Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1) Facts
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory
relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar,
paryingthat judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal
Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the
use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of
the public.
In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. The contest is open to all
motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There is
neither a fee or consideration required nor a purchase
required to be made. The forms are available upon
request at each Caltex station and there is also a
sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be
deposited.
The court ruled that the petitioner does not violate the
Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the
public distribution or said rules by the mails. The
respondent then appealed.
2) Issue(s)
a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause
of action for declaratory relief?
3) Ruling
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states
a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and
judgment
appealed
from
is
4) Ratio
Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1 Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief
should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a
will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose
rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance.
Legislative Intent
Airspona v CA (113 SCRA 459)
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal
Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de
Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the
beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad
Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned
policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed
against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the City
Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an
agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the
certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance
Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife
of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his
work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal
and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone
to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was
Held:
From the discussion of the conference committee
report of the two houses of Congress that the
prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a
bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a
Nature
of
Construction
the
Rules
of
Statutory
Propriety of Construction
NFL v. Eisma (127 SCRA 419)
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor
filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for
direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid
employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of
the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On
(1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of time that also
overlapped.
Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in
Contract B, is now deceased. This is the reason why
her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For
purposes of brevity, these defendants shall be referred
to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza. Mobil Oil seeks
the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and
Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which
Contract B is derived and depends has already been
cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that
Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid
and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land,
subject to the present litigation is concerned.
Defendants Leverizas claim that Contract A which is
their contract with CAA has never been legally
cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is
Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which
should be declared void. CAA asserts that Contract A is
still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by
Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul
Contract A because of the violation committed by
Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by
virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA
further asserts that Contract C not having been
approved by the Director of Public Works and
Communications is not valid. After trial, the lower
courts rendered judgment: 1. Declaring Contract A as
having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and
has therefore ceased to have any effect as of that
date; 2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased
to have any effect as of June 28, 1966 because of the
cancellation of Contract A; 3. Declaring that Contract C
was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is
still valid and subsisting;
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is
AFFIRMED in toto. YES Contract A was entered into by
CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee
specifically for the purpose of operating and
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC
may refer to SK elections, where the recall election is
for Barangay post.
DAVIDE:
HELD:
NO. But petition was dismissed for having become
moot and academic.
RATIO:
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal
working of the local government unit necessitating
additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the
conduct of recall election one year immediately
preceding the regular local election. The proscription
is due to the proximity of the next regular election for
the office of the local elective official concerned. The
electorate could choose the officials replacement in
the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall
election.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent
of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular
local election as one referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.
CONCURRING OPINION:
Facts:
The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to
the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue
the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of
the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
en banc on 4 December 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges
presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of
Issue:
Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to exempt justices and judges from
taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.
Judicial Legislation
Held:
The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with
the
fundamental
principle
of
constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.
The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10,
Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes
Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate
must be higher than that which they are receiving at
the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It
would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the
discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Thus, the
The Supreme
prohibition.
Court
dismissed
the
petition
for
of
the
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by
the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an
eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC
one from the House of Representatives and one from
the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in
2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one
full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice
that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is
the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their
theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of Congress, such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive meaning as
expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that
both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate.
Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of a representative from Congress, it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further
argue that petitioner has no real interest in
questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current
composition.
The
respondents
also
question
petitioners belated filing of the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been met
conscientious
objector
in
securing
PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier primarily in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra
vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.
Gamboa v. Finance
October 9, 2012)
Sec.
(G.R.
No.
176579,
Facts:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned
the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million
shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus,
First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased
from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing
the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT
to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it
violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of
public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign
ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more
than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in
favor of the petitioner, hence this new case, resolving
the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision
filed by the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court made an erroneous
interpretation of the term capital in its 2011 decision?
