Crimpro Compiled Digests Parts 9 10

1
CrimPro (Parts 9-10)
AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien
PEOPLE VS. PABLO
The
respondent
aggravated
his
Rogelio Carace, Godofredo Carace, Gil Castrence, Rogelio indiscretion by not only
Caranza and Damian Senit were charged with Homicide for denying the motion for
the killing of Benjamin Atcha. The accused pleaded not postponement, but also
guilty.
in immediately granting
the
defense
written
Several postponements were made upon motion by themotion to consider the
prosecutors and without objection on the part of theprosecution's
case
defense.
rested, without giving the
prosecution a chance to
On July 17, 1973, for failure of its last witness, Dr. Francisco oppose the same, and
Q. Duque, to arrive, the prosecution moved forwithout reviewing the
postponement on the ground that Dr. Duque is a vital and evidence
already
indispensable witness who would testify on the cause of presented for
death of the victim.
The presiding judge, Hon. Magno B. Pablo, denied the
motion for postponement and ordered the prosecution to
proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The
prosecuting fiscal asked for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion for postponement, but the judge
denied the motion for reconsideration, prompting the
prosecution to file a second motion for reconsideration in
writing, signed by both the fiscal and the private
prosecutor, stating inter alia :
4.That
this is the first time that the prosecution is

moving for a postponement of this case or. the
ground of the absence of the last witness Dr.
Francisco Q. Duque and it appears on the records
that the subpoena sent to Dr. Duque was received by
his secretary who may not have conveyed the same
to Dr. Duque and the second time on the part of the
prosecution since the beginning of the hearing on
this case;
5. That
to serve the better ends of justice the

prosecution should be given another opportunity at
least to secure and resort to other processes to
enable it to present Dr. Francisco Q. Duque at the
next scheduled hearing.
Judge denied. Prosecution asked for 10 days within which
to elevate the question of the propriety of denial to the
appellate court. Judge allowed, but still granted the Motion
to Consider Prosecution's Case Rested and Motion to
Dismiss filed by the defense that afternoon. Accused were
also acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the prosecutions motion to postpone
and granting defenses motion to consider the
prosecutions case rested and to dismiss the case.
HELD: Yes.
The motion for postponement is justified because
Dr. Duque is a vital witness as he can testify with regard to
the causal relation between the wounds inflicted by the
accused and the victims death. The alleged denial of the
right to speedy trial as constitutionally granted to the
accused was a flimsy ground for the court to deny the
postponement as requested by the prosecution, much less
to dismiss the case, without even a recital of the facts as
established by the evidence already presented, which
appears to have at least proved the commission of a crime
by the accused against the victim, although perhaps a
lesser one than the offense charged.
He should have first given warning that there win
definitely be no further postponement after that which he
reasonably thought should be the last. He should also have
ascertained whether Dr. Duque had personally known of
the subpoena, so that if despite his personal knowledge
thereof, he failed to come to court, his arrest may be
ordered, as is the precise procedure enjoined upon the
court to follow under Section 11, Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court.
The records also disclose that trial was never postponed
due to the non-appearance of Dr. Duque. The first and only
postponement sought on that ground was denied.
a proper assessment as
to what crime has been
committed
by
the
accused of which they
may
properly
be
convicted
thereunder,
acquitted
the
said
accused,
although,
realizing
later
the
improvidence
in
his
action, he amended his
order of acquittal of the
accused
to
that
of
dismissal of the case.
The order of dismissal,
under the circumstances
pointed out above, would
amount to an acquittal
because evidence had
already been presented
by the prosecution. An
evaluation
of
said
evidence
is
thus
indispensably
required,
where, as in this case,
the evidence presented
even if the prosecution's
case
is
considered
submitted at a stage
short of the presentation
of its complete evidence,
obviously
suffices
to
prove a crime, even if a
lesser one than the
offense
charged.
The
dismiss was sought to be
justified
upon
an
invocation of the right to
speedy trial. Precisely,
the respondent judge,
allegedly, to avoid a
violation thereof, denied
further postponement. It
is therefore, a palpable
error
to
base
the
dismissal of the case, as
the respondent judge did,
on the ground of the
violation of accused's
right to speedy trial. If at
all, the dismissal may be
decreed by reason of the
failure of the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the
accused of any crime
under the information,
even on the basis of the
evidence presented when
its case was deemed
submitted on motion of
the
defense.
The
respondent
court,
however, failed utterly to
show this to be what
actually obtained after
the hearings held on at
least six days, as the
order of the respondent
judge
acquitting
the
accused, or dismissing
the case, as he later
amended his order, made
no mention whatsoever
of
the
evidence
presented
by
the
prosecution during the
six times the case was
set, for hearing merely
stating, by way of an
obviously
baseless
conclusion, that the guilt of the accused has not been to grant said request
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The basis of thewould be to defeat his
dismissal of the case is, therefore, both legally andact of denying the motion
factually incorrect.
for postponement seems
Aside from this series of missteps and legal error only to show the erratic
committed by the respondent judge, which in their totality turn of his mind. There is
inconsistent
clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion, the records nothing
denying
the
also show that the court, after denying the second motionbetween
motion
for
postponement
for postponement filed in writing by the prosecution,
granted on request, the latter ten (10) days within which to and allowing the denial to
elevate the matter of the denial of the aforesaid second be tested by a higher
motion for reconsideration. The respondent denies this court where it is alleged
the
respondent
fact, but We find the records demonstrably showingthat
in
denying
respondent's denial totally devoid of truth. His alleging that judge
postponement,
committed a grave abuse

of discretion. A judge
who refuses to have his
judicial acts tested in a
higher court would be
acting with tyranny, a
judicial
norm
hardly
proper of one exercising
judicial function in the
lower echelon of the
judicial hierarchy.
EXTRA: no double
jeopardy if ever. Grave
abuse of discretion.
PEOPLE VS. ESCOBER

delay due to the failure of
stenographer
Eduardo
Facts: Juan Escober and Macario Punzalan, Jr. were found
Bober
to
submit
to this
by the trial court guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Court the transcript of
Homicide.
stenographic notes of
some hearings.
Heres what happened:
Vicente went to his office with his two kids. On their way,
in
the
they saw Escober at his post. In the office, Vicente took a Speed
administration of justice,
bath.
however, is not the sole
Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a concern of courts and
tricycle and went to the office. Abuyen knocked at the judges. More than this is
gate. Escober opened and talked to Abuyen. Abuyen thenthe essentiality of justice
and fairness which is the
told Punzalan to wait outside.
primordial objective of
the
Mrs. Chua arrived. She noticed that the gate was open and
saw Punzalan standing there. She shouted to ask why and
then she heard a gunshot coming from the garage. When
she looked, she saw Abuyen and Escober walking towards
the gate. Escober volunteered the information that her
husband was not hit.
When Vicente went out of the bathroom, he saw his kids
mortally wounded. He also noticed that the drawers were
open.
The kids were rushed to the hospital but were declared
dead on arrival.
They were found guilty and the penalty of death was
imposed.
ISSUE: Escober contends that the decision was null and
void for with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the
1973 Constitution and that it was rendered even before all
the stenographic notes of the proceedings had been
transcribed.
HELD: Judge didnt follow the prescribed form Every
decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based ...
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The
inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's
tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without
detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations
of the Amended Information were the facts without
specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported
this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accusedappellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with
contradictions
without
pointing
out
what
these
contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober
should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found
the crime to have been attended by the aggravating
circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength,
treachery, in band, "among others," but did not particularly
state the factual bases for such findings.
As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof
extremely difficult. Without a particularization of the
evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the
findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible for
the appellate court to determine whether or not such
findings were sufficiently and logically supported by the
evidence relied upon by the trial court.
Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have
appreciated the efforts shown by respondent-judge to
administer justice in this case in the most speedy and
expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our
admonition that judges do not have to wait for the
transcription of stenographic notes before rendering
judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings
personally taken by them. For this is what respondent
judge did. The records show that he took copious notes of
the testimonies of the witnesses on which he apparently
based this decision, as the transcript of the stenographic
notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of
the judgment. In fact, the review of the case suffered some
courts. Respondent judge

lamentably disregarded
the latter for the former.
[SC no
longer
remande
d the
case para
mabilis]
Escober
not guilty
beyond
reasonabl
e doubt.
The prosecution's theory

is that Juan Escober is a
principal
by
indispensable
cooperation in the crime
of robbery with homicide.
In support thereof, it tried
to prove that Escober's
actuations during the
incident in question were
done with the knowledge
of and pursuant to said
nefahous plan. These
acts consist of- [1] his
alleged act of opening
the
gate
of
the
compound to his coconspirators;
[2]
his
having been seen by Mrs.
Lina
Chua
behind
Alorte/Abuyen,
the
alleged
mastermined,
after the gunshot; and [3]
his having volunteered
the information to Mrs.
Chua that he was not hit.
The prosecution further
attempted to show that
the gun-firing was a mere
ritual in avoidance of
suspicion
and
that
Escober's version of the
incident is too replete
with contradictions to
merit belief.
After a thorough review
of the evidence, We find
that the guilt of Juan
Escober has not been
proved
beyond
reasonable doubt.
The act of opening a gate
upon hearing a knock is
by itself an innocent
gesture.
One
who
imputes an evil motive or
purpose thereto must
prove
his
allegations
convincingly. In the case
at bar, even if the version
of Macario Punzalan, Jr.
that Escober opened the
gate at the knock of the
alleged
mastermind
Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto
Alorte
were
to
be
believed, the same would
not constitute sufficient
and convincing proof that
Escober had knowledge
of the nefarious plan. The
worse that could be
attributed to him is lack
of better judgment or
laxity in the performance of his duties as a security guard the scene and the need
by the prosecution as
Exhibit B during the
in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution for immediate escape.
separate trial of said
dictated by his occupation to exclude from the premises
Abuyen/Alorte.
being guarded persons who have not demonstrated anyEven assuming arguendo
legitimate reason for getting in.
that the gun was fired in
the air and not at
The spontaneous and
candid manner by which
The facts of the case likewise do not support the Escober, the same could
it
was
given
lends
prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was a have been done to scare
credence
to
his
mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen Lina Chua away from the
statement,
that
observation of counsel for Escober that "... it is not a scene of the crime rather
than to divert suspicion
Abuyen/Alorte
wanted
common experience that a person allows himself to be
from Escober.
Escober
killed.
This
shot by a gun. He would be the stupidest person on earth if
statement, together with
he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots
the statement of Abuyen/
That the gun-firing was
[sic] with malefactors The least or perhaps the safest way
Alorte that he himself
not a ritual and that
for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be rendered Escober was not a part of
fired at E scober although
ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or the criminal plan are
the latter was not hit,
wounding him so he would live if he were a conspirator. To further bolstered by the
unwittingly corroborates
allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he statement
Escober's version that
made
by
10
the gun was aimed at
Macario Punzalan during
might get killed.
him. That Escober was
the
preliminary
not thereby hit should
Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within investigation, and extranot
be
taken
as
a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour as found by the judicial statement of the
conclusive proof that the
trial court, a time too short to enable Abuyen/Alorte and alleged
mastermind
gun-firing was a mere
Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if it were a Abuyen /Alorte
dated
ritual
pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered April 16, 1986, submitted
it considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at
3
participation in the crime was to
act as a look-out, and as such, he
did not participate in the killing of
the two helpless victims, he
because the same could be easily occasioned by a poor
cannot
evade
responsibility
aim and/ or the hurried manner of its execution.
therefor. Well-established is the
The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this
rule in this jurisdiction that
regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
whenever a homicide has been
[1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and
committed as a consequence of
[2] that his acts during the commission of the crime,
or on the occasion of a robbery,
such as the opening of the gate and having been
all those who took part as
behind Abuyen after the gunshot, were performed
principals in the commission of
pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case,
the robbery are also guilty as
the
prosecution's
reliance
on
the
alleged
principals in the special complex
inconsistencies in Escober's testimony regarding his
crime of robbery with homicide
actuations during the incident at bar can not improve
although they did not actually
its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the
take part in the homicide unless
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
it clearly appeared that they
15
innocent until the contrary is proved
and its
endeavored
to
prevent
the
corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on the
homicide.
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness
of the defense.
On Punzalan:
While it may be conceded that it would have been
more judicious for the trial court to appoint a counsel
de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte
of his co-accused Escober, such failure did not
constitute prejudicial error to warrant nullification of
the proceedings taken against Punzalan. There is no
evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of
Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show
that Atty. Mariano defended both accused with equal
zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able to present
his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of
having knocked that the trial court believed. In the final
analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have
suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to crossexamine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding
22
Punzalan's presence at the scene of the crime.
Escober's
testimony,
however,
was
merely
corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and
Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the prosecution who
23
were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano.
Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had
established the fact of robbery and we are convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such
plan. It is incredible that his three companions would
fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring
him along to the scene of crime, thereby risking
another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof.
Punzalan's flight from the scene of the crime with his
companions and his failure, if he were truly innocent,
to report to the police what he knew about the crime
after reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate
his knowledge of the plan.
While
it
has
been
established
that
Punzalan's
AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin

| Vien
PEOPLE VS. TOLING

6
Base, et al, it has been

Facts: The accused were found of Robbery in Band with held that "if the lower
court is not satisfied with
Homicide. Death penalty was imposed.
the evidence adduced by
the attorneys in criminal
The prosecution sought to establish that at about 11:45
o'clock in the evening of February 5, 1966, the accused,
conspiring and confederating with each other, robbed the
house of Francisco Lumpayao after mortally wounding
Isabelo Caseres who had responded to Lumpayao's call for
succor. The evidence consisted of the testimonies of
Francisco
Lumpayao,
Marcelino
Campomanes
and
Florentino P. Omandam, and the extrajudicial statements of
Hilario Gahito Candelario Bolando and Rogelio Cometa
(Exhibits "C", "D", and "E", respectively). To prove the
voluntariness and due execution of Exhibits "C", "D" and
"E", the prosecution introduced the testimonies of
Gualberto B. Bacarro, Municipal Judge of Tambulig,
Zamboanga del Sur and Acting Municipal Judge of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, and Paciano Guillen, Municipal Mayor
of the same municipality.
Lumpayao said he saw the accused trying to get the
chickens on the roof of his house. He shouted, and the
accused went far away. He saw his neighbor Caceres and
warned him about the robbers, but Caceres got shot by
Toling. Then when morning came, he saw that he lost some
stuff.
Campomanes corroborated the story.
On the other hand, the defendants presented their defense
consisting of denials and alibis. Hilario Gahito Candelario
Bolando and Rogelio Cometa repudiated their respective
extrajudicial statements, all contending that they were
mauled or maltreated into signing the same.
When the trial court was preparing its decision it
discovered that the Fiscal inadvertently omitted to present
as evidence the admission of Rogelio Cometa. Hence, the
court, motu proprio, ordered the reopening of the case to
enable the Fiscal to offer in evidence the extrajudicial
statement of Rogelio Cometa. Thereafter, the case was
submitted anew for decision.
In convicting appellants Rolando Cometa, Rogelio Cometa
and Candelario Bolando, the trial court appears to have
relied principally on the extrajudicial statements of Hilario
Gahito Candelario Bolando and Rogelio Cometa (Exhibits
"C", "D" and "E", respectively).
Gahito basically corroborated Lumpayaos testimony.
Bolando said he was threatened and then said the same
story. Cometa said that Toling told him that he (Toling) got
hired to kill Caseres for P250 and promised him P50 if he
would also go.
ISSUE: In their brief, appellants contend, among others,
that the trial court erred in reopening motu proprio the
proceedings after the case had been submitted for
decision, simply to enable the prosecution to present
evidence which it overlooked or failed to submit at the
trial; that the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon
the confessions of Hilario Gahito-Candelario Bolando and
Rogelio Cometa as competent evidence against each other
and as against their co-accused Rolando Cometa; and that
the trial court erred in holding that the crime committed
was Robbery in Band with Homicide under Article 294,
paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: With reference to the reopening of the proceedings
after both sides had rested and the case submitted for
decision, We hold that the trial court was not in error. As
5
early as in 1907, this Court held in U. S. v. Cinco,
that
"judges of the Courts of First Instance are judges of both
fact and law, and after all the evidence adduced by the
attorneys, if the court is not satisfied, we see no reason
why he should not be permitted to call additional witnesses
for the purpose of satisfying his mind upon any questions
presented during the trial of the case." Also, in U. S. v.
cases, with reference to a

particular point, he may,
on his own motion, call
additional witnesses or
recall some of the same
witnesses,
for
the
purpose of satisfying his
mind with reference to
particular facts involved
in the case.
Other stuff: Confessions
voluntary.
Under
the
facts, the extrajudicial
confessions of appellants
Rogelio
Cometa
and
Candelario
Bolando
should
have
been
admissible only against
said declarants and not
as the basis for the
conviction of Rolando
Cometa. The rule on
interlocking confessions
is where extrajudicial
confessions has been
made by several persons
charged
with
a
conspiracy
and
there
could have been no
collusion with reference
to
the
several
confessions, the fact that
the statements are in all
material
respects
Identical is confirmatory
of the testimony of an
8
accomplice.
In other
words, such extrajudicial
declarations may, under
certain conditions, be
taken into consideration
a. a circumstance in
judging the credibility of
the testimony of an
accomplice. In the case
of Rolando Cometa, there
is
no
testimony
implicating said appellant
which
the
aforesaid
extra-judicial confessions
would
confirm
or
corroborate.
Last: We agree
with the appellants that
they
should
not
be
convicted of Robbery in
Band
with
Homicide.
Rogelio
Cometa
positively declared that
for a price of P50.00, he
joined Francisco Toling in
the latter's plan to kill
Isabelo Caseres of Barrio
Bagong
Gutlang
in
consideration of a reward
of P250.00 promised by
Magno
Sejuela
who
wanted Isabelo Caseres
to be killed. Relating this
declaration
with
the
shooting and killing of
Isabelo
Caseres
by
Francisco
Toling,
We
cannot
escape
the
conclusion that indeed
the purpose of the group
was to kill Caseres. In this
connection, We hasten to
state
that
while
Candelario Bolando stated that he was told along the way purpose in order to
that their purpose was to rob Francisco Lumpayao, said induce the latter to go
statement cannot prevail over the positive declaration of with them. They were the
Rogelio Cometa as to their purpose, it appearing that leaders, while Candelario
Francisco Toling, who did the killing, and his brother-in-law, was merely a minor
Rogelio Cometa, were the ones who organized and led the follower.
Indeed,
the
group in the criminal enterprise. It is not improbable that actuations
of
the
they did not immediately reveal to Bolando their criminal appellants indicated that
the robbery was an

afterthought which arose
only when they saw that
Lumpayao and his family
have, because of fear,
abandoned their house.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan
CJ Teehankee (1986)
2
In that very same
Ninoy was assassinated, together with his

verdict, a most curious
suspected assassin
Rolando Galman. Immediately thereafter, Pres. Marcosthing was included (a
ordered an investigation for which he formed a 5member Fact Finding Board (a.k.a. Agrava Board)
first in Philippine judicial
2 Said Agrava Board conducted hearings and
received evidence regarding the assassinations. Upon history according to CJ
resolution, it submitted 2 reports to Pres. Marcos

