Lord Scarman was of the opinion that blasphemy
laws should cover all religions and not just Christianity and sought strict liability for those who "cause grave offence to
the religious feelings of some of their fellow citizens or are such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely
to read them".[1] The appeal was lost.
54.

Minerva Talkies v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1988 SC 54, administrative action

Karnataka Cinema Regulation Act of 1988 enabled the executive to carry out the purpose of the act by making laws and
by-laws. The executive made a law that the talkies shall hold only 4 shows per day. Minerva Talkies went against this
order and said it was a violation of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g).
The Court held that this restriction is valid and not beyond the present act. Such restrictions are put to preserve public
health and prevent the distribution and display of pornographic material amongst the public/audience.

55.

Jammu and Kashmir State Board of Education v. FeyazAramod Malik, AIR 2000 SC 1038, administrative

action
The act conferred vast powers of the state education board. The board had to the powers to conduct examinations
throughout the state and if any institution was found to be involved in mass copying, then the license of such an institution
could be cancelled by the board.
The appeal was that schools and colleges were meant to impart education and the powers went beyond the parent act
curbing the right to education of students.
The court stated that the main objective of such institutions were to impart education and conduct examinations. This act
was helping to achieve the object of these schools and colleges and hence was not ultra vires.
56.

Superintendent of Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohiya, freedome of speech and expression, also see case

of auto shanker
Restrictions may be imposed on freedom of speech in the name of preservation of morals but they must have a proximate
nexus between the restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved.
57.

Bharat Aluminum Limited Co. (BALCO) v. Workers Union (Disinvestment)

More than 50% shares of the company were owned by the Central Government. The government, by an executive order
wanted to go for disinvestment. This was however challenged by the workers of the company. They stated that Article
43A stipulates that workers must be consulted in the management of any industry.
The SC stated that the principles of natural justice are not supposed to be followed in the case of disinvestment. It further
stated that courts were not the competent authority to adjudicate this case. The parliament is the correct forum to solve
such disputes.
58.

Chitralekha Case (De-reservation)

This was before the 1st Constitutional Amendment was carried out. This case was one of the major reasons for the
amendment.
The Court had held that reservation for Scc and ST is against equality before law.
59.

EP Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, doctrine of arbitrariness

Service - enquiry - petition for directing respondents to withdraw and cancel Order and ask for direction to re-post
petitioner to post of Chief Secretary - file pertaining to matter throughout in possession of Government - absence of file
could not have stood in way of ordering an enquiry - suspicion cannot take place of proof - evidence generating judicial
certitude in up-holding plea of mala fides not on record - petition dismissed.

60.

Mohendra Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (Watershed- Election)

Election - power and duty - Article 324 (1) of Constitution of India and Sections 14, 66 and 153 of Representation of The
People Act, 1950 - Order of Election Commission in respect of counting of ballot papers and ordering re-poll under
challenge in this appeal - question whether Election Commission ordering fresh poll was during course of process of
election - election covers entire process from issue of notification under Section 14 to declaration of result under Section
66 - when any poll already taken place has been cancelled and fresh poll has been ordered then this order of fresh poll is
integral part of electoral process - impugned order itself shows that it has been passed in exercise of powers under Article
324 (1) and Section 153 - impugned Order relating to election in accordance with law and cannot therefore be quashed.
61.

RomeshThapar v. State of Madras, 1950, freedom of free speech and expression

The petitioner was the founder of weekly magazine Crossroads. It was a mouthpiece of the communist party. It was
banned entry and circulation under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The act banned any magazine or
newspaper if it was carrying some news that was detrimental to security or public order.
The case involved challenging this ban as repugnant of Article 19(1)(a): freedom of speech and expression includes the
freedom of press.
Justice PatanjaliShastri- The banning of the magazine is incorrect and is in violation of Art 19. Freedom of expression
includes the freedom to print thoughts. Thanjavur became a focal point as the first leading magazine tana siddhi was
published from Thanjavur and was also banned.
62.

Secretary of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of West Bengal, SC 1995, public

property, administrative action

The Court stated that there is no doubt that since airways and frequencies are public property, they have to be used in the
best interest of the society, and this can be done by the ministry by establishing a broadcasting network.
Generally, no restrictions are to be put on print or electronic media. The regulations that are ever put on both of these can
be slashed away by using Article 19(1)(a). If the government is putting a regulatory authority, then it is unconstitutional.
63.

R v. Lancashire country council, ex p Huddleston (Amber Light Theory)

A new relationship has emerged between courts and those who derive their authority from public laws. It is a partnership
based on a common goal, viz. fostering highest standards of public administration.
The respondent council had failed to allocate a university student grant to the claimant and the principle was directed at
the duty of that authority to state clearly the reasons for its refusal and the particular factors that had been taken into
consideration for the purpose.

Held: When a challenge is made in court to a decision of a public authority, there is an obligation on a respondent public
authority to put before the Court the material necessary to deal with the relevant issues. Sir John Donaldstone set out the
duty of candour applicable within the developing area of judicial review: This development has created a new
relationship between the courts and those who derive their authority from public law, one of partnership based on a
common aim, namely the maintenance of the highest standards of public administration . . The analogy is not exact, but
just as the judges of the inferior courts when challenged on the exercise of their jurisdiction traditionally explain fully
what they have done and why they have done it, but are not partisan in their own defence, so should be the public
authorities. It is not discreditable to get it wrong. What is discreditable is a reluctance to explain fully what has occurred
and why? Certainly it is for the applicant to satisfy the court of his entitlement to judicial review and it is for the
respondent to resist his application, if it considers it to be unjustified.But it is a process which falls to be conducted with
all the cards face upwards on the table and the vast majority of the cards will start in the authoritys hands. Sir John
Donaldson MR discussed the development of administrative law saying: This development has created a new relationship
between the courts and those who derive their authority from the public law, one of partnership based on a common aim,
namely the maintenance of the highest standards of public administration . . The analogy is not exact, but just as the
judges of the inferior courts when challenged on the exercise of their jurisdiction traditionally explain fully what they
have done and why they have done it, but are not partisan in their own defence, so should be the public authorities. It is
not discreditable to get it wrong. What is discreditable is a reluctance to explain fully what has occurred and why. .
Certainly it is for the applicant to satisfy the court of his entitlement to judicial review and it is for the respondent to resist
his application, if it considers it to be unjustified. But it is a process which falls to be conducted with all the cards face
upwards on the table and the vast majority of the cards will start in the authoritys hands.