Held/Reason:
divided,merged,
abolished,
or
its
boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteriaestablished in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes castin a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Petitioner
Umali
elucidates
that
the
phrase
"political
units
directly
affected"
necessarilyencompasses not only Cabanatuan City but
the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all
theregistered voters in the province are qualified to
cast
their
votes
in
resolving
the
proposedconversion of Cabanatuan City.On the other
hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to
support their claim that only theCity of Cabanatuan
should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453
states:Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized
Status. It shall be the duty of the President todeclare
a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after
it shall have met the minimumrequirements prescribed
in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application thereforand ratification in a plebiscite by
the qualified voters therein. Respondents take the
phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as
referring only to theregistered voters in the city
being converted, excluding in the process the
voters in theremaining towns and cities of Nueva
Ecija.In this case, the provision merely authorized the
President to make a determination onwhether or not
the requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are
complied with. Theprovision makes it ministerial for
the President, upon proper application, to declare
acomponent city as highly urbanized once the
minimum requirements, which are base on certifiable
and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are
satisfied.
The
mandatorylanguage "shall" used in
the provision leaves the President with no room for
discretion.In
so doing, Sec. 453, in effect,
automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for
purposes ofconversions once the requirements are
met. No further legislation is necessary before the
cityproposed to be converted becomes eligible to
become an HUC through ratification, as the basisfor
the delegation of the legislative authority is the very
LGC.The
plebiscite
requirement
under
the
constitutional
provision
should
equally
apply
toconversions as well.While conversion to an HUC is
not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution wenevertheless
observe
that
the
conversion of a component city into an HUC
is substantialalteration of boundaries.
Paras v. COMELEC (264 SCRA 49)
Ordillo v. COMELEC (192 SCRA 100)
Facts:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and KalingaApayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766
entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in
only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces
and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990,
issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
and
social
structures
and
other
relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are
not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766
provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting
of the Regional Government and local government
units. It further provides that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise
powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
Autonomous Region . . .
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress
never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced
with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials,
a set of provincial officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area.
Self-executing
Legislation
Gutierrez
v.
House
of
Representatives
Committee on Justice (G.R. No. 193459, February
15, 2011)
FACTS:
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session,
private respondents known as the Baraquel group filed
an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon
the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene
Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives
transmitted the impeachment complaint to House
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes
group filed another impeachment complaint against
petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by PartyList Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.
The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups
complaint to Speaker Belmonte who also directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.
Second issue:
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the
existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the right to be heard
and to defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate
and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two
factors are considered: failure to report for work
without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship with the second as
the more determinative factor which is manifested by
overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employees has no more intention to work.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Agabon v. NLRC (G.R. No. 158693, November 17,
2004)
FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum
board and cornice installers from January 1992 to
February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by
an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of
such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation
may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the
Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched
the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive
that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution,
particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Progressive Interpretation
Orceo v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190779, March 26,
2010)
FACTS:
Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as
follows:
(1) Annulling Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it includes
airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations within the
meaning of firearm, and declaring the Resolution as
invalid;
(2) ordering the COMELEC to desist from further
implementing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft
guns and their replicas/imitations are concerned;
(3) ordering the COMELEC to amend Resolution No.
8714
by
removing
airsoft
guns
and
their
replicas/imitations within the meaning of firearm;
and
(4) ordering the COMELEC to issue a Resolution
directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police and other law enforcement
agencies deputized by the COMELEC to desist from
further enforcing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft
guns and their replicas/imitations are concerned.
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding
moments among family members. Families are entitled
to protection by the society and the State under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free
to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These
liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by
the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends that
Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the
State policies in these constitutional provisions:
(1) Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Reman
Enterprises,
Inc.
v.
Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (G.R.
No. 197676, February 4, 2014)
Facts:
On June 29, 2009, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law Republic Act No. 9646, otherwise
known as the Real Estate Service Act of the
Philippines. The law aims to professionalize the real
estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate
service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers,
assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the
country. Prior to its enactment, the real estate service
practitioners were under the supervision of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the
Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection
(BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation
functions. Such authority has been transferred to the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service
(PRBRES), created under the new law.
On July 21, 2010, the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated
by the PRBRES, upon approval of the PRC, under
Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, the petitioners, Remman
Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Association (CREBA), instituted Civil Case
No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and
unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No.
9646:
Issues:
1.
Whether or not R.A. No. 9646 violates the one
title-one subject rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1)
of the Philippine Constitution
2.
Whether R.A. No. 9646 conflicts with PD 957, as
amended by EO 648, with respect to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate
developers
3.
Whether R.A. No. 9646 violates the right of the
petitioners to due process
4.