(1)
while the
Minority Report (solely written and subscribed to by Teehankee)
Board Chairman Agrava); and (2) Majority Report
(subscribed to by the remaining 4 members of the Board) Sandiganbayan acquitted
3 Both reports rejected the militarys version of what all the named accused in
took place during the assassination

both reports
instead found: (1) that Galman was not an NPA-hiredthe criminal case, it
assassin and that he was not the assassin period; (2) that
only the soldier-escorts in the staircase with Ninoy could
have shot him; and (3) that the same escorts gunned convicted the very victim
down Galman to be their fall guy
4 The only difference between the 2 reports is thatRolando Galman (who
the majority report found all 26 private respondents of
this case (headed by AFP Chief Gen. Fabian Ver) to be was not on trial) as the
involved in the military conspiracy to assassinate Ninoy
assassin
of
Ninoy
and therefore indictable for his and Galmans killing
Chairman Agravas minority report, on the othercontrary

hand, would exclude 19 of herein named private
respondents and limit culpability to the 6 soldiers who information
were on the service stairs with Ninoy
before it!
6 Curious enough, the minority report was submitted
one day ahead of the majority report. Said minority
report was received congenially and cordially by Pres.
Marcos, forthwith referring it to the Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) for final resolution through the legal
system and for trial in the Sandiganbayan
The majority report, submitted the next day, was

coldly received by Marcos, to which he paid practically no
attention
Despite Pres. Marcoss initial order, the Tanodbayan

filed charges against all 26 herein private respondents
(consistent with the majority report) before the
1
Sandiganbayan
9 But before the Sandiganbayan could hand down
the verdict in the Ninoy-Galman double murder case,
herein petitioners (heirs of Galman PLUS epals, e.g. Fr.
Bernas, Mareng Winnie, Frank Chavez, Cecilia MunozPalma, JBL Reyes, etc) filed this present action for
certiorari and prohibition alleging that public respondents
(Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan) committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the
constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law
to
the
presented
Petitioners
filed
for an MR. But due to
the verdict of acquittal,
the Court agreed with
respondents that the
case
has
been
rendered
moot and
academic, hence the
MR was denied
Later, one of the

Deputy
Tanodbayans
who prosecuted the
Ninoy-Galman case (i.e.
Manuel Herrera) wrote
a tell-all published in
the
Manila
Times
entitled Aquino Trial a
Sham
where
he
revealed
several
3
orders
from
Pres.
Marcos
to
the
Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan Justices
to
whitewash
the
criminal
cases
and
produce a verdict of
acquittal
On the basis of
such
startling
revelations,
herein
petitioners
filed their
nd
2
MR, which the
Court
admitted.
Respondents
opposed
nd
2
MR
interposing
double
jeopardy
as
special
defense.
Respondents
also
questioned the remedy
being
sought
by
petitioners
they
allege that petitioners
remedy is a direct
action to annul the
judgment where the
burden of proof falls
upon them to establish
by clear, competent
and
convincing
evidence the cause of
the nullity
ISSUES:
1.
10
Petitioners prayed: (1) for a TRO to restrain the

Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits
of the Ninoy-Galman criminal case; (2) for declaration of
a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan; and
(3) ordering
a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an

unbiased prosecutor
11
Petitioners principally argued that the Tanodbayan

did not represent the interest of the people when he
failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present
vital and important testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan
Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of
the accused
12
The Court initially granted TRO but later resolved

to lift the same and dismiss the instant petition. With the
lifting of the TRO, the Sandiganbayan was able to render
2
its verdict acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving
them of any civil liability
Refer to footnote #3
2.
3.
WON Tanodbayan and

Sandiganbayan
committed
serious
irregularities
constituting
mistrial
and gross violation of
the
constitutional
rights of the sovereign
people
of
the
Philippines
to
due
process of law [YES]
WON double jeopardy
has attached in favor
of accused [NO]
WON
the
proper
remedy was a direct
action
to
annul
judgment [NO]
nd
HELD: Petitioners' 2
MR
is
GRANTED.
Judgment
is
hereby
rendered nullifying the
proceedings
in
respondent
Sandiganbayan and its
judgment of acquittal and
ordering a RE-TRIAL of
the said cases which
should be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and
with careful regard for
the requirements of due
process, so that the truth
may be finally known and
justice done
script by Pres. Marcos

on how to go about
whitewashing the case.
RATIO:
involved detailed
1. [No need to elaborate on this issue] Suffice it to say that This
plans on suppression of
the
evidence, harassment of
Court is convinced of the petitioners evidence (through witnesses
and
the
Herreras tell-all) of the collusion, suppression of ultimate
judgment
of
material evidence and harassment of witnesses to acquittal
from
the
obtain a favorable judgment (of acquittal) for the
accused by direct orders of then Pres. Marcos. The CourtSandiganbayan Justices.
adopts the theory of the petitioners that, indeed, the
Sandiganbayan trial of the Ninoy-Galman double
murder case is a sham trial, scripted or stage- 4
In substantiating
4
from
Herrera.
Commission
Said
(composed
of CA and SC Justices)
found
that
competent
evidence exist to support

Herreras
averments
of
whitewashing. There was

also
an
overwhelming
managed according to Marcoss wishes

Therefor,this claim, the Court
number of circumstantial
the Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
to
the
and collateral evidence
mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre- subscribed
determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
findings of a Fact-finding
and
testimonies
ab initio
[quotable quote] The Supreme Court cannot permit such Commission
it
scattered from the days
a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
constituted to look into
of the Agrava Boards
3
According
to the
Herrera,
from
the
very
start
ofpreliminary
the
legal
process
against
the
accused,
Pres.
Marcos
was
bent
on
whitewashing
case.
As
early
as
the
investigation
hesohas
ordered
that
allinitial
26
accused
be
allegations
of
investigation which tend
charged
in double
thephase,
information
(contrary
totheir
his
referral
of the
the
minority
report)
that,
upon
(pre-arranged)
acquittal,
jeopardy
will
attach.
Herrera
further
revealed
there
held,
sometime
before
trial
could
begin, athat
Malacaang
Conference
where
he,
the
Tanodbayan,
and
thewas
Sandiganbayan
Justices
were
given
a
whitewashing
coming
to prove his claims.
6
8
A dictated, coerced
and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as that in the
case at bar is a VOID
judgment.
In
legal
contemplation, it is no
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are
judgment at all. It neither
courts of law and justice and equity. They would have
binds nor bars anyone. By it
no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
no rights are divested.
Through it, no rights can be
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to
subvert and suppress the truth, instead of

attained
ergo, the right
against double jeopardy
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn
cannot
be
invoked
and committed to render impartial justice to all alike
9
[quotable
quote]
For
who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or
the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or
justice to prevail the scales
must balance. It is not to be
favor and removed from the pressures of politics and
dispensed for the accused
prejudice
alone. The interests of the
society,
which
they
have
2. No Double Jeopardy - It is settled doctrine that
wronged must also be equally
double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
considered. A judgment of
this Court's setting aside of the trial courts'
conviction is not necessarily a
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
denial of justice. A verdict of
prosecution which represents the sovereign
acquittal neither necessarily
people in criminal cases is denied due process
spells a triumph of justice. To
the party wronged, to the
society offended, it could also
1 The cardinal precept is that where there is a
mean injustice. This is where
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction.
the Courts play a vital role.
Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process
They render justice where
justice is due.
raises a serious jurisdictional issue
in other words,
where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
3. No Need to Resort to a Direct Action to
Annul the Judgment
2 Proceeding from the forgoing, naturally, an
order/judgment being null and void for lack of
The instant petition does not
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper
involve a case of mere
basis for a claim of double jeopardy
irregularities in the conduct of
the proceedings or errors of
3 REMEMBER: Legal jeopardy attaches only (a)
judgment which do not affect
upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
the integrity or validity of the
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
judgment or verdict. Therefor,
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
the
present
action
(for
otherwise terminated without the express consent of
certiorari
and
prohibition)
the accused
which was timely filed to
4 The lower court never becomes a competent
declare a mistrial and to
court when it is ousted of its jurisdiction due to a
enjoin the rendition of the
violation of the right of the prosecution to due
void judgment is the correct
process!
remedy
5 In such cases, clearly, the first jeopardy was
never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the sham trial was but a

mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial to
assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal
and total absolution as innocent of an the accused

with such a conclusion, it goes without saying that
the sovereign people were denied due process of law
with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan
7
Respondents
contend
that
the
Sandiganbayans judgment of acquittal ends the case
which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without
being put in double jeopardy

this contention is
MISPLACED

| Vien
Manantan v. CA
J. Quisumbing (2001)
5
Meanwhile, for the first

jeopardy to attach, the
1 Petitioner George MANANTAN was acquitted by thefollowing requisites must
trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence be attendant: (a) upon a
without a ruling on his civil liability
valid
indictment,
(b)
a
competent
2 On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, before
court,
(c)
after
the CA found petitioner Manantan civilly liable andarraignment, (d) a valid
ordered him to indemnify private respondents (Sps.plea
having
been
Nicolas) for loss of support, death indemnity, and moral entered; and (e) the case
was
dismissed
or
damages for the death of their son, RUBEN Nicolas
otherwise
terminated
3 Prosecutions Version: The deceased RUBEN andwithout the express
accused
consent of the accused
MANANTAN together with 2 other friends were on a
(boys) night out, driving around Santiago, Isabela in
MANANTANs car from one place to another (night clubs,
bowling alley, lugawan, etc.) where accordingly that had
drinks (duh?) and even took some lady companions.
After a long night, with MANANTAN manifestly drunk,
they meant to drive back home. MANANTAN was
accordingly driving fast and was not staying on his side
of the road. Ultimately, they figured in a head-on collision
with a passenger jeepney causing their vehicle to turn
turtle twice. RUBEN died as a result of the accident
Defenses Version: Substantially the same, only

that MANANTAN was supposedly sober and was driving at
normal speed and following traffic rules.
5 As stated above, TC found MANANTAN not guilty,
from which
RUBENs heirs/parents (Sps. Nicolas) interposed an
appeal before the CA on the civil aspect of the judgment
praying that MANANTAN be ordered to pay the proper
indemnities
Also stated above, the CA modified the TCs

judgment and awarded civil indemnity to the Sps. Nicolas
ratiocinating that MANANTANs negligent and reckless
act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of
by his discharge.
HOWEVER, what was
elevated to the CA was
the civil aspect of the
criminal case!
1
not
Petitioner was
charged anew
with
a
second
criminal
offense
identical to the first
offense
that
in
appeal!
no second
criminal offense was
being
imputed
to
MANANTAN
on
the
appeal before the CA
2 In modifying the
TC, the CA did not
modify the judgment of
acquittal. Nor did it
order the filing of a new
criminal case against
petitioner for the same
offense.
Obviously,
therefore, there was no
second
jeopardy
to
speak of
1.a Discussion on
ACQUITTAL and its
Effects
Our law recognizes two
kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the
civil liability of the
accused:
(1)
the vehicular accident

in effect, the CA gave judicial
notice to MANANTANs intoxication while driving,
considered a violation of the Traffic Code from which a
presumption of negligence is provided
under such a
judgment,
no
more door for
civil liability for
the simple reason
that
it
has
already
been
settled that the
accused is not
the perpetrator of
the offense, for
which, naturally,
he
cannot
be
held civilly liable.
There being no
delict,
civil
liability ex delicto
is out of the
question, and the
civil action,
if
any, which may
be
instituted
must be based on
grounds
other
than the delict
complained
of
(Rule 111, ROC)
MANANTAN moved for reconsideration but the

same was denied, hence this petition
ISSUES:
1.
WON the assailed CA decision puts him in double

jeopardy for the same offense [NO]
2.
WON his acquittal before the TC extinguished his civil

liability [NO]
HELD: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed

decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1.
No Double Jeopardy - The constitution provides that no

person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
When a person is charged with an offense and the

case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in
any other manner without the consent of the accused,
the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense
this is double jeopardy
2 For double jeopardy to exist, the following
5
elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
the first
IN THE INSTANT CASE, true, MANANTAN had once

been placed in jeopardy by the filing of the criminal case
for reckless imprudence and, indeed, the (first) jeopardy
was terminated
Acquittal
on
the ground that
the accused is
not the author
of the act or
omission
complained of
(2)
Acquittal based
on reasonable
doubt on the
guilt
of
the
accused
In
this case, even if
the guilt of the
accused has not
been
satisfactorily
established
beyond
reasonable
doubt, he is not
exempt from civil
liability
which
may be proved
by
preponderance of
evidence only (Art 29, CC). Although the two

actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the
judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be
read in evidence in the civil action to establish any
fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission. The reason for
this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are
applicable.
2.
judgment of acquittal
did not clearly and
categorically
declare
the non-existence of
petitioners negligence
or imprudence. Hence,
MANANTANs acquittal
must be deemed based
on reasonable doubt,
allowing Article 29 of
the Civil Code to come
into play
Acquittal did not Extinguish Civil Liability The Courts

The Court gives
diligent scrutiny of the records, particularly the TCs 2
judicial notice to the
decision of acquittal, supports the CAs conclusions
TCs declaration that it
the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, did not discount the
MANANTANs civil liability was not extinguished by his possibility that the
discharge
accused
was
really
negligent; only that it
1 A closer look at the TCs judgment shows that the could not ultimately it
could not categorically

put its mind to rest on
a verdict of conviction
due
to
certain
circumstances
presented that creates
a
hypothesis
inconsistent
with
MANANTANs
negligence
these
statements from the
TCs
ruling
clearly
shows
that
MANANTANs acquittal
was predicated on the
conclusion that his guilt
had
not
been
established with moral
certainty
People v. Guevarra
J. Padilla (1989)
1
[Supra, Dan Saksak case, but Im making a new

digest anyway]
Jaime Guevarra, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino,

Baldo de Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, Boy Pogi,
Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak", and Chotse
Doe alias Bernabe Sulaybar were accused of the crime of
Kidnapping
of
him
by
victim
Priscilla
is
strong
enough to sustain his
conviction; and (3) his
lawyers kabobohan of
not filing the motion to
quash and not showing
up
during
reinvestigation
these problems are due
his
lawyers
inaction/omissions and
when not timely raised,
Dan Saksak is deemed
bound
by
these
inactions
By some twist of fate, only Dan Saksak and Poncing

Abergas were tried and convicted of the crime charged
(the other accused could not be served/arrested, while
the others had reportedly died already)
2
[Relevant part of
case
for
our
4 Dan Saksak was convicted of Kidnapping and the
purposes in this part of
Serious Illegal Detention and was sentenced to death,

the syllabus]
as
hence this automatic appeal
provided above, he was
tried
and
5 But before anything else, a brief restatement of the charged,
convicted for the crime
FACTS: Armed men (herein accused) entered the house of
Kidnapping
and
Illegal
of the Sps. Luisito and Priscilla Cruz and robbed them. Serious
Detention. HOWEVER,
While Luisito and the rest of his household were ushered the Court believes that
into a room and tied there, his wife Priscilla was forcibly Dan Saksak cannot be
of the graver
boarded inside her own car by the armed men. Dan convicted
offense as found by the
Saksak accordingly drove the car. The men then told trial court!
Priscilla Cruz that they were holding her for ransom of
3
A scrutiny of the
P50,000. Later, the engine of the car broke down. The Priscillas
testimony
men hired a truck in order for them to continue their would indicate that the
travel but upon reaching Valenzuela, the men simply left element of demand for
her
ransom does not exist
this case. No ransom
6 Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak, upon arrest, in
note was presented in
denied having participated in the commission of the court, much less is
crime charged and interposed the defense of alibi
there a
7 Aside from his alibi, Dan Saksak, as we can
remember from before, also questioned the veracity of
the charge sheet by raising the issue of identity

he6
claimed the police and fiscals did not have proof that RECALL that the Court
Vergel Bustamante and Dan Saksak are one and thedismissed this issue by
6
pointing
out
same person
documentary
evidence
ISSUE: WON Dan Saksak was correctly tried and and
records
of
his
convicted? [YES, but with modification]
identity from the MTC of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija as
HELD: The judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMEDwell as information from
with the modification that the defendant-appellant Vergelthe Western Manila City
Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" is sentenced to suffer the Jail. In any case, recall
also that the Court ruled
penalty of reclusion perpetua
that his cry of irregularity
in the information has
RATIO:
already
been
waived
he did not raise the
1 On three points, accused Dan Saksak raised issue since
on his verdict of conviction. But on all three, the Court same through a motion
disagreed with him, hence his conviction stood: (1) Dan to quash at trial. Raising
Saksak first questioned the proof of the prosecution that it now only on appeal,
Vergel Bustamante and Dan Saksak are the same person accordingly, is a waiver
(see footnote #6); (2) Dan Saksak also raised the issue of of such a right.
his extra-judicial confession

even if the confession
were not included in evidence, the positive identification
showing that a demand

for money was made
upon the family of the
victim for her safe
return. The absence of
a demand for ransom
negates the allegation
of
kidnapping
for
ransom
IN THE CASE AT
BAR, The information
filed
against
Dan
Saksak et al merely
alleges
that
the
accused therein had
kidnapped Mrs. Priscilla
Cruz. But, there is no
allegation that said
kidnapping was for
the
purpose
of
extorting a ransom
DOCTRINE:
An
accused person cannot
be convicted of a
higher offense than
that with which he is
charged
in
the
complaint
or
information on which
he is tried. It matters
not how conclusive and
convincing
the
evidence of guilt may
be, an accused person
cannot be convicted in
the Courts of these
Islands of any offense,
unless it is charged in
the
complaint
or
he
is
tried,
or
necessarily
included
therein. He has a right
to be informed of the
nature of the offense
with
which
he
is
charged before he is
put on trial, and to
convict him of a higher
offense
than
that
charged
in
the
complaint
or
he is tried would be an
authorized denial of
that right
Sayson v. People
J. Cortez (1988)
them were lies, she
called and notified Rufino
1 An information for the crime of Estafa through and the police. Thats
Falsification of a Commercial Document was filed against how he got caught. As
the herein petitioner, Ramon SAYSON before the CFI of to how he got the blank
Manila
check, it appears that he
them while the
2 Prosecutions Version: A blank US dollar check ofstole
blank checks were being
Bank of America came into the possession of SAYSON. shipped
from
San
With intent to defraud one Ernesto Rufino and/or the Francisco to the Manila
Bank of America, SAYSON allegedly filled out said blank branch of the Bank of
check and made it appear as though said check wasAmerica.
issued to one Atty. Norberto Perez (as payee) in the
amount of US$ 2,250 by the Bank. By means of similar
deceits, SAYSON allegedly induced Rufino to change the
check at the prevailing exchange rate, the total sum
7
amounting to P14, 850.
SAYSON was duly arraigned were he pleaded not

guilty.
Then,
trial
ensued.
Despite
several
postponements, the prosecution rested its case
Time for the defense to present its evidence

on
the scheduled day of the hearing, only SAYSON appeared
in court. He said that his counsel had another case in a
different court. Contrary to such statement, in the
morning of the said day, his counsel has sent a telegram
to the court requesting cancellation of the hearing
because he was sick
TC denied the motion for postponement and the

case was considered submitted for decision without
petitioner's evidence
TC ultimately found accused SAYSON guilty of the

crime charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty of prison correccional and to pay a fine of
P2,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed but modified the

penalty by imposing six months of arresto mayor and
eliminating the fine
Unsatisfied, SAYSON comes now with this petition

for review on certiorari raising the following:
ISSUE: WON SAYSON was denied due process when he

was unable to present his evidence and convicted
thereupon [NO]
HELD: The instant petition is DENIED and the decision of
the CA is AFFIRMED in toto
RATIO:
The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one

of the constitutional rights of the accused. But while the
accused has such a right, the same is not exempt from
the rule on WAIVER as long as the waiver is not
controverted to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law
There is nothing in the Constitution nor in

any law prohibiting such waiver. Accordingly,
denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been
made
SAYSON, however, avers that he was not inclined

to waive his right to present evidence and his actuations
during trial only suggests that he was vehemently
asserting such a right by way
I have omitted some exciting facts on how he got his

hands on the blank checks and how he was caught. But in
case youre interested, heres a gist of what happened:
SAYSON was friends with the private secretary of Rufino
(owner of theatres in needed dollars). His friend, however,
knew him not as SAYSON but as Fiscal/Atty. Norberto Perez.
When he learned that his friends boss (Rufino) needed
dollars, he offered his perjured check for exchange. Rufino
issued him checks in peso. When SAYSON went to the bank
to encash Rufinos check in his name (posing as Atty.
Perez), the bank teller, being a diligent employee as she is,
inquired and verified all the documents he has presented
to her for encashing purposes. She called the phone
number he provided, sent a messenger to the home
address SAYSON provided, etc. When she found out all of
of his verbal motion of

postponement due to
absence of counsel de
parte
Unfortunately for
SAYSON, it is too well
established a rule that
the grant or refusal of
an
application
for
continuance
or
postponement of the
trial lies within the
sound discretion of the
court. And the ruling of
the court will not be
disturbed on appeal in
the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion
When
the
discretion of the court
is exercised with a
reasonable degree of
judicial acumen and
fairness, it is one which
the higher court is
loath to review or
disturb. The trial judge
must be to a certain
extent free to secure
speedy and expeditious
trials when such speed
and expedition are not
inconsistent
with
fairness
As such, the TC
is
afforded
the
favorable
presumption
of
regularity in ruling
on continuances or
postponements.
Trial judges are in the
best position to form
the
correct
opinion
upon the cases before
them due to their
peculiar
(personal)
knowledge
of
all
relevant circumstances
presented. It would
take
an
extreme
case of abuse of
discretion to make
the action of the
trial court a denial of
due process
IN THE CASE AT
BAR, the information
was filed on March
1972
but
the
arraignment was held
December the following
year
na!
The
prosecution
started
presenting its evidence
March 1973 and after 1
year, 10 months and 1
day, only then did it
rest its case. During
this
whole
time,
SAYSON had already
secured
7
postponements!
This is a notoriously
postponed
case!
Hence, the judge was
right to declare that
"the
defense
had
abused the rules." No
grave
abuse
of
discretion in denying
the petitioner's motion
for postponement can
be imputed to the trial
court
In any case, the denial of SAYSONs motion to 9

The rule in this
postpone is not without other basis. For starters, it was jurisdiction
is:
filed out of time; there was no 3-day notice as required by "variance
between
the rules (Rule 15, Sec 4, ROC); motion was also not the allegations of
accompanied by an affidavit nor a medical certificate to the information and
support the alleged illness of counsel as required under Rule the evidence offered
22, Sec 5; lastly, there was a conflict between SAYSONs by the prosecution
excuse for his counsels absence and his counsels own sorry
excuse with the court he sent via telegram
postponement was properly denied!
his motion for
in support thereof
does not of itself
entitle the accused
to an acquittal
[now comes the relevant issue for our purposes]

The last issue dwells on the effect of the alleged variance 10 Also, it has been
between the prosecution's allegation and proof
repeatedly held that
SAYSON firmly asserts that his conviction was in

gross violation of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him because the
charge in the information is so much different from the
acts proved in court

this is UNTENABLE
8 SAYSON maintains that he cannot be justifiably
convicted under the information charging him of
attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of
America because the totality of the evidence presented
by the prosecution show very clearly that the he
allegedly attempted to defraud Mever Films, Inc., a
corporate entity entirely separate and distinct from
Ernesto Rufino, Sr.

as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint
or information can be properly identified
IN THE INSTANT CASE FOR Estafa which is a

crime against property under the Revised Penal
Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter
of the offense, was described with such particularity
as to properly identify the offense charged, it
becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was established during the trial that
the offended party was actually Mever Films and not
Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in
the information
when an offense shall

have been described in
the
complaint
with
sufficient certainty as
to identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as
to the person injured
shall
be
deemed
immaterial as the same
is a mere formal defect
which did not tend to
prejudice
any
substantial right of the
defendant
10
11
The above ruling

finds support in the
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure
where
despite
the
requirement that the
complaint/information
should state the name
and surname of the
person against whom
or
against
whose
property the offense
was committed or any
appellation
or
nickname by which
such person has been
or is known and if there
is no better way of
identifying
him,
he
must
be
described
under a fictitious name
(Rule 110, Sec 12,
ROC), the designation
of the name of the
offended party is not
absolutely
indispensable for

| Vien
11
Vino v. People
J. Gancayco (1989)
1
At around 11pm of March 1985, while ERNESTO

was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard
ROBERTO (his son) cry out in a loud voice saying that he
had been shot
He immediately switched on the lights of their

house and when he looked outside, he saw his son
ROBERTO wounded. Together with his wife and some
neighbors, they went down to meet ROBERTO who was
crying and calling for help
After coming down, ERNESTO et al saw Lito VINO

and Jessie SALAZAR riding a bicycle coming from the
south towards their direction
VINO was driving while SALAZAR was carrying an

armalite. Upon reaching ERNESTO's house, they stopped
to watch ROBERTO. SALAZAR pointed his armalite at
ERNESTO et al. Thereafter, the two left
ROBERTO was brought to the hospital. He was still

conscious and alive such that and PC/Col. Cacananta was
able to take his ante-mortem statement. In the said
statement which ROBERTO signed with his own blood
(how cool is that?!), SALAZAR was identified as his
assailant. Then ROBERTO died.
On account of said ante-mortem statement and the

testimonies of the other witnesses, VINO and SALAZAR
were charged with murder before the MTC of Balungao,
Pangasinan
7 MTC judge however referred the case against
SALAZAR to the
Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) as he was a member
of the military
given course
hence, only the case against VINO was
MTC referred case for PI to fiscal and an

information for murder against VINO was ultimately filed
before the RTC of Pangasinan
Upon arraignment, VINO entered a plea of not

guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting
evidence in his own behalf, VINO filed a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence
10
RTC then rendered decision finding VINO guilty as

an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on
him the indeterminate penalty of prision correccional as
minimum to prision mayor as maximum. He was also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
11
VINO appealed said conviction with the CA but the

same was denied, TCs decision was affirmed in toto
hence this appeal
12 During the pendency of the appeal, JAGO has
remanded
SALAZARs case to the civil courts as he was already
discharged from military service. Indeed, he was tried
and prosecuted in the RTC for the crime committed and
he was acquitted
13 Forthwith, VINO informed the Court of such
development
ISSUES:
1.
WON his conviction as accessory can be sustained even

when the information charged him as a principal [YES]
2.
WON a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can

stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged principal
in a separate proceeding [YES]
HELD: Petition is DISMISSED. Motion for Reconsideration is

also DENIED with FINALITY.
RATIO:
1.
This is not a case of a variance between

offense charged and the offense proved
established by the evidence In this case,
correct offense of murder was charged in
information. The commission of the said crime
the
or
the
the
was
established by the
evidence; ergo, there
is no variance as to
the
offense
committed.
The
variance is in the
participation
or
complicity
of
the
petitioner. While the
petitioner was being
held responsible as a
principal
in
the
information,
the
evidence
adduced,
however, showed that
his participation is
merely that of an
accessory.
DOCTRINE: The
greater
responsibility
necessarily
includes
the lesser. An accused
can
be
validly
convicted
as
an
accomplice
or
accessory under an
information
charging
him as a principal
The offense as
charged in this case is
included
in
or
necessarily
includes
the offense proved in
court, in which case the
defendant
shall
be
convicted
of
the
offense
proved
included in that which
is charged, or of the
offense
charged
included in that which
is proved
Under Art 16 of
the
Revised
Penal
Code, the two other
categories of persons
responsible
for
the
commission
of
the
same offense, aside
from the principal, are
the accomplice and the
accessory. After the
TCs findings of fact,
there is no doubt that
the crime of murder
had been committed
and that the evidence
tended to show that
SALAZAR
was
the
assailant and VINO was
his companion
VINO must have

been present during its
commission or at the
very least must have
known its commission
this is the only

logical
conclusion
considering
that
immediately after the
shooting, VINO was
seen driving a bicycle
with SALAZAR holding
an armalite, and they
were together when
they left. It is thus clear
that
VINO
actively
assisted SALAZAR in
his escape. Petitioner's
liability is that of an
accessory
At the onset, the

prosecution
should
have charged VINO as
an accessory right then
and there because the
degree of responsibility
of
petitioner
was
apparent
from
the
evidence from the very
get-go. At any rate, this
lapse did not violate
the substantial rights of
petitioner
2.
The trial of an
accessory
can
proceed
without
awaiting the result
of
the
separate
charge against the
principal
The
corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and

accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence the determination of the liability of the
accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of
that of the principal
also
some
fatal
omissions on the part
of the law enforcers
that constrained the TC
judge
to
acquit
SALAZAR
on
reasonable doubt
The identity of
It
goes
without
saying
therefore
that5
the
assailant
is of no
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal (say, due to
significance
the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity), the material
accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime for the purpose of the
prosecution
of
the
was in fact established
accessory. Even if the
2 The acquittal of the principal will only work as an assailant can not be
acquittal for the accessory if such acquittal was based on identified
the
the finding that no crime was committed inasmuch as responsibility of Vino as
the same has happened by accident
an
accessory
is
indubitable
3 IN THE CASE AT BAR, the commission of the crime
of murder and the responsibility of the VINO as an
accessory was established. As to SALAZARs acquittal, itDissenting Opinions of
must be noted that he was acquitted on the ground of Cruz and GrioAquino, JJ:
reasonable doubt. In
SALAZARs trial, prosecution was not able to present 1
The
basic
convincing evidence such that the identity of the principle established by
assailant was not clearly established
the
ponencia
is
4 In SALAZARs case, the ante-mortem statement agreeable that an
may
be
was competently controverted by the defense. There was accessory
convicted even when
12
exonerated, the effect is that VINO is now being held

liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a
crime. VINO's conviction should therefore be
reversed
The accessory may not be convicted under

paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code if
the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance,
the principle that "the accessory follows the
principal" appropriately applies
the identity of the

principal cannot
be
known as long as the
crime is established
and the degree of
responsibility of the
accused is proved.
HOWEVER, such
general principle does
not find application in
the
case
at
bar
because the case of
VINO is sui generis
VINO
was
convicted of having
aided SALAZAR who
was named as the
principal at VINO's trial.
At
his
own
trial,
SALAZAR was acquitted
for lack of sufficient
identification. VINO was
convicted of helping in
the escape not of an
unnamed principal but,
specifically,
of
SALAZAR. As SALAZAR
himself has been

| Vien
13
Dimatulac v. Villion
J. Davide, Jr. (1998)
18 These
1
[Supra, case about Mayor who killed a police man

and the prosecutor and judge were one in favoring the
accused]
SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his

residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga
notwithstanding, Judge
Villion
ordered
the
setting
of
the
arraignment where the
YABUTs were able to
enter their pleas of not
guilty
Thereafter, a complaint for Murder was filed before

the MCTC of Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga against19 Petitioners
private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut et al.
moved to set aside
but to no
4 Not all respondents were brought under custody of arraignment
avail; meanwhile, SOJ
the law as only a handful of them were actually arrested Guingona finally came
and only one submitted a counter-affidavit
up with a resolution of
5 MCTC judge found reasonable ground to believe petitioners appeal and
that a crime of Murder has been committed and the in his resolution, SOJ
accused are probably the perpetrators thereof. He Guingona ruled
recommended the issuance of warrants of arrests and
provided no bail
This
notwithstanding,
Pampanga
Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted
a reinvestigation. However, it is not clear from the record
whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon
motion of private respondents
In her resolution after reinvestigation, Ass. Prov.

Pros. Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs et al were in
conspiracy with one another, but that the offense
committed was only homicide, not murder. She also
recommended bail (even when the YABUTS were not
even under custody)
Before the information for Homicide can be filed,

the private complainants (heirs of SPO3 Dimatulac) filed
an appeal on the resolution of Ass. Prov. Pros. AlfonsoFlores to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) alleging mainly
that Alfonso-Flores erred in lowering the crime from
Murder as originally filed to Homicide despite the glaring
presence of treachery, evident premeditation, etc.
Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of

the Provincial Prosecutor but this notwithstanding,
Alfonso-Flores proceeded to file the information for
Homicide which the Prov. Prosecutor (Manarang)
approved and certified
10
Private
prosecutor
(counsel
for
private
complainants) filed a motion to defer proceedings (i.e.
arraignment) before the RTC in view of his clients
pending appeal with the SOJ
11
YABUTs
opposed
said
motion
to
defer
proceedings/arraignment arguing that the pendency of
the appeal before the SOJ was not a ground to defer
arraignment. Moreover, the trial court had to consider
their right to a speedy trial, especially since there was no
definite date for the resolution of the appeal. They
invoked this Court's rulings in
Crespo v. Mogul
12
RTC judge ultimately denied motion to defer

arraignment as he found no compelling reason therefor,
considering that the private prosecution has not shown
any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by
the SOJ. RTC Judge hence set the arraignment
13
Private prosecutor filed for an MR on said denial of

his motion to defer arraignment but RTC judge
challenged him instead to file a certiorari petition before
this Court
14
Instead of doing so, the private prosecutor moved

to inhibit RTC Judge for his bias and hasty setting of the
arraignment. Private prosec also filed a petition for
prohibition with the CA to enjoin RTC Judge from
proceeding with the arraignment
15
Meanwhile, public prosec filed manifestation that

he is opposing private prosecs motion to inhibit RTC
judge and declared that he will no longer allow the
private prosec to participate in the case
16
RTC Judge voluntarily inhibited himself and then

the case was transferred to herein respondent Judge
Villion
17
With
change
of
Judge,
petitioners
filed
manifestation informing him of the cases pending before
the SOJ and the prohibition case before the CA
that
treachery
was
indeed present. Hence,
he
directed
the
Provincial Prosecutor of
San
Fernando,
Pampanga "to amend
the information filed
against the accused
from
homicide
to
murder
Petitioners
now
called Judge Villons
attention
to
SOJ
Guingonas resolution.
However, it appears
that
SOJ
Guingona
changed his mind when
he reversed himself
Judge
Villion
ultimately
denied
petitioners motion to
set aside arraignment
for which petitioners
now come to this court
for
certiorari,
prohibition
and
mandamus to nullify
such denial of motion
to
set
aside
arraignment
ISSUES:
1.
WON the provincial

prosecutor
erred
downgrading
or
lowering the crime
charged from Murder
to Homicide [YES]
2.
WON
Judge
Villion
erred in proceeding
with the arraignment
of the accused and
denying motion to set
aside
arraignment
[YES]
3.
WON SOJ erred in