Whether Republic Act No. 9646, particularly
Section 28(a), violates the equal protection clause
Rulings:
1. R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one title-one
subject rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the
Philippine Constitution
The one title-one subject rule does not require
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect. It is satisfied if
all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title,
or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign
to the general subject and title.
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
Publication Requirements
Taada v. Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling
respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it
would be granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular interest
to be subserved, or some particular right to be
HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not with the publication requirement
which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified
for the law to become effective. The necessity for the
publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application,
was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is
necessary to provide the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which regulate actions and
conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no
basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of the
clause unless otherwise provided.
Held:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article
2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. The legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall
be
shortened
or
extended.
Publication
requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws; (2) presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
SC Circulars
Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Hon. Lidua
(G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013)
FACTS:
Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was
authorized to render any motorvehicle immobilized by
placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally
parked.Balajadia
and
the
other
respondents
dismantled, took and carried away the clampsattached
HELD:
No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, only the filing of anInformation tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is
involved in an ordinance.The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the
violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
alsofeatured similar facts and issues with the present
case. In that case, the offense was committed onMay
11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30,
1990, and the Information was filed withthe
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. When the representatives of the petitioner filed
the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of
Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information.
They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The failure
of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is
unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case
against the private respondents. It stands that the
doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and
their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity
of filing the Information in court in order to toll the
period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the
effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the
above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if
the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutors
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution
of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.
However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
Construction
Statutes
of
AOs
and
IRRs
vis--vis
FACTS:
PETITIONER a law firm, was exempted for the period 1
January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag~IBIG Fund
coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior
retirement plan.
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees
issued Board Resolution amending and modifying the
Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As
amended, for a company to be entitled to a waiver or
suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan
providing for both provident/ retirement and housing
benefits superior to those provided under the
Pag~IBIG Fund.
On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the
respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of
Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan
and that HDMFs amendment to the law is invalid.
However, HDMF disapproved PETITIONER's application.
On 31 March 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on the ground that the coverage
of employers and employees under the Home
Development Mutual Fund is mandatory in character
as clearly worded in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, as
amended by R.A. No. 7742.
On 6 November 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition
before the Supreme Court .
ISSUE:
Issue:
WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies
retroactively to those removed from office before it
took effect on January 1, 1992.
Held:
No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7160 does not have any retroactive effect.
Laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively.
A statute, despite the generality in its language, must
not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or
matters which transpired before its passage: Lex
prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not
backward.
Construction
Statutes
of
Solicitor General v
December 11, 1991)
Ordinances
MMA
(G.R.
No.
vis--vis
102782,
Facts:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District
vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations was not among the sanctions that
could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission
under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the
conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled
vehicles obstructing the public streets.
It was there also observed that even the confiscation
of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the
decree to be imposed by the Commission.
Held:
No. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of
legislative power to promulgate such measures, it
appearing that the requisites of such delegation are
present. These requisites are:
1)the completeness of the statute making the
delegation; and
2)the presence of a sufficient standard.
1)must
2)must
3)must
4)must
5)must
6)must
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR
announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro
City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided
to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he
reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7,
1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all.
On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No.
3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court
of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor
and
supplemental
petitioner.
Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the
writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by
law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869.
This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
what
Realities existing
adoption
at
the
time
of
RULING:
[The Court partly granted the petition and held that
the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors of a public utility, or in
the instant case, to the total common shares of PLDT.]
Aquino v. COMELEC (62 SCRA 275)
FACTS:
In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to
seek the nullification of some Presidential Decrees
issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos. It was
alleged that Marcos does not hold any legal office nor
possess any lawful authority under either the 1935
Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore
has
no
authority
to
issue
the
questioned
proclamations, decrees and orders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful
government.
HELD:
Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto
proceedings and Benigno Aquino, Jr. et al, have no
legal personality to sue because they have no claim to
the office of the president. Only the Solicitor General
or the person who asserts title to the same office can
legally file such a quo warranto petition.
On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the
validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on
September 22, 1972 by President Marcos because
there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said
proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that
Legislative Debates
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR (192 SCRA 51)
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for
restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent
injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without
jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A.
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the
Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the
same apply to herein petitioner, and further from
performing an act in violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioner. On June 10,1988, the President
of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in
its coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32
of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80). On January 9, 1989, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules
and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.