reversing himself and
his order to amend
the information from
Homicide to Murder
[YES]
HELD:
Petition
is
GRANTED. The orders
denying the Motion to
Defer
Proceeding/Arraignment
and denying the Motion
to Set Aside Arraignment
are declared VOID and
SET
ASIDE.
The
arraignment of private
respondents is likewise
declared VOID and SET
ASIDE. Furthermore, the
order of SOJ is SET ASIDE
and his initial order
REINSTATED. The Office
of
the
Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga
is DIRECTED to file with
the RTC the amended
information for Murder.
Thereafter the trial court
shall proceed in said case
with
all
reasonable
dispatch.
RATIO:
Plainly,
the
proceedings in this case
were
replete
with
procedural irregularities which lead the Court to conclude

that something had gone awry in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in manifest
advantage of the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State
and to private complainants, herein petitioners (heirs of
SPO3 Dimatulac)
1.
transmitted
by
the
judge
this was not
the case here because
had
Alfonso-Reyes
review the case on the
MCTC Judges basis
alone, she would have
arrived at the same
resolution
There was No Basis for the Reinvestigation, much

less the Subsequent Downgrading of the Offense 2
Something awry
from Murder to Homicide Despite warrants of really existed between
arrest issued by the MCTC against the YABUTS, for some Ass. Prov. Pros. Alfonsothe
unexplained reason, they were never arrested; neither Reyes 8 and
did they surrender. Hence, they were never brought into YABUTS. This allowed
YABUTs to make a
the custody of the law! So how come Ass. Prov. Pros. the
mockery of the law in
Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation of the case? order that they gain
Worse, she came up with a resolution lowering the their provisional liberty
pending trial and be
crime from Murder as originally charged into Homicide!
charged with the lesser
offense of homicide
1 While it may be true that under the second 3 The
public
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
being
the provincial prosecutor may disagree with the findings prosecutors,
towards
the
of the judge who conducted the preliminary partial
investigation, as here, this difference of opinion must be YABUTS, should have
on the basis of the review of the record and evidence had the decency at
file the homicide charges to the prejudice of the

private complainants and the State as well
because he thought so
the public prosecutor
forgot that since the offended parties here had not
waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their
right to institute it separately from the criminal
action, then they had the right to intervene in the
criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 1l0 of
the Rules of Court
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right

to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of AlfonsoFlores. This right is provided to them by the last
paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
9
Court.
DOJ Order No. 223 S. 1993 recognizes the right

of both the offended parties and the accused to
appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations
or reinvestigations
And although the section
speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal
complaint, petitioners herein were not barred from
appealing from the resolution holding that only
homicide was committed, considering that their
complaint was for murder. By holding that only
homicide was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the
complaint for murder. Accordingly, petitioners could
file an appeal under this DO
There is also absolutely no basis to support the

respondents contention (invoking Crespo or Roberts)
that Dimatulacs appeal with the SOJ should be
dismissed motu propio on account of the YABUTS
arraignment. Even with reference to
10
Sec 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, the same contention
still fails to hold water

simply because that section
refers to appeals by respondents or accused! In this
case, the appeal was interposed by private
complainant; hence, the bar on Sec 4 does not apply!
5 In any case, nothing in the ruling in Crespo v.
Mogul, reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals,
forecloses the power of authority of the SOJ to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases
despite an information already having been filed in
court. The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as far as
practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a
complaint or information is filed in court
Indubitably then, there was on the part of the

public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the
information for homicide, depriving the State and the
offended parties of due process
2.
Respondent Judge Villion should not have

Hastened
YABUTS Arraignment and/or Denied Petitioners
Motion to Set Aside Arraignment - Acting with
deliberate dispatch, Judge Villon set arraignment of the
accused almost immediately upon receiving the
await the
of SOJ of
petitioners appeal
but no, they instead
proceeded to
8
(1) She entertained

their
motion
for
reinvestigation
even
when they had not been
put under the custody of
the law yet. There was a
standing warrant against
them, but Alfonso-Reyes
did not even demanded
their surrender first; (2)
she also accepted their
counter-affidavits;
and
(3) she recommended
bail when the YABUTS at
that time were for all
intents
and
purposes
fugitives from justice!
records of the case from the former RTC Judge who

recused himself. Had Judge Villion reviewed the case
with due diligence, as should be done by anyone who
has just taken over a new case, he could not have
helped but notice multiple motions, manifestations and
utter vehemence of the petitioners to hear their cause
It was also very arrogant of the public

prosecutor to declare the exclusion of the private
prosecutor in the proceedings of the case just
least to
resolution
the better
x xorIf chief
upon
petition
by a proper
party,
the Secretary
ofx Justice
reverses
the
resolution
of shall
the
provincial
orfiscal
city
fiscal
state
prosecutor,
he
direct
the
concerned
file
the
corresponding
information
without
conducting
another
preliminary
or or
to
dismiss
or to
move
for the
dismissal investigation
of
the complaint
information.
It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred
to therein could be either the offended party or the
accused.
10
Sec.be
4. Non-appealable
cases.
Exceptions.
- No or
appeal
may
taken
fromState
a resolution
of except
the Chief
State
Prosecutor/Regional
Prosecutor/Provincial
City
Prosecutor
finding
probable
upon
a
showing
manifest
error
or
grave
abuse
ofentertained
discretion.
Notwithstanding
the had
showing
ofcause
minifest
error
or
grave
abuse the
ofofdiscretion,
no during
appeal
shall
be
where
appellant
already
been
arraigned.
If
appellant
is
arraigned
the
pendency
of
appeal,
said appeal
shall be dismissed motu propriothe
by
the
Secretary
of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution
finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing
of the information in court. (emphasis supplied)
14
AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |

Martin | Vien
part of wisdom would suggest on his part (had he
not been too much of biased git) to pause and
consider petitioners pleas
The
various
motions,
pleadings
and
manifestations
of
herein
petitioners
are
unmistakable indicia of the probability of a
miscarriage of justice should arraignment be
precipitately held. However, Judge Villon cursorily
ignored all this. While it may be true that he was not
bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal, as
he had, procedurally speaking, complete control
over the case and any disposition thereof rested on
his sound discretion, his judicial instinct should have
led him to peruse the documents and initially
determine, for his own enlightenment with serving
the ends of justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed
murder was the offense committed; or, he could
have directed the private prosecutor to secure a
resolution on the appeal within a specified time
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge

Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in
rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on the
assailed information for homicide. Again, the State
and the offended parties were deprived of due
process
**All told, the abuse of discretion on the part of the

public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was
gross, grave and palpable, denying, the State and the
offended parties their day in court, or in a
constitutional sense, due process. As to said judges,
such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that

their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect
thereto, thereby nullifying as having been done without
jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further
hearings, the denial of the motion to reconsider such
denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of
not guilty
3.
It was a Grave Error for the SOJ to Reconsider

his Original Resolution to Amend the
Information from Homicide back to Murder
Solely on the Basis of YABUTs Arraignment In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control
and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga;
and meekly surrendered to the latter's inappropriate
conduct even hostile attitude, which amounted to
neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste
of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the
arraignment of the YABUTs
The DOJ should have courageously exercised its

power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the
shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the
final analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully
serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if
belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside
arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could
have directed the public prosecutors concerned to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into

the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the
regularity of arraignment
15
FACTS:
PEOPLE V. ALMENDRAS
401 SCRA 555
Quisumbing, J; 1
April
24,
2003
TC
moved
the to
dates
for
the
hearing
ofMarch
the
criminal
case
7,
14 and
21, 2000.
2
March was
14 notdefense
counsel
Jimenez
present
atordered
the
hearing.
The
trial
court
then
him
to
appear
for
the
defense
on
March
21,
2000,
failing
which
it
would
appoint a counsel
de
oficio
for couple,
the
Almendras
to
expedite
disposition
of
the
case.
June 19,
1998
Vilma
and Arsenio
Almendras,
residents
ofof
Sta.
by
operatives
the-Ana,
PNPaManila,
Narcotics
in
Calamba,
as
result were
of Command
a arrested
buy-bust
operation. Laguna
3
11
March
20
August
4Sec.
An
information
was
by
the
defense
counsel
Office
of to
the
Prov.
Prosecutor
of Republic
Laguna
charging
both
the
accused
of
violating
Sec.filed
21
(b)No.
in
relation
15,
Art.
III,
Act
6425,
otherwise
known
as
theof
moved
tothe
suspend
proceedings
pending
final
disposition
bytheir
the
CA
on
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
petition.
The
prosecution
was
then
given
10
days
to
comment
on
the
motion
and
trial
dates
moved
Rep. Act
anew
towere
April
6 May
and
2000
and
10, 2000.
No. 7925.
4
May
10 TC
cancelled
the
and scheduled
reset
new
dates
for July
5, hearing
12 and
19.
May 6, 1999
the prosecution
rested
itsset
case.
Reception
the17.
defense
evidence was
then
for5
May 12, 13,ofand
Julyshow
5 up.
The
defense
counsel
again
failed
4
to
trial
dates
were
then
moved
anew
to
September
21
10 - defense
counsel
for leave
to
and
October
5. and 28
file May
a Motion
for Demurrer
tomoved
Evidence
and the
admission
of
said
Demurrersubmitted
with
Alternative
Prayer
for Bail.
The
defense
that
the6
prosecution
failed
to
establish
the
element
of lack
of
authority
to
sell
and
deliver
the
alleged
shabu.
It
further
alleged
that
the
prosecution
failed
to
Sept.
21again.
defense
present
any
concrete
evidence
establishing
that
counsel
was
absent
the
substance
tested
at
the
PNP
Crime
Laboratory
once
TC
advised
the
accused
was
the
same
substance
seized
from
appellants.
to coordinate
with
The defense then prayed for an acquittal.
Lowenew
court
cancelled
the schedule
hearings
and
settings
were made
for June 8,
14, andfor
21.May 7
their
counsel
to
ensure
his
presence
at
the
next
scheduled
trial
date.
Sept.
25trialmoved
the
defense
that
the
court
cancel
the hearing
for
28their
to
awaitSept.
the
final
disposition
of
June that
8
an
TC
denied
the
Demurrer
to Evidence.
petition
before
the
It
ruled
what
is material
in
aproof
prosecution
for
CA.
a
sale
ofthe
illegal
drug
is court
that were
the
transaction
took
place.
The
trial
pointed
out
that
both
marked
money
and
the
shabu
presented
in that
open
Thechemist
trial court
also8
pointed
out
thecourt.
poseur
buyer,
the
police
investigator,
and
the
forensic
identified
in
court had
the
shabu
seized
from
theonAlmendras
couple,
placed
their
initials
the that
bag
Sept. 28 counsel
trial
containing
the
same,
and
hence,
resumed.
it
wassince
the same
drugdenied
seized
fromestablished
appellants.
The
defense
lower
court
likewise
appellants
prayer
for
failed
to appointed
showSince
up
bail
the
amount
of
shabu
involved
was
again,
TC
Atty.
Carambas
of
990.97
grams, perpetua
for which to
thedeath,
imposable
penalty
PAO
as
counsel
de
was
reclusion
making
the
oficio
for
the
offense
non-bailable.
Almendras
couple
in
the next
event
counsel
Jimenez
was
absent
the
scheduled
7
hearing.
June
21,
1999
,
the
defense
manifested
that
it
was
seeking
a
review
of
the
trial
courts
Resolution
denying
its
Demurrer
to
Evidence
from
the
Supreme
Court.
The
reception
of
the
defense
evidence
was
then
reset
anew
September
7,
15, and 23, 1999.
TC also denied the
8
defenses motion of
The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Sept. 25. New trial
Prohibition,
and
Mandamus
with
dates were then set
Preliminary Injunction with the CA alleging
for Oct. 5, 11, 12
that the TC gravely abused its judicial discretion
in denying their Demurrer to Evidence and in 9and 19.
denying their prayer for bail.
Oct.
5
testify
defense
counsel
Jimenez
was
absent
once
again.
Atty.
Carambas
then
manifested
that
the
Almendras
spouses
refused
to
court.
TC
then
reset
hearing
for
Oct.
26
and
ruled
that
in
the
event
defense
failed
to
adduce
its
evidence
on
said
date,
the
would
be
considred
as
having
waived
its
right
present
and
the
case
would
be
deemed
submitted
for
decision.
They contended that

the order of the TC
compelling them to
present
their
evidence
with
assistance
of
counsel de oficio
was violative of their
right to due process.
11
October spouses
24
Almendras
moved
that
the TC
judge
voluntarily
inhibit the
himself
hearing
case. from
12
October
26
lack
TC
denied
the
Motion
for
Voluntary
Inhibition
for
merit.
Since
defense
counsel
Jimenez
was
again
not
in
court,
appeared
for
Almendras
spouses.
Atty.
Carambas
manifested
that
the
spouses
told
him
that
they
would
not
testify
in
court
unless
assisted
by
Atty.
Jimenez.
The
prosecution
then
moved
that
the
defense
be
deemed
to
have
waized
its
right
to
present
evidence
and
the
case
be
considered
submitted
for
decision.
TC
granted
the
prosecutions
motion
and
set
promulgation
of
judgement
for Nov.
23.
13
Nov. 15
Almendras
spouses
filed
a Very
Urgent
Motion
for
the
Issuance
of
Temporary
Restraining Order
before the CA.
10
October
Almendras
Motion
forspouses
an 10filed a
11
That on or about June 19, 1998, at Brgy. Pansol,

Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused without any authority of law, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known
as
SHABU weighing one (1) kilogram a regulated drug, to
a poseur buyer for and in consideration of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) and the rest in boodle money
arranged into bundles to make it appear as real and
genuine payment of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00), as full payment of the agreed price, in
violation of the aforesaid law.
9directed
Nov. 26 SC granted the motion of the PAO and
10 Atty. Jimenez to file appellants brief for
Arsenio.
Nov. 23 finding
RTC of
ofappellants
Calamba Sec.
promulgated
its
judgment
guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt
violating
15 counsel
of
Rep.
Act
No. 6425,
asdeath.
amended,
and
sentenced
both
appellants
to
Since
defense
Jimenez
was
not
around
for
the
promulgation
of
judgment,
appellants
assisted
by Atty.
Carambas
as
counsel
dewere
oficio.
Sept.
6, to
2001
PAO
manifested
to SC Said
that
they
talked
Vilma
Almendras
tocounsel
ascertain
if
she
wanted
to Out
be represented
by
them.
appellant
told
the
PAO
thatrepresented
her
was
Atty.
Jimenez.
of
respect
for
the
right
of
appellants
herein
to
be
by
a
counsel
of
their
choice,
the
PAO
moved
for
the
suspension of the period to file appellants
brief.
Sept. 14 -entered
the law its
firmappearance
of Puyat, Jacinto
& Santos
formally
for appellant
Vilma Almendras.
2 the
SC
granted
the
motion
the
PAO
and
required
Almendras
spouses
toof
submit
to
the Oct.
Court
name
address
of
a new
counsel
of choice,
otherand
than
Atty. Jimenez.
Aug. 27,
2002
as
SCcounsel
noted the
failed
of him.
Arsenio
to comply
with
resolution
of Oct.
2 and
appointed
the
PAOthe
de oficio
for
Order
Enjoining
Observance
of
Judicial Courtesy
with the CA. They
prayed
that
the
appellate court issue
an order enjoining
the TC to observe
judicial courtesy by
suspending
proceedings in the
criminal case so as
not to pre-empt the
decion
of
the
appellate
court.
Oct. 1 Atty. Jimenez moved for leave to enter
7 his appearance as counsel for Arsenio and admit

his
Oct. constancia.
15 PAO moved to be excused from filing a brief for
Arsenio in deference to Arsenios right to be

represented by a counsel of his choice.
supplemental brief for Arsenio.
ISSUE
WON Almendras spouses should be allowed to
adduce evidence
1
HELD: YES
TC failure
ruledright
that
Almendras
spouses
had
waived
the
to present
evidence
because
their
to
proceed
with
the
presentation
of
evidence
despite
several
postponements
granted
to evidence,
them.
Onthe
the
sole
basis
of the
the
prosecution
trial
court
rendered
a
verdict
of
conviction
for
violation
of
Dangerous
Drugs
Act,
and
sentenced
both
appellants to death.
2
The
postponement
of evidence
the
trial ofofa the
case
to
allow
the
presentation
of
party
is
a
matter
which
lies
the
discretion
trial
court,
but
it is
a in
discretion
which
be
exercised
wisely,
considering
the must
peculiar
circumstances
obtaining
in justice.
each
case
and
with
a view to doing
substantial
Almendras
lost
chance
to
present
evidence
to their
the
delaying
strategem
of spouses
theirdue
original
counsel
of
record.
Defense
counsel
Jimenez
caused
no
less
than
15
in
a span
of two
years.
Delay
is continuances
obviously
the
name
of
his
game.
5was
The case
forpreliminary
certiorari, injunction,
prohibition
and
mandamus
with
which
defense
with
the CA
to
assailfiled
the byTCs
denialcounsel
of their
demurrer
evidence,
did not
interrupt
the
course
of the
the
principal
action
in criminal
nor
thetorunning
of
the reglementary
involved
in
proceedings.
Settled
isperiods
thecase
rule
that
arrest
the
the
principal
action
during
the
pendency
ofofcertiorari
proceedings,
there
must
be acourse
restraining
order
or a writ
injunction
from
the
appellate
courtof preliminary
16

| Vien
directed to the lower court. There was none in
1the instant case.
v.
Mercado
the
action
on
the People
motion
for
leave
ofthat
court
tojudicial
fileisdemurrer
to
evidence
the
demurrer
itself
left
to the
exercise
ofor
the
courts
sound
judicial
discretion.
2
denigrate
an by
appellants
refusal
to be
represented
a counsel
deexpect
oficio.
Having
engaged
the
services
ofstubborn
counsel,
however,
a
party
hasin
justifiable
to
that
only
his chosen
counsel
could
amply
protect
his
interests
the
case. reason
At
the abuse
same time,
we cannot
fairness
any
grave
of discretion
oninthe
part ascribe
of the trial
court.
What brought the trial courts order forfeiting

the right of the defense to present evidence
was defense counsels tactics that took the
case on its lethargic course. The trial court
merits commendation for its manifestation of
zeal and determination to expedite the case
and render justice.
People v. Singh. Section 23 of Rule 119, 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provides that the order

denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.
It
bears
stressing
a lawyers
to
his
client
must
not bethat
pursued
at and
thefidelity
expense
of
ferreting
the
and
justice
to
all.
His
responsibility
to administering
protect
advance
the
interests
of truth
his
client
does
warrant
a
course
of intentions.
action
propelled
by illnot
motives
and
malicious
10
3
4
In Apex
Mining,
Inc.client
v. Court
of
Appeal,
- of
in
cases
reckless
or
gross
negligence
counsel
deprives
of
due
process
law,
orwhere
when
itsthe
application
will
result so
in
outright
deprivation
of interests
the to
clients
liberty
or
property
or where
the
of client
justice
require,
relief
is
accorded
the
who
suffered
by
reason
of
the
lawyers
gross
or
palpable mistake or negligence.
However,on
intoview
of thethat
deathaccusedpenalty
imposed
appellants,
are
constrained
rule
appellants
be allowed
to presentwe
evidence
for
their defense
now.
People
v.
Cabodoc
- the Rules
ofofand
Court
were
conceived
and
promulgated
todispensation
aid
not
to
obstruct
the
proper
administration
justice,
set
forth
guidelines
in
of
justice
but
not
to or
bind
andthe
chain
the
hand
that
dispenses
justice,
for
otherwise,
courts
will
be
mere
slaves
to
robots
of
technical
rules,
shorn of judicial discretion.
may
suspend
its own rules
or except
caseCourts
from
them
for thethem.
purposes
of justice
or, in a
proper
case,
disregard
11
Doroteo
Salazar
and Dozen
Construction
and
Development
Corporation
v. Court
of
Appealswe
granted
on
motion
of
petitioners
who
stoodofnew
to
lose
property
due
to the
negligence
theirtrial
respective
counsels.
In theto present
case,
involving
the
death
sentence,
more
reason
do
appellants
deserve
be
heard,
lives
about
to counsels
bewith
forfeit.
Notbecause
that antics,
we their
are nor
rewarding
defense
apparent
do are
we

When a new trial is granted on the
ground of errors of law or irregularities
committed during the trial, all the
proceedings and evidence affected thereby
shall be set aside and taken anew. The
court may, in the interest of justice, allow
the introduction of additional evidence.
When a new trial is granted on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence, the
evidence already adduced shall stand and
the newly-discovered and such other
evidence as the court may, in the interest
of justice, allow to be introduced shall be
taken and
17
We
although
Section
2
of Rule
121,
thenote
Rules
ofnone
Court
enumerates
the
specific
grounds
inthat
granting
new
trial
or
reconsideration,
which
iseffects
present
here,
nonetheless
6of
the
thereof
considers
theSection
interest
ofon
justice
as
a gauge
the
introduction
of additional
evidence,
to
wit:in
SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration. - The effects of granting a
new trial or reconsideration are the
following:

| Vien
considered together with the evidence
already in the record.
DISPOISTION the judgment of the RTC of
Calamaba is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the trial court for reception of
defense evidence and other appr appropriate
proceedings conformably with this decision,
without further delay. FURTHER, counsel de parte,
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, is hereby ordered to show
cause why no administrative action should be
taken against him for what appears to be
misconduct as a member of the bar and abuse of
judicial process, within 10 days from notice.
18
FACTS
1
PEOPLE V. DATU
G.R. NO. 136796
1
Quisumbing, J; Feburary
19,
2003
During
Madayag
moved trial,
for discharge
Romeo
Datu
his materials.
fathers business
of selling
hardware
andmanaged
construction
The victim,
as a state witness.
Jan.
28,for1998
TC
granted
Madayags
motion
discharge
as a state
witness.
Antonio Chan, was a compadre of Datus father.

Datu raised the
Datu family sold a dump truck to the victim. Out 3defense
of alibi. He
knowing both
of the 4 postdated checks issued, only three were 4 denied
Madayag
and
Batuelo.
Bautelo interposed
the
defense
of denial
and
encashed. Datu confronted the victim about the 5alibi.
dishononred check. Datu was in a foul mood and
18,
1998
TC Nov.
rendered
a
judgement
finding
Datu
guilty
as
principal
induction
Batuelo
by
direct
and
indispensable
participation
and
sentenced
them
to
suffer
the
supreme
penalty
of
death
by
lethal
injection.
refused to entertain the victims explanation. 6 Dec. 10 Appellants
moved
for
reconsideration.
Datu approached one of his workers, Madayag, 7
Dec. 22 TC denied the
and told him that somebody in Burgos had fooled
motion.
8
him and he needed
Jan. 7,for1999
appellants
filedthe
a
motion
trial/mistrial
ground
thaton new
Madayags help. Magadayag agreed. Datu sent of
prosecution
witness,
Sgt.
Flordelito
Sabuyas,
execudet
an
affidavit
on
Dec.
11,
1998 retracting
one of his workers (Batuelo) to apply as a driver
his
previous
statements
and
insted
declared
that
the
wife
of
the
victim
and
Madayag
of the victim. Datu approached Madayag and told
up
Datu framed
and
Batuelo.
The
prosecution
opposed
the
motion.
him that he wanted somebody killed and that he
9
would have 5 or 6 companions. Datu promised to
Jan.
8 TC for
denied new
the
motion
trial/mistrial
pro
forma for being
pay Madayag P10,000 for his participation in the 10
killing.
Jan.
11
appellants
a
supplemental
motion
forfiled
new
trial,
to which
was
attached
an
affidavit
executed
2
by
one
Roosevelt
Salvador,
who
alleged
that
Batuelo,
their four
companions
Madayag
lied
at BurgosMadayag,
at almost and
one oclock
in the
morning ofarrived
April
under
oath
and
was
physically
manhandled
to
testify
for
the
prosecution.
17, 1997. They alighted from the van and walked
through a rice field to the house of the victim,
11denied
Jan. 18 TC
with
the
supplemental
Batuelo leading the way. Upon reaching the
motion
on
the
ground that since
the case records
victims house, they scattered on Batuelos order
had been elevated
to SC for automatic
and found hiding places behind the piles of hollow
review, the motion
had become moot
blocks in the Chan compound. The group waited
and academic.
for about an hour until the victim came out of his
house. Madayag then rushed to the victim and
ISSUE
tried to grab him. The latter, however, saw
Madayag and was able to grab a piece of wood. WON the TC erred in
He struck Madayag with the piece of wood, denying the motion for
new trial based on
hitting him on the left side of the forehead, newly discovered
causing a bleeding wound. Batuelo and the evidence.
others then joined Madayag and managed to take
hold of their victim.
HELD: YES
1TC
Appellants
deprived
them
of
due
process
when
it
Batuelo then sprayed tear gas directly on the
perfunctorily
denied
their
supplemental
motion
for
a
new
trial
based
on
newly
discovered
victims face. The latter continued to resist but
evidence,
consisting
of
Roosevelt
Salvadors
sworn
statement.
They
only
managed
to
learn of
andaffidavit
obtain
was finally subdued and thrown to the ground.
Salvadors
after
the
TC
had
rendered
the
decision
under
automatic
review.
Apparently,
his
One of the assailants then strangled him, while
statement
could
not
be
discovered
and
produced
at
the
trial,
despite
reasonable
diligence
on
their
part.
Hence,
said
another tried to twist his head. Another assailant
statement must
be
deemed
newly
discovered
evidence
that
be
properly
presented
in
a may
new
went inside the house to get rope, tied it around
trial.
testimony
in
a
new
trial
will Salvadors
effectively
demolish
the
credibility
of
prosecutions
star
witness
and
the victims neck, then they carried him inside
reasonable
doubt
as to the guiltcast
of
appellants.
By
refusing
to
consider
this
new
evidence
of
how
Madayag
was
the house and hung one end of the rope from a
tortured
byfinancial
military
men
given
consideration
the
wife
of
the
victim
to
participation
the
railing above the basement of the house.
killing
of infeign
her
husband
and
Thereafter, Batuelo took hold of the victims body
and forcibly pulled it down.
implicate
3
appellants herein,
Bothered
byon
his
conscience
and
unable
to
concentrate
his
work,
Madayag
disclosed
to
nd
his
wifewifes
that
he
had
participated
in the
killing
of
Antonio
chan.
They
decided
to
refer
his
problem
the TC deprived
to
his
2
cousin,
an
Army
intelligence
operative,
Flordelito
Madayag
met
with
the
wife.
TheSabuyas.
lattertruth.
agreed
to forgive
him
if victim/s
heSgt.
would
tell
the
She
then
accompanied
toof
the
Prov.
Prosecutor
where
appellants of their
he executed
statement
implicating
Datu
and
Batuelo
in the ahim
killing
Antonio
Chan.
day in court by
4
Sept.
30,with
1997
murder.
Datu, Batuelo and several Does were
charged
the
denying
their
5
supplemental
Oct.
13,
charge.
Datu and
Batuelo
were
arraigned
and
with
ofTC
counsel,
pleaded
not
guilty
to1997
theassistance
directed
the
prosecution
to
amend
the
information
to
include
one
Domingo
as
an
accused,
in
view
of
his
extrajudicial
confession
admitting
motion for new
participation
inMadayag
the crime.
6
trial.
The
Nov.
20 Madayag
the prosecution
filedaccused.
an amended information,
naming
as one of the
recantation
by
7assistance
Dec.
2
Madayag
was
arraigned
with
the
prosecution
of
counsel
de
oficio.
Due
to
his
refusal
to
enter
a plea,
TC directed that a plea of not guilty
be
entered
forthe
him.
witness
Sgt.

the prosecutions other evidence which show
the culpability of appellants. Furthermore,
Salvadors affidavit is suspect for being a
concoction and prevarication, since it is highly
improbable that Sabuyas would cooperate in
abducting
and
torturing
Madayag
to
wrongfully admit complicity in a crime,
Sabuyas
of
his
testimony in open
court as a further
ground for granting
a new trial.
OSG - since the

proffered affidavit
of Salvador assails
only the credibility
of state witness
Madayag, it would
not
suffice
to
justify the holding
of
new
trial.
Otherwise put, it
would
be
insufficient
to
overcome
knowing him to be the husband of a close

relative. The claim that Madayags testimony
was rehearsed and fabricated is belied by the
observation of the trial court that it entertained
no doubt as to his credibility, as his testimony
was unwavering, straightforward, and bereft of
1any pretension.
Section
2material
(b),
Rule
121
an accused
may
move
for new
trial
on
the -aground
discovered
Forofbe
newly
discovered
evidence
toevidence.
be
ground
fornewly
new
trial,
the
following
requirements
must
met:
(1)
the
evidence
is
discovered
after
trial;
(2)
such
evidence
could
notdiligence;
have
been
discovered
and
produced
at the
trial
evenand
with
the
exercise
of
reasonable
(3)
the
evidence
is
material,
not
merely
cumulative,
corroborative,
or
impeaching,
and
of
such
weight
that,
if
admitted,
would
probably
change the judgment.
In thisconsists
case,
the
alleged
newly
evidence
of
the
affidavit
ofdiscovered
Roosevelt
Salvador
declaring
that
he
and
several
military Domingo
men,
including
Sgt.
Sabuyas,
abducted,
then
manhandled
and
physically
abused
Madayag
to admit
complicity
in
the
killing
of
Antonio
Chan
and,
as state
witness,
implicate
appellant
Datu.
Salvador
further
declared
that
Madayag
only
agreed
cooperate
after
the
victims
wife
offered
himto
a
more than
financial
package
in
exchange
forreasonable
his
inSalvador
court
down
herein.
declared
that
hetotestimony
would
state
the pinning
restalso
in
court,
if appellants
required
testify.
It is
would
beBut
easy
to who
characterize
Salvador
as
one
ofover.
those
heroes
emerge
when
the
war
the
made
by
Salvador
after
the
trial
astatement
quo
was
finished,
is
evidence
which
appellants
could
not
have
secured
during
the
trial,
such
that
it
must
be
considered
as
newly
discovered
evidence
that
may
be
presented
in
a
new
trial.
More
so,
as
his
statement
as
evidence,
while
mainly
of
an
impeaching
character,
is
material
enough
that
could change the results.
4rule,
With
respect
tocan
Sabuyas
recantation,
as a
we and
haveas
often
regarded
a
recantation
with
disfavor
it
be
easily
secured
from
a
poor
ignorant
witness
for
monetary
consideration.
But,is a
aswho
appellants
correctly
point
out, Sabuyas
professional
soldier,
an
intelligence
operative
is not
ignorant
of
the
actions
he
took
but
risked
prosecution
for
perjury
when
he be
recanted
his and
testimony.
Under
the
circumstances,
the rules
governing
the
matter
should
construed
applied
liberally
on
the
broader
ground
of
substantial
justice.
In
the
present
case,
moreover,
the
penalty
imposed
by
the
trial
court
upon
appellants
is
death.
Sabuyas
testimony
in
court
hasrecantation,
been
described
worthy
of note
and
the
to
the solution
the
case.
But
with
his
it
is as
asaof
ifquest
that
key
no
longer
fitskey
to
unlock
completely
the
truth
in
the case.
Aparties
trial
isto
primarily
for
truth,
where
the
are
given
full
opportunity
to
adduce
evidence
ferret
out
the
truth.
Given
the
gravity
of
the
offense
charged
and
severity
of result
theof
sentence
imposed,
eventhe
a
mere
shadow
doubt
inbelow.
this
case
vitiate
the
reached
Hence,
we
are
favorably
disposed
to
makeevidence
suremight
that
every
piece
of pertinent
material
be
adduced
before
the trial court.
19

| Vien
1conscience
People vs.convict
Ebias accused-appellant
- we cannot in good
and
impose
upon
thepossibly
death exonerate
penalty when
evidence
whichhim
would
may
be presented
by him
in a new trial. him
DISPOSITION the assailed decision by the RTC of
Ilagan, Isablea is VACATED and the case is hereby
REMANDED for further proceedings. Both the
accused Datu and Batuelo should be allowed to
present newly discovered evidence in their
defense and such other evidence as the court
may allow to be introduced and taken for
consideration together with the evidence already
in the records.
20
PEOPLE V. EBIAS
G.R. No. 127130
Mendoza, J; Oct. 12, 2000
1
FACTS
On and
July
7, 1994
at
around
12Dambo,
noon, Ronaldo
Narez
cousin,
Tirso saw
Narez,
to
get
some
jackfruit
in
Barangay
Laguna.
On his
their
way,
they
twowent
men
sitting
by
the
roadside.
As
they
were
nearing
thePangil,
place
where
the
two
men
were,
the
latter
waved
at
them.
Ronaldo
and
Tirso
Narez
ignored
the
summon
and
continued
walking.
When
they
were
about
15
meters
from
the
men,
they
heard
one
of
the
men,
who
was
brandishing
a
bolo,
say
Boy,
tirahin
mo
na.
The
other
man
then
drew
his
sulpak
and
shot
them.
Ronaldo
and
Tirso
Narez
ran
towards
the
kaingin.
Ronaldo
Narez
realized
that
his
right
leg
was
bleeding.
Nonetheless,
he
managed
to
reach
his
house
and
told
his
father
what
had
happened.
Ronaldo
was who
taken
to the
Pakil
Hospital
for
treatment.
Tirso,
had
been
taken
to
the
same
hospital,
suffered
a
gunshot
wound
on
hison
stomach.
He died
fromalso
his
injuries
the
next
day,
July 9,
1994.
2
July
11 Ronaldo
Narez executed
an affidavit
in which
he identified
his assailant
as a certain
Boy Marantal.
August
Ronaldo
executed
another
affidavit
in
he16
said
that
was the
same
Boywhich
Marantal
who
shot Ernesto
him
and Ebias
his cousin.
Dec. with
13, 1994
byEbias
and
a John
doe in
were
charged
murder
with
murder
an
information
filed
thefrustrated
Prov.
of
Laguna.
When
arraigned,
Ebias Prosecutor
pleaded
not
guilty.
During the trial, Ronaldo reiterated in open

court that Ebias and Boy Marantal were one and
the same person. However, he could not identify
companion as the latters face was
6 Ebiass
covered
withconsisted
a yellow
handkerchief.
Ebias
defense
of denial
and alibi.
May
15, imposed
1995
TC
a death.
decision,
finding
Ebias
guilty
of
the crime
of murder
with frustrated
murder
and
therendered
penalty
of
Ebias
prosecution
failed
comply
with
rules
for -during
the
protection
of to
the
rights
of the
the
accused
confrontations
with The
alleged
eyewitnesses
before
the
police.
erroneously
gave
credence
to the
testimony
ofTC
a
perjured
eyewitness
upon
whose
sole
testimony
hinged
the
entire
case
against
him.
The
TC
failed
to
appreciate
uncontroverted
facts
established
by
the defense
wellprosecution
as admissions
against
interests
made as
by the
witnesses.
Nov.
20,
1998a of
Ebias
filed a motion
seeking
the
appointment
a a counsel
detheoficio
for
Leonardo
Eliseo,
death
convict
at
National
Bilibid
letter
confessing
toheld
the
commission
the wrote
crime
for
which
Ebias
was
liable. Prison,ofwho
10
April 27, 1999 the Court denied Ebias motion for

lack of merit.
probably
change
the judgment if it
was introduced in
evidence. Attached
to Ebiass motion
for new trial was an
affidavit executed
by Eliseo narrating
his participation in
the shooting of
Tirso and Ronaldo.
Eliseo
explained
that the initial plan
was to hold-up a
Bombay. While
waiting for the
target, Tirso and
Ronaldo suddenly
appeared
and
started
walking
towards
them.
Eliseo got nervous
and missed the
Bombay.
This
made Eliseo furious
thus he shot Tirso
and Ronaldo.
But it was not

established
how he came to
know him by
that particular
name. In both
his affidavit and
his testimony,
Ronaldo quoted
the assailants
companion as
telling
the
latter,
Boy,
tirahin mo na.
Obviously, the
surname
Marantal
did
not come from
the unidentified
companion.
Ronaldo Narez
stated in his
affidavit that he
knew accusedappellants
name to be Boy
Marantal
1- Indeed,
it
appears
from
confession
by Eliseo,
also
a death
row WON Eliseos
convict,
thatmade
hecould
committed
the
crime
for death.
which
his
affidavit
Ebias
was
convicted
and
sentenced
to
Such
evidence
not
have
been
discovered
and
produced
during his
trial
because
was
only
after
his responsibility
conviction
that
he
came
toit
know
of confession constitutes
Eliseos
for
the
crime
and
his
executed
on
willingness
to confess.
He
asserted
that
Eliseos
confession
would
newly-discovered
August
16,
evidence warranting a
1994 that it
new trial in favour of
was only later
Ebias
when
he
learned
from
1
HELD:
YES
the police that
For
newlydiscovered
evidence
to
be
a
ground
for
new
the real name
trial,
the
following
requisites
must
concur:
(a) after
the
evidence
is
discovered
of Boy Marantal
trial;
(b)
such
evidence
couldbeen
not
have
discovered
produced
at and
the
was Ebias. This
trial
even
with
the
exercise
of
reasonable
diligence;
and not
(c)
the
evidence
is
raises
the
material,
merely
cumulative,
corroborative,
or
impeaching,
and
of
such
weight change
that,
if
suspicion
that
admitted,
could
probably
the judgment.
2
Ronaldo
was
The
uncorroborated
influenced
by
testimony
of
a
lone
witness
is
sufficient
basis
for
the
conviction
ofit the
accused
if
is
matters
other
credible,
positive,
and
constitutes
proof
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
the
latter
is
than his own
guilty.
In this
case,
the
trial
court
relied
primarily
on
the
positive
identification
made
by
Ronaldo
in
personal
convicting Ebias.
3
perception
in
The
defense
was
not able
to
identifying
overthrow
the
testimonies
of
prosecution,
which
was
straightforward,
convincing
as for
to
Ebias as the
leave
no space
doubt.
Accused
was]
positively
identified
to
the
author
of be
person who had
crime.
It rule
is
a that
well
settled
greater
weight
is
given
to
the
positive
identification
of
shot them.
accused
by
prosecution
witness.
4
15 Second. Ebias
Ronaldo
Narez
remained
steadfast
and
unshaken
in
had
been
a
his was
testimony
that
it
accusedappellant
whom
he
saw
shootquestions
him
and
his
cousin.
long
time
However,
arise
regarding
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
identification
made
resident
of
by
Ronaldo
Narez
of
accusedappellant
ascousin
the
person
who
shot
him
and
his
Barangay
resulting
in the
latters
death.
Dambo, Pangil,
o First. Ronaldo
Laguna before
identified
the
the incident. In
person
who
fact,
Ronaldo
shot them as
testified
that he
Boy Marantal.
knew
21
he only saw the latter
once
before
the
incident.
11the
Feb.
3, 2000
and
Ebias
moved forevidence.
newhad
trail
on ISSUE
ground
of newly-discovered
He
averred
that
new
material
been
discovered
by
the
defense, evidence
consisting
of
a
Ebias personally because the latter was a

family friend who would sometimes visit
their house. Yet, in the affidavit he
executed before the police on July 11,
1994, he stated that he was not familiar
with the person who shot them because
15 Third. It would thus
seem that Ebias was

the only person shown
to
Ronaldo
for
identification. We have
set our face against
such procedure. The identification of the

accused during a show-up or where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification is highly
suggestive. For confronted with a single
suspect, an eyewitness would most likely
yield to police pressure to identify the
suspect as the perpetrator of the crime,
substituting fancy for fact, suspicion for
guilt. We cannot with certainty say that
such is not the case here. This on the one
hand.
On
the
other
hand,
cannot
say
that
Ronaldo
was
mistaken
inwe
identifying
Ebias
as
the
person
who
shot
him
and
his
cousin.
After
all,
he
never
deviated
from
his
testimony
that
he
saw
accused-appellant
when
the fifteen
latter
shot
them.
The
crime
was
committed
at
noontime
with
the
shooter
a
mere
meters
away
from
his
victims.
was
thus
able
to see
his
attacker
in Ronaldo
full view.
We
cannot,
therefore,
discount
identification
of him
accused-appellant
as the
person
who
shot
and hisRonaldos
cousin. positive
There
is
thus a positive
need the
for a
new trial of
in
order
tothe
determine
veracity
Ronaldo
Narezs
identification
vis--vis
alleged
confession
made
by
Leonardo
Eliseo
since
no
less
than
a
life
is
at
stake.
We
recognize
that
court
litigations
are
primarily
for
the
search
of
truth,
and
a
liberal
interpretation
of
the
rules
by
which
both
are
given
the
fullest
opportunity
toparties
adduce
proofs
is the
best
way
to
ferret
out
such
truth.
Hence,
ain liberal
interpretation
of
the rule
granting
a motion
for
new
trialdeath
isconvict
called
for.
Weand
cannot
good
conscience
Ebias
impose
upon
him
the
penalty
when
evidence
which
would
possibly
exonerate
him
may
be
presented
by
him
in
a
new
trial.
Neither
can
we
acquit
him
on
the
sole
ground
that
another
person confessed to having committed the
crime.
4the
On is
the other
hand,
we cannot
discount
the
possibility
that
the
confession
by
Leonardo
Eliseo
last-ditch
effort
Ebias
to avoid
deatha penalty.
For
this by
reason,
this
case
should
be
only
for
purpose
of
allowing
thereopened
defense
to
present
the
testimony
of
Leonardo
Eliseo
and
for
thethe
prosecution
to
present
rebutting
evidence
which
it may
desire
toany
present.
DISPOSITION without vacating the judgment of

RTC, this case is REMANDED to the RTC of
Muntinlupa City for the purpose of allowing the
presentation of the testimony of Leonardo Eliseo
and any evidence which the prosecution may
wish to present to rebut such testimony. In
accordance with Rule 121, 6 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, evidence already in the
record shall stand and the new evidence shall be
taken into account by the trial court and
considered with evidence already in the record
and, thereafter, judgment should be rendered
accordingly.

| Vien
22
AGULTO V. CA
January 17, 1990
GRIO-AQUINO, J.
Facts:
On April 23, 1970, an information for bigamy

was filed against the petitioner, Avelino C. Agulto
alleging as follows:
That on or about December 30, 1968, in he
City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, having been
previously united in lawful marriage with one
Maria Pilar Gaspar, which marriage is still in
force and subsisting and without having been
legally dissolved, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contracted a second marriage
with Andrea Suico.
After the trial was finished and the parties had

rested, but before judgment was promulgated, the
accused filed on November 12, 1975 a motion to
reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, i.e., a copy of a marriage contract between
Andrea Suico and one Romeo Vergeire supposedly
contracted on July 19, 1960, or before Andrea's marriage
to the petitioner.
On March 23, 1976, the court denied the

motion on the ground that it was filed too late because
the accused, with due diligence, could have discovered
the so-called newly-discovered evidence sooner and
could have presented it during the trial, it appearing that
he was appraised of the alleged marriage of Andrea
Suico and Romeo Vergeire on October 17, 1972 yet.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the

court's order was also denied.
He then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of

Appeals alleging
o That the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in refusing to allow him to adduce the newly
discovered evidence which would have shown that his
second marriage on December 30, 1968 to Andrea
Suico was null and void because the latter was
previously married on July 19, 1960 to a certain Romeo
Vergeire
o That said evidence was not available to petitioner at
the time of the presentation of his evidence but only
after the parties had rested their case.
The respondents opposed the petition contending

among others, that the alleged newly discovered
evidence (the marriage contract between Andrea Suico
and Romeo Vergeire) does not bear the seal of the justice
of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
o The Court notes, moreover, that the document does
not indicate the municipality and the province where
the municipal court is located.
o The xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract is not
properly certified and authenticated, and, on its face it
appears that the marriage was celebrated without a
marriage license
o The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court

gravely abused their discretion in refusing to reopen the
trial.
Held/Ratio: No, the Court of Appeals did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to reopen the trial.
A distinction should be
made between a Motion
for New Trial and a
Motion to Reopen Trial.
A Motion for New Trial

may
be
filed
after
judgment but within the
period for perfecting an
appeal (Sec. 1, Rule 37,
Rules of Court).
A Motion to Reopen Trial
may be presented only
after either or both
parties
have formally
offered and closed their
evidence,
but
before
judgment. There is no
specific provision in the
Rules
of
Court
for
motions to reopen trial. It
is albeit a recognized
procedural recourse or
devise, deriving validity
and
acceptance
from
long established usage.
The reopening of a case
for the reception of
further evidence before
judgment is not the
granting of a new trial
(Alegre vs. Reyes, 161
SCRA 226).
A motion for
new trial in civil
or
criminal
actions may be
applied for and
granted
only
upon specific,
well-defined
grounds
set
forth
respectively in
Rules
37
(Section 1) and
121 (Section 2).
On the other
hand,
the
reopening of a
case for the
reception
of
additional
evidence after
a
case
has
been submitted
for decision but
before
judgment
is
actually
rendered is, it
has been said,
controlled
by
no other rule
than that of the
paramount
interests
of
justice, resting
entirely in the
sound judicial
discretion of a
Trial Court; and
its concession,
or denial, by
said Court in
the exercise of
that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal

unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. (Emphasis
supplied.)
a second marriage.
Considering
the
defects of the xerox
document
Petitioner's motion to reopen the trial on the ground copied
the
accused
of newly discovered evidence of a previous marriage which
between Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire,Agulto claims to be his
assuming the marriage was valid, was not supported "newly-discovered
by evidence that said marriage was still existing evidence," the trial
when Andrea Suico wed the petitioner. On the othercourt's order denying
hand, the fact that the fiscal did not charge her with his motion to reopen
bigamy is significant. Unlike Agulto, she was found the trial was properly
by the fiscal to be under no impediment to contractsustained by the Court
of Appeals. His motion

bears the earmarks of
a
merely
dilatory
pleading. Still, it has
succeeded in delaying
this case for fourteen
(14) years.
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review is denied for
lack
of
merit.
This
decision is immediately
executory. Costs against
the petitioner.
23
Alegre v. Reyes
May 9, 1988
NARVASA, J.
submitted his proofs

during only two trial
settings, on September
24, and on September
29,1980.
Memoranda
were
thereafter
submitted
by
the
parties, inclusive of
replies by both of them.
A motion to reopen the trial is quite distinct from a motion

for new trial. And it is the refusal of the Trial Court to
reopen the case for presentation of additional defense
proofs after the close of the trial but before promulgation
of judgment, that is the grave error claimed by the
petitioner to have been committed in the criminal case
against him, resulting in a denial to him of the right to
present all the evidence material to his defense.
Facts:
Petitioner Alegre was indicted in the Court of First

Instance of Manil for the felony of malversation of
public funds under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code. The amended information alleged that
... in or about and during the period comprised
between October 17, 1975 to April 30, 1976 ...
(Alegre), being then the President and
General Manager of the
Philippine
Jai-Alai
&
Amusement
Corporation (PJAC), ... and a public officer
within the contemplation of law (Art. 203, Penal
Code) because of the fiduciary nature of the
duties which he exercised in respect to the
disbursement of the trust funds impressed
with public attributes and character and as
such are government funds which he
received for and in behalf of the government
with the obligation to account for the same,
thereby taking part in the performance of public
functions in the government, who, by reason of
his position in said office, is charged with among
others, approving disbursements of Petty Cash
Vouchers of said PJAC, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously approve Petty Cash
Vouchers for the aforesaid period in
payment of claims for lost and torn winning
tickets and reimbursement of erroneous
payments made by the paying cashiers
thereat in the total amount of P18,170.00,
chargeable against public funds destined
for charitable purposes and which were
then held in trust by the ... Corporation,
and that by his approval of these payments and
reimbursements, disbursements were in fact.
made and charged against said public funds
which consisted of dividends for unclaimed
winning tickets held in trust by said ...
Corporation, and that by approving such
disbursements of said amounts the accused
through negligence, flagrant recklessness and
utter disregard of precautions in safeguarding
said public funds, allowed other persons to take,
misappropriate, misapply and convert said funds
to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount of P18,700.80, Philippine
Currency.
On arraignment, Alegre entered a plea of not

guilty. Trial commenced on November 17, 1977 lasting
for about two and a half years, or until March 24,
1980 when the prosecution rested its case. All told, the
prosecution presented twenty-nine (29) witnesses and
voluminous exhibits, marked from Exhibits A through the
KKK, inclusive. Among the documents presented by the
State were thirty-three (33) affidavits, admitted over the
defendant's objection that they were hearsay since the
affiants had not been called to the witness stand for
cross-examination.
Alegre's evidence, on the other hand, consisted

only of his sole testimony, and a few exhibits. He
Twelve
(12)
days or so after
receiving a copy of
the
prosecution's
reply memorandum
and
before
rendition
or
judgment Alegre
filed under date of
February 12,
1981 a "Motion to
Reopen
Trial
for
Presentation
of
Additional Evidence"
to prove "that the
funds in question
are not public funds
and
are
not
impressed
with
a
public
character,"
and "that he is not a
public officer."
15 Additional
evidence meant to be
presented
which
1
includes:
the resolution
alleged
ultra
vires
character
of
the
GamesBoard
&
Amusements
of
November
21,
1956,
involved
in
the
offense
charged,
and
whether
itbinding
was
valid
and
since
it
had
not
been
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
2
the nature to
of the
funds
been alleged
malversed,have
as
private
circumstances
in
refutation
of
particular
stated
portions
of by
the
NBI
Report
(Exhibit
A)
presented
the
State,
as
well
as
the affidavits
of
more
than
30
persons
who
never
called
towere
the
witness
stand
to
personally
give
evidence
the
facts set of
out
in
their
sworn
statements
thetornfactfor
that
payments
lost
or
winning
tickets
came
from
an
account
called
"betting
dividends
payable,"
not
from
the
account
of
unclaimed
dividends
already
earmarked
for
charity
the
additional
fact
that
reimbursements
of
erroneous
payments
made
by
cashiers
and
tellers
of
PJACpetty
came
from
the
cash
funds
of
the
corporation
and
not
from
said
unclaimed
dividends
forfeited
in declared
favor of
charitable
institutions
the
standing
practice
the
sanctioned
byPJAC,
its
Board
ofofclaims
Directors,
of
for
dividends
based
on
lostpaying
or torn,
winning
tickets
7
the not
fact from
that
Alegre
had
personally
profited
said
practice;
and,
8
that
the
fact
"(a) PJAC is a
private corporation,
and (b) that its funds
are
treated
like
those of any private
entity (itemizing the
particulars thereof)."
15
Alegre
quote
candidly admitted his
mistake
and
oversight in failing to
lay these additional
proofs
before
the
Court prior to his
resting
his
case,
realization
of
the
gravity of the error,
and
the
gaping
omissions
in
his
evidence
having
dawned on him in the
course of drawing up
his memorandum-inchief
and
reply
memorandum.
15
The motion was

opposed
by
the
prosecution, it being
argued in substance
that the additional
evidence would not
affect the essential
question
of
the
defendant's guilt or
innocence, and that
the latter had been
accorded
adequate
time and opportunity
to put on all his
proofs but he had failed to do so. Alegre filed a reply.

Thereafter the motion was denied by the Trial
Court. It said that the points raised would only
be unnecessarily cumulative and a superfluity.
behalf.
However,
without waiting for
the
required
comment,
the
Appellate
Court
dismissed
Alegre's
petition
for
certiorari for lack of
merit.
On the theory that the Trial Court had acted with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declining to grant reopening under the
circumstances, Alegre applied to the Court of Appeals for
3 Alegre then filed
a writ of certiorari. The
the
Supremee
Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining with
Court
the
instant
order enjoining the Lower Court from proceeding petition for review on
with promulgation of judgment, and required the certiorari.
Acting
Solicitor General to comment in the People's thereon,
this
Court
e]
issued a temporary
restraining order dated
May
25,
1981,
inhibiting
the
respondent Judge from
further proceeding in
Alegre's case.
Issue: Whether or not
the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion
in not granting Alegres
motion to re-open trial?
Held/Ratio: YES.

Court first discusses the distinctions between a motion
to reopen and a motion for new trial. [I will make it in
table form for our benefit. :D]
Motion to
reopen
Motion for new trial

b
proper only after rendition
may properly e presented or
only after either or both promulgation of judgment.
partie have
s
formally
offered,
and closed their evidence,
but
before
judgment
unlike a motion for new
trial, is
not specifically mentioned
and
prescribed as a remedy by
the
Rules of Court. There is no
specific provision in the
Rules
of Court governing motions
to
reopen. It is albeit a
recognized
procedural recourse or
device,
deriving
validity
and
acceptance from
long,
established
usage.
the reopening of a case for

the
receptio
n
of
additional
evidence after a case has
been
submitte
d
for decision but
befor judgmen
e
t
is actually
rendered is, it has been
said,
controlled by no other rule
than that of the paramount
of
interests justice,
resting
entirely in the sound
judicial
discretion of a Trial Court;
and
its concession, or denial, by
said Court in the exercise of
that discretion will not be
reviewed on appeal unless
a
clear abuse thereof is
shown.
[jurisprudenc
A motion for new trial in

civil
or criminal actions may be
applied for and granted
only
upon specific, well-defined
grounds, set forth
respectively
in Rules 37 (Section 1 ) and
121 (Section 2).
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, and the

relevant facts, it appears that the Trial Court
had
acted
unreasonably,
capriciously,
whimsically, and oppressively in spurning
Alegre's plea for reopening the trial so that he
might present additional evidence. The record
shows that it took the prosecution no less than two
and a half years to adduce its proofs; the accused
presented evidence witliinthan a span of five
(5) days and only on two (2) hearing dates. The
prosecution called to the stand twenty-nine (29)
witnesses and introduced more than sixty (60)
exhibits; the accused offered naught but his sole
testimony and a few documents. There was withal
no undue delay in Alegre's presentation of his
motion to reopen.
Of significance, too, is the absence of showing
of any substantial prejudice to the State which
would have been occasioned by the reception
of Alegre's proferred additional evidence.
There was moreover a frank avowal of error
and oversight on Alegre's part; he had quite
apparently
underestimated
the
State's
evidence and overrated his own meager
proofs.
All these circumstances, taken together,
should have persuaded the Trial Judge to give
the accused the few hearing dates that the
presentation of his additional evidence would
have entailed; and the resultant delay in the
termination of the trial would certainly not
have caused serious or substantial injury to
the State's cause, It was moreover unreasonable,
in the premises, for the Trial Court to justify denial of
the application for reopening by simply adverting to
the fact that "the accused had (been given) all the
opportunity to present his evidence" which the
accused does not at all deny, but as to which he
pleads that serious error on his part prevented him
from fully availing of that opportunity or by
stressing that "the record has been extensively
saturated with evidence on the
24
reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have

sustained the Trial Court's aforesaid action.

points raised in the motion such that further evidence
on said points would only be unnecessarily cumulative
and a superfluity"
since the "saturating evidence" did not proceed from
the appellant, in the first place, and hence his additional
evidence would not be cumulative thereto but in
refutation thereof, and could not, in any event, be
characterized as "a superfluity." By extension, it was
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated April 21, 1981 and the Order of the Trial Court
dated February 26,1981 thereby affirmed, are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is
hereby ORDERED to reopen the case for reception of
the petitioner Alegre's proferred evidence in
accordance with the rules of evidence, and under the
control of said Judge. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
25
26
Valdez v. Aquilizan
October 31, 1984
ABAD SANTOS, J.
immediate reaction is
that the petition is
[Guys, this is almost the whole full text. Maikli lang kasi highly impressed with
siya, like, 4 pages max. Hindi ko matanggal yung merit.
transcripts kasi its where you could better understand
what the judge did e. I will just highlight/underscore those
na super important.]
NB: What is important in this case is the fact that
the judge wasnt impartial when trying the accused
for rape. In effect, the judgment of respondent
judge convicting accused was set aside, and then a
new trial was granted for petitioner.
[actually, ito lang talaga ang essence niya, but I still put
everything else dahil naf-feel ko lang na magtatanong si
Sir ng finer points on this case.
Petition for certiorari posted on March 22, 1984,

in Cotabato City by speed airmail but was received only
on April 26, 1984.
The petitioner is accused of rape in three

cases [same girl, different dates] filed in the court
presided by the respondent judge.
The petition seeks to annul the proceedings

which were conducted by the respondent judge
and to disqualify him from the case. Because the
verified petition imputed serious irregularities to the
respondent judge, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order on May 21, 1984, restraining
him from further proceeding with Criminal Case
Nos. 13, 14 and 15.
In the hearing of the

three criminal cases on
May 26, 1983, the private
complainant was to be
crossexamined
inasmuch as her direct
examination had been
finished at the previous
hearing on April 7, 1983.
On May 26, the private
prosecutor, Atty. Norberto
Ela,
was
absent.
Thereafter,
the
respondent judge stated:
"It appears in the records
that
the
complaining
witness is still under
cross. It is the Honorable
Judge who is examining
her ...
(Addressing the witness)
During the last hearing of
this case, the Honorable
Court reserved its right to
cross examine you on
your testimony." And the
respondent
judge
examined the witness
but the examination is
better described as
direct
rather
than
cross.
Witness
the
following:
In the comment which the respondent judge was

required to submit, he said that he had already
decided the three cases. (Petitioner Wilson Valdez
was convicted of rape in each of the three cases and
was sentenced to three reclusion perpetua plus
indemnity.) The decision is dated April 2,
1984, but the petitioner claims that it was
promulgated on May 3, 1984, without the
presence of his counsel and even of the Fiscal;
that no notice was issued in respect of the
promulgation; and that no copy of the decision
was given to the defense counsel of record.
The case was set for hearing on August 6, 1984, and

thereafter the Court issued a resolution which reads:
At the hearing this morning the following appeared:
Attys. Jose V. Juan and Antonio T. Nicolas of the
Special Appealed Cases Division, Citizens' Legal
Assistance Office, Ministry of Justice, Padre Faura,
Manila, for the petitioner; respondent Judge
Gregorio U. Aquilizan on his own behalf; and North
Cotabato Provincial Fiscal Aquiles Narajos who
brought the record of Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14
and 15 in the sala of the respondent judge.
Counsels for the petitioner mentioned several
irregularities said to have been committed by the
respondent judge in the handling of the case
above-mentioned. Resort to the record proved to
be fruitless because it was grossly deficient.
Counsels for the petitioner are hereby given ten
(10) days from notice hereof to submit a
memorandum specifying the irregularities said to
have been committed by the respondent judge
with supporting evidence. A copy of the
memorandum shall be furnished to the respondent
judge who is required to answer the same point by
point within ten (10) days from receipt. (Rollo, p.
127.)
The memoranda are now before this Court and the
COURT: ... After going

over the records of
the cases and the
supposed
exhibits,
you mentioned about
a pair of scissors
used to intimidate
you,
coerced and
forced
by
the
accused, by pressing
the same at your left
side?
A. Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Proceed
Fiscal.
FISCAL FULVADORA:
Q
You
mentioned
about
a
pair
of
scissors used by the
accused. Showing to
you
this
scissors,
what relation is this
scissors which was
used by the accused
in threatening you on
February 10, 1982?
A Yes, sir, this is the
one being used by
him.
COURT:
Q Is this the very
scissors that you saw
when he pressed it?
A Yes, your Honor.

Q When was this used by the accused Wilson Valdez?
A On February 10, 1982, your Honor.
FISCAL FULVADORA: May we request that this scissors
Identified by the witness be marked as Exh. "F", your
Honor.
COURT: Mark it.
Q Please demonstrate to the Court how this Exh. "F"
was used by the accused in intimidating you?

On June 23, 1983, a hearing was scheduled. The
transcript for that day shows that Fiscal Camilo
Fulvadora appeared for the prosecution but
private prosecutor Ela, was absent. Also absent
was Atty. Jorge Zerrudo, counsel for the accused.
The transcript does not show whether or not the
accused was brought to court. Notwithstanding
the absence of counsel for the accused and
probably the accused himself, the respondent
judge continued his "cross-examination" of the
private
complainant.
The
respondent
judge
explained his behaviour thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in
view of the absence of Atty. Zerrudo
who in spite of due notice in open
court, during the last hearing of this
case and without justifiable reason
failed to appear, however, for the sake
of justice in order not to prejudice the
right
of
the
accused
as
the
complaining witness was on crossexamination, stated the witness is
being cross examined by the court in
order to get an illustration of certain
facts needed by all defense here or
the prosecution of the accused Wilson
Valdez alias Willy. (TSN, June 23,
1983.)
In his memorandum the respondent judge claims
that he "did not proceed with the trial but
merely sought clarifications on vital aspects
taken up in the hearing of April 7, 1983."
The explanation of the respondent judge is
belied by the transcript which shows that he
asked
the
private
complainant
searching
questions and this is reflected on pages 4 to 12
of the transcript.
The statement of the respondent judge that he
wanted to protect the right of the accused to a
speedy trial is not appreciated. He "protected"
the rights of the accused by holding a trial in the
absence of the latter's counsel. If an accused has
a "protector" like the respondent judge, there is
no need for a fiscal or a private prosecutor. It
may not be amiss to state in this connection that
the accused did not complain of delay in the trial
of his case probably because he was not there.
At any rate if the respondent judge had wanted
to expedite the trial he should have appointed a
temporary counsel for the accused.
The hearing on the three cases was resumed on August
18, 1983. In the meantime, Atty. Zerrudo was replaced
by Atty. Julian Ruiz as counsel for the accused because
he wanted an Ilocano lawyer to represent him for
better communication. On that day. the private
A
(Witness
demonstrating to the
Court) The witness
demonstrating to the
supposed victim the
pressing
of
the
pointed scissors at
the
left
side
abdomen.
Q Did he also use
that during the
accord rape he
committed
A Yes your Honor.
Q About the third

time, he use also?
A Yes your Honor.
(TSN, May 26, 1983.)
To be sure a trial
judge has the right,
nay even the duty, to
address questions to
witnesses.
But
the
questions should be
clarificatory;
they
should not build the
case for any of the
adversaries.
complainant was still on cross-examination. Without

any request from the parties, the respondent
judge decided to hold the hearing in his chamber
"due to delicadeza." Present in the chamber were
counsel for the accused, the fiscal and the
stenographer only; the accused was not allowed
to go inside.
The respondent judge claims, however, "that the
accused together with his guard were at the door of a
make-shift room, so-called judge's chamber." This might
well have been the case but the accused was entitled as
of right to be inside the room because it was his liberty
and honor which were at stake. On August 31, 1983, the
respondent judge announced, "We will hear this in
chamber." And then the following took place:
ATTY. RUIZ: Now, last time this case was
presented and was scheduled for hearing
inside the chamber. Counsel for the
accused requested that the accused be
given chance to confront the complaining
witness but this, your honor was denied so
at this instance it is reiterated that the
accused be given again a chance to be
present during the investigation (sic).
27
like to request and reiterate and manifest

for the petition that he be recalled. It is not
the intention of the defense counsel, your
honor, to delay the speedy termination of
these cases. As a counsel for the accused, I
would like to reiterate that the accused be
recalled to the witness stand.

COURT: Fiscal.
FISCAL CAMILO FULVADORA: With the
sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
FISCAL FULVADORA: The Honorable Court

will decide on that part of presentation of
the accused, whether to grant it or not the
manifestation.
COURT: Denied. (TSN, August 31,1983.)

On February 7, 1984, the following took place:
COURT: How many questions are you asking?
ATTY. RUIZ: Your honor, we are still in the

process of direct examination for the
accused. We are recalling the accused in
the witness stand. I understand your
honor last time, due to lack of material
time, we requested for a resetting of
these three cases inasmuch as the matter
whether to give the accused for the
meantime your honor, I am petitioning
that he must be recalled and placed in the
witness stand.
ATTY. RUIZ: Due to lack of material time,

the three cases, I forgot to ask few
questions regarding the evidences or
exhibits which are the panty, knife, and
scissors, in the direct examination in that,
it was overlooked in the part of this
representation that the three after
presented some of the exhibits per
prosecution, were not questioned.
FISCAL FULVADORA: It is not the matter of
forgotting the exhibits of the counsel, there
are time given to present this trial. I
remembered that he propounded few
questions for the defense and he
manifested that he is through in his direct
examination and it is my time to cross the
testimony of the accused.
COURT: It is discretionary on the part of

the Judge. What can you say Fiscal?
FISCAL FULVADORA: I remembered right
that it is the purpose for the trial, that the
manifestation of the defense counsel that
he is through with the testimony of the
witness,
he
requested
that
the
prosecution will be continued in some
other time.
ATTY. RUIZ: We concur with the Provincial
Fiscal but prior, we are petitioning the
Honorable Court to recall the witness for
further direct examination and I am
requesting that will have to continue the
proceeding. We are convinced with the
observation of the Court that it is
discretionary of the Honorable Court but
this representation however, we would

beginning of the case, where the
questioning we were already finished, yet
the Provincial Fiscal continued separately
to the presentation of other cases.
COURT': Denied. Under cross. (TSN Feb. 7, 1984.)
It is obvious from the foregoing that the
respondent judge did not manifest the requisite
cold impartiality which the petitioner deserved.
The petition which questions the actuations of the
respondent judge and seeks his disqualification was
received by him on March 29, 1984. Prudence dictated
that he refrain from deciding the cases or at the very
least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his
decision pending action by this Court. But prudence
gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge
acted precipitately by deciding the cases on
April 2, 1984, and promulgating his decision on
May 3 of the same year. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The
decision in Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of the
respondent judge is set aside; the aforesaid cases shall
be transferred to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court
in Kidapawan for trial de novo which shall also resolve
ATTY. RUIZ: I forgot, before the Honorable

Court that this representation have reasons
of overlooking why I was not able to
question to all the matters considering of
the lack of material time and that there are
other cases waiting which are ready for the
hearing. It is the discretionary on the part
of the Honorable Court specially that the
criminal penalty is death and while the
Provincial Fiscal having further presentation
of exhibits at the
28
the
petitioner's
motion
for
release on recognizance under
Sec. 191 of P.D. No. 603. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar
(Chairman),
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Escolin
and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

| Vien
29
PEOPLE VS. AMPARADO

Facts: norman Amparado was found guilty of Murder for
the death of Manuel Maghanoy. He seeks a new trial, citing
as grounds therefor: [1] the discovery of new and material
evidence [2] errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial prejudicial to his substantive rights as an
accused; and, [3] interest of substantial justice and
avoidance of a failure of justice. Plaintiff-appellee People of
the Philippines thru the Solicitor-General opposes said
motion.
The newly-discovered evidence relied upon by accusedappellant consists of the testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr.,
Manuel Henry Auza and Violeta Amparado. While, as
contended by the Solicitor, the testimony of Violeta
Amparado could not be considered as newly-discovered nor
could it materially affect the judgment, said testimony
being merely cumulative in character, We find the
proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin Jr., and Manuel
Henry Auza to be newly-discovered and of sufficient weight
and character as to alter the outcome of the case.
Part of the affidavit:
Q Why, please state the reason when according
to you, you exerted earnest effort and reasonable
diligence to produce evidence and witnesses for
your defense during the trial?
A Because I did not know then of any person or
persons who were in the road and able to render
assistance to late Manuel Maghanoy after he was
stabbed, considering that after the stabbing in
self-defense, I was just inside the house; when I
went with the Policemen that same evening,
Manuel Maghanoy was no longer there and
during the trial and the pendency of the appeal, I
did not go back to the scene, premises and
environment of the incident of Estaka, Dipolog
City, to gather information as to the possibility of
any person or persons who might have rendered
assistance to Manuel Maghanoy after he was
stabbed in the house or who could be present in
the road when the incident happened, for fear of
retaliation from his relatives and friends,
especially that I received information that they
were hunting me.
Q When, for the first time did you discover that
Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza were
present in the road in front of the home of Deling
Velasco when the incident between Manuel
Maghanoy and you happened in the house where
you were boarding and that they were the first
persons who rendered assistance to Manuel
Maghanoy after he was wounded by you in self-
defense or to
repel
his
unlawful
aggression?
A Only after I
received a copy
of the decision
of
the
Honorable
Supreme Court
on October 15,
1985.
Q How did you
discover it?
A
After
I
received
the
decision of the
Honorable
Supreme Court,
I
went
to
Dipolog City to
look
for
a
lawyer for an
advice
or
consultation.
Coincidentally,
I met Roseller
Ladera
who
was one of the
prosecution
witnesses and I
regretably told
him that I was
convicted and
sentenced
to
life
imprisonment
principally due
to
the
testimony
of
Rogelio
Patangan, and
Roseller Ladera
told me that it
was surprising
for the reason
that
Rogelio
Patangan was
not
present
during
the
incident, it was
a
certain
Antonio Cachin
Jr.
and his
companion who
were present
based on what
he knew.
ISSUE: Should the
motion for new trial be
granted?
HELD: Yes.
Under
these
circumstances, there can
be no doubt that the
evidence sought to be
presented
are
newlydiscovered as defined by
the
Rules
of
Court.
Furthermore,
the
proposed testimonies of
Antonio Cachin Jr. and
Manuel Henry Auza, who
aver to be the first
persons
to
render
assistance to the victim
immediately after the
stabbing
incident,
if
admitted, would tend to
show that the alleged
eyewitness
Rogelio
Patangan, whose version
of the crime was given
full faith and credence by
the
trial
court
and
sustained by this Court,
was not present at the
4
scene of the crime.
If
this is true, then, the
version
of
the
prosecution
might
perforce fail and that of
the
defense
prevail.
Consequently,
the
judgment of conviction
could be reversed, or at
the very least, modified.
Finding that the evidence
sought to be presented
by
accused-appellant
conforms
to
the
requisites laid down by
Section 2[b] of Rule 121
of the Rules of Court, the
Court Resolved to GRANT
accusedappellant's
motion for new trial.
30
PEOPLE v. ENRIQUEZ
90 PHIL 423
1 28, 1951
Feria, J; November
A trial
motion
for
new
in
criminal
case
a
Court
of filedin
First
1
FACTS
April
17, 1951
- indeterminate
Judge the
Enriquez
promulgated
its
decision
sentencing
defendant
inof to
a
criminal
case
to
an
sentence
6
years
and
1 day
prision
mayor
as
minimum
12
years
and
1 of
day
of reclusion
temporal
as
maximum.
2
May
2 in the
defendant
filed
a between
motion
for
reconsideration
based
on as
theordinary
ground
that the
court
erred
appreciating
aged
and
18
of
the
defendant
mitigating
circumstance
lower
the
penalty
by 17
1
degree,
and
in which
not appreciating
the
surrender
of
the
defendant,
admitted
by
the
fiscal,
ashis
another
mitigating
circumstance,
on
the
ground
that
the
mere
previous
issuance
of
an
order
for
arrest
precludes circumstance.
the appreciation of his surrender as
mitigating
3
4
June
18 Judge
Enriquez
granted
the motion
and
amended
its original
decision
by considering
the
attendance
of
the
above-mentioned
mitigating
circumstances
in1the
the
commission
of
the
offense,
and
sentencing
defendant
to an
indeterminate
sentence
of
year
and
1 day
of
prision
correccional
as
minimum,
to
6
years
and
1
day of prision mayor as maximum.
Rodriguez
vs.
Rovira
- repeatedly
This
Court
has
held
that
a motion
for
reconsideration
based
upon
any
of
the
causes
enumerated
in
section
145
of Civil
the
code
of
Procedure
as
a
ground
for
the
motion
for
a
new
trial
has
the
same
effect
as
a
motion
for
a
new
trial,
regardless
ofstyled
the
fact
thatisitstated
is
differently
and
the
ground
in
a
manner
butdifferent
with
an
identical
meaning
5irregularities
Errors of law or
Prosecution
filed
motion
for reconsideration of the 2 nd2
judgment
but
thisawas
denied.
5acted
Provincial
fiscal
Batangas
thisEnriquez
petition
for
certiorari
the
thatfiled
Judge
in excess
ofofground
the
courts
jurisdiction
in
amending
hison
original
judgment
upon
a motion
for
reconsideration
filed
bysaid
thethat
defendant,
citing
in
support
of
his
contention
the
decision
in People
v.
Tamaya
wherein
it
the
period
at
the
endis of
which
awas
judgment
becomes
final,
which
fifteen
days,
isexcept
never,
under
any
circumstances,
suspended
by judgment
the
filing
of
a
motion
for
new
trial
by
the
defendant
under
section
1
of
Rule
117,"
and
that
"the
in
a criminal
may
be revised
or modified
only
within
the
period
to appeal
or fifteen
days from
the
date
of case
its promulgation."
ISSUE
WON Judge Enriquez erred in amending his original
judgment.
HELD: NO
1quoted
The
decisionnot
inthe
theresult
caseisin
ofcorrect.
Tamayo
above
quoted
though
concurred
by
majority,
who
concurred
in
The
last
portion
of
the
in7the
"People
vs.
Tamayo"
was taken
from
Section
of
rule
116
which
provides
that
"A decision
judgment
has
become
ST
final
or
appeal
has
been
taken,"
but
it
does
not
support
and
is
not
applicable
to
the
contention
of
tsense,
petitioner.
What
is
applicable
is
the
1
quoted
portion
of
the
decision,
though
not
in
its
literal
to the effect
"that
period
at end
of which
the
judgment
became
final
is never
under
any
circumstances
suspended
except
by
the
filing
of
a
motion
for
new
trial
by
the
defendant,
it
follows
that
it
is
also
suspended
by
a
motion
for
reconsideration
filed
thegrounds
defendant
on errors
of
law
which
is new
one
ofbythe
for
new
trial,
fora
such
motion
for trial.
reconsideration
is equivalent
to
motion
for

an attorney before pleading guilty or not
guilty, and in not giving him at least two days
to prepare for trial, could not be alleged as
grounds for new trial. And the object of a new
trial on errors of law in the judgment, which is
to invite the attention of the trial court to such
errors so that they may be corrected in order
to avoid taking an appeal for the same
1purpose, would be thwarted.
Errors
of
law
such
the
trial
an
accused
without
athe
preliminary
investigation,
or
without
having
been
informed
of
offense
charged,
are
errors
committed
during
arraignment
and
before
the
period
for
the
introduction
of
evidence
as
we
have
already
pointed
at
the
beginning
of
this
decision.
Such
errors
of
law
require
ato
new
trial
for
their
correction
because
they
affect
the
validity
of
the
whole
proceeding
taken
after
they
have
been
committed
in
accordance
with
provisions
of
Section
5
Rule
117.
But
as
errors
of
law
in
the
judgment
do
not
affect
or
invalidate
whole
proceeding
prior
the
judgment,
but
only
the
judgment
itself,
to
correct
such
errors
no
new
trial
is
required
but
only
a
reconsideration
of
original
and
rendition
a
new
judgment,
without
necessity
of
granting
new
trial.
2
Instance
may
be
based
either
(1) on
the
ground
of
errors
of law
or
irregularities
committed
during
the
trial
in
its
general
sense,
that
is,
errors
of
law
committed
during
the
period from
arraignment
to the
rendition
of
the
judgment,
prejudicial
torights
the
substantial
of
the
defendant,
and
(2)
on
newly
discovered
evidence
material
to the
theofground
case.
A
motion
new
on
of
errors
of law
in trial
the
judgment
may
be
properly
called
a
motion
for
reconsideration,
because
the
court
is
not the
asked
to
reopen
case for
further
proceeding,
but
only
to
reconsider
its
findings
or
conditions
law
and
make oftothem
conformable
the
law
applicable
to
the
case
in
the
judgment
the
court
has
to
render
anew,
as
was
done
by
the
court
the
present
case.inSuch
a
motion
for
reconsideration
has,
according
to
Section
6 a of
Rule
118,
the
same
effect
as
motion
for new
trial,
of
interrupting
the
period
for
perfecting
an
appeal
after
which
the
judgment
becomes
final,
Section 5 (a) of Rule 117 provides that:
(1) When a new trial is granted on the
ground of errors of law or irregularities

committed during the trial, all the
proceedings and evidence not affected by
the commission of such errors and
irregularities shall stand, but those
affected thereby shall be set aside and
taken anew. The court may, in the interest
of justice, allow the introduction of
additional evidence.
(3) In all cases, the original judgment shall
be set aside and a new judgment

rendered, and the former shall not be used
or referred to in evidence or argument on
the new trial.
rule
in criminal
cases
is stated
in Rule
civil
cases
in
the
following
in Section
of
37, This
which
is substantially
same
as3the
rule
above
quoted,
to wit: waythe
If the motion is made upon the cause
mentioned in sub-section (c), section 1 of
this Rule, and the Court finds its judgment
to be contrary to evidence or law, it may
amend such judgment accordingly without
granting a new trial, unless the court
deems the introduction of additional
evidence advisable.
In been
the ofUnited
States
where
from
the
provisions
our
criminal
law
on
new
have
taken,
errors
of
law
in trial
the
judgment
ornew
verdict
in new
criminal
cases
are
grounds
forverdict
trial.
"A
trial
will
granted
where the
is against
the
law."
4motion
People
v.
- in on
criminal
cases to
a
reconsideration
the
ground
of
errors
offor
law
inRomero
the judgment
isinterrupts
equivalent
a
motion
for
new
trial, and
the
period of fifteen days for the perfection of an
If a motion
a
new
trial for
of
reconsideration
is
filed
within
the
period
of
15
days
from
the
promulgation
of
the
judgment
of
conviction
of
the
defendant,
as
the
motion
filed
in the
present
case,
it
may
be
decided
or
passed
upon
validly
at any
thereafter
by time
the
court.
Because,
although
the
granting,
after
said
period,
a motion
for
newoftrial
would
place
the
defendant
in
double
jeopardy,
he
waived
his
right
not
to
be
placed
therein
by
the
filing
of
such
a
motion.
And
section
6,
Rule
118,
provides
that
"this
period
for
perfection
of from
an
appeal
shall
be
interrupted
the
time
a motion
for
new
trial
is
filed
until
notice
of
the
order
overruling
the
motion
shall
have
been
served
upon
the
defendant."
appeal.
It is
obvious
that
the
word
during
the
is
used
in
said
section
2 trial
in
its
general
sense,
including
the
rendering
of
the
judgment
because
it
was taken
section
42
of from
the
General
Orders
No.
58,
which
provided
that
within
a after
like
period
conviction
a
case
may
be
reopened
on
account
of
errors
of general
law
committed
at word
the
trial
in its
sense;
the
trial
covers
sections
31
to
41
of
said
General
Orders
No. 58 and
includes
the
rendition
the
judgment.
The
same
Ruleofof
111
of
the
Rules
Court,
in
speaking
of
the
"the
rights
of
the
defendant
at
the
trial,"
provides
in
its
section
1
that
"In
all
criminal
prosecutions
the
defendant
shall
entitled
to
be
present
and
defend
in
personof
by
attorney
atand
every
stage
the
proceeding,
that
is,
from
the
arraignment
to the
promulgation
of
the
judgment."
committed before
and
after
the
introduction
of
evidence such as
those committed in
denying
the
defendant his right
to be informed of
the
offense
charged,
in
refusing to grant
him
a
previous
preliminary
investigation,
in
not informing the
defendant of his
right to be assisted
by
31
DISPOSITION the present

petition for certiorari is
dismissed for lack of merit

| Vien
32
PEOPLE V SALILING
Facts:
Jesus Saliling was charged and convicted with

murder.
****Automatic as the review of said decision is as

mandated by law, still, a notice of appeal was filed, and
we now have accused-appellant maintaining that
neither premeditation nor treachery was proved by the
prosecution.
(Background Facts)
At about 4:30 a.m. of March 10, 1994, Arsenio Pascua
was conversing with Gerard Canapi in front of Ever
Disco Pub located on M.H. del Pilar, 3rd Avenue,
Kalookan City. They were waiting for their companions
who were coming from nearby International Cabaret.es
virtual law library Suddenly, appellant emerged behind
both Pascua and Canapi and then sidled up to Canapi.
Without any warning, he stabbed Canapi at least twice
with a homemade knife, and then quickly ran away .
When Pascua saw what happened, he shouted at his
companions who were about ten to fifteen meters
away and told them to pursue appellant.
Pascua hurriedly brought Canapi in a tricycle to the
MCU Hospital for treatment but the latter was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Appellant was thereafter arrested by operatives of the
6th Avenue Detachment of the Philippine National
police and turned over to PO3 Feliciano Almojuela for
investigation. On March 18, 1994, he was charged with
Murder before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Kalookan City.
In the present appeal, accused-appellant has

abandoned the defense of denial and alibi he put up
during the trial below and now admits the fact that he
indeed stabbed Gerald Canapi. In the present appeal,
accused-appellant has abandoned the defense of
denial and alibi he put up during the trial below and
now admits the fact that he indeed stabbed Gerald
Canapi.
WON there is treachery in the killing- YES
There is treachery when the attack on the victim

was sudden and unexpected and from behind and
without warning, with the victim's back turned towards
his assailant, or when the attack was so sudden and
unexpected that the victim was unable to defend
himself, thus ensuring the execution of the criminal act
without risk to the assailant.(People vs. Boniao)
WON there is evident premeditationNO
The following requisites must concur

before evident premeditation may be
appreciated: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient
lapse of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences his act .The prosecution
Verily, if reclusion
perpetua
was
reclassified
as
a
divisible
penalty,
then Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code
would lose its reason
and
basis
for
existence.
To
illustrate, the first
paragraph of Section
20 of the amended
R.A.
No.
6425
provides
for
the
penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death
whenever
the
dangerous
drugs
involved are of any
of
the
quantities
stated
therein.
If
Article 63 of the
Code were no longer
applicable
because
reclusion perpetua is
supposed to be a
divisible
penalty,
then there would be
no statutory rules for
determining
when
either
reclusion
perpetua or death
should
be
the
imposable penalty. In
fine, there would be
no
occasion
for
imposing
reclusion
perpetua
as
the
penalty
in
drug
cases, regardless of
the
attendant
modifying
circumstances.
twenty (20) years, or

the
maximum
duration of reclusion
temporal, is within
the
range
of
reclusion perpetua..
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano,
Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Puno,
Vitug,
Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco and
Hermosisima,
Jr.,
JJ.,
concur.
****Padilla dissents:
Thinks
there
is
sufficient
evidence
for
evident
premeditation.
Penalty of death is
then proper.
(Parang
walang
CrimPro relevant no?
Anyways, for your
guidance, this case is
placed in the outline
under
Specific
procedures
on
Appeal specifically
in Even split or no
majority in Supreme
Court so I think the
ones with the ****
sign are relevant.
Hay frustrating. )
We
hold
that
there is legal basis,
both in law and logic,
for
Presidential
Decree No. 818 to
declare
that
any
penalty
exceeding
omitted
or
failed
to
present
any
evidence
to
show that these
elements
are
present in the
case at bar.
WON
the
imposition of
the supreme
penalty
of
death
is
proper- NO
circumstance.
Neither was there
any
mitigation
thereof.
In
consequence, the
penalty must be
reduced to the
indivisible penalty
of
reclusion
perpetua.
We
thus
find that the
killing although
qualified
by
treachery was
not attended by
evident
premeditation,
People
vs.
or any other3
Lucas (240 SCRA
aggravating
66 [1995]):
33
Villegas vs Court of Appeals

1.
The case is a libel suit filed by assemblyman

Raquize against Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas,
who
allegedly
imputed
against
him
acts
constituting violations of the anti graft law thorugh
a speech before the Lions Club of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan and in a Radio TV interview in davao
before appearance in a Senate Committee.
2.
The committee observed that the allegations are

merely based on unsubstantiated claims of a
certain incredible witness, Pedro.
3.
4.
Information for libel was filed, Viollegas denies the charge.
5.
The case proceeded in absentia, and by the time of

his death, the prosecution already rested its case.
6.
Judge ordered the dismissal of the case, but

ordered the estate to pay Assemblyman Raquiza
two hundred million pesos plus plus plus.
7.
The heirs appealed. CA modified, reduced to a

lower amount. 2 million plus plus plus.
8.
Heirs appealed to the Supreme Court
Villegas left for America after the 1971 elections,

and stayed there until his demise.
Issue: Whether or not the death of Villegas before the

decision by the trial court extinguish his civil liability?
Held: YES. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
his civil liability based solely thereon.
1.
However, the claim for civil liability survives

despite the death of the accused if it is based
on a source of obligation other than delict
(crime).
2.
If the civil liability survives, an action for

recovery may be brought about.
3.
The statute of limitations on the civil liability is

deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal action, and may still therefore be
filed.
4.
In the Bayotas case, this court ruled that the

death of the accused during the pendency of
the appeal extinguishes not only his criminal
liability but also his civil liability if the latter is
based upon it. Except, if the civil liability is
based on the other sources of obligations.
Petition is GRANTED. Ca and Rtc REVERSED.
34
psychiatrists
and
psycholiogists
to determine
his state of
mind.
People vs PARAZO
1.
Automatic review of a conviction for rape and

frustrated homicide, which imposed upon the
accused, the supreme penalty of DEATH.
2.
Apellant interposed motion for reconsideration

under consideration, saying that there was no
language expert , which if true, would set aside
conviction.
3.
Apellant
was
examined
by
several
4.
Affidavits from the

doctors stress that
the accused is a deaf
mute, a retard, a
child-like mentally
challenged and
afflicted human
being, with only 7
years and 9 months
mental age and with a dismally low IQ of 60.
5.

| Vien
Records show that the trial ensured without a sign

language expert, for appellant to comprehend the
charges against him.
WON the conviction was valid? NO. Appellant

deserves a rearraignment and re trial to the end
that only proof beyond reasonable doubt may
cause the demise and eternal persihment of the
accused by lethal injection.
35

| Vien
People vs GALLO
1.
The supreme penalty of death was imposed

upon GALLO after conviction of qualified rape.
2.
The accused seeks the lowering of the penalty

from death to reclusion perpetua, saying that
seven attendant circumstances must be present in
order to subject him to eternal demise.
3.
He says that the indictment does not specifically

mention the qualifying circumstances to aggravate
the crime.
WON DEATH? No. Court grants petition.
1.
The court has the authority to suspend the

execution of a final judgment or to cause the
modification thereof as and when it comes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.
2.
Motion to reopen case granted.

36
court just has papers

to read.
2.
Witnesses
arent
expected to remember
every detail of the
truth, lest they have a
bionic or photographic
memory.
3.
The
fact
that
witnesses are blood
relatives
does
not
negate
their
testimony.
Eh
ano
kung
sila
lang
nakakita.
4.
The
theory
of
conspiracy stands. The
conduct of the evil
doers is enough to
make
such
a
determination
of
conspiracy.
The
circumstances
attendant to the case
shows the existence of
conspiracy, talagang
pinagtulungtulungan
yung
kawawang
biktima.
5.
Being below 15 years

old at the time of the
commission, Joel Barro
People vs BARRO
1.
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of

Camarines Sur finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonably doubt of the crime of MURDER.
2.
The accused mercilessly killed the innocent,

harmless victim in the town of Sangay, Cam arines
Sur. The poor thing died of Massive Hemmorrhage
to multiple stab wounds.
3.
The prosecutor filed the information, while the

accused posited the dfense of Alibi. They were
nonetheless convicted. One of them treacherously
escaped, thus, only Benigno Barro got to appeal.
He questions the credibility of the witnesses, the
conspiracy, and the credibility of the medical
findings.
WON guity? YES. Their contentions is devoid of

merit and should not be given any credence by this
most honorable high court.
1.
It is the great doctrinal rule that this court shall

respect the factual findings of the trial court and
shall generally leave them undisturbed. The courts
are first hand witness to the demeanor and body
language of the accused in trail while the supreme
and Florin Barro is entitled to privileged mitigating

circumatance. Lesson is kill while youre young coz
your penalty is less.
6.
Benigno Barro, there being no mitigating

circumstance to lower the penalty, the trail court
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
but Joel will just suffer Prison Mayor.

| Vien

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1

CrimPro (Parts 9-10)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien

PEOPLE VS. PABLO

this is the first time that the prosecution is

to serve the better ends of justice the

committed a grave abuse

CrimPro (Parts 9-10)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien

PEOPLE VS. ESCOBER

courts. Respondent judge

The prosecution's theory

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin

CrimPro (Parts 9-10)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien

PEOPLE VS. TOLING

Base, et al, it has been

cases, with reference to a

the robbery was an

CrimPro (Parts 9-10)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien

Ninoy was assassinated, together with his

resolution, it submitted 2 reports to Pres. Marcos

took place during the assassination

Chairman Agravas minority report, on the othercontrary

The majority report, submitted the next day, was

Despite Pres. Marcoss initial order, the Tanodbayan

Later, one of the

Petitioners prayed: (1) for a TRO to restrain the

a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an

Petitioners principally argued that the Tanodbayan

The Court initially granted TRO but later resolved

WON Tanodbayan and

script by Pres. Marcos

evidence exist to support

whitewashing. There was

managed according to Marcoss wishes

subvert and suppress the truth, instead of

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the sham trial was but a

and total absolution as innocent of an the accused

which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without

being put in double jeopardy

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin

CrimPro (Parts 9-10)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien

Meanwhile, for the first

Defenses Version: Substantially the same, only

Also stated above, the CA modified the TCs

the vehicular accident

MANANTAN moved for reconsideration but the

WON the assailed CA decision puts him in double

WON his acquittal before the TC extinguished his civil

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed

No Double Jeopardy - The constitution provides that no

When a person is charged with an offense and the

IN THE INSTANT CASE, true, MANANTAN had once

evidence only (Art 29, CC). Although the two

Acquittal did not Extinguish Civil Liability The Courts

could not categorically

CrimPro (Parts 9-10)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Martin | Vien

[Supra, Dan Saksak case, but Im making a new

Jaime Guevarra, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino,

By some twist of fate, only Dan Saksak and Poncing